ML16223A413

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Public Comments on Proposed Rule on Alwr Severe Accident Performance
ML16223A413
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/18/1993
From: Wilkins J
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To: Taylor J
NRC/EDO
References
D930618
Download: ML16223A413 (2)


Text

D930618 Mr. James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Taylor:

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE ON ALWR SEVERE ACCIDENT PERFORMANCE During the 398th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, June 10-11, 1993, we discussed with members of the staff public comments received on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) on ALWR Severe Accident Performance. We had the benefit of the documents referenced.

It is our understanding that the staff's proposed approach for proceeding with rulemaking involves the following four elements:

1. Continuing discussions with ACRS concerning a potential generic rule,
2. Delaying a final decision on implementation of the rule until after final safety evaluation reports are issued for the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) and the CE System 80+,
3. Coordinating the efforts of drafting a generic rule and the design certification rules for the ABWR and the CE System 80+

to ensure consistency, and

4. Following the reviews of the evolutionary and passive reactor designs to ensure consistency of the draft rule with these reviews.

We agree with this approach.

In our reports on this subject dated May 17, 1991 and May 14, 1992, we developed and subsequently endorsed what is designated as Alternative 3 in the ANPR. We continue to recommend this alternative.

For your further consideration, we recommend that your approach accommodate the following:

1. The amended regulations should not be so prescriptive as to preclude the use of a design feature which substantially reduces the challenge(s) to the containment. For example, the approach should not require accommodation of large amounts of hydrogen generation if a design change (such as different core materials) precludes significant hydrogen generation,
2. The recognition of passive design features to cope with some phenomena, e.g., a large volume-high strength containment, and
3. Consideration for dealing with combinations of containment loads from severe accident phenomena, e.g., steam explosions and hydrogen combustion/detonation.

We expect to have further discussions with the staff on this matter.

Sincerely, J. Ernest Wilkins, Jr.

Chairman

References:

1. Memorandum dated May 14, 1993, from Warren Minners, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, for John T. Larkins, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,

Subject:

Summary of Public Comments on Proposed Rule on ALWR Severe Accident Performance

- 57 FR 44513 (Predecisional Draft Commission Paper Attached)

2. Report dated May 17, 1991, from David A. Ward, Chairman, ACRS, to Kenneth M. Carr, Chairman, NRC,

Subject:

Proposed Criteria to Accommodate Severe Accidents in Containment Design

3. Report dated May 14, 1992, from David A. Ward, Chairman, ACRS, to James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations, NRC,

Subject:

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Severe Accident Plant Performance Criteria for Future LWRS