ML16224A221

Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 to Protect Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants

ML16224A221
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/10/1993
From:	Banks M Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Selin I NRC/Chairman
References
Download: ML16224A221 (2)

Text

D931210 The Honorable Ivan Selin Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 73 TO PROTECT AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS During the 403rd meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, November 4-6, 1993, we discussed SECY-93-270, which contains proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 to protect against malevolent use of vehicles at nuclear power plants. Our Subcommit-tee on Safeguards and Security reviewed this matter during a meeting on November 3, 1993. During this review we had the benefit of discussions with representatives of the NRC staff. We also had the benefit of the document referenced.

We do not support the proposal to go ahead with expedited rule-making, and regret that the issue came to us so late in the process that it is awkward to apply brakes now. But it is never too late.

The stated reason for enhancing the defenses of nuclear power plants against attack through vehicle-borne people or explosives (the staff interprets the word vehicle in the narrow sense, as car or truck) is that the attack on the World Trade Center and the unplanned intrusion at Three Mile Island Unit 1 provide bases for increasing both the Design-Basis Threat and the "Actual Threat."

The latter is a euphemism for the best intelligence information available to NRC. We do not believe that either increase is justified by the facts. It is particularly disturbing that the proposed amendments and consequent backfits are on a fast track, lacking the customary analysis, and that the Commission has apparently endorsed this approach.

A threat is always a function of both the level of potential harm to the public and its probability-no matter how challenging it may be to estimate the latter it is always possible. Indeed, an effort to do so can serve to enforce clear thinking. The staff has made no effort to estimate the likelihood of a malevolent intrusion, either before or after the two events cited, but has simply asserted that the risk has increased, and that the increase alone justifies the imposition of new requirements.

One of the more praiseworthy trends in risk management in recent years has been toward effective use of probability as a tool in regulation, whether through risk-based maintenance, cost-benefit analysis of backfits, promulgation of safety goals, or other mechanisms. The Commission has repeatedly endorsed this trend, and it is disheartening to see it so blatantly ignored in this case.

Lest there be a misunderstanding, we do not suggest for a moment

that there is no risk, only that there is no basis for the conclusion that it has recently and substantially increased.

The staff also asserts that it is newly concerned about timely warning of the accumulation of explosive materials in sufficient quantity to support an attack. We find that puzzling. All truck bombings for which the explosive material is known to any of us have been conducted with ANFO (ammonium nitrate/fuel oil), and the intelligence agencies have never been able to track the flow. Not only is there prodigious national use of this explosive for blasting (in the order of a megaton per year), but other normal uses of these base materials far exceed this. None of us know of any recent change in the difficulty of tracking this kind of explosive, nor did the staff suggest any.

We believe that the imposition of new requirements to counter the threat of vehicular attack should follow the usual orderly path of analysis for both cost and effectiveness. The latter should include a realistic assessment of the threat, including probabili-ties. Of course this is hard, but it is not impossible. And it depends on the thoughtful use of the best available intelligence data.

We are unconvinced of the need to rush into rulemaking. If there is special information unknown to any of us, leading to the conclusion that the threat has truly changed substantially for the worse, then there may not be adequate time for rulemaking, and the Commission should invoke its emergency authority. There is little to be said for the present course, too slow if the need is urgent, too fast if it is not.

Additional comments by ACRS Members Peter R. Davis, Carlyle Michelson, William J. Shack, and Charles J. Wylie are presented below.

Sincerely, J. Ernest Wilkins, Jr.

Chairman Additional Comments by ACRS Members Peter R. Davis, Carlyle Michelson, William J. Shack, and Charles J. Wylie We support the staff recommendation stated in SECY-93-270. It is our view that the proposed rule represents a prudent and effective step toward enhancing public health and safety.

Reference:

SECY-93-270, Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 to Protect Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, dated September 29, 1993