ML17179A763
| ML17179A763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1993 |
| From: | Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Delgeorge L COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17179A764 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9303090409 | |
| Download: ML17179A763 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000237/1993002
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No:
50-237/93002(DRS); No. 50-249/93002(DRS)
Docket Nos:
50-237; 50-249
Licenses No:
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place-Suite 300
Downers Grove, IL
60515
Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
Units 2 and 3
Inspection At:
Morris, Illinois
Inspection Conducted:
January 11-15 and February 18-22, 1993
3-2-'13
Date
~- 2- Cf's
Date
Section
Inspection Summary
Inspection on January 11-15 and February 18-22. 1993 (Reports No.
50-237/93002CDRS), No. 50-249/93002CDRS))
Areas Inspected: Routine fire protection inspection of
surveillances, equipment, fire brigade training and drills, zebra
mussel problems, and fire protection audits.
The inspector
utilized selected portions of NRC inspection procedures 64704 and
92702.
Results: Steady improvements continued in the fire _protection
program.
Overall, the fire protection program was considered
good.
The staff was knowledgeable and had taken appropriate
actions to correct issues and problems.
Strengths included
correcting hardware deficiencies, performing surveillances, and
training of fire brigade members.
Fire doors and transient
combustibles were well controlled.
Critiques of fire brigade
drills were performed well.
Control of fire protection concerns
was adequate in the area of plant modifications.
Reliability and
material condition of the diesel driven fire pumps was poor.
Preventive maintenance was being increased and the pump/engines
were being considered for replacement.
Concerns were identified
with the reliability of the Unit 1 loop fire main and the overuse
--*- - of repetitive checklists-during audits.
1.
2.
DETAILS
Persons Contacted
Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo)
- R. Black, Assistant Fire Marshal
E. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance
- L. Cartwright, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- A. D'Antonio, Supervisor Quality Verification
- M. Dillion, Fire Marshal
- R. Flahive, Technical Superintendent
- B. Gurley, Regulatory Assurance
- K. Housh, Technical Staff Fire System Engineer
- J. Kotowski, Operations Manager
- D. Mershon, Technical Staff Fire Protection Engineer
M. Nagle, Fire Brigade Instructor
- D. Roberts, Corporate Fire Protection Engineer
R. Stachniak, Operating Engineer
D. Winchester, Internal Audit Group Superintendent
u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNRC)
M. Leach, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Peck, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit meeting on
February 22, 1993.
Routine Fire Protection Program Review (64704)
This inspection consisted of observations of plant areas and
reviews of fire protection surveillances, maintenance on fire
protection equipment, fire brigade training and drills, fire
reports, deviation reports, work requests, safety evaluations,
controls to prevent bio-fouling by zebra mussels, and audits of
fire protection activities.
2.1
Observation of Plant Areas
The inspector observed several areas of the reactor building and
turbine building.
The observation included hose stations,
extinguishers, sprinkler valves, emergency lights, and
housekeeping.
The inspector determined that the equipment was
being maintained in good condition. Housekeeping was excellent
prior to the outage, although housekeeping could have been
improved during outage activities.
For example, rags were left
in work areas and large quantities of anti-contamination clothing
were allowed to accumulate.
The majority of the wood used during
outage activities was treated to make it fire resistant.
Fire
resistant plastic was also being used.
Lubricants and oils were
properly stored in fire resistant cabinets or in steel
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containers.
Equipment areas were mostly free of oil as the
result of equipment leaks.
Appropriate controls for cutting and
welding operations were being enforced.
No discrepancies were
noted with sprinklers or with fire main valves or headers.
Halon
bottles were at appropriate pressures and fire extinguishers had
been inspected and had a current inspection date.
No areas were
noted where sprinklers should have been installed but were not
already in place.
Controls were being maintained for transient
combustibles and fire doors.
All fire doors were functional and
temporary outage cables had been routed to ensure that the fire
doors were operable.
2.2
Surveillances
The inspector reviewed completed surveillance procedures for
1992.
The surveillances were performed accurately and on time.
