ML16152A249

Title:

Makeup Control - Dilute JPM Number: NRCL141-LJCS1 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-11 (75%, MOL).

Perform the following:

1. Go to RUN.

2. Simulate preparation for a load ramp to 90% by:

Placing MW IN feedback in on the DEHC panel.

Setting in a 3 MW/min ramp rate to a TARGET of 1080 MW.

3. Leave ramp on HOLD.

4. Go to FREEZE.

Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS1.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 11 OF 12 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS1 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

Unit 1 has been stable at 75% power for an extended period.

The shift is about to commence a load ramp to 90% power at 3 MW/min Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform a batch dilution of 100 gallons at 50 gpm, per OP B-1A:VII, section 6.6, and then return the makeup system to automatic operation. Equalization of Pressurizer boron concentration using heaters is desired .

NRCL141-LJCS1 PAGE 12 OF 12 REV. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS2

Title:

Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

References:

EOP E-1.1, SI Termination, Rev 30 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 2, 3, 4, 5 (step 5 is conditional on examinee performance of FOP Item)

Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: New alt path JPM 013.A2.01 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the Gen KA # / Rating: 4.6/4.8 following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions - LOCA.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 02/12/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 02/16/2016 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the student. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: None Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 was operating at low power, when an RCS leak developed.

OP AP-1 for RCS Leakage was entered, and the leak rate required the initiation of a Safety Injection.

The crew completed EOP E-0; EOP E-1 progressed to step 7, where SI Termination Criteria was checked, and met.

Transition was made to EOP E-1.1, SI Termination. The procedure has been performed through step 6 Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to continue actions to reduce ECCS flow in EOP E-1.1, starting at step 7 .

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: Medium and Low-head ECCS pumps are secured, and then ECCS flow is reestablished (after evaluating Pzr Level), per steps 7-9 of EOP E-1.1.

Note: JPM steps 4 and/or 5, may be performed. Either part/all of E-1.1, step 9 (step 4), or go directly to the FOP #3 for actions (step 5). Either method is acceptable, and is covered by the JPM.

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JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Step 7a - Checks if SI pumps should be 1.1 Referenced E-1.1, and begins secured. performance at step 7.

1.2 Checked RCS pressure stable or rising (it is, due to small size of current leak).

1.3 Checked RCS pressure greater than 1650 psig (pressure is in the normal range at this point).

1.4 Checked that NO SI pp flow is indicated (no flow).

Note: When the first RHR pump is secured, the RCS leak size will increase, so that Pzr level will drop to < 12% by the time step 9 is reached.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2.** Step 7b - Stops both SI Pumps. 2.1 Stopped both SI pumps. **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Step 8 - Checks if RHR pumps should 3.1 Observed that both RHR pumps are be stopped. aligned to the RWST.

3.2 Stopped both RHR pumps. **

Note: If the FOP Item #3 (SI reinitiation) is referred to and acted on at any point, skip to JPM step 5, and mark the unperformed parts of step 3 & 4 N/A.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

4.** Step 9 - Ensures ECCS flow is NOT 4.1 Checked RCS subcolled margin > 20 F (it is, required. (mark this step N/A, if FOP although falling).

3 was used, and continue with JPM step 5) 4.2 Checked Pzr level > 12% (it is either below 12%, or will be while observing; ie, dropping rapidly), proceeds to RNO part of step.

4.3 Restarted 2nd CCP. **

4.4 Restarted both SI pumps. **

4.5 Restarted a RHR pump (may start both).

4.6 Opened 8803A and 8803B.**

4.7 Opened 8801A and 8801B.**

4.8 Closed 8107 and 8108.

4.9 Transitioned to EOP E-1.

Cue: Other operators will continue with performance of EOP E-1.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 5.** Evaluates Foldout Page (FOP) Item #3, 5.1 Evaluated FOP #3, and determines that SI Reinitiation. SCM is adequate, but Pzr level cannot be maintained > 12%.

Note: This JPM step is only performed if the FOP #3 is acted on vs performing E-1.1, step 9; otherwise, mark step N/A.

NOTE: FOP states "Manually start ECCS pumps as necessary". If asked give cue Cue: The SFM directs that you start ALL ECCS CCPs and SI pumps, and one RHR pump while the crew transitions to EOP E-1.

5.2 Restarted 2nd CCP. **

5.3 Restarted both SI pumps. **

5.4 Restarted oneRHR pump.

5.5 Opened 8803A and 8803B.**

5.6 Opened 8801A and 8801B.**

5.7 Closed 8107 and 8108.

Cue: Other operators will continue with performance of EOP E-1.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI Termination JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Reinitiate ECCS Flow Following SI JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 Termination ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize the simulator to IC-156 (Based on HSB for S/U, MOL).

Perform the following:

1. Place FCV-603 and FCV-431 in OPEN position.

2. Place LCV-12 in CTRL Only

3. Place Aux Bldg Char Htr switch in neutral

4. Acknowledge alarms as needed (optional) Create IC at this point, to minimize multiple setups (if desired)

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

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EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS2 Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 was operating at low power, when an RCS leak developed.

OP AP-1 for RCS Leakage was entered, and the leak rate required the initiation of a Safety Injection.

The crew completed EOP E-0; EOP E-1 progressed to step 7, where SI Termination Criteria was checked, and met.

Transition was made to EOP E-1.1, SI Termination. The procedure has been performed through step 6 Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to continue actions to reduce ECCS flow in EOP E-1.1, starting at step 7 .

NRCL141-LJCS2.DOCX PAGE 8 OF 8 REV. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS3

Title:

Isolate the Accumulators Following a LOCA Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: (Note: Any unsat step requires a numbered comment; Use back as needed.

References:

EOP E-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown & Depressurization, Rev 23 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes (average validation time ___ min)

Critical Steps:

Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: Bank alternate path JPM Gen KA # / Rating: 006.A4.02 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) - Ability 3.8 / 4.0 to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Valves.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 02/08/16 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 02/10/16 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

After identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told the step at which to begin.

Required Materials:

Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

A small break LOCA (SBLOCA) has occurred on U1.

The operating crew has completed EOP E-0, transitioned to EOP E-1, and is now working in EOP E-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown &

Depressurization.

An RCS cooldown is in progress, and the crew has just transitioned from step 15c RNO to step 24, while waiting for additional subcooled margin to build in.

Initiating Cue: You are directed by the SFM to evaluate the accumulator isolation criteria and, if required, isolate the accumulators as directed by EOP E-1.2, Steps 24 & 25.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: Accumulator isolation criteria have been correctly evaluated and accumulators have been isolated or vented, if allowed, in accordance with Step 25 of EOP E-1.2.

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JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtained the correct procedure. 1.1 Referenced EOP E-1.2.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

2. ENSURE ECCS Flow NOT Required 2.1 Observed that RCS SCM is > 20 °F (VB2 (done twice, once in step 24, and vertical section bottom, or Appendix C).

again in step 25).

2.2 Observed that PZR level is > 12%, and continues to next step (VB3 vertical section right side).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3. Rack in the breakers for 8808 A, B, C, Note: The breakers for 8808A, B, & D and D, Accum Outlet Isol Vlvs were already racked-in in IC 219.

3.1 Contacted an available watch stander and directed closure of the accumulator isolation valve breakers: **

8808A: 52-1F-46 and 52-1F-46R

8808B: 52-1G-07 and 52-1G-07R

8808C: 52-1H-14 and 52-1H-14R

8808D: 52-1G-05 and 52-1G-05R Cue: Watch stander reports back that all breakers closed except 52-1H-14 (8808C) which tripped when he tried to close the breaker; the breaker shows physical damage.

(Step continued on next page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

4. Close 8808 A, B, and D. 4.1 Selected CLOSE on 8808A, 8808B, and 8808D. **

4.2 Ensured 8808A, 8808B, and 8808D had closed.

4.3 Diagnosed that accumulator 13 could not be isolated.

4.4 Referred to Step 25.d RNO.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

<< ALTERNATE PATH - START POINT >>

5.** Close 8880, accumulator nitrogen 5.1 Observed that 8880 was already closed.

isolation fill valve (VB1 vertical section, right side)**

Note: May have selected CLOSE on 8880.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

6. Open 8875C, accumulator vent and 6.1 Opened 8875C. **

nitrogen fill valve for accumulator 1-3.

(Step continued on next page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 6.2 Ensured 8875C had opened.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

7.** Open HCV943, Accum N2 Vent Control 7.1 Opened HCV-943 (VB1, vertical section, Valve center) **

7.2 Ensured accumulator 13 pressure was lowering. (VB1, vertical section, right side, top)

Note: Once the examinee has noted lowering pressure, the console operator will use time compression and quickly depress the accumulator. Once noted, provide the following cue.

Cue: Accumulator 13 is completely depressurized. (Time compression is being used.)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8. When accumulator is depressurized, 8.1 Closed HCV-943.

then close HCV-943.

(Step continued on next page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

9. Close 8875C. 9.1 Closed 8875C.

9.2 Ensured 8875C had closed.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

<< ALTERNATE PATH - END POINT >>

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS3 PAGE 7 OF 9 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

NRCL141-LJCS3.DOCX PAGE 8 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: ISOLATE ACCUMULATORS JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to IC-157 .

Perform the following:

1. Go to RUN.

2. Go to FREEZE.

Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS3.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

nrcl141-ljcs3 PAGE 9 OF 9 REV. 0 rev0.docx

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS3 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

A small break LOCA (SBLOCA) has occurred on U1.

The operating crew has completed EOP E-0, transitioned to EOP E-1, and is now working in EOP E-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown &

Depressurization.

An RCS cooldown is in progress, and the crew has just transitioned from step 15c RNO to step 24, while waiting for additional subcooled margin to build in.

Initiating Cue: You are directed by the SFM to evaluate the accumulator isolation criteria and, if required, isolate the accumulators as directed by EOP E-1.2, Steps 24 & 25.

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NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS4

Title:

Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: _______ minutes Comments:

References:

EOP FR-C.1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 5.7, 5.10 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New for L141 Gen KA / Rating: 074.EA2.02 - Ability to determine or interpret the following 4.3 / 4.6 as they apply to Inadequate Core Cooling:

Availability of main or auxiliary feedwater.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 11/01/2015 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 02/10/2016 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: EOP FR-C.1, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling Initial Conditions GIVEN:

Unit 1 has experienced a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident

All ECCS Pumps have tripped on overcurrent

AFW pump 1-1 has tripped on overspeed and cannot be reset

AFW pump 1-2 has tripped on overcurrent Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP FR-C.1 starting at step 10, Check Intact Steam Generators.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: EOP FR-C.1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling is performed to complete the following to address equipment failures:

Conditions for invoking Continuous Action Step 10 are recognized.

PORVs and Reactor Head Vents are opened.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 2 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 Referenced EOP FR-C.1.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 10 - Check Intact Steam 2.1 Observed Cautions prior to step 10.

Generators.

2.2 Noted adverse containment values apply.

2.3 Determined ALL S/G NR levels are <25%,

but total AFW flow to S/Gs 1-3 and 1-4 is >

435 GPM.

2.4 Maintained AFW flow to S/Gs 1-3 and 1-4 to recover levels.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

(Note: Examinee should continue with procedure steps below until AFW Pump 1-3 trips (S/G level 14.5% rising). This should cause the examinee to invoke Continuous Action Step 10. See Exam Line Item 9 on page 6 of 11.)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. Step 11 - Check RCS Vent Paths. 3.1 Determined power is available to PORV block valves - VB2 right side.

3.2 Determined all PORVs closed.

3.3 Determined all PORV block valves open.

3.4 Determined all Reactor Vessel Vent Valves closed.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

<< ALTERNATE PATH - START POINT >>

Note: When AFW Pump 1-3 trips, AFW flow falls to <435 gpm (zero). Examinee should return to continuous-action Step 10 and perform RNO actions.

4. Step 10 - Check Intact S/Gs (RNO). 4.1 Determined that ALL S/G NR levels were

<25%, and there was NO AFW flow.

CUE: Another operator will implement Appendix F.

4.2 Went to Step 19 per Step 10 RNO.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. Step 19 - Restore Temporary Core 5.1 Observed NOTE prior to Step 19 regarding Cooling. normal conditions for starting RCPs.

5.2 Determined that Core Exit T/Cs - >1200 F 5.3 Determined that ALL S/G NR levels were

<25%, and there was NO AFW flow. Went to Step 19.b RNO.

5.4 Determined SI was previously Reset - VB1 SI Red Light out, PK08-22 AUTO SI BLOCKED - ON.

5.5 Determined Containment Isolation Phase A was reset - VB1 CI Red Lights out.

5.6 Determined FCV-584, Instrument Air to Containment, was in the required (OPEN) position - VB4 apron.

(step continued on next page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 5 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 5.** Step 19 - Restore Temporary Core 5.7 Opened all 3 PORVs - VB3 right side.

Cooling (continued).

Cont

PCV-455**

PCV-456**

PCV-474**

5.8 Determined all PORV block valves were open 5.9 Determined core exit T/Cs still >1200 F.

5.10 Opened Reactor Vessel Head Vent valves -

PAM1 behind VB5:

8078 A**

8078 D **

8078 B **

8078 C**

5.11 Went to Step 20.

CUE: Another operator will continue with this procedure.

<< ALTERNATE PATH - END POINT >>

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Restore Temporary Core Cooling during an ICC Event JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 7 OF 9 REV. 0

Title:

RESTORE TEMPORARY CORE COOLING DURING AN ICC EVENT JPM Number: NRCL141-LJCS4 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-158 Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS4.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL141-LJCS4 PAGE 8 OF 9 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS4 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

Unit 1 has experienced a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident

All ECCS Pumps have tripped on overcurrent

AFW pump 1-1 has tripped on overspeed and cannot be reset

AFW pump 1-2 has tripped on overcurrent Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform EOP FR-C.1 starting at step 10, Check Intact Steam Generators.

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NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS5

Title:

Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low Pressure Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat Total Time: _______ minutes Comments:

References:

AR PK01-01, ASW SYS HX DELTA P/HDR PRESS, Rev. 21A OP E-5:II Auxiliary Saltwater System Two CCW Heat Exchanger Operation, Rev 18.

Alternate Path: Yes ______ _ No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 7.2, 7.4, 8.1, 9.1 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 076.A2.02 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or 2.7 / 3.1 mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Service Water Header Pressure AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 11/01/2015 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 02/16/2016 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: AR PK01-01, ASW SYS HX DELTA P/HDR PRESS, Rev. 21A OP E-5:II Auxiliary Saltwater System Two CCW Heat Exchanger Operation, Rev 18.

Initial Conditions Given:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Initiating Cue: PK01-01 has just alarmed. The SFM directs you to respond to the alarm.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) System is aligned to operate with two ASW pumps and two Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchangers in accordance with OP E-5:II, Auxiliary Saltwater System Two CCW Heat Exchanger Operation, Rev 18.

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JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 Referenced AR PK01-01, ASW SYS HX DELTA P/ HDR PRESS Note: Standby ASW pump auto-start has been temporarily disabled. Examinee may recognize 40.5 psig as high end of auto-start setpoint and take manual action to start ASW Pp 1-2.

1.2 Identified input 168 for Aux Salt Wtr To CCW Ht Exch 1-1 Press Lo and continued to step 2.1 Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. PK01-01, Step 2.1 - IF a loss of ASW 2.1 Observed ASW Pump 1-1 is still in service has occurred THEN GO TO ONE of the with stable amps and flow (VB-1).

following as applicable to current Proceeded to next step.

mode.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

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JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. PK01-01, Step 2.1.2 & 2.1.3 - Read 3.1 Read CCW HX 1-1 Outlet Temperature on CCW HX outlet temperature. IF CCW TI-181 85 oF (VB-1) and transitioned to HX outlet temperature is greater than OP E-5:II, Auxiliary Saltwater System Two the following as appropriate: CCW Heat Exchanger Operation.

MODES 1-3: 80°F THEN place a second ASW pump and CCW HX in service PER OP E-5:II, Section 6.1, "Preferred Method".

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: The following Cues apply to the Prerequisite section of OP E5:II.

4. OP E-5:II, Step 4.1 - Ensure the ASW CUE: ASW System is aligned for normal System is aligned for normal plant operation per procedure.

operations PER OP E-5:I, "Auxiliary Saltwater System - Make Available" .

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 4 OF 11 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. OP E-5:II, Step 4.2 - Ensure the CCW CUE: CCW System is aligned for normal System is aligned for normal plant operation per procedure.

operations PER OP F-2:I, "Component Cooling Water System - Make Available" Note: The following Cues apply to the Precautions and Limitations Section of OP E5:II.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

6. OP E-5:II, Step 5.1 -Review Technical CUE: The Shift Foreman has reviewed Specifications 3.7.7 and 3.7.8. Tech Specs.

6.1 Read P&L 5.2 regarding limits on ASW Pump motor start frequency.

Read P&L 5.3 regarding requirement for shell side of Hx to be at higher pressure than tube side.

Read P&L 5.4 regarding potential for Unit 1 ASW pump start to cause autostart of Unit 2 ASW standby pump.

OP E-5:II, Step 5.5 (Reactivity Brief if CUE: The Shift Foreman will address any required, ASW operability, ECGs) remaining P&Ls as required.

Continued to Section 6.1, Preferred 6.2 Method - Two ASW Pumps and Two Heat Exchangers.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 5 OF 11 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 7.** OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.1 -6.1.4 (place 7.1 Read NOTE regarding two column format standby ASW pump in service) corresponding to a specific train.

7.2 Placed ASW Pp 1-2 Standby Select Switch in "MAN" (VB-1)**

7.3 Directed Unit 2 CO to place the Unit 2 standby ASW pump Standby Select Switch in "MAN" to prevent a possible auto start.

Note: AR PK01-01 will re-flash due to high pressure when the second ASW pump is started (input 1131), but will clear once the second CCW Hx is placed in service.

7.4 Turned ASW Pp 1-2 control switch to the START position.**

7.5 Checked ASW pump motor current between 42.5 - 60 amps and stable.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8.** OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.5 & 6 - Open the 8.1 Opened FCV-603, ASW supply to CCW Hx second heat exchanger ASW supply to 1-2 (VB-1).**

CCW HX valve.

8.2 Checked the differential pressure across the CCW HX in expected range 80-130 psig (PI-46, VB-1)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 6 OF 11 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 9.** OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.7 - Open the CCW 9.1 Opened FCV-431, CCW Hx 1-2 outlet valve outlet valve on the second HX to cut (VB-1).**

in CCW flow 9.2 Noted CCW Hx 1-1 outlet temperature on TI-181 starting to lower slightly.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

10. OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.8 - Check AR PK01- 10.1 Checked the AR PK01-02 did NOT come in, 02 Inputs 148 or 227 not IN by indicating ASW Room fan DID start with ensuring ASW Room Fan starts when fan start.

the pump is started Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

11. OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.9 - Notify the Unit 2 11.1 Directed Unit 2 CO to return the Unit 2 CO to place the Unit 2 standby ASW standby ASW pump Standby Select Switch pump Standby Select Switch in to "AUTO".

"AUTO".

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 7 OF 11 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

12. OP E-5:II, Step 6.1.10 - (Step 12.1 CUE: Other Operators will address the addressing alignment for > 7 days) remainder of OP E-5:II".

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 8 OF 11 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 9 OF 11 REV. 0

Title:

Respond to ASW System Heat Exchanger Low JPM Number: NRCL141-LJCS5 Pressure Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-10.

Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS5.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 10 OF 11 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS5 Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Initiating Cue: PK01-01 has just alarmed. The SFM directs you to respond to the alarm.

NRCL141-LJCS5.DOCX PAGE 11 OF 11 REV. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS6

Title:

Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup Power Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat _____ Total Time: _______ minutes Comments:

References:

OP J-6A:II, Transferring 4160 Volt Banks, Rev 18B Alternate Path: Yes ______ X _ No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 3.1, 6.1, 12.1, 17.1, 21.1, 21.3 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 062.A4.07 - Synchronizing and paralleling of different AC supplies 3.1 / 3.1 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 11/21/2015 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 02/16/2016 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: OP J-6A:II, Transferring 4160 Volt Banks, Rev 18B (place-keeping marked-up to step 6.2.4)

Initial Conditions Given:

Unit 1 is at 2% power and performing alignments per OP L-3, Secondary Plant Startup.

12 kV bus E was transferred from Auxiliary power to Startup earlier in the shift.

Grid Control Center (GCC) has been notified that transfer of 4kV house loads to the 230kV system is about to commence.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to transfer all Vital 4kV buses from Auxiliary to Startup power per OP J-6A:II, Rev 18B, beginning with step 6.2.4.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard:

4kV bus F is aligned to Startup power per OP J-6A:II, Section 6.2.

4kV bus G is aligned to Auxiliary power. Examinee manually opened Startup Breaker 52-HG-14 or Aux Breaker 52-HG-13 when bus failed to transfer to Startup as expected.

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JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 OP J-6A:II, Section 6.2.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 6.2.4 - Direct the Operator 2.1 Read NOTE regarding Startup power performing the transfers as follows: inoperability due to Load Tap Changer (LTC) in manual.

2.2 Read step regarding Operator to remain at the transfer switches while the LTC is in manual.

2.3 Read note regarding Operator being prepared to return LTC to automatic any time during the transfer if startup power operability is required.

2.4 CUE: Another operator will return the LTC to automatic if startup power operability is required.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3.** Step 6.2.5 - Pull S/U Xfmr 1-1 Low 3.1 Pulled LTC to manual (VB-5).**

Side Vltg Adjust, to place it in "MAN" 3.2 Observed MAN ADJ ENABLED light above LTC control handle illuminate.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 3 OF 14 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Next step directs Examinee to go to step corresponding with desired bus to transfer. If asked, provide the following cue:

CUE: Perform bus transfers in the order they appear alphabetically, starting with Bus F.

4. Step 6.2.6 - GO TO the step 4.1 Determined first bus to transfer is vital 4kV corresponding to the first bus to be Bus F and moved to step 6.2.29.

transferred:

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: Reset of Auto Transfer Relays is not required (not active). Examinee may elect to perform reset steps if desired.

5. Step 6.2.29 - IF necessary, reset the 5.1 Pressed 4 kV BUS F AUTO XFR RESET Auto Transfer to Startup relay. button (VB-4).

5.2 Checked 4kV Bus F Auto Transfer reset indications:

PK18-19 (4 kV BUS F AUTO TRANSFER) is OFF

4 kV BUS F AUTO XFR RESET blue light is OFF (VB-4)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 4 OF 14 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 6.** Step 6.2.30 - Insert the Synchroscope 6.1 Inserted sync key for 4kV bus F Startup key in 4kV Bus F S/U Feeder Sync feeder breaker 52-HF-14 and turned Switch and place the key in "ON". clockwise to ON (VB-4). **

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: If examinee determines synchroscope is outside acceptable range, provide the following cue:

CUE: Scope has been determined to be within the 11-1 oclock range.

7. Step 6.2.31 & 32 - Check 7.1 Determined synchroscope indication to be Synchroscope indication. within range; proceeded to step 6.2.33 (VB-4)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

8. Step 6.2.33 - Check for normal 8.1 Checked auxiliary bus voltage on 4 kV BUS auxiliary bus voltage of 114-126 volts F or SYNC BUS VOLTS meter and indicated. determined voltage was within specified range (120 V indicated, VB-4).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 5 OF 14 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

9. Step 6.2.34 - While minimizing tap 9.1 Observed SYNC INCOMING VOLTS (Startup changes, adjust S/U Xfmr 1-1 Low Side voltage) matched SYNC BUS VOLTS Voltage Adjust to match voltages (Auxiliary voltage) within 3 volts indicated.

between auxiliary and startup power to within 100 V (3V indicated).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

10. Step 6.2.35 - IF in step 6.2.37, the 10.1 Read NOTE regarding expected behavior transfer does NOT occur within two of transfer circuit and breaker response.

seconds, THEN place the Synchroscope key in "OFF" AND release the bus transfer switch.

10.2 Read step describing action to take if transfer from Auxiliary to Startup power does NOT occur within 2 seconds.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

11. Step 6.2.36 - IF after the transfer in 11.1 Read step describing action to take if both step 6.2.37, both breakers remain Auxiliary and Startup breakers remain closed, THEN immediately trip one of closed after the transfer.

the breakers.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 6 OF 14 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 12.** Step 6.2.37 - Perform the transfer as 12.1 Turned 4kV BUS F XFR SW clockwise (VB-follows: 4, just right of 52-HF-10).**

a. Place 4kV Bus F Pwr Xfr Sw in the "XFER TO S/U" position and hold.

b. Check that auxiliary and startup 12.2 Checked for proper breaker response:

power feeder breakers operate as

52-HF CLOSED (RED LIGHT on expected. S/U 4kV Fdr to Bus F) (VB-4)

52-HF OPEN (GREEN LIGHT on Aux 4kV Fdr to Bus F) (VB-4) 12.3 Determined 4kV Bus F transferred

c. After checking the transfer successfully and released power transfer complete, release 4kV Bus F Pwr switch.

Xfr Sw.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

13. Step 6.2.38 - Place the Synchroscope 13.1 Turned sync switch counter-clockwise to key in "OFF" and remove the key. OFF and removed key.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 7 OF 14 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

14. Step 6.2.39 - Position the breaker 14.1 Flagged breaker control switches to match control switches to match actual actual breaker positions:

breaker positions:

52-HF-14: CLOSED (red)

52-HF-13: OPEN (green)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

15. Step 6.2.40,41 - GO TO the step 15.1 Determined next bus to transfer was Vital corresponding to the next bus to be 4kV Bus G and proceeded to step 6.2.42.

transferred:

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Note: Reset of Auto Transfer Relays is not required (not active). Examinee may elect to perform reset steps if desired.

16. Step 6.2.42 - IF necessary, reset the 16.1 Pressed 4 kV BUS G AUTO XFR RESET Auto Transfer to Startup relay. button (VB-4).

16.2 Checked 4kV Bus G Auto Transfer reset indications:

PK17-19 (4 kV BUS G AUTO TRANSFER) is OFF

4 kV BUS G AUTO XFR RESET blue light is OFF (VB-4)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 8 OF 14 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 17.** Step 6.2.43 - Insert the Synchroscope 17.1 Inserted sync key for 4kV bus G Startup key in 4kV Bus G S/U Feeder Sync feeder breaker 52-HG-14 and turned Switch and place the key in "ON". clockwise to ON (VB-4). **

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

18. Step 6.2.44 & 45 - Check 18.1 Read NOTE regarding allowable range for Synchroscope indication. synchroscope (between 11 o'clock and 1 o'clock)

Note: If examinee determines synchroscope is outside acceptable range, provide the following cue:

CUE: Scope has been determined to be within the 11-1 oclock range.

18.2 Observed synchroscope indication to be within range; proceeded to step 6.2.46 (VB-4)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 9 OF 14 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

19. Step 6.2.46 - Check for normal 19.1 Checked auxiliary bus voltage on 4 kV BUS auxiliary bus voltage of 114-126 volts G or SYNC BUS VOLTS meter and indicated. determined voltage was within specified range (120 V indicated, VB-4).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

20. Step 6.2.47 - While minimizing tap 20.1 Observed SYNC INCOMING VOLTS (Startup changes, adjust S/U Xfmr 1-1 Low Side voltage) matched SYNC BUS VOLTS Voltage Adjust to match voltages (Auxiliary voltage) within 3 volts indicated.

between auxiliary and startup power to within 100 V (3V indicated).

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 10 OF 14 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions Note: Procedure steps 6.2.48 & 6.2.49 describe indications and actions the Examinee should take if the buses DO NOT transfer as expected (identical to 6.2.35 and 6.2.36).

21.** Step 6.2.50 - Perform the transfer as 21.1 Turned 4kV BUS G XFR SW clockwise (VB-follows: 4, just right of 52-HG-10).**

a. Place 4kV Bus G Pwr Xfr Sw in the "XFER TO S/U" position and hold.

<< ALTERNATE PATH - START POINT >>

b. Check that auxiliary and startup 21.2 Identifies improper breaker response:

power feeder breakers operate as

52-HG CLOSED (RED LIGHT on expected. S/U 4kV Fdr to Bus G) (VB-4)

52-HG CLOSED (RED LIGHT on Aux 4kV Fdr to Bus G) (VB-4) 21.3 Manually opens either of the following breakers: **

52-HG-14

52-HG-13

<< ALTERNATE PATH - END POINT >>

CUE: Other operators will complete any necessary actions associated with the buses.

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 11 OF 14 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to Startup JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Power EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 12 OF 14 REV. 0

Title:

Transfer Vital 4kV Buses from Auxiliary to JPM Number: NRCL141-LJCS6 Startup Power Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-22. The simulator is setup at 2% power, ready to transfer from Auxiliary to Startup power.

Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS6.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 13 OF 14 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS6 Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 is at 2% power and performing alignments per OP L-3, Secondary Plant Startup.

12 kV bus E was transferred from Auxiliary power to Startup earlier in the shift.

Initiating Cue: The SFM directs you to transfer all Vital 4kV buses from Auxiliary to Startup power per OP J-6A:II, Rev 18B, beginning with step 6.2.4.

NRCL141-LJCS6 PAGE 14 OF 14 REV. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS7

Title:

Remove Power Range Channel N42 From Service Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

References:

OP AP-5, Malfunction of Protection or Control Channel, Rev. 43 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: Bank JPM - LJC-051 Gen KA # / Rating: 015.A2.02: - Faulty or erratic operator of dterector or 3.1 / 3.5 compensating components.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 02/10/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 02/16/2016 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From Service JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee.

The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. If the task is being done in the plant or lab, and after identifying the appropriate procedure for the task, the examinee may be given the procedure and told what step to begin the task at.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure (partial procedure allowed),

if the task is being done in the plant or lab.

Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 is at 100% power.

A malfunction caused power range channel N42 to slowly fail high.

Rod control was placed in MANUAL after rods stepped in several steps.

The Shift Foreman has requested the Maintenance to:

o Trip bistables BS421C and BS421D, and o Remove the control power and instrument power fuses.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to remove power range channel N42 from service, with the exception of pulling fuses and tripping of bistables, in accordance with OP AP-5, Attachment 4.1.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: Power range channel N42 has been removed from service, with the exception of pulling fuses and bistable tripping, in accordance with OP AP 5, attachment 4.1.

NRCL141-LJCS7.docx PAGE 2 OF 7 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From Service JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 Referenced OP AP-5, Attachment 4.1, Actions to be performed for NI failure.

Note: Operator may review STP I N42.B Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2.** Place rod stop bypass switch the **********************************

failed channel position. Cue: (If the operator refers to the requirement to use concurrent verification), "the requirement is waived for this JPM."

2.1 Placed the ROD STOP BYBASS switch in the BYPASS PR N42 position. **

Note: May verify PK07-07, PWR RNG 42 ROD STOP BYPASSED -- ON.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-ljcs7 PAGE 3 OF 7 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From Service JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Place power mismatch bypass switch 3.1 Placed the POWER MISMATCH BYPASS to the failed channel position. switch in the BYPASS PR N42 position. **

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4.** Place quadrant power tilt alarm 4.1 Placed the QUADRANT POWER TILT upper section switch to the failed ALARM UPPER SECTION switch in the channel position. PRN42 position. **

4.2 Verified that the CHANNEL DEFEAT light lit.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

5.** Place quadrant power tilt alarm lower 5.1 Placed the QUADRANT POWER TILT section switch to the failed channel ALARM LOWER SECTION switch in the position. PRN42 position. **

5.2 Verified that the CHANNEL DEFEAT light lit.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-ljcs7 PAGE 4 OF 7 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: Remove Power Range Channel N42 From Service JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 6.** Place the comparator defeat switch to 6.1 Placed the COMPARATOR CHANNEL the failed channel position. DEFEAT switch in the N42 position. **

6.2 Verified that the COMPARATOR DEFEAT light has lit.

Cue: Maintenance Services will remove the control power and instrument power fuses.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-ljcs7 PAGE 5 OF 7 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: REMOVE POWER RANGE CHANNEL N42 FROM SERVICE JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 ATTACHMENT 1, SIMULATOR SETUP Restore the simulator to IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Enter Lesson Drill file 1051 Description Fails power range channel N42 high Runs simulator to allow rods to step in 5 steps. (30 seconds)

Perform the following:

Place rod control in MANUAL as soon as the Rods step in several steps. (Done manually vice in drill file to prevent rod motion after returning to Run)

Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

nrcl141-ljcs7 PAGE 6 OF 7 REV. 0 rev0.docx

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS7 Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 1 is at 100% power.

A malfunction caused power range channel N42 to slowly fail high.

Rod control was placed in MANUAL after rods stepped in several steps.

The Shift Foreman has requested the Maintenance to:

o Trip bistables BS421C and BS421D, and o Remove the control power and instrument power fuses.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to remove power range channel N42 from service, with the exception of pulling fuses and tripping of bistables, in accordance with OP AP-5, Attachment 4.1.

nrcl141-ljcs7 PAGE 7 OF 7 REV. 0 rev0.docx

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-LJCS8

Title:

Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW Discharge High Radiation Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform X Simulate Results: Sat _____ Unsat _____ Total Time: _______ minutes Comments:

References:

AR PK11-21, High Radiation Rev. 31 Alternate Path: Yes ______ __ No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 15 minutes Critical Steps: 3.3, 4.1, 5.1 Job Designation: RO or SRO Rev Comments: New Gen KA / Rating: 008.A2.04 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following 3.3 / 3.5 malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: PRMS alarm AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 12/04/2015 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRISTOPHER MEHIGAN DATE: 02/16/2016 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 Discharge High Radiation EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Directions: All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The student will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee may be given the procedure and told the step with which to begin.

Required Materials: AR PK11-21, High Radiation Initial Conditions GIVEN:

Unit 1 is at full power

PK11-21 has just alarmed Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform the actions of AR PK11-21, High Radiation.

DO NOT READ TASK STANDARD TO EXAMINEE Task Standard: The alarm is determined to be due to spurious RM-17 alarm (step 3.3).

The RM-17 is reset (step 4.1) and the CCW Surge Tank Vent, RCV-16, reopened (step 5.1).

NRCL141-LJCS8 PAGE 2 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 Discharge High Radiation EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Obtain the correct procedure. 1.1 Obtains AR PK11-21 Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

2. Step 2.1 - General Actions 2.1. Determined cause of alarm is input 1066 by checking:

annunciator printout and/or

RONAN on SFM desk 2.2. Went to step 2.4 (due to input 1066)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

3. ** Step 2.4 - Process Radiation Monitors 3.1. Checked process radiation monitors Actions (Input 1066) and determined only RE-17A alarmed (2.4.1)

Either:

Rad map on PPC

RM panel 3.2. (Per section 3, automatic actions)

Ensured RCV-16 has closed Green light ON and Red light OFF on VB1 (2.4.3)

(2.4.2, 2.4.4, 2.4.5 & 2.4.6 - N/A)

Continued on next page

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS8 PAGE 3 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 Discharge High Radiation EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. 3.3. Determined alarm due to spurious (cont) actuation and went to step 2.1.4 to reset RE-17A (2.4.7.a.1) **

May use to verify RM-17A is reading normal:

Rad map on PPC (Green reading)

Trend point for RM-17A (spike and return to previous level)

RONAN alarm IN (RED) and also RESET (WHITE)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

4. ** Step 2.1.4 - Reset RE-17A 4.1.

Notified CO of expected alarm PK11-23

Checked RE-17A less than setpoint on PPC or at RM Panel

Placed RE-17A Operation Selector switch in "RESET" on Rad Monitor Pane) **

Placed RE-17A Operation Selector switch in "OPERATE" on Rad Monitor Panel **

Checked RE-17A high alarm and PK11-21 cleared Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS8 PAGE 4 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 Discharge High Radiation EVALUATOR WORKSHEET

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS8 PAGE 5 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 Discharge High Radiation EVALUATOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. ** Step 2.4.7.a.2 - Open RCV-16 5.1. Opened RCV-16 on VB1 **

Green light OFF and Red light ON on VB1 Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

6. Complete Step 2.4.7 6.1. Checked surge tank level indicators (LI-139 and LI-140) on VB1 stable (2.4.7.b) 6.2. Determined entry into OP AP-11, CCW System Inleakage is not warranted (2.4.7.c)

Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comment:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS8 PAGE 6 OF 9 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 Follow up Question Documentation:

Question: __________________________________________________________________

Response: __________________________________________________________________

- Denotes a Critical Step.

NRCL141-LJCS8 PAGE 7 OF 9 REV. 0

Title:

Respond to Spurious Alarm on RE-17A, CCW JPM Number: NRCL141-Discharge High Radiation LJCS8 Attachment 1, Simulator Setup Restore the simulator to IC-10 (100%, MOL).

Run Lesson NRCL141-LJCS8.lsn Inform the examiner that the simulator setup is complete.

Go to RUN when the examinee is given the cue sheet.

NRCL141-LJCS8 PAGE 8 OF 9 REV. 0

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-LJCS8 Initial Conditions: GIVEN:

Unit 1 is at full power

PK11-21 has just alarmed Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to perform the actions of AR PK11-21, High Radiation.

NRCL141-LJCS8 PAGE 9 OF 9 REV. 0

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-P1

Title:

De-Energize SSPS to Block Safety Injection Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments: (Note: Any Unsat step requires a numbered comment; use back as needed.)

References:

OP AP-8B, Control Room Inaccessibility - HSB to CSD, U1, Rev. 26 Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 10 minutes Critical Steps: 2, 4 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: Bank LJP-095 Gen KA # / Rating: 013.G2.1.30 - Ability to locate and operate 4.4 / 4.0 components, including local controls.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 11/01/2015 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: 02/10/2016 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee.

The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the "required materials" shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation "Cues" are contingent on proper operation by the examinee, and should be "adjusted" should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Copy of OP AP-8B, Step 6.

Initial Conditions: Given:

The Control Room has been evacuated and is NOT accessible.

Unit 1 is transitioning from HOT STANDBY to COLD SHUTDOWN from the Hot Shutdown Panel (HSDP), per OP AP-8B.

HSDP operators are about to start a cooldown to cold shutdown.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to defeat the Low Steam Line Pressure and Low Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injections in accordance with OP AP-8B, Step 6. You are supplied with a portable phone.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: Both trains of SSPS are de-energized with breakers PY-1117 and PY-1416 open.

NRCL141-P1 PAGE 2 OF 5 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Locate PY-11 cabinet and breaker 1.1 Read the CAUTION and verifies the Shift PY-1117. Foreman is aware of the CAUTION.

Cue: The SFM will station another operator at PY11 and PY14 once your task is completed.

1.2 Located PY-11 on the 115 area H, battery charger room 1.

1.3 Opened the panel door and located breaker PY-1117.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2.** Open breaker PY-1117. 2.1 Opened breaker PY-1117. **

Cue: An audible click was heard, and the breaker shows OFF on the side of the breaker.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

NRCL141-P1 PAGE 3 OF 5 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. Locate PY-14 cabinet and breaker 3.1 Located PY-14 on the 115, Area H, battery PY-1416. charger room 3.

3.2 Opened the panel door and located breaker PY-1416.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4.** Open breaker PY-1416. 4.1 Opened breaker PY-1416. **

Cue: An audible click was heard, and the breaker shows OFF on the side of the breaker.

4.2 Notified SFM that OP AP-8B, Step 6 is complete.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

NRCL141-P1 PAGE 4 OF 5 REV. 0 rev0.docx

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P1 Initial Conditions: Given:

The Control Room has been evacuated and is NOT accessible.

Unit 1 is transitioning from HOT STANDBY to COLD SHUTDOWN from the Hot Shutdown Panel (HSDP), per OP AP-8B.

HSDP operators are about to start a cooldown to cold shutdown.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to defeat the Low Steam Line Pressure and Low Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injections in accordance with OP AP-8B, Step 6. You are supplied with a portable phone.

NRCL141-P1nrcl141- PAGE 5 OF 5 REV. 0 p1 rev0.docx

Control Room Inaccessibility - Hot Standby to OP AP-8B R26 Cold Shutdown Page 4 of 36 UNIT 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION 1: APPENDIX H will NOT be implemented without the approval of the site emergency coordinator.

CAUTION 2: Do NOT run three CRDM fans at the same time. This may cause fan damage due to fan stall.

4. ENSURE TWO CRDM Fans - RUNNING IF CRDM fans are NOT in operation due (CRDM cabinet located adjacent to MCC to loss of nonvital power, 12J):

THEN Implement APPENDIX H to reenergize

Ensure Dampers Open for Running the nonvital buses if desired by the Fans SFM and emergency operations coordinator.

CAUTION: All indicators at the HSDP are susceptible to damage and may not be reliable during a Control Room or CSR fire. REFER TO APPENDIX A for alternate indication if the HSDP indication does not appear to be functioning correctly.

The SPDS or PPC displays in the TSC may provide additional information.

NOTE: If using alternate PZR Level indication at the DSDP, convert indicated level to actual level using Figure 1.

5. ESTABLISH PZR Level §50%:

a. Slowly adjust PZR level to 50% actual level

b. During RCS cooldown ensure PZR b. Suspend the RCS cooldown until PZR level level does not drop below 22% actual can be maintained GREATER THAN 22%

level actual level.

CAUTION: AUTO and MANUAL SI is NOT available with PY-1117 and PY-1416 OPEN.

6. DEFEAT Lo Stml Press And Low PZR Press SI:

a. Assign an operator with a means of communication to remain near PY-1117 and PY-1416 whenever the breakers are open

-THIS STEP CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE -

OP_AP-8Bu1r26.DOC 0408.1538

Control Room Inaccessibility - Hot Standby to OP AP-8B R26 Cold Shutdown Page 5 of 36 UNIT 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

6. DEFEAT Lo Stml Press And Low PZR Press SI: (Continued)

b. Open Inst AC Bkrs to inhibit Lo Stml Press SI and Low PZR Press SI

1) Train A Output Cab, PY-1117

2) Train B Output Cab, PY-1416

7. INITIATE RCS Cooldown to Cold Shutdown:

a. Begin recording cooldown data approximately every 30 minutes on Attachment 1 (Form 69-20682)

b. Maintain RCS temp and press within operating band of Figure 4 using PI-406 and TI-406 (DSD panel)

c. If an RCP is in operation, limit cooldown rate to LESS THAN 100°F/hr. If performing a natural circulation cooldown limit cooldown rate to LESS THAN 25°F/hr. (Use TI-406 cold leg/hot leg avg at the DSP Panel)

d. Manually Open the 10% Steam d. Locally control the 10% Steam Dumps Dumps to achieve desired cooldown PER OP C-2:II to achieve the desired rate in the RCS cooldown rate.

e. Check VCT level being maintained in e. Ensure charging pump suction aligned to AUTO (unless previously aligned to RWST the RWST).

1) If auto makeup remains in service, 1) Ensure 8805A or 8805B Open locally.

a cooldown rate of approximately (85' Pen alcove) 40°F/hr should be used if not on

2) Ensure Closed LCV-112B or natural circulation. Modify the LCV-112C locally. (CVCS Blender cooldown rate as necessary to Room, 100')

stay within the VCT auto makeup capability.

OP_AP-8Bu1r26.DOC 0408.1538

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-P2

Title:

Reset the Turbine Driven AUX Feedwater Pump Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

This is a Unit 2 JPM

References:

Unit 2 OP D-1:IV, Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump - Restart or Make Available After Overspeed Trip, Rev. 15.

Alternate Path: Yes No X Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 20 minutes Critical Steps: 2, 3, 5 Job Designation: NO/RO/SRO Rev Comments/TIPs: Bank LJP-012A Gen KA # / Rating: E05.EA1.1 - Ability to operate and/or monitor the 4.1 / 4.0 following as they apply to the Loss of Heat Sink:

Components, and functions of control and safety systems including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, anutomatic and manual features.

AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 02/10/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: MM/DD/YYYY REV. 0

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee.

The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed.

Equipment operation "Cues" are contingent on proper operation by the examinee, and should be "adjusted" should equipment operation differ from expected.

The examinee should be given the "required materials" shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Note: Instructions for resetting the Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump are provided in OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2, and duplicated on a lamicoid in the Auxiliary Building by the pump. For the purposes of this JPM, a paper copy of Attachment 2 should be provided and used by the student.

Required Materials: Provide a copy of the reference procedure, U2 OP D-1:IV, Attach 2.

Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power.

All four steam generator narrow range levels are offscale low.

AFW pump 2-1 has tripped on overspeed and is needed for a plant heat sink.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to restart AFW pump 2-1 in accordance with OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: The TDAFW pump has been reset and started in accordance with the guidance of OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2 .

NRCL141- PAGE 2 OF 8 REV. 0 P2.DOCX.DOCX

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions

1. Ensure that the speed setting knob 1.1 Ensured the speed setting knob on MS on the turbine governor is FCV-15 is positioned to the maximum positioned to the maximum speed setting (fully clockwise.)

setting.

Cue: Knob is fully clockwise.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2. ** Turn the turbine throttle trip valve 2.1 Turned MS-2-FCV-152 in the clockwise MS-2-FCV-152 handwheel in the direction until the spring is fully clockwise direction until the spring is compressed.**

fully compressed.

Cue: Spring is fully compressed.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p2.docx PAGE 3 OF 8 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2.docx PAGE 4 OF 8 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

3. ** Latch up the latching lever using the 3.1 Pulled the connecting rod slightly towards trip hook. MS-2-FCV-152 AND pushes down on the trip tappet and nut. **

Cue: Tappet nut is seated 3.2 Released tension applied to connecting rod.

Cue: Trip hook is latched Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p2.docx PAGE 5 OF 8 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2.docx PAGE 6 OF 8 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

4. On top of the outboard turbine Note: Image below illustrates tappet nut bearing, check the latch plate fully seating and manual trip handle in depressed into the latching the reset position. Student should mechanism to ensure the trip describe position of tappet nut (flat mechanism properly reset. against housing), trip handle (handle is horizontal), and interface (leading edge of trip handle body pressed flush against tappet nut) that ensures trip mechanism is properly reset).

4.1 Checked latch plate fully depressed into the latching mechanism.

Cue: Latch plate is fully depressed into latching mechanism.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

nrcl141-p2.docx PAGE 7 OF 8 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2.docx PAGE 8 OF 8 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

5. ** Fully open turbine trip throttle valve Note: Procedure advises Operator that MS-2-FCV-152 by turning the turbine will roll up to speed as MS handwheel in the counter clockwise FCV-152 is opened and governor will direction. maintain full speed of approximately 4140-4240 rpm. Turbine speed should be monitored by the Operator on a column-mounted tachometer located in the vicinity of FCV-152.

5.1 Turned the handwheel in the counter clockwise direction until MS-2-FCV-152 is fully open.**

Cue: Normal turbine rollup noise is heard as FCV-152 rotates CCW.

Cue: (when MS-2-FCV-152 is fully open)

Turbine noise levels are normal.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2.docx PAGE 9 OF 9 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: RESET THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMP JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

6. Check if turbine trips on overspeed. Note: Operator may elect to contact control room and/or use local indications to verify pump flow and speed indications. Cues are provided below for both cases.

Note: Use following cue if local Tach used for overspeed trip check:

Cue: (Point to approximately 4200 RPM on tachometer) - Meter is reading here and stable. Turbine noise levels are normal.

Note: Use following cue if Control Room contacted for overspeed trip check:

Cue: AFW Turbine speed indicates approximately 4200 RPM on VB3.

Pump discharge pressure is in the normal band.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p2.docx PAGE 10 OF 10 REV. 0

JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: Given:

Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power.

All four steam generator narrow range levels are offscale low.

AFW pump 2-1 has tripped on overspeed and is needed for a plant heat sink.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to restart AFW pump 2-1 in accordance with OP D-1:IV, Attachment 2.

nrcl141-p2.docx PAGE 11 OF 11 REV. 0

OP D-1:IV R15 Page 8 of 8 Restarting Turbine Driven AFW Pump After Overspeed Trip - Lamicoid Instructions U2 Attachment 2: Page 1 of 1 The following instructions are for emergency use only in restarting the turbine driven AFW pump after an overspeed trip. Similar instructions are posted on a lamicoid in the auxiliary building at the turbine driven AFW pump.

Restarting the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump after an Overspeed Trip:

1. Ensure the speed setting on turbine governor MS-2-FCV-15 is set to maximum (fully clockwise).

2. Turn the turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 handwheel in the clockwise direction until the spring is fully compressed.

3. Latch up the latching lever using the trip hook as follows:

a. Pull the connecting rod slightly towards MS-2-FCV-152 AND push down on the trip tappet and nut.

b. WHEN the tappet nut is properly seated, THEN gently release tension applied to the connecting rod.

4. On top of the outboard turbine bearing, check the latch plate fully depressed into the latching mechanism to ensure the trip mechanism properly reset.

5. Fully open turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 by turning the handwheel in the counter-clockwise direction. (The turbine will roll up to speed as MS-2-FCV-152 is opened. The governor will maintain full speed of approximately 4140-4240 RPM.)

6. IF the turbine trips on overspeed, THEN perform the following:

a. Perform steps 1 through 4

b. Slowly open turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 by turning the handwheel in the counter-clockwise direction until full speed is attained.

7. Leave turbine trip throttle valve MS-2-FCV-152 in the latched position.

OP_D-1~IVu2r15.DOC 0209.0951

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Number: NRCL141-P3

Title:

Start a D/G and Restore Power to a Vital Bus following Control Room Evacuation Examinee:

Evaluator:

Print Signature Date Testing Method: Perform Simulate Results: Sat Unsat Total Time: minutes Comments:

Note: This is a Unit 2 JPM

References:

OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility, Establishing Hot Standby, Rev. 30 Alternate Path: Yes X No Time Critical: Yes No X Time Allotment: 30 minutes Critical Steps: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 Job Designation: RO/SRO Rev Bank LJP-003A Comments/TIPs:

Gen KA # / Rating: 068.AA1.31 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as 3.9 /

they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: ED/G 4.0 AUTHOR: LISA TORIBIO DATE: 02/10/2016 OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE: CHRIS MEHIGAN DATE: MM/DD/YYYY REV. 0

JPM TITLE: PERFORM A LOCAL START OF A DIESEL GENERATOR JPM NUMBER: ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Directions: No plant controls or equipment are to be operated during the performance of this Job Performance Measure. All actions taken by the examinee should be clearly demonstrated and verbalized to the evaluator. The examinee will be given the initial conditions and initiating cue. The task standard will NOT be read to the examinee.

The examiner will then ask if any clarifications are needed. The examinee should be given the "required materials" shown below, and access to other plant references as appropriate.

Equipment operation "Cues" are contingent on proper operation by the examinee, and should be "adjusted" should equipment operation differ from expected.

Required Materials: Copy of OP AP-8A (Unit 2), Attachment 3 Initial Conditions: Given:

A fire in the vertical boards has required an evacuation of the control room.

U-2 control has been established from the Hot Shutdown Panel.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to energize bus F per step 2 of Attachment 3 in OP AP-8A, Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby.

NOTE: Do NOT provide the student with the Task Standard.

Task Standard: Diesel Generator 2-3 has been started and bus energized in accordance with OP AP-8A, Attachment 3, step 2.

Site Safety Standard: All personnel entering the Diesel Generator room shall have double hearing protection in their possession. The individual performer shall have double hearing protection available (with them upon entry to the DG room), and in place prior to simulating the manual start of Diesel Generator 2 3. Per TQ2.ID8, rev. 16, the same safety standard shall be used for simulated tasks. Failure by the performer to don double hearing protection shall result in a TPE failure.

NRCL141-P3.DOCX PAGE 2 OF 11 REV. 0

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Start Time:

Step Expected Operator Actions 1.** Step 2b - Place the 125 V DC Control 1.1 Read and observed procedure CAUTIONs Power Transfer (EQD-23) in OFF. prior to Step 2.

1.2 Located the 125 V DC Control Power Transfer Switch on the right side of the DG 2-3 DC Cont Pwr Transfer Switch Panel.

1.3 Placed the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in OFF. **

Cue: The EQD-23 is in the OFF [middle]

position Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

2.** Step 2c - Place the droop switch on 2.1 Located the diesel generator 2-3 droop the excitation cubicle to the ISOC switch on the excitation cubicle.

mode.

2.2 Placed the droop switch to the ISOC position.**

Cue: The Droop Switch is in the ISOC position Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 3 OF 11 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 4 OF 11 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 3.** Step 2d - Place the Mode Control 3.1 Located the Mode Control selector switch switch on the local control panel in on the diesel generator 2-3 local control the TEST position. panel.

3.2 Placed the Mode Control selector switch to the TEST position.**

Cue: The Mode Control Switch is in the TEST position Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

4.** Step 2e - Place the diesel generator 4.1 Located the diesel generator 2-3 control control selection switch on the selection switch on the excitation cubicle.

excitation cubicle to the LOCAL position.

4.2 Placed the diesel generator 2-3 control selection switch to the LOCAL position.**

Cue: The Control Selector Switch is in the LOCAL position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 5 OF 11 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 6 OF 11 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 5.** Step 2f - Place the Appendix R fuse 5.1 Located the 43DC-23/SS switch on the selector switch 43DC-23/SS to the diesel generator 2-3 local control panel.

BACKUP position.

5.2 Placed the Appendix R fuse selector switch to the BACKUP position.**

Cue: The Appendix R Switch is in the BACKUP position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

6.** Step 2g - Place the 125V DC Control 6.1 Placed the 125V DC Control Power Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in Transfer Switch to NORMAL. **

NORMAL.

Cue: The EQD-23 switch is in the NORMAL [top] position.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 7 OF 11 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

7. Step 2h - Depress the alarm relay reset 7.1 Located the alarm relay reset push push button. button on diesel generator 2-3 local control panel.

7.2 Depressed the alarm relay reset push button.

Cue: The Alarm Reset push button has been depressed and returned to normal.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 8 OF 11 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 8.** Step 2i - Place the Engine control switch Note: Per DCPP Site Safety Standards, (DE-23) on the control panel in START. the individual performer shall have double hearing protection available (with them upon entry to the DG room) and in place prior to simulating start of Diesel Generator 2-3. Failure to don appropriate hearing protection constitutes failure of the TPE.

8.1 Read NOTE 8.2 Located the START/STOP switch at the diesel generator 2-3 local control panel.

8.3 Placed the START/STOP switch to the START position.**

Cue: Normal DG startup noise level is heard. If asked, other DG parameters are moving up to (or are at) their normal values.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 9 OF 11 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions

9. Step 2k - Notifies the HSDP of DG 9.1 Notified the SFM at the U-2 HSDP of DG status. status, and asked if 4KV bus voltage is satisfactory.

Cue: The U-2 SFM reports 4KV bus voltage is ZERO. The SFM directs you to continue in OP AP-8A, and energize 4KV bus F locally.

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

<< ALTERNATE PATH START POINT >>

10.** Step 2l - Energizes bus F at the 4 kV Note: Sync keys are stored at the Hot switchgear. Shut Down Panel Procedure Cabinet and the 4kV switchgear lockers.

10.1 Obtained a sync key (may do this any time before breaker operation; this action may be simulated) **

10.2 Read Caution.

Note: Blue lights for OC Aux Relay Alarm are on the feeder breakers for SU, DG and 480V 2F.

Amber light for DG 23 differential relay is on Safeguards Relay Panel.

White lights are used as phase or DC potential indication only (Continued on next page)

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 10 OF 11 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 10.** Step 2l - Energizes bus F at the 4 kV 10.3 Checked bus not faulted by checking for switchgear, overcurrent and/or differential trips on DG or bus, and for dropped relay target; Continued may also check for visible damage and/or smells.

Cue: The OC and Differential lights are out for the bus and DG, there are no dropped relay flags, and there are no visible signs of damage in the room (or unusual odors).

10.4 Ensured bus feeder breakers open:

Aux Feeder 52-HF13

SU Feeder 52HF14 Cue: Breakers 52-HF-13 and 52-HF-14 are both red light OFF, green light ON.

10.5 Turned on the DG 2-3 FEED SYNC switch**

Cue: The Sync Switch is in the SYNC position.

If checked, DG voltage is now indicated on the "big" sync scope.

(Continued on next page)

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 11 OF 11 REV. 0 rev0.docx

JPM TITLE: INITIATE A NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 INSTRUCTOR WORKSHEET Step Expected Operator Actions 10.** Step 2l - Energizes bus F at the 4 kV 10.6 Closed DG 2-3 output breaker, 52-HF-switchgear, Continued 7**

Cue: Breaker 52-HF-7 shows a red light ON and green light OFF.

Approximately 4KV is indicated on the "big" sync scope voltmeter for the bus.

10.7 Turned off the DG 2-3 FEEDER SYNC switch.

Cue: The Sync Switch is in the OFF position. (if checked) The "big" sync scope indicates no voltage.

<< ALTERNATE PATH END POINT >>

10.8 Reported 4KV Bus F status to SFM (optional).

Step was: Sat: ______ Unsat _______

Comments:

Stop Time:

Total Time: (Enter total time on the cover page)

- Denotes Critical Step and Sub Steps.

nrcl141-p3 PAGE 12 OF 12 REV. 0 rev0.docx

EXAMINEE CUE SHEET JPM NUMBER: NRCL141-P3 Initial Conditions: Given:

A fire in the vertical boards has required an evacuation of the control room.

