ML16341D200

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards OL Review Mgt Rept Requested in 850204 Memo.Info Current as of 850214
ML16341D200
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde, Diablo Canyon, 05000000
Issue date: 02/22/1985
From: Kirsch D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To: Thompson H
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8502270487
Download: ML16341D200 (22)


Text

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Licensing, NRR FROM:

D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Pro)ects

SUBJECT:

OL REVIEW MANAGEMENT REPORT In response to your memorandum of February 4, 1985, the following information is being submitted.

Markup of Licensing Status of Palo Verde Unit 1 and Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2.

The information provided is current as of February 14, 1985.

I If you have any questions regarding the information being submitted, please cont'act me at FTS 463-3723.

Urfgfnal sfgnacf Bg D. F. Kirsch D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects CC ~

H. Denton T. Novak Licensing Branches 81-4 bcc:

RSB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)

Mr. Martin pink/green/docket file copies State DODDS/dot K

SC 2'85 2g/ /85 227Q4g

@@0 880P p

ADQCg pg( 0 FOR

~QO

I P

1 J"

I Vp J

REGION V Plants Included:

Diablo Canyon 2

Palo Verde 1

e

LICENSING STATUS OF DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 Diablo Canyon Unit 2 i< in the final stages of the OL review.

Pacific Gas and ElectricCompany, (PGLE) informed the NRC on January 29, 1985 that Unit 2 will be ready for fuel loading by March 31, 1985.

Initial criticality is scheduled for early June and power ascension (above 5X) is expected to commence mid-June.

This is a delay of one month from the previous schedule.

It is attributed to delays in the turnover of the unit from construction to startup/operations and in the completion of modifications.

FSAR REVIEW The FSAR review has been completed.

The PG8E safety analysis for Diablo Canyon Unit 1 and 2 are included in a single FSAR, which was completely updated in September 1984.

The staff Safety Evaluation Report was issued in October 1974 for both units and has since been supplemented with SSER 1 through'7 for both units.

SSER 18 through

27. address a number of subjects and issues, as described below, with respect to Unit 1 only.

LICENSING The following matters previously evaluated with regard to Unit 1 ar'e now being evaluated for Unit 2.

Desi n Verification 2.

The Unit 1 issues that resulted from the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP), the PGEE Internal Technical Program (ITP), the NRC evaluation and other related design verification efforts are being evaluated with respect to Unit 2 applicability, implementation and completion.

This includes an evaluation of the PGBE Unit 2 Internal Review Program (IRP) which tracks this effort.

The staff has, conducted extensive audits and inspections, in particu/ar with respect to matters of seismic design and analysis.

An SER Supplement on this matter is in preparation which will also be provided to Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board for its consideration regarding a decision on the need for further hearings on design gA for Unit 2.

Alle ations Since 1982 approximately 1650 allegations have been received by the NRC regarding the design, construction and operation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.

Many of them were submitted in support of various petitions pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 by the Government Accountability Project (GAP).

They have been evaluated primarily. by Region V, NRR and OI as appropriate with respect to Unit 1 and a final SER Supplement for Unit 1 is in preparation.

The allegations are currently being evaluated with respect to applicability and safety significance for Unit 2.

An evaluation will be issued prior to a licensing decision for Unit 2.

l t

C>)

LICENSING STATUS OF DIABLO CANYON 2 3.

Piping and Sup orts Many of the allegations under Item 2 above pertain to piping and pipe supports.

The staff evaluated this entire matter for Unit 1, including extensive audits and inspections at the PGEE offices and at the site (SSER-25).

This resulted in several specific license conditions in the Unit 1 low power license.

The staff is conducting a similar effort for Unit 2 and an evaluation will be issued prior to a license decision.

4.

Resolution of Licensinq Matters SSER 27 (July 1984) presented the staff evaluation of a number n+ issues in support nf -the issuance of a full power license for Unit 1.

They include the following items:

5.

Fire Proter'tion Staffing for Unit 1 and 2 combined operation Post Accident Sampling System Regulatory Guide 1.97 NUREG-0737 commitments-and open items Applicability of Unit I license conditions A Safety Evaluation will be issued prior to a license decision and license conditions will be included in the Unit 2 license as appropriate.

Technical S ecifications PGAE'has revised the current Technical Specifications for Unit 1

~to (I) include specifications for Unit 2, as appropriate, due to differences between the two units and tn account

~or shared

- systems and operations, and (21 correct the specifications (editorial corrections, additional clarification, improved consistency and nomenclature),

update the specifications (radiological effluents, reporting requirements and administration>.

The staff intends to issue these revised Technical Specifications for Unit 2 only at the time nf issuance of.the Unit 2 license and reissue them for Unit l and 2 as combined Technical Specifications at a later time after appropriate Sholly notifications.

