ML15167A546

2015-06 Final Written Exam

ML15167A546
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	06/05/2015
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
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Download: ML15167A546 (549)

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ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 003 K6.02 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 2.7 Reactor Coolant Pump: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS: RCP seals and seal water supply.

Question 1 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is in MODE 1.

The #1 seal on RCP 1-04 has just failed.

As a result, RCP 1-04 seal injection flow will be ___(1)___ rapidly, and seal leakoff flow will be

___(2)___.

A. (1) rising (2) lowering B. (1) rising (2) rising C. (1) lowering (2) lowering D. (1) lowering (2) rising Answer: B Page 1 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the resulting RCP parameters following a RCP seal failure.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible because with reduced back pressure on seal injection as a result of the failing seal, seal injection flow will increase. However, the flow restriction of RCS and seal injection flow up through the seal package will be reduced and seal leakoff flow will also increase rather than decrease.

B. Correct. With reduced back pressure on seal injection as a result of the failing seal, seal injection flow will increase. The flow restriction of RCS and seal injection flow up through the seal package will be reduced and seal leakoff flow will also increase.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because a misconception could exist as to where the seal injection flow enters the RCP. If seal injection entered above the #1 seal pressure would be higher and seal injection flow would decrease. Further, it could be thought that seal leakoff flow would also decrease as a result of the decrease in seal injection flow.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because a misconception could exist as to where the seal injection flow enters the RCP. If seal injection entered above the #1 seal pressure would be higher and seal injection flow would decrease. The flow restriction of RCS and seal injection flow up through the seal package will be reduced and seal leakoff flow will also increase.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-101, Section 4.0 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21ABN101OB103 Analyze the response to an RCP Number 1 Seal Failure in accordance with ABN-101, Reactor Coolant Pump Trip/Malfunction.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT0069 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 3 55.43 Page 2 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 01, Section 4.0 4 Revision: 11 Page 3 of o 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/30/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 004 K2.03 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.3 Chemical and Volume Control: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Charging pumps.

Question 2 Which of the following lists the power supplies for Centrifugal Charging pump (CCP) 1-02 and for the Positive Displacement Charging pump (PDP) 1-01?

CCP 1-02 PDP A. 1EB2 1B1 B. 1EA2 1B1 C. 1EA2 1EB1 D. 1EB2 1EB1 Answer: C Page 4 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the bus power supplies to 2 of the 3 charging pumps.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. As both pumps are capable of discharging into the RCS at NOP, it is plausible that both are powered from 480 V buses. The first part is incorrect as CCP 1-02 is powered from the Train B safeguards 6.9 kV bus not the 480 V bus. The second part is incorrect as the PDP although not safety related is powered from a Train A 480 V safeguards bus in contrast to a non-safeguards 480 V safeguards bus as would be expected.

B. Incorrect. CCP 1-02 power supply is correct. The second part is incorrect as described in A above.

C. Correct. The Centrifugal Charging Pumps are 600 hp motors and are powered from the 6.9 kV safeguards buses 1EA1 and 1EA2. The PDP is a smaller motor (200 hp) and though it is a non-Class 1E component, it is powered from a Class 1E power supply: 480 V bus 1EB1.

D. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect as described in A above. The PDP power supply is correct.

Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for CVCS, page 28 and 34 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21SYSCS1OB103 Describe the components of the Chemical and Volume Control System including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 5 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for CVCS, page 28 and 34 Revision: 4-28-2011 POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP The positive displacement charging pump (PDP) is a horizontal, variable speed, positive displacement type pump rated for a maximum flow of 98 gpm at a developed head of 5800 feet.

The pump is designed to develop a differential pressure of 3125 psid for hydrostatic testing of the reactor coolant system. It is driven by a 200 horsepower, 1800 rpm, 480 VAC motor, powered from uEB1.

Centrifugal Charging Pumps u-01 and u-02 take separate suctions off of the common charging pump suction piping. These pumps are powered by 600 horsepower, 1800 rpm motors supplied from 6.9 kV engineered safeguards buses uEA1 and uEA2. Buses uED1 and uED2 provide 125 VDC power to the breaker control circuits of Centrifugal Charging Pumps u-01 and u-02, respectively. Each pump is rated at 150 gpm at a differential pressure of approximately 2590 psid across the pump. Each pump is rated for a maximum rated flow of 550 gpm at approximately 625 psid across the pump.

Page 6 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/13/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 005 A1.05 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.3 Residual Heat Removal: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RHRS controls including: Detection of and response to presence of water in RHR emergency sump.

Question 3 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

An RCS break has occurred in MODE 5.

ABN-104, Residual Heat Removal System Malfunction Section 8.3, MODE 5 or 6 Complete Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability - RCS Not Filled is in progress.

Hot Leg Injection from the RWST is in progress.

RWST level has lowered to 39%.

The Unit Supervisor directs performance of Attachment 11, Instruction for Makeup to the RWST from the Containment Sump.

(1) Which pump will be used to pump the sump water to the RWST?

(2) As the Containment Sump is pumped down, what is the next level indicated on 1-LI-4779B, CNTMT RECIRC SMP LVL as the sump level is lowered below 809 0?

A. (1) A Containment Spray Pump (2) 808 3 B. (1) A Containment Spray Pump (2) 808 0 C. (1) A Residual Heat Removal Pump (2) 808 3 D. (1) A Residual Heat Removal Pump (2) 808 0 Answer: A Page 7 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to monitor the water level in the RHR emergency sump and predict the next indicated level on the Containment Recirculation Sump Level Transmitters in order to stop the pump taking suction from the sump.

Explanation:

A. Correct. In accordance with ABN-104 Attachment 11 the CSP is used to pump sump water to the RWST. In accordance with ABN-104 Attachment 11 the CSP is stopped when Recirculation Sump level lowers below 808 6. The next reading below 809 0 is 808 3.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct, see A above. The second part is incorrect but plausible as the majority of the recirculation sump level indication is in one foot increments. However, sump level indicates at 808 3 between 808 and 809.

C. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect but plausible as the procedure utilizes the CSPs to pump the sump water to the RWST. The RHR pump is plausible as a flow path can be aligned to pump water back to the RWST as would be used when draining the RCS, except the suction source would be the sump. This path is not used as a loss of decay heat removal capability exists. The second part is correct as described in A.

D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect as described in C. Second part is incorrect as described in B.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-104, Attachment 11. Attached w/ Revision # See ECCS Study Guide Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21ABN104OB105 Analyze the response to a Complete Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability in accordance with ABN-104 Residual Heat Removal System Malfunctions Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 8 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECCS Study S Guide Revision: 5-2-2011 Page 9 of o 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 04 Attachment 11 Revision:: 9 Page 10 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/31/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 006 A3.04 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.8 Emergency Core Cooling: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: Cooling water systems.

Question 4 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

1-HV-4572, RHR HX 1 CCW RET VLV has been throttled to 15% open in preparation for starting a second CCW pump:

A Unit 1 Safety Injection occurs.

In response to the above conditions, 1-HV-4572 will throttle ____________ of design flow.

A. directly to approximately 55%

B. directly to approximately 40%

C. full open, then stroke back to approximately 55%

D. full open, then stroke back to approximately 40%

Answer: D Page 11 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to monitor the automatic operation of the cooling water supplies to the RHR Heat Exchangers during ECCS operations.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 55% is plausible, since this would be correct if it were a valve on the Containment Spray system.

B. Incorrect. Plausible, since 40% is the correct value. Also plausible that a valve actuated by a Safety Injection would not travel beyond what is required, but go directly to the required position.

C. Incorrect. Stroking open and then back to a required position is correct. 55% plausibility described in "A" above.

D. Correct. The CCW outlet valves required position during a safety injection is 40% open. On an SI, the valves will go full open, and then throttle back to the 40% position.

Technical Reference(s) Component Cooling Water Study Guide, Attached w/ Revision # See page 17, page 18, dated 5-1-2011 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the components of the Component Cooling Water system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT1391 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 12 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Component Cooling Water Study Guide, Revision: 5-1-2011 page 17, page 18 From Study Guide for Component Cooling Water:

The RHR heat exchangers have motor operated butterfly valves on the outlet of each heat exchanger powered from train related 1E 480v MCCs with control power supplied from a 480V to 120V transformer in each valves breaker compartment. The valves are controlled from a hand switch on u-CB-03. The hand switch is configured such that the valve moves only when the switch is being held in the open or close position. There is open/close indication on the hand switch and indication on u-MLB-4A3 and u-MLB-4B3 when the valve is in the throttled position for Safety Injection or spray actuation. There is also a blue light on the hand switch that is lit when the valve is in the throttled position for 40% design flow.

The upstream isolation valves for the RHR heat exchangers, uCC-0109 and uCC-0157, have been modified to act as orifices and can not be used for system isolation. This design allows only the 40% design flow to the heat exchangers. These manual valves are normally sealed closed to provide acceptable CCW flow balancing for a DBA to limit heat addition to the CCW system.

These valves are not required to be opened to mitigate a DBA (e.g. LOCA); however, they may be opened to accelerate cooldown after accident heat loads have sufficiently decayed that the plant and systems conditions will support full CCW flow without exceeding the limiting CCW operating temperature of 135°F at the exit of the CCW heat exchanger and if the valve locations are accessible (corridor may be high radiation area following LOCA). These valves provide a flow limiting function in Modes 1, 2, and 3 and may be opened in Mode 3 below 400°F to aid in cooldown. The valves may be opened as needed to support RHR cooldown in Modes 4, 5 and 6.

On a safety injection actuation signal the heat exchanger valves will travel full open and, then close to a pre-set position which corresponds to 40% design flow through the heat exchangers, nominal 3140 gpm. If SI has been reset and the position of the valves changed and a containment spray signal follows, the valves will automatically reposition to the throttled position equivalent to 40%

design flow.

Containment Spray Heat Exchangers On containment spray actuation signal, the heat exchanger valves will travel full open and then close to a pre-set position which corresponds to 55% design flow through the heat exchangers, nominal 3345 gpm.

Page 13 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 007 K1.03 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.0 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRTS and the following systems: RCS.

Question 5 Given the following condition:

Annunciator 1-ALB-05B, Window 2.3 - PRT HI TEMP has just alarmed.

Which of the following describes how the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) inventory will be cooled, in accordance with SOP-110A, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank System?

A. Recirculate the PRT inventory through the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Heat Exchanger, using Component Cooling Water from the non-safeguards loop to cool the Heat Exchanger.

B. Recirculate the PRT inventory through the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Heat Exchanger, using Component Cooling Water from the in-service safeguards loop to cool the Heat Exchanger.

C. Drain the PRT to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank while making up to the PRT from the Demineralized Water Storage Tank.

D. Drain the PRT to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank while making up to the PRT from the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank.

Answer: A Page 14 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of how the PRT is cooled via the RCDT which is part of the RCS.

Explanation:

A. Correct. The procedure used to cool the PRT is SOP-109A, Pressurizer Relief Tank. The reference includes the steps required to cool the PRT which encompasses the NOTE at the end of step 5.4.I stating that "The PRT is now recirculating in the cooldown mode." The water supply is correct in that the RCDT is supplied with CCW from the non-safeguards loop.

B. Incorrect. Plausible because the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) heat exchanger is used, however, the CCW is supplied from the non-safeguards loop rather than the in-service safeguards loop. The in-service safeguards loop is plausible in that loads are regularly swapped based on what safeguards loop is in operation.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because there is a flowpath from the PRT to the RCDT, however, this method would generate waste which is undesirable.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because there is a flowpath from the PRT to the RCDT, however, this method would generate waste which is undesirable.

Technical Reference(s) 1-ALB-5B, Window 2.3 Attached w/ Revision # See SOP-109A, Step 5.4.C Comments / Reference SOP-110A, Steps 5.4.D, G, H Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank system.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT7083 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 3 55.43 Page 15 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-5 5B, Window 2.3 Revision: 5 Page 16 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-5 5B, Window 2.3 Revision: 5 Page 17 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-10 09A, Step 5.4 4.C Revision: 13 Page 18 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-110A, Steps 5.4.D, 5 G Revision: 9 Page 19 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-110A, Steps 5.4.H 5 Revision:

Page 20 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/13/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 008 A2.03 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.0 Component Cooling Water: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: High/low CCW temperature.

Question 6 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

A normal unit shutdown is in progress.

All Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) are running.

At 0800 Train A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) was placed in service.

At 0805 the following alarms were received:

1-ALB-3B, Window 1.5, CCW HX 1 OUT TEMP HI 1-ALB-3B, Window 2.11, ANY RCP THBR CLR CCW RET TEMP HI 1-ALB-3B, Window 1.12, ANY RCP L\O/MOTOR CLR CCW RET TEMP HI The following indications are noted on all RCPs:

Motor bearing temperatures are 190°F and stable.

Lower radial bearing temperatures are 200°F and stable.

(1) Which of the following describes the impact of the above conditions?

(2) Which procedural action is appropriate for mitigating these conditions?

A. (1) An RCP bearing temperature limit has been exceeded due to a loss of cooling flow.

(2) Reduce the heat load on the Component Cooling Water system by reducing RHR flow through the RHR heat exchanger.

B. (1) CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature is approaching design limits.

(2) Reduce the heat load on the Component Cooling Water system by reducing RHR flow through the RHR heat exchanger.

C. (1) An RCP bearing temperature limit has been exceeded due to a loss of cooling flow.

(2) Immediately stop all RCPs.

D. (1) CCW heat exchanger temperature is approaching design limits.

(2) Immediately stop all RCPs.

Answer: B Page 21 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to predict the impacts following operations on the CCWs which results in high CCW temperature and based on those predictions describe the actions that should be taken to mitigate the high temperature issue.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Second part is correct. RCP bearing temperature limits is plausible since the temperature is close to the limit (195°F for motor bearing, and 225°F for radial bearing) but has not exceeded it.

B. Correct. Indications are given in which an excessive heat load has been placed on the operating train of CCW. RCP temperatures are elevated, but have not exceeded any operational limits. To address this condition, the crew will need to reduce the RHR cooldown rate, which will lower the heat load on the CCW system and provide additional cooling to the RCPs. This action is listed in the alarm response for CCW HX 1 OUT TEMP HI. It is a note which refers the crew to SOP-102A for making needed adjustments to RHR flow. The goal is to reduce heat load to restore CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature to < 118°F. ABN-502, Section 2.3, Step 7, provides information to the operators regarding design limits of the CCW Hxs, specifically that if temperatures are allowed to exceed 122°F, this will require a special evaluation, including a Condition Report, since design limits have likely been exceeded.

C. Incorrect. Plausible to believe limits have been exceeded, since the values are close, and if either of these values are exceeded, ABN-101, RCP Trip/Malfunction requires tripping the affected RCP.

D. Incorrect. Plausible that tripping the RCPs is appropriate, since RHR has been initiated and will provide core cooling, and the unit is in a planned shutdown, and because that would lower the heat load on RHR, and therefore on the CCW system.

Technical Reference(s) 1-ALB-3B, Window 1.5 Attached w/ Revision # See ABN-101, Section 3.3, Step 2, and Section Comments / Reference 7.3 ABN-502, Section 2.3, Step 7 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SSTSW1OB103 ) Discuss ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions, to include the following: Applicability, Symptoms, Plant Indications, Automatic Actions, Initial Operator Actions.

Question Source: Bank # Industry Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 22 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-3 3B, Window 1.5 Revision: 7 Page 23 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 01, Section 3.3, 3 Step 2 Revision: 11 Page 24 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 01, Section 7.3, 7 Step 4 Revision: 11 Page 25 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-50 02, Section 2.3, 2 Step 7 Revision: 6 Page 26 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/10/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 010 K3.02 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.0 Pressurizer Pressure Control: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PZR PCS will have on the following: RPS Question 7 Unit 2 plant conditions:

Reactor power = 100%

A failure in the Pressurizer Pressure Control circuit causes 2-PK-455A, PRZR MASTER PRESS CTRL output demand to fail to 100%.

Based on the above plant conditions, complete the following statements:

1. The reactor trips ____(1)____.

2. Safety Injection ____(2)____ actuate.

A. (1) due to low RCS pressure as the Pressure Control System reacts to the failure (2) does B. (1) due to low RCS pressure as the Pressure Control System reacts to the failure (2) does NOT C. (1) immediately due to 4/4 RPS channels indicating greater than the high RCS pressure trip setpoint (2) does D. (1) immediately due to 4/4 RPS channels indicating greater than the high RCS pressure trip setpoint (2) does NOT Answer: A Page 27 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

This question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of how a pressurizer pressure control malfunction affects the RPS system.

Explanation:

A. Correct. If the setpoint fails to 0 psig, immediately the actual RCS pressure appears to be greater than the setpoints for the various components. The PORVs will open, spray valves will open and heater will de-energize. While the PORVs should close at 2185 psig (separate signal, B/S), the spray valves will remain open and depressurize the RCS to the point of an SI.

B. 1st part is correct. 2nd part is correct because an SI will occur. It is plausible because the PORVs will close at 2185 psig which will slow the pressure decrease.

C. Part 1 is incorrect because the reactor will not trip due to RPS seeing high RCS pressure. It is plausible because the same 4 actual RCS pressure signals input to RPS but its prior to the pressure control circuitry. Part 2 is correct.

D. 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see C). 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s) Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Attached w/ Revision # See Study Guide Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the components of the Pressurizer Level Control System including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops. (LO21.SYS.PP1.OB05)

Question Source: Bank # X Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 28 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SYS.PP P1 Revision: 5-5-2011 Page 29 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

SYS.PP1 Revision: 5-5-2011 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL COMPONENTS Pressure Measuring Instruments Pressure is a force exerted by some medium, usually a fluid, over a unit area (e.g. pounds per square inch). Pressurizer pressure instruments measure the difference between pressure in the pressurizer and in the containment building atmosphere. This measurement is referred to as gauge pressure and is expressed as pounds per square inch gauge (psig).

Five pressure detectors measure the pressure in the steam space at the top of the pressurizer. CPNPP uses bourdon tube instruments to provide pressurizer pressure signals. (See Figure 2) The bourdon tube elastic transducer operates on the principle that a deflection or deformation of a bent tube with an applied internal pressure is relative to the balance of the internal pressure force and the elasticity of the tube material. We indirectly measure pressure by measuring the displacement of the end of the tube as it tends to straighten with increasing internal pressure. The resulting displacement is used to develop an electronic signal by positioning an electrical pickup device.

Each pressure detector is associated with a pressure transmitter that develops an electronic signal for remote indication. Transmitter u-PT-455F provides indication at the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Transmitters u-PT-455, 456, 457, and 458 provide Control Room indication, control, protection, and alarm functions. 118VAC instrument buses supply power to the transmitters, uPC1 to PT-455, uPC2 to PT-456, uPC3 to PT-457, and uPC4 to PT-458. Power is supplied to each instrument channel from separate instrument busses in order to provide electrical separation.

Pressure channels 455, 456, 457 and 458 provide indication on the Main Control Board with 1700 -

2500 psig meters on control board panel u-CB-05. Each of these channels also provides input to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) for the generation of reactor protection signals. A switch on the control board selects one of these channels to supply a chart recorder on u-CB-05. (See Figure

3) Another switch (1/u-PS-455F), located on u-CB-05, is a three-position switch that directs two channels to provide controlling functions. The center position of the switch, labeled 455/456, is normally selected. In this position, channels 455 and 456 are selected for control. The position labeled 457/456 substitutes channel 457 for channel 455, and the position labeled 455/458 substitutes channel 458 for channel 456.