U-2 control has been established from the Hot Shutdown Panel.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Foreman directs you to establish local control and start diesel generator 2-3 by completing OP AP-8A, Attachment 3, step 2.

NRCL141-P3.DOCX PAGE 13 OF 13 REV. 0

OP AP-8A R30 Page 47 of 58 Turbine Bldg Actions U2 Attachment 3: Page 1 of 5 PERFORM the following:

1. IF offsite power is still available, THEN ensure OPEN the RCP breakers:

52VD3

52VD4

52VE6

52VE7 NOTE 1: This Attachment requires a Sync Key which is stored with the procedure folder next to the 12kV Room flashgear locker.

NOTE 2: Bus F is the preferred bus to establish AFW and other support conditions.

CAUTION 1: The Control Selection switch at the D/G excitation cubicle must be switched to the LOCAL position prior to operation of the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (located on the D/G Control Panel) to the BACKUP position. Failure to do so could result in a loss of all local D/G control.

CAUTION 2: The D/G Tach-Pak may lockup if deenergized and reenergized in a short period of time, the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) should remain in the OFF position for 10 seconds before moving to the desired power supply.

2. Establish Local Control and Start D/G 2-3. (Bus F)

a. IF D/G 2-3 is already running, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

2) PROCEED to step 2.k.

b. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in OFF.

c. PLACE Droop Switch on excitation cubicle to ISOC.

d. PLACE Mode Control switch on control panel in TEST.

e. PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

f. PLACE the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (43DC-23/SS) on control panel in BACKUP.

g. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in NORMAL.

h. DEPRESS the Alarm Relay Reset push button on control panel.

NOTE: Depending upon number and types of faults, the D/G breaker may automatically close and loads sequence on following D/G start.

i. PLACE Engine control switch (DE-23) on the control panel in START.

OP_AP-8Au2r30.DOC 0613.1010 Phone Nos. HSDP x2497, x3108; DSDP x2246 D/G 2-1 x2276; D/G 2-2 x2252; D/G 2-3 x2275 12kV Rms x2274; 4kV Rms Fx2404, Gx2778, Hx2706; 480 V Rms x2497

OP AP-8A R30 Page 48 of 58 Turbine Bldg Actions U2 Attachment 3: Page 2 of 5

j. IF the D/G did not start, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-23) in OFF, wait for 10 seconds, then PLACE in BACKUP position.

2) PLACE Engine control switch (DE-23) on the control panel in START.

k. Contact the HSDP:

1) Report status of D/G 2-3.

2) Ask if 4kV Bus F voltage is satisfactory.

CAUTION: Use CAUTION when reenergizing dead buses, a bus fault may have caused it to de-energize. faulted bus would be indicated by a AC Feeder breaker overcurrent (OC) or a Bus Differential flag drop.

l. IF voltage is not satisfactory, THEN PERFORM the following at the 4kV Switchgear:

1) CHECK the bus NOT Faulted.

2) Ensure Aux Trans Fdr Bkr 52HF13 open.

3) Ensure S/U Trans Fdr Bkr 52HF14 open.

4) Turn ON the D/G 2-3 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

5) CLOSE D/G Output Bkr 52HF7.

6) Turn OFF the D/G 2-3 FEEDER SYNC Switch.

CAUTION 1: The Control Selection switch at the D/G excitation cubicle must be switched to the LOCAL position prior to operation of the Appendix R Fuse Selector switch (located on the D/G Control Panel) to the BACKUP position. Failure to do so could result in a loss of all local D/G control.

CAUTION 2: The D/G Tach-Pak may lockup if deenergized and reenergized in a short period of time, the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-21) should remain in the OFF position for 10 seconds before moving to the desired power supply.

3. Establish Local Control and Start D/G 2-1. (Bus G)

a. IF D/G 2-1 is already running, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE Control Selection switch on excitation cubicle in LOCAL.

2) PROCEED to step 3.k.

b. PLACE the 125V DC Control Power Transfer Switch (EQD-21) in OFF.

c. PLACE Droop Switch on excitation cubicle in ISOC.

d. PLACE Mode Control switch on control panel in TEST.

OP_AP-8Au2r30.DOC 0613.1010 Phone Nos. HSDP x2497, x3108; DSDP x2246 D/G 2-1 x2276; D/G 2-2 x2252; D/G 2-3 x2275 12kV Rms x2274; 4kV Rms Fx2404, Gx2778, Hx2706; 480 V Rms x2497

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 1 Op-Test No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 2% with MFW in service, aligned to Start-Up Power, MOL, 1431 ppm boron Turnover: In OP L-3, performing step 6.28, raising power to 8%.

Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 N/A R(ATC, Raise reactor power from 2% to 8% OP L-3, sec 6.28.

SRO) 2 MAL_NIS3B SRO Intermediate range detector NI-36 fails low @ 3.0%. (AP-5, TS 3.3.1.F) (Used for SRO TS Only).

3 CNV_MFW9_3 C (BOP, Feed Reg Bypass Valve FCV-1510 oscillation; manual control SRO) required (PK09-15).

4 MAL_EPS4D_2 C (ALL) 4kV Vital Bus G differential trip results in loss of charging and letdown isolation (AP-17, AP-27, TS 3.4.11.C, 3.8.1.B, 3.8.4.A).

5 MAL_RCP1A, XMT_RCP17_3, M (ALL) RCP 1-1 #1 seal leak requiring Rx Trip and tripping of RCP 1-1.

XMT_RCP18_3 (AP-28) 6 MAL_RCS4C M (ALL) 400 gpm Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 7 CNV_MSS24_2 C (BOP) PORV on ruptured S/G fails open, requires backup air to close

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC ES-D-1-01 r1.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7) 6

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Event 7) 1

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5,6) 2

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-0.1, E-3) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) (CT-18, 19, 20, 21) 4 Critical Task Justification Reference Isolate the ruptured steam generator SG inventory increase leads to water release

W Margin to Overfill from the intact steam generators and through the S/G PORV or safety valve(s) or to SG (CN-CRA-05-53 Rev1) isolate feedwater to the ruptured steam overfill, which would seriously compromise the SG

W Offsite Doses (CN-generator prior to overfill (100% WR as a fission-product barrier and complicate CRA-05-54) level) (CT-18) mitigation.

SGTR UFSAR 15.4.3

WCAP-17711-NP Perform RCS cooldown at maximum rate Transition to contingency procedures to address

W Margin to Overfill such that MAGENTA PATH on RCS inadequate subcooling or Pressurized Thermal (CN-CRA-05-53 Rev1)

INTEGRITY is avoided and RCS subcooled Shock conditions results in delaying RCS

SGTR UFSAR 15.4.3 margin still exists following the cooldown depressurization and SI termination. This delay

WCAP-17711-NP (as determined by target temperature allows excess inventory in the ruptured S/G to specified in E-3, step 6) (CT-19). continue to increase, with the potential of challenging SG overpressure components or causing an overfill condition to occur.

Depressurize the RCS to meet Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a

W Margin to Overfill depressurization criteria specified in E-3, ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS complicates (CN-CRA-05-53 Rev1)

App GG prior to overfilling the ruptured mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a

SGTR UFSAR 15.4.3 S/G (100% WR level) (CT-20). significant reduction of safety margin beyond that

WCAP-17711-NP irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Terminate Safety Injection prior to Failure to terminate SI, once it is possible to do so,

W Margin to Overfill overfilling the ruptured S/G (100% WR challenges the margin to S/G overfill. Failure to (CN-CRA-05-53 Rev1) level) and control RCS pressure and control RCS pressure and makeup flow can

SGTR UFSAR 15.4.3 makeup flow so that primary and reinitiate primary to secondary leakage.

WCAP-17711-NP secondary inventory are stable by the completion of step E-3, step 29 (CT-21).

L141 NRC ES-D-1-01 r1.docx Page 2 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #1

1. Control rods are used to raise power from 2% to 8% OP L-3, Secondary Plant Startup, step 6.28. ATC operator complies with 1 step pull and wait procedural requirement while monitoring relevant controls and diverse indicators. Shift Foreman provides reactivity oversight.

2. Intermediate range detector NI-36 fails low @ 3.0%. The ATC operator identifies single intermediate range detector lowering with no other indications corroborate a power decrease. SFM directs power ascension placed on hold. OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel may be referenced. Shift Foreman addresses TS 3.3.1.F, One Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable.

3. Feed Reg Bypass valve FCV-1510 begins to oscillate causing an unexpected rise in S/G 1-1 feedwater flow and level. Crew responds to AR PK09-15, Digital Feedwater Cont System, taking manual control of the failed valve. Shift Foreman establishes level control band for manual operation. May refer to TS 3.7.3 for MFRV bypass valves, but LCO is not applicable.

4. 4 kV bus G trips on differential causing a loss of charging and letdown isolation. The crew responds by entering OP AP-17, Loss of Charging, and OP AP-27, Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus. Shift Foreman establishes priorities and maintains oversight while the board operators implement abnormal procedures as assigned. Normal charging and letdown are restored and redundant/backup equipment is placed in service. Shift Foreman addresses applicable short action Tech Specs: TS 3.4.11.C-Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves; 3.8.1.B-AC Sources Operating for D/G 1-2; 3.8.4.A-DC Sources.

5. RCP 1-1 seal leak ramps in over 2 minutes resulting in high seal return flow. Crew responds to AR PK05-01, RCP NO 11 for seal leakoff flow greater than 5.0 gpm and transitions to OP AP-28, Section B, RCP Number 1 Seal Failure. When seal leakoff and radial out bearing temperatures begin to rise, SFM directs Rx Trip and subsequent tripping of RCP 1-1 and closure of associated pressurizer spray valve.

6. Crew enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitions into EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. A 400 gpm SGTR*** on S/G 1-3 ramps in approximately two minutes post-trip. The crew identifies the need to safety inject when pressurizer pressure and level begin to lower rapidly. The Shift Foreman re-enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitions to EOP E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, based on RM-73 and rising S/G 1-3 level, where the crew will address the following four critical tasks:

CT-18: Isolate the ruptured steam generator prior to overfill (100% WR level).

CT-19: Perform RCS cooldown at maximum rate such that MAGENTA PATH on RCS INTEGRITY is avoided and RCS subcooled margin still exists following the cooldown (accomplished by reaching the target temperature specified in E-3, step 6).

CT-20: Depressurize the RCS to meet depressurization criteria specified in E-3, App GG prior to overfilling the ruptured S/G (100% WR level).

CT-21: Terminate Safety Injection prior to overfilling the ruptured S/G (100% WR level) and control RCS pressure and makeup flow so that primary and secondary inventory are stable by the completion of step E-3, step 29.

(continued on next page)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-01 r1.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #1

7. The 10% Pressure Operated Relief Valve on the ruptured steam generator inadvertently actuates (steam generator pressure is still over 100# below setpoint). The Control Operator identifies the open valve by the audible sound of steam and a red position indicator. The valve is successfully closed by cutting in backup air and taking the backup control switch to close.

The scenario is terminated once normal charging is realigned and the crew has determined ECCS flow is not required (E-3, step 29).

- - CT / TCOA note: SGTR was evaluated against Time Critical Operator Actions (TCOAs) # 2,3,4, and 5 & 19 (SGTR);

initial power level and supporting equipment conditions differ significantly from the conditions used in this scenario.

For these reasons, the S/G isolation will remain critical (a critical task, per WOG), but TCOA time limits will not be applied to this scenario.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-01 r1.docx Page 4 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 2 Op-Test No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 50% MOL 1085 ppm boron; Bus F week: CFCU 1-1 and D/G 1-3 OOS Turnover: Maintenance has requested Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 energized on vital backup power.

Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 PZ01PRZ_PRH12_1RTAPWRRT, LOA_PZR31 C (ATC, Pressurizer Heater Grp 1-2 ground and power failure SRO) during routine maintenance (PK17-24, TS 3.4.9) 2 H_V1_034M_1, XMT_VEN6_3, C(BOP, CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to XMT_VEN7_3, XMT_VEN8_3 SRO) low CCW flow (PK01-21, TS 3.6.6) 3 MAL_CVC8A C (ATC, Seal Injection Filter 1-1 plugs causing reduction in SRO) charging flow to RCP seals. (PK04-22) 4 MAL_GEN4_2 R (ATC) Main Generator underfrequency at 50% causes load C (BOP, rejection (AP-2).

SRO) 5 MAL_MSS3A, MAL_SYD2 M (ALL) Steamline break outside containment upstream of flow restrictor (S/G 1-1); requires Rx trip and SI.

RCPs trip due to a loss of 12kV power, driving conditions for entry into FR-P.1 (CT-48).

6 MAL_PPL5A, MAL_PPL5B C (BOP) ATWS condition; requires manual opening of 13D/E breakers from C/R (CT-1).

7 MAL_PPL1A C (BOP) Train A Phase A fails to actuate on the SI; requires manual closure of isolation valves.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC ES-D-1-02 r1.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 6,7) 2

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 1,2,3,4) 4

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-2) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FR-P.1) 1

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference Reactor tripped by completion of The safeguards systems that protect the plant during

Westinghouse Owners E-0, step 1(CT-1). accidents are designed assuming that only decay heat and Group WCAP-17711-NP pump heat are being added to the RCS. Failure to

Calc G.2 Rev 5 (08151-manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the 2169) subcriticality critical safety function beyond that

OP1.ID2, Time Critical irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Operator Actions Rev 8A,

34.

Terminate ECCS flow by the Failure to terminate ECCS flow when SI termination

Westinghouse Owners completion of FR-P.1, step 11 (CT- criteria are met causes the PRZR to fill and RCS pressure Group WCAP-17711-NP 48). to increase. Additionally, the unnecessary continuation of ECCS flow needlessly aggravates the thermal stress on the reactor vessel. This constitutes an incorrect performance that causes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-02 r1.docx Page 2 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #2

1. Reactor Operator places Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 (aligned to vital backup power supply) in service to support routine maintenance. Associated control board power meter spikes to high end of scale followed by annunciator alarm PK17-24, 480V Bus 1G Ground on the associated bus. Operator recognizes the abnormal condition and reopens the breaker or, if breaker is not opened manually, break trips open in 15 seconds.

Shift Foreman enters TS 3.4.9 Condition B, for one required group of pressurizer heaters inoperable (72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months shutdown tech spec).

2. CFCU 1-2 has loss of CCW flow due to debris migration causing stator and motor bearing temperatures to rise rapidly and bring in annunciator alarm PK01-21, Contmt Fan Clr. Reactor operators identify low flow indications on vertical boards and rapidly rising stator/bearing temperatures using plant process computer trends. Crew secures the CFCU to prevent motor damage and contact maintenance/engineering for assistance. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.6.6 Condition C, one required CFCU system inoperable such that a minimum of two CFCUs remain OPERABLE (7 day shutdown tech spec).

(Note: Malfunction is designed to trip the CFCU if crew has not shut the fan down within 5 minutes of stator temperature reaching 380oF).

3. In-service Seal Injection Filter 1-1 plugs, reducing flow to RCP seals and bringing in AR PK04-22, RCP Seal Inj Fltr Delta-P Hi. Reactor Operators verify CCP seal cooling is still being maintained by CCW and ATC operator throttles RCP seal injection hand control valve, HCV-142, as needed to maintain pressurizer level. Shift Foreman establishes bands for pressurizer level and confirms field operators have been dispatched to swap seal injection filters.

4. An underfrequency condition on the grid results in a full load rejection on Unit 1 from 50% power. Crew recognizes condition based on numerous power level alarms and the ensuing secondary side transient. The crew monitors primary and secondary systems response, most notably rod control, steam dumps, and digital feedwater to ensure all systems respond appropriately in automatic. Shift Foreman implements OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection to stabilize the plant. The ATC operator places rods in manual to maintain reactor power between 20%-30% reactor power and determines required boration to stabilize the plant. BOP operator performs secondary realignments.

5. A main steamline break develops gradually (4 minute ramp) upstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves, outside containment. The crew identifies the need to safety inject and enter Emergency Operating Procedures based on pressurizer pressure and level lowering rapidly. Initial diagnosis may also note the absence of parameters indicative of a primary side break. Shift Foreman directs Safety Injection (SI) and entry into EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

6. On the SI, the reactor fails to automatically actuate (ATWS). Manual Rx Trip switches are ineffective as well.

Control board operators will perform their respective immediate actions: ATC drives control rods inward and BOP manually opens control rod breakers 13D/E on VB5 (CT-1, Reactor tripped by completion of E-0, step 1)**. The Shift Foreman maintains his oversight position to ensure immediate actions are performed properly and in a timely manner, prior to formally entering EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

(continued on next page)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-02 r1.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #2

7. After confirming the remaining immediate actions are complete, the BOP Operator is directed to complete Appendix E, ESF AUTO ACTIONS, SECONDARY AND AUXILIARIES STATUS. The operator identifies numerous containment isolation valves out of position as indicated by illuminated status lights on Containment Isolation Phase A Monitor Light Box B and individual valve position lights (red). BOP manually aligns all out of position valves and reports failure of Phase A, Train A as part of his update to the Shift Foreman on step 11 of the appendix.

Attempts to stop the cooldown in E-0 are ineffective due to the break location, and the crew continues through the diagnostic steps, transitioning to EOP E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Isolation of the faulted S/G per Appendix HH is assigned to one of the board operators (generally the BOP), while the Shift Foreman and remaining crew member continue on through the main procedure body in parallel.

The loss of power to the RCPs (Startup power lost shortly after Rx trip), combined with the S/G blowdown eventually leads to a MAGENTA and subsequent RED path on RCS INTEGRITY. The Shift Foreman transitions to EOP FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, where the crew completes the critical task of SI termination (CT-48, Terminate ECCS flow by the completion of FR-P.1, step 11).

The scenario is terminated once Safety Injection is terminated in FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition (completion of step 11).

- - TCOA note: Steam break was evaluated against Time Critical Operator Actions (TCOAs) # 18 & 19 (MSLB IC & OC); the break sizes, ramp times, initial power levels, and other conditions differ significantly from the conditions used in this scenario.

- - TCOA note: The ATWS was evaluated against Time Critical Operator Actions (TCOA) # 34 and is similar to the TCOA basis event. TCOA time limits will be applied to the scenario. Operators must trip the reactor from the control room within 90 seconds.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-02 r1.docx Page 4 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 3 Op-Test No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL 960 ppm boron; AFW 1-3 and CFCU 1-5 OOS Turnover: Maintain 100% Power Event Malf Event Event Description No No. Type* (See Summary for Narrative Detail) 1 N/A R(ALL) Grid Control Center backdown order (200 MW within 30 minutes) (AP-25).

2 XMT_ASW2, XMT_ASW1, C (BOP, ASW Pp 1-1 high bearing temperature / trip due to loss of PMP_ASW2, SRO) motor oil (PK01-03, AP-10, TS 3.7.8.A).

AS01ASW_ASP11_MTFSEIZUR 3 DSC_ROD1 C (ATC, DRPI power supply failure during ramp. (PK03-21, TS SRO) 3.1.7.B).

4 MAL_CVC1 C (ALL) 35 gpm letdown leak inside containment (AP-18).

5 ZMLSEI1, MAL_SEI1, MAL_RCS2A M (ALL) Seismically induced 100% DBA LBLOCA. Reactor Trip and Safety Injection auto-initiate. Crew transitions to E-1.3 Cold Leg Recirculation when RWST reaches 33% (CT-36).

6 PMP_ASW2_1 C (BOP) ASW Pp 1-2 trip during initial bus transfer; manual restart required) (CT-9).

7 RLY_PPL73, RLY_PPL74, RLY_PPL75, C (BOP) Containment spray fails to actuate (manually alignment RLY_PPL76 required) (CT-3).

8 AF01AFW_AFP12_MTFSHEAR C (ATC) AFW Pp 1-2 shaft shears and TDAFW auto-start fails.

9 PMP_RHR2_1, PMP_RHR1_1 C (ATC) RHR pumps fail to trip @ 33% RWST level; manual stop required.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC ES-D-1-03 r1.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) 8

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 6,7,8,9) 4

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-1, E-1.3) 2

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See description below) 3 Critical Task Justification Reference Manually start at least 1 ASW pump by ASW train is required to remove accident generated

FSAR, Section 6.2. & 9.2.7.

completion of EOP E-0, Appendix E, step and core decay heat following a design basis LOCA.

Westinghouse Owners

5. (CT-9) Without ASW, CFCUs cannot remove heat from the Group WCAP-17711-NP containment atmosphere. Additionally, ASW serves

Technical Specification Basis as the ultimate heat sink during the recirculation B.3.7.8 mode of ECCS cooling. Failure to start the minimum number of required ASW pumps places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

Manually align at least 1 train of Failure to initiate the minimum required

EOP FR-Z.1 Background Containment Spray (1 pump and Containment Spray equipment as a means of Document associated valves) by completion of EOP pressure suppression represents a severe challenge

Westinghouse Owners E-0, Appendix E, step 7. (CT-3) to Containment Safety Function. Group WCAP-17711-NP Transfer to cold leg recirculation within Transfer to cold leg recirculation within the TCOA

STA-061 (07938-3-21, W 10 minutes after RWST reaches low level time frame is license commitment. Failing to Letter PGE-99-546 (07711-set point of 33%. (CT-36) perform RHR suction realignment within the specified 1153) time constraint can lead to inadequate RHR NPSH

OP1.ID2, Time Critical and degraded the emergency core cooling system Operator Actions Rev 8A, performance. #8.

Westinghouse Owners Group WCAP-17711-NP L141 NRC ES-D-1-03 r1.docx Page 2 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3

1. Shift Manager reports a confirmed Grid Control Center backdown order due to 500 kV line fire risk. Unit 1 is directed to shed 200 MW within 30 minutes. The Shift Foreman determines an appropriate ramp rate to meet the backdown order requirement (may assign this task to reactor operator) and implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown. The ATC determines an initial boration based on the Reactivity Handbook and advises the Shift Foreman of his recommendation. The BOP enters the programmed ramp into the turbine control system. The reactivity evolutions are implemented sequentially, with the Shift Foreman providing oversight.

2. A loss of motor oil to ASW Pp 1-1 causes high motor bearing temperatures, bringing in annunciator AR PK01-03, Aux Salt Water Pumps. Reactor operators follow procedural guidance and identify rapidly rising upper and lower motor bearing temperatures on ASW Pp 1-1 using the plant process computer (PPC). The local field operator is dispatched to determine the cause of the alarm and the Shift Foreman directs a swap to the standby ASW pump. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.7.8.A, for one ASW train inoperable (72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months shutdown tech spec).

(Note: ASW Pp 1-1 will experience a seized shaft malfunction if it is stilling running 8 minutes after the high temperature alarm actuates ~ 350oF).

3. The normal power supply to DRPI trips opens at 1000 MW (close to end of target ramp). Crew responds per AR PK03-21, DRPI FAILURE/ROD BOTTOM, placing rods in manual. The Shift Foreman directs the ramp to be placed on hold and field operators are contacted to place DRPI on backup power. Shift Foreman provides crew with procedural guidance regarding rod motion (minor adjustments as well as actions required should a major transient occur) with DRPI unavailable and before entering TS 3.1.7.B for more than one DRPI per group inoperable (immediate TS action is to place rods in manual).

4. A 35 gpm letdown line leak inside containment, downstream RO 27/28/29 ramps in over 3 minutes. The ATC identifies lowering letdown flow, VCT level, and rising charging. The BOP operator checks containment parameters to aid diagnostic efforts. Diagnostic brief by the crew identifies letdown line inside containment as likely leak source (pressurizer pressure stable, structure sumps rising, RM-12 in alarm). Crew enters OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure to address the leak. Normal letdown is isolated and excess letdown is placed in service.

(Note: If leak is not identified as being on the letdown line during initial diagnosis, crew will enter OP AP-1, and be directed to OP AP-18).

5. Large seismic results in 100% DBA LBLOCA. Reactor Trip and Safety Injection occur immediately and the crew enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The crew performs their immediate actions and checks for actuation of emergency safeguards equipment, diagnosing conditions consistent with a large break LOCA (high containment pressure, loss of pressurizer pressure and level, loss of subcooling, high containment sump levels). The crew identifies RCP trip criteria have been met, with Shift Foreman concurrence, trip all four RCPs (TCOA).*** Shift Foreman directs the BOP Operator to complete Appendix E, ESF AUTO ACTIONS, SECONDARY AND AUXILIARIES STATUS, and continues on in E-0.

(continued on next page)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-03 r1.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #3

6. Reactor Operator notes that ASW Pp 1-2 is not running (tripped off during bus transfer) and manually restart the pump (CT-9, Manually start at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps in an operating safeguards train by the completion of E-0, Appendix E, step 5). **

(Note: This action may be performed after individuals have verified immediate actions or as part of Appendix E, ESF AUTO ACTIONS, SECONDARY AND AUXILIARIES STATUS) .

7. Reactor Operator identifies Containment Spray has failed to actuate as required based on high high containment pressure and an active Safety Injection signal. Action is taken to manually start containment spray pumps and align spray valves. (CT-3,Manually align at least 1 train of Containment Spray (1 pump and associated valves) by completion of EOP E-0, Appendix E, step 7).**

(Note: This action may be performed after individuals have verified immediate actions or as part of Appendix E, ESF AUTO ACTIONS, SECONDARY AND AUXILIARIES STATUS).

8. Reactor Operator identifies low S/G level and no flow condition from running AFW pump (sheared shaft) along with TDAFW failed auto start. TDAFW pump is manually started to restore S/G level.

Crew continues through E-0 diagnostic steps, and transitions to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Functional restoration status trees are checked and crew identifies transition criteria for FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock. Conditions will be met for exiting the procedure at the first step.

The Shift Foreman performs a procedure transition brief to review plant conditions, priorities, and review the expected procedural flow path prior to continuing on into E-1. The task of monitoring for E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation transition criteria is assigned to one of the Reactor Operators as a Fold Out Page (FOP) item during the brief.

9. When RWST level will reach 33%, both RHR pumps fail to trip, but can be manually stopped in the Control Room. The crew to transition immediately to E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, performing the TCOA/CT*** of Cold Leg Recirculation Alignment (CT-36, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation and establish at least 1 train of ECCS flow prior to RWST level reaching 4%). The Shift Foreman will assign one operator (usually the BOP) Appendix EE to perform RHR Hx alignment, while he and the remaining operator complete the TCOA alignment steps of E-1.3. The loss of one train of ASW early in the scenario will limit the crew to a single RHR Hx, requiring the crew to clearly communicate and choreograph the final valve alignment process.

The scenario is terminated once a single train of Cold Leg Recirculation Alignment is complete per EOP E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

- - TCOA note: This DBA LBLOCA was evaluated against TCOA #8, and is similar to the TCOA bases event, so TCOA time limits will be applied to the scenario (operators have 10 min to align to cold leg recirculation, as timed from the RWST reaching 33% [alarm comes in] and finishing the alignment). Phase B, RCP Trip Criteria in this scenario was evaluated against TCOA #67 and determined to apply. Operators have 5 minutes to trip all four RCPs from the initial Phase B actuation signal.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-03 r1.docx Page 4 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 4 Op-Test No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL 960 ppm boron; AFW 1-3 and D/G 1-3 OOS Turnover: Perform remainder of STP P-CCP-11, continuing from step 12.9.11 Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 H_V2_164M_1 C (ALL) STP P-CCP-11 surveillance test unsat due to high amp reading; pump swap required. TS 3.5.2.A 2 VLV_PZR6_2 C (BOP, Pressurizer PORV PCV-474 seat leak-by to PRT. (PK05-23, SRO) TS 3.4.11.A).

3 MAL_RCS4H R (ALL) 10 gpm SGTL ramped in over 1 minute; plant shutdown required (OP O-4, AP-3, AP-25, TS 3.4.13.B).

4 VLV_SGB1_1, VLV_SGB2_1, C(BOP, SG Blowdown High Rad auto actuations fail (PK11-17).

VLV_SGB3_1, VLV_SGB4_1, SRO)

VLV_SGB1_9, VLV_SGB10_1, VLV_SGB11_1, VLV_SGB12_1, VLV_SGB13_1, VLV_SGB14_1, 5 LOA_CND1 M (ALL) Condenser vacuum requiring turbine trip/Rx trip (AP-7).

6 VLV_PZR4_2 C (BOP) Pressurizer PORV PCV-455C fails slightly open on trip requiring manual isolation by associated block valve (CT-10).

7 MAL_AFW1 C (BOP) Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump trips on overspeed.

PMP_AFW1 Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump 1-2 fails to autostart, manual start available.

