ML16341B703

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Memorandum & Order (ALAB-649) Denying Governor Brown 800612 Motion for Immediate Briefing on Security Matter.Motion Does Not Demonstrate Any Connection Between Incident Mentioned in Nucleonics Week 810611 Issue & Plants
ML16341B703
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  
Issue date: 07/15/1981
From: Bishop C, Bishop Dj
NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
To:
CALIFORNIA, STATE OF
References
ALAB-649, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8107200096
Download: ML16341B703 (8)


Text

DCeggs)

USNRt:

C 00 Dockebng 8 Sennce cfetrrtpl Branch gfII'g Gu 5-JUL1 r1981 t>aEa~Eo JQ~)a )9a)

'UL)16 19lg, v Nlfie'" ye@

Administrative Judges:

Richard S.

Salzman, Chairman Dr.

W.

Reed Johnson Thomas S.

Moore UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD

)

In the Matter of

)

Jp

)

PACIFIC GAS 6 ELECTRIC COMPANY) Docket o~l $0~

5 OL

)

0-323 OL (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power

)

Plant, Units 1 and 2)

)

)

Messrs.

Bruce Norton and Arthur C. Gehr, Phoenix,

Arizona, and Malcolm H. Furbush, Philip A. Crane, Jr.,

and Dou las A. 0 lesby, San Francisco, Cali-fornia, for the applicant, Pacific Gas and Electric Company.

Messrs.

Herbert H. Brown, Lawrence C.

Lan her and Christo her B. Hanback, Washington, D. C.,

and B ron S.

Geor iou, Sacramento, California, for the Governor of California.

Messrs.

William J.

Olmstead and Charles Barth and Mrs. Lucinda Low Swartz for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER July 15, 1981 (ALAB-649)

On June 12,

1980, the Governor of California moved for an "Immediate Briefing on

[a] Security Matter."

As grounds for the briefing, we are told that the Governor's "counsel read in the June ll, 1981 issue of Nucleonics Week that alleged sabotage with serious potential consequences for public health and safety occurred recently at the Beaver

'810720009'b 810715 PDR ADOCK 05000275 9

PDR

Valley-1 Nuclear Power Plant."

The Governor's counsel believes that a full briefing for this Board and all par-ticipants in this case would be the only effective means to determine the relevance of the incident to the situation at the Diablo Canyon plant in California.

A copy of the four paragraph article from the trade journal in question was attached to the Governor's motion; no other information accompanied it.

The staff and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, the applicant, oppose the Governor' request.

No briefing is warranted on the basis of the papers be-fore us.

The Governor makes no effort in his 17-line motion to demonstrate any connection between the incident mentioned and this case.

We are not told, for example, whether the alleged incident is even theoretically possible at Diablo Canyon.

We are left to speculate whether the two reactors employ the same type of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) with a similar arrangement of pumps and valves, or whether the potential consequences of closing an ECCS suction valve at Diablo Canyon are likely to be the same as those that were hypothesized for Beaver Valley. Nor do we know whether the proposed technical specifications for the Diablo Canyon operating license application require the same procedures for assuring proper ECCS valve alignment as those employed at

Beaver Valley.

These and a myriad of similar questions are 1/

generally answerable from materials available to the public without any need to resort to sensitive security information.

Rather than shoulder his initial burden to demonstrate rele-

vance, Governor Brown seeks to transfer the lead to us and the NRC staff.

No basis exists for the. relief sought in the absence of a showing of such relevance.

Although the staff's response made no mention of any ongoing investigation, the article in Nucleonics Week in-dicates that the Beaver Valley licensee, the NRC staff, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are looking into the matter.

If, while this case is still pending before us, the staff's inquiry should disclose relevant information of significance to the Diablo Canyon security proceeding, we will surely be so informed.

The staff has long been obliged to keep the licensing and appeal boards apprised of significant 2/

developments in pending cases, and is further obligated "to 1/

See 10 CFR %52. 790,

50. 34 (b),
50. 36 (a),

and

50. 39.

2/

Duke Power Co.

(McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and

lay all relevant materials before the Board to enable it adequately to dispose of the issues before it."

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-77-2, 5

NRC 13, 15 (1977).

Accord, Vir inia Electric and Power Co.

(North Anna Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-551, 3/

9 NRC 704, 706 (1979).

Notion denied.

It is so ORDERED.

FOR THE APPEAL BOARD C. J n Ba.shop Secre ary to the Appeal Board 3/

Finally, should it determine that the Beaver Valley incident, raises a significant safety issue after our jurisdiction in this proceeding has terminated, the staff would be required to assess any possible impli-cations for other licensed facilities, including Diablo

Canyon, as part of its continuing regulatory responsi-bilities.

~

~