CNL-15-056, Application to Modify Technical Specification 2.1.1.2, Reactor Core Minimum Critical Power Ratio Safety Limits (TS-506)
| ML15268A566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/2015 |
| From: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15268A565 | List: |
| References | |
| CNL-15-056, TAC MF0877, TAC MF0878, TAC MF0879, TS-506 FS1-0023302, Rev. 1 | |
| Download: ML15268A566 (34) | |
Text
Proprietary Information Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4)
This letter is decontrolled when separated from Attachment 3 of the Enclosure Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 CNL-15-056 September 25, 2015 10 CFR 50.90 ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-33 NRC Docket No. 50-259
Subject:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1 - Application to Modify Technical Specification 2.1.1.2, Reactor Core Minimum Critical Power Ratio Safety Limits (TS-506)
Reference:
Letter from NRC to TVA, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 -
Issuance of Amendments Regarding Technical Specifications (TS) Change TS-478 Addition of Analytical Methodologies to TS 5.6.5 and Revision of TS 2.1.1.2 for Unit 2 (TAC NOS. MF0877, MF0878, and MF0879), dated July 31, 2014 (ML14108A334)
In accordance with the provisions of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is submitting a request for amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1. The proposed amendment modifies the TS 2.1.1.2 value of the safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) for two-loop operation to 1.06 and the SLMCPR for single loop operation to 1.08. The revised SLMCPR values reflect a reduction from the current values, and are supported by the application of the methodology approved for BFN, Unit 1, in Technical Specifications Change TS-478 (Reference).
The enclosure to this letter provides a description of the proposed changes, a technical evaluation of the proposed changes, a regulatory evaluation, and a discussion of environmental considerations. Attachment 1 of the enclosure provides the existing BFN, Unit 1, TS marked-up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 2 of the enclosure provides clean typed BFN, Unit 1 TS pages revised to show the proposed changes. There are no TS Bases changes.
Attachments 3 and 4 of the enclosure contain technical information supporting the acceptability of the revised TS 2.1.1.2 limit. Attachment 3 contains information that AREVA NP considers to be proprietary in nature and subsequently, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390, Public inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding, paragraph (a)(4), it is requested that such information be withheld from public disclosure. Attachment 4 contains the non-proprietary version of the report with the proprietary material removed, and is suitable for public disclosure. of the enclosure provides the affidavit supporting this request.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNL-15-056 Page 2 September 25 , 2015 TVA has determined that there are no significant hazards considerations associated with the proposed changes and that the TS changes qualify for a categorical exclusion from environmental review pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) . Additionally, in accordance with 10 CFR 50 .91 (b)(1 ), TVA is sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to the Alabama State Department of Public Health .
The BFN Plant Operations Review Committee and the TVA Nuclear Safety Review Board have reviewed this proposed change and determined that operation of BFN in accordance with the proposed change will not endanger the health and safety of the public.
TVA requests approval of these proposed TS changes by September 25, 2016, with implementation within 60 days of issuance.
There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this submittal. If there are any questions or if additional information is needed , please contact Mr. Edward D. Schrull at (423) 751-3850.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 25th day of September 2015 .
President, Nuclear Licensing Enclosure :
- 1. Technical Specifications Change TS-506 - Change to Technical Specification 2.1.1.2 for Browns Ferry Unit 1 Attachments:
- 1. Proposed Technical Specifications Page Markups
- 2. Proposed Retyped Technical Specifications Page
- 3. Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis With SAFLIM3D Methodology (Proprietary) -AREVA FS1-0023301, Revision 1
- 4. Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis With SAFLIM3D Methodology (Non-proprietary) - AREVA FS 1-0023302, Revision 1
- 5. Affidavit for Withholding of AREVA Report FS1-0023301, Revision 1 (Attachment 3) from Public Disclosure cc (Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant State Health Officer, Alabama State Department of Public Health
Enclosure Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 Technical Specifications Change TS-506 Change to Technical Specification 2.1.1.2 for Browns Ferry Unit 1 1.0
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION This evaluation supports a request to amend the Operating License for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1 (DPR-33). The proposed change modifies the BFN, Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 2.1.1.2 value of the safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) for two-loop operation to 1.06 and the SLMCPR for single loop operation to 1.08.
The revised SLMCPR values reflect a reduction from the current values, supported by the application of the SAFLIM3D methodology approved for BFN, Unit 1, by the Safety Evaluation for TS-478 (Reference 1).
2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION To support the use of the ATRIUM 10XM fuel design in BFN, Unit 2, commencing in the spring of 2015, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) submitted TS-478 (Reference 2), a license amendment request (LAR) to revise the operating licenses of BFN, Units 1, 2, and 3 to add three additional AREVA analytical methodologies. One of these methodologies is SAFLIM3D (Reference 3). The NRC approved the addition of this methodology to TS 5.6.5.b for all three BFN units, including BFN, Unit 1 as part of the approval of TS-478 (Reference 1).