8 PMP_AFW_2 M (ALL) AFW Pp 1-2 overcurrent trip at less than the minimum required S/G level causing Loss of Heat Sink extreme challenge and entry into FR-H.1 (CT-43).

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC ES-D-1-04 r1.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 8

Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 6,7) 2

Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4) 3

Major transients (1-2) (Events 5 and 8) 2

EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-0.1) 1

EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) (FR-H.1) 1

Critical tasks (2-3)(See Scenario Summary) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference Close the block MOV upstream of the The open PORV and block valve constitute the

Westinghouse Owners stuck open PORV by completion of E-0.1, degradation of a fission product barrier. Closing the Group WCAP-17711-NP step 5 (CT-10). block valve is essential to safety since failure to do so results in the unnecessary continuation of the degraded condition.

Establish feedwater flow to at least one Primary to secondary heat transfer deteriorates If

Westinghouse Owners S/G before RCS bleed and feed is S/G dryout is allowed to occur. The resultant rise in Group WCAP-17711-NP required (CT-43). RCS temperature and pressure can lead to RCS barrier loss when pressure rises above the Pressurizer PORV setpoint, causing a loss of inventory and eventual fuel over-heating and damage.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-04 r1.docx Page 2 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #4

1. Crew takes the watch with STP P-CCP-11, Routine Surveillance Test of Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-1 already in progress. Pump amps are found to be slightly above the normal operating range, and the crew follows the STP procedural guidance to shut down the pump. The crew notes CCP 1-3 was in-service just prior to the test, and performs a pump swap following the guidance of OP B-1A:V. The field operator assigned to check for bearing oil flow reports no oil was visible in the sight glass while the pump was running. Shift Foreman enters TS 3.5.2.A, for one ECCS train inoperable (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to determine no common cause failure and 14 days to restore the train to OPERABLE status).

2. Pressurizer Pressure Operated Relief Valve PCV-474 begins leaking by, bringing in annunciator AR PK05-23, PZR SAFETY OR RELIEF LINE TEMP. The crew performs diagnostics, confirming the existence of seat leakage based on PZR PORV tailpipe temperature and rising Pressurizer Relief Tank pressure and temperature. Annunciator guidance is followed to identify and isolate PCV-474 by closing its associated block valve, 8000A. Shift Foreman addresses TS 3.4.11.A, for one or more PORVs inoperable solely due to excessive seat leakage. (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to close the associated block valve).

3. Steam Generator 1-4 develops a 10 gpm tube leak over a one minute period. Rising counts on various radiation monitors alert the crew to both the nature and location of the leak. The leak is Crew determines leak rate and enters OP AP-3, Steam Generator Tube Failure. The leak is also evaluated per OP O-4, Primary to Secondary Steam Generator Tube Leak Detection, which directs the crew to reduce power by 50% in the next hour and be in Mode 3 within two hours. Shift Foreman determines TS 3.4.13.B, RCS Operational Leakage applies and enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdow for the ramp off-line.

4. AR PK11-17, SG BLOWDOWN HI RAD comes into alarm during the ramp as a result of high radiation on RM- 23. Isolation relays fail to actuate and the crew takes manual action to close the affected valves on the steam generator blowdown sample header and swap steam generator blow down discharge over to the Equipment Drain Receiver.

5. The vacuum breaker at the main condenser develops a leak at approximately 1150 MW, causing condenser vacuum to steadily degrade. The crew enters OP AP-7, Degraded Condenser, and may attempt to adjust the ramp rate, but will be unsuccessful in avoiding an automatic turbine trip/Rx trip.

The Shift Foreman will monitor the turbine automatic trip set point and the may elect to manually actuate once it is clear that a trip is unavoidable.

6. The crew enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and performs their immediate actions. Board operators also identify PCV-455C in mid-position. The valve will not close and must be isolated using the associated block valve 8000B (Critical Task CT-10, close the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PORV by completion of E-0.1, step 5).**

7. Operators identify low S/G level with no AFW pumps running while preparing to transition out of E-0.

The turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump is tripped on overspeed and cannot be restarted. The remaining Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (MDAFW 1-2) failed to auto start and is started manually.

(continued on next page)

L141 NRC ES-D-1-04 r1.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #4

8. Crew transitions from E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. When S/G 1 & 2 reach approximately 14.5%, Motor Driven Aux Feedwater 1-2 trips on overcurrent, leading to Loss Of Heat Sink condition. EOP FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink is used to establish secondary feedwater from the condensate system. (Critical Task CT-43:

Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G before RCS bleed and feed is required (i.e. before WR S/G level in any 3 S/G is less than 18% OR Pressurizer pressure is greater than 2335 psig due to a loss of secondary heat sink).**

The scenario is terminated in FR-H.1, once condensate flow to the steam generators has been established.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-04 r1.docx Page 4 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No: 5 Op-Test No: L141 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% MOL 960 ppm boron; Bus F week: CFCU 1-1 and D/G 1-3 OOS Turnover: Remove Pressurizer Steam Space Purge from Service per OP B-9:III, Primary Sampling System - Shutdown and Clearing, starting on step 6.2.2.

Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 N/A N (BOP) OP B-9:III, Remove Pressurizer Steam Space Purge from Service Section 6.2 (isolate valves and secure extra backup heaters) 2 XMT_RCS93_3 I (ATC, Loop 3 Tcold slow failure high, requiring manual SRO) control of rods. (AP-5, TS 3.3.1.E,X; 3.3.2.M).

3 PK0916_0591, AF02X51HF9TF_F_ACT, C (BOP, AFW Sys Leakage Temperature Hi / AFW Pp 1-3 PMP_AFW_MTRF SRO) overcurrent trip device fails to actuate during required pump run (AR PK09-16, TS 3.7.5.B).

4 MAL_MFW2A C (ALL) MFP 1-1 High Vibration requiring ramp and pump shutdown (AP-25).

5 ZMLSEI1_F, MAL_SEI, MAL_PPL5A, M (SRO, ATWS on large seismic and Turbine fails to trip.

MAL_PPL5B, MAL_TURK ATC) Manual trip actuation successful for both.

6 RCS3E, MAL_PPL3A, MAL_PP3B M (ALL) 500 gpm post-trip SBLOCA ramps in over 2 minutes.

Auto SI fails to actuate. (CT-2) 7 PMP_CVC1_1, PMP_SIS_1 C (ATC) On SI, Bus F ECCS pumps fail to actuate (CCP 1-1 and SIP 1-1); manual start available.

8 RLY_PPL11, RLY_PPL12 C (BOP) Seismic damage causes SSPS relay failures on Phase A isolation valves. Direct path from containment to Aux Bldg requires manual isolation (CT-11).

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L141 NRC ES-D-1-05 r1.docx Page 1 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) (Events 2,3,4,5,6,7,8) 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) (Events 7,8) 2

3. Abnormal events (2-4) (Events 2,3,4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) (Event 5,6) 2

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (E-0.1, E-1, E-1.2) 3

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3)(See Scenario Summary) 2 Critical Task Justification Reference Manually initiate Safety Injection by Failure to initiate Safety Injection under the postulated

Westinghouse Owners completion of E-0.1, step 5 (CT-2). conditions of this scenario places the plant outside the Group WCAP-17711-NP assumptions of the FSAR accident analysis and in violation of the facility licensing condition.

Close containment isolation valves Given the major event in this scenario (SBLOCA), the

Westinghouse Owners such that at least one valve is open path between containment and the Auxiliary Group WCAP-17711-NP closed on each containment (CT- building represents the loss of a second fission product

DCPP Emergency Action 11). barrier. Closing the isolation valves is essential to safety Level Technical Basis since failure to do results in radiation release continuing Manual beyond containment.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-05 r1.docx Page 2 of 4 Rev 1

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

- NRC #5

1. (Normal Evolution) The watch is assumed as Chemistry completes Pressurizer Steam Space Sampling. Reactor Operators isolate valves and secure extra backup heaters per OP B-9:III, Section 6.2, Remove Pressurizer Steam Space Purge from Service.

2. Loop 3 Tcold slowly fails high causing rods to drive in unexpectedly and charging flow to increase momentarily (until the Process Control System kicks out the bad signal). After determining auto rod motion is unwarranted, the ATC operator takes rods to manual and controls charging to maintain pressurizer level within pre-established bands. The Shift Foreman enters OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel, and directs manual operation of failed automatic controls to return parameters to normal.

Once rods are returned to their starting all rods out position and temperature returned to normal, rod control can be placed back in Auto. Shift Foreman enters Tech Specs 3.3.1.E,X, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, and 3.3.2.M, ESFAS Instrumentation for the failed channel. (All are 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months actions).

3. Inleakage from Main Feedwater causes high temperatures alarms in AFW Pp 1-3 downstream piping. The crew responds per AR PK09-16, AUX FW SYS LEAKAGE / TEMP HI, which directs the crew to run the pump and feed forward a small amount of water to minimize thermal transients in the pipe. When started, pump amps peg high, but the overcurrent relay device has failed and the pump continues to run. BOP operator immediately shuts the pump down and reports the condition. Shift Foreman enter T.S. 3.7.5.B, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for one AFW train inoperable (72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action).

4. MFP 1-1 shows increasing vibration, rising to 7 mils over 2 minutes. The crew responds per AR PK09-13 MAIN FEEDPUMP 1-1, which calls for a 50-200 MW/min ramp down to 550 MW. Shift Foreman enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown and directs the crew to ramp the unit. Upon completion of the ramp, the feed pump is tripped and the plant stabilized.

5. A large seismic event (greater than seismic Rx trip setpoint) occurs during stabilization. Crew identifies the ATWS condition and successfully trips the reactor using the control board reactor trip lever. The crew manually trips the turbine during performance of their immediate actions when they identify it has failed to trip as well. Crew enters EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

6. 500 gpm SBLOCA ramps in over a 2 minute period, post-trip as a result of the seismic. Indications of the LOCA become evident as pressurizer level and pressure lower, and containment parameters begin to read up-scale.

The crew may initially try to start and additional charging pump and isolate letdown. Auto Safety Injection will not actuate requiring the crew to manually initiate Safety Injection (CT-2, Manually initiate Safety Injection by completion of E-0.1, step 5).

7. Seismic damage results in various ESFAS pump failures. Bus F ECCS pumps fail to actuate (CCP 1-1 and SIP 1-

1) on Safety Injection signal, requiring the crew to manually start both pumps.

8. SSPS slave relays K606, Train A & B both fail causing several Phase A Containment Isolation valves in series (inside and outside containment on a single process line) to remain open, resulting in the critical task of manually closing Phase A containment isolation valves (CT-11, Close containment isolation Phase A valves prior to completing E-0, Appendix E). Crew will work through E-0 diagnostic steps and transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and then to E-1.2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.***

L141 NRC ES-D-1-05 r1.docx Page 3 of 4 Rev 1

The scenario is terminated once Cooldown is commenced in EOP E-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

- - TCOA note: The SBLOCA was evaluated against TCOA #10, and is similar to the TCOA basis event. TCOA time limits will be applied to this scenario. Operators must trip the RHR pumps or initiate cooling to the RHR HXs with 30 minutes following the SBLOCA.

L141 NRC ES-D-1-05 r1.docx Page 4 of 4 Rev 1

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 26 Event

Description:

Raise reactor power from 2% to 8%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

(OP L-3, Secondary Plant Startup, starting at step 6.28)

SRO Reads NOTE prior to step 6.28 ATC * (6.28) Slowly raises power to 8% by pulling control rods one step at a time.

SRO Provides reactivity oversight while raising power BOP * (6.29) Monitors feed/steam P (PI-509, VB3 or CC2, DFWCS HMI on CC3)

(6.30) Verifies that DFWCS maintains constant P during rise in power (it's in auto, and will maintain P)

SRO Reads NOTE prior to step 6.31 The next event will occur when power (nuclear) reaches 3%, or per lead examiner.

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 1 of 28 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 26 Event

Description:

Intermediate range detector NI-36 fails low @ 3.0%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses failed NI channel using one or more of the following:

Redundant channel NI-35 does not channel check (CC1)

Power range NIs not changing (CC1)

SRO May Implement OP AP-5, Malf of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel)

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines primary and secondary control systems are controlling properly in AUTO.

SRO/BOP * (2) Determines that the failure is not Eagle-21 related (PK06-01 and PK06-03 are OFF)

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines failure is not associated with a T channel (VB2)

SRO * (4) Verifies steam dumps are not open as result of instrument failure or spurious actuation. (Dumps SHOULD be open to maintain temperature for current 2% power conditions. Shift Foreman SHOULD NOT enter RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column)

SRO * (5) Notifies I&C of the NI-36 failure, as time permits SRO Reads CAUTION prior to step 6 SRO * (6) Notes requirements to take channel OOS prior to maintenance (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 2 of 28 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 26 Event

Description:

Intermediate range detector NI-36 fails low @ 3.0% (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC * (7) Uses Attachments 4.1 and 4.2 to determine affected indicator o (a) Places Out-of-Service (OOS) sticker on NI-36 Indicators (CC1).

SRO/BOP * (8) Uses Attachment 4.1, pg 19 to determine required TS/ECG actions for the inoperable channel o TS 3.3.1.F (24 hrs to go < P-6 or > P-10) o TS 3.3.1.G (not applicable unless both channels failed) o TS 3.3.1.S (not applicable > P-6) o (Shift Foreman discretion) may have IR trip bypassed from NI-35 (not TS action)

Note: Shift Manager to provide the following cue only if the Shift Foreman decides to lower power to less than P-6 as a result of TS 3.3.1.F evaluation.

Cue: (from Shift Manager) I&C field evaluation indicates that NI-36 can be returned to service by end of shift.

Continue raising power to 8%. Per OP L-0 Attachment 9.9, the requirements are met for Mode 1 entry with the intermediate range channel failure."

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs addressed (per lead examiner)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 3 of 28 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 26 Event

Description:

Feed Reg Bypass valve FCV-1510 oscillations in AUTO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis is made by using one or more of the following:

PK09-15, Digital Feedwater System alarm

Erratic feed flow on 1-1 S/G (PPC, VB3 meters, DFWCS console (CC3))

FCV-1510 demand/actual mismatch; rising level on S/G 1-1 (DFWCS HMI on CC3)

BOP Takes manual control of FCV-1510 and restores flow SRO Implements AR PK09-15, Digital Feedwater Cont System (AR PK09-15, Digital Feedwater Cont System)

SRO * (1.0) Reads input 875 and associated note regarding multiple possible input alarms (220 possible, all with reflash capability) o Goes to section 2.1 for General Actions SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Checks DFWCS status o (a, b) Restores S/G 1-1 level to previous band o (c) Reviews DFWCS alarm screen; notes level deviation alarms o (d, e) Checks for additional related annunciators o (f) Checks for indications of level, pressure, or flow control channel failures May reference OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel for additional guidance SRO May refer to TS 3.7.3, but valve is capable of closing (on FWI) - LCO is not applicable Proceed to the next event once S/G 1-1 level is being controlled in MANUAL, per the lead examiner

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 4 of 28 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 5 of 26 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis of loss of 4KV Bus G is made from one or more of the following:

Numerous equipment alarms associated with the loss of 4KV Bus G equipment

PK17-16 and PK17-17 4KV Bus G alarms (both related to loss of bus)

Blue light on 4KV Bus G (diff) (VB4)

White lights out on 4KV and 480 vac Bus G (VB4)

BOP Diagnoses differential trip on Bus G due to alarms (above), blue light on Bus G, and loss of power available white light on Bus G (VB4, middle skirt)

SRO Implements OP AP-27, Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus (OP AP-27, "Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus")

SRO/BOP * (1) Checks vital 4KV busses energized (only Bus G OFF; other white bus lights checked ON) (VB4, skirt)

SRO/ATC * (2) Checks DRPI energized (aligned to normal power supply, Bus F, no impact) (VB2, upper left)

BOP * (3) Confirms 4KV Bus G is tripped on differential (VB4, blue light on bus)

SRO * (4) Notifies maintenance of bus fault BOP * (5) Checks alternate pumps running on 4kV busses o (5.b) Starts CCW 1-3 (VB1)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 6 of 26 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-27, "Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus", continued)

ATC * (5) Checks alternate pumps running on 4kV busses (cont) o (5.b) Reports no charging pumps running; letdown has isolated (VB2)

Note: Shift Foreman may elect to postpone implementation of OP AP-17 until after field operators are dispatched to restore backup power supplies as part of OP AP-27, Attachment 4.2 SRO * (5) Checks alternate pumps running on 4kV buses (cont) o (5.b RNO) Directs Reactor Operators to Implement OP AP-17, Section A to restore charging and letdown (see page 9 for implementation)

SRO/BOP * (6) Checks 480 vac vital busses - only bus 1G de-energized (VB4 - white power light for each 480 vac bus)

Shift Manager Cue (if asked for next step) There are currently no loads on their backup source (from the OP O-13)

BOP * (Att 4.2) Implements Attachment 4.2 for bus 1G:

o (1.a) Verifies DRPI was not on backup power (it was not) o (1.b) Places PCV-455C Pzr PORV in CLOSE position (due to 8000B loss of power)

(VB2, upper panel, far right), and refers the Shift Foreman to TS 3.4.11 (TS 3.4.11.C (1 hr) o ( 1c) Assigns field actions to Nuclear Operators (2.a) Initiate performance of D/G margin assessment for additional bus loading per OP O-13 (2.c) Transfer of following equipment to backup power (as required):

Battery 1-2 to charger 1-21 per OP J-9:II

Instrument AC PY-16 per OP J-10:VII

Control Room Vent Power Panel B2 switch no. EPCB2 per OP O-13 (2.d) Check Diesel Fuel Transfer Pp 02 NOT on backup power (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 26 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-27, "Loss of Vital 4kV and/or 480V Bus", continued)

BOP * (Att 4.2) Implements Attachment 4.2 for bus 1G: (continued) o (1.d) Verifies Pressurizer heater group 12 NOT on backup power supplies (they are not) o (1.e) Verifies redundant equipment on the other 480V buses is running Contacts Aux Watch to align BATP 1-1 to the blender.

Starts CFCU 1-2 o (1.f) Verifies other minor equipment status (as time permits)

SRO * (7) Evaluates Tech Specs and ECGs (longer specs as time permits, per lead examiner):

o TS 3.4.11.C - PORV block valve (1 hr) o TS 3.8.1.B - AC Sources - operating (STP I-1C w/I 1 hr) o TS 3.8.4.A - DC Sources - operating (restore batt charger) (2 hrs) o NOTE: may not have time to look up all (longer time limit) Tech Specs prior to next event o TS 3.6.3.A & C - Containment isolation valves (4 hrs, 72 hrs) o TS 3.8.9.A - Distribution system (vital bus) - operating (8 hrs to restore) o TS 3.7.3.A - MFIVs, MFRVs & bypasses, etc (72 hrs) o TS 3.8.7 - Inverters (only a trouble alarm at this point, so none INOPERABLE) o ECG 8.1 Charging Pump No. 3.

o ECG 23.6.A - Vital 480 vac swgr class 1 ventilation (30 days)

SRO/BOP * (8) Checks unloaded DGs (VB4) o Places D/G 1-2 Mode Selector Switch in the MANUAL position o Stops D/G 1-2 SRO * (9) Checks OPERABILITY of ESF equipment (pumps, valves lost due to Bus G loss)

RCP Seal Leak triggered off restoration of battery backup and CCP 1-1 running, per the lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 26 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-17, Loss of Charging starting at section A, Loss of All Charging)

BOP * (1.a & c) Ensures suction flowpath for available remaining charging pump CCP 1-1 o VCT level and pressure in normal band (VB2, middle) (it is) o Suction valves LCV-112B and 112C OPEN (VB2, middle right skirt)

Red light for LCV-112B is on LCV-112C is without power (bus G) but was OPEN prior to the bus loss.

Operator may elect to use Monitor Light Box C (VB1, top) to verify valve position o Charging recirculation valve 8105 and 8106 (VB2, lower skirt just below pump)

Red light for 8105 is on 8106 without power (bus G) but was OPEN prior to the bus loss.

NOTE: HC-459D in MANUAL will operate FCV-128 while the FCV-128 controller is in AUTO and an acceptable, and sometimes the desired, method of operation ATC * (1.d) Closes FCV-128 by placing FCV 128 (CENT CHG PPS FLOW CONT on CC2) OR HC-459D (PZR LEVEL CONTROL in MANUAL) o AUTO light out, MAN light lit o Takes output to zero flow on FI-128A (CC2)

BOP * (1.e) Starts CCP 1-1 SRO/ATC * (1.f) Establishes RCP seals only charging o Adjusts FCV 128 or HC-459D to establish approximately 35 gpm charging flow indicated on FI-128A (CC2)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 26 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-17, Loss of Charging starting at section A, Loss of All Charging, continued)

SRO/ATC * (1.g&h) Restores pressurizer level o Places FCV-128 in MANUAL (if not done previously) o Adjusts FCV 128 to restore pressurizer level to program (CENT CHG PPS FLOW CONT on CC2)

(2) Adjusts HCV-142 to maintain seal injection 8 to 13 gpm (RCP SEAL INJ BACK PRESS CONT on CC2)

SRO/BOP * (3.a) Checks pressurizer level greater than 17% (LI-459A, 460A and 461 on VB2)

BOP/ATC * (3.b) Restores Letdown using appendix R o Ensures FCV-355 - OPEN (HDR C ISOL VLV on VB1) (it is) o Opens TCV-130 to 40% demand - (LETDOWN TEMP on VB2) o Ensures 8149A, B AND C - CLOSED. (LTDN ORIFICE STOP on VB2) (they are) o Opens LCV-459 AND LCV 460 (LTDN ISOL on VB2) o Ensures 8152 - OPEN (LTDN ISOL VLV O.C. on VB2) o Opens PCV-135 to 60% demand (LETDOWN PRESS on VB2) o Establishes approximately 87 gpm charging flow o Adjusts FCV 128 to raise charging flow(CENT CHG PPS FLOW CONT on CC2) o Adjusts HCV-142 to maintain seal injection 8 to 13 gpm (RCP SEAL INJ BACK PRESS CONT on CC2) o Opens 8149B OR C (75 GPM LTDN ORIFICE STOP on VB2) o Adjusts PCV 135 for 350 psig AND place in AUTO (PI-135 on VB2) o Adjusts TCV 130 for 90 - 110°F AND place in AUTO (TI-130 on VB2) o Checks RV 8117 - TI 129 NORMAL (LTDN RV on VB2) o Notifies SFM letdown in service (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 26 Event

Description:

4 kV Bus G Trips on Differential (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-17, Loss of Charging starting at section A, Loss of All Charging, continued)

SRO/ATC * (3.c) Adjusts charging as needed to restore PZR Level to band specified by Shift Foreman SRO/ATC * (4.a - e.) Checks VCT Makeup Control o Checks VCT level 14% to 87% (LI-112 on VB2) o Reads NOTE prior to step 4.b o Checks VCT pressure 15 to 60 psig (PI-135 on VB2) o VCT makeup control (YIC-100) set for RCS boron concentration AUTO mode selected with boron concentration displayed at current RCS boron (CC2) o Checks Instrument Air available (VB4)

SRO/BOP * (5.a) Checks charging aligned to VCT o Red light for LCV-112B is on o LCV-112C is without power (bus G) but was OPEN prior to the bus loss.

Operator may elect to use Monitor Light Box C (VB1, top) to verify valve position SRO * (6.a) Evaluate Technical Specifications and ECGs o Covered under OP AP-27 evaluation SRO * (7) Evaluates STP M-55 for applicability; determines N/A.

(May request the SM to perform the evaluation)

SRO * (8) Returns to Procedure and Step in Effect

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 26 Event

Description:

RCP 1-1 #1 Seal Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis of RCP 1-1 number seal leakage increase is made using one or more of the following:

RCP parameters rising (charging flow rising, seal lower bearing temp lower, high seal return flow on VB2, lower center, below DRPI) (PPC picture and various group displays)

PK05-01 RCP 1-1, input 1393 (AR PK05-01, RCP 11)

SRO Implements AR PK05-01 SRO/ATC * (1.0) Identifies inputs 1393 (RCP 1-1 Seal Leakoff Flo Hi, >5.0 gpm) and goes to section 2.1 for General Actions SRO Reads caution regarding alarms on an RCP indicate a complex RCP malfunction that is unlikely to be resolved before equipment damage or an automatic trip occurs SRO * (2.1) Informs crew of Reactor Trip criteria associated with multiple diverse alarms in close succession on RCP 1-1 and assigns as CONTINUOUS ACTION to monitor. Describes additional requirements following Rx Trip (trip RCP 1-1, close associated pressurizer spray valve PCV-455A, and implement OP AP-28, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction)

SRO/ATC * (2.2) Determines seal leakoff rate is greater than AR PK upper limit of 6 gpm and transitions to OP AP-28, Section B, RCP Number 1 Seal Failure.

(OP AP-28, Section B, RCP Number 1 Seal Failure)

SRO Reads notes regarding total seal leakoff flow (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 26 Event

Description:

RCP 1-1 #1 Seal Failure, Manual Reactor Trip (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-28, Section B, RCP Number 1 Seal Failure, cont.)

ATC * (1.) Checks RCP Seal #1 Return flow for RCP 1-1 and reports approximately 7 gpm.

Note 1: The Shift Foreman may determine that the rapid increase in seal leakoff flow (7 gpm ramped in over 1 minute) , constitutes a step rise in # 1 Seal Leakoff > 2 gpm, and direct implementation of the following CONTINUOUS ACTIONS.

Note 2: Foldout page directs reactor trip / performance of Section B, step 1 if RCP bearing temperatures are increasing with RCP #1 seal return flow > 6 gpm.

SRO (1.a) Informs crew of Reactor Trip criteria associated with step rise in # 1 Seal Leakoff > 2 gpm, and assigns as CONTINUOUS ACTION to monitor. Describes additional requirements following Rx Trip o stop RCP 1-1 o close Seal #1 outlet isolation valve 3-5 minutes after pump is secured o monitor CCW temperature and flow to RCP 1-1 o close the associated pressurizer spray valve PCV-455A SRO (1.b) References Decision Table (Total #1 Seal LeakOff versus RCP Radial Bearing Outlet Temperature and #1 Seal Outlet Temperature).

ATC (1.b) Reports RCP Radial Bearing Outlet Temp and #1 Seal Outlet Temp rising.

SRO (1.b) Directs reactor trip and RCP 1-1 trip after immediate actions and E-0 entered.

ATC (1.b) Initiates reactor trip (CC1, or VB2)

BOP (1.b) Trips RCP 1-1 (may do this following EOP E-0 immediate actions)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 26 Event

Description:

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open(VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), Nis decreasing (CC1 left))

ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital bus H has a white light on the mimic bus)

ATC/BOP * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 OFF, also checks SSPS ESF status lights on VB1 and PK02-02 to verify SI is NOT required)

ATC/BOP * (4 RNO) Checks AFW status (VB3, AFW Pp 1-2 & 1-3 will be running), and exits E-0 for E-0.1 May throttle AFW LCVs on VB3 lower left to limit RCS cooldown; levels will be relatively high due to low initial power.

ALL

Implements CSFSTs SRO

Transitions to EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, and performs procedure transition brief (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 14 of 26 Event

Description:

E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response)

Note 1: Follow-up actions from AP-28 (associated pressurizer spray valve PCV-455A (CC2) and closure of Seal #1 outlet isolation valve (8141A, VB-2) 3-5 minutes after RCP 1-1 is secured) are implemented in parallel with E-0.1.

Note 2: EOP E-0.1 actions will be performed until crew identifies SGTR, which will most likely occur within the first step or two of E-0.1; there is no requirement to perform any particular E-0.1 actions prior to the transition back to E-0.

