ML17179B112

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Summary of 930914 Meeting W/Util in Rockville,Md Re Proposed Alternate Approach to Performing Individual Plant Exams for External Events (IPEEE) for All Plants Except Lasalle.List of Meeting Attendees & Util Meeting Handouts Encl
ML17179B112
Person / Time
Site: Dresden, Byron, Braidwood, Quad Cities, Zion  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/23/1993
From: Siegel B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9310010137
Download: ML17179B112 (97)
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SUMMARY

OF MEETING ON INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMS FOR EXTERNAL EVENTS . REC'D W/LTR DTD 09/23/93.... 9310010137 -NOTICE-THE ATTACHED FILES ARE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE INFORMATION & REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH. THEY HAVE BEEN CHARGED TO YOU FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD AND MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RE-CORDS & ARCHIVES SE;RVICES SEC-TION P1-22 WHITE FLINT. PLEASE DO NOT SEND DOCUMENTS CHARGED OUT THROUGH THE MAIL. REMOVAL OF ANY PAGE(S) FROM DOCUMENT FOR REPRODUCTION MUST BE RE-FERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL. -NOTICE-

LIST OF ATTENDEES SEPTEMBER 14, 1993, MEETING ON INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATIONS FOR EXTERNAL EVENTS Byron Siegel L. B. Marsh David Jeng Robert Rothman Goutam Bagchi Phyllis Sobel Yong Kim John Chen Charles Ader John Flack Edward Rodrick Nilesh Chokshi Roger Kenneally Carlos Diaz Stephen Stimac S. Kong Wang . G. T. Klopp AFFILIATION NRR/PDIII-2 NRR/CBLA NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/ECGB RES/SAIB RES/SAIB RES/SAIB RES/SAIB RES/SSEB RES/SSEB CECo/NETS CECo/NETS CECo/NETS CECo/NETS CECo/NETS NUS NU MARC ENCLOSURE 1 T. Lechton Farid Zikria Nayeem Farukhi George Wrobel Rochester Gas & Electric

ENCLOSURE 2 COMMONWEALTH EDISON'S APPROACH TO IPEEE Presented By: T. Lechton G. Klopp K. Wang C. Diaz September 14, 19:!) ~- ... 4....... ~

OVERVJ:EW o HISTORY o TEAM STRUCTURE 0 AGENDA o PURPOSE

6/28/91 HJ: STORY Generic Letter 88-20 Supplement 4 issued. 12/24/91 CECo submits response to GL-88-20 Sup.4. Agrees to walkdowns and careful screening analysis. Considers integration with SQUG effort. 7/27/92 NRC acknowledges CECo's proposal of use of alternate method. Additional information sought.

9/18/92 10/15/92 12/14/92 CECo provides details on approach utilizing IPEs, expert walkdowns and focused scope PRAs. Presentation made by CECo to NRC on use of F screening approach. NRC requested additional information on program to obtain better understanding of methodology and schedule.

SQUG/!PEEfproject Team G. Wagner Sponsor T. Lechton Team Leader I I I I IPEEE SQUG Site Reg. Engineers Engineers Engineers Assurance G.Klopp N.Smith J. Wethington E. White [PRAJ [Quad Cities] K.Wang B. Lory D. Beutel [PRA] [Zion] C. Diaz P. Donavan D. Robinson [Fire Prot.] [Byron] D. Christiana [Braidwood] L. Wright [Dresdep]

  • The LaSalle IPEEE was performed by Sandia Labs

SQUG/IPEEE PROJECT TEAM Terri Lechton - BS Mechanical Engineering/MBA 13 Years industry experience in plant testing, operations, and engineering. Certified SRO. George Klopp - BS/MS Mechanical Engineering 28 Years experience in areas of engineering, plant testing, operations, and PRA. 14 Years experience in PRA. Experience at all 6 CECo nuclear stations. Participated extensively in IDCDR program and NUMARC Accident Management activities. Author of a number of publications on PRA. Listed as IAES expert on PRA.

s. Kong Wang -

BS/MS/PhD NUclear Engineering 8 Years industry experience. Assessed safety-related systems and containment integrity as A/E. Performed analytical studies in LWR severe accidents for a national laboratory. Carlos Diaz - BS Fire Protection Engineering 9 Years fire protection experience. Performed fire protection studies for 2 national laboratories. Neil Smith - BS Electrical Engineering/MBA Registered Professional Engineer. Chairman of SQUG for 11 years. Served on the EPRI Seismic Center Committee, NUMARC Seismic Issue Working Group, and EPRI seismicity OWners Group. Bruce Lory - BS Mechanical Engineering 14 Years experience in seismic and environmental qualification. Technical Chairman for SQURTS. Paul Donavan - BS Mechanical Engineering 17 Years industry experience specializing in piping analysis for snubber reduction and pipe transient analysis. Serves on several codes & standards committee for piping. Jim Wethington - BS Mechanical Engineering 11 Years industry experience, Licensed SRO, Station Mechanical Lead. Doug Beutel - BS Mechanical Engineering Registered Professional Engineer. 13 Years industry experience in seismic analysis (11 as A/E). Don Robinson - BS Electrical Engineering 21 Years industry experience. IPE Program Engineer for Byron Station. Dan Christiana - BS Mechanical Engineering 15 Years industry experience in engineering, construction, and startup. Leslie wright - BS Chemical Engineering 11 Years industry experience in engineering.

MEETJ:NG AGENDA COMMONWEALTH EDJ:SON'S APPROACH TO J:PEEE TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1993

1.

Overview of Previous Commitments/ T. Lechton Meetings, and Team Approach Being Used at CECo. (15 mins.)

2.

Introduction to the IPEEE Matrix G. Klopp Approach for Screening and Evaluation ~ (30 mins.)

3.

Application of the Approach to Seismic K. Wang Examples (30 mins.)

4.

Application of the Approach to Fire

c. Diaz Examples (30 mins.)
5.

Overview of Completion Schedule T. Lechton (15 mins.)

6.

Discussion and Questions All (60 mins.)

\\. PURPOSE Describe the IPE structure & features. Describe the derivation of the matrix model. Describe general approach to the use of the matrix model for IPEEE. Describe the multi-stage screening and evaluation process for the seismic and fire events. Show, by example, how the matrix model can be applied to seismic and fire applications

  • Describe planned dates for IPEEE and SQUG walkdowns.

Obtain feedback on the matrix model approach. Ohta.in NRC confidence in the usage of the matrix model approach as an alternate means of addressing IPEEE.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON IPEEE PROGRAM IPE BASED MATRIX FORMULATION FOR IPEEE GEORGE KLOPP SENIOR TECHNICAL EXPERT PRA /

EDISON IPE FEATURES

1. SUPPORT STATE MODEL A.

SUPPORT STATE EVENT TREE B. SUPPORT SYSTEM FAULT TREES C. EXPLICIT SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY ON THE INITIATING EVENT D. DUAL UNIT REPRESENTATION E. FULL SUPPORT SYSTEM INTER-DEPENDENCY MODEL

    • ,. _,..,~,~*"~""*~*
2. LARGE PLANT RESPONSE TREE MODEL (EVENT TREE MODEL)

A. FRONT LINE SYSTEMS B. EOP MANDATED OPERATOR ACTIONS C. REALISTIC SUCCESS CRITERIA D. INTEGRATED CONTAINMENT AND CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESPONSE MODELLING

3. EXTENSIVE USE OF MAAP CODE (HUNDREDS OF RUNS) TO ENVELOP THE REALISTIC PLANT BEHAVIOR
4. IPE REPRESENTS A HUGE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE ON PLANT SEVERE ACCIDENT BEHAVIOR
5. PLANT RESPONSE TO ALMOST ALL EXTERNALLY INITIATED EVENTS WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE IPE ITSELF g:\\public\\"'1'tpool\\wll1te2.wpf

EDISON IPE STRUCTURE

1. INITIATING EVENT LIST
2. SUPPORT STATE EVENT TREES
3. PLANT RESPONSE TREES
4. SUPPORT SYSTEM FAULT TREES
5. FRONT LINE SYSTEM FAULT TREES
6. HRA FOR TOP EVENT EOP RESPONSES

IPE TYPICAL INITIATING EVENT LIST Event 1

  • LARGE LOCA 2
  • MEDIUM LOCA
3. SMALL LOCA
10.

