ML16341G600

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Insp Rept 50-323/92-14 on 920414-0513.Violatons Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Installation of New Emergency DG in Facility,Including Air Start Sys,Fuel Oil Sys & Ventilation Sys
ML16341G600
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 06/05/1992
From: Gody A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML16341G598 List:
References
50-323-92-14, NUDOCS 9206230186
Download: ML16341G600 (14)


See also: IR 05000323/1992014

Text

U.

S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION

V

Report Number:

Docket Number:

License

Number:

Licensee:

Facility Name:

Inspection at:

Inspection

Conducted:

Inspector:

50-323/92-14

50-323

DPR-82

Pacific

Gas

and Electric Company

77 Beale Street,

Room

1451

San Francisco,

California 94106

Diablo Canyon Unit 2

Diablo Canyon Site,

San Luis Obispo County,- California . -


.

April 13 through

May 13,

1992

C. Myers, Reactor

Inspector

Approved by:

o y

r.,

>n

ie

Engine ring Section

te

igne

~Summar:

Ins ection

on

A ril 13 throu

h

Ma

13

'1991

Re ort No. 50-323 92-14

Areas

Ins ected:

The areas

inspected

in this routine engineering

inspection of the installation

of the

new emergency diesel

generator

in Unit 2 included the air start system,

the fuel oil system

and the ventilation system.

Inspection

Modules 37700,

49063,

50073,

50100,

and

55050 were

used for guidance.

Results:

General

Conclusions

and

S ecific Findin s:

In general,

the inspector

concluded that the

new emergency

diesel

generato}

mechanical

systems

were being installed in accordance

with engineering

requirements.

Craft personnel

had knowledge concerning installation criteria.

There

was adequate

quality assurance

overview of this project in the areas

examined.

9206230186

920605

PDR

ADOCK 05000323

8

PDR

Si nificant Safet

Matters:

None

Summar

of Violations:

One violation involving a failure to have written

instructions

was identified in Paragraph 2.f.

A non-cited violation involving

a failure to follow procedures

was identified in Paragraph

2.e.

0 en

Items

Summar

None

Persons

Contacted

DETAILS

Pacific

Gas

and Electric

Com

an

  • H. Angus,

Technical

Services

Manager

  • M. DeWitt, guality Assurance

Engineer

  • C. Dougherty,

Senior guality Assurance

Supervisor

  • U. Farradj,

Mechanical

Group Leader,

Nuclear Engineering

and

Construction

Services

(NECS)

  • B. Goelzer,

Diesel

Generator

System Engineer

  • T. Grebel,

Regulatory Compliance Supervisor

J. Griffin, Senior Compliance

Engineer

S. Hamilton, Design

Change Coordinator

J. Kelley, Engineer,

NECS

  • C. Kan, Regulatory Compliance
  • D. Miklush, Operation Services

Manager

C. Pendleton,

System Engineer

  • B. Savard,

Special

Project Coordinator,

NECS

  • P. Sarafian,

Senior Engineer,

Onsite Safety

Review Group

  • S. Szuch, guality Assurance
  • H. Tresler,

Project Engineer,

NECS

W. Young, Construction

Engineer,

NECS

Nuclear

Re ulator

Commission

  • P. Horrill, Senior Resident

Inspector

  • Denotes those attending

the exit meeting

on April 23,

1992

The inspector

also held discussions

with other licensee

personnel

during

the course of the inspection.

Desi

n Chan

es

New Emer enc

Diesel

Generator

37700

The inspector

reviewed the progress

being

made

on the

new (sixth)

emergency

diesel

generator

(EDG-2-3) under Design

Change

Package

(DCP) H-

44405.

The inspector walked

down the work areas

with licensee

personnel

and independently

witnessed

work in progress.

The inspector

observed

portions of the following Work Orders

(WO):

.WO C93482

Diesel fuel oil priming tank installation

.WO C93682

Pipe support installation

.WO C93487

Priming Tank fabrication

The inspector

reviewed quality assurance

and quality control involvement

for this project

and found it to be adequate.

In general

the inspector

found that the sixth diesel

generator

was being

installed in accordance

with engineering

requirements.

The crafts

personnel

were qualified and knowledgeable

of the installation criteria.

a.

New

EDG

Room

The inspector monitored work taking place in the

new

EDG room.

The

EDG had

been leveled

and installed

on its foundation.

In process

work included piping support installation for the air start

and

turbocharger air systems,

ventilation ducting installation for the

diesel

room ventilation system

and i,nstallation of the diesel

exhaust

system.