ATC/BOP * (1) Checks Tavg stable or trending towards Tref (if should be); no actions expected here other than continued throttling of AFW flow may be done (AFW LCVs on VB3 lower left), to control RCS temperature ATC/BOP * (2) Checks Feedwater Isolation (FWI) complete

Checks Tave < 554°F (expected, given initial power level)

Checks FWI MLB (monitor light box) (VB1, upper center), RED light ON, WHITE lights OFF (they are, this actuation occurs if < 554°F)

Checks AFW flow > 435 gpm (the flow will be adequate, and S/G levels will be at or near normal) (VB3)

ATC * (3) Checks all control rods - fully inserted (they are) (VB2 upper left, for DRPI panel)

ATC/BOP * (4) Checks Pzr and level control

Checks Pzr level > 17% (it is) (VB2 meter, CC2 recorder, PPC)

Checks charging and letdown in service (they both are) (CC2 and VB2 CVCS mimic)

Checks Pzr level trending to 22%; operates FCV-128 and HCV-142 (CC2) to control Pzr level 22% - 60% (RNO)

Operates Pzr heaters as needed (auto/manual) to maintain normal pressure (normal auto operation expected at this point, with pressure returning to normal or normal already)

The next event (major) triggered off shutdown of RCP 1-1, per the lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses of SGTR is made using one or more of the following:

Pressurizer level and pressure lowering (PPC, CC2, VB2)

S/G 1-3 level rising (PPC, VB3)

Main steam line hi-rad rising, loop 3 (RM-73) (PPC, VB2) (not visible for several minutes after initial break)

SRO/BOP

May attempt to isolate letdown (VB2, upper center skirt)

SRO/ATC

Initiates manual SI (CC2, far right)

ALL Crew enters EOP E-0 on trip/SI actuation and silently performs immediate actions:

Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing)

Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses F/G/H have white lights on mimic busses)

Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train lights and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated)

(EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection")

Note: Immediate action steps are re-verified by Shift Foreman after first being performed independently by each member of crew SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing) (VB2, CC1)

SRO/ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv bus status (VB4, vital busses F/G/H have white lights on mimic busses)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", continued)

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train light ON and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated) o Both trains of SI actuated as indicated by PK08-21, SI red light above Monitor Light Box C (VB1), and both trains of SI/RHR pumps running (VB1 skirt)

SRO * (5) Directs implementation of App E (usually given to BOP); See page 18 SRO/ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF o AFW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 both running, but with throttling in Auto due to initial power level at trip (level high) o TDAFW not running nor required; will require field operators to manually control valves due to loss of 4kV bus G SRO/ATC * (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves o Safeties closed (closed); no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria; o RCS WR Pressure is greater than 1300 PSIG, trip criteria is not met (VB2).

SRO/ATC * (9) Determines S/G are NOT faulted o No S/G lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized SRO/ATC * (10) Checks for ruptured S/G o Notes RE-73 elevated with and S/G 1-3 level rising o Directs transition to EOP E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 26 Event

Description:

PORV on ruptured S/G fails open, requires backup air to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: PCV-21 (10% Pressure Operated Relief Valve on the ruptured S/G) 2 minutes after SI is initiated. Response details are described below:

ALL Diagnoses PCV-21 inadvertently open using one or more of the following:

Audible sound of steam

Red status light on steam dump valve status indicator panel (VB3)

Rising steam flow on S/G 1-3 (PPC, VB3)

Notes S/G 1-3 pressure is less than 10% dump setpoint of 1020 psig (VB3)

May attempt taking manual control of PCV-21 using HC-536 (hand-controller), but is will not be successful (VB3)

Cuts in Back-up Air using back-up air cut-in toggle switch (VB3)

Closes PCV-21 using back-up air control valve (VB3)

Verifies PCV-21 goes closed by position indicator light color fully green and steam flow lowered to zero flow (VB3)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 18 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

(1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

(1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system

(2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 ON, output bkrs already and exciter field bkr open due to line up to 230 kV start up power, CC3 right side)

(3 & 4) Verifies Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, Monitor Light Box B: red lights ON, only one light ON, (seal water return) is associated with Bus G loss)

(5) Verifies ESF (SI) actuation complete (SI Portion of Monitor Light Box C: red light ON, white lights - several ON, but all associated with Bus G loss);

BOP * (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white light ON for FW Iso Valve 439 (Bus G)

BOP * (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is NOT required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are OFF)

BOP * (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light OFF, white light are OFF)

BOP * (9) Checks AFW status o AFW Pp 1-2 and 1-3 both running, but throttling due to initial power level at trip (level high) o TDAFW not running nor required; will require field operators to manually control valves due to loss of 4kV bus G o Verifies min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 15%

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 19 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP * (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel)

(11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP * (12) Checks excess letdown; notes NOT in service prior to trip

(13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY. Determines Condenser is NOT available (MSIVs are closed) and directs field operators to break vacuum when turbine is less than 200 rpm

(14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side) and verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel),

BOP * (15) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))

(16) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area);

(17) Verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI)

(18) Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2)

(19) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm)

(20) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 20 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks if RCPs should be stopped (VB2) (still above RCP trip criteria)

SRO/ATC * (2) Identifies S/G 1-3 as ruptured (RM-73 in alarm; indications of rising level without feed during E-0)

SRO/BOP * (3) Implements Appendix FF to isolate ruptured S/G 1-3 (see page 21)

SRO/ATC

Reads CAUTION regarding maintaining isolation of Faulted/Ruptured S/G (do not feed)

(4.a) Notes ruptured S/G level is greater than 15%

(4.b) Takes LCV-115 to MANUAL and closes the valve SRO/ATC * (5) Checks ruptured S/G pressure greater than 225 psig (it is)

Reads CAUTION regarding false PTS (Integrity Status Tree indication) for ruptured loop

(6.a) Determines required cool down target Core Exit Temperature from table based on current ruptured S/G pressure.

SRO/ATC * (7) Determines Condenser is available o MSIVs - ANY OPEN on INTACT SGs o PK08 ON SRO/ATC

Reads two CAUTIONS regarding Main Steam Line Isolation

(8) Blocks Low Steamline Pressure SI o (8.a) Checks RCS Pressure - LESS THAN 1915 PSIG (it is) o (8.b) Checks PK08-06, PZR SI PERMISSIVE P ON (it is) o (8.c) Blocks LO Steamline Pressure SI, Train A and B, verifies PK08-17 ON (it is)

(continued on page 22)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 21 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Appendix FF, "Isolate Faulted Steam Generator")

BOP Reads CAUTION regarding TDAFW as only source of feedflow prior to step 1

(1) Reads step to insure 10% steam dump controller in AUTO; notes valves was manually isolated earlier using backup air.

(2) Checks S/G 1-3 10% steam dump valve closed (PCV-21) (VB3)

(3) Verifies S/G 1-3 MSIV and bypass (FCV-43 and FCV-23) valves closed (VB3)**

(4) Verifies S/G 1-3 supply to TD AFW Pp (FCV-38) closed (VB3, skirt)**

(5) Verifies S/G 1-3 SGBD valves (FCV-157 and FCV-246) closed (VB3, lower left skirt)

(6) Verifies S/G 1-3 is isolated from intact S/G (S/G 1-3 MSIV and MSIV Bypass are both closed as are all intact S/G MSIV and MSIV Bypasses)

(7) Informs Shift Foreman S/G 1-3 isolation is complete

- CT-18: Isolate the ruptured steam generator prior to overfill BOP * (8) Verifies removal of WR Thot input to SCMM for loop 3 (behind boards, PAMS panel behind VB3) o Goes to PAM3 panel o Checks Loop 3 Thot Disabled (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 22 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

Reads CAUTION that RCP Trip Criteria is NOT applicable after operator begins RCS cooldown.

(9) Initiates RCS Cooldown Using 40% Steam Dumps o (9.a) Verifies Appendix FF is complete Note: If AR PK 08-07, Lo Lo Tave Permissive (P-12) is active, Shift Foreman will need to pull step 9.d forward to unblock the 40% steam dump valves. If 40% dump valves not used, following step is N/A.

SRO/ATC * (9) Initiates RCS Cooldown Using 40% Steam Dumps (continued) o (9.b) Places Steam Dumps in Steam Pressure Mode Place HC-507 in MANUAL and reduce demand to 0%

Place Steam Dump Mode Select Switch in STEAM PRESSURE o (9.c) Dumps steam at maximum rate possible without achieving a main steam line isolation (less than 120 psi/min).

o (9.d) Places Steam Dump Control in Bypass Intlk (Train A and B) to rearm 40%

dumps if P-12 activates (or is already active) o (9.e) Will continue on in procedure at step 11 while cooldown continues.

o (9.f) Stops the cooldown when ALL Core Exit Thermocouples are equal or slightly below required target temperature **

o (9.g) Stabilizes temperature slightly less than required temperature using steam dumps in AUTO

- CT Perform RCS cooldown at maximum rate (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 22 of 28 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 23 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

Note: If MSL Isolation occurs while using 40% steam dumps, Shift Foreman may elect to continue cooldown using 10% dump valves (described below) to avoid unnecessary delays. If 10% dump valves not used, following step is N/A.

SRO/ATC * (10) Initiates RCS Cooldown Using 10% Steam Dumps o (10.a) Verifies Appendix FF is complete o (10.b) Uses 10% Steam Dumps and manually dumps steam at maximum possible rate.

o (10.c) Continues on in procedure at step 11 while cooldown continues.

o (10.d) Stops the cooldown when ALL Core Exit Thermocouples are equal or slightly below required target temperature **

o (10.e) Stablizes temperature slightly less than required temperature using steam dumps in AUTO

- CT Perform RCS cooldown at maximum rate SRO/BOP * (11.a,b) Maintains intact S/G levels while controlling S/G NR levels between 20%-65%

(11.c) May shut down TDAFW pump SRO/BOP * (12) CHECK PZR PORVs and Block Valves o (12.a,c) Power available to block valves & ALL open (8000B open/de-energized) o (12.b) PZR PORVs - all closed (PCV-455C hand switch to closed)

SRO/BOP * (13) Resets Safety Injection (VB1)

SRO/BOP * (14) Resets both Trains Phase A (Phase B was not in) (VB1)

SRO/BOP * (15) Restores Instrument Air to Containment and checks header pressure greater than 90 psig (VB4)

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 23 of 28 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 24 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

SRO/BOP * (16) Shuts down RHR pumps SRO/ATC * (17) Checks RCS cooldown stopped before continuing on to depressurization of RCS SRO/BOP * (18) Checks ruptured S/G pressure stable or rising (should be 950-1040 psig, and stable)

SRO/BOP * (19) Checks Subcooling greater than 40oF (it is)

SRO/BOP

Reads note regarding use of a PORV for depressurization if normal spray is determined to be ineffective.

(20) Attempts to depressurization of RCS using normal Pressurizer Sprays o Monitors RCS pressure; lowering very slowly (455A isolated earlier in scenario) o Determines sprays are ineffective; moves on to PORVs

(21) Depressurizes the RCS using one PZR PORV o Depressurizes the RCS to minimize break flow and refill the PZR until one of the criteria of Appendix GG is met:**

RCS Pressure < S/G pressure, and Pzr level at least 12%, OR, Pzr level > 74%, OR, SCM < 20 F o Closes the PORV

- CT Depressurize the RCS to meet depressurization criteria prior to overfilling the ruptured S/G (100% WR)

SRO/BOP * (22) Checks RCS Pressure Rising (it is), continues to step (24) to see if ECCS flow should be terminated.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 25 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

SRO/BOP

Reads CAUTION regarding OVERFILLING the ruptured S/G if ECCS flow is not stopped when Termination Criteria is satisfied

(24) Checks if ECCS flow should be terminated o (24.a) Checks RCS subcooling greater than 20oF (it is) o (24.b) Checks Secondary Heat Sink (S/G level is greater than 15% in the intact S/Gs) o (24.c) RCS Pressure - Stable or Rising (it is) o (24.d) PZR Level greater than 12 % (it is)

SRO/ATC * (25) Stops ECCS Pumps and places them in standby o (25.a) Stops both SI pumps**

o (25.b) Ensures at least 1 ECCS CCP; leaves CCP 1-1 running o (25.c) Ensures CCP 1-3 stopped; not running due to bus G loss o (25.d) Checks for two ECCS CCPs running; there are not - continues to step 26 to isolate charging injection.

Note: Bus G Charging Injection Valves are without power from malfunction that occurred prior to SI. Valve positions are as needed for alignment and may be verified using Monitor Light Box C (VB1)

SRO/BOP * (26) Isolates Charging Injection o (26.a) Ensures Open 8105**, 8106 already open (Bus G) (VB2) o (26.b) Closes 8803A**, 8803B already closed (Bus G) (VB2) o (26.c) Closes 8801A**, 8801B already closed (Bus G) (VB2)

SRO/ATC * (27) Establishes Charging Flow o (27.a) Throttles HCV-142 to 20% demand

- CT Terminate Safety Injection prior to overfilling the ruptured S/G (100% WR level) and control RCS pressure and makeup flow so that primary and secondary inventory are stable by the completion of step E-3, step 29.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 26 of 26 Event

Description:

400 GPM Post-Trip SGTR on S/G 1-3 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

SRO/BOP * (27) Establishes Charging Flow (continued) o (27.b) Opens 8107, 8108 already open (Bus G) (VB2) o (27.c) Opens 8146 (VB2) o (27.d) Ensure 8145 and 8148 Closed (VB2)

SRO/ATC * (27.e) Throttles FCV-128 open to establish charging flow SRO/ATC * (28) Controls Charging to Maintain PZR Level o (28.a) Throttles FCV-128 and HCV-142 to maintain PZR Level GREATER THAN 17% and RCP Seal Injection 8-13 GPM SRO/BOP * (29) Checks ECCS Flow Not Required o Subcooling based on Core Exit Thermocouples GREATER THAN 20oF o PZR Level GREATER THAN 12%

The scenario is terminated once normal charging is realigned and the crew has determined ECCS flow is not required.

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 26 of 28 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 0 Days Operating Mode: 2 Gross Generation: 0 MWe Power Level: 2% Net Generation: 0 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: To be determined by the crew GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

None SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

None ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

None TURNOVER ITEMS:

Reactor trip occurred 7 days ago.

The reactor was declared critical and power stabilized at 2% power late last shift.

MFP 1-1 is in service and supplying feedwater.

The unit is currently aligned to Startup Power (230 kV).

OP L-0 has been signed off for Mode 1 Entry.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

Continue with OP L-3, step 6.28, and stabilize power at approximately 8%.

L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 27 of 28 Rev 0

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

There are no unexpected alarms - all current alarms are consistent with current mode and power level TURNOVER ITEMS:

U-1: 2% and preparing to raise power to approximately 8%.

U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

Time in core life: _MOL_.

Power History: Previously at 100% for 17 days. Currently power level is approximately 2% following a reactor trip a week ago (MFP trip during maintenance).

Boron concentration is _1431 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago.

Control Rod Height: 143 steps on CBD.

Rod motion: used to maintain current power level and to raise power to 8%.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

None L141 NRC ES-D-2-01 r0.docx Page 28 of 28 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 19 Event

Description:

PZR Htr Grp 1-2 test run and failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

Note: SRO may choose to read (direct) the procedure himself, or hand off the procedure to the BOP and ATC to perform SRO Shift Foreman implements OP A-4A:I, step 6.4.1.b.7, to energize Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 from backup (vital) power OP A-4A:I, step 6.4.1.b.7 ATC

Reads procedure CAUTION prior to step 6.4.1.b.7 that Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 must be manually turned off if Pressurizer low level (automatic low level trip not available) condition occurs when aligned to backup (vital) power.

ATC * (6.4.1.b.7) Places Htr Grp 1-2 in AUTO after ON to energize (CC1).

Reads NOTE prior to step 6.4.1.b.8 on indicating lights for the PZR Htr Grp not illuminated on backup power.

ATC * (6.4.1.b.8) Checks PZR Htr Grp 1-2 is energized by observing the kW meter (CC1 above Htr Grp controls)

Observes Htr Grp 1-2 kW meter is pegged high and informs the Shift Foreman.

Observes PK17-24 (480 V Bus 1G Ground) and informs the Shift Foreman.

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 1 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 19 Event

Description:

PZR Htr Grp 1-2 test run and failure (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: The ATC/BOP may elect to secure Htr Grp 1-2 prior to informing Shift Foreman direction in accordance with OP1.DC10 and then notify the Shift Foreman after taking the action.

If action not already taken, directs ATC to secure Htr Grp 1-2.

Note: PK17-24, 480 V Bus 1G Ground, alarm will clear when the breaker, 52-1G-72 trips open , therefore, entry into the PK is not documented below.

Enters TS 3.4.9.B for Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 inoperable since the Heater Group cannot be powered from its emergency (backup/vital) power supply.

Notifies Maintenance and/or Shift Manager of Pressurizer Heater Group 1-2 failure.

Proceed to the next event once seals once Tech Specs addressed, per Lead Examiner.

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 2 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 19 Event

Description:

CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to low CCW flow Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

Observes PK01-21 (Contmt Fan Clr) and informs the Shift Foreman.

PK01-21, Contmt Fan Clr SRO Enters PK01-21, Contmt Fan Clr

(1.0) Identifies input 441 (Contmt Fans Temp PPC) and goes to section 2.1, Fan High Temperature.

ATC * (2.1.1) Checks annunciator and PPC printouts to determine the affected component is CFCU 1-2 Note: The Crew may elect to secure CFCU 1-2 at any point after discovering the lack of CCW flow and rising CFCU bearing alarms.

BOP * (2.1.2) Checks CCW flow on all CFCUs. Observes CFCU 1-2, FI-35 (VB1, vertical section),

is several hundred gpm below normal and trending down.

BOP * (2.1.3) Checks containment ambient air temperature less than 120oF (it is). (VB1, vertical section)

Reads note regarding CFCU ability to be run at elevated temperatures (stator/bearings),

without affecting the component lifetime.

(2.1.4) Notes documentation is required if CFCU is left in service with high temperature alarms.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 19 Event

Description:

CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to low CCW flow (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Reactor Operators will be monitoring CFCU 1-2 stator and bearing temperatures using Plant Process Computer (PPC). Actually stator temperature at this point will vary based on crew pace through annunciator response, but is most likely above the limit described below.

Note: CFCU 1-2 will trip on overcurrent if fan is still running 5 minutes after stator temperature reaches 380oF.

SRO * (2.1.5) Notes need to contact engineering for evaluation if fan will be left in service with stator temperature above 293oF.

(2.1.6) Provides direction to shutdown CFCU 1-2 per OP H-2:II, Containment Fan Coolers - Shutdown, Placing in Standby, and Clearing.

May direct crew to shift CFCU 1-5 to fast speed to maintain ambient Containment conditions.

Enters TS 3.6.6.C for CFCU 1-2 inoperable due to no CCW flow and beginning stages of damage to the motor.

Notifies Maintenance and/or Shift Manager of CFCU 1-2 degradation.

May request CFCU 1-1 return to service expedited.

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 4 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 19 Event

Description:

CFCU 1-2 high stator/bearing temperature due to low CCW flow (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP H-2:II, Containment Fan Coolers - Shutdown, Placing in Standby, and Clearing BOP

Reviews Precautions and Limitations BOP * (6.1) Stops CFCU 1-2, by pressing associated STOP control on VB1 (center)

Acknowledges reflash on AR PK01-21 for CFCU 1-2 high vibration (expected during coast down) after verifying input.

BOP

Resets CFCU Vibration alarm to clear annunciator panel (VB1, lower)

Proceed to the next event once seals once Tech Specs addressed, per Lead Examiner.

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 5 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 19 Event

Description:

Seal Injection Filter 1-1 Plugged Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses plugged seal injection filter using one or more of the following indications:

Lowering seal injection flow to all RCPs (VB2, middle right)

PKs 05-01, 05-02, 05-03, 05-04 in alarm due to RCP seal low flow alarms

PKs 04-22 in alarm for High RCP Seal injection Filter DP BOP/ATC

May check CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers (VB1, left)

May check RCP parameters to verify cooling (PPC picture, VB2 meters)

Attempts to raise seal injection flow using HCV-142. (CC2)

Identifies potential impact on Pressurizer level (charging flow lowering as more flow is directed toward seals); re-adjusts to maintain pressurizer level.

Identifies input 498 for PK04-22, RCP Seal Injection Filter Delta-P Hi PK04-22, RCP Seal Injection Filter Delta-P Hi SRO * (1) Determines input is for RCP Seal Injection Filter 1-1 and goes to General Actions section.

SRO Reads CAUTION regarding 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months limit for operating RCPs without injection flow Note: If seal flow adjustment was previously attempted, it is not necessary to repeat action SRO/ATC * (2.1.1) Attempts to throttle HCV-142 to establish 8-13 gpm seal injection flow to each RCP.

o Recognizes charging flow lowering with no change in seal flow o Readjusts seal flow to maintain pressurizer level (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 6 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 19 Event

Description:

Seal Injection Filter 1-1 Plugged (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (PK04-22, "RCP Seal Injection Filter Delta P Hi"- continued)

SRO Reads NOTE prior to step 2.1.2 regarding potential impact on seal and bearing temperatures.

SRO/ANY * (2.1.2) Directs board operator to monitor RCP radial bearing temperatures on the PPC SRO/BOP * (2.1.3) Directs Nuclear Operator to swap seal injection filter 1-1 to filter 1-2 per OP B-IA:I, Section 6.3 SRO * (2.1.4) Contacts Maintenance to replace seal injection filter 1-1.

SRO/ATC Directs ATC to reestablish RCP seal flow, once filter is swapped.

Proceed to the next event once seals injection has been returned to normal, per Lead Examiner.

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 7 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 19 Event

Description:

Full Load Rejection (from 50%)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis made of load rejection by use of various alarms, generator load dropping, and/or generator output breakers open.

SRO Implements OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection Note: Once the generator output breakers open, the rod control system will drive rods in, lowering power (via steam dump demand). Rods are placed in manual, and power stabilized on steam dumps between 20-30% power (ideally, but not required, is to stabilize at a point where group 1 steam dumps are throttled, and group 2 steam dumps are closed).

(OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection)

SRO Reads CAUTION prior to step 1 ATC * (1) Verifies that control rods are inserting properly in AUTO (VB2, intermittent green IN light)

ATC/BOP * (2) Verifies proper operation of steam dumps, Tave trending to Tref (VB3, red/green indicator lights; Tave/Tref from CC1 recorder/PPC)

BOP * (3) Checks MFP suction adequate

(3a) Verifies 3rd Condensate/booster Pp set running (VB3, lower, center, will auto-start)

(3b) MFP suction is verified adequate (PPC, VB3 meter; will remain > 260 psig)

BOP * (4) Verifies DFWCS in AUTO and controlling S/G levels (CC3 MFW HMI, VB3, PPC)

Checks MFW control and bypass valves in AUTO

Checks both MFPs and their controller in AUTO

May check level trends, as well as steam flow/feed flow trends (CC3, PPC, and/or big VB3 DFWCS electronic recorders)

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 8 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 19 Event

Description:

Full Load Rejection (from 50%) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection, con't)

ATC * (5) Rod Control is placed in manual, and power is controlled (via Tave and steam dumps) between 20-30%

ATC * (6) Verifies Pressurizer Pressure is controlling in automatic (2210-2260 psig) (may be outside this for short periods, but is controlling in automatic)

ATC * (7) Verifies Pzr Level is controlling at program, and (optional) charging flow adequate to prevent letdown flashing: may take manual control of Pzr level (now, or any time during ramp) to prevent flashing of letdown (under these conditions, approx 60 gpm charging flow is required to keep letdown properly cooled)

Places HC-459D (master level controller) or FCV-128 (charging flow controller) in manual (CC2, right side, for both)

Keeps charging high enough to prevent letdown from flashing (VB2, upper panel, letdown temperature, is monitored)

Uses HCV-142 (seal backpressure) to maintain RCP seal flows 8-13 gpm SRO/ATC * (8) RCS is borated per reactivity handbook for approx. 20% - 30% load reduction (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook)

Presses STOP on M/U Ctrlr HMI (CC2)

Presses BORATE on HMI

Sets target gallons for boration (as decided above, and per the Shift Foreman);

verifies batch is reset

Sets boric acid flowrate

Presses START, and monitors boration

Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman SRO Reads NOTE on stabilizing the plant prior to step 9 (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 9 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 19 Event

Description:

Full Load Rejection (from 50%) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection, con't)

BOP * (9) Stabilizes secondary:

Places hotwell reject valve HC-3 controller in manual and closed (VB3, lower, right)

Places FCV-31 (part of cold gas temp control scheme) in manual and full open (VB3, lower right; note that this valve/controller is reverse acting, in that 0% on controller is full open demand)

Adjusts TCV-23 and FCV-31 to attain acceptable steam jet air ejector (SJAE) flows and cold gas temps, and then returns controllers to auto, and monitors (all VB3, lower right)

Secures one condensate booster pp set, and places it back in AUTO Cue: (from Shift Manager) If 500kV Offsite power asked or discussed by SRO, GCC reports 500kV power is available.

Proceed to the next event once step 9 (above) is completed, and at least the 1st boration is completed by the ATC, per the lead examiner.

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 10 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5,6 Page 11 of 19 Event

Description:

S/G 1-1 MSLB Outside Containment, Upstream of MSIVs ATWS (13D/E Work) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Crew identifies RCS temperature lowering, pressurizer level and pressure lowering (PPC, VB2, PK(cooldown), increased steam flow (VB3/CC3 steam flow meters, recorder, PPC), and dropping S/G pressures (VB3, PPC) and Tave (PPC, CC2, VB2)

SFM/ATC

Directs/performs manual Safety Injection ALL

Perform immediate actions

Identify ATWS condition ATC

Verifies rods are inserting at maximum rate BOP

Manually opens Reactor Trip Breakers 13D/E (VB5) (Critical Task) (WOG CT-1, Manually trip the reactor from the control room by the end of E-0 step 1) **

SRO Implements EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left)) (CT, see above) **

SRO/ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

Note: Offsite power (230 kV Startup) will be lost shortly after the reactor trip breakers are open, causing a loss of all non-vital power, and a transfer of busses G & H to their respective Diesel Generators. Bus F will be without power due based on the initial scenario setup (D/G 1-3 OOS).

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses G/H have white lights on mimic busses)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 19 Event

Description:

EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) (cont)

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train lights and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated)

SRO * (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP)(see page 13)

ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature - stable (temps will initially be dropping due to faulted S/G; AFW will be throttled back (VB2, upper panel lower area)

ATC * (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr safeties (closed) / PORV block valves (all open), and no elevated tailpipe temps or sonic flows on safeties/PORVs (VB2 - upper panel, far right);

checks Pzr sprays closed (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria (RCS pressure [VB2, PPC] < 1300 psig and SI or ECCS CCPs running (VB1 and VB2))

o RCPs already tripped due to loss of Startup Power ATC/BOP * (9) Checks for faulted S/Gs o Faulted - Notes 1-1 S/G pressure continuing to lower (all S/G pressures on VB3)

SRO Transitions to EOP E-2 (see page 14)

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 12 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5,7 Page 13 of 19 Event

Description:

S/G 1-1 MSLB Outside Containment, Upstream of MSIVs (cont)

Phase A, Train A Failure - Appendix E Manual Alignments Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

BOP App E is implemented:

(1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

(1b) Announce trip/SI on PA system

(2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 ON, output bkrs open, and exciter field bkr open, CC3 right side)

(3 & 4) Checks Phase A and containment vent isolation complete (VB1, ESF status lights, red light ON (one), white lights - some ON);

o Manually positions Phase A, Train A valves as needed.

(5) Verify ESF (SI) actuation complete (ESF/SI red light ON, white lights - some ON);

takes RNO actions to verify all unavailable pumps are associated with the loss of Bus F.

(6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (normal FWI portion is complete, with red light ON, and white lights OFF) (S/G portion: red light is ON, white lights ON for Bus F FWI valves FCV-438 (which must be closed in order to isolate the faulted S/G) and FCV-441.

o Dispatches operator in the field to manually close FCV-438 and 441.

(7) Checks containment spray, Phase B- NOT required (red lights are OFF for ESF for this on VB1, and white lights are OFF)

(8) Main Steam Isolation - Most likely in by this point and isolation complete (red lights are ON and white lights are OFF)

(9) Checks AFW status (All AFW pump running, VB3 center area); verifies either min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 15% (VB3 center)

(10) Verifies ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel); expected is that only CCPs will be delivering flow at this RCS pressure. Leaves CCP 1-3 running due to CCP 1-1 loss with Bus F.

