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Summary of Public Meeting with Tennessee Valley Authority Regarding Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - License Amendment Requests
	ML15331A065
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	12/23/2015
From:	Robert Schaaf; Plant Licensing Branch II
To:	; Tennessee Valley Authority
	Schaaf R, NRR/DORL
Shared Package
ML15331A054	List: ML15331A065;
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	Download: ML15331A065 (8)
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 23, 2015 APPLICANT: Tennessee Valley Authority FACILITY:

Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF NOVEMBER 19, 2015, MEETING WITH TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY REGARDING WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUESTS On November 19, 2015, a Category 1 public meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and representatives of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The purpose of this meeting was for TVA staff to present information regarding pending license amendment requests to propose changes to Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) technical specification (TS) requirements. The proposed changes would extend diesel generator (DG) allowed outage times (AOT) for both WBN units, and revise ice condenser door surveillance requirements for WBN Unit 2. A list of attendees for the meeting is included in Enclosure 1.

Representatives from TVA first discussed the pending request to extend the AOT for the DGs from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 14 days. The presentation is available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under Accession No. ML15324A442. The TVA representatives described historical changes to the AOT for Unit 1, provided an overview of the plant electrical systems, described the need for the proposed change, described the proposed changes to the TSs, discussed the regulatory guidance relied on to develop the proposal, and described several ancillary TS and Bases changes that will be included in the submittal. The principle reason for the change is to provide sufficient time to perform routine DG surveillance testing and maintenance without requiring a dual-unit shutdown due to the extended inoperability of one of the shared DGs due to maintenance activities. The proposed change will conform to the guidance of NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) 8-8, "Onsite and Offsite Power Sources AOT Extensions." BTP 8-8 states that a supplemental power source should be available as a backup to the inoperable DG during the extended outage. The TVA submittal will propose to rely on the FLEX DGs installed in response to the Mitigating Strategies Order (EA-12-049, ADAMS Accession Package No. ML12054A736) as the supplemental power source.

The NRC staff posed several questions and made several observations about the proposed amendment. The staff emphasized that the proposed extension needs to be adequately justified, including the specification of detailed maintenance timelines to support the requested extension interval. The staff requested information on how the availability of the FLEX DG would be assured during the maintenance activity; and how an unavailable FLEX DG or reliance on the FLEX DG during the maintenance interval might challenge FLEX strategies. TVA representatives indicated that this would be addressed in the submittal. The staff also requested information about whether TVA had considered the staff position provided in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2008-15, "NRC Staff Position on Crediting Mitigating Strategies Implemented in Response to Security Orders in Risk-Informed Licensing Actions and in the Significance Determination Process" (June 25, 2008; ADAMS Accession No. ML080630025), in choosing the amount of probabilistic risk assessment credit provided to FLEX strategies in TVA's quantifications. TVA representatives stated that they were cognizant of the staff positions in the RIS and that the analyses were consistent with those in crediting the FLEX equipment.

TVA representatives stated that the first need for the extended AOT would be a scheduled DG maintenance outage in the spring of 2016. The NRC staff indicated that meeting this schedule would likely be challenging, and recommended that TVA consider alternative maintenance or licensing strategies for the spring 2016 maintenance activity.

The TVA representatives then provided an overview of the pending request to revise the interval for first-year TS surveillance requirements for the Unit 2 containment ice condenser lower inlet doors. The presentation is available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15324A443. The TVA representatives provided an overview of the ice condenser design, the proposed TS changes, and described the history of industry surveillance test performance failures. The proposed change would permit operation through the summer months without requiring a plant shutdown merely for the purpose of conducting the door surveillances. A handout provided by TVA listing the reported surveillance testing failure history is provided in Enclosure 2.

The NRC staff questioned whether the proposed surveillance requirement could result in a greater than intended interval between first-year surveillance tests under certain circumstances. The staff discussed with the TVA representatives potential alternatives to address the staff's concern, such as the inclusion of a note to limit the total time interval permitted between surveillance tests, and/or to perform tests in the event of an unplanned shutdown of the plant.

No members of the public were in attendance and no Public Meeting Feedback forms were received. No regulatory decisions were made at this meeting.

Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-6020 or via e-mail at Robert.Schaaf@nrc.gov Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees

'/JJ)~

Robert G. Schaaf, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 2-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

2. TVA Handout on Industry Surveillance Test History cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

MEETING ATTENDANCE LIST Applicant: Tennessee Valley Authority

Subject:

Pending License Amendment Requests Location: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Headquarters. Room 0-16B04 NAME TITLE James Trapp Deputy Director (Acting)

Ben Beasley Branch Chief Robert Schaaf Senior Project Manager Andrew Hon Senior Project Manager Senior Reactor Systems Margaret Ghernoff Engineer Stewert Bailey Branch Chief

Matthew McConnell Senior Electrical Engineer Sunil Weerakkody Branch Chief Mehdi Reisifard Reliability and Risk Analyst Roy Mathew Team Leader Plant: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

Units 1 and 2 Date: November 19. 2015 Time: 9:30 p.m. - 11 :30 p.m.

ORGANIZATION NRC/NRR/DORL (Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)

NRC/N RR/DORL/LPLI 1-2 (Plant Licensing Branch 11-2)

NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLll-2 NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLll-2 NRC/NRR/DSS/STSB (Division of Safety Systems, Technical Specifications Branch)

NRC/NRR/JLD/JERB (Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, Electrical and Reactor Systems Branch)

NRC/NRR/JLD/JERB NRC/NRR/DRA/APHB (Division of Risk Assessment, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Operations & Human Factors Branch)

NRC/NRR/DRA/APLA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment Licensing Branch NRC/NRR/DE/EEEB (Division of Engineering, Electrical Engineering Branch)

NAME TITLE ORGANIZATION Vijay Goel Electrical Engineer NRC/NRR/DE/EEEB Jerome Bettle Reactor Systems Engineer NRC/NRR/DSS/SCVB (Containment and Ventilation Branch)

NRG/Region ll/DRP/RPB6 Craig Kontz Senior Project Engineer (Region II, Division of Reactor Projects, Reactor Projects Branch 6)

Jared Nadel Senior Resident Inspector NRG/Region 1 l/DRP/RPB6/WBRO (Watts Bar Resident Office)

Gordon Arent Director, Licensing TVA Roger Scott Licensing TVA Bob Bryan Watts Bar Nuclear Licensing TVA Manager Brad Dolan PWR PRA Manager TVA Jerry Riste Licensing TVA Russ Wells Senior Project Manager, TVA Licensing

Tim Page Licensing TVA

via teleconference

LER History of Lower Inlet Door Surveillance Testing Plant Door Visual Door Opening Door Open Torque TorQue Plant A 1975 -1; 1976 - 4; 1979 - 2; 1983 - 1 Plant B 1978 - 1 Plant A 12/27 /1980 - Loose Insulation on two doors Plant B 6/28/1983 - One door failed due to glycol on seal Plant B 8/23/1983 Five doors had high torque; frame adjusted on three, one cleaned seal, and one closed on a loose RTD cable Plant A 12/4/1985, seven doors failed due to frost build-up due to outage work Plant A 8/03/1998, review of damage to shock absorbers.

Redesigned shock absorbers. No failed surveillance test Plant A 5/11/2002, One door failed the open part of the test. Torque was about 10% high.

Plant D 7/17/1997, 10 doors had interference due to floor heaving Plant C 3/060/1999 -

Procedural review showed two doors failed torque test in 1997 Plant D 3/03/2005, Seven doors failed one of the tests in this surveillance.

Plant C 9/17/2005, Two doors failed one of the tests in this surveillance.

Plant E 12/31/1984, Door Blocks left in Plant E 3/12/1986, Five doors did not meet one of the torque criteria Plant E 3//05/1999, One door was restricted by frost build-up on a glycol line.

Plant F 9/14/1998, 46 of 48 doors opening restricted due to ice build-up on a glycol line.

Plant H 3/16/1992, Multiple doors impaired due to floor heaving.

Plant G 3/18/1992 Eleven doors impaired due to floor heaving.

Plant KE 5/13/1996, Fifteen doors failed part of their surveillance.

Plant K 2/27/1999, Ice buildup on two doors in bay 1 caused the doors to exceed the opening torque. Ice buildup due to a SG Manway leak inside containment.

ML15331A054 (Pka.); ML15310A501 (Notice); ML15331A065 (Summar' OFFICE DORL/LPLI 1-2/PM DORL/LP LI 1-2/LA DORL/LPLll-2/BC DORL/LPLll-2/PM NAME RSchaaf BClayton BBeasley RSchaaf DATE 12/07/2015 12/07/2015 12/22/2015 12/23/2015