0 l

LICENSING STATUS OF DIABLO CANYON 2 HEARINGS The initial decision by the Atomic Safety and I,icensing Board of August 1982 authorizing issuance of a full-power license also applies to Unit 2.

However, the favorable decision of March 1984 of the Appeal Board regarding design quality assurance (ALAB-763) and its decision affirming the Initial Decision (ALAB-781) expressly stay the effectiveness of the authorization to issue a full-power license for Unit 2.

Further Appeal Board action is necessary.

NRC INSPECTION ITEMS 1.

Construction Inspections of modifications resulting from the design verifications program is in progress.

These inspections have resulted in approximately ll items of noncompliance from January 1,

1983 to January 31, 1984.

There are currently about 3 open items resulting from this inspection effort.

2.

Preo erational Testin The majority of the Unit 2 preoperational testing inspection program activities have been completed.

There are currently no open items in this functional area that would adversely impact low power testing.

3.

Radiation and Protection and Radwaste The radiation protection inspection program has been completed with no adverse findings.

The radwaste and effluent monitoring system inspections remain incomplete pending completion of several preoperational tests and monitor calibrations.

These tests and calibrations are not scheduled to be complete until the last week of March.

Recent testing of the post accident sampling system performed by the licensee was found to be unacceptable by them.

These tests will be repeated.

At this time, no substantive issues have been identified in this area which would impact the schedule for licensing.

4.

Emer enc Pre aredness The emergency preparedness preoperatjqnal inspection program is planned by FY-85.

i(/

I

'r t

LICENSING STATUS OF PALO VERDE 1

Operating License NPF-34, restricted to 5/ of rated power, was issued on December 31, 1984.

Fuel loading was initiated on January 7,

1985 and was completed on January 12, 1985.

Initial criticality is targeted for May 7, 1985.

The licensee expects to complete the 5/ testing program by late May 1985.

FSAR Review The FSAR review is complete with the exception of (1) several. issues for which the requirements for completion are addressed by conditions in the

license, and (2) the evaluation of two test methods for tests to be performed after exceeding 5% power, as discussed in SSER 7.

H~earin s

The record for Unit 1 was closed in June

1982, and the Licensing Board and Appeal Board decisions were i.ssued in December 1982 and February
1983, respectively.

Preplanned inspection program activities were completed prior to licensing.

There are currently 27 construction open items in inspection reports applicable to Unit 1.

There are also 12 operational open items.

The open items were reviewed for licensing impact prior to licensing and judged not to be controlling issues.

The licensee's open 50.55e reports, which include the construction open items in the inspection reports, were also reviewed.

Where appropriate, a number of these items were made license conditions.

The inspection program for radiation protection is complete.

Incomplete licensee actions regarding PASS and CRACS were documented as license conditions or by formal written commitments for completion prior to entrance into a specific mode of operation.

A recent design controls inspection at Bechtel Norwalk in December identified two potentially significant design issues.

One of the issues (equipment nozzle loading) remains open.

The licensee has committed to complete its review prior to initial criticality.

~Safe nards The preoperational physical security inspection has been completed.

As a result of this inspection, the licensee's Security Program was found to be in compliance with NRC security requirements except in the areas of (1) security vital area alarm rate, (2) outdoor protected area lighting, (3) eye examinations for security officers, and (4) security lock and security system test procedures update.

.The licensee committed to correcting these deficiencies by January 31, 1985, with the glaucoma testing of security oficers being completed by April 30, 1985.

0 I

P F

0 lj LICENSING STATUS OF PALO VERDE 1 Inde endent A Evaluation In 1982, the licensee obtained Torrey Pines Technology (TPT) to perform an independent quality assurance evaluation for Palo Verde.

The scope of review was approved by the NRC staff and the scope included evaluation of (1) the management organization, (2) gA policies and activities, and (3) design and construction verification.

Following completion of the evaluation, TPT'ubmitted a final. report in November 1982 which identified the following:

(1) 16 Findings - 'each of which was defined as a deviation that could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard (2) 41 Observations - each of which was defined'as a deviation with no potential for a substantial safety hazard In response to the TPT Findings, the'icensee's provided.Corrective'ction Plans for resolving the issues.

The staff has revi'ewed both the TPT evaluation of Palo Verde as well as the licensee's corrective actions.

The TPT evaluation-'has shown that the quality assurance program established and implemented for Palo Verde was effective in controlling design activities.

While deficiencies were identified in the program controls and implementation,

'the overall quality'ssurance activities were adequately performed so that no adverse impact on safety was found.

The TPT findings appear to be isolated issues. that are not indicative of any generic problems.

The staff has also found that the licensee's corrective actions for the individual findings satisfactorily resolve each issue.