The controlling signals function as follows:

Channel 455 normally selected - channel 457 alternate:

Provides actual pressure signal for the PRZR master pressure controller u-PK-455A Controls both spray valve controllers u-PK-455B & C Controls variable heater output Actuates power operated relief valve u-PCV-455A at +100 psig error signal Actuates pressure deviation hi alarm at +75 psig error signal Actuates low pressure alarm and energize backup heaters at 25 psig error signal Channel 456 normally selected - channel 458 alternate:

Actuates power operated relief valve u-PCV-456 at 2335 psig Actuates high pressure alarm at 2310 psig Page 30 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

SYS.PP1 Revision: 5-5-2011 ACTION OUTPUT % ERROR SIGNAL NOMINAL VALUE PORV opens 81.3 +100 psig 2335 psig PORV closes 75.0 +80 psig 2315 psig Spray valves fully open 73.4 +75 psig 2310 psig Spray valves start to open 57.8 +25 psig 2260 psig Variable heaters off 54.7 +15 psig 2250 psig Normal operating pressure 50.0 2235 psig Variable heaters fully on 45.3 15 psig 2220 psig Backup heaters off 44.7 17 psig 2218 psig Backup heaters on 42.2 25 psig 2210 psig Page 31 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 012 G.2.1.32 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.8 Reactor Protection: Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.

Question 8 With Train A of SSPS being tested with its Input Error Inhibit Switch in INHIBIT and its Mode Selector Switch in TEST, Train A Protection can process...

A. an automatic Safety Injection actuation and an automatic Reactor Trip.

B. a manual Safety Injection actuation and a manual Reactor Trip.

C. a manual Reactor Trip, but NO Safety Injection actuation.

D. an automatic Reactor Trip, but NO Safety Injection actuation.

Answer: C Page 32 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to apply the system precautions from the SOP for the RPS.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible to confuse these concepts, since they are complex, and since a significant aspect of SSPS design is to maintain a test function without actuating undesired actuations, including reactor trip.

B. Incorrect. Second part is correct. It also seems plausible that you should be able to manually actuate Safety Injection anytime, regardless of the configuration of SSPS test switches, but as the Precaution explains, the SI signal (even the manual) is external.

C. Correct. Per the explanation of the Precautions the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT in INHIBIT will not prevent a reactor trip. It does prevent any external signals (such as SI) other than manual from being input into SSPS. Also the MODE SELECTOR switch in TEST does not prevent a reactor trip.

D. Incorrect. Plausible if applicant misinterprets the Precautions in the SOP for SSPS, since many of them are for the purpose of explaining actuations that WON'T occur.

Technical Reference(s) SOP-711A, Section 3.0 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSES1OB105 ) EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguard Actuation Systems.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT5653 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 33 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-711A, Section 3.0 Revision: 9 Page 34 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/14/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 013 K5.02 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 2.9 Engineered Safety Features Actuation: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ESFAS: Safety system logic and reliability.

Question 9 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is at 100% power.

Power has been lost to Distribution Panel 1PC3, (CP1-ECDPPC-03).

Actions are being taken in accordance with ABN-603, Loss of Protection or Instrument Bus.

Subsequently:

1-PT-934, Containment Pressure Channel IV, then fails high.

Which of the following correctly completes the statements?

1. An automatic Safety Injection actuation ___(1)___ occur.

2. An automatic Containment Spray actuation ___(2)___ occur.

A. (1) does NOT (2) does NOT B. (1) does (2) does NOT C. (1) does NOT (2) does D. (1) does (2) does Answer: B Page 35 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the safety system logic for the Containment Pressure Channels.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible since CS is energized to actuate and 1 channel is in a deenergized condition so CSAS will not occur. Second part is correct.

B. Correct. An SI actuation on HI-1 CNTMT PRESSURE (deenergized to actuate) will occur, but a CS (energized to actuate) will not occur unless another energized channel senses a high pressure condition C. Incorrect. Plausible since one of the two signals is energized to actuate and the other is deenergized to actuate, but SI is deenergize to actuate and CS is energized to actuate .

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. CS is energized to actuate and 1 channel is in a deenergized condition, so CS will not occur.

Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for 208, 120 & 118 VAC Attached w/ Revision # See Distribution, page 23 of 48 Comments / Reference Study Guide for Containment Spray, page 7 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSES1OB105 ) EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguard Actuation Systems.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT0956 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 36 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for 208, 120 & 118 VAC Distribution Revision: 5-9-2011 LOSS OF THE PROTECTION BUSES Effects on the Protection Racks and NIS racks When power is lost to a PC bus (1-4) then the affected protection rack (1-4) and NIS racks (1-4) lose all power. Both of the 24 V DC power supplies in the affected protection rack are powered from the same PC bus (actually from the same breaker on the bus) due to train separation requirements. Both instrument and control power supplies for all the instruments (Power Range in NIS racks 1-4, Intermediate Range in NIS racks 1 and 2, and Source Range in NIS racks 1 and 2) in the NIS rack have lost power. Also, power is lost to the 24 V DC and 800 V DC power supplies located in the upgrade protection (N-16) racks and the affected rack is without power.

All the instruments in the protection rack will fail down scale, and all the bistable cards in that rack will be in the de-energized state. This causes input relays associated with the bistable cards to de-energize, causing the universal logic cards to sense a tripped condition as indicated by the TSLBs for that channel lighting and 1 of 4 (or 3) annunciators alarming. The exceptions to this would be the energize-to-actuate bistables such as Hi-3, RWST Lo-Lo level, and P-6 (a NIS bistable). In the NIS racks, loss of control power de-energizes all the 118 V AC bistable outputs from the NIS rack to the SSPS input relays.

Page 37 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for Containment Spray, page Revision: 5-2-2011 7

INJECTION (FIGURE 4)

Once HI-3 containment pressure is reached ( 18.2 psig), indicating a need for Containment Spray flow, a P signal is generated and the Containment Spray System is automatically transferred to the injection mode of operation. Water is drawn from the RWST and through the pump. The heat exchanger outlet valve begins to open resulting in water spray into containment. As the heat exchanger outlet valves come off of their closed seats a close signal is sent to the recirculation valves. Flow is then routed through the heat exchanger, (no cooling required) into containment, up the risers, and out the spray nozzles. The chemical additive tank motor operated outlet valves open and the eductor begins pulling the concentrated chemicals from the tank and injecting them into the suction of its associated pump. Once a low level is reached in the chemical addition tank, the chemical addition tank motor operated outlet valves close or, if this fails to happen, a lo-lo level (

5.82%) will close the air operated outlet valves, terminating the chemical injection.

Page 38 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/31/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 022 A4.01 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.6 Containment Cooling: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCS fans.

Question 10 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is at 100% power.

Containment Recirculation Cooler Fans 1-01, 1-02, and 1-04 are in service.

Subsequently:

A safety injection has occurred on Unit 1.

Which of the following describes the hand switch indications for 1/1-HS-5405A, CNTMT FN CLR FN1, two minutes after the safety injection initiates?

GREEN FAN LIGHT AMBER MISMATCH LIGHT WHITE TRIP LIGHT A. ON ON ON B. OFF OFF OFF C. ON ON OFF D. ON OFF ON Answer: C Page 39 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator monitor the status of the Containment cooling fans for proper alignment following a Safety Injection actuation.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible, since this would be the indications if fan tripped due to an overcurrent.

B. Incorrect. Plausible since these are the indications which would exist if the fan were still operating, and would be accurate if the actuation had been a blackout instead of an SI. The fan is load shed on the SI.

C. Correct. The fan is load shed via a shunt trip of the breaker upon receipt of the SI signal. With the handswitch in the Auto after Start position, this will cause the AMBER light to energize. The GREEN light is on because the breaker is open, and the WHITE light only energizes on a fault which causes an overcurrent.

D. Incorrect. Plausible since the GREEN light indication is correct, but the AMBER and WHITE lights are reversed.

Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for Containment Ventilation, p. Attached w/ Revision # See 11 Comments / Reference 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSCL1OB102 ) EXPLAIN the instrumentation and controls of the Containment Ventilation system and PREDICT the system response.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT5830 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 40 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Study Guide G for Con ntainment VVentilation, Revision: 5-2-2011 page 11 of 21 From Co ontainment Ventilation Study Guid de Containm ment Air Cooling and Recirculatio R on The Conttainment Airr Cooling an nd Recirculattion Fans aree controlled by handswitches on u-C CB-03.

These fan ns are autommatically stop pped by a Saafety Injectioon signal, annd automaticcally started bby the Blackoutt Sequencer. When the Containment C Air Coolingg and Recircculation Fan handswitch is taken to Start,, the associaated motor operated o chillled water vaalve will opeen and the aiir operated ffan dischargee damper will open. Thee chilled wateer valve andd fan discharrge damper w will close whhen the fan handsswitch is takken to Stop.. Control off these fans mmay be transsferred to the Remote Shhutdown Panel. When W Remotee Shutdown Panel P contro ol is selectedd, an alarm aalerts the Conntrol Room, and the Safety In njection trip and a Blackou ut Sequencerr start are de feated.

Page 41 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-3 3A, Window 2.1 Revision: 8 Page 42 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/30/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 026 K1.02 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.1 Containment Spray: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems: Cooling water.

Question 11 Which of the following describes the source of cooling water, Component Cooling Water (CCW) or Station Service Water (SSW) for the listed component of the Containment Spray Pumps (CSP)?

CSP bearing coolers CSP seal coolers A. CCW SSW B. SSW CCW C. CCW CCW D. SSW SSW Answer: B Page 43 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the connections between the Containment Spray system and cooling water to the bearing and seal coolers Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible to reverse the cooling source; correct aspect of this choice is that a different source of cooling water is used for each of the listed components.

B. Correct. SOP-204A Prerequisites has the operators ensure that CCW is available and aligned to the pump seal coolers, and that SSW is available and aligned to the pump bearing coolers.

C. Incorrect. Second part is correct. Plausible that CCW would also supply cooling to the bearing coolers, since it is supplying cooling to the seal coolers.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part plausibility described in "C" above.

Technical Reference(s) SOP-204, Section 2.0, Prerequisites Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSCT1OB103 ) DESCRIBE the components of the Containment Spray system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT5826 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 44 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-20 04, Section 2.0 2 Revision: 15 Page 45 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/31/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 039 K1.06 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.1 Main and Reheat Steam: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MRSS and the following systems: Condenser steam dump.

Question 12 Given the following Unit 2 conditions:

The Unit is in MODE 3 after performing a normal shutdown.

43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT is in STM PRESS.

2-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in AUTO.

2-PK-507 POT is set to control Reactor Coolant System temperature at 510°F.

Subsequently:

2-PT-0507, Main Steam Header Pressure Transmitter, fails HIGH.

Which of the following describes the response of the Steam Dump system?

A. ONLY Bank 1 opens in response to the difference between the setpoint and measured pressure.

B. BOTH Bank 1 and 2 open in response to the difference between the setpoint and measured pressure.

C. ONLY Bank 1 opens in response to the Hi-1 Bistable actuation.

D. BOTH Bank 1 and 2 open in response to the Hi-1 Bistable actuation.

Answer: A Page 46 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the cause-effect relationship between a failure of the main steam header pressure and the steam dump system.

Explanation:

A. Correct. In the Steam Pressure Mode of control the Bank 1 valves will open in an attempt to control Main Steam header pressure at the desired setpoint B. Incorrect. Plausible because the demand would be high enough to open both the Bank 1 and 2 valves, however, the Bank 2 valves will not open below the P-12 interlock (P-12 is 553°F) .

C. Incorrect. Plausible because in the TAVE Mode of control the bistable 1 actuation opens both Banks 1 and 2, however, the controller is in the Steam Pressure Mode and the bistable is not in the circuit. Additionally, if believed that the Hi-1 bistable would open both Bank 1 and 2, should realize that the Bank 2 valves will not open below the P-12 interlock.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because in the TAVE Mode of control the Hi-1 bistable actuation opens both Banks 1 and 2, however, the controller is in the Steam Pressure Mode and the bistable is not in the circuit.

Technical Reference(s) Steam Dump Study Guide Attached w/ Revision # See ABN-709, Section 3.2, 3.3 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSSD1OB105 ) EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Steam Dump system.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT6180 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 47 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Steam Dump Study Guide Revision: 5-4-2011 STEAM PRESSURE CONTROLLER (PAGE The Steam Pressure Controller is controlling when the unit is below 15% power or is shutdown.

This controller compares actual Main Steam Header Pressure to the desired pressure set on the M/A station by the operator. The Main Steam Header Pressure signal is generated by PT-507.

When the signal generated by PT-507 increases one psig above the set point on the M/A station, an output signal is generated to open the Steam Dump Valves. The output of this controller increases 1% for every 1.8 psid.

The Main Steam Dump to Condenser Valves should open when an output exists from this controller. For this controller to generate an output, the Steam Dump Mode Selector Switch must be selected to the Steam Pressure mode. This action places the controller in the control circuit and arms the Steam Dump Valves. The only time the Steam Dump Valves would not open would be when Main Condenser vacuum and Circulating Water Pumps have not made up the C-9 Condenser Available signal.

(Page 8)

Each Main Steam Dump to Condenser Valve has four solenoid vent valves which are arranged in series along the air route from the valve positioner to the valve actuator. Three of these solenoid valves prevent operation of the Steam Dump Valves unless conditions are satisfactory for their operations. Solenoids 1 and 2 are protection grade solenoids (P-12). These solenoids receive signals from the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). Whenever the Solid State Protection System detects two Reactor Coolant System average temperature instruments indicating <553°F, a signal is sent to these protection grade solenoids causing them to block the Instrument Air flow path to the actuator.

The solenoids also vent off downstream pressure which allows the valve actuator's spring to close the Steam Dump Valves. Solenoid 1 receives its signal from Train A SSPS and solenoid 2 receives its signal from Train B SSPS.

(Page 25)

The Steam Dump Valves are modulated in banks of three valves. Bank 1 valves are the first to open. These valves should be fully open when the system controllers demand is 25%. Bank 2 valves start to open at 25% demand and are fully open at 50% demand and so on. The valves close in the same manner as they open. Bank 4 valves are fully closed when Bank 3 valves start to modulate closed and so on. Bank 1 valves are designated the cooldown valves and are provided with a feature which allows bypassing the 553°F (P-12) temperature interlock. The other banks of valves are not afforded this option. The cooldown valves are used for plant cooldowns-hence the name.

Page 48 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-70 09, Section 3.2, 3 3.3 Revision: 9 Page 49 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet 1 to 13 3

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/31/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 059 A3.02 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 2.9 Main Feedwater: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including: Programmed levels of the S/G.

Question 13 Unit 2 plant conditions:

Reactor power = 60%

SG NR levels = 65% increasing slowly Which of the following correctly completes the statements?

1. Based on the above conditions, SG levels are ____(1)____.

2. A Steam line break at this power level would result in a ____(2)____ cool down than the same break at 100% power.

A. (1) moving closer to their setpoint (2) larger B. (1) moving closer to their setpoint (2) smaller C. (1) moving farther away from their setpoint (2) larger D. (1) moving farther away from their setpoint (2) smaller Answer: C Page 50 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

This question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of the SG program levels and the differences between Unit 1 and 2.

Explanation:

A. 1st part is incorrect because the program level setpoint for Unit 2 is 64%. It is plausible because if it were Unit 1, it would be correct. 2nd part is correct. At lower powers, there is more mass in the SG so a break would result in more water boiling and subsequently more cooldown of the RCS.

B. 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see A). 2nd part is incorrect because at a lower power, there is more water inventory (mass) in the SGs. It is plausible because it is a common misconception that there is more energy in the SG at higher power.

C. 1st part is correct. 2nd part is correct.

D. 1st part is correct. 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see B).

Technical Reference(s) Main Steam Study Guide Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DIFFERENTIATE between the Unit 1 and 2 Main Steam systems. (LO21.SYS.MR1.OB07)

EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Main Steam system. (LO21.SYS.MR1.OB05)

Question Source: Bank # X Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 51 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL Steam Generator Control (Figures 10 and 10a)

Each SG is equipped with a three-element feedwater controller (feedwater flow, steam flow and water level) which automatically maintains a desired water level in the secondary side of the SG during normal power operation. This system is normally referred to as the Steam Generator Water Level Control system (SGWLC).

The SGWLC instrumentation provides automatic isolation signals to the feedwater valves to protect the Reactor from excessive cooldown and the Turbine from moisture carryover. The instrumentation is also used to provide signals to the reactor protection system for the generation of various reactor trips. Some of the instrumentation is redundant in order to meet reactor protection grade requirements.

The SG level setpoint is constant for all power levels. The setpoint was designed to minimize the impact of analyzed operational and protection considerations. Analysis of possible accident conditions has determined that the water mass in the steam generator should be minimized to mitigate the consequences of analyzed accident situations. Any steam break in the secondary system will cause rapid boiling of the water within the SGs. This boiling will remove a large amount of energy from the reactor coolant system. The resulting reactor coolant cooldown will cause a large positive reactivity insertion into the reactor core due to a negative moderator temperature coefficient. Thus, a steam break can cause an uncontrolled reactor power excursion which will be proportional to the water mass available for boil-off within the SG.

As power increases the steam volume within the SG tube area also increases. The increased steam volume results in a decrease of the water mass within the SG. Likewise, at lower power levels, steam volume within the SG tube area decreases and the mass of water increases. This relationship is important with respect to the safety analysis. Since more water mass is available in the SG at lower power level, a steam break in the secondary will result in a larger cooldown and subsequent reactivity transient than would be experienced at higher power levels. This means that the safety consideration requiring a low water mass is most limiting at low power levels. Therefore, the maximum level at low power must be governed by the above considerations.

There are several operational constraints upon the level program that must also be considered. The normal operating setpoint must be sufficiently removed from the high and low protective trip setpoints so that there is a reasonable likelihood of operation without interruption.

The phenomenon of shrink and swell complicates this. The probability of causing a low-low level reactor trip following a design load rejection because of this shrink and swell phenomenon must be minimized. Therefore, the margin between level setpoint and the low-low level trip must be maximized.

Another operational consideration involves the effect of moisture carryover into the steam header to the turbine blading. Excessive carryover can cause rapid turbine failure. High SG level reduces the Page 52 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 efficiency of the moisture separators. A high level turbine trip is designed to prevent such damage. The SG normal level setpoint must be sufficiently below this trip setpoint.

Level Transmitters SGs use wet reference leg differential pressure type level transmitters. SGs 1 and 2 have six transmitters. Four of the six transmitters are narrow range. Two are wide range transmitters, one of which feeds to the control room and the other feeds the RSP. SGs 3 and 4 use five of these level transmitters with four being narrow range and one wide range. RSP wide range level indication for SGs 3 and 4 is driven from its associated wide range transmitter.

If the density of the fluid in the reference leg is the same as that in downcomer, then:

P1 = ghdowncomer + Pdowncomer P2 = ghref + Pdowncomer P2 - P1 = g (href - hdowncomer)

Where:

g = force due to gravity P = pressure h = height If the reference leg height is maintained at a constant level, then the height of the fluid level in the downcomer is proportional to the differential pressure. A condensing pot at the top of the reference leg is kept uninsulated. The uninsulated region is relatively cooler and steam will condense inside the pot and maintain a constant reference leg level.

A problem arises when the temperature of the reference leg fluid is considerably different from the downcomer fluid. Differential pressure is expressed as:

P = g(Pref x href -P downcomer x hdowncomer)

During normal steady-state operations, the difference in density due to difference in the two fluid temperatures is compensated for by calibrating the level instrument to include the expected difference in density. The problem is more of a concern during a postulated high energy line break. In this condition the reference leg temperature increases as the containment temperature increases. This change in density of the reference leg from its calibrated condition will cause an error in the indicated steam generator level. Actual level will be less than indicated level for the SG as reference leg temperature increases.