In the NRC approval of TS-478, the BFN, Unit 2 SLMCPR values were also conservatively reduced based on results obtained from application of the AREVA SAFLIM3D SLMCPR method. The BFN, Unit 2 SLMCPR values were reduced to 1.06 and 1.08 for two-loop and single loop operation, respectively.
This LAR (TS-506) requests approval of a similar change to the BFN, Unit 1 SLMCPR. The proposed amendment revises the SLMCPR values in TS 2.1.1.2 for two-loop operation from the current value of 1.09 to 1.06, and the single loop operation value from the current value of 1.11 to 1.08. The proposed change makes the BFN, Unit 1 SLMCPR values identical to those already approved for BFN, Unit 2. of the enclosure provides the existing BFN, Unit 1, TS marked-up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 2 of the enclosure provides clean typed BFN, Unit 1 TS pages revised to show the proposed changes.
In support of the proposed TS change, AREVA has performed a BFN, Unit 1 specific evaluation based on a representative Cycle 12 core design to demonstrate that the proposed SLMCPR values are conservative. A proprietary version of this report is included as Attachment 3; a non-proprietary version is included as Attachment 4. An affidavit for withholding the proprietary version from public disclosure is included as Attachment 5.
E-1
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
Three additional AREVA analytical methods (RODEX4, ACE, and SAFLIM3D) were added to TS 5.6.5.b as part of the NRC approval of TS-478. Beginning with Cycle 12, BFN, Unit 1, (projected to begin in the Fall of 2016) will use the SAFLIM3D methodology for determining the SLMCPR values for two-loop and single loop operation.
The SAFLIM3D methodology described in Reference 3 was used to calculate the SLMCPR such that no more than 0.1% of fuel rods in the core experience boiling transition during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences. The SLMCPR was determined using a statistical analysis that employs a Monte Carlo process that perturbs key input parameters used in the MCPR calculation. The SAFLIM3D methodology uses the approved critical power correlations to calculate the CPR for a fuel assembly based on the thermal hydraulic conditions and power distribution of the assembly.
Application of the SAFLIM3D methodology to BFN, Unit 1 is in conformance with the license condition specified by the NRC in the approval of TS-478 (Reference 1). The Safety Evaluation states:
The fuel channel bow standard deviation component of the channel bow model uncertainty used by ANP-10307PA, AREVA MCPR Safety Limit Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, Revision 0, (i.e., TS 5.6.5.b.11) to determine the SLMCPR shall be increased by the ratio of channel fluence gradient to the nearest channel fluence gradient bound of the channel measurement database, when applied to channels with fluence gradients outside the bounds of the measurement database from which the model uncertainty is determined.
In support of the requested change, AREVA has performed a BFN, Unit 1 specific evaluation (Attachments 3 and 4) based on a representative Cycle 12 design to demonstrate that the proposed SLMCPR values are conservative. The Cycle 12 reload is the transition cycle in which the first reload of ATRIUM 10XM fuel is introduced. The balance of the fuel in the Cycle 12 core will be ATRIUM-10 fuel. This mix of fuel types is the same as the BFN, Unit 2 Cycle 19 core used to support the BFN, Unit 2 SLMCPR change in TS-478.
The SLMCPR results presented in Attachment 3 support a two-loop operation SLMCPR value of 1.04 and a single loop operation SLMCPR value of 1.05. The proposed BFN, Unit 1 TS SLMCPR values of 1.06 for two-loop operation and 1.08 for single loop operation were conservatively selected relative to the values discussed in Attachment 3, to establish TS values that would not routinely require changing for future BFN, Unit 1 reloads.
No plant hardware or operational changes are required as a result of the proposed license amendments.
4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
4.1 APPLICABLE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS/CRITERIA 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 10, Reactor Design, states that the reactor core and associated coolant, control, and protection systems shall be designed with appropriate margin to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during any condition of normal operation, including the effects of anticipated operation occurrences. The proposed change in the SLMCPR values in TS 2.1.1.2 E-2
complies with the requirements of GDC 10 and will continue to assure that fuel clad integrity is maintained.
10 CFR 50.36(c)(1) requires that safety limits (SLs) be included in the Technical Specifications. SLs for nuclear reactors are limits upon important process variables that are found to be necessary to reasonably protect the integrity of certain of the physical barriers that guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. The proposed change modifies the existing SL 2.1.1.2 values.
4.2 PRECEDENT The NRC has previously approved the reduction of the BFN, Unit 2 SLMCPR values based on results obtained from the AREVA SAFLIM3D SLMCPR method. The relevant portion of the license amendment listed below provides the precedent.