The inspector

found the ongoing work to be well

coordinated.

Procedures

were in use at the work locations.

The

inspector

found the licensee's

actions to be adequate.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

ualit

Assurance

Oversi ht of Work

The inspector

reviewed the quarterly reports

issued

by the quality

assurance

organization specifically for the

new

EDG project.

The

inspector toured the construction

areas with quality assurance

personnel.

guality assurance

personnel

had identified problems with

the procurement

specifications for the diesel silencer,

problems

with changes

in the concrete

used for safety walls,

and problems

with electrical

separation.

Based

on

a review of the quarterly report

and discussions

with

quality assurance

personnel

the inspector

concluded that the quality

assurance

organization

was providing an effective review of ongoing

and completed

work for the

new

EDG.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

Housekee

in

The inspector

observed

work activities in progress

involved with the

installation of fuel oil piping, air start

and turbocharger air

piping,

and diesel

room ventilation ducting.

The inspector

found the

cleanliness

of the general

work areas

to be well maintained.

Appropriate protection of unaffected

equipment

was observed.

The

inspector

observed

one uncovered

pipe opening

on the air relief

valve for the turbocharger air receiver tank which was promptly

corrected

when brought to the attention of the area

foreman.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

ir Com ressor

Unloader Line Check

Valve'he

inspector

observed that the air unloader line from the air

compressor

to the air receiver tank did not contain

a check valve as

did the other piping connections

to the tank.

The inspector

reviewed the system

PAID and found that

no check valve was

identified for the line.

The inspector questioned

whether the

exclusion of a check valve was consistent

with the design basis

capacity for the tank.

The licensee

provided the inspector with an

analysis

(Calculation H-108) which identified that the existing

configuration

was correct

and consistent

with the design basis

analysis.

The inspector

found that the licensee

documents

adequately

resolved his concern.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

Rela

Contact Seismic

uglification

The inspector

reviewed Action Request

(AR) A259385,

dated

February

25,

1992,

which identified that relay contact chattering

had

been

experienced

during seismic testing of the control panels for the

sixth diesel

generator.

The

AR identified the

need to review the

impact of the test results

on the existing five diesels

which use

the

same relays

and

any other applications of the relays in the

plant.

At the time of the inspection,

the inspector

found that the

generic review of the test results

had not been

addressed

in

response

to the AR.

The inspector

was concerned

that the relay

contact chattering

could affect the seismic qualification of the

five operable diesels.

In response

to the inspector's

concern,

the licensee identified that

relay contact chattering

had

been evaluated

by Nuclear Engineering

and Construction

Services

(NECS),

and that it had

been determined

not to affect the seismic qualification of the existing diesels.

The licensee initiated

an Action Evaluation

(AE) for the

AR to

document

the engineering

evaluation.

At the exit meeting,

the

licensee identified that the

AE had

been

issued.

Licensee

procedure

NPAP C-12/NPG-7. 1, "Identification and Resolution

of Problems

and Nonconformances,"; Paragraph

5.2.6.b required that

the shift foreman must

be informed of all

ARs that report

deficiencies that

may affect equipment operability as

soon

as the

condition is identified.

The procedure

included all ARs that:

. question or could reasonably

impact the operability of

equipment

governed

by the Technical Specifications,

or

. identify the failure (or potential failure) of a plant

component,

system or program to meet its design

basis or FSAR

commitment.

The inspector

found that the shift foremen

had not been

informed of

AR A259385259385which identified

a potential

inadequacy

in the seismic

qualification of the operable

diesel

generators.

This failure to inform the shift foreman

as required

by procedure

NPAP C-12 is

an apparent violation

(NCV 50-323/92-14-01).

The

violation is not being cited because

the criteria specified in

Section VII.B(l).ofthe

NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.

In addition, the inspector

reviewed licensee

procedure

NPAP C-

29/NPG-7. 10,

Rev.

0, "Operability Evaluation."

Paragraph

2.2.3

required that; for degraded

conditions

impacting equipment

operability, the timeliness of the evaluation for operability should

4

be commensurate

with the safety significance of the issue.

Further,

Paragraph

2.2.3.b required,

in part, that for deficiencies

in

qualification, the schedule for evaluation of operability should

be

established

within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after engineering

concurs that

operability is impacted.

The inspector

found that

AR A259385259385had

been initiated in February,

1992,

by engineering identifying the

potential for seismic test results

to impact the operability of the

five existing diesels.