LOSS OF DC POWER Freauency 3E-4/YR BE-4/YR 3E-3/YR 8.7E-4/YR ~

SUPPORT STATE EVENT TREES

1. Number of Trees - function of initiating event groupings.

{Example: LOCA's tend to use same tree)

2. Top events or nodes are success/fail for support systems such as:

AC power Bus XXX DC power Bus YYY Diesel Generator WWW Service Water Supply Closed Cooling Water Supply

3. Typical Tree - up to 20 nodes
4. Output:

Each Event Tree Branch is a Unique Support State

5. Quantify a Support State Event Tree for each initiating event

INITIATING EVENTS In SUPPORT STATE EVENT TREES Support States

PLANT RESPONSE TREES (PRT)

1. One plant response Tree for each initiating event.
2. Top events, or nodes, are success/fail for Front Line Systems & EOD Mandated Operator Actions such as:

High Pressure Injection Functions Auxiliary Feedwater Functions Operator Acts to De-Pressurize RCS Steam Generator PORV Functions Containment Fan Coolers Funct*ion

3. Typical PRT has up to 30 Top Events or Nodes
4. Quantify PRT for Each Support State *
5. Output: Each Branch Point
  • a Plant is State.

Many duplications. Each Branch Point

  • the culmination is of a unique accident sequence.

'... ;J.., ' INITIATING EVENTS SUPPORT STATE EVENT TREE PLANT RESPONSE TREE "i" Plant State~ Sequences

TABLE 4.5.3-1 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES FOR BASE IPE MODEL QUANTIFICATION Numbe r Frequency PerClnt Canas* Slate Event (5) Value (6) Delcnplion (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) 1 B.1Bt:-06 44.15% OLt;;OM UJw UOc-04 LOSS ui-uw n.1n CM le SPC Ul3E-02 SPC FAILS; 24, 29. 2R1 AVAILABLE 2 1.67E-06 Sl.02% OLCCM LDC 8.70E-04 LOSS OF DC POrYER Ii OSPC 2.10E-03 OPTR FAILS TO AUGN FOR SPC 3 5.0SE-07 12.73"/o ML COM MLOCA ll.OOE-04 MLOCAIE OSPC 6.60E-04 OPTR FAILS TO AUGN FOR SPC 4 4.28E-07 2.31% LL~ LOOP Sl.60E-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE DGB ~.SOE-02 LOSS OF DG:2/3, e HRS

24.

7.BOE-03 LOSS OF BUS 24'Z4-1 AVAIL.ABLE. 24HR OMUP 7.90E-03 OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MIU TO IC ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE LP 1.00E+OO LP B SUCCEEDS [1-{ZLl.W*)) SPC 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE 5 3.89E-07 2.10% MEABM MLOCA B.OOE-D4 MLOCAIE CAD UOE-03 OPTR FAILS TO INITIATE ADS HP2 5.18E-02 HP FAILS: ALL SUPPORTS AVAll..ASLE MANUAi. START 6 3.74E-07 2.02~. LL COM LOOP Sl.60E-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE : DGB Sl.SOE-02 LOSS OF DG:2/3, 6 HRS 24 7.BOE-03 LOSS OF BUS 24'Z4-1 AVAILABLE. 24HR MUP 6.S17E-03 MUP FALS: 25 FLO ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE LP 1.00E+OO LP B SUCCEEDS (1-{ZLl.W*)] SPC 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE 7 3.71E-07 2.00% BLABM DLOOP 1.60E-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE DGB Sl.SOE-02 LOSS OF OG2/3, 6 HRS DG2 1.56E.o1 LOSS OF OG2 AFTER CG2/3, e HRS DG3 1.1SIE-01 LOSS OF DG3 AFTER CG2/3 AND 002. 6 HRS SB07 1.00E+OO SBC IN UNIT 3, SBC IN UNIT 2 ROP1 2.0SE-02 FAILURE TO REC CSP TO PREVENT CM (4-6 HRS) OIC2 1.00E+OO OPTR FAILS TO PREVENT LOOC FL.R OF IC B 3.03E-07 1.63% LLCOM LOOP Sl.60E-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE DGB Sl.SOE-02 LOSS OF OG2/3, e HRS OMUP 7.90E-03 OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MIU TO IC ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAil.URE LP 1.00E+OO LP B SUCCEEDS (1-{ZLl.W*)] SPC 5.41aE.o3 SPC FAILS: 24, 211, 29, 2R1 AVALASLE 9 2.42E-07 1.30"/o OLCCM LOC 18.70E-04 LOSS OF DC POWER IE HP1 ~.88E.o2 HP FAILS; 2M1 Fl.D SPC 1.03E.o2 SPC FAILS: 24, 29, 2R1 AVAD.ASLE 10 2.23E-07 1.20"1. MEABM MLOCA ll.OOE-04 MLOCAIE HP1 2.BllE-02 HP FAILS: ALL SUPPORTS AVAILASLE CAD UOE-03 OPTR FAILS TO INITIATE ADS 11 2.07E-07 1.12"1. ML COM MLOCA 8.00E-D4 MLOCAIE SPC 2.71E-o4 SPC FAILS: ALL SUPPORTS AVAILABLE 12 1.97E-07 1.06'1. OLCOM LOC 8.70E-o4 LOSS OF DC POWER IE SPC 1.03E-02 SPC FAILS: 24, 29, 2R1 AVALABl.E SVW 2.43E-02 SMALL. TORUS VENT FAILS; 29, 311 AVAILABLE SVC 11.7CE-01 SMALL. ORYWELL VENT FAUi; 29. 311 AVAILASLE 13 1.86E-07 1.00% UABM LOOP ll.60E-D2 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE OMUP 7.90E-03 OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MIU TO IC HP1 2.BBE-02 HP FAILS: ALL SUPPORTS AVAILABl.E CAD 1.20E-02 OPTR FAILS TO INITIATE ADS ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE 14 1.ne-01 ~.96% BLAYN CLOOP 1.60E-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE DGB 11.SOE-02 LOSS OF DG2/3, 6 HRS DG2 1.56E-01 LOSS OF OG2 AFTER CG2/3, e HRS DG3 1.111E.o1 LOSS OF DG3 AFTER CG2/3 AND 002, 6 HRS SS07 1.00E+OO SBC IN UNIT 3, S80 IN UNIT 2 ROP1 2.05E-D2 FAILURE TO REC CSP TO PREVENT CM (4-6 HRS) OIC2 1.00E+OO om FAILS TO PREVENT LOOC FL.R OF IC ROP2 3.22E.o1 FAILURE TO REC CSP TO PREVENT CF (NR IN 0-6 HRS) 15 1.61t:-07 0.87% tll.At:IM LUUI" Sl.60c~2 w::;;; ur Ul"t"l:ill I: n.1n c" II: DGB II.SOE-OZ LOSS OF DG:2/3, e HAS DG2 1.56E.o1 LOSS OF OG2 AFTER DG2/3, e HRS 241 ll.78E-03 LOSS OF BUS 24-1, GIVEN 34-1 CROSSTIE AVAILABLE SBC? 1.00E+OO SSO OCCURS IN UNIT 2 ROP1 2.0SE-02 FAILURE TO REC CSP TO PREVENT CM (4-6 HRS) OIC2 1.00E+OO OFTR FAILS TO PREVENT LOOC FL.R OF IC LP 1.00E+OO LP A SUCCEEDS (1-{ZLl-1.Li-)] 16 1.S&E-07 0..86"/o DISON LOC 8.70E-04 LOSS OF DC POWER IE 241 1.llllE-04 LOSS OF BUS 24-1, GIVEN BUS 24 AVAi.ABLE LP 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE cs 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE 1.461:-0/ 0.79% LLl.iUM L.uur Si.60t:-02 IL.OSS ur urr;:,11 c runr:::tt II: OMUP 7.llOE-03 OFTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MIU TO IC ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAIL.URE SPC 2.71E-04 SPC FAILS: ALL SUPPORTS AVAILABLE

TABLE 4.5.3*1 (Continued) DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES FOR BASE IPE MODEL QUANTIFICATION Number (1) 98 99 100 Notes:

1.
2.

3.

4.