- 1. Letter from NRC to TVA, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding Technical Specifications (TS) Change TS-478 Addition of Analytical Methodologies to TS 5.6.5 and Revision of TS 2.1.1.2 for Unit 2, dated July 31, 2014 (TAC NOS. MF0877, MF0878, and MF0879) (ADAMS Accession No. ML14108A334) 4.3 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION This analysis addresses the proposed change to amend Operating License DPR-33 to reduce the Technical Specification (TS) 2.1.1.2 Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (SLMCPR) values.
TVA has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, Issuance of amendment, as discussed below:
- 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No The proposed TS revision is based on the implementation of a previously approved methodology. As such, it involves no changes to the operation of any system or component during normal, accident, or transient operating conditions. The change does not affect the initiators of any accident. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No The proposed reduction of the SLMCPR values is based upon previously approved methodologies and does not involve changes to the plant hardware or its operating characteristics. As a result, no new failure modes are being introduced. Therefore, the change does not introduce a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
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- 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response: No The margin of safety is established through the design of plant structures, systems, and components, and through the parameters for safe operation and setpoints of equipment relied upon to respond to transients and design basis accidents. The proposed change in SLMCPR does not change the requirements governing operation or availability of safety equipment assumed to operate to preserve the margin of safety. The change does not alter the behavior of the plant equipment.
The reduction of the SLMCPR values does not change the requirement that no more than 0.1% of fuel rods in the core experience boiling transition during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, TVA concludes the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.
4.4 CONCLUSION
S The proposed reduction of the TS 2.1.1.2 SLMCPR values are acceptable based on the following:
3/4 A BFN, Unit 1 specific analysis of the SLMCPR values has been completed to demonstrate the adequacy of the revised SLMCPR values. The analysis utilized the NRC-approved AREVA SAFLIM3D methodology listed in TS 5.6.5.b of the BFN, Unit 1 Technical Specifications as approved in Reference 1.
3/4 The SLMCPR values have been chosen conservatively to ensure that no more than 0.1% of rods experience boiling transition.
3/4 The modification of the SLMCPR values does not require any plant modifications that could affect the behavior of the plant during normal, transient, or accident conditions.
Based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
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5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
A review has determined the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change a surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.
6.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Letter from NRC to TVA, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding Technical Specifications (TS) Change TS-478 Addition of Analytical Methodologies to TS 5.6.5 and Revision of TS 2.1.1.2 for Unit 2 (TAC NOS. MF0877, MF0878, and MF0879), dated July 31, 2014 (ML14108A334)
- 2. Letter from TVA to NRC, Technical Specification Change TS-478 - Addition of Analytical Methodologies to TS 5.6.5 for Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3, and Revision of TS 2.1.1.2 for Browns Ferry Unit 2 in Support of ATRIUM 10XM Fuel Use at Browns Ferry, dated February 28, 2013 (ML13070A307)
- 3. ANP-10307PA, Revision 0, AREVA MCPR Safety Limit Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, AREVA NP Inc., June 2011 E-5
Attachment 1 Proposed Technical Specification Page Markups
SLs 2.0 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.1 SLs 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs 2.1.1.1 With the reactor steam dome pressure < 785 psig or core flow
< 10% rated core flow:
THERMAL POWER shall be d 25% RTP.
2.1.1.2 With the reactor steam dome pressure t 785 psig and core flow 1.08 t 10% rated core flow:
1.06 MCPR shall be t 1.09 for two recirculation loop operation or t 1.11 for single loop operation.
2.1.1.3 Reactor vessel water level shall be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel.
2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure SL Reactor steam dome pressure shall be d 1325 psig.
2.2 SL Violations With any SL violation, the following actions shall be completed within 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />s:
2.2.1 Restore compliance with all SLs; and 2.2.2 Insert all insertable control rods.
BFN-UNIT 1 2.0-1 Amendment No. 236, 267 February 06, 2007
Attachment 2 Proposed Retyped Technical Specifications Pages
SLs 2.0 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.1 SLs 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs 2.1.1.1 With the reactor steam dome pressure < 785 psig or core flow
< 10% rated core flow:
THERMAL POWER shall be d 25% RTP.
2.1.1.2 With the reactor steam dome pressure t 785 psig and core flow t 10% rated core flow:
MCPR shall be t 1.06 for two recirculation loop operation or t 1.08 for single loop operation.
2.1.1.3 Reactor vessel water level shall be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel.
2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure SL Reactor steam dome pressure shall be d 1325 psig.
2.2 SL Violations With any SL violation, the following actions shall be completed within 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />s:
2.2.1 Restore compliance with all SLs; and 2.2.2 Insert all insertable control rods.
BFN-UNIT 1 2.0-1 Amendment No. 236, 267, 000
Attachment 4 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis With SAFLIM3D Methodology (Non-proprietary) - AREVA FS1-0023302 Revision 1
IDENTIFICATION REVISION FS1-0023302 1.0 AREVA Front End BG Fuel BL TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES: 18 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
This is the non proprietary version of FS1-0023301.