However,

an evaluation of operability for the

deficiency was not performed.

The inspector

noted that the

new

procedure

had only been

issued

in November,

1991.

The inspector

found that the

new operability evaluation

procedure

(C-29) was not

referenced

in the existing problem identification procedure

(C-12).

The licensee

acknowledged

the lack of coordination

between the

existing procedures

and stated that

a revision to the C-12 procedure

had

been initiated to correctly reference

the requirements

of the C-

29 procedure.

The inspector

found the licensee

action to be

adequate.

One non-cited violation was identified.

Ex ansion Joint Assembl

The inspector

observed that

a vendor supplied expansion joint

bellows

had

been installed atop the diesel

turbocharger

connecting

it to the exhaust piping.

The inspector

observed that the lower

flange of the bellows,

connected

to the turbocharger,

contained

twenty bolt holes but only ten bolts were installed.

The identical

upper flange of the bellows,

connected

to the exhaust

pipe,

had

twenty bolts installed.

The inspector

was concerned

that the proper

number of bolts

may not have

been installed in the lower flange of

the bellows.

The inspector

reviewed the diesel

assembly

drawing,

ALCO drawing 30-A-73343.

The inspector 'found that the drawing

identified ten bolt holes for the turbocharger

flange.

The inspector

discussed

his observation with the licensee

mechanical

foreman

who

explained that the assembly

had

been

compared to the other diesels

and found to be identical.

As

a result the inspector

concluded that

the correct

number of bolts

had

been installed.

However, the drawing did not specify any bolting or gasket

requirements

for the assembly.

The inspector reviewed

Work Order

(WO) C93408 which assembled

the bellows to the turbocharger

as part

of the vendor supplied

components.

The

WO did not specify any

bolting or gasket

requirements

for the assembly.

Through discussions

with licensee

construction

personnel,

the

inspector

found that the

10 bolts

and gasket for the lower flange of

the bellows

had

been installed under

WO C89564 which attached

the

exhaust

pipe to the upper flange of the bellows.

The inspector

reviewed the

WO and found no specific instructions pertaining to the

lower bellows flange assembly

although

a bolt torque record did

include data for the lower flange assembly.

The inspector concluded

that lower flange assembly

work was outside the scope of

WO C89564.

The licensee

General

Construction

(GC) personnel

stated that,

lacking specific instructions,

they had interpreted

the drawings in

the field to extend the bolting and gasket specifications for the

upper bellows flange to the lower flange

and adjusted

the number of

bolts to match the turbocharger bolt hole 'pattern.

The inspector

found that the licensee's

actions

appeared

to result in an

appropriate

assembly of the components.

However, the inspector

was

concerned

that the construction

personnel

had not obtained specific

clarification of the assembly'equirements

from engineering

at the

time of the installation.

This failure to have appropriate written

instructions for performing work on safety related

equipment is

an

apparent violation

(ENF 50-323/92-14-02).

The inspector

noted that the sixth diesel

generator

had

been

procured

as

commercial

grade

equipment

and that the licensee

was in

the process

of performing

a seismic qualification and dedication for

use in the safety related application.

According to the licensee,

this method of qualification was unique to the sixth diesel

generator

compared

to that of the other five diesel

generators.

Due

to the in-house

seismic qualification

and dedication,

the inspector

was concerned

that the licensee's

failure to adequately

control

vendor component

assembly

may affect the seismic qualification of

the diesel.

The licensee

acknowledged

the inspector's

concern for

appropriate

engineering

involvement in the installation process.

One violation was identified.

The inspector

conducted

an exit meeting

on April 23,

1992, with members

of the licensee staff as indicated in Section

1.

During this meeting,

the inspector

summarized

the scope of the inspection activities

and

reviewed*the inspection findings

as described

in this report.

The

licensee

acknowledged

the concerns identified in the report.

The inspector

requested

that the licensee

inform the Region

V staff of

its intended

schedule for the tie-in of the new'iesel

generator

fuel oil

piping to the existing fuel oil transfer

system.

The licensee

acknowledged

the inspector's

request.

Subsequent

to the exit meeting,

additional discussions

with licensee

personnel

were held onsite

on April 24,

1992.

The inspector

reviewed

additional

documents

submitted

by the licensee

to the Region

V office on

Hay 13,

1992.

No additional

issues

resulted

from those reviews.

During this inspection,

the licensee

did not identify as proprietary

any

of the materials

provided to or reviewed

by the inspector.

0

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