Another problem involving reference legs is reference leg boiling. Reference leg boiling can occur with a sudden pressure drop in the steam generator (i.e. steam line break, step increase in load). If the reference leg pressure decreases to less than the saturation pressure, then boiling will occur. This decreases the density of the fluid in the reference leg and will cause an error in the indicated steam generator level. Actual level would be less than indicated level for the affected SG as reference leg level decreases.

Narrow range 0 to 100% level indication is provided on the main control board for all four steam generators. One channel of narrow range level indication, steam flow, and feed flow are displayed on a recorder. A selector switch will select one of two narrow range level detectors on each SG to supply control signals for the control system, trend recorder and alarm. Protective outputs from narrow range level are low-low SG level reactor trip, high-high SG level turbine trip, and low steam generator level AMSAC actuation.

The wide range (cold cal) level detector shares an upper tap with a narrow range detector and has a lower tap just above the tube sheet. Wide range indication on the main control board and RSP is used Page 53 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 when outside the normal operating band. The main control board also has two wide range level recorders. Each wide range recorder receives input from two SGs.

The relationship between the narrow range and wide range is such that approximately 57% level wide range is approximately 0% level narrow range. A 60% level indication on the wide range ensures that the tube bundle is covered. Normal level is maintained constant at 67% narrow range on Unit 1 and 64% narrow range on Unit 2.

Actual level is compared with normal level setpoint 67% (64%) and summed with density compensated steam flow and feed flow for a control signal to the Feedwater Control Valve (FCV). If the level transmitter fails high, then the associated FCV will try to close down to compensate, causing the affected SG level to trend down to a low level trip setpoint 38% (35.4%). Conversely, if the level transmitter fails low, then the associated FCV will try to open to compensate, causing the affected SG level to trend up to a high level trip setpoint 84% (81.5%).

Page 54 of 54 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 13

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/14/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 061 K6.02 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 2.6 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: Pumps.

Question 14 Given the following Unit 1 plant conditions:

Reactor power = 45%

The running Main Feedwater pump trips Motor Driven Aux FW Pump 1-01 fails to start Based on the above conditions, complete the following statements:

1. The Turbine Driven Aux FW Pump will automatically start ____(1)____.

2. If the Turbine Driven Aux FW Pump fails to start and the operating Motor Driven Aux FW Pump is cross-connected to supply all 4 SGs, total flow shall be limited to a MAXIMUM of ____(2)____ gpm to prevent a run-out condition.

A. (1) when ONE Steam Generator NR level reaches its LOW-LOW setpoint (2) 700 gpm B. (1) when ONE Steam Generator NR level reaches its LOW-LOW setpoint (2) 800 gpm C. (1) ONLY when TWO Steam Generator NR levels reach their LOW-LOW setpoint (2) 700 gpm D. (1) ONLY when TWO Steam Generator NR levels reach their LOW-LOW setpoint (2) 800 gpm Answer: D Page 1 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

This question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of how a failed AFW pump will impact operation of the remaining components.

Explanation:

A. 1st part is incorrect because for the Turbine Driven AFW pump, the start setpoint is 2/4 SGs at the LOW-LOW setpoint. It is plausible because the auto start for the Motor Driven AFW pumps occur when 1 SG is at the LOW-LOW setpoint. 2nd part is incorrect because flow is limited to 800 gpm. It is plausible because the orifice installed downstream of each Feed Regulating Valve is designed to limit flow to 700 gpm to preclude run-out conditions.

B. 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see A). 2nd part is correct. When cross-connected, flow is limited to 800 gpm to prevent a run-out condition.

C. 1st part is correct. The Auto-Start setpoint for the Turbine Driven AFW pump is LOW-LOW on 2/4 SGs. 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see A).

D. 1st part is correct. 2nd part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-305 Attached w/ Revision # See Auxiliary Feedwater Study Guide Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DISCUSS ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunctions, to include the following:

1)Applicability 2)Symptoms 3)Plant Indications 4)Automatic Actions 5)Initial Operator Actions (LO21.SST.AF1.OB02)

Question Source: Bank # X Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 2 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 MDAFW W PUMPS The two MDAFW pu umps are horrizontal, spliit casing, 9 sstage centrifu fugal pumps. They are ppowered by 700 hp, 3570 3 rpm, 60 0 HZ motorss. Normal po ower supplyy is from the 6.9 KV safeeguards busees uEA1 and d uEA2. Maximum M pu ump capacity y is 570 gpm m at a maxim mum developped head of 11370 psig.

The MDA AFWPs may y be manuallly started or stopped witth control booard switchess. These sw witches are three possition (STOP P, AUTO, ST TART) selecctor switchess which sprinng return to center position and pull-to-loock in the STTOP position n. Manual sttart, out of ssequence afteer a blackouut or safety innjection signal, is prevented with w signal in nterlocks. Iff an automatiic start signaal from the S SI or BO seqquencer is still preseent, the pum mp hand switcches must bee taken to thhe pull-to-locck position to stop the puump.

When Co ontrol Room m switches arre inaccessibble, manual ooperation froom the Remoote Shutdow wn Panel (RSP) is provided. Local L manuaal control froom the RSP ooverrides alll other signalls. Manual ccontrol is switched d from contro ol board to th he RSP with h transfer swiitches locateed on the Shuutdown Trannsfer Panel (STP) (T Train "A") orr on the RSP (Train "B")). When conntrol is transfferred, an alaarm for locaal override iss actuated in the Contrrol Room.

The MDA AFWPs willl automaticallly start due to (Figure 22):

Low--low Steam Generator G naarrow range level at 38%  % ( 35.4% foor Unit 2) inn two out of ffour detecctors on any one Steam Generator, G

Trip of o both main n feed pumps, Safetty injection sequence s sig gnal (SI),

Blackkout (BO) seequence sign nal, or AMS SAC signal Page 3 ofo 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 MDAFWP FLOW CONTROL VALVES Each MDAFW pump discharge line branches into individual lines feeding its two associated SGs. The individual AFW line to each SG is provided with a normally open, pneumatically operated flow control valve. Manual isolation valves are provided for maintenance and local flow control.

Page 4 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 MDAFW pump flow to each SG is controlled by flow control valves, PV-2453A and B for the Train A pump, PV-2454A and B for the Train B pump. The flow control valves fail open on loss of air or electrical power.

Each flow control valve is provided with a safety class air accumulator sized for five full cycles, plus leakage and steady state consumption for 30 minutes. This allows the valve to control AFW flow following a loss of Instrument Air coincident with a plant condition which requires AFW operation, or to isolate a faulted SG when the normal motor operated isolation valves are not available. The manual isolation valves are then used to control the flow in the event of loss of air to the flow control valves.

Manual/auto (M/A) controllers on the Main Control Board enable the operator to control flow manually from the Control Room. Upon automatic start of the MDAFW pumps, flow control valves PV-2453 A&B and PV-2454 A&B will automatically trip from manual to automatic control and position full open to ensure flow to the SGs. After a 10 second time delay the flow control valves can be manually positioned by the operator to adjust flow to the SGs. M/A controllers for these valves on the RSP enable the operator to control flow from the RSP when the RSP controllers are placed in manual. When in automatic, these controllers allow feed control to be accomplished at the Main Control Board.

A flow restricting orifice is provided downstream of each feed regulator valve. The orifice is designed to limit the maximum flow to a faulted SG to 700 gpm and prevent a pump runout condition.

TDAFWP STEAM SUPPLY The two steam supply lines contain normally closed, pneumatic diaphragm isolation valves. These air operated valves fail open, ensuring that the turbine accelerates to design speed within 85 seconds, on loss of air supply or electrical power. Each valve is provided with a safety class air accumulator to permit the valves to be closed in the event of an instrument air failure. The accumulators are sized to close the steam supply valves and maintain them closed for 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

The main steam line to the TDAFW pump is equipped with condensate traps to remove any moisture buildup in the lines. Turbine steam is exhausted to the atmosphere through a safety related roof vent.

The turbine steam exhaust line on Unit 1 is equipped with a condensate trap to eliminate moisture buildup in the exhaust line and turbine. These traps are routed to a flash tank located in the pipe trench outside the TDAFW pump room. In both Units, selected traps are provided with level switches which provide signals to actuate annunciator window 2.6, "ANY TD AFWP D\POT LVL HI" alarm on ALB-8B on the Main Control Board. This annunciator provides indication of excessive condensation and/or moisture buildup in the steam supply line to the TDAFW Pump turbine.

The TDAFW Pump may be started or stopped from the Control Room by opening or closing the steam supply valves. The TDAFW Pump steam supply valves, HV-2452-1 and HV-2452-2, are operated using three position (OPEN, AUTO, CLOSE) switches on CB-09 which spring return to center position and pull-to-lock in the STOP position.

When Control Room switches are inaccessible, manual operation from the RSP is provided. Local manual control from the RSP overrides all other signals. Manual control is switched from the Main Control Board to the RSP with installed hand switches on the Switch Transfer Panel (STP) for the Train A valve (main steam line 4) or the RSP for the Train B valve (main steam line 1). When control is transferred, an alarm for local override is sounded in the Control Room.

The TDAFWP steam supply valves will automatically open, admitting steam to the TDAFW Pump turbine, due to:

Low-low SG NR level at 38% ( 35.4% for Unit 2) on two of four detectors in any two SGs, Blackout Sequencer operator lockout signal, or Page 5 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 AMSAC signal CROSS-CONNECTING STEAM GENERATORS If necessary, a single MDAFW pump can be used to feed all four SGs. However, operating with the MDAFW trains cross-connected in Modes 1, 2, or 3 violates the train independence of Technical Specification 3.7.5 and places the Unit in a LCOAR for both of the cross-connected trains. With one MDAFW pump operating to supply all four SGs, pump flow must be limited to 800 gpm in order to preclude pump runout.

Page 6 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/31/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 062 K2.01 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.3 AC Electrical Distribution: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Major system loads Question 15 Which of the following is correct regarding the power supply to Ventilation Chiller X-01 and Ventilation Chiller X-06?

A. 1EA1 XA1 B. 2EA1 XA1 C. 1EA1 1EA2 D. 2EA1 1EA2 Answer: A Page 7 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

This question matches the KA by requiring demonstration of knowledge of the power supplies for Major AC loads.

Explanation:

A. Correct, the power supplies for the ventilation chillers X-01 and X-06 are 1EA1 and XA1 respectively.

B. Incorrect. Plausible because ventilation chiller X-01 could be thought to be powered from Unit

2. Ventilation chiller X-06 is powered form XA1.

C. Incorrect. Ventilation chiller X-01 is powered from 1EA1. Ventilation chiller X-06 is powered from XA1 but could be thought to be powered from 1EA2 because ventilation chiller X-02 is powered from 1EA2.

D. Incorrect but plausible (see B & C).

Technical Reference(s) SOP-814 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the components of the 6.9 KV and 480 V Electrical Distribution system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops. (LO21.SYS.AC2.OB03)

Question Source: Bank # X Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 8 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Page 9 of o 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Page 10 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Page 11 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 063 G2.2.44 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.2 DC Electrical Distribution: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

Question 16 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power with all systems in normal alignment.

1ED1/1-1/DSW, 125 VDC STATION BATTERY BT1ED1 DISCONNECT SWITCH, was placed in OFF.

Which of the following would provide the Control Room indication of this condition?

A. Low Bus Voltage indicated on DC Bus 1ED1 voltmeter on CB-11.

B. SSII Train A alarms for SSW, ECCS, CS, MDAFW, DG PWR, SFTY CH WTR, CR HVAC, CCW and RHR.

C. High amperage on Battery BT1ED1 ammeter on CB-11.

D. SSII Train B alarms for SSW, ECCS, CS, MDAFW, DG PWR, SFTY CH WTR, CR HVAC, CCW and RHR.

Answer: B K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it demonstrates the ability of the operator to determine impacts of actions in the plant on indications and system availability in the control room.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible because the location of the voltmeter with respect to the DC Bus and the Battery. One must determine that voltage will be maintained by the Battery Charger.

B. Correct. These are the correct alarm conditions for the conditions listed.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because of the location of the ammeter with respect to the DC Bus and the Battery. One must determine that the ammeter will be indicating outflow from the battery and not the Battery Charger amperage.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because one must determine the proper Train for the Battery versus the alarm indications given.

Technical Reference(s) ALM-1901A, SSII Train AA Attached w/ Revision # See OP51.SYS.DC1, Figure 8 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Page 12 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSDC1OB008 ) COMPREHEND the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the DC Electrical Distribution System.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT8174 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam CPNPP 2012 NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 13 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: From AL LM-1901A, SSII S Train A AA Revision: 6 Page 14 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: From AL LM-1901A, SSII S Train A AA Revision: 6 Page 15 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

From OP51.SYS.DC1, Figure 8 Revision: 05/04/2011 Page 16 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 064 A2.06 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 2.9 Emergency Diesel Generator: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Operating unloaded, lightly loaded, and highly loaded time limit.

Question 17 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 1.

A fault occurred on XST2.

XST1 was available and a Slow Transfer was completed.

During the transient, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-01 inadvertently started.

CS-1EG1, DG1 BKR 1EG1 remained open.

Reactor power has been reduced to 95%.

Subsequently:

40 minutes have elapsed since the XST2 fault occurred.

In accordance with SOP-609A, Diesel Generator System, which of the following actions is required?

EDG 1-01 is required to be loaded to A. 3.5 MW for at least 60 minutes B. 2.2 MW for at least 60 minutes C. 3.5 MW for at least 20 minutes D. 2.2 MW for at least 20 minutes Answer: A Page 17 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to predict the impacts on the EDG and actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of running unloaded for greater than 30 minutes.

Explanation:

A. Correct. In accordance with SOP-609A, if a EDG runs unloaded for greater than 30 minutes, it is required to load the EDG to 3.5 MW for at least 60 minutes to burn off any unburned fuel in the exhaust system.

B. Incorrect. Plausible as the time of the EDG run is correct but the loading is incorrect. However, the 2.2 MW value is a normal unloading plateau following a EDG run as the EDG will be maintained at 2.2 to 2.5 MW for a period of 20 minutes.

C. Incorrect. Plausible as the loading of the EDG run is correct but the time is incorrect. However, the time is plausible as a normal unloading plateau following a EDG run, the EDG will be maintained at 2.2 to 2.5 MW for a period of 20 minutes.

D. Incorrect. Plausible as the loading and time of the EDG run are incorrect. However, the 2.2 MW loading and 20 minutes correspond to a normal unloading plateau following a EDG run as the EDG will be maintained at 2.2 to 2.5 MW for a period of 20 minutes.

Technical Reference(s) SOP-609A Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Emergency Diesel Generator system.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT7394 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 18 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-60 09A Revision: 21 Page 19 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-60 09A Revision: 21 Page 20 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/1/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 073 K4.01 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.0 Process Radiation Monitoring: Knowledge of PRM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Release termination when radiation exceeds setpoint.

Question 18 Given the following conditions:

X-HS-WM182A, VALVE TO CO-CURRENT WASTE HOLD-UP TANKS, and X-HS-WM183A, VALVE TO LVW POND, are in their normal alignment.

Initially A radioactive spill in the vicinity of SFGD Sump 1-03 causes X-RE-5251A (ABP-74),

LVW/EVAP POND VNT & DRN HDR RADIATION DETECTOR, to go into ALERT alarm.

Subsequently X-RE-5251A (ABP-74), LVW/EVAP POND VNT & DRN HDR RADIATION DETECTOR, goes into HIGH alarm.

Which of the following describes the valves AUTOMATIC response?

1. Following the ALERT alarm, ___(1)___.

2. Following the HIGH alarm, ___(2)____.

A. (1) X-HS-WM182A is CLOSED and X-HS-WM183A is OPEN.

(2) X-HS-WM182A is CLOSED and X-HS-WM183A is OPEN.

B. (1) X-HS-WM182A is CLOSED and X-HS-WM183A is OPEN.

(2) X-HS-WM182A is OPEN and X-HS-WM183A is CLOSED.

C. (1) X-HS-WM182A is OPEN and X-HS-WM183A is CLOSED.

(2) X-HS-WM182A is CLOSED and X-HS-WM183A is OPEN.

D. (1) X-HS-WM182A is OPEN and X-HS-WM183A is CLOSED.

(2) X-HS-WM182A is OPEN and X-HS-WM183A is CLOSED.

Answer: B Page 21 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the liquid waste stream normal alignment and the system design features which provide for termination of the release if radiation levels were to exceed the HIGH Alarm setpoint.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. The first part is correct as described in B below. The second part is plausible and incorrect if the misconception exists that the operator is required to reposition the valves in the field as would be required for an ALERT alarm in accordance with RWS-108.

B. Correct. An ALERT alarm from X-RE-5251A does not automatically redirect flow from the LVW pond to the Co-current waste system. Therefore, X-HS-WM182A which is normally Closed -

remains Closed and X-HS-WM183A which is normally Open - remains Open. A HIGH alarm from X-RE-5251A does automatically redirect flow from the LVW pond to the Co-current waste system.

Therefore, X-HS-WM182A which is normally Closed - Opens and X-HS-WM183A which is normally Open - Closes.

C. Incorrect. The first part is plausible if the misconception exists that the valves automatically reposition on an ALERT alarm, as RWS-108 would require the operator to manually reposition on an ALERT. The second part is plausible and incorrect as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. The first part is plausible as described in C above. The second part is correct as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) ALM-3200A, Alarm Procedure DRMS Attached w/ Revision # See RWS-108, Vents and Drains System Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EXPLAIN the instrumentation and controls of the Digital Radiation Monitoring System and PREDICT the system response..

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # ILOT0017 (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 13 55.43 Page 22 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-32 200, Alarm Procedure P DR RMS Revision: 4 Page 23 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-32 200, Alarm Procedure P DR RMS Revision: 4 Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-32 200, Alarm Procedure P DR RMS Revision: 4 Page 24 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: RWS-10 08, Vents an nd Drains Syystem Revision: 8 Page 25 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Original Question: ILOT0017 A radioactive spill in the vicinity of SFGD Sump 1-03 causes X-RE-5251A (ABP074),

LVW/EVAP POND VNT & DRN HDR RADIATION DETECTOR, to go into a high (red) alarm condition.

Assuming X-HV-WM182A, VALVE TO CO-CURRENT WASTE HOLD-UP TANKS, and X-HV-WM183A, VALVE TO LVW POND, are in their normal alignment, which of the following is the expected automatic response of the valves?

X-HV-WM182A X-HV-WM183A A. Opens Opens B. Opens Closes C. Closes Opens D. Closes Closes Answer: B Page 26 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 2/23/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 076 A3.02 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.7 Service Water: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: Emergency heat loads.

Question 19 Given the following conditions:

Train A is the protected train on both units.

A fault has occurred on XST2.

All equipment responded in accordance with design, with the following noted exception:

The Train B Station Service Water (SSW) Pump on the affected bus failed to start on the Blackout Sequencer.

Which component is operating without cooling until the affected SSW Pump can be started?

A. Emergency Diesel Generator 1-02.

B. Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02 C. Emergency Diesel Generator 2-02 D. Centrifugal Charging Pump 2-02 Answer: B Page 27 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to monitor which emergency heat loads require SSW supply during automatic operation of the SSW system..

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible because the fault on XST2 will cause a loss of the preferred offsite power supply to 1EA2 but the slow transfer to the alternate offsite power supply will occur prior to the EDG getting a start signal. Therefore, the EDG 1-02 does not start and is thus not running without cooling.