Fnsquency Permnt Ownag* State Event (5) Valu. (6) DMcrip!ion (7) (2) (3) (4) 1.21E--08 0.07% U..IJOM OWOP 1.&0t:--02 L.~;, vr ""'"'""" c,.vncn It: OMUP 7.90E-03 OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MIU TO IC ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE OSPC 1.&0E-04 OPTR FAILS TO ALIGN FOR SPC 1.16E--08 0.06". BIABM LOOP ll.&OE-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE OGB Sl.SOE-02 LOSS OF OG2/3, 6 HRS DGa 1.56E-01 LOSS OF OG2 AFTER OG2/3, 6 HRS 241 8.78E-03 LOSS OF BUS 24-1, GIVEN 34-1 CROSSTIE AVAll.ASLE SBC? 1.00E+OO SBC OCCURS IN UNIT 2 CIC 3.70E.02 OPTR FAILS TO INITIATE IC (SBC, LOOP RVC 2.70E-02 RVC FAILS; RELIEF VALVES Cl..OSING (TRANS) LP 1.00E+OO LP A SUCCEEDS (1-{2U-lL1-)] 1.16E.08 0.06% TEERF ATWS 2.28E-04 ATWS INITIATOR MC 1.37E-01 MAIN CONO FAILS (GIVEN FW FAILS) AFTER ATWS RCFM 3.33E.01 FRAC OF RPS FAILURES THAT ARE MECHANICAL RPT1 6.00E.03 AUTO RPT FAILS; ALL SUPPORTS AVAILASLE WW/OW 2.16E.01 FRAC OF CONT FLRS IN OW (VS *. WW) "Number" refers to accident sequence ranking in the top 100 sequences. "Frequency" is the frequency per year that this sequence is expected to occur. "Percent" is the percent of total core damage represented by this single sequence. "Damage St" is the plant damage state to which this sequence belongs. The fifth character presents the release associated with this type of sequence and is manually assigned at the end of the analysis in presentations of dominant sequences.

5.

"Event" is the list of PRT and support system event tree top events which have failed in this sequence.

6.

"Value" is frequency (for initiators) or probability (for failures) associated with each event.

7.

"Description" defines the "Event" label. ____...,"',....'I,,. AC",,...,.* Cir"\\,,

FAULT TREES & HRA

1. Fault trees combine component failures in specific systems to fail system.
2. Fault tree output is frequency of system failure (failure to meet success

.criteria)

3. HRA, human reliability analysis, evaluates operator performance, task task, in performing EOP mandated activities.

by

4. HRA output is frequency of failure to perform task correctly (eg failure of function/system due to operator error)
  • DERIVATION OF MATRIX MODEL OF IPE
1. The matrix methodology was developed as a tool for living PRA
2. Derivation starts with "Dominant Accident Sequence Report"
3. Involves Top 100 Sequences
4. Uses Standard, Readily Available, Matrix Mathematic & Personal Computer Tools

"tl Q) ~

  • ...C s 0

(.) ~ Q) & Q) J-4 ~

~

Q) ~ Q) J-4 0 u ~ 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Zion PRA Core Mt Sequence Distribution 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 Number of Sequences Total Core Melt Freq. = 3.99E-06

Dresden PRA Core Me-quence Distribution 100% "d 80% Q) ~

  • .-4 e 0

~ ti ~ 60% Q)

s 04 Q)

'-4 ~ +.a 40% Q) ~ Q) '-4 0 u 20% 0% 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Number of Sequences Total Core Melt Freq. = 1.85E-05

TABLE 4.5.3-1 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES FOR BASE IPE MODEL QUANTIFICATION Numb9 r Frequency Percent Damage Stale Event (5) Value (6) Descriplicn (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) 1 8.181:-06 44.150/o IJLwl.AVI LDC 8.701:--04 ~ vr uw rvncl"I It: SPC 1.03E-02 SPC FAILS; 24, 29. 2R1 AVAILASLE 2 1.67E-06 9.02"* DLCOM LDC 8.70E44 LOSS OF CC POWER IE OSPC ~10E-03 OPTR FAILS TO ALIGN FOR SPC 3 5.05E-07 2.73% ML COM MLOCA 8.00E--04 MLOCAIE OSPC 6.SOE--04 OPTR FAILS TO ALIGN FOR SPC 4 428E-07 2.31% LL COM LOOP 9.SOE-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE 098 9.SOE-02 LOSS OF OG213, 6 HRS 24. 7.SOE-03 LOSS OF BUS 24124-1 AVAILABLE. 24HR OMUP 7.90E-03 OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MfU TO IC. ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE LP 1.00E+OO LP B SUCCEEDS (1-(2U-W*)) SPC 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE 5 3.B9E-07 2.10% MEASM MLOCA 8.00E-04 Ml..OCAIE CAD 9.BOE-03 OPTR FAILS TO INITIATE ADS HP2 S.1BE-02 HP FAILS: ALL SUPPORTS AVAILABLE MANUAL START 6 3.74E-07 2.02,-. LL COM LOOP 9.SOE-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE DGB 9.SOE-02 LOSS OF OG2/3, 6 HRS 24 7.80E-03 LOSS OF BUS 24124-1 AVAILABLE. 24HR MUP 6.97E-03 MUP FAILS; 25 FLO ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE LP 1.00E+OO LP B SUCCEEDS (1-(2U-W*)) SPC 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE ~,,. 7 3.71E-07 2.00"* Bl.ABM DLOOP 1.SOE-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE DGB 9.SOE-02 LOSS OF DG2/3, 6 HRS OG2 1.56E-o1 LOSS OF OG2 AFTER 002/3, e HRS OG3 1.19E-01 LOSS OF OG3 AFTER 002/3 AND 002. 6 HRS SBC'? 1.00E+OO SBO IN UNIT 3, SBC IN UNIT 2 ROP1 2.0SE-02 FAILURE TO REC OSP TO PREVENT CM (4-6 HRS) OIC2 1.00E+OO OPTR FAILS TO PREVENT LODC FLR OF IC 8 3.03E-07 1,63,.. LL COM LOOP 9.SOE-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE OGB 9.50E-D2 LOSS OF DG2/3, 6 HRS OMUP 7.90E-03 OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MfU TO IC ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE LP 1.00E+OO LP B SUCCEEDS (1-(2U-W*)) SPC S.49E-D3 SPC FAILS: 24, 28, 29. 2R1 AVAILABLE 9 2.42E-07 1.3°"* OLCOM LDC B.70E--04 LOSS OF DC POWER IE HP1 2.88E-02 HP FAILS: 2M1 FLO SPC 1.03E-02 SPC FAILS; 24, 29. 2R1 AVAILABLE 10 223E-07 120"* MEABM MLOCA B.OOE--04 Ml.OCA IE HP1 2.BBE-02 HP FAILS; ALL SUPPORTS AVAIL.ABLE OAO 9.BOE-03 OPTR FAILS TO INITIATE ADS 11 2.07E-07 1.12,-. ML COM MLOCA B.OOE--04 MLOCAIE SPC 2.71E--04 SPC FAILS; ALL SUPPORTS AVAILABLE 12 1.97E--07 1.06"* DLCOM LDC B.70E--04 LOSS OF OC POWER IE SPC 1.03E-02 SPC FAILS; 24, 29, 2R1 AVAILABLE SVW 2.43E-02 SMAU. TORUS VENT FAILS; 29, 39 AVAILABLE SVO 9.70E-01 SMALL ORYWELL VENT FAILS; 29. 39 AVAILABLE 13 1.S6E-07 1.00"* UABM LOOP 9.SOE-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE OMUP 7.90E-03 OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MfU TO IC HP1 2.BBE-02 HP FAILS; ALL SUPPORTS AVAIL.ABLE CAD 120E-02 OPTR FAILS TO INITIATE ADS ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE 14 1.ne-01 0.96"/e BLAYN OLOOP 1.SOE-02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE DGB 9.SOE-02 LOSS OF OG2/3, 6 HRS DG2 1.56E-01 LOSS OF DG2 AFTER 002/3, 6 HRS DG3 1.19E-01 LOSS OF DG3 AFTER 002/3 ANO 002, 6 HRS SBC'? 1.00E+OO SSC IN UNIT 3, SBC IN UNIT 2 ROP1 2.0SE-D2 FAILURE TO REC CSP TO PREVENT CM (4-6 HRS) 0102 1.00E+OO OPTR FAILS TO PREVENT LODC R..R OF IC ROP2 3.22E-01 FAILURE TO REC CSP TO PREVENT CF (NR IN D-6 HRS) 15 1.611:-07 0.87,-. tl~M L"""'r 9.601:-02 ~\\Jr \\Jrr<:m t: r._.ncn It: DGB 9.SOE-02 LOSS OF DG2/3, 6 HRS DG2 156E-01 LOSS OF OG2 AFTER DG2f3, 8 HRS 241 B.78E-03 LOSS OF BUS 24-1, GIVEN 34-1 CROSSTIE AVAILABLE SBC'? 1.00E+OO SBC OCCURS IN UNIT 2 ROP1 2.0SE-02 FAILURE TO REC CSP TO PREVENT CM (4-6 HRS) OIC2 1.00E+OO OPTR FAILS TO PREVENT LOOC FLR OF IC LP 1.00E+OO LP A SUCCEEDS [1-(2U-LL1*)) 16 1.59E-07 0.86% DISON LDC B.70E--04 LOSS OF DC POWER IE 241 U9E--04 LOSS OF BUS 24-1, GIVEN BUS 24 AVAILABLE LP 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE cs 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE 17 1.461:-07 0.79% LLw\\JM L....._.r 11.soi:-02 ~Svr vrr;:i11t: '""'"en It: OMUP 7.90E-o3 OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MIU TO IC ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE SPC 2.71E44 SPC FAILS; ALL SUPPORTS AVAILABLE