The observations and discrepancies were corrected with the
exception of the Unit 2/3 diesel fire pump.
Numerous engine and
pump problems were noted in surveillances DFPP 4123-5, "Unit 2/3
Diesel Fire Pump Weekly Operability."
The licensee was making
efforts to better utilize surveillance resources based on risk
and failure rate of equipment, which helped make resources
available for other efforts.
2.3
Maintenance on Fire Protection Equipment
2~3.1
Diesel Fire Pumps
The diesel fire pumps (DFP) were poorly maintained.
Very little
preventive maintenance (PM) was done.
Maintenance history showed
that the DFPs had a large number of failures during the 1990 to
1993 time period.
The repair data indicated that the DFPs went
from failure to failure without any overall corrective actions to
correct the situation.
The failures were caused by years of
neglect when PM efforts were not appropriate for the importance
of the DFPs, that is, for fire protection and refilling the
condenser following a station blackout.
PM activities did not include replacing parts that deteriorated
with age, such as hoses and gaskets, and checking strainers.
For
example, when one of the DFP engine coolant hoses burst because
of age and pressure, the licensee did not replace the other
hoses.
The hoses were also not put on a PM schedule to be
replaced.
Other failures included gaskets, radiator caps,
packing, and seals.
The engine coolant strainer was not on the
PM schedule for periodic cleaning.
Strainers were only cleaned
in the fire main system following a problem.
Other system
strainers had been cleaned and checked for the first time since
their installation more than 20 years ago.
3
..
DFPl engine failed in 1991.
The licensee could not pinpoint the
exact cause, but the engine had overheated several times in the
six months prior to this problem.
The engine was replaced but
the pump is in poor condition with very little margin to meet its
flow requirement.
Maintenance history indicated that the
reliability of DFP 1 increased after the engine replacement.
The
pump and engine are scheduled for replacement in 1993.
A
modification package was approved and the licensee is pursuing an
equipment supplier.
Repair data indicated that DFP 2/3 was in poor condition.
The
reliability was low.
The failure rate was high and occurred even
though the pump was only operated 40-50 hours per year.
As a
result of an engine hose failure, DFP 2/3 failed the same time
DFPl failed.
The licensee was able to make repairs within 24
hours otherwise the reactors were required to be shut down.
The
licensee purchased a third OFP that can be temporarily connected
until one of the two main pumps are repaired.
The problem of
shutting down the plants is solved, but the reliability has not
been increased much for the two main fire pumps in the event of a
fire.
Both DFPs will be replaced in the 1993/1994 time frame. In
addition, improved PM procedures are in the concurrence cycle for
the existing pumps.
Also, The PM schedule now includes checking
and cleaning strainers.
The technical superintendent stated
during the exit that the DFPs would be put on the Technical
Issues List, which assures that adequate resources will be
devoted for improving the material condition of the DFPs.
2.3.2
Batteries
Surveillance reports indicated that maintenance of the DFP
batteries had been a problem including water levels, possible
overcharging, and maintaining specific gravity.
The licensee had
taken action to turn over the maintenance of the batteries to the
electrical group during 1992.
Following this change the
surveillance reports indicated that the condition of the
batteries had improved.
2.3.3
Unit 1 Yard Fire Main Loop
The Unit 1 yard fire main loop appeared to be in poor condition.
The 1992 fire protection insurance log indicated that the fire
loop was inoperable several times in 1991 and 1992.
The problems
were believed to have occurred because of being disturbed during
the installation of the sewage system, and not as a result of the
asbestos cement piping being made brittle because of pressure
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1*
cycling and aging.
Maintaining reliability of the loop is
important because both main fire loops are required to meet the
requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
Current low reliability
makes it questionable whether this system will be available
during a fire.
2.4
Fire Brigade, Fire Reports, and Fire Drills
Fire brigade members received extensive training, which included
classroom and offsite fire fighting.
The onsite fire drill
requirements had been met by all brigade members who were listed
as qualified.
All appropriate drill and training records were
properly maintained.
A review of the fire records indicated that the fire brigade was
only required to respond twice in 1992.