B. Correct. The fault on XST2 will cause a loss of the preferred offsite power supply to 1EA2 which will result in the Blackout Sequencer operating. The Blackout Sequencer will start CCP 1-02 and should also start SSWP 1-02. Since the malfunction is a failure of the SSWP 1-02 to start, CCP 1-02 which is cooled by SSW is running without cooling water.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because the loss of XST2 will affect both units. However, the effect on Unit 2 is the loss of the alternate power supply to 2EA2 and thus the Blackout Sequencer does not operate for Unit 2 and there is no affected train of equipment.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because the loss of XST2 will affect both units. However, the effect on Unit 2 is the loss of the alternate power supply to 2EA2 and thus the Blackout Sequencer does not operate for Unit 2 and there is no affected train of equipment.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-601, Steps 2.1.b & 3.2 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ANALYZE the response to Station Service Water Pump Trip in accordance with ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction..

Question Source: Bank # X Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam June 2014 Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 28 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-60 01, Step 2.1.b RRevision: 12 2

Page 29 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-60 01, Step 3.2 RRevision: 12 2

Page 30 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/14/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 078 G.2.1.27 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.9 Instrument Air: Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.

Question 20 Which of the following correctly completes the statements regarding the function of the Instrument Air system?

1. The Instrument Air system ___(1)___ required to ensure a complete Phase A Containment Isolation.

2. The Instrument Air system ___(2)___ required for safe shutdown of the plant.

A. (1) is NOT (2) is NOT B. (1) is NOT (2) is C. (1) is (2) is NOT D. (1) is (2) is Answer: A Page 31 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate an understanding of Instrument Air system design functions.

Explanation:

A. Correct. In accordance with the FSAR Section 9.3.1, any instrument air supplied valves are designed to fail-safe, thus ensuring a Phase A Containment Isolation without requiring Instrument Air. Further in accordance with the FSAR, the Instrument Air system is NOT required for safe shutdown of the plant.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in A above. The second part is plausible as the FSAR additionally states that the Instrument Air system greatly facilitates the plant recovery following an emergency which is supported in the fact that the unit air compressors are loaded by the Blackout Sequencer following a loss of power to the safeguards bus.

C. Incorrect. The first part is plausible in that numerous Phase A Containment Isolation valves are air-operated. The second part is correct as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in C above. Second part as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) FSAR Section 9.3.1. Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSIA1OB101 ) State the function of the Instrument Air System.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 32 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

FSAR Section 9.3.1 Amendment 106 Page 33 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FSAR Section S 9.3.1 Amendmen nt 106 Page 34 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/1/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 103 K4.04 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 2.5 Containment: Knowledge of containment system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Personnel access hatch and emergency access hatch.

Question 21 Which of the following describes the type of interlocks associated with the Personnel Air Lock and Emergency Air Lock that prevent opening both doors (inner and outer on each) at the same time?

Personnel Air Lock Emergency Air Lock A. mechanical and electrical mechanical only B. electrical and hydraulic mechanical only C. electrical and hydraulic mechanical and electrical D. mechanical and electrical mechanical and electrical Answer: B Page 35 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the design features associated with the interlocks on both containment access air locks.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Second part is correct. The personnel air lock does have an electrical interlock also, but this answer fails to include the hydraulic interlock. It is plausible to believe that a mechanical interlock exists, since a mechanical interlock is used for the Emergency Air Lock.

B. Correct. Per information provided in the Study Guide material for Containment, the Personnel Air Lock design includes an electrical and a hydraulic interlock. The Emergency Air Lock depends solely on a mechanical interlock.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct. And it is true that the Emergency Air Lock uses a mechanical interlock. It is also plausible that an electrical interlock would be used, since that design is incorporate in the one for the Personnel Air Lock.

D. Incorrect. Plausibility of both parts previously described above.

Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for Containment, page 8 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSCY1OB102 ) DESCRIBE the components of the Containment system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 9 55.43 Page 36 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for Containment, page 8 Revision: 5-2-2011 From Study Guide for Containment Personnel Air Lock -- A nine foot personnel air lock, utilizing a breech type, double door assembly will provide normal building access. The double door arrangement is electrically and hydraulically interlocked to prevent both doors from being opened simultaneously during normal operations.

Both air lock doors are furnished with pressure-equalizing valves, automatically operated by door actuation, to equalize pressure. Entry to containment is normally accomplished by using installed electrical and hydraulic systems with automatic controls. In the event of power system failures, the lock is provided with a manual mode of operation. The lock is located on the 832' level of containment/safeguard building. (See Figure 3)

Emergency Air Lock -- The emergency airlock is approximately 5 ft. 9 in. in diameter, employing a double-door assembly. The airlock doors are 2 ft. 6 in. in diameter and are operated by mechanical linkage between the handwheel and equalization valve. Once the hand wheel turns, the equalization valve through mechanical linkage will open, allowing pressure equalization, across the airlock door.

The emergency airlock relies on a mechanical interlock to prevent simultaneous door opening. The lock is located on the 905' level of the containment building. (See Figure 4)

Page 37 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/1/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 003 K5.02 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 2.8 Reactor Coolant Pump: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RPCS:

Effects of RCP coastdown on RCS parameters.

Question 22

1. The Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) ___(1)___ reactor trip is designed to ensure an adequate RCP coastdown time by tripping all RCP breakers.

2. Adequate coastdown time is designed to provide protection against violating the ___(2)___

Technical Specification Safety Limit A. (1) undervoltage (2) Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio B. (1) underfrequency (2) Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio C. (1) undervoltage (2) peak fuel centerline temperature D. (1) underfrequency (2) peak fuel centerline temperature Answer: B Page 38 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the safety benefit provided to the Reactor Core by increasing the coastdown time of the RCPs.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Second part is correct. First part is plausible since breakers commonly are designed to trip on undervoltage, but the underfrequency trip is the only one of the two that opens the RCP breakers .

B. Correct. This reactor trip anticipates a loss of coolant flow and helps prevent exceeding DNBR limits. Besides tripping the reactor, it also trips all RCP breakers to extend pump coastdown time .

C. Incorrect. First part plausibility described in "A" above. Peak centerline fuel temperature is plausible, since this is another Tech. Spec. safety limit, and is related to heat removal, but it is not the design reason for the RCP underfrequency reactor/RCP breaker trip.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part plausibility described in "C" above.

Technical Reference(s) Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Bases for 12. and 13 Attached w/ Revision # See Reactor Protection and ESFAS Study Comments / Reference Guide, page 46, 47 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ABN101OB101 ) ANALYZE the response to an RCP Trip in accordance with ABN-101, Reactor Coolant Pump Trip/Malfunction.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 14 55.43 Page 39 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Bases B for 12

2. and 13 Revision: 70 Page 40 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Reactor Protection and ESFAS Study Revision: 5-4-2011 Guide, page 46, 47 From Reactor Protection and ESFAS Study Guide Reactor Coolant Pump Undervoltage Trip This trip is interlocked with P-7 (P-10 or P-13) such that if power is above P-7 and an undervoltage condition (4830 volts) exists on 2 of 4 Reactor Coolant Pumps, the reactor will trip (Figure 9). This trip anticipates a loss of coolant flow and helps prevent reaching DNB conditions. A time delay is incorporated into the trip (0.5 sec) to prevent momentary electrical transients from tripping the reactor.

Reactor Coolant Pump Underfrequency Trip This trip is also interlocked with P-7 such that if power is above P-7 and an underfrequency condition (57.2 Hz) exists on 2 of 4 Reactor Coolant Pumps, the reactor will trip (Figure 10). This trip anticipates a loss of coolant flow and helps prevent reaching DNB conditions. Besides tripping the reactor, it also trips all RCP breakers to extend pump coast-down time.

A Westinghouse analysis (WCAP 8424) has shown that DNB will not be approached even if the RCP breakers are not tripped and they coast down at up to 5 Hz/sec, providing the underfrequency trip actuates at its present setpoint. However, conservatively we have retained the RCP breaker trip function of the Underfrequency trip although it is not mentioned in T.S. A time delay (0.1 sec.) is incorporated into the trip to prevent momentary electrical transients from tripping the reactor.

Like the undervoltage trip, this trip always remains a 2 of 4 trip because if it was a 1 of 4 trip then the loss of a single protection bus would cause a reactor trip.

Page 41 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/14/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 004 A2.10 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.9 Chemical and Volume Control: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Inadvertent boration/dilution.

Question 23 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power.

1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP indicates 95°F and stable.

Subsequently:

1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP indicates 125°F and stable.

1-ZL-4646, LTDN HX CCW RET VLV has both Green and Red lights LIT.

Which of the following correctly completes the statements below?

1. Reactor Coolant System average temperature is ___(1)___.

2. In accordance with ALM-0061A, Alarm Procedure 1-ALB-6A, the Reactor Operator should

___(2)____.

A. (1) increasing (2) place 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in manual and control letdown temperature at 95°F B. (1) decreasing (2) place 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in manual and control letdown temperature at 95°F C. (1) increasing (2) place 1/1-TCV-129, LTDN DIVERT VLV in the VCT position and ensure letdown is diverted to the VCT D. (1) decreasing (2) place 1/1-TCV-129, LTDN DIVERT VLV in the VCT position and ensure letdown is diverted to the VCT Answer: B Page 42 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to predict the plant response to a change in temperature in the letdown line and the operator action required in accordance with the ALM to correct the condition.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect as RCS temperature should be decreasing, but is plausible as letdown temperature is increasing the operator could mistake the temperature increase for an overall temperature increase in the RCS or could easily reverse the relationship of boration/dilution from changing temperatures in a demineralizer bed. The second part is the correct action as described in B below.

B. Correct. With letdown temperature increasing and flow through the demineralizers additional boron will be released back into the letdown stream resulting in an RCS temperature decrease. In accordance with ALM-0061A, the operator should take manual control of TK-130 and attempt to lower letdown temperature to 95°F.

C. Incorrect. First part is as described in A above. Second part is plausible as TCV-129 diverts at 135°F.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part as described in C above.

Technical Reference(s) ALM-0061A Attached w/ Revision # See LO21.GFC.DEM Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21.ABN.105.OB105 Analyze the response to a Dilution Anomaly in accordance with ABN-105, CVCS System Malfunctions Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 Page 43 of 45 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Study Guide G for Dem mineralizerss Revision: 8-7-2007 The resullt of this chaaracteristic iss that at loweer temperatuures the resinns are more eefficient at removing g boron from m the coolantt than at high her temperattures. A satuurated resin bed will acttually release boron as temp perature is in ncreased.

Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-00 061A Revision: 7 Page 44 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-00 061A Revision: 7 Page 45 of 45 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 14 to 23

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/30/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 012 A1.01 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 2.9 Reactor Protection: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RPS controls including: Trip setpoint adjustment.

Question 24 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is at 80% power during a Unit startup.

Assuming that Reactor Coolant System and flux distribution parameters remain on program/target, as power is raised to 100%, which of the following describes how the Overpower and the Overtemperature N-16 trip setpoints will change, if any?

Overtemperature N-16 Setpoint Overpower N-16 Setpoint A. increase remain the same B. decrease decrease C. decrease remain the same D. remain the same increase Answer: C Page 1 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to predict the changes in RPS parameters and in particular the variable OT N-16 setpoint.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible because the Overpower trip setpoint does not change, and the applicant could readily confuse the fact that the Overtemperature setpoint decreases, with the term "increase";

i.e., meaning the actual value is closer to the setpoint.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct. The Overpower setpoint does not increase from its nominal value.

There are however, some effects of temperature shielding due to Tcold changes, as explained in the Study Guide material for this topic. This could be confused and misinterpreted by the applicant as a decrease in the setpoint.

C. Correct. Since Tavg at 80% power is less than at 100% power, the Overpower setpoint will be at its nominal full power value and thus, will not change from 80% to 100% power, assuming Tavg stay on program. The Overtemperature setpoint, on the other hand, CAN increase or decrease from its nominal value. Since program Tavg will increase several more degrees during the power escalation, the trip setpoint will become more limiting, decreasing to its nominal full power value.

D. Incorrect. Overtemperature setpoint change could be confused and reversed with Overpower, which does not change for the conditions given. Plausibility of second part previously described in "A" above.

Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for Reactor Protection and Attached w/ Revision # See ESFAS Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSES1OB103 ) DESCRIBE the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguard Actuation Systems including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank # Industry Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 Page 2 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for Reactor Protection and Revision: 5-4-2011 ESFAS Overpower N-16 Trip An Overpower N16 reactor trip signal is generated on a 2 out of 4 coincidence when N16 power exceeds110% Rx power on Unit 1 (112% on Unit 2) (See Figure 12).

The Overpower N-16 trip provides assurance of fuel integrity (e.g., no fuel pellet melting and less than 1% cladding strain) under all possible overpower conditions, limits the required range for overtemperature trip and provides a backup to the High Neutron Flux trip. The Overpower N-16 trip function ensures that the allowable heat generation rate (kW/ft) of the fuel is not exceeded. It uses the N-16 power monitor indication of each loop has a measure of reactor power with a constant value setpoint.

The Overpower N-16 trip provides protection to mitigate the consequences of various size steam breaks as reported in WCAP-9226, "Reactor Core Response to Excessive Secondary Steam Releases." It also is credited in the analyses of the decrease in feedwater temperature. In steam breaks and in the case of decreased feedwater temperature, the RCS temperature in the downcomer will decrease and cause increased temperature shielding of the power range flux monitors. The power range flux monitors therefore will see a lower power level than the actual power level and will not trip when they should. However, since the N-16 signal is compensated for temperature changes, it is not sensitive to changes in RCS downcomer temperature (density) and will reflect actual power level and provide a trip when it is required. (At 100% power, the power range indication will be off .8% per degree Tc drop from the normal Tc value due to the temperature shielding.)

When the power level, as measured by 2 of 4 N16 channels, reaches within 3% (107% power for Unit 1, 109% power for Unit 2) of the reactor trip setpoint, an Overpower N-16 Rod Stop and Turbine Runback (known as a C-4 signal) is initiated (See Figure 13). C-4 attempts to keep power from reaching the trip setpoint by blocking outward rod motion and running turbine load back. The turbine runback rate is approximately 200%/min for 1.5 seconds, with a 28.5 second pause (equivalent to 10 %/min power reduction) until either the condition clears or power is <15% (where turbine speed control takes over).

Overtemperature N-16 Trip As with the Overpower N16 circuitry, there are four channels of Overtemperature N16 circuitry.

An Overtemperature setpoint is calculated in each channel, as described below. The circuitry continuously compares N16 power in each channel to that channel's setpoint. If a channel of N16 power reaches its overtemperature trip setpoint, a reactor trip signal is generated in that channel. If 2 of 4 channels reach their trip setpoints, then a reactor trip will occur (Figure 12).

The Overtemperature N-16 trip provides core protection to prevent DNB for all combinations of pressure, power, coolant temperature, and axial power distribution, provided that the transient is slow with respect to piping transit delays from the core to the N16 detectors.

Page 3 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for Reactor Protection and Revision:

ESFAS The Overtemperature trip setpoint automatically varies from its nominal value of 115% of rated thermal power by changes in monitored cold leg temperature, pressurizer pressure and core axial flux distribution. The trip setpoint is reduced when a monitored setpoint calculation parameter changes such that the margin to DNB is reduced. The allowable value for the Unit 1 trip setpoint is based on the calculated value for the given conditions and at present the Unit 2 allowable value is different from the Unit 1 allowable value. (See Note 1 of Table 3.3.1-1 in section 3.3.1 of T.S.)

In other words this means that the setpoint, in percent N-16 (which means percent power), is K1%

of full power N-16 minus a correction for Tcold, plus a correction for pressure minus a correction if I is outside a normal band. In operation, the setpoint decreases; if Tcold is high or increasing, if pressure is low or if I is extremely high or low. Thus, the setpoint becomes more limiting as the parameters approach a DNB condition. The setpoint increases or becomes less restrictive when Tcold is low or decreasing or pressure is high.

Although the values of K2 and K3 vary for each unit, the ratio of the penalty for a increase in 1 F of temperature to the penalty for a 1 psig decrease in pressure is approximately 19 to 1. That is to say, a one degree increase in temperature has the same effect as a 19 psig decrease in pressure to the setpoint. On most transients where temperature increases rapidly, causing a corresponding increase in pressurizer level and pressure, the penalty for the temperature increase is greater than the benefit of the pressurizer pressure increase because the pressure increase due to a Tcold increase is less than 19 psig/ F and the pressurizer pressure increase is limited by pressurizer sprays and PORVs.

Similarly, on most transients where Tcold decreases causing a pressurizer level and pressure decrease, the benefit from the Tavg decrease will outweigh the penalty from the pressurizer pressure decrease, because the pressurizer pressure will not decrease at > 19 psig/ F for temperature transients.

Page 4 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 061 K3.02 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.2 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the AFW will have on the following:

S/G.

Question 25 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

A reactor trip from 100% power has occurred.

The BOP operator has completed the EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Foldout Page items associated with Auxiliary Feedwater.

The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is Out-of-Service.

Steam Dumps are controlling Reactor Coolant System temperature at No-Load conditions.

EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response is in progress.

ALL Steam Generators currently indicate 55% Narrow Range Level.

1-FV-2456, MD AFW PMP 1-01 TO CST RECIRC ISOL VLV fails as designed.

Which of the following correctly completes the statement?

As a result of the failure, the flow from Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-01 to Steam Generators 1-01 and 1-02, has ___(1)___ and without taking field actions the BOP ___(2)___ capable of maintaining all Steam Generators within the prescribed level control band.

A. (1) decreased (2) is B. (1) decreased (2) is NOT C. (1) increased (2) is D. (1) increased (2) is NOT Answer: A Page 5 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the effect that a malfunction of the AFW system will have on flow to the Steam Generators and on Steam Generator level.

Explanation:

A. Correct. First part is correct as the valve will fail open resulting in approximately 200 gpm of flow being diverted away from the Steam Generators to the CST. However, the operator can take manual action to increase the AFW flow to SGs 1-01 and 1-02 by opening the Flow Control Valves and maintain SG levels in the prescribed control band of 50 to 60%. MDAFWP 1-01 is capable of delivering the 600 gpm necessary to accomplish the level control.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in A above. Second part is incorrect but plausible if the misconception exists that the MDAFWP does not have the capability to maintain adequate flow to the SGs with 200 gpm being diverted to the CST.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible if the misconception exists that 1-FV-2456 fails closed. The second part is correct in that operator adjustments would still be able to maintain the SGs within the prescribed control band.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in C above. Second part is plausible if the misconception existed that the operator would be unable to throttle the increased flow sufficiently to maintain the prescribed level band and still maintain the 150-200 gpm as directed per the foldout page.

However, the operator is allowed to throttle below these values when adequate SG level is maintained.

Technical Reference(s) EOP-0.0A Attached w/ Revision # See EOS-0.1A Comments / Reference Auxiliary Feedwater Study Guide Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSAF1OB104 ) EXPLAIN the instrumentation and controls of the Auxiliary Feedwater system and PREDICT the system response.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 6 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Study Guide G for Auxxiliary Feedwwater Revision: 5-11-2011 System Each of the t MDAFW W pumps is protected p from overheatiing under exttended low fflow conditions by a minimum m flow recircculation line containing a flow limitiing orifice, aan air operateed valve, annd a check valve wh hose internals have been removed. A minimum fflow of 150 gpm is suffiicient to prevvent overheatiing. Minimu um flow pum mp protection n is providedd with pumpp recirculatioon valves FV V-2456 and FV-2457 7. The valves will stay open o until thee associated MDAFW P Pump reachess 200 gpm fl flow on the dischargee flow elemeent. These valves v may beb opened orr closed mannually three-pposition (CL LOSE-AUTO-O OPEN) handswitches on the Main Co ontrol Boardd.