PROJECT DISTRIBUTION TO PURPOSE OF DISTRIBUTION HANDLING Restricted AREVA EIR - Engineering CATEGORY Information Report STATUS This ROLES document is electronically approved.
NAMES Records regarding the signatures DATES are stored in the Fuel BU Document Database. Any attempt ORGANIZATIONS to modify this file may subject SIGNATURES employees to civil and criminal penalties. EDM Object Id: HDII - Release date (YYYY/MM/DD) : [Western European Time]
Role This Name text shall no be visible - Adjust frames over to ensure signature Date (YYYY/MM/DD) block will completely Organization cover this text AUTHOR
- ULWHU CONSTANTINESCU
&2167$17,1(6&8$GULDQ Adrian, $5(9$,QF
- ULWHU TOUVANNAS George 7289$11$6*HRUJH $5(9$,QF
REVIEWER 5HYLHZHU 0226(-DPHV $5(9$,QF
TYLINSKI Scott, MOOSE James APPROVER 5HYLHZHU 7</,16.,6FRWW $5(9$,QF
$SSURYHU 0(*,11,6$ODQ SCHNEPP Robert, MEGINNIS $5(9$,QF
$SSURYHU 6&+1(335REHUW Alan $5(9$,QF
Exportkennzeichnung AL: 0E001 ECCN: 0E001 RELEASE DATA: Die mit "AL ungleich N" gekennzeichneten Güter unterliegen bei der Ausfuhr aus der EU bzw.
innergemeinschaftlichen Verbringung der europischen bzw. deutschen Ausfuhrgenehmigungspflicht. Die mit "ECCN ungleich N" gekennzeichneten Güter unterliegen der US-Reexportgenehmigungspflicht. Auch ohne Kennzeichen, bzw. bei Kennzeichen "AL: N" oder "ECCN: N", kann sich eine Genehmigungspflicht, unter anderem durch den Endverbleib und Verwendungszweck der Güter, ergeben.
SAFETY RELATED DOCUMENT: <
Export classification AL: 0E001 ECCN: 0E001 Goods labeled with AL not equal to N are subject to European or German export authorization CHANGE CONTROL RECORDS: France: N when being exported within or out of the EU. Goods labeled with ECCN not equal to N are subject USA: Y to US reexport authorization. Even without a label, or with label AL: N or ECCN: N, authorization This document, when revised, must be may be required due to the final whereabouts and purpose for which the goods are to be used.
reviewed or approved by the following regions: Germany: N CW01L Rev. 4.3 - 3/4/15
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 2/18 REVISIONS REVISION DATE EXPLANATORY NOTES 1.0 See 1st page Initial issue.
release date This is the non proprietary version of FS1-0023301.
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 3/18 Documentation of Multiple Analysts, Reviewers, or Approvers (Reference FSOP-7 Appendix 2)
Type of Review Role:
(applies to W= Pages/Sections Full Name & Title Reviewers only):
Writer/Analyst Signature Date Prepared/Reviewed/
(printed or typed) T = Technical R = Reviewer Approved D = Documentation A = Approver B = Both Adrian W N/A- Approval of N/A All except Figure 1, CONSTANTINESCU, document in Figures 5-9 Engineer electronic workflow constitutes acceptance.
George W N/A- Approval of N/A Figure 1, Figure 3, TOUVANNAS, document in Figures 5-9 Engineer electronic workflow constitutes acceptance.
Scott TYLINSKI, R N/A- Approval of N/A All except Figure 1, B Supervisor Engineer document in Figures 5-9 electronic workflow constitutes acceptance.
James MOOSE, R N/A- Approval of N/A Figure 1, Figure 3, B Engineer document in Figures 5-9 electronic workflow constitutes acceptance.
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 4/18
- 1. PURPOSE Reference 1 presents an AREVA methodology for determining the safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) that was approved by the NRC. The methodology is an update or extension of the previously approved methodology presented in Reference 2. The SLMCPR methodology was updated to incorporate full implementation of the ACE critical power correlation (References 3 and 4), a realistic fuel channel bow model (Reference 5), and expanded coupling with the MICROBURN-B2 core simulator (Reference 6). More detailed descriptions of these improvements are discussed in Reference 1. The purpose of this report is to provide SLMCPR results for Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 using the Reference 1 methodology to support a change in the list of approved methodologies in the Technical Specifications and also a change in the Technical Specification SLMCPR values for two-loop operation (TLO) and single-loop operation (SLO).