1 It should be noted that.although the subsequent findings resulting from the Region V special team inspection in 1983 did identify problems with the licensee's gA program, the Region Y 'findings primarily involved activities performed after the system or components had been turned over to Operations and Startup.

Therefore, th4 Region'V findings do not invalidate the TPT findings regarding the Palo Verde gA-Program for design and construction.

0 eratin Ex erience of Licensee The current operating experience of the licensee's personnel is as follows:

previous (1)

No one above the Director of Nuclear Operations has anyhnuclear power plant operating'experience.

However, the licensee has hired an experienced individual who has had previous operations and plant management experience to serve as an advisor to the Vice President, Nuclear Production.

~

~

IM

LICENSING STATUS OF PALO VERDE 1 (2)

The Director of Nuclear Oper ati ons has non-l icensed experi ence at other plants in the areas of startup and plant support (3 years),

as assistant superintendent of operations and engineering (2 years) and as assistant plant superintendent (2 years).

(3}

Other managers'perating experience include:

Maintenance Manager (8 years PWR)

Nuclear Fuel Management Manager (~ years PWR)

Nuclear Safety Manager (3 years PWR)'Technical Support. Manager (2 years PWR)

(4)

The operating experience of the currently licensed operators is as follows:

6 shift supervisors with a total of lA years (4

PWR) 19 SROs with a total of 16 years (5

PWR) 15 ROs with a total of 1 year (0 PWR).

All but ~ allegation areas being followed by Region V have been examined and the conclusions reported in inspection reports.

The ~ allegation areas which remain open ar'e described in the attached table.

OI Investi ations

. There are two pending investigations and three pending inquiries which address (1) alleged deficiencies in a piping system, (2) improper, testing, (3}

omissions in documents by applicant's data processing, (4) falsification of

records, and (5) intimidation of gC personnel.

The staff is actively pursuing these matters and it does not appear that the finding from the OI evaluation and any, subsequent required technical evaluhtion would impact lower power licensing.

One of these issues (falsification of records) was referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a proposed enforcement action (civil penalty) by Region Y on this matter was being held up pending completion of review by QOJ and OI.

The Department of Justice has declined prosecution on the issue of falsification of records.

The Office of Investigation report addressing this issue was released to the licensee by the Regional Administrator, Region V, on November 21, 1984.

The licensee now h'as 30 days in which to respond to the proposed imposition of.

civil penalty that addresses the falsification of records issue.

The proposed imposition of civil pen'alty was issued December 12, 1983, but the licensee was granted an extension of time in which to respond pending the release of the OI report.

4

~

I

LICENSING STATUS OF PALO VERDE 1 General Former Bechtel employees have made allegations through the intervenors that Bechtel has buried good tools and equipment in a burial ground on site with the intent of running up the cost of the contracts.

It was alleged that Bechtel has a cost plus fixed fee contract.

Bechtel has denied that they have a cost plus fixed fee contract.

The tools or equipment which were buried were in disrepair and not useable.

The State Attorney General's office of Arizona has been involved in the case for consideration of possible potential criminal offense.

This allegation is not within the jurisdiction of the NRC.

V

STATUS OF OPEN FSAR ISSUES PLANT " PALO VERDE UNIT 1 PH

- E.

LICITRA X27200 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PROOF 8t REVIEW:

8/84 FINAL: ll/84 - License issued 12/84 s

Ha or 0 en Issues 1.

Periodic testing of isolation valves Res onsible Or :

NRR/DSI/CSB I

~Cate or N/A SSER Schedule

~Io ut Issue 4/1/85 '5I85 Comments Under staff review.

2.

Detailed control room design review Offsite Emergency Planning NRR/DHFS/HFEB IE/DEPER/EPB NIA 10/1/85 11/85 4/1/85 05/85 Not required tor full-power license.

FERA finding on offsite emergency plans required.

4.

Chapter 15 Reanalysis NRR/DSI/RSB 4/1/85 05/85 Licensee to submit infor-mati on prior to initial certificati on.

5.

6.

Chemistry Control and Sampling Systems Evaluation of Operating Experience NRR/DE/CHEB NRRIDHFS/LQB N/A 3/1/85 05/85 4/1/85 05/85 Licensee to submit i@forma-tion by 2/1/85.

, Licensee submittals on 9/12/84 and 10/25/84.

Additional input required from licensee.

7.

Shift Advisors NRR/DHFS/LQB 4/1/85 05/85 Licensee's plan is acceptable

-but details of training program for shift advisors are required for review prior to initial criticality.

4

'l

~ ~,J

PALO VERDE ALLEGATIONS 1.

Test data falsification 2.

Reactor vessel stud hardness 3.

Improper field modifications of a HVAC support

1I P

7

'U