ML15190A339
| ML15190A339 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/2015 |
| From: | Gilinsky V Friends of the Earth |
| To: | Gary Arnold, Paul Ryerson, Nicholas Trikouros Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY/RAS | |
| References | |
| 50-275, 50-323, ASLBP 15-941-05-LA-BDO1 | |
| Download: ML15190A339 (20) | |
Text
From: Victor Gilinsky To: Ryerson, Paul; Arnold, Gary; Trikouros, Nicholas Cc: Wase, Alana; Kanatas, Catherine; Lindell, Joseph; Mizuno, Beth; OCAAMAIL Resource; dreddick@winston.com; drepka@winston.com; Roth(OGC), David; jmr@nei.org; CSisco@winston.com; trsmith@winston.com; Sola, Clara; Tibbetts, John; Wachutka, Jeremy; Williamson, Edward; Young, Mitzi; Docket, Hearing; ayresr@ayreslawgroup.com; olsonj@ayreslawgroup.com; bernetichj@ayreslawgroup.com
Subject:
[External_Sender] Limited Appearance Statement Date: Tuesday, July 07, 2015 11:09:30 PM Attachments: Gilinsky LA Statement.pdf Paul Ryerson, Chairman Judges Gary Arnold and Nicholls Trikouros, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Dear Board Chair Ryerson and Judges Arnold and Trikouros,
I am a former NRC Commissioner. I am submitting to you the attached document, which I would ask you to accept as a limited appearance statement in the proceeding regarding Friends of the Earths petition for a license amendment hearing on recent Diablo Canyon seismic issues.
Sincerely, Victor Gilinsky
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-275, 50-323
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PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY )
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(Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) July 7, 2015 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR GILINSKY
VICTOR GILINSKY LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT I am Victor Gilinsky. I reside at 369 Sumac Lane in Santa Monica, California. I was a member of the Commission from 1975 to 1984, a period during which it considered the adequacy of Diablo Canyons seismic design for plant operations. I would ask the Board to permit me to present a brief written statement in accordance with the Commissions rules regarding limited appearances by a person who is not a party. I am not affiliated with any party in the case before the Board or with any other organization with an interest in the case.
I offer this statement because the early history of how the NRC dealt with Diablo Canyons seismic safety issues helps to understand current issues. The Commission outlined some of this background in its Memorandum and Order (CLI-15-14), but there is much more that is relevant, going back before Diablo Canyons licensing.
To start with, the agency incorporated a very weak standard in Unit 1s 1968 construction permit. This was in keeping with priorities of the time: the Atomic Energy Commission was more interested in encouraging nuclear power plants everywhere in the country, including along the earthquake prone California coast, than in the complexities of seismic safety. In fact, the AEC commissioners did all they could to restrain their regulatory staff, which quickly got the idea. I served on the AEC Regulatory Staff from 1971 to 1973 and can attest to that.
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Also relevant to Diablo Canyons lax initial seismic standards is thatas was true of all early plantsthe plants construction permits were granted not under Atomic Energy Acts Section 103, covering power reactors, but under Section 104, covering Research and Development. The latter states: In issuing licenses under this subsection, the Commission shall impose the minimum amount of such regulations as will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations under this Act. There is no such instruction for minimum regulation in Section 103.
But allowing such a lax standard led to more trouble later on. Toward the end of construction the US Geological Survey judged the Hosgri faultpreviously identified in 1971to be capable of generating ground motions greater than those for which Diablo Canyon was designed. That forced postponement of operations for a decade while the plant was modified and reanalyzed. A good part of the time was lost because of the need to redo seismic modifications that the Company had initially done incorrectly.
To avoid abandoning a nearly constructed plant, the NRC Staff permitted an approach to seismic reanalysis and redesign that was significantly less conservative than it would have been for a new plant. The NRC allowed Pacific Gas & Electric to take every advantage of safety margins in the pre-Hosgri design. For example, in analyzing plant structures the NRC allowed a larger damping value than it had previously, which reduced the effect of ground 3
vibrations. At the same time, the agency allowed credit for the actual, as-built, strengths of structural materials, rather than for minimum strengthsthe conservative approachso that larger vibrations became tolerable.
However, using up plant seismic safety margins plus making plant modifications still did not suffice to meet the Hosgri standard. At this point, to find the plant capable of withstanding a Hosgri fault earthquake, the NRC Staff simply lowered the standard: It accepted a reduction of about 20 percent in the estimated ground vibrations at the plant. It did so based on not much more than a hand-waving argument offered by its seismic consultant about what he called the tau-effect.
Such a tau-effect reduction had never previously been given credence in a nuclear seismic analysis, nor to my knowledge has it been used since. Nevertheless, the Licensing Board hearing the caseto which then-California Governor Jerry Brown was a party in oppositionwent along with it on the basis of the Staffs endorsement of its consultants testimony. The Appeal Board later did, as well, although it could not provide a quantitative explanation. So far as I could tell, no one could.
The commissioners couldnt decide whether to accept review. They requested a report from the Commissions then-Office of Policy Evaluation and received a critical 89-page technical analysis. Two commissioners argued for a review of the 4
Appeal Board decision, including myself.1 Normally the Commission had 30 days to decide. It gave itself thirteen extensions over a period of nine months before it finally, in March 1982, let the Appeal Board decision stand, thus allowing the plant to operate. It was the weakest possible endorsement. My view is, of course, that of a commissioner in the minority on the issue who failed to persuade the commission to look into the validity of the plants seismic analysis. But the facts of the case are undeniable, including that without acceptance of the substantial tau reductions in ground motions, Diablo Canyon would not have qualified for an operating license.
After the more recent discovery of the Shoreline and other faults, the Company and the NRC Staff have tried, using new analytical techniques, to demonstrate that these do not challenge the Diablo Canyon seismic designs, or as the Commissions Memorandum and Order put it, that they are a lesser included case under the Hosgri evaluation. Whether PG&Es and the Staffs underlying calculations in dealing with Shoreline and other faults are valid remains to be determined. In my view, the safety issue is weighty enough, and made more so by the plants history, to require a license amendment hearing.
Equally significant is the shadow that hangs over the previously approved but dubious calculations supporting the adequacy of protection against earthquakes on the Hosgri fault. The NRC may regard the 1982 approval of the Hosgri 1
Opinion of Commissioners Gilinsky and Bradford on Commission Review of ALAB-644 (Diablo Canyon Seismic Proceeding), March 1982. Attached.
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modifications as a settled matter, legally speaking. But it is definitely not a settled safety matter, and that should be the uppermost consideration.
The problematic early history of Diablo Canyon seismic issues and the continued emergence of new issues argue strongly for a thorough and credible reassessment of the plants seismic safety. The Commission owes the public that. It can only happen in an adjudicatory license amendment hearing before an independent Board. I say this not because the NRC Staff lacks competence, but because it is in the nature of bureaucracy to defend past positions. The Staff has been at this for so long, it is not realistic to look to it to provide dispassionate advice. Its perspective and testimony are valuable, as are those of the plants owners, Pacific Gas & Electric, but their testimony should have to withstand cross-examination by experts outside the NRC. If their seismic safety case is as sound as they believe it to be, they will prevail. Exaggerated concerns over regulatory uncertainty have to take a backseat to assurance of the public health and safety.
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