(11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 13 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5,7 Page 14 of 19 Event

Description:

S/G 1-1 MSLB Outside Containment, Upstream of MSIVs (cont)

Phase A, Train A Failure - Appendix E Manual Alignments Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E) (cont)

SRO * (12) Checks excess letdown - not in service (8166/8167 closed); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater (VB4 lower panel, left side)

(13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), only one CB Pp set running, condenser status (not avail))

(14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel)

(15 - 20) Verifies DGs 1-1 and 1-2 running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900)); verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area); verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI); throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2); checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm); notifies Shift Foreman of completion (EOP E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation)

SRO Reads CAUTIONS prior to step 1 SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies ALL MSIVs and bypasses are closed (VB3, upper panel, left side)

SRO/ATC * (2) Checks for any intact S/G (1-2, 1-3, and 1-4 S/Gs have stable pressures, consistent with the RCS cooldown from the 1-1 S/G); continues in E-2 SRO/ATC * (3) Identifies 1-1 S/G as faulted (VB3, pressure is still dropping in uncontrolled manner, or completely depressurized at this point)

SRO * (4) Directs Reactor Operator to Implement Appendix HH to isolate the Faulted S/G (usually the BOP)

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 14 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 15 of 19 Event

Description:

S/G 1-1 MSLB Outside Containment, Upstream of MSIVs (cont)

EOP E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP E-2, APP HH, Isolate Faulted S/G BOP * (1) Isolates 1-1 faulted S/G (see BOLD substeps below, completed prior to exit from EOP E-2)

o (a) Verifies MFIV FCV-438 closed (all of these controls on VB3, lower left)

(already dispatched to field as part of E-0, Appendix E, but must verify complete prior to exiting E-2) o (b) Verifies SGBD valves FCV-760, 151, and 250 closed (IC, OC, and sample)

(already closed) o (c) Verifies S/G 1-1 10% steam dump closed (PCV-19) (already closed) o (d) Verifies AFW valves isolated Closes TDAFP AFW LCV-106 Closes MDAFP AFW LCV-111 for 1-2 S/G to isolate AFW o (e) Notes S/G-2 and 3 are intact, leaves FCV-37 and FCV-38 open o (f) Verifies AFW still available to S/Gs 1-2, 1-3 & 1-4 o (g) Informs Shift Foreman S/G 1-1 isolation is complete (only if FCV-438 is closed; else reports status of HH actions and activities still in the field)

BOP (2) Removes WR Thot input to SCMM for loop 1 (behind boards, PAMS panel behind VB3)(does these steps for each loop) o Goes to PAM4 panel o Presses Configuration Summary o Presses Failed S/G o Presses the PB for the Thot to be disabled (1) o Presses Disable Loop 1 (Main Body of Procedure continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 15 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 16 of 19 Event

Description:

S/G 1-1 MSLB Outside Containment, Upstream of MSIVs (cont)

EOP E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation (cont)

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks CST level > 10% (VB3, upper panel, center area meter and recorders)

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks for ruptured S/Gs o NOT Ruptured - notes NO valid alarm on PK11-06, PK11-17, or PK11-18; no upward trends on RE-19/15/15R/71-74 o Concludes that no SGTR exists Note: Red Path on Critical Status Function - Integrity will have developed by this point in the scenario, therefore, details for transition procedures have not been included in this outline.

ALL * (7) Evaluate ECCS Termination criteria o Determines that adequate subcooled margin exits (VB2/SPDS) (ATC) o Determines that adequate heat sink exists (VB3/PPC/SPDS) (BOP) o Checks RCS pressure (could be rising, stable, or falling at this point; no impact on the scenario) o Determines that Pzr level is adequate (VB2/CC2/PPC) (ATC) o Determines that criteria met or NOT (based on RCS pressure trend), and exits to either E-1 or E-1.1, based on which decision was made (SRO)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 16 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 17 of 19 Event

Description:

FR-P.1, SI Termination Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Condition")

PTS conditions in loop 1, requiring a transition to EOP FR-P.1. Entry will be triggered based on Loop Tcold less than 280oF with RCS Pressure greater than 300 PSIG.

SRO/BOP Reads CAUTION before step 1 regarding loss of AFW suction

(1) Checks RCS pressure greater than 300 psig (VB2, lower center) (it is)

(2) Determines RCS cold leg tems are not all stable or rising and enters RNO column

(2 RNO) Attempts to stop RCS cooldown:

(a) Verifies 10% steam dumps are closed (VB3, middle)

(b) Verifies Condenser steam dumps are closed (VB3, middle)

(c) Notes RHR system is in service, but is not contributing to the cooldown (RCS pressure is above shutoff head of RHR pumps) (VB1, upper right)

(d) Throttles feedflow to non-faulted S/Gs while maintaining a secondary heat sink (min total feedflow greater than 435 gpm until narrow range S/G level is greater than 15% in at least one non-faulted S/G (e) Minimizes cooldown from faulted S/G:

Verifies MSIV and bypass valve closed on S/G 1-1 (faulted)

Verifies feedwater to S/G 1-1 has been isolated (LCV-106, LCV-110)

SRO/ATC * (3) ChecksPZR PORV block valves (a) Power is available for valves (VB2, far right, lower)

(b) At least one block valve is open (VB2, far right lower)

SRO/ATC * (4) Determines PORVs should be closed based on current conditions (a) Lo Temp/Over pressure Setpt Protection C/O switch is not cut-in (VB2, far right lower); goes to step 4.d (d) Notes PZR pressure is less than 2335 psig (VB2, far right upper OR PPC)

(e) Verifies all three PORVs are closed (VB2, far right, middle)

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 17 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 18 of 19 Event

Description:

FR-P.1, SI Termination(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Condition", continued)

SRO/ATC * (5) Determines ECCS is in service

SIP 1-2 is running (VB1, lower skirt)

Charging injection valves 8803A/B and 8801A/B are open (VB2, skirt, lower middle)

Note: Entry into the RNO column of step 6 directs crew to implement procedure and step in effect, but to perform only those actions which do not cause additional cooldown or increase RCS pressure until the temperature soak directed in step 24 is complete.

SRO/ATC * (6) Checks if ECCS can be terminated

Checks RCS subcooling greater than 70oF (VB2,middle) (It is)

ChecksRVLIS Full Range greater than 60% (PAMs3 or 4, in back, or SPDS) (It is)

SRO/ATC * (7) Resets SI (VB1, middle)

SRO/ATC * (8) Resets Phase A (Phase B not actuated)

SRO/BOP * (9) Establishes Instrument Air to Containment (a) Opens FCV-584 (VB4, skirt, lower left)

(b) Checks instrument air header pressure greater than 90 PSIG (PI-380, VB4, upper left)

SRO/ALL * (10) Stops ECCS Pump (a) Resets vital 4kV auto transfer relays for all vital buses (VB4 skirt)

(b) Stops all but one ECCS charging pump**

(c) Stops SI Pump**

(d) Stops RHR Pumps**

(Critical Task) (WOG CT-48, Terminate ECCS flow by the completion of FR-P.1, step

11) **

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 18 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 19 of 19 Event

Description:

FR-P.1, SI Termination(CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP FR-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Condition", continued)

SRO/ATC * (11) Isolates charging injection (a) Verifies 8105 and 8106 open (VB2, center skirt)

(b) Closes 8803A/B**

(c) Closes 8801A/B**

(Critical Task) (WOG CT-48, Terminate ECCS flow by the completion of FR-P.1, step

11) **

The scenario is terminated once SI is Terminated as defined by CT-48 Bounding Criteria

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 19 of 21 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 593 MWe Power Level: 47% Net Generation: 543 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

None SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

TS 3.8.1.B DG 1-3 OOS for corrective maintenance on lube oil heater (discovered during rounds); RTS estimate is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; last partial STP I-1C completed 30 minutes ago (due in 7.5 hrs); action 3.8.1.B.3.1 has been completed.

ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

None TURNOVER ITEMS:

Maintenance has requested PZR Heater Group 1-2 to be energized. As part of the planned maintenance, the Heater Group has been aligned to backup (vital) power by field operators.

Unit was ramped to 50% 8 days ago for high vibrations on the MFP 1-1. Bearings have been replaced, and the pump has been returned to service; due to some minor/intermittent pump vibrations, engineering will be doing data-taking for another shift or two; management will then decide if the plant will ramp back to 100%.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

Energize PZR Heater Group 1-2 from control room per OP A-4A:I.

L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 20 of 21 Rev 0

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

Alarms in are consistent with current power level (PK14-16 & 14-19)

Alarms in also consistent with DEG 1-3 OOS (PK18-03, 18-04, 18-09 and 18-18)

TURNOVER ITEMS:

U-1: maintain 50% - no one in containment

U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

Time in core life: _MOL_.

Power History: Steady State @ 50% for 8 days, previously at 100% for 103 days.

Boron concentration is _1085 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago.

Control Rod Height: 175 steps on CBD.

Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.

The last dilution was completed _15_ min ago.

Rod motion: none planned, as needed to maintain I on target.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

Partial STP I-1C due in 7.5 hrs OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

None L141 NRC ES-D-2-02 r0.docx Page 21 of 21 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 25 Event

Description:

Grid Control Center Backdown Order to Shed 200 MW over 30 minutes Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

Cue: (from Shift Manager) I have just received a valid backdown order from the Grid Control Center (GCC) due to downed 500 kV lines. Per Ops Policy B-1, Unit 1 is directed to shed 200 MW total in the next 30 minutes. I will address OP J-2:VIII and OP AP-35.

SRO Implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction)

SRO Enters OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction

(1.a) Notes runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew)

SRO/BOP

Commences ramp (guidance is also on lamicoid pegboard on CC3 or Shift Foreman will hand off Step 1 sheet to BOP):

o (1.b) MW and IMP feedbacks are placed in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI, CC3) o (1.c) 990 MWe (1190-200, approximate) load target is entered into Triconex HMI o (1.d) Sets ramp rate to 7 mw/min (approximate rate; actual rate dictated by Shift Foreman) o (1.e) Pushes GO SRO o (1.f) Determines downpower is greater than 15%. May contact chemistry in advance or wait until 15% power change is complete.

ATC * (2) Verifies that control rods are inserting properly in AUTO (CC1)

(3) Turns Pressurizer Backup heaters on (CC1)

(4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; may take manual control to ensure adequate flow (CC2)

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 1 of 27 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 25 Event

Description:

Grid Control Center Backdown Order to Shed 200 MW over 30 minutes (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, "Rapid Load Reduction", continued)

SRO/BOP * (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2)(VB3)

Note: Boration values described below are representative of the conditions given, but will vary based on the actual ramp rate and target specified by SRO. Total gallons boron required for shutdown is determined from Reactivity Handbook.

SRO/ATC * (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook) o Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2) o Presses BORATE on HMI o Sets target gallons for boration verifies batch is reset o Sets boric acid flowrate o Presses START, and monitors boration o Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2)

SRO/BOP * (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1)

(9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2)

Next event triggered on start of boration, per Lead Examiner

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 2 of 27 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 25 Event ASW Pp 1-1, High Bearing Temperature

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: ASW Pp 1-1 will experience a seized shaft malfunction if stilling running approximately 8 minutes after the high temperature alarm actuates. ASW Pp 1-2 will fail to autostart, but manual start capability remains available.

ATC Responds to PK01-03 (AUX SALT WATER PUMPS) alarm and identifies input 426 for Aux Salt Water Pump Temperature Plant Process Computer (PPC) temperature.

Uses PPC to evaluate bearing temperatures for ASW Pp 1-1

Reports both top and bottom motor bearings temperatures greater than 219oF and trending up.

SRO Implements AR PK01-03 (AUX SALT WATER PUMPS)

AR PK01-03 (AUX SALT WATER PUMPS)

SRO * (1.0) Goes to section 2.2 for Motor Temperature Alarm SRO/BOP * (2.2.1) Contacts the Intake Watch to evaluate ASW Pp 1-1 for cause of high temperature alarm (at a minimum checks ventilation, motor oil levels)

SRO * (2.2.2) Directs BOP to swap to the standby ASW pump per OP E-5:IV, Auxiliary Saltwater System - Changing Over Pump and Heat Exchanger Trains.

Note: Shift Foreman may choose to review remainder of Annunciator Response silently if direction to perform pump swap has already been given.

Reads note regarding running the pump with bearing temperature up to 210oF; temperatures are above the limit

(2.2.3) Notes that leaving the pump in service with high temperature alarms requires documentation.

(2.2.4) Checks/determines stator temperatures are normal

(2.2.5) Refers to Tech Spec TS 3.7.8.A, for one ASW train inoperable (72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action).

(May elect not to enter the spec until Intake Watch reports in with additional information regarding pump. Call from field will report major motor oil leak).

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 3 of 27 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 25 Event ASW Pp 1-1, High Bearing Temperature (swap to standby ASW Pp 1-2) (cont)

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP E-5:IV, Auxiliary Saltwater System-Swapping Pumps or HXs During Single CCW HX Operation)

Note: Shift Foreman direct BOP to swap ASW pumps without swapping CCW heat exchangers based on time considerations. Both options are described below.

(OP E-5:IV, Step 6.1 Swapping an ASW Pump and CCW Heat Exchanger Train - If used, Otherwise N/A)

BOP Reads NOTE regarding two column format, determines left-hand column should be followed.(ASW Pump 1-1 running and CCW HX 1-1 in service)

(6.1.1) Determines current configuration: ASW Pump 1-1 running and CCW HX 1-1 in service .

(6.1.2) Contacts Intake Watch to secure Continuous Chlorination to ASW Bay 1-1.

(6.1.3) Contacts Aux Watch to ensure no liquid radwaste discharge is in progress.

(6.1.4) Directs U2 to place U2 standby ASW pump in Manual.

(6.1.5) Places Mode Selector Switch for ASW Pump 1-2 in MANUAL (VB1, far left, label reads Standby Select Switch)

Note: Starting ASW Pp 1-2 will cause AR PK01-01, ASW SYS HX P/HDR PRESS to alarm; alarm is expected and will clear when the second HX is placed in service.

Note: All control manipulations described below are located on the far left side of VB1 BOP * (6.1.6) Takes ASW Pump 1-2 control switch to START position (VB1, far left).

(6.1.7) Ensures pump amps are stable ((VB1, far left, just above pump controls)

(6.1.8) Opens FCV-603, CCW HX 1-2 saltwater inlet valve.

(6.1.9) Ensures differential pressures across both CCW HXs are in the green band (they are).

(6.1.10) Opens FCV-431, CCW HX 1-2 shell-side outlet valve.

(6.1.11) Closes FCV-430, CCW HX 1-1 shell-side outlet valve.

(6.1.12) Closes FCV-602, CCW HX 1-1 saltwater inlet valve.

(6.1.13) Checks P across CCW HX 1-2 less than 50 psig. (it is).

(6.1.14) Secures ASW Pp 1-1.

(6.1.15) Verifies P across CCW HX 1-2 stable, in the green band and ASW Pp 1-2 amps stable.

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 4 of 27 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 25 Event ASW Pp 1-1, High Bearing Temperature (swap to standby ASW Pp 1-2) (cont)

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP E-5:IV, Auxiliary Saltwater System-Swapping Pumps or HXs During Single CCW HX Operation) (cont)

BOP * (6.1.16) Advises U2 to they may return U2 standby ASW pump to AUTO.

(6.1.17) Informs Shift Foreman ASW train swap is complete.

(6.1.18) Contacts Intake Watch to align ASW Bay 1-2 for Continuous Chlorination.

(OP E-5:IV, Step 6.2 Swapping ASW Pumps Without Swapping CCW Heat Exchangers - If used, Otherwise N/A)

BOP Reads NOTE regarding two column format, determines left-hand column should be followed.(ASW Pump 1-1 running , swapping to ASW Pump 1-2)

(6.2.1) Contacts Intake Watch to secure Continuous Chlorination to ASW Bay 1-1.

(6.2.2) Directs U2 to place U2 standby ASW pump in Manual.

(6.2.3) Places Mode Selector Switch for ASW Pump 1-2 in MANUAL (VB1, far left, label reads Standby Select Switch)

(6.2.4) Takes ASW Pump 1-2 control switch to START position (VB1, far left).

(6.2.5) Ensures pump amps are stable ((VB1, far left, just above pump controls)

(6.2.6) Secures ASW Pp 1-1.

(6.2.7) Verifies P across CCW HX 1-1 remains stable, in the green band and ASW Pp 1-2 amps stable.

(6.2.8) Advises U2 to they may return U2 standby ASW pump to AUTO.

(6.2.9) Informs Shift Foreman ASW train swap is complete.

(6.2.10) Contacts Intake Watch to align ASW Bay 1-2 for Continuous Chlorination.

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 5 of 27 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 25 Event ASW Pp 1-1, Seized Shaft/OC Trip; 1-2 ASW Pump does not auto start (swap to standby

Description:

ASW Pp 1-2) - N/A if crew completes swap prior to time delayed trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP E-5:IV, Auxiliary Saltwater System-Swapping Pumps or HXs During Single CCW HX Operation) (cont)

Goes to section 2.1, due to OC trip inputs SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Determines that the standby ASW pump is NOT running with normal current (did not start); takes 1-2 ASW pp to MAN, and starts it SRO * (2.1.2) Determines that ASW flow has been restored, and continues to next step.

Reads NOTE prior to step 2.1.3 SRO/BOP * (2.1.3) Checks that ASW/CCW HX P is normal (normal range: 100 -140"), P may be low, so BOP calls intake watch BOP * (2.1.4) Directs intake watch to secure continuous chlorination to the 1-1 ASW bay SRO * (2.1.5a) Dispatches operator to pump breaker (1-1 ASW)

SRO * (2.1.5b, 2.1.5c, 2.1.5d) Determines if breaker reclose is allowed, using Ops Policy B-2 (if desired; will not do this, as the 1-2 ASW pp is running normally); directs maintenance to investigate (including clearance and notification).

Note: "Normalizing" the ASW/CCW trains is not needed for this event SRO * (2.1.6) Established normal ASW/CCW alignment (will not start/complete)

SRO * (2.1.7) Refers to Tech Spec 3.7.8.A (72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action) for ASW Pp 1-1 (if not completed earilier).

Next event triggered on power level (1000 MW), per Lead Examiner

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 6 of 27 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 25 Event DRPI Power Failure During Ramp

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL DRPI power loss is diagnosed from one or more of the following:

DRPI Panel is "dark", with no rod position lights (VB2, left, black DRPI panel)

PK03-21 alarms on two inputs SRO Implements AR PK03-21, "DRPI Failure / Rod Bottom" (AR PK03-21, DRPI Failure / Rod Bottom)

SRO * (1) Selects section 2.1 from "DRPI urgent failure" input ATC * (2.1.1) Takes manual control of rods by placing bank selector switch in MAN, and verifying normal manual speed on meter (45-51 spm) (CC1 right)

SRO * (2.1.2) Places ramp on hold (ramp is close to completion)

SRO/ATC * (2.1.3) May review diverse indicators to be used (step counters, bank overlap, NIs, and RCS temperature) if moving rods is required prior to DRPI restoration.

SRO * (2.1.4) Implements Tech Spec 3.1.7.B (immediate action to place rod control in manual)

Shift Manager Cue (if asked for next step) There are currently no loads on their backup source (from the OP O-13)

SRO/BOP * (2.1.5.a) Directs transfer of DRPI to backup power per OP A-3:I (all field actions; may send Nuclear Operator to normal breaker first to investigate)

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 7 of 27 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 25 Event DRPI Power Failure During Ramp (cont)

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK03-21, DRPI Failure / Rod Bottom)(cont)

ATC * (2.1.5.b) Once DRPI is restored, Rod Control is returned to auto by placing the back selector in AUTO, and verifying 8 spm on the speed indicator (CC1, right)

Proceed to the next event once control rods are back in AUTO, and Tech Specs have been discussed, per the lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 25 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis of loss of Letdown Leak is made from one or more of the following:

VCT level lowering, Increased charging with abnormally low letdown flow

Structure sumps rising, RM-12 (Containment High Rad; Gas)

Pressurizer level stable Note: The Shift Foreman (SFM) may enter OP AP-18 (Letdown Line Failure) directly, or be directed there after first evaluating the leak as part of OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage). Both procedural flowpaths are described below.

If OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure, if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

SRO/ATC * (1) Ensures no load changes are in progress (they arent)

SRO/BOP * (2) Isolates letdown o Closes 8149C (VB2) o Closes LCV-459/460 (VB2) o Verifies HCV-133 (RHR Ltdn) closed (it is) (VB2)

SRO/ATC * (3) Checks for RCS Leakage - verifies that Pzr level and RCS press are both stable/rising ATC * (4) Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV-128 and HCV-142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV-142 closed (or near closed) (CC2)

SRO/BOP * (5) Establish Excess Letdown (see next page), per OP B-1A:IV SRO * (6) Initiates Recovery Actions o Contacts RP and Chemistry regarding letdown line failure system status (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 25 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak inside Containment (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP B-1A:IV, Place Excess Letdown in Service BOP * (6.1.1) Verifies charging at minimum (seals only) (done, per above step, or do now) o Reduces charging to minimum (RCP seals only), using FCV-128 and HCV-142 (approx. 8 gpm on RCP seals, with HCV-142 closed (or near closed)

BOP * (6.1.2) Contacts RP for rad conditions/posting Note: If Shift Manager asked in regard to flushing, provide the following cue:

CUE: Excess letdown line flushing is NOT needed.

BOP * (6.1.3) Skips line flush, moves on to next step BOP * (6.1.4) Opens FCV-361, CCW to Excess Ltdn HX (VB1)

BOP * (6.1.5) Verifies pot for HCV-123 is CLOSED (at 0) (VB2)

(6.1.6) Opens 8166/8167, Excess Letdown isolation valves (VB2)

(6.1.7) is N/A

(6.1.8) Slowly opens HCV-123 to establish excess letdown (VB2)

(6.1.9) Adjusts HCV-123 to provide 40 gpm letdown at NOP ATC/BOP * (to end of scenario) HCV-123 and FCV-128 are now used to control Pzr Level

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 11 of 25 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage) if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines charging flow and/or pressurizer level NOT normal o Charging flow is elevated and pressurizer level is slowly lowering (CC2)

(1) Adjusts charging and seal flow to maintain pressurizer level o Adjusts seal flows using HCV-142 (CC2) to maintain 8-13 gpm o May raise charging in manual using master level controller (HC-459D)(CC2) or flow controller (FCV-128)(CC2)

Note: Monitoring Pressurizer level and charging flow - NORMAL is a Continuous Action. Associated RNO steps are performed when crew reports applicable conditions exist (i.e. unable to maintain pressurizer level).

SRO/ATC * (1) Determines pressurizer level is still lowering (Continuous Action to Monitor)

SRO/BOP * (1 RNO) Starts second charging pump (VB2, Lower middle skirt)

(1 RNO) May isolate letdown as pressurizer level continues to drop o Closes 8149C, and closes LCV-459/460 (VB2, upper middle skirt)

ATC * (1 RNO) Checks for continuing decrease in pressurizer level o Readjusts charging and seal flow (CC1) o Determines pressurizer level is stable (PPC, VB2, CC2) (Continuous Action to Monitor)

SRO/ATC * (2) Checks RCS pressure greater than 2210 psig and stable or rising (VB2)

( 2220-2250 psig)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 12 of 25 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage) if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

SRO/ATC * (3) Determines CVCS Makeup can keep up with leak o Makeup Control is in AUTO (CC2) o VCT Level is being maintained within the control band (PPC, VB2 RCDR-4 just below DRPI) o Continuous Action to Monitor VCT Level Note: Step (4) actions are directed at identifying and isolating the leak.

SRO/BOP * (4.a) Rules out Seal Table leak o RE-7 not in alarm(PPC) o No audible alarm from MIDS panel (back of VBs)

SRO/BOP * (4.b) Rules out S/G Tube Leak o Main Steam Line Rad Monitors RM-71/72/73/74 not in alarm (VB2/PPC) o SJAE Rad Monitor RM-15/15R not in alarm (VB2/PPC) o S/G Blowdown Rad Monitor RM-23 not in alarm (VB2/PPC) o S/G sample activity RM-19 not in alarm (VB2/PPC) o PK11-06/17/18 are all out SRO/BOP * (4.c) Rules out RCS in-leakage to CCW o CCW Surge Tank Pressure is not in alarm (PK01-14) o CCW Surge Tank Level is stable (VB1, upper left just below Monitor Light Box B) o CCW Rad Monitors RM-17A/B not in alarm (PPC) (PK11-21) o CCW surge tank vent, RCV-16, remains open (VB1, lower left)

SRO/BOP * (4.d) Rules out pressurizer steam space leak through safeties and PORVs o Pressurizer safety valves and PORVs closed (VB2, upper right panel) o PORV tailpipe temperature is less than 200oF (TI-463: VB2, upper right panel)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 13 of 25 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage) if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

SRO/BOP * (4.e) Notes no indications (indicator or alarm) of reactor vessel flange leakage (VB2 indicator and PK11-02 alarm)

SRO/BOP * (4.f) Observes that RCP seal leakage is normal (VB2, PPC)

SRO/BOP * (4.g) Notes no indication of RCS valve packing leakage (PK05-08 alarm)

ALL * (4.h) Observes several containment environmental indicators - NOT normal o Containment sump and reactor cavity sump levels rising (PAM1) o Containment radiation monitor RM-12 trending upward (PPC) o Containment air temperature/pressure may be slightly elevated (VB1, upper left)

SRO/BOP * (4.h.1 RNO) Contacts Chemistry to sample Reactor cavity samples for increased activity SRO * (4.h.1 RNO) Considers making Containment entry to pinpoint sources of RCS leak Note 1: Following step performed if crew diagnostics has not ruled out CVCS leak inside Containment.

Note 2: Letdown isolation may have been completed earlier as part of step 1 RNO, continuous action.

SRO/BOP * (4.h.3.a-b RNO) Isolates letdown (VB2, upper skirt) o Closes 8149A, B, and C o Closes LCV-459 and 460

(4.h.3.c RNO) Isolates charging (VB2, lower skirt) o Closes 8107 and 8108 (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 14 of 25 Event

Description:

35 gpm Letdown Leak (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP AP-1 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage) if used (otherwise, mark N/A)

Note: Performed if letdown/charging isolated in previous step, else, N/A.

SRO/ATC * (4.h.3.c RNO, cont) o Throttles back charging to stabilize Pressurizer level (CC2) o Re-estimates leakrate by throttling FCV-128 for flow and maintaining RCP seals 8-13 gpm using HCV-142 (CC2)

4.h.4 RNO Determines leak is now isolated o Transitions to OP AP-18, Letdown Line Failure (see pg 9 for details)

Major event triggers at end of Excess Letdown restoration (8167 OPEN), with 5 minute time delay or per lead examiner

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,8 Page 15 of 25 Event

Description:

Seismically Induced Large Break LOCA ASW Pump Autostart Failure (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: The DBA LBLOCA will occur rapidly, causing an immediate Safety Injection.

(EOP E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection")

SRO/ATC * (1) Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing)

(2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv bus status (VB4, white lights on mimic all on; 4kV vital powered from 230 kV Startup)

Note: Critical task to manually start at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps must be completed before transition out of E-0. Action is addressed as part of App E, step 5 alignment verification, but may be addressed as soon as failure is identified.

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks SI actuated (PK08-21 ON, also checks VB1 red train light ON and/or train equipment to verify both trains actuated) o Both trains of SI actuated as indicated by PK, SI red light o May report ASW pump status (ASW Pp 1-2 tripped off during bus transfer, may have been started manually**; ASW Pp 1-1 was inoperable earlier in scenario)

- Critical Task CT-9: Manually start at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps in an operating safeguards train before exiting E-0.

SRO * (5) Directs implementation of App E (usually given to BOP); See page 17 Note: Crew priorities should remain focused on overall mitigation strategy for LBLOCA, noting that AFW malfunction is inconsequential for this accident.

SRO/ATC o (6) Checks RCS temperature stable or lowering to 547oF o Notes temperature has dropped significantly due to LBLOCA,(VB2, upper panel lower area) o Notes AFW Pp 1-2 running, but with no flow and low pump amps.

o Notes TDAFW pump available, but not running Starts TDAFW pump and throttles flow (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 16 of 25 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA ASW Pump Autostart Failure (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", continued)

SRO/ATC * (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr Safeties and Spray Valves o Safeties closed (closed); no sonic flow, tailpipe temperature is elevated, but consistent with containment environment (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper panel, far right) o Pzr Sprays closed (green lights on) (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria; o Ensures all RCPs are tripped (VB2). (TCOA) o Action to trip RCPs may have already been completed as part of Appendix E or Foldout Page 3.0 SRO/ATC * (9) Determines S/G are NOT faulted o May note S/Gs are depressurizing, but as consequence of LBLOCA cooldown o None are completely depressurized SRO/ATC * (10) Determines S/G are NOT ruptured

Checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15/19 recorders onVB2 (and PPC); (all normal)

PK11-06/17/18 (all OFF)

May request samples SRO/ALL * (11) Checks RCS intact (it is not) (note: only one valid abnormal reading needed to transition from E-0)

(11a) Determines containment pressure is NOT normal (VB1 meters, PPC)

(11b) Determines containment sump levels NOT normal (VB1 meters, PAMS)

(11c) Determines containment radiation is NOT normal (RM-11, 02, 07 are all in alarm)

(11 RNO) Places 2nd ASW/CCW HX in service (opens FCV-603 and FCV-431, VB1 far left), and transition to EOP E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6 Page 17 of 25 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA ASW Pump Autostart Failure (CT) Containment Spray Actuation Failure (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E)

Note: Critical task to manually start at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps must be completed before transition out of E-0; may have been addressed during performance of immediate actions BOP Implements App E (ESF Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status):

(1a) Checks no personnel in Containment (part of turnover; may not voice)

(1b) Announces trip/SI on PA system

(2) Checks main generator - tripped (PK14-01 ON, output bkrs open, and exciter field bkr open, CC3 right side)

(3 & 4) Verifies Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation complete (VB1, Monitor Light Box B: red lights ON, white lights OFF)

(5) Verifies ESF (SI) actuation complete (SI Portion of Monitor Light Box C: red light ON, white lights - some ON);

(5.a RNO) Determines ASW 1-2 is NOT running o Determines ASW 1-2 is NOT running; manually starts pump** (if not previously identified) (CT-9, Manually start at least the minimum required number of ASW pumps in an operating safeguards train by the completion of E-0, Appendix E, step 5)

BOP * (6) Verifies Feedwater isolation complete (F.W. Isolation and S.G. Level Portions of Monitor Light Box C: red lights ON, white lights OFF)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,7,8 Page 18 of 25 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA Containment Spray Actuation Failure (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E, continued)

Note: TCOA to trip RCPs within 5 minutes of Phase B may have already been completed.

