ML16253A136

Restart of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2

ML16253A136
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	03/12/1991
From:	Banks M, Ward D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Carr K NRC/Chairman
References
D910312
Download: ML16253A136 (2)

Text

D910312 The Honorable Kenneth M. Carr Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

RESTART OF THE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 During the 371st meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, March 7-9, 1991, we reviewed the status of the resolution of the issues relating to the restart of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFNP), Unit 2. Our Subcommittee on TVA Plant Licensing and Restart met on March 4-5, 1991, to discuss this matter and toured several areas of the BFNP on the morning of March 4, 1991. We had the benefit of discussions with the NRC staff and TVA representatives, as well as the documents referenced.

The BFNP consists of three BWR electric generating units, each rated at 1098 MWe. TVA shut down Unit 2 for refueling in September 1984 and shut down Units 1 and 3 in March 1985 because of NRC concerns regarding declining performance at BFNP. All three units have remained shutdown.

On September 17, 1985, the Executive Director for Operations of the NRC issued a letter to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of TVA requesting information on the actions being taken to resolve NRC's concerns about TVA's nuclear program, including the BFNP.

In response, TVA submitted to the NRC a Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan. This plan identified the root causes of the problem in TVA's nuclear program and described measures to remedy the problems at the corporate level.

In addition to its Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan, TVA prepared separate plans to address the problems at each of its nuclear plants. The Browns Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan (BFNPP), Rev.

2, describes the problems and the corrective actions to be taken at Browns Ferry. The BFNPP was specifically directed to the restart of Unit 2, although many of the programs associated with Unit 2 restart have applicability to Units 1 and 3.

TVA determined the problems at Browns Ferry to be the result of three primary causes:

(1) Lack of clear assignment of responsibility and authority to managers and their organizations that clearly established accountability for performance.

(2) Insufficient management involvement and control in the work place leading to a failure to adequately establish highest quality of performance.

(3) Failure to maintain consistently a documented design basis for

the plant and to control consistently the plant's configuration with that basis.

The BFNPP identified specific functional areas of plant activities that were determined to require strengthening on a long-term continuing basis. These included operations, maintenance, surveillance, radiological controls, chemistry, security, emergency preparedness, and scheduling of activities at the site.

During our review, we considered the organizational changes, plant and equipment modifications, and quality control measures that are being implemented to accomplish improvements and corrective actions. We also considered matters related to corporate and plant personnel and personnel training programs. In addition, we were informed of measures that TVA has taken to learn from the nuclear industry, including visits to plants with good operating performance.

During the tour of BFNP, members of our subcommittee observed results of TVA management efforts to improve the working environment and morale of plant employees, to encourage responsiveness, and to establish better lines of communication with employees.

We conclude that the problems and deficiencies that led to the shutdown of BFNP are being addressed adequately. We believe that after TVA has appropriately implemented its commitments and corrective action plans described in the BFNPP to the satisfaction of the NRC staff, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely, David A. Ward Chairman

References:

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, April 1989, "Safety Evaluation Report on Tennessee Valley Authority, Browns Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan;" Supplement 1, October 1989; and Supplement 2, January 1991.

2. Tennessee Valley Authority, Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan, Volume 1, Rev. 6, May 5, 1989.

3. Tennessee Valley Authority, Browns Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan, Volume 3, Rev. 2, October 24, 1988