The two events were for
a motor fire and a power transformer fire.
The small number of
responses was indicative of good control of combustibles,
cutting/welding activities, and housekeeping.
Recent efforts at improvements for fire fighting include
purchasing more equipment to better outfit the fire brigade
members, with plans to locate the equipment at strategic
locations in the plant.
This will allow a faster response to
fires.
2.5
Deviation Reports and Work Requests Review
The inspector reviewed open nuclear work requests (NWRs) for fire
protection.
The backlog was low considering the high number of
NWRs that had been performed during the year.
The NWRs had been
properly prioritized and none of the outstanding work items
appeared to be highly safety significant.
The backlog had been
reduced from 175 to 139 during 1992.
In addition, the fire
protection Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) backlog had been reduced
from 65 to 32 in 1992.
There have been numerous tamper switch maintenance problems on
fire protection valves.
Many of the problems resulted from old
tamper switches and the difficulty in purchasing replacement
parts.
A contributing factor was that the switches were an add-
on feature, which was easily knocked out of calibration.
These
problems were being corrected by including valves on the locked
valve program with valves being maintained in position by chains
and locks.
Specific locks and keys will be maintained for fire
protection valves.
The licensee reviewed the valves to assure
that those important to safety were included in this effort.
Some valves had been added to or deleted from the list based on
the review.
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2.6
10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations
The majority of the fire protection program has been removed from
the Technical Specification.
This allows changes to be made to
the fire protection program by performing a 10 CFR 50.59 safety
evaluation.
The inspector reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 safety
evaluations issued for program changes for 1992.
All of the
changes were appropriate and were not detrimental to fire
protection safety.
Some surveillance cycles had been extended
based on industry data and failure rates.
The safety evaluations
that delayed performing full flow testing of the fire main system
for six months were based on preventing zebra mussels from
entering the fire protection systems, and to give the licensee
adequate time to make corrective actions.
The plant is currently dealing with a bio-fouling problem, zebra
mussel infestation, in its intake water.
Zebra mussels were
found last summer on screens in the intake structure.
Notable
efforts were being made to prevent zebra mussels from entering
the fire main systems and potentially making the fire protection
systems inoperable.
Full flow surveillances of the fire
protection system were suspended for six months to permit
modifications to the systems.
Hypochlorite is being injected
into the service water system, which connects to the keep fill
line of the main system.
In addition, thermal shock treatment is
also being used to kill the mussels.
A modification is planned
for an injection system into the fire main system.
Strainer
checks indicate that the zebra mussels have not entered the fire
main system.
The licensee has increased the surveillance
frequency for strainers.
The concentration of chemicals will be
monitored in the fire main system following the full flow tests
to ensure that the system is maintained zebra mussel free.
2.7
Audits of Fire Protection Abtivities
The inspector reviewed the following audits of fire protection
activities:
Quality Assurance/Nuclear Safety Audit Report Number
12-91-I, January 17 through 30, 1991; Quality Assurance/Nuclear
Safety Audit Report Number 12-92-I, January 27 through 31, 1992;
and Offsite Quality Verification Audit Report Number 12-93-I,
December 14 through 18, 1992.
Preparation for the audits was good.
The audit reports were
brief and did not indicate the amount of reviews that had been
performed in the fire protection area.
The audits had adequate
detail to detect most program problems.
The licensee had taken
timely corrective actions for those fire protection deficiencies
that were identified during the audits.
The audits met
regulatory requirements.
6
q.;
In general, the audits were more compliance based rather than
being performance based.
The licensee utilized a repetitive
check list approach to auditing.
The check lists indicated that
activities listed had been reviewed in detail; however, this
continued approach could contribute to missing deficiencies year
after year.
For example, problems with the DFP and Unit 1 yard
loop reliability, which are discussed in Paragraph 2.3, were not
discussed in the audits.
3.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in
Paragraph 1) on February 22, 1993, and summarized the scope and
findings of the inspection. The informational content of the
inspection report was discussed with regard to documents reviewed
during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any of the
documents as proprietary.
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