This reccirculation is s provided to t prevent vaporization v n and conssequent pum mp damage e. The orifice in n the recircuulation line is sized to flow 200 gp pm. The va alves are pneumatically operated d and fail open in cas se of air or electrical faailure. Each h of these aair operated d valves is n normally open, an nd closes ono receipt off a signal frrom its asso ociated flow w transmitte er located in n each pump discharge lin ne.

With onee MDAFW pump p operating to supply y all four SG Gs, pump floow must be llimited to 8000 gpm in order to preclude p pummp runout.

A flow reestricting orrifice is prov vided down nstream of e each feed rregulator va alve. The orifice is designed to limit the maximum m flow to a faulted f SG to 700 gpm m and preve ent a pump p runout condition n.

Page 7 ofo 72 CPNPP NRCN 2015 ROR Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-0.0 0A Revision: 8 Page 8 of o 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 9 of o 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Questio Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 064 K1.05 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.4 Emergency Diesel Generator: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ED/G system and the following systems: Starting air system.

Question 26 In describing the relationship between Emergency Diesel Generator start modes, and the starting air system:

For a(n) ___(1)___ start signal, the Emergency Diesel Generator will rotate with air until the engine speed is greater than 200 rpm, OR until ___(2)___, whichever occurs first.

Which of the following completes the above statement?

A. (1) emergency (2) 10 seconds have elapsed B. (1) emergency (2) the starting air receiver pressure drops below 150 psig C. (1) normal (2) 10 seconds have elapsed D. (1) normal (2) the starting air receiver pressure drops below 150 psig Answer: B K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the cause-effect relationship between the starting air system and the DG.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible, because the DG is require to achieve rated speed and load within 10 seconds. Therefore, if the DG has not achieved 200 rpm within this same time frame it would be reasonable to assume the start would be aborted.

B. Correct. For an emergency start, the DG will rotate with air until either the engine speed exceeds 200 rpm, or the starting air receiver pressure lowers to less than 150 psig.

C. Incorrect. Plausible since the aspect of a normal start being terminated based on how many seconds it has been since starting air was initiated is correct. But the correct time is 5 seconds.

10 seconds is plausible as described in A.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in C. Second part is correct.

Page 10 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for EDGs Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSED1OB123 ) EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Emergency Diesel Generator system..

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8 55.43 Page 11 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for Emergency Diesel Revision: 5-2-2011 Generators, pages 10, 1 From Study Guide for EDGs When provided with a normal start signal, the diesel generator will rotate with air until either the engine speed is greater than 200 rpm or 5 seconds elapse, whichever comes first, so long as sufficient starting air pressure is available to roll the engine. Following a normal start the diesel will run with all automatic shutdown protections available and interlocks will remain available to prevent the diesel generator from closing onto its associated 6.9 kV bus if the bus is faulted.

When provided with an emergency start signal, the diesel generator will rotate with air until either the engine speed is greater than 200 rpm or the starting air receivers' pressure decreases to less than 150 psig. So long as the emergency start signal is maintained, the diesel will run with all automatic shutdown protections disabled except for the overspeed trip and the generator differential fault trip.

Interlocks which prevent closing a diesel generator onto its associated 6.9 kV bus when the bus or the diesel generator has a phase-to-ground fault are defeated so long as the emergency start signal is maintained. Defeating this interlock allows a diesel generator to power its associated bus with a phase-to-ground fault.

Start air admission pilot solenoids 1B and 2B will also energize if the associated start air receiver pressure is > 150 psig then the PS-5B contact will be closed. The engine start proceeds normally from this point. An emergency start will continue to supply the engine with start air until either the engine speed exceeds 200 rpm or the PS-5B start air receiver low pressure switch opens at <150 psig. In contrast, a normal start signal is not interrupted by low receiver pressure, but is restricted to < 5 seconds by the TD-2A relay.

Page 12 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 005 K3.07 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.2 Residual Heat Removal System: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on the following.:

Refueling Operations Question 27 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 6.

Core Reload has just completed.

Reactor Cavity Water Level is greater than 23 feet above the top of the reactor vessel flange.

Core Performance Engineering has requested that the operating Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Train be stopped for core mapping.

Which of the following is appropriate with respect to Core Performance Engineerings request?

The operating RHR train A. can be stopped for a MAXIMUM of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provided safety injection is available for emergency boration.

B. can be stopped for a MAXIMUM of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provided NO operations are permitted that would reduce RCS boron concentration.

C. cannot be stopped and core mapping should continue with RHR flow of greater than or equal to a MINIMUM of 1100 gpm.

D. cannot be stopped and core mapping should continue with RHR flow of greater than or equal to a MINIMUM of 3800 gpm.

Answer: B Page 13 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the effect of stopping the RHR pump during refueling operations.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible because having safety injection available for emergency boration would provide an additional means of adding cooling water and boron to the RCS system. However, this requirement does not pertain to removing the operating RHR system from operation for the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> allowance.

B. Correct. The operating RHR Train can be stopped for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period provided no operations are permitted that would cause the introduction of coolant into the RCS at less than the minimum required boron concentration. Stating that would reduce RCS boron concentration is another way of saying the same thing.

C. Incorrect. Plausible RHR flow as low as 1100 gpm is allowed per IPO-010A, and would be less interfering with core mapping. Thus, this answer is correct if a misconception existed that the operating Train cannot be stopped but can be lowered in accordance with the guidance of RFO-102.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because the 3800 gpm flow is the amount required for the operating RHR Train. Thus, this answer is correct if a misconception existed that the operating Train cannot be stopped.

Technical Reference(s) IPO-010A Att. 2 Attached w/ Revision # See RFO-102 Comments / Reference ABN-107 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSIA1OB104 ) EXPLAIN the instrumentation and controls of the Instrument Air system and PREDICT the system response.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT0957 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 14 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: IPO-010 0A Revision: 18 Page 15 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: RFO-10 02 Revision: 13 Page 16 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: RFO-10 02 Revision: 13 Page 17 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: RFO-10 02 Revision: 13 Page 18 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 07 Revision: 9 Page 19 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/1/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 006 K4.17 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.8 Emergency Core Cooling: Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Safety Injection valve interlocks.

Question 28 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Reactor Operator desires to Open 1-8511A, CCP 1 ALT MINIFLO ISOL VLV.

Consider the following valves:

1-8804A, RHRP 1 TO CCP SUCT VLV 1-8804B, RHRP 2 TO SI SUCT VLV 1-LCV-112B, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 1-LCV-112C, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV Which of the following configurations satisfies the interlocks to OPEN 1-8511A?

A. 1-8804A and 1-8804B CLOSED; 1-LCV-112B and 1-LCV-112C OPEN B. 1-8804A and 1-8804B CLOSED; 1-LCV-112B and 1-LCV-112C CLOSED C. 1-8804A and 1-8804B OPEN; 1-LCV-112B and 1-LCV-112C OPEN D. 1-8804A and 1-8804B OPEN; 1-LCV-112B and 1-LCV-112C CLOSED Answer: B Page 20 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the design interlocks which preclude opening an ECCS valve with improper plant conditions.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. The first part for the 8804 valves is correct. The second part is plausible as it would be logical to have a normal alignment of the CVCS system when attempting to vent the Alternate Miniflow valve, however, this configuration is not easily obtained because of the interlocks which preclude pumping the VCT to the RWST.

B. Correct. The correct interlock configuration to manually open 1-8511A is both 1-8804A and 1-8804B must be closed. Additionally, either 1-LCV-112B or 1-LCV-112C must be closed. As both are closed in this configuration it satisfies the interlocks.

C. Incorrect. The first part is plausible as the 8804 valves would be manually opened with the 8511A valve open in EOS-1.3A. However, the interlock works in the opposite direction to preclude pumping containment sump water back to the RWST. The second part was described in A above.

D. Incorrect. The first part was described in C above. The second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) ECCS Study Guide, page 18 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Residual Heat Removal system..

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 21 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

ECCS Study Guide, page 18 Revision: 5-2-2011 INTERLOCKS TO MANUALLY OPEN 8511A & B Interlocks to Manually Open u-8511A & B RHR Pump u-01 to CCP Suction Valve, u-8804A fully closed RHR Pump u-02 to SIP Suction Valve, u-8804B fully closed Volume Control Tank to Charging Pump Level Control Valve, u-LCV-0112B OR u-LCV-0112C fully closed Page 22 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/1/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 001 A4.11 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.5 Control Rod Drive: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Determination of SDM.

Question 29 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Main Feedwater Pump 1A has tripped.

Unit 1 experienced a turbine runback.

1-ALB-6D, Window 1.7, ANY CONTROL ROD BANK AT LO LMT is LIT.

1-ALB-6D, Window 2.7, ANY CONTROL ROD BANK AT LO-LO LMT is DARK.

(1) Which of the following are correct concerning Shutdown Margin?

(2) What action should the Reactor Operator take in accordance with ALM-0064A, Alarm Procedure 1-ALB-6D?

A. (1) adequate shutdown margin is maintained (2) borate in accordance with SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System B. (1) adequate shutdown margin is maintained (2) emergency borate in accordance with ABN-107, Emergency Boration C. (1) adequate shutdown margin is NOT maintained (2) borate in accordance with SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System D. (1) adequate shutdown margin is NOT maintained (2) emergency borate in accordance with ABN-107, Emergency Boration Answer: A Page 23 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to monitor the annunciators to determine that the control rods are above the RIL which means that SDM is adequate. The operator will manually operate the makeup system to borate.

Explanation:

A. Correct. 1-ALB-6D, Window 1.7 provides direction to continue to monitor to ensure that the rods are maintained above the RIL. Boration in accordance with SOP-104A, is included in the ALM response.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct. Emergency boration in accordance with ABN-107 is plausible, as 1-ALB-6D, Window 2.7, ANY CONTROL ROD BANK AT LO-LO LMT includes the option to Emergency Borate per ABN-107.

C. Incorrect. Second part is correct. The first part is plausible as 1-ALB-6D, Window 2.7, annunciates on some turbine runbacks. If this annunciator were LIT, adequate SDM would not be assured and actions would be required to restore the rods above the RIL.

D. Incorrect. First part described in C above. Second part described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) ALM-0064A, Window 1.7 & 2.7 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSRI1OB107 ) EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Rod Control Indication and Rod Insertion Limit (RIL) Monitor Systems.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 24 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-6 6D, Window 1.7 Revision: 6 Page 25 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-6 6D, Window 1.7 Revision: 6 Page 26 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-6 6D, Window 2.7 Revision: 6 Page 27 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 002 K6.04 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 2.5 Reactor Coolant: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following RCS components: RCS vent valves.

Question 30 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is at 100% power.

1-ALB-5C Window 3.4, RV HEAD/PRZR VENT VLV NOT CLOSE annunciates.

1-HS-3607, RX HEAD VENT VLV has BOTH Red and Green lights LIT.

1-HS-3608, RX HEAD VENT VLV has Red light DARK and Green light LIT.

Which of the following describes the current status of the Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves?

1. Reactor coolant leakage to the containment atmosphere ___(1)___ occurring.

2. If OPT-303, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory is performed, the calculated Identified LEAKAGE ___(2)___ have increased from the prior calculated leak rate.

A. (1) is (2) should B. (1) is NOT (2) should C. (1) is (2) should NOT D. (1) is NOT (2) should NOT Answer: D Page 28 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the RCS Vent Valves including the valve configuration to determine that a single malfunction does not create an RCS leak to the containment atmosphere.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is plausible but incorrect in that leakage to the containment atmosphere would not occur unless a second unknown failure also existed. This answer is plausible as it requires a detailed understanding that the valves are in series and not parallel. The second part is incorrect in that performance of an OPT-303 should not yield an increased RCS leak rate as any leakage would be stopped by the in series second vent valve. This answer is plausible as the Head Vent valves are lined up to the PRT during vacuum fill evolutions and it could be thought that the head vent normally discharges to the PRT which would increase the calculated leak rate.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part plausibility described in "A" above.

C. Incorrect. Second part is correct. The second part is incorrect in that performance of an OPT-303 should yield an increased RCS leak rate if thought that the leakage was to containment. This answer is plausible if thought that this leakage was Identified LEAKAGE in accordance with Technical Specification as the source of the leakage was known.

D. Correct. The two head vent valves (1-HV-3607 and 3608) are in series and a failure of a single valve does not create a flow path to the containment atmosphere. The second part is correct in that performance of an OPT-303 should not yield an increased RCS leak rate as any leakage would be stopped by the in series second vent valve.

Technical Reference(s) ALM-0053A, Window 3.4 Attached w/ Revision # See SOP-101A Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSRC2OB101 ) DESCRIBE the components of the Reactor Vessel, Internals and Core Components system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 3 55.43 Page 29 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-00 053A, Alarm Procedure 1 1-ALB-5C Revision: 7 PCN 2 Page 30 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-10 01 Revision: 18 PCN 7 Page 31 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/2/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 011 K2.02 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.1 Pressurizer Level Control: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: PZR heaters.

Question 31 Which of the following is correct regarding the power supply to Pressurizer Heaters?

Pressurizer control group heaters (Group C) are supplied from:

A. 480 VAC 1EB1 and can be operated from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

B. 480 VAC 1EB1 and can NOT be operated from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

C. 480 VAC 1B1 and can be operated from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

D. 480 VAC 1B1 and can NOT be operated from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Answer: B Page 32 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

This question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of the power supplies for Pzr heaters.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect because it cannot be operated for the RSP. It is plausible because Przr Heater Gp A&B can be operated from the RSP.

B. Correct.

C. Incorrect because the Pzr heater are powered from Safeguards 480VAC. Plausible because they will de-energize upon receiving an SI signal so they are not used when other safety equipment is utilized.

D. Incorrect (See A & C).

Technical Reference(s) 6.9 kV and 480 V Study Guide Attached w/ Revision # See Reactor Coolant System Study Guide Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the components of the Reactor Coolant system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

(LO21.SYS.RC1.OB03)

Question Source: Bank # X Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 33 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Reactor Coolant System Study Guide Revision: 5-5-2011 Reactor Coolant System Study Guide Pressurizer Heaters Seventy-eight (78) vertically mounted heating elements are installed in the PRZR lower hemispherical head and are divided into groups A, B, C, and D. Together, all groups have a combined total heating capacity of 1,802 KW. Each of Groups A and B have 21 heating elements and a heat capacity of 485 KW. Each of Groups C and D has 18 heating elements and a heat capacity of 416 KW.

Groups A, B, and D are backup heaters. Backup heaters energize by closing their power supply breakers in switchgear uEB2, uEB3 and uEB4. Each group has a three-position maintained (OFF-AUTO-ON) handswitch located on CB05. Backup heaters may be manually energized by placing the handswitch in ON or manually de-energized by placing the handswitch in OFF. A signal from the master pressure controller and by a pressurizer level deviation high of 5% above program energizes backup heaters when the handswitch is in AUTO. Groups A and B may be operated from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Group C control heaters are often referred to as variable or proportional heaters. The pressurizer master pressure controller varies the output of the control heaters. They are operated by a three-position (OFF-neutral-ON) spring-return to center handswitch located on CB05. Taking the handswitch to the ON position and releasing it to the center position closes the power supply breaker in switchgear uEB1, energizing the control heaters. A silicon controlled rectifier (SCR) circuit supplies power to the heater elements using a time-proportioned average output voltage based on the control signal from the master pressure controller. This means that full 480 VAC power supplies the heaters in pulses such that the average voltage supplied over time is proportional to the pressure controller output. The power supply breaker for the control heaters does not automatically close.

Safety Injection (SI), low pressurizer water level (17%), and low bus voltage automatically trip the power supply breakers for the backup and control heaters. Operators monitor electrical current indication for each heater group, using meter displays above the handswitches on CB05.

The 480 volt buses receive power from their respective 6.9KV buses via 480 volt transformers located in the train associated switchgear rooms in the Safeguards Building 810' and 852' levels (Figure 3).

Page 34 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

6.9 kV and 480V Study Guide Revision: 5-5-2011 Figure 3 - 480v AC Safeguards Buses As an alternate source of power, each 480v bus has a manual tie breaker with the other train related 480v bus which may be shut if normal power is lost. Interlocks require the normal power supply breaker to be opened prior to closing this manual tie breaker.

Each bus supplies various motor loads and MCCs via manual breakers.

The 6.9KV to 480v AC step down transformers are contained in a housing adjacent to the associated bus. These transformers are cooled by forced air flow by fans contained in the bottom of the housing and controlled from the front of the housing.

NON-SAFEGUARDS 480V AC DISTRIBUTION The Non-Safeguards 480v AC buses are located within the switchgear rooms in each plants 810 level of Turbine Building. These buses receive their normal power from the Non-Safeguards 6.9KV buses via a step down transformer that is adjacent to each bus (Figure 5). Alternate power is available via a normally open bus tie breaker to another Non-Safeguards 480v AC bus.

Page 35 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Figure 5 - 480v AC Non-Safeguards Buses These buses provide power to various motor control centers (MCCs) throughout the plant and the Control Rod Motor Generators as well as various smaller pumps in the Turbine Building.

Page 36 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 014 K5.02 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 2.8 Rod Position Indication: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RPIS:

RPIS independent of demand position.

Question 32 Given the following conditions:

All Control Bank D rods indicate 215 steps demand position.

Control Bank D rod H-8 has slipped and is misaligned from the remaining Bank D rods.

Control Bank D rods other than H-8 DRPI indicate either 210 or 216.

The RO is instructed to align rod H-8 with the remainder of the Group using the DRPI method of ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction.

Which of the following correctly answers the statement below?

When the DRPI alignment is successfully performed; the initial movement of all Control Bank D rods is in the ___(1)___ direction and the ACTUAL position following alignment, including uncertainty, of the Control Bank D rods are between ___(2)___.

A. (1) inward (2) 200 and 214 B. (1) outward (2) 200 and 214 C. (1) inward (2) 206 and 220 D. (1) outward (2) 206 and 220 Answer: D Page 37 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the Rod Position Indication independent from the step demand position.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as described in C below. The second part is incorrect but plausible as inserting first would result in alignment of the bank with indicated position of 204 or 210 and with uncertainty would yield actual position between 200 and 214.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in D below. Second part is incorrect but plausible if believed after completing the alignment all rods in the bank indicated either 204 or 210 as this would be plausible to ensure the bank is together. Thus, with uncertainty the actual rod positions would be between 200 and 214.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible if believed that the DRPI alignment method initially inserted the Bank. The uncertainty position is plausible if believed that inserting first still resulted in the rods being aligned at either the 210 or 216 DRPI lights as described in D below.

D. Correct. In accordance with ABN-712, the DRPI alignment method will first withdraw the remainder of the rods to the next higher DRPI light which given the initial conditions would be the 216 light.

After Rod H-8 is withdrawn to the 216 DRPI light then the entire Bank is inserted to the original position. Thus, all Bank D rods would either be at the 210 or 216 DRPI position. As DRPI accuracy is only +/- 4 steps, the actual positions are between 206 and 220.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction Attached w/ Revision # See RPI & RIL Study Guide Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EXPLAIN the instrumentation and controls of the Rod Control Indication System and PREDICT the system response.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 6 55.43 Page 38 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-70 02 Revision: 10 PCN 15 5

Page 39 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-70 02 Revision: 10 PCN 15 5

Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-70 02 Revision: 10 PCN 15 5

Page 40 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: RPI & RIL R Study Gu uide Revision: 5-2-2011 Page 41 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/11/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 015 K4.07 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.7 Nuclear Instrumentation: Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) provide for the following: Permissives.

Question 33 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is performing a downpower from 100% in accordance with IPO-003A, Power Operations.