TABLE 4.5.3*1 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES FOR BASE IPE MODEL QUANTIFICATION Numoer I Frequency 1 1 Pel'Olnt I ~jll9* Sla19 I Event (5) I Value (6) 'Oescnplion (7) (1) (2) (3) B 3.03E--07 1.63% LL COM LOOP 9.60E--02 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IE OGB 9.SOE--02 LOSS OF OG213. 6 HRS OMUP 7.90E--03 OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MIU TO IC ROP1 1.00E+OO EVENT FAILURE LP 1.00E+OO LP B SUCCEEDS (1-(2U-l.1.2*)] SPC 5.49E--03 SPC FAILS; 24. 28. 29. 2R1 AVAILABLE ""'.... r- -- -1 1

TABLE 4.5.3-1 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES FOR BASE IPE MODEL QUANTIFICATION Numc.r rl9qUlncy (1) (2) l1Percenl (3) I~~ smi. j &em (S) jvaiu. (6} ,~(7) 8 i.03E.07 1.63,,

  • U.COM LCOP ji.SOE-Q2 ILCSS CF CFFSJTE ~ER IE r

.. *-~ *- ""'!."'!' *. -,,.....~,.,........... --* 1 1 11 ~

TABLE 4.5.3-1

  • DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES FOR BASE IPE MODEL QUANTIFICATION N1JT1mr IFrtq11ency IPermnt jD111111g9 sim 1ewn1 (S) jvaiue (6) jDamcnpDon (7)

(1 > 12> 1<3> . (4) I I ~-+-=~--l""=..,.......-+.-:-=:------1'~-....;*;.._...1,* ___.i_*-------***-* ,.,E-07 1.03% U.CCM Ir IUDE-02 r I -1 I-1 1 ILCSS OF DG213. e HRS . l ' -- '.. ---- *-*-...... IDENTIFYING FAILED SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND DEVELOPING SUPPORT STATE LABELS FOR THE SUPPORT STATE MATRIX (I.E. LOOP; SUPPORT STATE # 4; _WITH A_ COND._ FREQUENCY OF 9.SE-2)

TABLE 4.5.3*1 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES FOR BASE IPE MODEL QUANTIFICATION NLl'llD9r jF19q1>>ne:y IP*rmnt 'D9NG8 &.18 l&ent (5),,Value (S) ,~ (7) (1) f(2J f(3) (4) 8 3.03E-07 1.63"* LLCCM OMUP ROP1 r

  • **r *-

LP SPC ~ ~ 1 -, 1 1 1.DO~ OPTR FAILS TO PROVIDE MIU TO IC 1.00E.00 EVENT FAILURE 1.DOE.00 LP B SUCCEEDS [1-(ZU.W*)] S.49E-03 SPC FAILS; 24, 21, 29. 2R1 AVALASLE --=-~--~~.. '"'- ~DENTrFYrNG FAJ:LED FRONT-LINE SYSTEMS' ANO OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR THE PLANT STATE MATRIX SINGLE SEQUENCE INPUT (I.E. LOOP; SS # 4; PS LLCOM WITH A COND.FREQUENCY OF 4.34E-5)

NEXT:

1. Repeat sequence breakdown for all 100 sequences.
2. Enter initiating event list (same as in base IPE document) as scalar values
3. For each initiator: Develop a support state list & table of conditional frequencies.

Enter as a row vector.

4. For each initiator: Develop a list of sequences for each support state & plant state noted above & establish a conditional frequency of sequences (e.g.

product of front line system failures & operator actions) Sum sequence conditional frequencies by support states & plant states & enter in matrix

  • DEVELOPING THE SUPPORT STATE VECTOR INITIATING EVENT:

LOOP SSl.

  • 4...
  • 19 S7 -

[... 9.SE-2...* ]

DEVELOPING THE PLANT STATE MATRIX INITIATING EVENT: LOOP SS/PS LLCOM BLAYN 1 2 3 4 VALUE IS THE SUM OF THE PRODUCTS OF CONDITIONAL FREQUENCIES OF FAILED FRONT LINE SYSTEMS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR LOOP INITIATED SEQUENCES IN SUPPORT STATE 4 FROM THE TOP 100 SEQUENCES FOR PLANT STATE LLCOM

IZ1 tJ H tJl ~ 8 IZ1 E-t ~ ~ .-=I ..:I ~ D z tJl ~ tJl IZ1 .ca: ll:1 ca IZ1 ~ tJl IZ1 ~ ca

DRESDEN STATION IPE: MATRIX FORMUlATION 5121193; G. T. KLOPP

                    • 1 ******************* 1 **** ******** **** *** ******************

This matrix formulation follows the same approach used for the Zion Station IPE formulation. Since Dresden's IPE did not employ "support states" per-se, the top 100 sequences have been carefully reviewed for support state occurence. It was found that 20 such states exist with no "impact vector" evaluations at all. Therefore, the 20 states are used as the foundation for the *s* matrices in this work. The 20 states are defined in attachment 1 to this work. INITIATING EVENT SCALARS:. II := 3* 10-' FORLLOCA 16 =7.4 FORGTR 12 := 8-10-' FORMLOCA 17 :=9.6*10-~ FOR LOOP 13 = 3.10-3 FORSLOCA 18 :: l.6* l0- 2 FORDLOOP 14. = 1.1

  • 10* 7 FORISLOCA 19 := 2.28* 10-4 FORATWS IS = 7. l
  • 10* 2 FORIORV 110 :: 8.7* 10-4 FORLODC SUPPORT STATE ROW MATRICES (VECTORS):

Sl =.9998 FORLLOCA S2 :=.9998. FORMLOCA 53 =O FORSLOCA S4 =O FORISLOCA SS =.9998 FORIORV SS 1 13 56 = (.9998 2.4* 10-6 ) FORGTR SS 1 3 4 5., 7:--; 9--,, 11~ 12~ 15~, 19

1.

57.:: (.999g 7.41* 10-' 9.5* 10-2 1.39 1 l.3* 10-4 2.35* 10-' l.16* lO-' l.48* 10-2 3.34* 10-7 7.8* 10-3 3.25* 10". FOR LOOP SS 1 3 4 6 7 9 17 18 SS:= (.999s 7.41* 10-4 9.5* 10-2 1.76-10-3 1.3* lO-' 2.35* 10-' 1.6* IO-' 2.2 2 )FOR DLOOP 59 =.9998 FORATWS SS 2 8 10 14 20 SlO = ( l.O l.99* 10-4 1.18* 10"4 4.14* 10"5 l.13* 10-4 ) FOR LODC

PLANT STATE MATRICES: Pl =7.48* 10" 5 FOR LLOCA; ALCOM; SS 1 PS MLCOM MEABM P2 := (9.5* 10"4 7.9* 10"4 ) FOR MLOCA; SS 1 . P3 :=O FOR SLOCA P4 * = 0 FOR ISLOCA PS. = 2.44* lo* 6 FOR IORV; ILCOM; SS 1 PS TLCOM TIABM SS / 1.25* 10" 1 1.86* Hf') 1 FORGTR P6 = \\s.49.10* 3 o 13 PS LLCOM LIABM BLABM BLAYN UCOM LLABM USON BIABM SS S.59* 10"6 4.16* 10"6 0 0

4. 78* 10* 7 4.09* 10" 7 0

0 l: 1.79* 10" 2 0 0 0 2.28* 10"4 0 0 0 7.12* lO"' 2.73* 10"6 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3.4* 10"6 2.73* 10"6 0 0 0 0 0 0 '5 0 0 2.05* 10"2 6.6* 10"3 0 0 0 9.99* 10"4 7 P7 = 1.74* 10"2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1.74* 10" 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 7.12* 10"5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0 15 8.7* lO"' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 1.49* lO-' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 FOR LOOP

PS LLCOM BLABM BLAYN BIABM UABM SS 3.4*10"6 0 0 0 2.73* I0-6 1 1.738* 10"2 0 0 0 0 3 7.12*10" 5 0 0 0 0 4 0 2.126. io-2 6.6* I<T3 9.99-10*4 0 8 PS := 0 2.0S*Hf2 0 0 0 7 FORDLOOP 1.487* 10"2 0 0 0 0 9 1.487* 10"2 0 0 0 0 17 4.35* 10"5 0 0 0 0 18 PS TEEQF TEERF P9 = (2.33* 10"3 3.06* 10"4 ) FORATWS; SS 1 PS DLCOM DIBON DIABM DIBMS SS f l.321-I0" 2 0 1.96* 10"4 7.74* IO-' 0 1.0 0 0 PIO =; 1.0 0 0 0 FORLODC 0 l 0 1.0 0 0 4 1.0 0 0 0 0

FEATURES OF MATRIX MODEL Retains "Component" level information through access to sequence information. Road map form of flow charts.