- 2. METHODOLOGY The analysis presented in this document used the methodology presented in Reference 1. The SLMCPR is defined as the minimum value of the critical power ratio which ensures that at least 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core are expected to avoid boiling transition during normal operation or an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO). The SLMCPR is determined using a statistical analysis that employs a Monte Carlo process that perturbs key input parameters used in the calculation of MCPR. The set of uncertainties used in the statistical analysis include both fuel-related and plant-related uncertainties.
The SLMCPR analysis is performed with a power distribution that conservatively represents expected reactor operating states that could both exist at the operating limit MCPR (OLMCPR) and produce a MCPR equal to the SLMCPR during an AOO. [
]
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 5/18
[
]
In the AREVA methodology, the effects of channel bow on the critical power performance are accounted for in the SLMCPR analysis. Reference 1 discusses the application of a realistic channel bow model.
- 3. ANALYSIS The final core design and step-through, developed by AREVA to meet the operating requirements specified by TVA, was used in the BFE1-12 MCPR safety limit analysis. The BFE1-12 design supports licensed rated power of 3,458 MWt and operation to licensing end of cycle (EOC) cycle exposure of approximately 18,054.6 MWd/MTU. The design includes extensions for final feedwater temperature reduction (FFTR) and coastdown. Figure 1 presents the core loading, the cycle the fuel was originally loaded, and the number of assemblies. The BFE1-12 core is made up of ATRIUM' 10XM* and ATRIUM-10 fuel. Analyses were performed [
] for the Browns Ferry power/flow map for MELLLA operation as shown in Figure 2. The radial power distribution [ ] is presented in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
The calculated fast fluence gradients for the BFE1-12 core design have been compared to the upper and lower bounds of the channel bow database. As shown in Figure 5, the BFE1-12 reference core design remains bounded by the upper/lower bound of the channel bow database [
]. The channel bow model uncertainty for the assemblies that experience fluence gradients outside the bounds of the measurement database was augmented with the same approach as demonstrated in the Response to SNPB RAI-6 in Reference 9.
The ACE/ATRIUM 10XM critical power correlation (References 3 and 4) is used for the ATRIUM 10XM fuel while the SPCB critical power correlation (Reference 7) is used for the ATRIUM-10. The fuel- and plant-related uncertainties used in the BFE1-12 SLMCPR analysis are presented in Table 1. The radial and nodal power uncertainties used in the analysis include the effects of up to 40% of the TIP channels
- ATRIUM is a trademark of AREVA Inc.
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 6/18 out-of-service, up to 50% of the LPRMs out-of-service, and a 2500 effective full power hour (EFPH) LPRM calibration interval.
[
]
The BFE1-12 SLMCPR analysis supports a TLO SLMCPR of 1.04 and an SLO SLMCPR of 1.05. Table 2 presents a summary of the analysis results including the SLMCPR and the percentage of rods expected to experience boiling transition. The percentages of the total number of fuel rods predicted to experience boiling transition in the overall Monte Carlo statistical evaluation associated with each nuclear fuel type are presented in Table 3. The results are for the [
]. The BFE1-12 fuel design is presented in Figures 7 through 9.
- 4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS Compared to the current TLO and SLO SLMCPR limits using the Reference 2 methodology, results show a significant decrease in both the TLO and SLO SLMCPR limits with the Reference 1 methodology. The SLMCPR differences are primarily a result of the following differences in the methodologies:
x Implementation of the realistic channel bow model x Explicit use of the [ ] as a result of the expanded coupling with MICROBURN-B2 The improved SLMCPR results with the Reference 1 methodology are consistent with the results presented in Tables 4-1 and 4-3 of Reference 1.
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
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- 5. REFERENCES
- 1. ANP-10307PA Revision 0, AREVA MCPR Safety Limit Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, AREVA NP, June 2011.
- 2. ANF-524(P)(A) Revision 2 and Supplements 1 and 2, ANF Critical Power Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation, November 1990.
- 3. ANP-10298PA Revision 0, ACE/ATRIUM 10XM Critical Power Correlation, AREVA NP, March 2010.
- 4. ANP-3140(P) Revision 0, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 Improved K-factor Model for ACE/ATRIUM 10XM Critical Power Correlation, AREVA NP, August 2012.
- 5. BAW-10247PA Revision 0, Realistic Thermal-Mechanical Fuel Rod Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, AREVA NP, February 2008.
- 6. EMF-2158(P)(A) Revision 0, Siemens Power Corporation Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors:
Evaluation and Validation of CASMO-4 / MICROBURN-B2, Siemens Power Corporation, October 1999.
- 7. EMF-2209(P)(A) Revision 3, SPCB Critical Power Correlation, AREVA NP, September 2009.
- 8. Letter, H. Donald Curet (AREVA) to H.J. Richings (USNRC), POWERPLEX£ Core Monitoring:
Failed or Bypassed Instrumentation and Extended Calibration, HDC:96:012, May 6, 1996.