BOP * (7) Determines Containment Spray and Phase B Isolation is required (Contmt Isol, Phase B portion of Monitor Light Box D: red lights are ON)

(7.a.1 RNO) May attempt to manually initiate Containment Isolation Phase B/Spray (VB1, directly below containment environment indications, but without success)

(7.a.2 RNO) Notes white lights on for Containment Spray Pumps and valves and performs manual alignments (VB1, middle) CT-3, Manually align at least 1 train of Containment Spray (1 pump and associated valves) by completion of EOP E-0, Appendix E, step 7)

(7.a.3 RNO) Maintains RCP seal injection between 8-13 gpm (may need to start CCP 1-3)

(7.a.4 RNO) Ensures all RCPs are tripped. (TCOA)

BOP * (8) Checks Main Steamline Isolation complete (Main Steam Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box D: red light ON, white light are OFF)

Note: Step to control AFW and identification of AFW 1-2 shaft shear may have already been completed (E-0, step 6 RNO) by other crew members. Crew priorities should remain focused on overall mitigation strategy for LBLOCA, noting that AFW malfunction is inconsequential for this accident.

BOP * (9) Checks AFW status o Notes AFW Pp 1-2 running, but with no flow and low pump amps.

o Notes TDAFW pump available, but not running Starts TDAFW pump and throttles flow o Verifies min of 435 gpm flow (VB3 center) or S/G level > 25% (adverse containment) (VB3 center)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 19 of 25 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Appendix E, continued)

BOP * (10) Checks ECCS flows (charging injection (VB2 upper panel left), SI, RHR (both on VB1 upper panel); shuts down CCP 1-3.

(11) Reports ESF and AFW status to the Shift Foreman (Shift Foreman may direct operator to continue on in Appendix E, or redirect to higher priority tasks)

BOP * (12) Checks excess letdown in service prior to trip o Manually closes 8166 & 8167

(13) Checks secondary systems (MFPs tripped (VB2, green lights ON), stops all but one CB Pp set, takes LCV-12 control switch to CONT ONLY. Determines Condenser is NOT available (MSIVs are closed) and directs field operators to break vacuum when turbine is less than 200 rpm

(14) Verifies proper operation of Aux Bldg and Control Rm vent systems (VB4 vent status light panel white lights); turns on aux bldg vent charcoal filter preheater; verifies containment iodine fans secured (VB4, lower panel)

(16) Verifies available DGs running normally (VB4, freq (60), volts (120), speed (900))

(17) Verifies vital batteries supplied by chargers (charger and bus volts on VB5, upper panel middle/lower area);

(18) Verifies MSRs reset (CC3 Triconex HMI)

(19) Throttles RCP seal injection flows to normal if needed (FCV-128, to 8-13 gpm each, CC2)

(20) Checks PK11-04 NOT IN (SFP alarm)

(21) Notifies Shift Foreman of completion (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 20 of 25 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", continued)

SRO Performs procedure transition brief for E-1, and implements CSFST (if required)

Note: A CSFST RED or MAGENTA path may occur prior to EOP E-1 entry or before the end of the scenario (FR-P.1 on PTS); If its occurs, it will be a short entry (perform a single step and exit)

SRO Implements FR-P.1, Imminent PTS (if RED or MAGENTA path occurs)

(ONLY IF FR-P.1, Imminent PTS, is entered; otherwise, this section is N/A)

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks RCS pressure (low), and RHR flow (normal); exits to procedure in effect SRO Implements EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks RCPs tripped (already done, VB2)

ALL * (2 & 3) Checks for faulted/ruptured S/Gs o Faulted - checks all S/G pressures on VB3 (not uncontrolled drop/depressurized; all are dropping slowly, as the primary is now the heat sink for the secondary) o Ruptured - checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15/19 recorders on VB2 (and PPC; no upward trends or spikes, unless containment shine is noted), and PK11-06/17/18 (alarms not in); requests chemistry to sample S/Gs for activity (as follows, if done):

Verifies phase A containment isolation reset (VB1)

Opens FCV-584 (air to containment) (VB4, lower left)

Opens blowdown isolation valves inside containment (FCV-760, 761, 762, 763) if requested for sampling (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 21 of 25 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

SRO/BOP * (4) Maintains S/G levels 25-65%

(5) Re-verifies PORVs closed and associated block valves open (VB2 - upper panel, far SRO/BOP right)

SRO/ATC * (6) Determines Containment Spray should remain in service o (a) PK01-18 is ON o (b) Checks if Spray Additive Tank Level is less than 16% (VB1, to right of Cont Press/Temp display) o Assigns continuous action to monitor level, and isolate tank when level falls below 16% by performing the following (step 6c):

Reset both trains of Containment Spray (VB1, middle)

Close 8994A and 8994B Dispatch operator to open breakers for 8994A/B (VB1, middle skirt)

(7)Containment radiation levels are above normal (PK11-21 is ON, RE-2/RE-7 in alarm)

(b RNO) Verifies spray system still in service (VB1, middle skirt)

SRO * (8) Determines ECCS flow should NOT be reduced o (a) RCS subcooling is less than 20oF (SCMM YI-31, lower center VB2)

SRO/ATC

Reads CAUTION regarding running RHR pump with cooling to associated heat exchanger

(9) Determines RHR pump should NOT be stopped o (a.1) Notes pressure is less than 300 psig (a.1 RNO) Checks all available RHR pumps running, continues to step 11 (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 22 of 25 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

SRO/ATC * (11) Checks if Diesel Generators should be stopped o Checks Vital 4kV buses powered from Off-Site (they are) o Resets SI o Stops all D/Gs and places respective control switch in AUTO SRO/ALL * (12) Evaluates Plant Status o (a) Verifies cold leg recirculation capability - notes power available to both RHR pumps o (b) Checks Aux building radiation monitor - all are Normal o (c) Checks if RHR pumps are on recir - they are not o (d) Directs RO to Implement Appendix P, Monitor Light Box Verification (checks ECCS valve lineup) o (e) Contacts Chemistry to sample the RCS and place H2 analyzers in service o (f) Checks Turbine status (oil pumps, coast down, etc) o (g) Checks for alarms on Spent Fuel Pool level and temperature SRO/ATC * (13) Determines that post LOCA cooldown procedure (EOP 1.2) is not appropriate o (RCS pressure is < 300 psig (VB2, PPC, CC2) o RHR flow > 100 gpm (VB2)

ALL * (Note) (If step 13 is reached prior to 33% in the RWST) The crew will preview EOP E-1.3 ATC * (14) When RWST level of 33% is reached, RHR Pps are verified STOPPED; o Both RHR pumps fail to stop and must be stopped manually o will need to manually stop RHR Pp 1-2 (VB1 lower right) (if this occurs due to FOP kickout to E-1.3, RHR Pps may be stopped as late as E-1.3 step 2)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 9 Page 23 of 25 Event

Description:

E-1.3, Cold Leg Recirc Alignment (CT) (TCOA)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

At 33% in RWST (PK03-01 will also alarm); this is time 0 for TCOA to complete transition to cold leg recirc in 10 minutes.

Note: all BOLD substeps part of Critical Task CT-36, Transfer to cold leg recirc prior to an RWST level of 4%.**

The TCOA is more limiting than this criteria (Critical Task and TCOA; end point on next pages) **

Record time: _______________

Note: Only a single train of RHR Cold Leg Recirc will be placed in service due to the loss of ASW Pp 1-1 earlier in the scenario. The SFM may direct either RHR HX to be placed in service and perform corresponding cold leg alignment accordingly BOP * (1) App EE assigned/performed:

(App EE, 1) All (6) series contactor switches are cut in (VB2, upper panel)**

(App EE, 2, 3) Verifies reset of SI and both trains of CI Phase A and Phase B (VB1, upper panel)

(App EE, 4) Determines ASW/CCW is aligned to only 1 ASW Pump (2 CCW HXs are in service, VB1, far left)

Notifies SFM that only one RHR pump and HX should be placed in service due to limited ASW/CCW capacity.

Places one RHR HX in service per SFM direction: (CT requires one or the other)**

If RHR HX 1-1 specified, opens outlet valve, FCV-365 (VB1, far right)

If RHR HX 1-2 is specified, operator will open FCV-364 (VB1, far right)

Continues to step 7

(App EE, 7 & 8) Verifies CCP 1-3 stopped (VB2); makes PA announcement concerning Cold Leg Recirc

(App EE, 9) Dispatches operators to rack in breakers for 8980 and 8976.

SRO/ATC * (2, 3) Verifies RHR Pp 1-2 stopped and closes 8700B (VB1, lower right)**

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 9 Page 24 of 25 Event

Description:

E-1.3, Cold Leg Recirc Alignment (CT) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

SRO/ATC * (4, 5) Verifies RHR Pp 1-1 stopped and closes 8700A (VB1, lower right)**

ATC * (6) Closes RHR crosstie valves 8716 A/B (VB1, lower center)**

ATC * (7) Isolates ECCS Pp recirc paths by closing 8974 A/B, and closing 8105 / 8106 (VB2)**

SRO/ATC * (8) Verifies recirc sump level > 92 ft (will be close to 94 or more, VB1 upper right side)

Note: Only 1 RHR Pump and RHR Hx will be placed in service due to limited ASW/CCW capacity. Procedure flow path and the related Critical Task steps identified below correspond with the specific RHR HX placed in service and its associated cold leg recirc train alignment.

For RHR HX 1-2 as the only in service HX, else N/A SRO/ATC * (9a-d) Opens recirc suction valve 8982B, Ensures RHR Hx 1-2 in service per Appendix EE (VB1, lower right) and then starts RHR Pp 1-2 (verifies flows, amps) (both on VB1, lower right)**

(9e-h) Opens crosstie 8804B (VB1, lower center)**, and verifies SI Pps running and RHR Pp amps w/i limits

(10) Opens crossties 8807 A/B (VB1, lower center)**, (TCOA/CT completion time

___________) and verifies CCP 1-2 running

(11a-c) Checks RHR Pp 1-1 stopped and 8700A Closed.. Ensures RHR Hx 1-1 is in service per Appendix EE (VB1, lower right) (was not placed in service based on ASW/CCW capacity available as reported during performance of Appendix EE)

(11c RNO) Goes to step 12 (TCOA total time must be < 10 minutes) (CT) **

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 9 Page 25 of 25 Event

Description:

E-1.3, Cold Leg Recirc Alignment (CT) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior For RHR HX 1-1 as the only in service HX, else N/A SRO/ATC * (11a-d) Checks RHR Pp 1-1 stopped and 8700A Closed. Ensures RHR Hx 1-1 is in service per Appendix EE (VB1, lower right) and then starts RHR Pp 1-1 (verifies flows, amps) (both on VB1, lower right)

(11e-h) Opens crosstie 8804A (VB1, lower center) (TCOA/CT completion time

___________), and verifies SI Pps running and RHR Pp amps w/i limits

Continues to step 12 (TCOA total time must be < 10 minutes) (CT) **

SRO/ATC * (12) Observes one train of RHR train is now in cold leg recirc lineup ATC * (13) Closes normal ECCS pump suction valves: 8805 A/B, 8976, and 8980 Terminate the scenario any time after a single train of cold leg recirculation has been aligned (completion of CT and TCOA to be on CL Recirc)

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Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 1197 MWe Power Level: 99.6% Net Generation: 1147 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

CFCU 1-5 OOS for backdraft damper replacement.

SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

TS 3.7.5.B MDAFP 1-3, OOS due to low dP during routine surveillance test, estimated RTS is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; pump has been OOS for 14 hours1.62037e-4 days 0.00389 hours 2.314815e-5 weeks 5.327e-6 months .

ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

None TURNOVER ITEMS:

Shift Manager was notified by Grid Control Center (GCC) that several 500 kV lines have been taken out of service due to a fire in the central valley. OP AP-35 and OP J-2:VIII have been referenced and no actions are required at present.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

Maintain 100% power L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 26 of 27 Rev 0

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

None TURNOVER ITEMS:

U-1: maintain 100% - no one in containment.

U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

Time in core life: _MOL_.

Power History: Steady State at 100% for past 111 days.

Boron concentration is _960 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago.

Control Rod Height: 230 steps on CBD.

Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.

The last dilution was completed _30_ min ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

None OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

None L141 NRC ES-D-2-03 r0.docx Page 27 of 27 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 21 Event

Description:

Perform STP P-CCP-11 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (STP P-CCP-11, Routine Surveillance Test of Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-1 starting at step 12.9.11)

BOP (12.11 &12) Verifies normal charging (CC2) and seal injection (VB3) , then calls Aux Watch to verify oil flow is visible through bearing sight glass BOP (12.13 & 12.14) Records CCP 1-1 motor amps

Notes the amps are higher than 87.5 amps (VB3) (reading 95 amps)

Informs Shift Foreman the amps are high and the pump must be shutdown ATC/BOP Refer to OP B-1A:V, step 6.1 to swap from CCP 1-1 to CCP 1-3.

ATC (6.1.1) Notify RP of pump swap to CCP 1-3 on VB2 (6.1.2) HC-459D (PZR LEVEL CONTROL in MANUAL) o AUTO light out o MAN light lit BOP (6.1.3 & 4) Start CCP 1-3

Red light ON (at pump control switch)

Green light OFF (at pump control switch)

1-3 Amps (CHARGING PPS MOTOR AMPS on vertical section above control switch) between the RED arrows (normal band)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 21 Event

Description:

Perform STP P-CCP-11 (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SFM When Aux Watch reports there was no oil visible in the CCP 1-1 sight glass;

Declares CCP 1-1 inoperable

Enters Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A BOP (6.1.5) Stops CCP 1-1 (on VB2)

Red light OFF (at pump control switch)

Green light ON (at pump control switch)

1-1 Amps (CHARGING PPS MOTOR AMPS on vertical section above control switch) 0 (zero ATC (6.1.6 - 6.1.9) Adjusts controls (as necessary) for Pressurizer level and RCP seal flow

Adjusts HCV-142 (RCP SEAL INJ BACK PRESS CONT on CC2)

Adjusts HC-459D (PZR LEVEL CONTROL on CC2)

When pressurizer level approximately at reference level, returns FCV-128 & HC-459 to AUTO (note, FCV-128 may have remained in AUTO and may not require adjustment) o MAN light out o AUTO light lit BOP (6.1.10) Place Auxiliary Building ventilation in BLDG ONLY mode (VB4, right side, above CR VENT MODE lights)

Places SPLY & EXH MODE SELECT switch in BLDG ONLY position

White BLDG light it BOP (6.1.11) Updates status board as required

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 21 Event

Description:

PCV 474 Seat Leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (AR PK05-23, PZR SAFETY OR RELIEF LINE TEMP, starting at step 2.1)

ALL Diagnosis that a PORV is leaking by is made using one or more of the following:

AR PK05-23, input 360 (Pzr PORV Valves Disch Temp Hi)

PORV tailpipe temperature elevated (PORVS/SAFETIES DISCH TEMP - PORVS (TI-463 on VB2)

Safety tailpipe temperature slightly elevated/unchanged (PORVS/SAFETIES DISCH TEMP

- 8010A/B/C (TI-469, 467, 465 on VB2)

PRT pressure, level, temperature rising (PI-472, LI-470, TI-471 on VB2)

SRO Enters AR PK05-23, PZR SAFETY OR RELIEF LINE TEMP, starting at step 2.1.2 SRO/BOP (2.1.2) Monitor for indications of relief valve lift (VB2)

Sonic flow (PZR SAFETIES FLOW POI-116A, 117A and 118A)

Pressurizer Pressure meters (PI-455A, 456, 457 & 474)

Pressurizer Pressure digital display (PI-403A)

PRT pressure, level, temperature rising (PI-472, LI-470, TI-471 on VB2)

SRO Reads note prior to step 2.1.3 SRO (2.1.3) - N/A (2.1.4) reads step, no actions to be taken by crew (2.1.5) - N/A (2.1.6) - N/A SRO Reads note prior to 2.1.7 (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 21 Event

Description:

PCV 474 Seat Leakage (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP (2.1.7) Performs PORV leak isolation Close PCV-474 block valve MOV-8000A (VB2)

Green light LIT/Red light OUT Monitor TI-463 - lowering (PORVS/SAFETIES DISCH TEMP - PORVS)

Determines PCV-474 is the leaking PORV SRO (2.1.8) Evaluate Technical Specifications and ECGs

LCO 3.4.11 Condition A (indefinite with block valve closed)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnoses Steam Generator Tube Leak from one or more of the following:

Increased charging flow (PPC, CC2)

Air ejector off-gas hi-rad in alarm (PPC, RM-15/15R) (PK11-06)

Steam generator blowdown hi-rad and/or isolation (PPC, RM-19,23) (PK11-17)

Main steam line hi-rad (RM-74) (PPC, PK11-18)

ATC Observes PK11-06 input 423 (SJAE Hi-Rad) alarming and informs the Shift Foreman.

ATC/BOP May check PPC and/or VB2 Recorders (lower left) for upscale readings/ trends on rad monitors (If AR PK11-06 is entered, starting at step 2.1; otherwise this section is N/A SRO/BOP * (2.1.1) Checks for upscale readings on both RM-15 and 15R (PPC, RCDR-3 VB2 lower left) (both are in alarm; may be over ranged) o (2.1.1.a) Implements OP O-4, "Primary to Secondary Steam Generator Tube Leak Detection" o (2.1.1.b) Notifies Chemistry of abnormal condition o (2.1.1.c) Transitions to OP AP-3, Steam Generator Tube Failure Note: Review of OP O-4 shutdown criteria is also covered as part of OP AP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Failure" (if not addressed during AR PK11-06 response)

BOP

Reviews OP O-4 for action levels and shutdown criteria

Evaluates OP O-4 action level using PPC Group Display

Determines current OP O-4 action level as 3 (leak >= 100 gpd) and updates Shift Foreman (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-3, Steam Generator Tube Failure, starting at step 1)

SRO Reads NOTE prior to step 1 regarding requirement to complete procedure actions unless superseded by EOP E-3 , Steam Generator Tube Rupture Note: Maintaining Pressurizer level stable is a Continuous Action. Associated RNO steps are performed when crew reports applicable conditions exist (i.e unable to maintain pressurizer level).

SRO (1) Checks pressurizer level and charging flow

May take charging to MANUAL control and attempt to adjust charging and seal flow to maintain pressurizer level (CC2)

(step 1.a) Determines pressurizer level stable (CC2, PPC)

SRO/BOP (1.a RNO) Starts additional charging pump IF requested by ATC (VB2)

SRO/ATC (1.b) Checks for continuing decrease in pressurizer level

Determines leak rate is approximately 10 gpm

Readjusts charging and seal flow (CC2)

Determines pressurizer level is stable (CC2, PPC) (Continuous Action to Monitor)

Depending on transient response, may isolate Letdown by closing LCV-459 and LCV-460 (VB2)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP (2) Identify affected steam generator

(2.a) Determines that no S/G levels are rising unexpectedly (VB3 meters, PPC)

(2.b) Identifies main steamline rad monitor 74 rising (VB2 recorders, upper left; PPC)

(2.c) Verifies S/G blowdown isolation/sample valves open (VB3 lower left)

(Depending on pace of crew, blowdown may have isolated due to high rad on RM-23; RNO step is performed to allow sampling by chemistry)

(2.c RNO) Checks blowdown isolation due to RM-19 in alarm (PPC, RCDR-3 VB2 lower left); Places RE-19, 23 Hi Rad S/G Blowdown and Sample Valve iso defeat cutout switch to "cut-in" and opens blowdown sample valves (FCV-244, 24, 248, 250) (VB3, lower left)

(2.d) Contacts Chemistry to perform S/G sampling SRO/ATC (3-Continuous Action to Monitor) Determines VCT level can be maintained by RCS makeup (CC2,VB2, PPC)

SRO (4) Determines plant shutdown requirement

(4.a) determines leakrate greater than O-4 shutdown criteria

(4.b) due to O-4 criteria, implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown, starting at step 1)

SRO (1.a) Determines runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew)

SRO/BOP Starts load reduction (guidance is also on lamicoid pegboard on CC3):

(1.b) Places MW and IMP feedbacks in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI, CC3)

(1.c,d) Sets load target and ramp rate (greater or equal to 10 MW/min)

(1.e) Pushes GO (1.f) Contacts Chemistry to advise 15%/hr shutdown rate will be exceeded SRO/ATC (2) Ensures control rods are inserting in AUTO (CC1)

(3) Turns Pressurizer heaters on (CC1)

(4) Checks charging adequate to prevent flashing in the letdown system; may take manual control to ensure adequate flow (CC2)

SRO/BOP (5) Ensures DFWCS is controlling S/G levels in AUTO (MFW control/bypass valves; MFPs all in AUTO) (CC2)(VB3)

SRO/ATC (6) Performs boration (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook)

Presses STOP on M/U Ctrl HMI (CC2)

Presses BORATE on HMI

Sets target gallons for boration (expected approx. 20-75 gallons for first batch); verifies batch is reset

Sets boric acid flowrate

Presses START, and monitors boration

Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman(CC2)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP * (7) Checks MFP suction pressure greater than 260 psig (VB3)

NOTE: During the ramp, AR PK11-17, SG BLOWDOWN HI RAD comes into alarm. See writeup in EVENT 4 SRO/ATC * (8) Checks Tavg trending to Tref (PPC, CC1)

(9) Checks Pressurizer pressure and level trending to programmed band (PPC, CC2)

SRO If not already completed, reviews T.S. 3.4.13, Action B - greater than 150 gpd primary to secondary leakage. Required actions: be in MODE 4 in in 12 hrs.

SRO Reads caution prior to step 8 SRO/ATC (8) Check steam dump operation (TR-412, RCS TAVG/TREF recorder on CC1 or PPC trend)

(no action should be required)

If Tavg NOT trending to Tref o Places HC-507 in MANUAL (40% STM DUMP VLVS PRESS CONT, CC3) o With 0 demand, places Steam Dump Mode Selector Switch in STEAM PRESS mode (CC2) o Adjusts HC-507 demand to match TAVG and TREFavoiding opening Group II steam dumps (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 10 of 21 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (10 gpm) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC (9) Check pressurizer pressure and level trending to program (VB2 or PPC trend) (no action should be required)

If NOT o Manually control heaters/spray or charging as necessary (CC2)

SRO/BOP (10) Shutdown number 2 Heater Drip Pump per OP C-7B:II, Heater 2 Drain Pump -

Shutdown and Clearing

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 11 of 21 Event

Description:

SG Blowdown High Rad auto actuation failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (Blowdown High Radiation, starting at step 2.11 of AR PK11-17)

ALL Diagnosis that a Blowdown High Radiation has occurred:

AR PK11-17, input 1242 (Steam Gen Blowdown to Disch Tunnel Hi Rad RE-23)

RM- 19, Steam Generators Blowdown Liquid Radiation Monitor Detector Assy, in HIGH alarm (PPC)

RM- 23, Steam Generator Blowdown to Discharge Tunnel, in HIGH alarm (PPC)

BOP (2.1.1) Determines blowdown isolated and SG Blowdown Tank shift to Equipment Drain Receiver did not occur

Closes OC SG blowdown isolation valves (red light out, green light lit)

FCV-151, SG 1-1

FCV-154, SG 1-2

FCV-157, SG 1-3

FCV-160, SG 1-4

Closes SG blowdown sample valves (red light out, green light lit)

FCV-250, SG 1-1

FCV-248, SG 1-2

FCV-246, SG 1-3

FCV-244, SG 1-4

Closes FCV-498, Disch Tunnel (red light out)

Opens FCV-499, Equip Drn Rcvr (red light lit)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 12 of 21 Event

Description:

SG Blowdown High Rad auto actuation failure (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs the actions to correct the alignment

Closes OC SG blowdown isolation valves (red light out, green light lit)

FCV-151, SG 1-1

FCV-154, SG 1-2

FCV-157, SG 1-3

FCV-160, SG 1-4

Takes BLOWDOWN TANK OUTLET ISOL SEL switch to right position to Close FCV-498, Disch Tunnel (red light out) and open FCV-499 (red light lit)

SFM (2.1.2 - 2.1.9) Performs several evaluate steps SFM/BOP (2.1.10) Places the RE 19 & 23 Hi Rad SG BD & Smpl Vlvs (O.C.) Iso Defeat C/O SW in "CUT IN" (up) position (VB3)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum/Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-7, "Degraded Condenser, Section A", starting at step 1)

ALL Diagnoses loss of condenser vacuum from one or more of the following:

Condenser pressure rising (PI-44 (PRESSURE digital) on VB3, PPC) and PR-11A/B (PRESS/AFTER COND FLOW on VB3)

MW lowering (CC3, PPC)

PK10-11, CONDENSER PRESS/LEVEL SRO Implements OP AP-7, Degraded Condenser, Section A: Loss of Condenser Vacuum SRO Reads CAUTIONS regarding Attachments to be performed if both CWPs are lost, and guidance to trip reactor if actions to stabilize the plant appear unlikely to succeed Note: ATC and/or BOP will be directed to monitor the turbine for how close they are getting to the turbine trip setpoint. They can see both vacuum and the setpoint on the turbine controller screens (CC3), and can also compare condenser vacuum with the Attachment 2 "curve" in OP AP-7, showing power level vs allowable turbine operation area.

SRO/BOP (1) Checks condenser pressure less than turbine trip setpoint (Attachment 2) (It is)

SRO/BOP (2) Directs load reduction to maintain Condenser pressure below turbine trip setpoint (Attachment 2 limits)

Performs RNO (initiate Turbine Trip) due to inability to stabilize condenser vacuum (may occur before crew can take action)

SRO Enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6,7 Page 14 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response MDAFW 1-2 Autostart Failure; PCV-455C Failed Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0,"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" starting at step 1)

ALL Crew enters EOP E-0 on Rx Trip and silently performs immediate actions:

Verifies reactor trip (trip bkrs open, rods on bottom, NIs decreasing)

Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

Checks vital 4kv busses (VB4, vital busses F/G/H have white lights on mimic busses)

SRO/ATC (1) Verifies reactor trip

trip bkrs open

rods on bottom

NIs decreasing SRO/ATC (2) Verifies turbine trip

All four stop valves closed (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

SRO/BOP (3) Checks vital 4kv bus status (VB4, white lights on mimic)

Determines all vital bus is energized from startup SRO/ATC (4) Checks for SI actuated (PK08-21: ON)

(4.a RNO) Determines SI is neither actuated nor required o PK02-02 is OFF o Safeguards bistable status lights are out (logic for SI is not made up) (VB1, left upper area, just below PK01 and PK02)

(4.a.2. RNO) Announces Reactor Trip on PA (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6,7 Page 15 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response MDAFW 1-2 Autostart Failure; PCV-455C Failed Open (CT-10) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP (4.a.3 RNO) Controls AFW flow to reduce cooldown while maintaining a secondary heat sink

Checks for adequate secondary heat sink (S/G level 15% in at least 1 S/G or total AFW flow 435 gpm) (VB3, upper right) it will be zero gpm o Starts AFW pump 1-2

Monitors RCS Loop Tcolds for indications of cooldown (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC); throttles feedflow if cooldown continues (VB3, lower left)

Transitions to E-0.1 ("Reactor Trip Response")

NOTE: PCV-455C failed partially open on the reactor trip, the operator may close the block valve any time after immediate actions are complete (CT-10)**

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6,7 Page 16 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response MDAFW 1-2 Autostart Failure (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, starting at step 1)

Note: During the performance of E-0.1, the only running AFW pump (1-2) trips when narrow range level in one steam generator reaches approximately 13.5%. At the point, there will be a valid RED path on Secondary Heat Sink, the crew will cease E-0.1 actions and go to FR-H.1.