The Nuclear Instrumentation Channels are measuring the following:

o NI-41 49.6%

o NI-42 50.2%

o NI-43 50.4%

o NI-44 49.7%

The Unit 1 Turbine Trips.

Which of the following correctly completes the statements below? (Ignore any I&C instrumentation tolerances which may be introduced during calibration).

1. PCIP Window 1-7, RX < 50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 is ___(1)___.

2. The Reactor ___(2)___ Automatically trip.

A. (1) DARK (2) does B. (1) DARK (2) does NOT C. (1) LIT (2) does D. (1) LIT (2) does NOT Answer: A Page 42 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of permissives generating in part from the NIS system.

Explanation:

A. Correct. The PCIP indication is normally LIT below 50%, but when performing a downpower the annunciator would only light after 3/4 channels have changed status.P-9 does not reset until 3/4 channels are below 50% power. As only 2/4 channels have reset based on the measured power, the reactor would still receive an automatic trip signal when the turbine trips.

B. Incorrect. The first part is correct as described in A above. The second part is incorrect but plausible if thought that P-9 had already reset.

C. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect but plausible if a misconception about the PCIP indication or the P-9 reset existed. The second part is correct as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. The first part as described in C above. The second part as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) Reactor Protection and ESFAS Study Attached w/ Revision # See Guide Comments / Reference ALM-0065A IPO-003A Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safeguard Actuation Systems.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 43 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen a ESFAS Study nce: Reactorr Protection and Revision: 5-4-2011 Guide, pa age 61 Page 44 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-00 065A Revision: 4 Page 45 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-00 065A Revision: 4 Page 46 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: IPO-003 3A Revision: 29 Page 47 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/2/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 016 K1.06 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.6 Non-nuclear Instrumentation: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NNIS and the following systems: AFW system.

Question 34 Which of the following sets of conditions lists all the automatic start signals to the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump?

A. 2 of 4 Steam Generator narrow range levels at 35.4% in 2 of 4 Steam Generators.

Blackout Sequencer Operator Lockout.

AMSAC signal.

B. 2 of 4 Steam Generator narrow range levels at 38% in 2 of 4 Steam Generators.

Trip of both Main Feedwater Pumps.

Safety Injection Signal C. 2 of 4 Steam Generator narrow range levels at 38% in 2 of 4 Steam Generators.

Blackout Sequencer Operator Lockout.

AMSAC signal.

D. 2 of 4 Steam Generator narrow range levels at 35.4% in 2 of 4 Steam Generators.

Trip of both Main Feedwater Pumps.

Safety Injection Signal.

Answer: A Page 48 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the non-nuclear instrumentation inputs that will result in the start of the Unit 2 TDAFW Pump.

Explanation:

A. Correct. These are the correct signals and coincidence for starting the TDAFW Pump on Unit 2.

B. Incorrect. Plausible because the coincidence is correct for Unit 1, however, he Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps will only start when both Main Feedwater Pumps trip.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because this answer is correct for Unit 1 D. Incorrect. Plausible because the Steam Generator level is correct and the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps will start when both Main Feedwater Pumps trip, however, the SI signal will only start the MDAFW Pumps.

Technical Reference(s) Auxiliary Feedwater Study Guide Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DIFFERENTIATE between the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater systems.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT8341 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 49 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Auxiliary Feedwater Study Guide, page 15 Revision: 5-11-2011 From Aux Feedwater Study Guide The TDAFWP steam supply valves will automatically open, admitting steam to the TDAFW Pump turbine, due to:

Low-low SG NR level at 38% ( 35.4% for Unit 2) on two of four detectors in any two SGs, Blackout Sequencer operator lockout signal, or AMSAC signal In addition to the CST discharge valves, any of the automatic start signals for the MDAFW pumps or the TDAFW pump will automatically close all SG blowdown isolation valves and sample valves in order to maximize the amount of water available for AFW use.

Page 50 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/18/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 017 A3.01 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.6 In-core Temperature Monitor: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ITM system including: Indication of normal, natural, and interrupted circulation of RCS.

Question 35 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred.

EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response is in progress.

The following indications are observed:

Highest reading Core Exit Thermocouples indicate 632°F.

Hot Leg Wide Range temperatures indicate 626 to 628°F.

1-PI-458, PRZR PRESS CHAN IV indicates 2235 psig.

1-PI-403, HL 4 PRESS (WR) indicates 2300 psig.

Which of the following correctly completes the statement below?

1. During performance of natural circulation verification in EOS-0.1A, Train B 1-TI-3612-1, RCS SAT MARGIN indicates adequate subcooling ___(1)___ exist.

2. If 1-PI-458 was to fail LOW, 1-TI-3612-1 would indicate ___(2)___ subcooling.

A. (1) does (2) more B. (1) does NOT (2) more C. (1) does (2) less D. (1) does NOT (2) less Answer: D Page 51 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to monitor automatic operation of the in-core temperature monitor following an instrument failure and indication of natural circulation in the RCS.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect as the calculated subcooling is ~20°F, which is less than the 25°F required for natural circulation verification. The second part is incorrect but plausible if believed that the in-core temperature monitor system automatically excluded the failed channel. If this was the case, the input from channel 403 would result in the RCS SAT Margin indicating more subcooling.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in D below. The second part as described in A above.

C. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect as described in A above. The second part is correct as described in D below.

D. Correct. The first part is correct based on the indications presented (highest temperature and lowest pressure ) The current subcooling is ~20°F which is less than the 25°F required for natural circulation verification. A failure low of PI-458 would result in the indicated subcooling degrading as 1700 psig would be used instead of the current 2235 psig input.

Technical Reference(s) EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response Attached w/ Revision # See Steam Tables Comments / Reference LO21SYSRC3 Proposed references to be provided during examination: Steam Tables Learning Objective: LO21ERGE01OB102 Analyze the recovery technique used and the procedure steps of EOS-0.1 Reactor Trip Response Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 14 55.43 Page 52 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Commen nts / Referen nce: LO21SY YSRC3 Revision n: 4-27-2011 1

Page 53 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 338

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: LO21SY YSRC3 Figure 7 Revision n: 2-10-2004 4

Page 54 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/18/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 033 A2.03 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Abnormal spent fuel pool water level or loss of water level Question 36 Given the following conditions:

Both units are in MODE 1.

Both Spent Fuel Pools are aligned to Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Heat Exchanger (HX)

X-01.

1-ALB-6B, Window 4.4 - SFPCS TRBL alarms.

A Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) reports that the following alarms annunciated on LV-06 Spent Fuel Pool Panel:

Window 2.2 - SFP 1 LEVEL HI Window 4.2 - SFP 1 TRANSFER CANAL LEVEL HI Window 2.6 - SFP 2 LEVEL HI Window 4.6 - SFP 2 TRANSFER CANAL LEVEL HI The NEO reports that the local gauge indicates SFP 1 at 859' 1 and SFP 2 at 859' 0.

NO SFP fill activities have recently occurred.

Which of the following actions are required to prevent the alarms from recurring?

A. Adjust the SFP HX X-01 Return valves throttle positions.

B. Perform a one-time drain of excess water to the Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank.

C. Perform a one-time drain of excess water to the Waste Hold-up Tank.

D. Remove SFP HX X-01 from service and isolate the HX.

Answer: D Page 55 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to determine that an abnormal spent fuel pool water level condition exist and delineate the operator actions necessary to correct the situation.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible because the alarms for high spent fuel pool levels indicate that a delta may exists between the pools and the throttle valves require adjustment. With the indicated pool levels a throttle valve position adjustment would not resolve the issue.

B. Incorrect. Plausible because draining the water to the U1 RWST is one of the methods to remove the excess water from the spent fuel pools, however, without taking further action the alarm would reoccur.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because draining the water to the Waste Hold up tank could remove excess water from the Spent Fuel Pools; this is not one of the proceduralized methods to remove the excess water from the spent fuel pools.

D. Correct. The indications of all pools and transfer canal rising indicate that water is actually being added to the spent fuel pools. Addition of water to the pools could be from inadvertent leak by of the fill valves but this is not provided as an option. The source of the leakage is from the Component Cooling Water via the spent fuel pool heat exchanger.

Technical Reference(s) ALM-0701, Window 2.2 Attached w/ Revision # See ABN-502 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21ABN501106 Analyze the response to Leakage Out of the CCW System in accordance with ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction Question Source: Bank # ILOT1698 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 56 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-70 01, Alarm Pro ocedure Spe ent Fuel Revision: 6 Pool Pan nel Page 57 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-50 02 Revision: 6 Page 58 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-50 02 Revision: 6 Page 59 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/19/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 041 K3.02 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.8 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SDS will have on the following: RCS.

Question 37 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

A Reactor trip has occurred from 100%.

Steam Dumps failed to open.

Which of the following correctly completes the statement below?

Assuming NO additional operator action, RCS Temperature will stabilize at approximately ___(1)___

and Pressurizer Level will stabilize at approximately ___(2)___.

A. (1) 557°F (2) 25%

B. (1) 557°F (2) 30%

C. (1) 561°F (2) 25%

D. (1) 561°F (2) 30%

Answer: D Page 60 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the effect that the loss of the steam dump system has on the RCS temperature and RCS pressurizer level.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible if thought that the Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) were set to control pressure at 1092 psig, which equates to an RCS Temperature of 557°F.

However, the ARVs are set at 1125 psig, thus, allowing RCS temperature to be controlled at approximately 561°F during a failure of the Steam Dumps to open. Second part incorrect but plausible if the common misconception of relating Pressurizer Level to Reactor Power was applied.

Reactor power is commonly related to Pressurizer Level to determine what the approximate Level setpoint should be, thus, in this case with 0% Reactor Power one could inaccurately determine that Pressurizer Level should be at its No Load value of 25%. However, actual pressurizer level setpoint is based on RCS Average Temperature, which is 4°F higher than the no load or 0% power RCS Average temperature of 557°F due to the ARV control point, and would therefore produce a level setpoint of approximately 30%.

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect, plausibility as described in "A" above. Second part is correct as described in D below.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in D below. Second part is incorrect, plausibility as described in A above.

D. Correct. The ARVs are set to control at 1125 psig which equates to an RCS Temperature of approximately 561°F. To determine this one must be able to recall what the normal pot setting is for the ARVs (8.65) and then correlate that pot setting to a value in psig (1125) This value then must be converted to psia (1140) and the Steam Tables must be used to determine the saturation temperature at this value (~561°F). For the second part one must know that the Pressurizer Level range from 0% - 100% Reactor power is from 25% - 60% based on the value of RCS Average Temperature. This equates to a 35% Pressurizer Level Change over a 100%

change in Reactor power. Also, one must know that on Unit 1 (different on Unit 2) RCS Average Temperature will change from 557°F - 585.4°F from 0% - 100% Reactor Power. This equates to a 28.4°F change in RCS Average Temperature over a 100% change in Reactor Power. Thus, to calculate what the new Pressurizer Level will be one must subtract 557°F from 561°F and determine that a 4°F rise in temperature will have occurred due to the failure of the Steam Dumps to operate. Then divide that 4°F by the total possible change in temperature (28.4°F) and come up with an answer of 0.141. Then multiply that 0.141 by the total possible change in Pressurizer level (35%) and come up with an answer of approximately 5%. Then add that 5% to the No Load pressurizer level of 25% to determine the new Pressurizer level to be approximately 30%.

Technical Reference(s) TDM-501A Attached w/ Revision # See IPO-002A Comments / Reference PZR Pressure & Level Study Guide Steam Tables Proposed references to be provided during examination: Steam Tables Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSSD1OB103 ) Discuss the components of the Steam Dump System including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Page 61 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 62 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: TDM-50 01A Revision n: 5 Page 63 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 338

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: TDM-50 01A Revision n: 5 Page 64 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 338

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: IPO-002 2A, Step 5.4.4 Revision: 20 Page 65 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: PZR Pre essure and Level L Study Guide Revision n: 5-5-2011 Commen nts / Referen nce: PZR Pre essure and Level L Study Guide Revision n: 5-5-2011 Page 66 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 24 to 338

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 086 A1.02 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.0 Fire Protection: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Fire Protection System operating the controls including: Fire water storage tank level.

Question 38 Which of the following describes the operation of the Fire Water Storage Tanks?

1. In accordance with OWI-104-18, Perimeter Data (Sunday), a level of 90% in a Fire Water Storage Tank ___(1)___ meet the minimum requirement.

2. When the low level setpoint for makeup to a Fire Water Storage Tank is reached, makeup to the tank ___(2)___.

A. (1) does (2) occurs automatically B. (1) does not (2) occurs automatically C. (1) does (2) requires manual valve operation D. (1) does not (2) requires manual valve operation Answer: C Page 67 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to predict and monitor the fire water storage tank level including automatic versus manual action.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is correct. Plausible as the makeup valves would automatically open, but Chemistry personnel must manually open XFP-0373 to admit flow to the tank.

B. Incorrect. Plausible that 84% does not meet the minimum required level, because the perimeter data sheet for taking rounds lists two levels: 82% and 85%; 85% is a limit, but it is the upper limit and could be confused if recalled incorrectly. Second part as described in A above.

C. Correct. OWI-104-18 is the watchstanding data sheet for perimeter areas, including the Fire Water Storage Tanks (two of them). The minimum acceptable level is 82%. The Fire Protection Study Guide, page 23 explains that Chemistry personnel manually makeup to the tank when a low level is reached; since the water supply is from potable water, they will add chemicals as needed at that time. The makeup valves to the tank automatically open and close. However, the makeup line is manually isolated by XFP-0373 such that when the makeup valves open, no water is admitted to the tank. Chemistry aligns the manual valves to actually fill the tank in accordance with COP-904.

When the fill is completed XFP-0373 is then closed by Chemistry so that no water will flow into the tanks if a low level automatically opens the automatic makeup valves.

D. Incorrect. Second part is correct. First part plausibility described in "B" above.

Technical Reference(s) OWI-104-18, Note 28 Attached w/ Revision # See Fire Protection Study Guide, page 23 Comments / Reference SOP-904, Sections 4.1 & 5.2.1 MX-0225 Sht. 008 COP-904 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSFP1OB102 ) DESCRIBE the components of the Fire Detection system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 Page 68 of 72 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 24 to 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts/Referenc ce: OWI-104 4-18, Note 28 Revision: 63 Commen nts / Referennce: Fire Prootection Stud dy Guide, pa age 23 Revision: 4-19-2011 From Firre Protectio on Study Gu uide INSTRU UMENTATIION & CON NTROL FIRE WATERA STORAAGE TANKS (F ( IGURE 8)

Level in the storage tanks t is designed to be maintained m aautomaticallyy utilizing a makeup valvve on the fill lin ne which is opened o and closed by a level transmmitter. Howevver, when thhe low makeuup setpoint isi reached, chemistry c maanually open ns the makeuup valve. Thhe valve alloows the Potabble Water Sy ystem to supply water to the Fire Waater Storage Tank. When the high m makeup setpooint is reached, a signal is seent to shut thhe makeup valve.

v Shoulld the valve fail to close, a high leveel signal is sent to annunciatorrs in the Maiin Control Room R and Firre Pump Hoouse to warn operators off the condition n. A low leveel signal is sent s to the Main M Control Room and F Fire Pump H House annunciators to warn ofo this condittion. A levell switch provvides for loww and low-loow level alarrms. Should potable water nott be availablle, the Emerg gency Makeup Pump (loocated in thee Service Waater Intake Structuree) can be manually starteed to supply water to thee storage tankk. During coold weather condition ns, a temperaature switch energizes an n alarm to allert operatorrs to recirculate the storaage tank to preven nt its contentts from freezzing.

Page 69 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-90 04 4.1 and 5.2.1 Revision: 16 Page 70 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: COP-90 04 Revision: 16 Page 71 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: MX-022 25 Sht 008 Page 72 of 72 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 24 to 3 38

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/19/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 007 G.2.4.45 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.1 Reactor Trip Stabilization-Recovery: Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.

Question 39 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Unit 1 Reactor has tripped due to a Loss of Offsite Power.

The crew has transitioned from EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response.

During performance of Step 4 to Check PRZR Pressure Control, the Reactor Operator notes the following annunciators are LIT:

1-ALB-5B, Window 3.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 PRESS LO 1-ALB-5B, Window 4.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 SI PRESS LO 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE 1-ALB-6C, Window 2.7 - PRZR PRESS LO SI ACT PCIP Window 1.8, SI ACT is DARK What are the highest priority actions required by the Reactor Operator?

A. Verify pressure < 2235 psig and Close any open PORV.

B. Manually Close any open PORV AND associated Block Valve.

C. Verify Pressurizer Spray valves automatically closed.

D. Manually actuate Safety Injection and Go to EOP-0.0A.

Answer: D Page 1 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to prioritize between an orange alarm and a first out annunciator which is white and another first out already exist and interpret the significance with which to take action.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible as EOS-0.1A Step 4 states if pressure less than 2235 to verify the PORVs closed and if not manually close PORVs.

B. Incorrect. Plausible as EOS-0.1A Step 4 states if pressure less than 2235 to verify the PORVs closed and if not manually close PORVs. If any PORV cannot be closed the associated block valve should be closed.

C. Incorrect. Plausible as EOS-0.1A Step 4 states if pressure less than 2235 to verify the PORVs closed and if not manually close PORVs and Block valves if required. The next verification performed is that the pressurizer spray valves are closed and if not manually close the spray valves.

D. Correct. In accordance with EOS-0.1A Step 4, with the listed annunciators in alarm and the PCIP when NOT Lit, the Reactor Operator should manually actuate SI and go to EOP-0.0A where they would perform the Immediate Actions.

Technical Reference(s) 1-ALB-5B, Window 3.4 & 4.4 Attached w/ Revision # See 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4 Comments / Reference 1-ALB-6C, Window 2.7 PCIP Window 1.8 EOS-0.1A Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: STATE the two paths through which the ERG network may be entered, and DESCRIBE the conditions that require/allow entry for each.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 2 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-5 5B Window 3.4 3 Revision: 5 Page 3 of o 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-5 5B Window 4.4 4 Revision: 5 Page 4 of o 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-5 5C Window 1.4 1 Revision: 7 Page 5 of o 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-6 6C Window 2.7 2 Revision: 5 Page 6 of o 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: PCIP Window W 1.8 Revision: 4 Page 7 of o 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 8 of o 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 9 of o 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 008 AK3.04 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 4.2 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Knowledge of the reasons for the following response as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: RCP tripping requirements Question 40 Given the following conditions:

A Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress.

Reactor Coolant System pressure is 1435 psig and slowly lowering.

Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures indicate 592°F.

Containment pressure is 4 psig and slowly rising.

Pressurizer level is 32% and rising.

All Safety Systems have actuated properly.

DRPI indication was lost for one control rod on the trip.

Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Trip Criteria has been met.

(1) Which of the following describes the location of the Reactor Coolant System leak?

(2) Which of the following is the reason for tripping the RCPs?

A. (1) The leak is on the Reactor Vessel Head (2) Core damage is possible from increased mass loss when forced two-phase flow is maintained.

B. (1) The leak is on the Reactor Vessel Head (2) Core damage is possible when a phase separation from a subsequent loss of forced flow occurs.

C. (1) The leak is on the steam space of the Pressurizer (2) Core damage is possible from increased mass loss when forced two-phase flow is maintained.

D. (1) The leak is on the steam space of the Pressurizer (2) Core damage is possible when a phase separation from a subsequent loss of forced flow occurs.