  • in

DRESDEN IPE MATRIX FLOW CHARTS TABLE OF CONTENTS FLOW CHART #1 *** SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING FLOW CHART #2 *** HIGH PRESSURE.. INJECTION FLOW CHART #3 *** FEEDWATER FLOW CHART #4 *** ISOLATION CONDENSER FLOW CHART #5 *** MAKEUP TO I.C. FLOW CHART #6 *** LOW PRESSURE INJECTION FLOW CHART #7 *** RELIEF VALVE CLOSING FLOW CHART #8 *** ALTERNATE ROD INSERT. FLOW CHART #9 *** RECIRC. PUMP TRIP FLOW CHART #10 ** LPCI INJECTION VALVES FLOW CHART #11 ** OPER. ACT. - OSPC FLOW CHART #12 ** OPER. ACT. - OHX

FLOW CHART #13 ** OPER. ACT. - OSBCS FLOW CHART #14 ** OPER. ACT. - OAD FLOW CHART #15 ** OPER. ACT. - OMUP FLOW CHART #16 ** OPER. ACT. - OIC FLOW CHART #17 ** OPER. ACT. - OSL FLOW CHART #18 ** OPER. ACT. - ORP

DRESDEN IPE FLOW CHART #1 SPC (SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING) NOTE: THIS CHART IS BROKEN DOWN INTO 8 SHEETS ORGANIZED AS ~ FOLLOWS: SHEET 1: TREES SHEET 2: SHEETS 3 THRU 8: COMPONENT/FAULT INITIATORS/PRT'S MATRICES/SEQ.

FLOW CHART# 1

  • SHEET 1 SS # 1, 5; FT 2Ll-LL-8; SS # 4, 13, 16, 18; FT 2Ll-LLA 2.71E-4

&LL9; 5.5E-3 HXPLUGGED 51% HX VLV 2A 1503 34% MOV 1501-20A&B 7 VALVE 2 1501-3A 34 MOV 1501-38A&8 7 MOV 1501-11A & 8 20.4 -3A&8 MOV 1501-11A&8 7 HXPLUGGED 2.5 MOV 1501-3A&8 7 PUMPS 4.8 PUMPS 3.7 I SS # 2; FT 2Ll-LL9A & B 1.03E-2 VALVE 2-1501-20A 18.2o/o MOVMAINT. 5.5 1501-38A & b VALVE 2-1501-38A 18.2 1501-208 - SPC HX 2A 1503 VLV 18.2 MOVMAINT 5.5 + 1501-118 VALVE 2-1501-3A 18.2 1501-038M 1501-11AM SHEET MOVMAINT. 5.5 2 MOVMAINT 1501-208 5.5 1501-388 1501-3A & B 1501-20A 1501-118

FLOW CHART# 1 SPC P2MLOCA PS IORV P6GTR \\~ SHEET3 'V SHEET4 P7 LOOP PS DLOOP P10 LDC '~ SHEET7 SHEET2 '~ SHEET 8

FLOW CHART# 1 P7 11 P7 21 P7 31 P7 41 P7 SEQ. 11 17,43,44 P7 SEQ 81 37,80,82 P7 LOOP I P7 61 P7 71 P7 81 P7 10,1 I P7 SEQ. 21 4, 6, 18, 83, 87 P7 SEQ 10,1 69, 72 P7 . 11, 1 P7 25 I P7 SEQ 31 8,24,25 P7 SEC 11, 1 75, 79 SHEETS P7 SEQ 25 94 P7 SEQ 41 67 P7 SEQ 61 P7 SEQ 71 19, 22, 50 31, 33, 66

FEATURES OF MATRIX MODEL (CONT'D) Fast PRA Manipulation Permits rapid screening of changes or variations in terms of impact on result. Prov.ides a "Skeleton" on which additions to the model, covering "new" sequences, can be made as required (simply add elements or even matrices if the existing structure does not accommodate.)

DETAILS OF USE FOR IPEEE PROGRAM

1. Apply to seismic & fire initiators
2. Use to "screen out" insignificant contributors
3. Use to add "new" sequences or modify frequencies of existing sequences as required
4. Next 2 speakers will provide detail on the use of the matrix methodology
5. Each speaker will discuss examples of the screening methodology and how it will identify items for detailed analysis g: \\public\\wptpool \\white:<.wpf

The matrix approach is the equivalent to a truncated seismic or fire PRA using a best estimate approach. This method does not account for mathematical uncertainties. We believe that this approacb is more comprehensive and useful than the seismic margins approach and only slightly less detailed than a full, formal PRA. g:\\public\\wptpool\\wh1te2.wpf

COMMONWEALTH EDISON IPEEE PROGRAM SEISMIC EVALUATION KONG WANG SENIOR PRA ENGINEER

SE:CSM:CC :CPEEE SCREEN:CNG/EVALUAT:CON STAGE I Multiple screening analyses based on IPE data and structures starting~with conservative and moving toward realistic screening. STAGE II Plant walkdowns and expert judgement. STAGE III Focused analyses using deterministic and/or probabilistic methods. . Evaluation of the impact of event on CDFs using IPE matrix modelling. l

STAGE I {PRE-SCREENING) IDENTIFY KEY COMPONENTS 1 DEVELOP 2A SITE SEISMIC HAZARD CURVE 28 COMPARE TO IPE COMPONENT FAILURE RATES I GENERATE EQUIPMENT FRAGILITIES 3A PRODUCT HAZARD

  • FRAGILITY COMPARE TO IPE COMPONENT FAILURE RATES Uuan IP!

1 1.al'ler than IPE COMPONENTS IESS VULNERABLE TO SEISMIC EVENTS STAGE II {WALKDOWN) STAGE III {FOCUSED STUDY) WALKIJOWN DICTATES NEED 5 FOR FURTIIER EVALUATION 4 38 3C IDENTIFY COMPONENTS FOR WALKDOWN WALKDOWN

1. CONFIRM PRE-SCREENED COMPONENTS AGAINST PLANT AS-BUILT CONFIGURATION
2. EXPERT JUDGEMENT
3. GATHER DATA FOR FINAL ANALYSIS

~.

  • (

~* 8 ~* SCREEN our 8

1. SEISMIC FRAGILITY EVALUATION
2. MODIFY IPE MATRIX STRUCTURE

~, APPLY 6 IPE MATRIX MODEL AND EVALUATE IMPACT DUE TO SEISMIC SUM UP 7 CONTRIBUTION OF THE SCREENED-IN'S ~

1. SEARCH FOR INSIGHTS
2. POTENTIAL INPROVEME
3. IPEEE SUBMITTAL FLOWCHART FOR SEISMIC IPEEE SCREENING/EVALUATION NTS
  • STAGE I:

PRE-SCREENING

1.

Identify and review reference materials* for I pre-screening: Basic IPE FSAR/UFSAR Special seismic st~dies Previous PRA work, etc.

STAGE I (Continued) 2A. Develop site seismic hazard curve: Using the EPRI seismicity curve and past seismic amplification factors, develop the accelerations at various levels for each plant for the screening level event.

l A-ffaoJt.1114,,t.t. 10-3 Z1"Gn ~,~,,,,., ~J"'rd c.. rc1e 0.084 0.056 0.088 0.056 10*4 0.14 w u z < c w w u x 10-5 w u.. 0 u z w

> c w

cc: u..

> z 10-6 z <

OL--~~--1.~~~--'-~~~--~~~----~~...___..~__.~--~-- 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6

0. 7 DAMAGE-EFFECTIVE GROUND ACCELERATION (g's)

Figure 7.2-1. Seismicity Family 7.2-18

STAGE I. (Continued) 2B. Compare to IPE component failure frequencies: Components with frequencies of annual seismic exceedance smaller than the IPE random failure frequencies are pre-screened out. This is very conservative since the component failure frequencies due to seismic, i.e., fragilities, are assumed to be "1.0" in this screening stage.