(38-9043714-000).
- 9. ANP-3248(P) Revision 1, AREVA RAI Response for Browns Ferry ATRIUM 10XM Fuel Transition, AREVA NP, September 2013.
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 8/18 Table 1 Fuel- and Plant-Related Uncertainties MCPR Safety Limit Analyses Standard Parameter Deviation Fuel-Related Uncertainties
[
]
Plant-Related Uncertainties Feedwater flow rate 1.8%
Feedwater temperature 0.8%
Core pressure 0.7%
Total core flow rate TLO 2.5%
SLO 6.0%
- [ ]
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 9/18 Table 2 Results Summary for MCPR Safety Limit Analysis Percentage of Rods in Boiling SLMCPR Transition TLO - 1.04 0.0849 SLO - 1.05 0.0906 Table 3 Contribution of Total Predicted Rods in BT by Nuclear Fuel Type Contribution of Total Rods Predicted to be in BT (%)
Nuclear Fuel Fuel Burnup TLO SLO Type Design Status [ ] [ ]
20 ATRIUM-10 Twice burned [
21 ATRIUM-10 Twice burned 22 ATRIUM-10 Twice burned 23 ATRIUM-10 Once burned 24 ATRIUM-10 Once burned 25 ATRIUM-10 Once burned 26 ATRIUM 10XM Fresh 27 ATRIUM 10XM Fresh 28 ATRIUM 10XM Fresh ]
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 10/18 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 22 22 22 22 22 22 24 24 24 24 22 22 22 22 21 21 21 20 21 22 24 24 24 24 26 24 24 26 24 24 24 24 22 22 20 21 21 22 24 23 26 24 26 26 23 27 27 23 26 26 24 26 23 24 22 22 22 22 22 23 26 27 28 27 23 28 23 23 28 23 27 28 27 26 23 22 22 22 21 22 22 22 28 25 28 23 27 25 27 23 27 27 23 27 25 27 23 28 25 28 22 22 21 21 20 22 22 28 25 27 25 27 23 27 23 27 23 23 27 23 27 23 27 25 27 25 28 22 22 20 21 21 24 23 25 27 23 27 23 28 23 28 23 28 28 23 28 23 28 23 27 23 27 25 23 24 22 22 20 22 22 23 26 28 25 27 23 28 23 27 23 27 23 23 27 23 27 23 28 23 27 25 28 26 23 22 21 20 20 22 24 26 27 23 27 23 28 23 27 23 28 23 28 28 23 28 23 27 23 28 23 27 23 27 26 24 22 20 20 22 24 24 28 27 23 28 23 27 23 27 23 28 23 23 28 23 27 23 27 23 28 23 27 28 24 24 22 20 20 22 24 26 27 25 27 23 27 23 27 23 28 25 28 28 25 28 23 27 23 27 23 27 25 27 26 24 22 20 20 22 24 26 23 27 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 27 23 23 27 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 27 23 26 24 22 20 20 24 26 23 28 23 27 23 27 23 28 25 27 23 28 28 23 27 25 28 23 27 23 27 23 28 23 26 24 20 20 24 24 27 23 27 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 27 23 27 24 24 20 20 24 24 27 23 27 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 27 23 27 24 24 20 20 24 26 23 28 23 27 23 27 23 28 25 27 23 28 28 23 27 25 28 23 27 23 27 23 28 23 26 24 20 20 22 24 26 23 27 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 27 23 23 27 23 28 23 28 23 28 23 27 23 26 24 22 20 20 22 24 26 27 25 27 23 27 23 27 23 28 25 28 28 25 28 23 27 23 27 23 27 25 27 26 24 22 20 20 22 24 24 28 27 23 28 23 27 23 27 23 28 23 23 28 23 27 23 27 23 28 23 27 28 24 24 22 20 20 22 24 26 27 23 27 23 28 23 27 23 28 23 28 28 23 28 23 27 23 28 23 27 23 27 26 24 22 20 20 21 22 23 26 28 25 27 23 28 23 27 23 27 23 23 27 23 27 23 28 23 27 25 28 26 23 22 22 20 22 20 24 23 25 27 23 27 23 28 23 28 23 28 28 23 28 23 28 23 27 23 27 25 23 24 21 21 20 22 22 28 25 27 25 27 23 27 23 27 23 23 27 23 27 23 27 25 27 25 28 22 22 20 21 21 22 21 28 25 28 23 27 25 27 23 27 27 23 27 25 27 23 28 25 28 22 22 22 21 22 22 22 23 26 27 28 27 23 28 23 23 28 23 27 28 27 26 23 22 22 22 22 22 24 23 26 24 26 26 23 27 27 