Answer: D Page 10 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of tripping the RCPs during a pressurizer vapor space accident.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as the loss of DRPI indication could lead to the assumption that a rod ejection has occurred, but this is not the case as DRPI would have a flashing General Warning light and Rod Bottom lights lit for an ejected rod as DRPI cannot find the location of the rod. The second part is incorrect but plausible as increased mass loss is expected under forced flow, but this is not the reason the RCPs are tripped. As long as forced flow cooling is maintained, core damage would be avoided.

B. Incorrect. First part as described in A above. Second part is correct as described in D below.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in D below. Second part as described in A above.

D. Correct. The combination of rising pressurizer level and a loss of subcooling is indicative of a pressurizer vapor space LOCA. The RCPs are tripped under Westinghouse SBLOCA analysis to preclude a trip and phase separation under saturated conditions such that the core would become uncovered.

Technical Reference(s) LO21.ERG.XD3 Study Guide Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21ERGXD3OB103 Identify the accident for which ERG RCP trip criteria provide protection, and Explain why it is considered necessary under these conditions.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 11 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: LO21.ERG.XD3 Revision n: 1-17-2002 Page 12 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 009 EK2.03 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.0 Small Break LOCA: Knowledge of the interrelations between the small break LOCA and the following: S/Gs Question 41 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Unit 1 has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection due to a small-break LOCA.

Containment pressure peaked at 3.8 psig and is slowly lowering Containment radiation is stable at 10 R/hr.

The crew has completed the actions of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Charging pump flow to the Reactor Coolant System Cold Legs is 390 gpm.

Reactor coolant system pressure is 1500 psig and stable.

SG pressures are 1092 psig and stable.

Which of the following describes reactor coolant pump (RCP) status upon transition to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and are the Steam Generators needed for heat removal?

RCPs Running SGs Needed for Heat Removal A. YES YES B. YES NO C. NO YES D. NO NO Answer: A Page 13 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate an understanding of the relationship between a SBLOCA response and whether SGs are required for heat removal.

Explanation:

A. Correct. . For this plant condition, since subcooling is greater than 25°F, and since adverse containment conditions do NOT exist, the RCPs will not have been tripped since the EOP-0.0A foldout page trip criteria were not met. (Adverse containment conditions are containment pressure > 5 psig or > 105 R/hr.). Also, since RCS pressure is greater than SG pressures and both RCS and SG pressures are stable, the SGs are needed for RCS cooling. Adequate subcooling is determined by the saturation temperature for the Steam Generator pressure with forced Reactor Coolant, thus the RCS temperature is 557°F.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct. Part 2 is plausible because the applicant may conclude that the SGs are not required for RCS heat removal since there is 390 gpm of flow to the cold legs from the high head injection (charging) pumps.

C. Incorrect. First part is plausible because the applicant might conclude that RCPs will not be running, since a Safety Injection has occurred and the charging pumps are injecting into the cold legs at 390 gpm. But the RCPs are only secured (in accordance with E-0.0A Foldout Page criteria if the NV pumps are running AND subcooling has been lost. Part 2 is correct.

D. Incorrect. First part plausibility described in "C" above. Second part plausibility described in "B" above.

Technical Reference(s) EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Attached w/ Revision # See Attachment 1.A, Foldout Page, Step 1 Comments / Reference LO21.MCO.TAA Proposed references to be provided during examination: Steam Tables Learning Objective: ( LO21ERGE0AOB107 ) DISCUSS EOP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection including the Purpose, Applicability, Symptoms/Entry Conditions, Operator Actions, Bases, Foldout Pages and Attachments.

Question Source: Bank # Industry Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 14 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-0.0 0A, Reactor Trip or Safe ety Injection,, Revision: 8 Attachme ent 1.A, Fold dout Page, Step S 1 Page 15 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LO21.MCO.TAA Revision: 1-3-2002 Secondly, energy can be transferred from the primary system to the secondary system via the steam generators (SGs), provided that generators water level is being maintained. In this case, the heat sink is one of the following:

1. Steam generator safety valves

2. Steam generator atmospheric relief valves

3. Steam dump valves If the RCS break is a large one, the flow rate out of the break is sufficient to remove the decay heat.

The plant is then cooled by the combined effects of flow out of the break and SI flow into the system. The situation is very different for a small break; break flow will be insufficient to remove core decay heat.

For example, suppose that a 1-inch cold leg break occurs after the plant has established a very high power history (high decay heat levels are present). Suppose also that both the SG Atmospheric relief valves (ARVs) and the steam dump valves are inoperable, and only minimum safeguards (one train) are available (basically the assumptions used in the FSAR). The plant begins to depressurize; a reactor trip, turbine trip, and SI occur. More subcooled liquid volume leaves the break than is being added. The pressurizer continues to empty and pressure steadily drops. As the pressurizer empties, the rate of pressure decrease suddenly rises since a relatively small quantity of vapor is produced from surge-line flashing. Eventually, saturation conditions are reached - first in the hot legs and vessel outlet plenum and soon after in the entire plant. The break is small and it is unable, by itself, to remove all the decay heat. Thus, the break is insufficient to continue depressurizing the plant. Another heat sink must function to prevent the plant from reaching an over temperature condition. Using conservative assumptions, the SG safety valves are the only available heat sink. Assume that the lift pressure of the lowest safety valve is 1200 psia, which corresponds to a SG saturation temperature of about 567.2F.

Page 16 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 011 EA2.05 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.3 Large Break LOCA: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Significance of charging pump operation.

Question 42 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

A large break LOCA occurred.

EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, was completed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago.

A Loss off Offsite Power has just occurred.

In response to this event, the control switches for the ______ must be taken to PULL OUT to protect the pumps for subsequent recovery.

Which of the following completes the above statement?

A. Containment Spray Pumps B. Safety Injection Pumps C. Residual Heat Removal Pumps D. Centrifugal Charging Pumps Answer: D Page 17 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to identify that the CCPs must be placed in pull-out to protect the pumps for subsequent recovery actions as they are running without a suction source.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible since the alignment made during EOS-1.3A would have the Containment Spray Pumps being supplied from the RHR pump discharge and RHR pumps will not restart following a blackout. The SI pumps will be load shed when the blackout occurs, and will not restart since the SI signal was reset during performance of EOS-1.3A (Step 1).

B. Incorrect. Plausible since the alignment made during EOS-1.3A would have the SI pumps being supplied from RHR pump discharge. The RHR pumps will not restart following a blackout. The SI pumps will be load shed when the blackout occurs, and will not restart since the SI signal was reset during the performance of EOS-1.3A (Step 1).

C. Incorrect. Plausible since the RHR pumps will be load shed when the blackout occurs, but will not restart since SI was reset during the performance of EOS-1.3 (Step 1). It is also plausible that the applicant could be confused on the direction in the procedure as to whether to restart RHR of to place it in PULL OUT.

D. Correct. During the performance of EOS-1.3A, the suction of the CCPs is aligned to the discharge of the RHR pumps, which are taking suction on the containment sump. The CCPs receive a blackout start signal; the RHR pumps do NOT. Thus, the CCPs would be running with no suction source for the given conditions. The operators are cautioned about this and directed to place the control switches in PULL OUT, until an RHR pump can be restarted.

Technical Reference(s) EOS-1.3A, Step 5 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ERGE13OB100 ) Upon completion of this lesson, the student should be able to discuss plant response, operator actions, and the reasons for the actions contained in EOS-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Question Source: Bank # Industry Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 18 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-1.3 3A, Step 5 Revision: 8 Page 19 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-1.3 3A, Caution Bases Revision: 8 Page 20 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/3/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 015/017 AK1.02 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.7 RCP Malfunctions: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Consequences of an RCPS failure Question 43 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is at 40% power.

RCP 1-02 trips on overcurrent.

Which of the following describes:

1. Initially, unaffected Steam Generators steam flow and feed flow will ___(1)___.

2. In accordance with ABN-101, Reactor Coolant Pump Trip/Malfunction, a manual reactor trip

___(2)___ required.

A. (1) rise (2) is not B. (1) lower (2) is not C. (1) rise (2) is D. (1) lower (2) is Answer: C Page 21 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the operational implications and consequences of an RCP failure.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is correct. Plausible, since this would be true if reactor power was greater than 48%.

B. Incorrect. First part plausible if applicant confuses shrink / swell phenomenon. Second part plausibility described in "A" above.

C. Correct. The affected steam generator will shrink with steam and feed flow decreasing. The non-affected steam generators will assume a higher steam load, resulting in a higher steam and feed flow and decreased steam pressure. The higher steam load on the operating loops will increase the loop Delta-Ts, and Tave will change, requiring rod motion to restore the Tave setpoint to its proper value.

D. Incorrect. Second part is correct. First part plausibility described in "B" above.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-101, Reactor Coolant Pump Attached w/ Revision # See Trip/Malfunction, Section 2.2, Step 2.3.1 Comments / Reference LO24.ABN.101, ABN-101 Simulator Exercise Guide, Section 3.2.B, Plant Indication, Item 5 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SSTRC1OB103 ) RESPOND to Reactor Coolant Pump malfunctions in accordance with ABN-101, "Reactor Coolant Pump Trip/Malfunction".

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 22 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 01, Reactor Coolant C Pum mp Revision: 11 Trip/Malffunction, Sec ction 2.2 Page 23 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 01, Reactor Coolant C Pum mp Revision: 11 Trip/Malffunction, Ste ep 2.3.1 Page 24 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LO24.ABN.101, ABN-101 Simulator Revision: 12-18-13 Exercise Guide, Section 3.2.B, Plant Indication, Item 5 Credit Hours: LO24.ABN.101 2 Hours ABN-101 Page 25 of 50 Event 1 - RCP Trip 1.1 Event Initiation ACTIVATE RC02A 1.2 Plant Response Alarms ANY RCP TRIP (5B-1.1) 1 OF 4 RCP UNDRVOLT (5B-1.2)

RC LOOP 1 1 OF 3 FLO LO (5A-1.3) 1 OF 4 RCP UNDRFREQ (5B-2.2)

Plant Indication Low flow indication on any reactor coolant loop.

Breaker TRIP or MISMATCH light illuminated on any RCP handswitch.

Motor amps on any RCP motor reading zero.

Reactor trip occurs in the event of one reactor coolant pump trip with reactor power greater than 48% (P-8 permissive annunciator NOT LIT).

The affected steam generator will shrink with steam and feed flow decreasing.

The operating steam generators will assume a higher steam load resulting in a higher steam and feed flow and decreased steam pressure. The higher steam load on the operating loops will increase the loop Delta-T's and TAVE will change requiring rod motion to restore the TAVE setpoint to its proper value.

Page 25 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 025 AK2.03 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 2.7 Loss of RHR: Knowledge of the interrelation between the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following: Service water or closed cooling water pumps Question 44 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is in MODE 5.

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump 1-01 is in service.

Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump 1-01 is operating.

Subsequently:

CCW Pump 1-01 trips.

CCW Pump 1-02 has not started.

1. The BOP ___(1)___ manually start CCW Pump 1-02 without Unit Supervisor permission, in accordance with Operations Guideline 3.

2. When CCW Pump 1-02 is started, the operator must ensure that flow is provided to the RHR 1-01 Heat Exchanger by verifying the safeguards loop isolation valves are ___(2)___.

A. (1) cannot (2) closed B. (1) cannot (2) open C. (1) can (2) closed D. (1) can (2) open Answer: D Page 26 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the relationship between maintaining RHR in operation with a loss of the Train related CCW Pump, which is the closed cooling water pump for RHR.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Operations Guideline 3 Attachment 6 instructs the operators to reinforce equipment actions that have a valid actuation signal but have not actuated. In this case, CCW Pump 1-02 has an automatic start signal and has not started. The BOP should start the pump and does not require permission to do so. This distractor is plausible as starting the pump is not an Immediate or Initial Operator Action and therefore could be thought that US permission is required. The second part is incorrect but plausible in that it may be thought the valves must be verified closed to preclude exceeding the maximum flow rate from a single running CCW Pump.

B. Incorrect. Second part is correct. First part plausibility described in "A" above.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part plausibility described in "A" above.

D. Correct. Operations Guideline 3 Attachment 6 instructs the operators to reinforce equipment actions that have a valid actuation signal but have not actuated. In this case, CCW Pump 1-02 has an automatic start signal and has not started. In accordance with ABN-502, the RHR Hx 1-01 can be supplied from CCW Pump 1-02 if the safeguards loop isolation valves are open. When a single train is in operation, the safeguards loop isolation valves are maintained open to supply components in the non-safeguards loop and any components which may be running in the opposite train. When the pumps trip, no valve realignment occurs, thus the operator is only verifying that the valves are in their expected configuration. If an abnormal arrangement were identified, an SOP would need to be utilized with thorough review to alleviate the abnormal configuration which existed for a particular reason.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-502, Component Cooling Water Attached w/ Revision # See System Malfunction, Step 4 Comments / Reference OPDG 3 Att. 6 Step 7.2 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ABN501OB105 ) ANALYZE the response to a CCW Pump Trip in accordance with ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8 55.43 Page 27 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-50 02, Compone ent Cooling W Water Syste em Reevision: 6 Malfunction, Page 28 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: OPDG 3, 3 Attachment 6 Revision::

Page 29 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 026 AA1.05 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.1 Loss of Component Cooling Water: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: The CCWS surge tank, including level control and level alarms, and radiation alarm Question 45 Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

Component Cooling Water Pumps 2-01 and 2-02 are in service.

Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Levels are lowering with the following annunciator indication:

2-ALB-3B, Window 2.4 - CCW SRG TK TRN A LVL HI-HI/LO is LIT 2-ALB-3B, Window 3.4 - CCW SRG TK TRN B LVL HI-HI/LO is LIT 2-ALB-3B, Window 1.3 - CCW SRG TK TRN A/B LVL LO-LO is DARK 2-ALB-3B, Window 2.2 - CCW SRG TK TRN A/B EMPTY is DARK There are NO CCW system radiation monitor alarms on the PC-11 in alarm.

In accordance with alarm procedures, and ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunctions:

1. When Window 1.3 annunciates the operators ___(1)___ able to identify the leaking train from Control Room indication.

2. The CCW Safeguards loop first isolates when the affected train CCW Surge Tank level falls below

___(2)___ while the other train Surge Tank level remains stable.

A. (1) are NOT (2) 33%

B. (1) are NOT (2) 57%

C. (1) are (2) 33%

D. (1) are (2) 57%

Answer: A Page 30 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to monitor the loss of CCW as a result of lowering CCW Surge Tank level.

Explanation:

A. Correct. The alarm for CCW Surge Tank LO-LO (2-ALB-3B, Window 1.3) comes in at a level above the holes in the CCW Surge Tank partition plate and as such the leaking train cannot yet be determined without a field report. ABN-502, Section 3.3, Step 6.d directs the operators to monitor CCW tank level and verify that the affected loop is isolated. The values given are 57% for Unit 1, and 33% for Unit 2.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in A above. Second part is plausible, since this would be correct for Unit 1.

C. Incorrect. Plausible as the holes in the partition plate end above the Empty alarm, but they exist below the LO-LO level alarm, thus the determination cannot be made until level is below the bottom hole. Second part is correct as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in C above. Second part as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) 2-ALB-3B, Window 1.3, 2.2, 2.4 & 3.4 Attached w/ Revision # See ABN-502, Component Cooling Water Comments / Reference System Malfunctions Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the components of the Component Cooling Water system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 31 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-50 02, Compone ent Cooling W Water Revision: 6 System Malfunctions M s Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-50 02, Compone ent Cooling W Water Revision: 6 System Malfunctions M s Page 32 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 2-ALB-3 3B Window 1.3 1 Revision: 3 Page 33 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 2-ALB-3 3B Window 1.3 1 Revision: 3 Page 34 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 2-ALB-3 3B Window 2.4 2 Revision: 3 Commen nts / Referen nce: 2-ALB-3 3B Window 2.4 2 Revision: 3 Page 35 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 2-ALB-3 3B Window 3.4 3 Revision: 3 Commen nts / Referen nce: 2-ALB-3 3B Window 3.4 3 Revision: 3 Page 36 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 2-ALB-3 3B Window 2.2 2 Revision: 3 Page 37 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 2-ALB-3 3B Window 2.2 2 Revision: 3 Page 38 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 2/23/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 027 AK2.03 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 2.6 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunctions: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following: Controllers and positioners Question 46 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

1/1-PS-455F, PRZR PRESS CTRL CHAN SELECT is in the 455/456 position.

1-PI-455A, PRZR PRESS CHAN I fails LOW.

In accordance with ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, which of the following describes the reason that 1-PK-455A, PRZR MASTER PRESS CTRL is placed in manual, prior to placing 1/1-PS-455F in the 457/456 position?

A. Pressurizer Backup Heaters could trip and lockout.

B. A PRZR PRESS HI Reactor Trip could occur.

C. 1-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV could OPEN.

D. A RX 10% PWR PRZR PRESS LO Reactor Trip could occur.

Answer: C K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the effect of alternating controlling channels in automatic as the controller would have a significant integral signal which could cause an inadvertent PORV opening..

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible because it is a misconception that a coincident TRIP and CLOSE signals would be present and cause the anti-pumping circuit to lockout the feeder breaker.

B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the high pressure trip could be initiated but the coincidence is 2 of 4 and only one channel is failed.

C. Correct. ABN-705 requires that the PRZR Master Pressure Controller be placed in MANUAL prior to selecting the Alternate Channel due to the possibility of inadvertently opening a PORV due to the proportional/integral function of Master Pressure Controller.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because it is a misconception that the improper sequence could momentarily cause a second low pressure signal and result in an inadvertent Reactor trip.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-705 Steps 2.2 & 2.3 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Page 39 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ANALYZE the response to a Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Malfunction in accordance with ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT8275 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 40 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-70 05, Pressuriz zer Pressure e Instrument Revision:: 13 Malfunction Page 41 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-70 05, Pressuriz zer Pressure e Instrument Revision:: 13 Malfunction Page 42 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/16/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 029 G.2.2.44 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 4.2 ATWS: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

Question 47 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Initial:

The Unit was at 100% power.

A turbine trip occurred.

The reactor did NOT trip and could NOT be tripped from the Control Room.

Current:

Pressurizer pressure is 2335 psig.

The crew has transitioned to FRS-0.1A, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT.

The crew is initiating emergency boration in accordance with Step 4 of FRS-0.1A.

In accordance with FRS-0.1A:

1. A minimum charging flowrate of ___(1)___ gpm is required.

2. Pressurizer PORV operation ___(2)___ required to enhance emergency boration flow.

A. (1) 30 (2) is NOT B. (1) 60 (2) is NOT C. (1) 30 (2) is D. (1) 60 (2) is Answer: C Page 43 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to interpret the control room indications during an ATWT and demonstrate an understanding of operator actions necessary to affect the systems.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. The first part is correct. The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that lowering RCS pressure to enhance injection flow is necessary at the PORV setpoint.

B. Incorrect. The first part is plausible since this is the normal flow through the miniflow lines from a running CCP. Second part plausibility described in "A" above.

C. Correct. Step 4 (Initiate emergency boration) of FRS-0.1A directs the operator to verify a boration flow of 30 gpm or align charging pump suction to the RWST. A subsequent step (Step 5) requires PZR PORV operation to reduce pressure below 2185 psig if pressure is above 2335 psig.

D. Incorrect. First part plausibility previously described in "B" above. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) FRS-0.1A, Step 4 and 5 Attached w/ Revision # See FRS-0.1A, Attachment 3 Comments / Reference CVCS Study Guide Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the applicability of FRS-0.1A/B, "RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR GENERATION/ATWT" regarding modes and the actions taken if the procedure is otherwise used.