Example: Diesel Generator IPE random failure: Unavail. due to maint.: 1.4E-2 Fail to run: 1.8E-2 ~ Fail to start: 8.2E-3 Total random failure rate: Seismic annual exceedance rate: 4E-2 SE-5 Therefore, DG can be screened out.

STAGE I (Continued) 3A. Generate component fragilities 3B. 3C. Previous seismic studies and expert judgement. Generate component failure frequencies due to seismic frequency = hazard

  • fragility Compare to IPE component random failure frequencies for the components which are not pre-screened out during the Step 2B.

t.O /, 0 0.75 I F I I OFFSITE POWER 'I I I O.!iO I CERAMIC INSULATORS I I 0.25 I I / 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 10 1.0 ~ ~ / © 0.75 I I ~ I SERVICE WATER PUMPS F I I O.!iO I I ~ ~ I I ~ N 0.25 I I I / \\0 ~ 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 o.e 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 10 1.0 0.76 / / F I / AUXILIARY BLDG FAILURE OF SHEAR WALL 0.60 / / 0.26 / / / ,II' 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 1.0 10 DAMAGE-EFFECTIVE GROUND ACCELERATION h1'1t

  • Figure 7. 2-2.

Fragility Families for Key Components

Example: RCFC duct IPE Random Failure: Seg. C unavail. due to maint.: 8.SE-3 Valve 1MOV-SW0009 fail to open: 3.SE-3 lC fan fail to start: 3.3E-3~ Div. 17 relay fails: 5.6E-4 Total random failure freq.: 1.6E-2 Failure due to seismic: {annual exceedance freq. X fragility) SE-5 X SE-2 2.SE-6 Therefore, RCFC duct can be pre-screened out.

STAGE II

4. Walkdowns
  • Confirm pre-screened out components configuration
  • Anticipate two types of I issues:
1.

Confirm plant as-built configuration, 2. Subtle problems found by seismic experts such as potential tank failures via buckling.

  • Expert judgement (e.g.,

develop component fragilities, estimate spatial interaction, etc.)

  • Gather data for final analysis on non-screened out components.

STAGE III

5. Focused analyses
  • Topics derived from screening analyses and walkdowns.
  • Verification of subtle problems identified during,

walkdown, e.g., the loss of a tank due to failure of support buckling in conjunction with the loss of other similar identified components will be modeled as modifications to the base IPE along with appropriate random failures.

  • Both primary effects (e.g.,

-seismic induced loss of ssc) and secondary effects (e.g., flood from ruptured tank) will be considered in IPEEE work.

STAGE III(Continued)

6. Apply IPE matrix model and evaluate impact due to I

I seismic Develop IPE matrix structure Evaluate impact on IPE matrix structure (i.e., initiating event matrix and support state matrix.) Evaluate impact on plant state matrix (i.e., impact due to the inclusion of the seismic failure as an additional failure cutset on component level.)

  • Evaluate impact on CDFs.

Example of evaluation using Matrix Modeling: Assume a seismic induced*. failure rate (i.e., hazard X fragility) for LPI pump = SE-5 Look into the top 36 dominant accident sequences of the Zion IPE, the sequences associated with LPI system are 2, 13, 15, 25, and 32.

TABLE 4.5.3-1 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES FOR BASE IPE MODEL QUANTIFICATION FREQUENCY PERCENT SSI BIN EVENTS VALUE DESCRIPTION

1.

6.087E-007 15.21% AE9S lLOCA 3.000E-004 LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT ORC 2.160E*003 OPERATOR ACTION - ESTABLISH LOW PRESSURE ECC RECIRCULATION (LLOCA W/SPRAY)

2.

4.092E-007 10.239/o AE9S LLOCA 3.000E-004 LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT LPI 1.450E-003 112 LOW ~s~u9;1 !rt\\ff"§ f ~Q,gLg Lligli al I ~Qililil oAf 1.oooE+OOO RWST RE LOS FOLARGE LOCA WITH CURRENT EOPs

3.

3.962E-007 9.90% 98 ll9S DLOOP 1.400E-002 DUAL UNIT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT BUS 2.2aoE-003 AC POWER WITH DLOSP 148,149 FAIL AFW 1.450E-002 1/3 AUX FEED PUMPS TO 4/4 SG NO POWER FC 9.847E-001 215 FAN COOLERS HPR 1.000E+OOO 1/4 HIGH PRESSURE RECIRCULATION TO 214 COLD LEGS NO POWER RTK 1.000E+OOO EQUIPMENT TO REFILL THE RWST (POWER UNAVAILABLE)

4.

3.891E-007 9.73% RLDT SGTR 9.020E-003 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT ODS 1.150E-003 OPERATOR ACTION

  • SG DEPRESSURIZATION FOR PRIMARY COOLING ORT 3.800E-002 OPERATOR ACTION* REFILL THE RWST
5.

2.751E-007 8.88% RL9T SGTR 9.020E-003 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OIR 8.140E-004 OPERATOR ACTION *MINIMIZE ECCS FLOW ORT 3.800E-002 OPERATOR ACTION* REFILL THE RWST

8.

2.472E-007 8.18% Rl9T SGTR 9.020E-003 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT ODS 1.1soE-003 OPERATOR ACTION

  • SG DEPRESSURIZATION FOR PRIMARY COOLING RTK 2.510E-002 EQUIPMENT TO REFILL THE RWST (SGTR)
7.

1.74BE-007 4.37% Rl9T som 9.020E.003 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUR.E INITIATING EVENT OIR 8.140E-004 OPERATOR ACTION *MINIMIZE ECCS FLOW RTK 2.s10E-002 EQUIPMENT TO REFILL THE RWST (SGTR)

8.

1.526E-007 3.81% ML9S MLOCA 1.100E-003 MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT LPR 5.200E-004 1/2 LOW PRESSURE RECIRCULATION TO 214 COLD LEGS ALL POWER (COND) RTK 2.910E-001 EQUIPMENT TO REFILL THE RWST FOR lOCAs

9.

1.448E-007 3.&2*,4 AE9S LLOCA 3.000E-004 LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT LPR 5.150E-004 112 LOW PRESSURE RECIRCULATION TO 1/3 COLD LEGS All POWER (COND) ORT 1.oooE+ooo RWST REFILL NOT POSSIBLE FOR LARGE LOCA WITH CURRENT EOPs WP1169-3:10/040692 4 - 161 I

Example {Continued) LPI Seq. # I.E. S. S BIN Fail. freq 2 LLOCA 1 AE9S 1. 45E-3 13 SLOCA 1 SL9S 4. 22E-5 15 MLOCA 1 ML9S 1. 65E-4 25 LLOCA 1 AE9F 1. 45E-3 32 SLOCA 1 SL9S 4. 22E-5

Example (Continued) The elements which contain LPI system in the plant state matrix are: P(l,1), P(1,4), *P(1,7), and P(l,10).

P,- PLANT STATES AE9S 111111 ML 9S 111111 SL 9S 111111 AE9F 111111 4E-3 II 3.3E-4 II 1.SE-5 II 1.4E-4 I 1111111111111111111ti11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 s 1 u p 12 p D 63 R T s T A T E s

Example (Continued) Let's look element P(l,l): P(1,1) represents (at 4E-3) the likelihood of plant state AE9S given a LLOCA and support state

1.

For this case in point, there are three sequences of interest: #1, #2, and #9. {Note ~ that only #2 contains*LPI.) Seq. #1 Failure is ORC, operator action to establish ECCS recirculation, with a frequency of 2.16E-3. Seq. #2 Failures are LPI, with a frequency of 1.45E-3 and ORT, operator action on RWST ref ill with a frequency of 1.0 Seq.* #9 Failures are LPR, with a frequency of 4.3E-4 and ORT with a frequency of 1.0.

~101{ TABLE 4.5.3-1 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES FOR BASE IPE MODEL QUANTIFICATION i; FREQUENCY PERCENT SSll BIN EVENTS VALUE DESCRIPTION 15.21% AE9S LLOCA 3.000E-004 LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT ORC 2.160E-003 0 10.23% AE9S LLOCA 3.0ooE-004 LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT LPI 1.450E-oo3 1/2 LOW PRESSURE INJ PUMPS TO 213 COLD LEGS All POWER ORT 1.000E+OOO RWST REFILL NOT POSSIBLE FOR LARGE LOCA WITH CURRENT EOPe

3.