23 26 26 24 26 23 24 22 22 21 20 22 22 24 24 24 24 26 24 24 26 24 24 24 24 22 21 20 21 21 22 22 22 22 22 24 24 24 24 22 22 22 22 22 21 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Number of Fuel Type Description Loaded Assemblies 20 ATRIUM-10 10 65 21 ATRIUM-10 10 24 22 ATRIUM-10 10 87 23 ATRIUM-10 11 200 24 ATRIUM-10 11 72 25 ATRIUM-10 11 36 26 ATRIUM 10XM 12 40 27 ATRIUM 10XM 12 128 28 ATRIUM 10XM 12 112 Figure 1 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 Core Loading Map AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 11/18 Figure 2 Browns Ferry Power / Flow Map AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 12/18 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 60 0.145 0.181 0.212 0.235 0.263 0.288 0.299 58 0.214 0.317 0.400 0.459 0.508 0.558 0.671 0.670 56 0.131 0.233 0.375 0.541 0.742 0.796 0.832 0.891 1.053 0.909 54 0.240 0.413 0.691 0.852 1.119 1.020 1.224 1.236 1.022 1.237 52 0.259 0.414 0.618 0.838 1.189 1.295 1.337 1.367 1.128 1.330 1.119 50 0.132 0.259 0.412 0.597 1.005 1.011 1.279 1.137 1.416 1.212 1.423 1.177 1.418 48 0.228 0.415 0.615 1.000 1.021 1.291 1.166 1.408 1.188 1.458 1.211 1.471 1.215 46 0.201 0.369 0.685 0.828 1.000 1.284 1.130 1.403 1.188 1.440 1.227 1.471 1.229 1.474 44 0.142 0.315 0.531 0.838 1.172 1.262 1.155 1.395 1.189 1.441 1.233 1.499 1.244 1.497 1.232 42 0.179 0.410 0.718 1.098 1.272 1.120 1.384 1.174 1.431 1.224 1.497 1.223 1.437 1.203 1.435 40 0.208 0.452 0.791 0.996 1.303 1.380 1.161 1.411 1.215 1.491 1.238 1.447 1.033 1.204 1.138 38 0.230 0.495 0.810 1.189 1.326 1.174 1.412 1.190 1.479 1.240 1.492 1.200 1.210 1.038 1.356 36 0.255 0.540 0.862 1.194 1.083 1.366 1.159 1.418 1.236 1.491 1.234 1.456 1.191 1.420 1.173 34 0.277 0.648 1.017 0.985 1.275 1.126 1.402 1.186 1.491 1.252 1.486 1.257 1.483 1.208 1.439 32 0.287 0.647 0.878 1.191 1.065 1.354 1.161 1.421 1.205 1.464 1.219 1.470 1.229 1.468 1.201 30 0.286 0.646 0.877 1.190 1.072 1.354 1.158 1.420 1.210 1.463 1.219 1.470 1.229 1.467 1.209 28 0.275 0.648 1.017 0.985 1.276 1.127 1.402 1.185 1.491 1.250 1.485 1.255 1.480 1.206 1.437 26 0.254 0.538 0.863 1.195 1.089 1.367 1.159 1.418 1.235 1.490 1.235 1.454 1.178 1.416 1.172 24 0.230 0.493 0.808 1.189 1.326 1.174 1.411 1.190 1.478 1.232 1.490 1.197 1.207 1.035 1.352 22 0.204 0.446 0.787 0.995 1.303 1.380 1.162 1.410 1.211 1.489 1.235 1.443 1.025 1.199 1.134 20 0.176 0.385 0.712 1.095 1.269 1.119 1.383 1.173 1.429 1.222 1.493 1.219 1.431 1.199 1.430 18 0.136 0.288 0.525 0.835 1.169 1.260 1.153 1.393 1.188 1.437 1.229 1.493 1.239 1.492 1.227 16 0.202 0.344 0.677 0.825 1.001 1.282 1.133 1.401 1.186 1.434 1.214 1.464 1.225 1.467 14 0.223 0.403 0.609 0.996 1.018 1.288 1.165 1.404 1.184 1.452 1.205 1.465 1.215 12 0.128 0.235 0.408 0.568 1.002 1.006 1.277 1.139 1.413 1.210 1.417 1.174 1.412 10 0.259 0.413 0.618 0.838 1.189 1.294 1.334 1.364 1.125 1.325 1.115 8 0.263 0.424 0.695 0.854 1.119 1.020 1.223 1.233 1.020 1.234 6 0.136 0.236 0.396 0.543 0.732 0.809 0.832 0.889 1.050 0.907 4 0.207 0.321 0.399 0.459 0.509 0.555 0.669 0.669 2 0.144 0.182 0.212 0.237 0.264 0.288 0.298 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 60 0.299 0.289 0.267 0.240 0.214 0.183 0.146 58 0.672 0.673 0.561 0.512 0.475 0.408 0.304 0.206 56 0.910 1.054 0.894 0.835 0.800 0.746 0.544 0.398 0.239 0.137 54 1.238 1.023 1.238 1.226 1.022 1.122 0.857 0.696 0.425 0.263 