ML17083B338
| ML17083B338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1984 |
| From: | Eisenhut D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Gilinsky, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| TASK-AS, TASK-BN84-082, TASK-BN84-82 BN-84-082, BN-84-82, DUMMY-635, NUDOCS 8404130432 | |
| Download: ML17083B338 (14) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
-:-O Cogp-iV~
~SAN@=g DPI gr APR L3 P84
'84 APR13 P3:OS Docket I'los.:
50-275 and 50-323 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Comnissioner Bernthal FROM:
SllBJECT:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division o Licensinq Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DIABLO CANYON - STATEMENT BY HR.
ISA YIN, NRC STAFF, APRIL 11, 1984 (BOARD NOTIFICATION NO.84-082 In accordance with NRC procedures f'r Board Notifications the enclosure is provided for vour information.
The enclosure is a statement by Mr. Isa Yin of the NRC staff regarding conclusions and recommendatinns of an NRC Review Group that recently evaluated concerns expressed earlier hy Mr. Yin.
By copy of this notification, the appropriate Board and parties to. the Dibalo Canyon proceeding are being provided a copy of this information.
'nclosure:
As stated uF arre11 G. g'sen u, 0 rector Division o8 Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula.ion cc:
See next page
%90+/3 G Q3 ~
4
The Cnvmissioners cc:
,1. Kline, ASLB T.
S. moore, ASLAB W.
R. Johnson, ASLAB 1.
H. Buck, ASLAB SECY (2)
'"'Parties to the'roceeding
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION Diablo Canyon Units 152
'ocket Nos. 50-275/323 OL ACRS Members Ms. Elizabeth Apfelberg Maurice Axelrad, Esq.
Mr. Richard E. Blankenburg Mr. Glenn 0. Bright Dr. John H. Buck Philip A. Crane, Jr.,
Esq.
Mr. Frederick Eissler David "S'. Fleischaker, Esq.
Mrs.
Raye Fleming Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Mr. Mark Gottlieb Mr. Lee M. Gustafson Mr. Thomas H. Harris Mr. Richard B. Hubbard Dr.
W.
Reed Johnson Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
Dr. Jerry Kline Mr. John Marrs Thomas S. Moore, Esq.
Bruce Norton, Esq.
Joel R. Reynolds, Esq.
Mr. James
- 0. Schuyler Lewis Shollenberger, Esq.
Mr. Gordon Silver Michael J.
Strumwasser, Esq.
Paul C. Valentine, Esq.
Harry M. Willis John F.
Wolf, Esq Dr. Robert C. Axtmann Mr. Myer Bender Dr. Max W. Carbon Mr.'esse C. Ebersole Mr. Harold Etherington Dr. William Kerr Dr. Harold W. Lewis Dr. J.
Carson Mark Mr. William M. Mathis Dr.
Dade W. Moeller Dr. David Okrent
'Dr. Milton S. Plesset Mr. Jeremiah J.
Ray Dr. Paul C.
Shewmon Dr. Chester P. Siess Mr. David A. Ward Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel Malcolm H. Furbush Resident Inspector/Diablo Canyon NPS Dr. William E.
Cooper Mr.
W.
C. Gangloff Mr. Lee M. Gustafson Dr. Jose Roesset Mr. Malcolm H.'Furbush
Diablo Can on 1
In the past two weeks there had been discussions among the staff and the PGKE representatives on matters concerning whether or not there had been a design control gA program breakdown in the design of large bore (L/B) and small bore (S/B) piping systems.
To know the answer, one must..first ask the following questions:
1.
Had there been adequate personnel training program as well as effective implementation of the program at the site?
2.
Was there a sound document control system?
3.
Were there sufficient technical and gA procedures to cover all important aspects of design activities?
4.
Did responsible personnel always follow established work proce'dures?
5.
Were all components proven to be functionable in accordance with design intentions?
6.
Mere the licensee audits of design activities effective enough to identify problems for corrective measures?
7.
Wa.s licensee forceful in correcting identified problems?
The inspection findings documented in my incomplete draft report said "NO" to all the above questions.
In the past two weeks, I worked together with the Review Team consisted of NRR, IE, Regional management and technical staff.
While the difference in professional opinion, in interpretation of regulatory requ";ementS,,
and in the
...,..r.elatiye significance..of: various.issueq. discussed in my. draft, report;still
- existed, there was a consensus among the team members on what actions should be taken prior to full power operation.
The compromises I have made included:
( I) that improvement of program and component design could be carried out during low power testings, and (2) that the decision to reinspect all safety related piping systems to avoid structural interferences will be based on wnether or not NRC's observation during MS and FW tests will identify any significant deficiencies.
The action item, list included the following:
Complete S/B support computer calculation review.
Complete shimming of closely spaced rigid supports, as necessary.
Establish program for monitoring thermal
- gaps, as necessary.
Review snubber lockup motions used to evaluate snubber/rigid restraint interactions.
Establish "guick Fix" and "Diablo Problem" review program.
Staff inspection of HS and FW hot walkdown.
~
~
Complete review of technical allegation issues.
1 Complete regional inspection (including evaluation of IDVP).
The staff's present position regarding the S/B support computer performed calculations is that all 100% of them should be re-evaluated by DCP..
This i.s contrary.to,.the. Robert Cloud. and Associates. conclusion. after the IDVP studies.,-.
They believe that no additional S/B support calculation was required even in the face of a large amount of identified computational deficiencies.
The difference of licensing criteria interpretation and the degree of tolerance
~1 in accepting calculation input errors and deficiencies between the staff and Cloud is apparent.
The nature of the deficiencies relative to the L/B support calculations documented in the Cloud Interim Technical Reports will be reviewed by the staff in the near future.
Results from the review of this issue and five others that are also related to the L/B and S/B piping system design evaluations performed by Cloud will form the basis for determining whether or not there should be additional actions to be taken by the licensee.
- Recently, there had been media and public concerns relative to my "surprise" testimony before the Commission, particularly the possibility of management
'suppression of inspection findings.
Let me speak of the truth in this matter.
'My. work performance in the NRC in the last 94 years was well recognized inside
, and outside the organization.
I had been decorated with NRC Meritorious Service Award and Special Achievement Award, and was sent to Korea and Taiwan to train their technical personnel.
My assignment at Diablo Canyon showed that the NRC management really wanted knowledgeable staff to handle the case.
During the past 44 months of working on the case, there had not been any
l
management pressure to: stop me fro'm inspecting or investigating any matters
'l th t I felt were pertinent to the
.'ssues, and certail i."'Ore had not "eel'. an; attempt made to discourage me from discussing findings with the Congressional staff the licensee and the general public.
Problems concerning some over-looking of the findings could have been caus'ed by difference in professional
- opinion, and by the tremendous work loads that have burdened the understaffed I'",,
=,HRR organizatio.n for. so.. long,;.
A)l the experienced HRC inspection and enforcement staffers are aware that identifying licensee program and hardware deficiencies is only 40~ of the task.
It takes more effort to negotiate for upgraded programs and to follow up on implementation of corrective actions.
Being a graduate from Cal Poly, 20 miles away from the Diablo Canyon site, it is my personal interest and commitment to work hard with the staff to resolve all identified issues and problems, Not h
until all improved programs have been implemented; all identified hardware problems have been corrected; and all reinspections have been conducted, you can certainly be assured that there will be no staff recommendation for the issuance of a full power commercial operation license.
(', v.
+/ii/fY Isa T. Yin Senior Mechanical Engineer Division of Engineering Region III, NRC
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