3.962E-007 9.90% 98 Ll9S DLOOP 1.400E-002 DUAL UNIT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT BUS 2.230E-003 AC POWER WITH DLOSP 148,149 FAIL AFW 1.450E-002 1/3 AUX FEED PUMPS TO 4/4 SG NO POWER FC 9.847E-OOI 215 FAN COOLERS HPR 1.000E+OOO 1f.4 HIGH PRESSURE RECIRCUL.A TION TO 214 COLD LEGS NO POWER RTK 1.000E+OOO EQUIPMENT TO REFILL THE RWST (POWER UNAVAILABLE)

4.

3.891E-007 9.73% Rl9T SGTR 9.020E-003 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT ODS 1.150E-003 OPERATOR ACTION - SG DEPRESSURIZATION FOR PRIMARY COOLING ORT 3.BOOE-002 OPERATOR ACTION - REFILL THE RWST

5.

2.751E-007 8.88% RL9T SGTR 9.020E-003 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OIR 8.140E-004 OPERATOR ACTION *MINIMIZE ECCS FLOW ORT 3.BOOE-002 OPERATOR ACTION - REFILL THE RWST

6.

2.472E-007 8.18% RL9T SGTR 9.020E-003 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT ODS 1.160E-003 OPERATOR ACTION

  • SG DEPRESSURIZA TION FOR PRIMARY COOLING RTK 2.510E-002 EQUIPMENT TO REFILL THE RWST (SGTR)
7.

1.748E*007 4.37% RL9T SGTR 9.020E-003 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT OIR 8.140E-004 OPERATOR ACTION - MINIMIZE ECCS FLOW RTK 2.s10E-002 EQUIPMENT TO REFILL THE RWST (SGTR)

8.

1.62BE-007 3.81% ML9S MLOCA 1.100E-003 MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT LPR s.200E-004 1/2 LOW PRESSURE RECIRCULATION TO 214 COLD LEGS ALL POWER (COND) RTK 2.910E-001 EQUIPMENT TO REFILL THE RWST FOR LOCAs

9.

1.448E*007 3.6:!9!. AE98 LLOCA 3.000E-004 LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT LPR 5.150E-004 1/2 LOW PRESSURE RECIRCULATION TO 1/3 COLD LEGS ALL POWER (COND) ORT 1.000E+OOO RWST REFILL NOT POSSIBLE FOR LARGE LOCA WITH CURRENT EOPs WP1169-3:1D/040692 4 - 161

INITIATING EVENT SCALAR ( I ) LLOCA 11 - 3E-4 SUPPORT STATE VECTOR ( S ) : SS 1 SS 61 SS 63 LLOCA S1 = ( 0.9996 5.2E-5 2E-4 ) PLANT STATE MATRIX ( P ): LLOCA PS AE9S AE7S AE9F AE7K AE7F SS 4E-3 0.0 1.6E-4 0.0 0.0 1 Pl - 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 61 0.0 1.0 0.0 3E-2 4E-2 63

DERIVATION OF PLANT STATE ELEMENTS EXAMPLE : Pl (1,1) = 4E-3 SEQUENCE NO. 1 2 9 SUPPORT STATE PLANT NO. STATE 1 AE9S 1 AE9S 1 AE9S SYSTEM COMPONENT EVENTS FAILURE ORC 2.16E-3 CHECK VALVE 1SIB957 FTO LPI 1.45E-3 .. ~ CHECK VALVE 1SIB958 FTO DIV. 18 & 19 R2 FAIL ORT 1.0 OTHER CONTRIBUTORS LPR 5.2E*-¢ ORT 1.0 1.3E-3 7.4E-5 7.9E-£ 6.BE-5

Example (Continued) Now, we need to decompose these interim (system) results down to component level. Looking at the ECCS fault tree notebook, for support state l, we find the dominant failure contributors for LPI failure to be: Component Check valve 1SI8957 Failure Freq.

1. 3E-3 FTO Check valve 1SI8958 FTO Div. 18 & 19 R2 fail Other contributors Total.

Seismic failure freq. Combined failure freq. 7.4E-5 7.9E-6 6.8E-5 1.45E-3 5E-5 1.SE-3 I

i* Example (Continued) Now, let's estimate the impact on the element P(1,1) of the plant state matrix due to seismic induced failure of LPI. The element in plant state is represented by 1 m p = I: ( II [ ~ ck ] j i i.

z.

] where 1 = m - n = number of sequepces contributing to this

element, number of systems or operator failures defining the sequence, number of components in the system, and component failure rate for component k.

I'

Example (Continued) Therefore, element P(1,1) is modified to be: P(l,l) - (2.16E-3(0RC)) 5 eq. #1 + (1.5E-3(LPI)*l.O(ORT)) 5 eq. #2 + (5.15E-4(LPR)*l.O(ORT)) 5 eq. #9 4.12E-3 Comparing to the old value of P(l,l} which is 4E-3, this is only an increase of 3% due to seismic induced failure. The final CDF due to the impact of seismic induced failure of LPI can be evaluated by modifying other elements.

7. Final Touch Importance of component failures due to seismic events *Can be ranked by evaluating the impact of the individual component.

The impact on the final CDF~ due to all the components which may have higher failure rates than random failure frequencies can be evaluated collectively by modifying all the component failure frequencies and carrying out matrix manipulation.

  • Look for insights and potential improvements.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON IPEEE PROGRAM FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION CARLOS DIAZ If PRINCIPAL FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEER

FI:RE I:PEEE. SCREENI:NG/EVALUATI:ON Stages I. Multi-step pre- _ screening evaluation based on IPE structures. II. Detailed plant walkdowns aimed at validating assumptions and identifying potential concerns not .previously considered. III.- Focused final evaluation using deterministic and/or probabilistic approach.

STAGE I (PRE-SCREENING) 2 IDENTIFY AREA PRE-SCREEN KEY* 3 EQUIPMENT IN AREA ? NO i YES 4 DEVELOP FIRE FAILURE FREQUENCIES

1. IDENTIFY OTHER REIEVANT AREAS FOR EQUIPMENT
2. ASSIGN FIRE FAILURE FREQUENCY
3. SUM UP FREQUENCIES FOR AU. RELATED AREAS PRE-SCREEN COMPARE TO -

5 INTERNAL EVENT IPE FAILURE FREQUENCIES 9l>IUll 6 REVIEW PLANT SPECIFIC DATA FOR COMPONENT FIRE FAILURE FREQUENCIES 7 eBE-SCREEH COMPARE TO INTERNAL EVENT IPE FAILURE FREQUENCIES - STAGE II (WALKDOWN) 8 lfALKDOWN

1. CONFIRM PRE-SCREENED OUT AREAS
2. GATHER DATA FOR FINAL ANALYSIS ON NON-SCREENED OUT COMPONENTS
3. LOOK FOR VULNERABILITIES
4. ADRESS FRSS ISSUES FLOWCHART FOR STAGE III (FOCUSED STUDY)

FOCUSED ANALYSIS 9

1. FIRE MODELLING AND/OR
2. MATRIX MODELING MODIFY COMPONENT FAILURE RATES
3. MATRIX MANUPILATION AND EVALUATION
1. SEARCH FOR INSIGHTS
2. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
3. IPEEE SUBMITTAL FIRE IPEEE SCREENING/EVALUATION
  • EVALUATION PROCESS Stage I
1. Identification and review of key reference materials for the identification of fire areas and other fire protection features:

Fire Hazards Analysis Safe Shutdown Analysis FIVE Methodology

2. Identification of "Key Equipment" in each fire area:

"Key Equipment" will be derived from the IPE components, IPE support systems, and the Safe Shutdown Analysis.

3. First Pre-Screening Phase Screen out any area which does not contain any "key equipment".
4. Develop Failure Frequency Due to Fire:

For each area that could not be screened out, calculate the failure frequency due to fire for each key component within the area. The FIVE data base will be used to generate the failure frequencies.

5. Second Pre-Screening Phase Screen out those '.

components whose fire failure rate is less than the random failure rate of the component used in the IPE matrices.

6. Develop Plant Specific Failure Rates Due To Fire
  • Develop realistic failure rates using specific plant information.
7. *Third Pre-Screening Phase Screen out those components whose failure rate due to fire : (as derived from realistic data) is less than the failure rate of the component in the IPE.

STAGE II

8. Validation of Findings From Stages I and II Walkdown all the areas to:
1)

Verify the failure rates due to fire used in stages I & II, and

2)

Address the

3)

Fire Risk Scoping Study Issues as discussed in the FIVE methodology, and Identify any potential new hazards discerned from physical inspection.

STAGE III Focused Analysis

1.