52 1.120 1.331 1.128 1.368 1.338 1.297 1.192 0.841 0.623 0.417 0.260 50 1.418 1.177 1.423 1.213 1.417 1.139 1.281 1.010 1.007 0.599 0.414 0.239 0.131 48 1.218 1.471 1.210 1.457 1.188 1.409 1.169 1.292 1.022 1.003 0.615 0.409 0.230 46 1.474 1.230 1.470 1.219 1.440 1.189 1.405 1.135 1.287 1.005 0.830 0.685 0.389 0.210 44 1.232 1.497 1.243 1.498 1.233 1.441 1.190 1.397 1.157 1.264 1.174 0.842 0.532 0.294 0.138 42 1.435 1.204 1.436 1.223 1.497 1.225 1.432 1.176 1.387 1.122 1.274 1.099 0.716 0.390 0.174 40 1.138 1.204 1.028 1.447 1.239 1.492 1.210 1.413 1.163 1.383 1.306 0.998 0.790 0.448 0.204 38 1.356 1.038 1.210 1.200 1.494 1.235 1.481 1.200 1.414 1.176 1.328 1.191 0.810 0.494 0.229 36 1.172 1.419 1.180 1.457 1.237 1.494 1.237 1.420 1.164 1.369 1.089 1.196 0.864 0.538 0.253 34 1.439 1.208 1.482 1.257 1.488 1.252 1.493 1.187 1.404 1.127 1.276 0.985 1.017 0.649 0.274 32 1.210 1.468 1.233 1.471 1.220 1.465 1.209 1.421 1.158 1.354 1.063 1.189 0.877 0.646 0.286 30 1.203 1.468 1.230 1.470 1.219 1.464 1.210 1.421 1.162 1.352 1.062 1.188 0.876 0.645 0.285 28 1.438 1.207 1.481 1.256 1.486 1.250 1.491 1.189 1.401 1.121 1.273 0.986 1.016 0.647 0.274 26 1.173 1.417 1.182 1.454 1.235 1.490 1.235 1.416 1.158 1.364 1.087 1.193 0.861 0.537 0.252 24 1.352 1.036 1.207 1.198 1.490 1.238 1.476 1.188 1.408 1.172 1.324 1.187 0.807 0.491 0.228 22 1.135 1.199 1.025 1.442 1.228 1.485 1.215 1.406 1.159 1.377 1.301 0.994 0.786 0.444 0.205 20 1.429 1.200 1.430 1.217 1.490 1.218 1.424 1.171 1.380 1.118 1.269 1.095 0.713 0.386 0.175 18 1.228 1.491 1.236 1.490 1.234 1.433 1.185 1.390 1.153 1.260 1.171 0.838 0.528 0.309 0.138 16 1.467 1.224 1.462 1.210 1.431 1.183 1.398 1.128 1.287 1.003 0.831 0.685 0.370 0.200 14 1.210 1.463 1.204 1.449 1.182 1.401 1.165 1.292 1.028 1.017 0.627 0.422 0.233 12 1.412 1.172 1.415 1.208 1.409 1.134 1.277 1.018 1.023 0.714 0.434 0.267 0.136 10 1.118 1.324 1.123 1.361 1.331 1.292 1.188 0.843 0.634 0.438 0.276 8 1.233 1.020 1.231 1.220 1.017 1.116 0.851 0.698 0.429 0.271 6 0.909 1.050 0.887 0.832 0.807 0.730 0.538 0.376 0.237 0.138 4 0.669 0.669 0.556 0.508 0.459 0.397 0.316 0.204 2 0.298 0.285 0.263 0.238 0.212 0.181 0.144 Figure 3 Radial Power Distribution Map for Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 SLMCPR [ ]
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 13/18 Figure 4 Radial Power Distribution for [ ]
AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 14/18 Figure 5 Channel Fluence Gradient Distribution for Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 15/18 Figure 6 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 Reference Full Core Loading Pattern AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 16/18 Figure 7 [
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AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 17/18 Figure 8 [
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AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
N° FS1-0023302 Rev. 1.0 Browns Ferry Unit 1 Cycle 12 MCPR Safety Limit Analysis with SAFLIM3D Methodology Handling: Restricted AREVA Page 18/18 Figure 9 [
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AREVA - Fuel BL This document is subject to the restrictions set forth on the first or title page
Attachment 5 Affidavit for Withholding of AREVA Report FS1-0023301, Revision 1 (Attachment 3) from Public Disclosure