SRO/ATC (1) Checks RCS temperature stable or trending to 547oF based on RCS Loop Tavg (RCPs running) (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC)

If RCS temp < 547oF and decreasing : (Note: expected) o checks steam dumps (VB3, indicator lights middle) and S/G blowdown isolation valves outside containment (VB3, lower left skirt) all closed. Also checks MSRs reset on on Turbine Control HMI (CC3) o throttles AFW feedflow as needed to stop cooldown while maintaining heat sink (S/G level 15% in at least 1 S/G or total AFW flow 435 gpm) (VB3, upper right)

RCS temp > 547oF and increasing o If required, sets 10% dump controllers to 1005 psig, (83.8% setpoint) (VB3, lower left) o verifies dumps modulate open to control temperature at 547oF

Monitoring of RCS temperature stable assigned as Continuous Action SRO/BOP (2) Checks Feedwater Status (a) RCS temperature < 554oF (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC) (NOTE: expected)

(b) Checks Feedwater Isolation has occurred Feedwater Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box C (VB1)

(Red lights ON / White lights OFF )

(c) Checks total AWF flow greater than 435 GPM (VB3, upper middle)

SRO/ATC (3) Checks Rods fully inserted (VB2-DRPI)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6,7 Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Response MDAFW 1-2 Autostart Failure; PCV-455C Failed Open (CT-10) (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC (4) Checks Pressurizer level controls (a) Level greater than 17% (VB2, middle right)

(b) Charging in service with adequate flow (VB2)(CC2)

(c) Letdown in service (VB2, upper middle skirt)

(d) Pressurizer level trending to 22% (VB2, middle right)

(may adjust charging to maintain level 22% to 60%)

(e) May energize pressurizer heaters (CC1, lower left)

SRO/ATC

Reads CAUTION regarding Aux Spray and notes as N/A (Aux Spray not in service)

(5) Checks Pressurizer pressure control (a) Pressure greater than 1850 psig (VB2, far right)

(b) Pressure stable or trending to 2235 psig (VB2)(CC2)

(b) RNO will direct closing of PCV=455C block valve, MOV-8000B (VB2 lower right)**

o Critical Task CT-10, Close the block Motor Operated Valve (MOV) upstream of the stuck open PZR PORV by completion of the first step in the EOP network that directs the crew to close the block MOV.

SRO/BOP * (6) Checks S/G NR levels greater than 15%

o (a) Reports all S/G NR levels less than 15%, but total AFW flow is greater than 435 gpm (VB3, upper middle) o (b) Will control AFW flow to maintain S/G NR levels between 20% and 65%

o (c, d) Checks TD AFW Pump required for heat removal Reports TD AFW pump is tripped on overspeed (VB3, center skirt)

Monitoring of S/G levels assigned as Continuous Action When the 1-2 AFW pump trips, the crew will go to FR-H.1.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 18 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of secondary heat sink Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, starting at step 1)

ALL Observes one or more of the following:

AFW Pp 1-2 tripped on overcurrent o Blue and Green lights lit (VB3, lower skirt)

AFW flows and discharge pressures fall to zero (VB3 center)

S/G level less than 15% NR o Trend recorder below PK11 (VB3) o Steam Generator LEVEL narrow range meters (VB3 left side)

RED PATH for Heat Sink on CSFSTs SRO Enters EOP FR-H.1 (LOSHS) due to loss of AFW (complete) and low S/G levels SRO (1) Determines total feedflow less than 435 gpm is NOT the result of operator actions SRO/ATC (2) Determines Secondary Heat Sink is required (a) RCS Pressure is GREATER than any intact S/G ; (RCS pressure (VB2); S/G pressure (VB3))

(b) RCS Hot Leg Temp is GREATER than 350oF; (VB2, lower (chart recorder))

SRO/ATC (3) Checks at least one ECCS CCP available

NOTE: 1-3 may have been started when CCP 1-1 secured due to high amps. If not running, 1-2 CCP is "available" (green and white lights lit) (VB2)

Red light lit

Amps in the normal band (CCP 1-3; VB2, lower left)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 19 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of secondary heat sink (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP (4.a) Verifies Blowdown and Sample isolation valves outside containment are closed (VB3, lower left skirt)

SRO/BOP (4.b.1) Verifies CST level is GREATER than 10% (VB3, middle)

SRO/BOP (4.b.2) Verifies none of the AFW pumps are running (VB3, middle)

(4.b-c RNOs) Dispatches operators to locally check lineups and investigate pump trips; May check on status on getting AFW 1-3 returned to service.

SRO/ATC (5) Stops all four RCPs (VB2, right)

Note: Step may have already been completed during performance of EOP E-0.1.

SRO/BOP (6) Adjusts 10% dump controllers to 1005 psig, (83.8% setpoint) (VB3, lower left)

SRO/BOP Reads CAUTION regarding monitoring of Hotwell level (7.a) Checks at least one Condensate Booster Pump Set running in recirc (VB3, center skirt)

SRO/ATC (7.b) Takes manual control of all Main Feedwater Reg Valves and Main Feedwater Reg Valves Bypasses and sets demand to zero (DFWCS HMI on CC3)

SRO/BOP (7.c) Checks Feedwater Isolation Valves open (VB3, lower left)

SRO/BOP (7.d) Determines Main Feedwater is NOT available (Condenser NOT available) (PK08-14 NOT lit) and goes to step 9 (Establish Feed from Condensate System)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 20 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of secondary heat sink (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC Reads CAUTIONS before step 9.a regarding blocking/unblocking of automatic SI actuation Reads NOTE regarding parallel performance of S/G and RCS depressurization (steps 9.c in parallel with steps 9.a-b) and the need to stop S/G depressurization if PK06-06 comes in before SI signal are blocked (needed to prevent unwanted SI)

(9.a.1) Depressurizes RCS to less than 1915 PSIG (P-11) using one Pressurizer PORV (VB2, lower right vertical)

(9.a.2) After P-11 actuates (PK08-06), blocks RCS low pressure SI ((2) train switches) and low steamline pressure SI signals ((2) train switches)(CC2)

(9.a.3) Maintains RCS pressure below P-11 (1500 and 1865 PSIG) using PORV (VB2)

SRO/BOP (9.b.1) Verifies Main Feedwater Isolation Valves OPEN (VB3, lower left)

SRO/BOP (9.b.2) Verifies Main Feedwater Isolation signal OFF (PK09-11); resets as needed (VB3, center)

SRO/ATC (9.b.3) Throttles open Main Feedwater Reg Valves OR Main Feedwater Bypass Valves (CC3 DFWCS HMI)

SRO/BOP (9.b.4) Bypasses feedwater heaters and condensate demineralizers (FCV-55 and FCV-230)

(VB3, skirt, lower right)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

Loss of secondary heat sink (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP Reads CAUTION before step 9.c regarding potential for low Tave Feedwater Isolation (9.c) Depressurizes ONE intact S/G to LESS THAN 490 PSIG at MAXIMUM RATE:

(9.c.1) Verifies all MSIV and MSIV bypass valves closed (VB3, lower left)

(9.c.2) Places one 10% dump valve in manual and opens to 100%; Red light ON, green light OFF (VB3, middle)

SRO/ATC (9.c.3) Checks charging in service; may maximize during depressurization to prevent losing Pressurizer level during the cooldown SRO/BOP **(9.c.4) Establishes feedflow to at least one S/G (VB3)

(Critical Task CT-43, Establish feedwater flow into at least one S/G before RCS bleed and feed is required (i.e. before WR S/G level in any 3 S/G is less than 18% and ALL NR levels less than 15%) **

(9.c.5) Stabilizes depressurized S/G pressure at 480 PSIG (VB3)

Sets depressurized S/G 10% dump valve setpoint to current S/G pressure, approx. 40%

(or below) on controller

Returns controller to AUTO Terminate the scenario once feedwater flow from the Condensate System is established , per the Lead Examiner

- Critical TasK L141 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 21 of 23 Rev 0

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log Unit 1 Unit 1 Days at Power: 111 Days Operating Mode: 1 Gross Generation: 1197 MWe Power Level: 99.6% Net Generation: 1147 MWe Today - Dayshift Shift Manager Turnover:

PRA RISK STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Green GRID STATUS NEXT SHIFT: Normal AVERAGE RCS CALCULATED LEAKRATE: 0.01 gpm CONDENSER INLEAKAGE: < 0.01 gpd CONDENSER D/Ps: NW 5.9 SW 6.4 NE 6.3 SE 6.1 PSID MAIN GENERATOR H2 USAGE: 325 scfd / 327 scfd 5 day ave SPENT FUEL POOL: Temp = 80oF; Time to 200oF = 30 hrs using actual temp (F-ID-7A)

NEW PRIORITY WORK:

D/G 1-3 Corrective Maintenance SHUTDOWN TECH SPECS / ECGS:

TS 3.8.1.B DG 1-3 OOS for corrective maintenance on lube oil heater (discovered during rounds); RTS estimate is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; last partial STP I-1C completed 30 minutes ago (due in 7.5 hrs); action 3.8.1.B.3.1 has been completed.

TS 3.7.5.B MDAFP 1-3, OOS due to low dP during routine surveillance test, estimated RTS is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; pump has been OOS for 14 hours1.62037e-4 days 0.00389 hours 2.314815e-5 weeks 5.327e-6 months .

ECG ACTIONS THAT IF COMPLETION TIME NOT MET ECG 0.3 IS ENTERED:

None TURNOVER ITEMS:

STP P-CCP 1-1 in progress.

PRIORITY ITEMS FOR NEXT SHIFT:

Complete Control Room Portion of STP P-CCP 1-1 Surveillance Testing continuing from step 12.9.11.

L141 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 22 of 23 Rev 0

Shift Foreman Turnover ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM:

Alarms in are consistent with the DG 1-3 OOS (PK18-03, 04, 09, 18)

TURNOVER ITEMS:

U-1: maintain 100% - no one in containment.

U-2: 100% power REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT:

Time in core life: _MOL_.

Power History: Steady State at 100% for past 111 days.

Boron concentration is _960 ppm_ from a sample taken 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago.

Control Rod Height: 230 steps on CBD.

Diluting the RCS approximately 25 gallons every 1.5 hrs.

The last dilution was completed _15_ min ago.

CONDITIONAL SURVEILLANCES & INCREASED MONITORING:

Partial STP I-1C due every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT STATUS

None L141 NRC ES-D-2-04 r0.docx Page 23 of 23 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 24 Event

Description:

Remove Pressurizer Steam Space Purge from Service Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Procedure step numbers are included at the front of each action/comment in parenthesis, where applicable.

OP B-9:III, Primary Sampling System - Shutdown and Clearing, starting at step 6.2.3)

NOTE: step 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 completed prior to taking the watch (part of the turnover).

BOP * (6.2.3) Closes NSS-1-9354A (IC) and NSS-1-93554B (OC) (NSSS SAMPLE ISOL VLVS- left skirt VB1)

BOP * (6.2.4) closes CVCS-1-8101 (VCT TO VENT HDR ISOL VLV - center vertical section VB2 ATC * (6.3.5) Secures backup heaters (1-3 or as desired) (CC1)

May adjust HC-455K to close spray valves (CC2)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 24 Event Loop 3 Tcold Fails High (slowly)

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Diagnosis of the failed Tc channel (and/or unwarranted rod movement) is made using one or more of the following:

Reactor and generator power are approx equal and not moving

Tave and Tref were initially matched

Loop 3 Tave, T, and other indications (CC1, VB2 meters) are diverging from the other loops)

PK06-03 (RTD failure), PK06-04 (PPS Trouble), and other alarms related to failed channel ATC

Control rods are placed in manual (may be done prior to OP AP-5 entry, or during its use) (CC1)

SRO Implements OP AP-5, Malf of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel)

SRO/ATC * (1a, 1b) Notes that rod control (Tave) is NOT controlling properly in Auto (see above) and goes to step 1a, 1b RNO and takes MANUAL control of rods (CC1); "may" take control of Pzr level (FCV-128 to MAN) if it is in auto at the time of the failure (CC2).

SRO refers to Att. 4.2 now or later.

BOP/SRO * (2a) Determines that the failure is Eagle-21 related (PK06 ON), and goes to step 2a RNO)

ATC * (2a RNO) Determines which Protection Set is affected (from Ronan or Viewer/board indications); set III (continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 24 Event Loop 3 Tcold Fails High (slowly)

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel, con't)

SRO * (2a RNO) Directs WCL (Work Control Lead)/watchstander to open all Prot Set III doors (racks 11,13) and monitor per Att 4.2 SRO * (2a RNO) Determines which instruments are in the affected racks (11 & 13) using Att 4.1 (would include loop 3 Tave, T, OPT and OTT setpoint on VB2/PPC)

SRO * (2a RNO) Determines affected bistables and fills out Bistable Trip Authorization Sheet (Att 4.4) (may be deferred on delegated)

TC-431C Loop 3 OTT Trip

TC-431G Loop 3 OPT Trip

S/G TTD bistables (4) are an option, but not required (ie, either TTDs set to zero, or lo-lo bistables tripped)

SRO/ATC * (3) Verifies that Loop 3 T is NOT selected as a recorder input (on CC1)

BOP * (4) Verifies steam dumps are not actuated (no armed or open, unless not reset from ramp just completed - VB3, center)

SRO * (5) Notifies I&C of the Loop 3 Tcold failure, as time permits SRO Reads CAUTION prior to step 6 SRO/BOP * (6, 7) Notes step 6 requirements to take channel OOS prior to working; Places OOS stickers on failed channel indications (VB2 meters, uses Att 4.1 and 4.2)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 24 Event Loop 3 Tcold Fails High (slowly)

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-5, Malfunction of Eagle-21 Protection or Control Channel, con't)

SRO * (8) Determines Tech Spec actions using Att 4.1:

TS 3.3.1.X, 3.3.2.M - S/G TTD inputs (set to zero, or lo-lo bistables tripped, 72 hrs)

TS 3.3.1.E, - TC-431C, OTT trip (72 hrs)

TS 3.3.1.E. - TC-431G, OPT trip (72 hrs)

Proceed to the next event once Tech Specs have been addressed, and per the lead examiner.

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Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 24 Event

Description:

AFW Sys Leakage / Temperature Hi Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

Identifies AR PK09-16, AFW Sys Leakage/Temperature Hi in alarm and updates Shift Foreman (AR PK09-16, AFW Sys Leakage/Temperature Hi)

SRO/BOP * (2.1.1-2.1.4) Directs watchstander to evaluate high temperature alarm associated with AFW piping using guidance of AR PK09-16 and report findings back to control room.

NOTE: Time compression used for report back from watchstander (reports AFW line downstream of LCV-115, discharge valve for AFW Pp 1-3 is approximately 194oF)

SRO/BOP * (2.1.5) Identifies temperature is above 180oF AFW line limit o Requires start of AFW Pp 1-3 per OP D-1:I and supply approximately 5 gpm feed water to lower thermal transients on the pipes (OP D-1:I, Auxiliary Feedwater System - Make Available)

NOTE: Shift Manager will provide the follow cue regarding procedure Precautions/Limitations/Prerequisites:

Cue: Work Control Shift Foreman and Work Control Lead report all field conditions and actions are satisfied for starting the AFW Pump SRO * (6.3) Motor Driven AFW Pump - Operations at Power o Reads NOTES that operating the pump at power for reasons other than level control renders the pump inoperable o (6.3.1.a) Checks all AFW trains OPERABLE (they are)

BOP o (6.3.1.b) Places LCV Pump Running Interlock Bypass Cutout Toggle switch in the CUT-IN position (VB3) o (6.3.1.c) Places LCV-115 and LCV-113in MAN (VB3) o (6.3.1.d) Closes LCV-115 and LCV-113 (VB3)

(continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 5 of 26 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 24 Event

Description:

AFW Sys Leakage / Temperature Hi Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP o Verifies watchstander stationed by pump for start o (6.3.1.e) Starts AFW Pp 1-3 (VB3) o (6.3.1.f) Checks AFW flowrate to steam generators is approximately 0 gpm (VB3)

(no flow is indicated) o (6.3.1.g) Checks AFW Pp 1-3 amps less than 45 while on recirculation o Identifies pump amps pegged at high end of scale o Shuts down the pump SRO

Shift Foreman enter Tech Spec TS 3.7.5.B, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for one AFW train inoperable (72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action).

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 24 Event

Description:

MFP 1-1 High Vibration Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Identifies PK09-13, MFP 1-1 in alarm and updates Shift Foreman SRO Implements AR PK09-13, MFP 1-1 (high vibrations)

(AR PK09-13, MFP 1-1) (high vibrations)

SRO * (1) References Input, goes to section 2.2 BOP * (2.2.1.a) Evaluates vibration readings from 1-1 MFP (turbine/MFP HMI on VB4, lower left); notes multiple probes with rising vibration readings SRO * (2.2.2) Notes that the 1-1 MFP is not the only MFP in operation, and is directed to go to OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction, and ramp the unit to 550 MWe at 50-200 mw/min, and then trip that MFP SRO Implements OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction)

SRO * (1a) Determines runback/programmed ramp is not in progress (may not vocalize, since this ramp is initiated by the crew)

SRO/BOP

Ramp is started (guidance is also on lamicoid pegboard on CC3):

(1b) MW and IMP feedbacks are placed in service (all on Triconex turbine HMI, CC3)

(1c) 550 MWe load target is entered into Triconex HMI

(1d) Sets ramp rate to 50-200 mw/min

(1e) Pushes GO (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 7 of 26 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 24 Event

Description:

MFP 1-1 High Vibration Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction, con't)

SRO/BOP (OP O-3) May make calls to chemistry when 15%/hr shut down rate is exceeded SRO/ATC * (2) Verifies that control rods are inserting properly in AUTO (VB2, intermittent green IN light)

SRO/ATC * (3) Verifies ON all pressurizer backup heaters (CC1, left)

SRO/ATC * (4) Verifies charging flow adequate to prevent letdown flashing: may take manual control of Pzr level o Places HC-459D (master level controller) or FCV-128 (charging flow controller) in manual (CC2, right side, for both) o Keeps charging high enough to prevent letdown from flashing (VB2, upper panel, letdown temperature, is monitored)

SRO/BOP * (5) Verifies DFWCS in AUTO and controlling S/G levels (CC3 MFW HMI, VB3, PPC) o Checks MFW control and bypass valves in AUTO o Checks both MFPs and their controller in AUTO o May check level trends, as well as steam flow/feed flow trends (CC3, PPC, and/or big VB3 DFWCS electronic recorders)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 24 Event

Description:

MFP 1-1 High Vibration Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction, con't)

SRO/ATC * (6) RCS is borated per reactivity handbook for approx 50% load reduction (the following guidance is on the boration checklist in the reactivity handbook) o Presses STOP on M/U Ctrlr HMI (CC2) o Presses BORATE on HMI o Sets target gallons for boration (as decided above, and per the Shift Foreman);

verifies batch is reset o Sets boric acid flowrate o Presses START, and monitors boration o Once stopped, either returns to AUTO (presses AUTO, then START), or performs additional boration per the Shift Foreman SRO

The Shift Foreman provides reactivity oversight for the ramp SRO/BOP * (7) Checks secondary system status:

o (7a) MFP suction is verified adequate (PPC, VB3 meter; will remain > 260 psig)

SRO/ATC * (8) Verifies proper operation of steam dumps, Tave trending to Tref (VB3, red/green indicator lights; Tave/Tref from CC1 recorder/PPC)

SRO/ATC * (9) Checks pressurizer pressure and level trending to program (actual will be close to program, but may be in manual control) (CC2, PPC)

SRO * (10) Notes Heater Drip Pump will stay running

(11) Unit will remain online (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 9 of 26 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 24 Event

Description:

MFP 1-1 High Vibration Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction) (cont)

SRO/BOP

When ramp completes at 550 MW, directs BOP to Shutdown MFP 1-1 ALL * (12) Stabilizes the plant once ramp completed (as time permits, these are later AP-25 actions) o Tave within 1.5 F of Tref o Axial flux difference (AFD) in target band (or borating to get it there); rods > RIL o S/Gs are trending towards program level (CC3, VB3, PPC) (they will be stable and close to program level of 65%)

o MFP D/Ps are on program (DFWCS HMI on CC3) (D/P will be very close to program, and stable) o Pzr pressure and level stable, in normal bands (CC2, PPC) o Returns turbine to standby status o Takes MW and IMP pressure feedbacks OUT on Triconex turbine control HMI (CC3) o Sets valve position limit (VPL) to 1-2% above current value (same controller) o May perform reactivity brief SRO/BOP * (13a, 13b) Resets steam dumps (to normal control) o Checks steam dumps closed (they are, CC3 middle status light panel), and UI-500 (demand signal; next to status lights) @ 0%)

o Resets C-7A/7B (C-7A may be in) (CC2, right)

(continued on next page)

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Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 11 of 24 Event

Description:

MFP 1-1 High Vibration Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (OP AP-25, Rapid Load Reduction) (cont)

SRO/BOP * (14) Stabilizes secondary:

o Ensures FCV-55 closed o Ensures TCV-23 is in AUTO and maintaining Generator Cold Gas temperature <

122oF (VB3, lower, right) o Ensures FCV-31 in AUTO and controlling properly (VB3, lower right ) (part of cold gas temp control scheme; note that this valve/controller is reverse acting, in that 0% on controller is full open demand) o Ensure FCV-30 in AUTO and controlling properly o Ensures LCV-12 Condensate Reject Valve is controlling condenser hotwell level in AUTO o If no longer needed to supply additional suction pressure to MFPs, returns standby Condensate/Booster pump set to standby The next event may be implemented once the plant is stable @ 50% power, at least one boration has been completed, per the lead examiner.

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 11 of 26 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 24 Event

Description:

Seismic/ATWS/Turbine Fails to Trip - Entry in E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL

Large Seismic brings in numerous alarms associated with sloshing tanks and pump flow as well as the actual seismic event. Seismic event is greater than the Rx Trip setup.

ALL/ATC

Crew identifies reactor trip required (seismic setpoint exceeded), but not actuated.

Manual trip is initiated using reactor trip switch (CC1 or VB2)

Crew performs immediate actions and identifies Turbine has also failed to trip and performs manually trips the turbine (CC3)

SRO Implements EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

ATC * (1) Verifies trip (trip bkrs open (VB2 upper left), rods on bottom (VB2 upper left DRPI panel), NIs decreasing (CC1 left))

ATC * (2) Verifies turbine trip (stop valves closed) (CC3 HMI or VB2 RPS indicator lamps)

BOP * (3) Checks vital 4kv buses (VB4, vital busses F/G/H have white lights on mimic busses)

Note: Leak ramps in slowly following turbine trip and may not be diagnosed at point crew is ready for transition to EOP E-0.1. Both procedural flowpaths are covered. For SI NOT actuated, see below. For SI actuated, goto pg 15 For SI NOT Actuated or Required - Transitioning to E-0.1 (mark N/A if SI has already been actuated)

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks for SI actuated (PK08-21: IS OFF) o (4.a RNO) Determines SI is neither actuated nor required PK02-02 is OFF Safeguards bistable status lights are out (logic for SI is not made up) (VB1, left upper area, just below PK01 and PK02) o (4.a.2. RNO) Announces Reactor Trip on PA (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 12 of 26 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 24 Event

Description:

NO SI -Transition to E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP * (4.a.3 RNO) Controls AFW flow to reduce cooldown while maintaining a secondary heat sink

Checks for adequate secondary heat sink (S/G level 15% in at least 1 S/G or total AFW flow 435 gpm) (VB3, upper right)

Monitors RCS Loop Tcolds for indications of cooldown (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC); throttles feedflow if cooldown continues (VB3, lower left)

Transitions to E-0.1 ("Reactor Trip Response")

(EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response)

Note: Development of 500 gpm SBLOCA will become evident during first few steps of E-0.1. Foldout Page Item #2 addresses SI Actuation Criteria and should be assigned to one of the Reactor Operators during the transition brief.

SRO/ATC * (1) Checks RCS temperature stable or trending to 547oF based on RCS Loop Tavg (RCPs running) (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC) o If RCS temp < 547oF and decreasing : (Note: expected) checks steam dumps (VB3, indicator lights middle) and S/G blowdown isolation valves outside containment (VB3, lower left skirt) all closed. Also checks MSRs reset on on Turbine Control HMI (CC3) throttles AFW feedflow as needed to stop cooldown while maintaining heat sink (S/G level 15% in at least 1 S/G or total AFW flow 435 gpm) (VB3, upper right) o RCS temp > 547oF and increasing If required, sets 10% dump controllers to 1005 psig, (83.8% setpoint) (VB3, lower left) verifies dumps modulate open to control temperature at 547oF o Monitoring of RCS temperature stable assigned as Continuous Action (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 13 of 26 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5,6 Page 14 of 24 Event

Description:

NO SI -Transition to E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response) (cont)

SRO/BOP * (2) Checks Feedwater Status o (a) RCS temperature < 554oF (VB2, lower center chart recorders or PPC) (expected) o (b) Checks Feedwater Isolation has occurred Feedwater Isolation portion of Monitor Light Box C (VB1)

(Red lights ON / White lights OFF )

o (c) Checks total AWF flow greater than 435 GPM (VB3, upper middle)

SRO/ATC * (3) Checks Rods fully inserted (VB2-DRPI)

SRO/ATC * (4) Checks Pressurizer level controls o (a) Level greater than 17% (VB2, middle right) o (b) Charging in service with adequate flow (VB2)(CC2) o (c) Letdown in service (VB2, upper middle skirt) o (d) Pressurizer level trending to 22% (VB2, middle right) may attempt to adjust charging to maintain level 22% to 60%, but effect of LOCA will be unable to maintain level due to LOCA o (e) May energize pressurizer heaters (CC1, lower left)

SRO/ATC * (5) Checks Pressurizer pressure control o (a) Pressure greater than 1850 psig (VB2, far right) o (b) Pressure stable or trending to 2235 psig (VB2)(CC2)

Pressure will be at or below SI setpoint requiring crew to perform Critical Task of manually initiating SI**

o Transitions back to to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injections

- CT-2, Manually initiate Safety Injection Return to page 12 when crew re-enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 14 of 26 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 24 Event

Description:

Post-Trip 500 gpm SBLOCA (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior For SI Required - Continuing in E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection ATC/BOP * (4) Checks if SI actuated (PK08-21 OFF, also checks SSPS ESF status lights on VB1 and PK02-02 to verify SI is NOT required) o Determines SI IS required based on changing plant parameters consistent with a SBLOCA o Initiates manual SI (CC2, far right) **

- CT-2, Manually initiate Safety Injection Note: Critical task to close containment isolation Phase A valves is performed as part of Appendix E.

SRO * (5) Directs App E implemented (usually to BOP) - Continued on page 17 SRO/ATC * (6) Checks RCS temperature - stable (temps may be dropping due to SBLOCA/ECCS flows; AFW may be throttled back (VB2 meters, upper panel lower area)

SRO/ATC * (7) Checks Pzr PORVs and Pzr safeties (closed) / PORV block valves (all open), and no sonic flows on safeties/PORVs (tailpipe temps might be slightly elevated, but consistent with containment temperatures from the SBLOCA) (VB2 - upper panel, far right); checks Pzr sprays closed (CC2)

SRO/ATC * (8) Checks RCP trip criteria - observes RCS pressure (may or may not be < 1300 psig; stops RCPs if < 1300 psig (VB1 and VB2) (Continuous Action)

SRO/ATC * (9) Checks S/G Faulted o No pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized ATC/BOP * (10) Checks ruptured S/Gs o Not Ruptured - checks RE-71/72/73/74 and RE-15/19 recorders on VB2 (and PPC);

(all normal), and PK11-06/17/18 (all OFF); may request samples (continued on next page)

- Critical Task L141 NRC ES-D-2-05 r0.docx Page 15 of 26 Rev 0

Appendix D (rev 10) Expected Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: L141-NRC Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 24 Event

Description:

Post-Trip 500 gpm SBLOCA (cont)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) (cont)

SRO/ALL * (11) Checks RCS intact (it is not) (note: only one valid abnormal reading needed to transition from E-0) o (11a) Checks containment pressure normal (it is elevated) (VB1 meters, PPC) o (11b) Checks containment sump level normal (already be elevated) (VB1 meters, PAMS) o (11c) Checks containment radiation normal (elevated) (PK11-21 and PK11-19)

(11 RNO) Places 2nd ASW/CCW HX in service (opens FCV-603 and FCV-431, VB1 far left)