Where appropriate,

2.

construct detailed fire. modelling for selected matrix element contributors, and evaluate as needed. and/or Modify the IPE matrixes by including the fire failure rates of those areas not screened out. Modify the matrices to include new hazards identified the walkdown. any I in

3.

Perform appropriate matrix manipulations to assess the impact of fire modelling through the foregoing stages.

Example of Matrix Modelling: To illustrate utilization of the matrix approach used in the third stage, we will assume that we are evaluating the 1 A RHR pump and that it has. not been screened out in stages I &II. r

1..,. Among the top 36 dominant accident sequences of the Zion IPE, the sequences associate with RHR system are: RHR Seq. Failure no. I.E. S.S BIN rate P(i,j) 2 LLOCA 1 AE9S l.45E-3 P(l, 1 )=4.0E-3 8 MLOCAl ML9S 5.2E-4 P(l,4)=3.3E-4 "r 9 LLOCA 1 AE9S 5.15E-4 P(l, 1 )=4.0E-3 13 SLOCA 1 SL9S 4.2E-5 P(l, 7)= 1.5E-5 15 MLOCAl ML9S l.65E-4 P(l,4)=3.3E-4 20 MLOCAl ML9S 5.2E-4 P(l,4)=3.3E-4 25 LLOCA 1 AE9F l.45E-3 P(l, 10)= l.4E-4 32 SLOCA 1 SL9S 4.2E-5 P(l, 7)= l.5E-5 36 SLOCA 1 SL9S 4.48E-4 P(l, 7)= l.5E-5

By including the failure rate due to fire, the revised failure rates are listed below: Old RHR New RHR Seq.# failure rate failure rate 2 l.45E-3 l.5 l E-3 8 5.2E-4 5.7E-4 9 5.2E-4 5.7E-4 13 4.2E-5 5.4E-5 15 l.65E-4

2. 13E-4 20 5.2E-4 5.7E-4 25 l.45E-3 3.45E-3 32 4.22E-5 5.4E-5 36 4.48E-4 4.88E-4

Now, let's estimate the impact on the plant state matrix. Remember that any element in the plant state matrix can be represented by where I denotes the number of sequences contributing to the element, m denotes the number of systems, components, or operator failures defining the sequences, and Ck denotes the component ,~ failure rate for component k. Modifying element P(l, l) results in: p (2. l 6E-3(01d value of Seq. l which is not affected by RHR))seq. 1 + ( l.51 E-3( New LPI)

  • l.O(ORT) )seq. 2

+ ( 5.7E-4( New LPR)

  • l.O(ORT) )seq. 9 4.24E-3 Comparing to the old value of P(l, l) which is 4.0E-3, this -is only an increase of 6% due to combining RHR pump l A random failure and fire. Similarly, other elements, i.e., P(l,4), P(l, 7), and P(1, l 0), can be updated as well. The final impact on the plant CDF can thus be estimated by modifying the other elements.

UNIT DRESDEN 2 DRESDEN3 QUAD CITIES 1 QUAD CITIES 2 ZION1 ZION2 LASALLE 1 LASALLE2 BYRON 1 BYRON2 BRAIDWOOD1 BRAIDWOOD2

SUMMARY

OF NUCLEAR sloN REFUELING SCHEDULE 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 J F M A M J J A S 0 N D JFMAMJJASOND J F M A M J J A S 0 N D JFMAMJJASOND I I I

  • I I *

~I I I" I 111111111 I I I ~ I CECO COMMITTED SUBMITTAL DATES Zion Dresden Quad Cities Byron Braidwood IPE IPEEE 4/92 6/96 1/93 6/96 12/93 12/96 4/94 6/95 6/96 6/97 r-- r-OUTAGE WALKDOWNS I i!lllllllli!l!i I = SQUG/IPEEE IQ = SQUG I I =IPEEE 'i' c:::J = Confirmatory IPEEE Walkdown

IPEEE PROJECT/TASK MATRIX Major Task/Resp. Evaluation Process Matrix Development Pre-Screening Process

  • Individuals Development Station Representative

@ © @ <D a> a> PRA Engineers <D @ 0) © <D @ @© @0 Fire Protection Engineers <D a> 0) © <D a> (J) PRA Augmented Staff Seismic/Fire Experts <D <ID (i) Licensing/Reg. Assurance

0)

Site VP Proj. Team Leader a> © CD Development of Process (J) IPE Completion (J) Identify Fin! Areas <Z> Station Critique <Z> Develop Matrices <Z> Identify Equip. in Fire Area a> NRC Presentation <3> Assign Fin! Freq. Development of Project Plan IPE Fin! Comparison Alternatives G> Identify Key Components G> Presentation to Station/Site VF <&> Selection of Method of <&> Develop Site Hazard Cmve 8 Implementation <?> Genemte Equip. Fmgilities IPE Seismic Comparison

IPEEE PROJECT/fASK MATRIX Major Task/Resp. Walkdown Focused Analysis Documentation Individuals Station Representative @ Q) ~ @ <V PRA Engineers <D @ Q) © @ <V @ <D Cl> a> © <Da>a>© Fire Protection Engineers a>O>@<V@ PRA Augmented Staff <D ~ a> © <D@a>© Seismic/Fire Experts <D © <V @ a> LicensinWReg. Assurance Site VP Proj. Team Leader <D Identify Sample of Pre- <D Initial Matrix Run <D Modify IPE Matrices Screened Items for Walkdown 0 Detailed Seismic & Fire Analysis 0 Compile Results 0 Develop Proc/Guidelines <3> Schedule Equip. to Walkdown <3> Final Matrix Run <3> Identify Potential Improvements Schedule Expert Time Analyze Other Extemal Events ffomado, Flood, Etc.] Write Report G> Access Atmngements G> Senior Management Review <&> Walkdown Packets Assemble <&> Submit to NRC CD Coordinate Walkdown Support Record Results

SQUG PROJECT TASK MATRIX Major Task/Resp. SSEL Completion Relay SSEL Walkdown Planning Individuals Completion Station Representative CD Q) @ © @ Q) @ Q) @ CV Operations Dept. CD SSEL Cognizant Eng. Q) Relay SSEL Cognizant Eng. © Seismic Capability Eng. Q) @ CD@©@ A/E or Specialty A/E <2> Q) © @cv* Third Party SQUG Expert Q) © Licensing/Reg. Assurance Site Eng. & Const. Manager <2> Site VP @ Q) Proj. Team Leader Q) @ Q) @ (!) Ops. Review On Existing (!) Prepare Options for Relay (!) Development of Project Plan of SSEL List Completion Alternatives 0 Finish SSEL After Ops. 0 Present/Select Relay List 0 Presentation to Statior\\fSite VP Review Completion Option Q) Selection of Method of Q) Give Relay SSEL SQUG Implementation Q) Review &t Sign-Off SSEL Training Give Walkdown Training Screen Out Non-Essential Relays <5> Coordinate Walkdown Support <5> Screen Out Seismically at Station Insensitive Relays <6> Prepare, Review &t Issue Project/Pl an <6> Evaluate Remaining Relays Guidelines to Perform SQUG <!> Initial Fill-Ou~f G.U. Walkdowns Forms <l> Prepare Walkdown Folders Review &t Sign-Off

SQUG PROJE~ TASK MATRIX Major Task/Resp. SQUG Walkdown Anchorage Outlier SQUG Report Individuals Evaluation Resolution Submittal Station Representative Q) a> CD Q) Mechanical Maintenance a> Operations Dept. SSEL Cognizant Eng. Relay SSEL Cf?gnizant Eng. Seismic Capability Eng. Q) (2) © Q) (2) Q) Q) CD A/E or Specialty A/E (j) (2) © CD <2> (J) (j) <D Third Party SQUG Expert (j) (2) Licensing/Reg. Assurance O> Site Eng. & Const. Manager Site VP Q) Proj. Team Leader (!) Pilot Walkdown ~ Sketch Out Anchorage © Develop Solution © Prepare Report Pattern <?.> Identify Follow-Up Q) Independent Audit <?.> Perfomt Walkdown ~ Analyze Anchorage Actions ~ CECo Approve & <3> Anchor Bolt Torque Pattern Submit Report to NR Testing ~ Document Results c © Fill Out SEWS &: SVDS

SUMMARY

  • CECo' s IPEEE program will fulfill NRC's IPEEE objectives.
  • Matrix modelling is a proven technology.,

Applications to PRA date back to the early 1980's (Zion Probabilistic Safety Study).

  • Matrix modelling represents an innovative application for evaluating IPEEE.
  • CECo' s multi-step screening is realistic and conservative.
  • .Matrix methodology will produce a comprehensive evaluation of seismic and fire events at each of the CECO plants.}}
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