Question Source: Bank # Industry Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 44 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referennce: FRS-0.11A, Step 4 Revision: 8 PCN 4 Commen nts / Referennce: FRS-0.11A, Step 5 Revision: 8 PCN 4 Commen nts / Referennce: CVCS Study S Guide Revision: 4-28-2011 Approxim mately 60 gp pm from each pump is diirected to a ccommon reccirculation line which leaads to the inlet of the seal water w heat ex xchanger. Thhe recirculattion flow prootects the cenntrifugal chaarging pumps frrom overheatting during periods p of lo ow flow operrations.

Page 45 of 50 CPNPP NRCN 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRS-0.1 1A, Attachment 3 Step 5 Bases Revision:: 8 PCN 4 Page 46 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 038 EK3.09 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 4.1 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture: Knowledge of the reasons for the following response as they apply to the SGTR: Criteria for securing/throttling ECCS.

Question 48 Given the following Unit 2 conditions:

Steam Generator 2-02 is ruptured.

Steam Generator 2-01 is faulted inside containment.

EOP-2.0B, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation is complete.

Containment pressure is 7 psig and rising.

RCS Depressurization in EOP-3.0B, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, is complete.

In accordance with EOP-3.0B, Steam Generator Tube Rupture

1. What is the PRIMARY reason for terminating Safety Injection flow when the criteria are met?

2. What MINIMUM Pressurizer Level is required to terminate Safety Injection flow?

A. (1) Prevent ruptured Steam Generator overfill and lifting of the Atmospheric Relief Valves.

(2) 15%

B. (1) Prevent ruptured Steam Generator overfill and lifting of the Atmospheric Relief Valves.

(2) 13%

C. (1) Prevent Pressurizer overfill and lifting of the Pressurizer Safety Valves.

(2) 15%

D. (1) Prevent Pressurizer overfill and lifting of the Pressurizer Safety Valves.

(2) 13%

Answer: A Page 47 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for securing Safety Injection flow following RCS depressurization during execution of the Steam Generator Tube Rupture procedure.

Explanation:

A. Correct. In accordance with EOP-3.0B, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Safety Injection flow must be terminated following RCS depressurization to prevent overfilling of the ruptured steam generator and lifting the atmospheric relief valve, thus, causing a release to the environment.

Also, during adverse containment conditions 15% pressurizer level is required on Unit 2 vice a 13% requirement for non-adverse conditions.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in A above. Second part is incorrect but plausible as 13% would be the pressurizer level at which safety injection flow would be terminated if adverse containment conditions DID NOT exist.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as the pressurizer does fill during RCS depressurization and it is a concern, however, there is not a concern with the primary Safety Valves lifting during the depressurization as the PORVs will open and relieve pressure if necessary. Second part is correct as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in C above. Second part as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) EOP-3.0B Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ERGE3AOB105 ) State the bases for operator actions, notes, and cautions from EOP-3.0.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 48 of 50 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 39 to 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-3.0 0B Revision: 8 Page 49 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-3.0 0B Revision: 8 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-3.0 0B Revision: 8 Page 50 of 50 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 39 to 4 48

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/3/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 040W/E12 AA2.01 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.2 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: Occurrence and location of a steam line rupture from pressure and flow indications.

Question 49 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection.

Main Steam Line Isolation was verified incomplete in EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. [1-HV-2333A, MSIV 1 indicates Open]

Steam Flow is still indicated on the following:

1-FI-512A, SG 1 STM FLO 1-FI-513A, SG 1 STM FLO 1-FI-532A, SG 3 STM FLO 1-FI-533A, SG 3 STM FLO Transition has been made to EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Subsequently:

Local operator action closes 1-HV-2333A.

Steam Flow is still indicated on the following:

1-FI-532A, SG 3 STM FLO 1-FI-533A, SG 3 STM FLO Steam Generator (SG) pressures are:

SG 1-01 400 psig and stable SG 1-02 640 psig and stable SG 1-03 200 psig and lowering SG 1-04 640 psig and stable Based on the plant indications, which of the following is correct?

A. SG 1-01 is faulted upstream of the MSIV; SG 1-03 is faulted upstream of the MSIV.

B. SG 1-01 is faulted upstream of the MSIV; SG 1-03 is faulted downstream of the MSIV.

C. SG 1-01 is faulted downstream of the MSIV; SG 1-03 is faulted upstream of the MSIV.

D. SG 1-01 is faulted downstream of the MSIV; SG 1-03 is faulted downstream of the MSIV.

Answer: C Page 1 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to utilize steam generator pressures and steam flows to determine the faulted steam generators and locations of the faults.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is plausible if incorrectly diagnoses of the indications that pressure has stabilized and flow has ceased for SG 1-01 once the MSIV was closed. Second part is correct as described in C below.

B. Incorrect. First part as described in A above. Second part is plausible if incorrectly diagnoses of the indications yield that the cooldown is continuing to lower SG 1-03 pressure and does not properly regard the steam flow indication.

C. Correct. Based on the SG pressures and indicated steam flows, SG 1-01 is faulted downstream of the MSIV which has been isolated once the MSIV was closed. SG 1-03 is faulted upstream of the MSIV as the pressure continues to lower with indicated steam flow.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in C above. Second part is incorrect as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) LO21.ERG.E2A Lesson Plan Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ERGE2AOB100 ) Upon completion of this lesson, the student should be able to discuss plant response, operator actions, and the reasons for the actions contained in EOP-2.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 2 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: LO21.ERG.E2A Revision n: 4/21/2014 4

Page 3 of o 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: LO21.ERG.E2A Revision n: 4/21/2014 4

Page 4 of o 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/4/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 054 AA1.01 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.5 Loss of Main Feedwater: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW):

AFW controls, including the use of alternate sources.

Question 50 Given the following on Unit 1:

A major earthquake has occurred in the vicinity of CPNPP.

The Reactor tripped on Steam Generator LO-LO Levels following a loss of all main feedwater.

The crew has transitioned to EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response.

An NEO has reported that the Unit 1 CST is ruptured and spilling the contents from the bottom of the tank to the Safe Shutdown Impoundment.

CST level is now 9% and lowering.

The Unit Supervisor has directed the performance of ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction.

Which of the following are correct in accordance with ABN-305?

1. 1-HS-4395, SSW TO AFWP SUCT VLV (TRN A) and 1-HS-4396, SSW TO AFWP SUCT VLV (TRN B) require ___(1)___ for proper operation.

2. 1AF-0020, SSW TO U1 AFW PMP SUCT HDR DRN VLV and 1AF-0120, SSW TO U1 AFW PMPS HI PNT VNT VLV must be closed ___(2)___ opening 1-HS-4395 and 1-HS-4396.

A. (1) two hands (2) after B. (1) two hands (2) before C. (1) keys (2) after D. (1) keys (2) before Answer: C Page 5 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to operate the controls necessary for aligning SSW as an alternate source to AFW following a loss of main feedwater.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect, but plausible as two handed operation is required for control room actions which are desired to not occur by mistake. In particular two handed operation is required for actuating Containment Spray and bypassing the P-12 interlock.

Second part is correct as described in C below.

B. Incorrect. First part is as described in A above. Second part is incorrect but plausible as closing the valves before admitting water would make sense if the piping were normally maintained filled. Then a check to ensure they are closed would be appropriate for avoiding a spill of SSW into the Safeguards building. However, this piping remains dry and open to the atmosphere. SSW water is admitted to the piping and must stream out to ensure the piping is full.

C. Correct. In accordance with ABN-305, keys must be obtained from the Shift Manager in order to operate the SSW to AFW MOVs. In accordance with ABN-305, the drain and vent valves are not closed until after water is admitted to the piping from SSW thus spilling in the general area.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part as described in "B" above.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-305, Section 5.3, Step 9 Attached w/ Revision # See OPGD 3, Attachment 6 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SSTAF1OB102 ) DISCUSS ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunctions, to include the following:

Applicability Symptoms Plant Indications Automatic Actions Initial Operator Actions Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 6 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: OPGD 3, 3 Attachment 6 Revision::

Commen nts / Referen nce: OPGD 3, 3 Attachment 6 Revision::

Page 7 of o 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-30 05, Section 5.3, 5 Step 9 Revision: 7 PCN 1 Page 8 of o 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-30 05, Section 5.3, 5 Step 9 Revision: 7 PCN 1 Page 9 of o 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/16/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 055 EA2.04 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.7 Station Blackout: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Instruments and controls operable with only dc battery power available.

Question 51 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

A Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power occurred.

The crew entered ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power.

Initial DC load shedding was performed in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Attachment 2 (DC Load Shedding.

Battery parameters are as follows:

Battery BT1ED1 Voltage: 112 VDC Battery BT1ED1 Current: 75 amps discharging Battery BT1ED2 Voltage: 108 VDC Battery BT1ED2 Current: 80 amps discharging It has been determined that additional DC load shedding is required on Bus 1ED2.

Which of the following describes the reason this additional load shedding on Bus 1ED2 would be required?

A. To maintain Battery BT1ED2 voltage greater than 105 VDC to ensure all Post Accident Monitoring indications are maintained in the Control Room.

B. To restore Battery BT1ED2 voltage to greater than 110 VDC to ensure minimum system voltage for subsequent power restoration activities.

C. To restore Battery BT1ED2 voltage to greater than 110 VDC to ensure all Post Accident Monitoring indications are maintained in the Control Room.

D. To maintain Battery BT1ED2 voltage greater than 105 VDC to ensure minimum system voltage for subsequent power restoration activities.

Answer: D K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the knowledge of minimum voltage from DC supplies to power the controls necessary for DG start.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible since 105 VDC is the minimum voltage required for equipment operation, however, in ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, Attachment 2 (DC Load Shedding) step 2, two channels of control room indication are secured to ensure that sufficient battery energy is maintained to facilitate restoring AC either by shutting an offsite AC supply breaker or by starting Page 10 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 the Emergency Diesel Generator and flashing its field if necessary. Vital Control Room instrumentation is powered via the instrumentation buses which receive power from their respective instrumentation inverters. The inverters can operate with DC input as low as 100 VDC, which is below the 105 VDC requirement of ECA-0.0A. In a normal lineup, the inverters will automatically shift to unfiltered transformer power. With a loss of all AC, the inverters will not shift and will continue to supply power to the instrument buses until DC input reaches ~100 VDC.

B. Incorrect. Plausible since additional load shedding is required to conserve energy for subsequent restoration activities, however, battery voltage need only be greater than approximately 105 VDC to allow equipment operation. Below 110 VDC, additional actions are necessary to conserve battery power. Additionally, reducing battery discharge rate by shedding additional load will not raise battery voltage.

C. Incorrect. Plausible since below 110 VDC, additional actions are necessary to conserve battery power, however, battery voltage need only be greater than approximately 105 VDC to allow equipment operation. Additionally, in ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, Attachment 2 (DC Load Shedding) step 2, two channels of control room indication are secured to ensure that sufficient battery energy is maintained to facilitate restoring AC either by shutting an offsite AC supply breaker or by starting the Emergency Diesel Generator and flashing its field if necessary. Vital Control Room instrumentation is powered via the instrumentation buses which receive power from their respective instrumentation inverters. The inverters can operate with DC input as low as 100 VDC, which is below the 105 VDC requirement of ECA-0.0A. In a normal lineup, the inverters will automatically shift to unfiltered transformer power. With a loss of all AC, the inverters will not shift and will continue to supply power to the instrument buses until DC input reaches 100 VDC.

D. Correct. Battery voltage needs only to be greater than 105 VDC for required equipment operation.

Additional load shedding is performed on the DC Bus in the Train that will be restored first. This will conserve DC energy to assist in recovery actions, such as starting the Diesel Generator.

Technical Reference(s) ECA-0.0A, Step 16 RNO, and BASES Attached w/ Revision # See ECA-0.0A, Attachment 2 and BASES Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: Given a procedural step, or sequence of steps from ECA-0.0, STATE the purpose/basis for the step(s)..

Question Source: Bank # ILOT8202 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 11 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.0 0A, Step 16 Revision: 8 Page 12 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.0 0A, Step 16 RNO and B ASES Revision: 8 Page 13 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.0 0A, Attachment 2 and BA ASES Revision:: 8 Page 14 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.0 0A, Attachment 2 and BA ASES Revision:: 8 Page 15 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 056 AA1.09 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.3 Loss of Off-site Power: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: CCW pump.

Question 52 Given the following Unit 2 conditions:

The Unit experienced a complete Loss of All AC Power while at 100% power 20 minutes ago.

A cooldown was initiated per ECA-0.0B, Loss of All AC Power.

Power was restored to Safeguards Bus 2EA2 from Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-02.

Steam Generator pressures were stabilized over a 5 minute period.

Subsequently:

ECA-0.2B, Loss of All AC Power Recovery with SI Required, has been entered.

Station Service Water (SSW) Pump 2-02 is running.

When Component Cooling Water Pump (CCWP) 2-02 handswitch is repositioned from PULLOUT to AUTO (After Stop) the pump A. does NOT start as the BOS Auto Lockout has defeated an AUTO start.

B. does NOT start as NO AUTO start signal is present.

C. does start as an AUTO start signal from SSW Train B is present.

D. does start as an AUTO start signal from the BOS is present.

Answer: A Page 16 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to monitor the CCW pump following a loss of off-site power.

Explanation:

A. Correct. The pump will not start as the BOS Auto Lockout has defeated an AUTO start of CCW Pump 2-02.

B. Incorrect. Plausible because CCW Pump 2-02 will not start, however, an AUTO start signal from the running train of SSW is present thus rendering this distractor incorrect.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because an AUTO start signal is present from the running train of SSW but the BOS Auto Lockout has defeated this start, thus the pump does NOT start.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because following a normal restoration to a de-energized safeguards bus the CCW Pump would auto start, however, the pump was placed in Pullout and remained in Pullout while the sequencer ran. Thus, this AUTO start is no longer present.

Technical Reference(s) ECA-0.0B, Step 8, and Bases section Attached w/ Revision # See SI & Blackout Sequencers Study Guide Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ERGC00OB100 ) Upon completion of this lesson, the student should be able to discuss plant response, operator actions, and the reasons for the actions contained in ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power; ECA-0.1, Loss of All AC Power Recovery without SI Required and ECA-0.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery with SI Required.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT7354 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 17 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.0 0B, Step 8 Revision: 8 Page 18 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.0 0B, Step 8 Bases B Revision: 8 Page 19 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SI and Blackout B Seq quencers Sttudy Guide Revision: 6-10-2011 Page 20 of 48 CPNPP NRCN 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SI and Blackout B Seq quencers Sttudy Guide Revision: 6-10-2011 Page 21 of 48 CPNPP NRCN 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 2/23/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 058 AK1.01 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 2.8 Loss of DC Power: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Battery charger equipment and instrumentation.

Question 53 With Unit 1 in Mode 3 and Battery Charger BC1ED1-2 inoperable, which of the following would require entry into Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating, action statements?

A. Battery Charger BC1ED1-1 EQUALIZE push button is depressed.

B. Battery BT1ED2 voltage is 125 VDC.

C. Battery BT1ED3 float current is 0 amps.

D. Battery Charger BC1ED4-1 is placed under clearance after placing Battery Charger BC1ED4-2 in service.

Answer: B K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the battery charger equipment as to what would constitute a TS loss of DC power..

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible since battery charger BC1ED1-2 is already out of service, but depressing the equalize push button causes battery charger output voltage to be 138 - 140 VDC which is an operable condition B. Correct. Each battery is required to have a minimum float voltage of 2.13 volts per cell or 128 volts total.

C. Incorrect. Plausible since 0 amps may indicate that the battery is not performing its function, but a float current of 0 amps indicates that the battery charger has fully charged the battery and the battery charger is supplying all bus loads. The specification is < 2 amps, per 3.8.4.A.

D. Incorrect. Plausible since one battery charger is already out of service, but BC1ED4-1 is a different train and BC1ED4-2 would be placed in service prior to placing BC1ED4-1 under clearance Technical Reference(s) Tech. Spec. 3.8.4 Attached w/ Revision # See SOP-605A, 4.1 Limitations, and 5.2.C Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: APPLY the administrative requirements of the DC Electrical Distribution system including Technical Specifications, TRM and ODCM.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT1654 Page 22 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8 55.43 Page 23 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Tech. Spec. 3.8.4 Revision:

Page 24 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-60 05A, 5.2.C Revision: 11 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-60 05A, 4.1 Revision: 11 Page 25 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/30/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 065 G.2.1.28 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.1 Loss of Instrument Air: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.

Question 54 For a Loss of Instrument Air event, which of the following completes the statements below?

1. The reason for the Auxiliary Feedwater Control Valve Air Accumulators is to provide a backup supply of operating air to the flow control valve actuators for a MINIMUM of ___(1)___.

2. The purpose of this feature is to ___(2)___ concurrent with a loss of instrument air event.

A. (1) 30 minutes (2) protect from runout of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps during a Main Feedwater Line Rupture B. (1) 30 minutes (2) maintain capability to isolate a faulted Steam Generator when normal motor operated isolation valves are not available C. (1) 45 minutes (2) protect from runout of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps during a Main Feedwater Line Rupture D. (1) 45 minutes (2) maintain capability to isolate a faulted Steam Generator when normal motor operation isolation valves are not available Answer: B Page 26 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the function and purpose for accumulators provided to specific equipment during the loss of instrument air.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part plausibility is that runout protection is a concern that is addressed in design of the Aux. Feedwater System, and is discussed in the training material, as detailed in the Study Guide and DBD for Aux. Feed.

B. Correct. Per the NOTE prior to Step 12 of ABN-301, the accumulators are designed to supply control air to the AFW control valves for 30 minutes. The Study Guide for AFW provides more information regarding the concern and the basis as being to maintain the capability to isolate a faulted Steam Generator concurrent with a loss of instrument air event .

C. Incorrect. 45 minutes is plausible since it is a specific time frame explained in the AFW Study Guide as the time beyond which, S/G overfill is expected to begin occurring, with no operator action. Second part plausibility explained in "A" above .

D. Incorrect. First part plausibility explained in "C" above. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-301, Section 2.3, Note prior to Step 12 Attached w/ Revision # See Study Guide for Auxiliary Feedwater Comments / Reference FSAR Section 10.4.9 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSIA1OB100 ) DESCRIBE the purpose of the Instrument Air System and EXPLAIN the systems interrelationship with other plant systems based on approved station documents, including but not limited too, Design Basis Documents, appropriate system drawings, Final Safety Analysis Report, vendor manuals, procedures or other appropriate documents.

Question Source: Bank # Industry Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8 55.43 Page 27 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Study Guide G for Auxxiliary Feedwwater Revision: 5-11-2011 R

MDAFW WP FLOW CONTROL VALVES A Each MD DAFW pump p discharge line l branches into indiviidual lines feeeding its tw wo associatedd SGs.

The indivvidual AFW W line to each h SG is proviided with a nnormally opeen, pneumattically operaated flow control valve.

v Manu ual isolation valves v are prrovided for m maintenancee and local fl flow control.

MDAFW W pump flow w to each SG is controlled d by flow coontrol valvess, PV-2453A A and B for tthe Train A pump, PV-2454A and B for th he Train B pu ump. The fllow control vvalves fail oppen on loss oof air or electricall power.

Each floww control vaalve is provid ded with a saafety class aiir accumulattor sized for five full cyccles, plus leak kage and steaady state con nsumption fo or 30 minutees. This allow ws the valvee to control A AFW flow folloowing a losss of Instrumeent Air coinccident with a plant condiition which rrequires AFW W operationn, or to isolatte a faulted SG S when thee normal mootor operatedd isolation vaalves are nott availablee. The manu ual isolation valves v are th flow in the evvent of loss of air to hen used to ccontrol the fl the flow control valv ves.

For plauusibility of 45 4 minutes:

The Indivvidual Plant Evaluation (IPE)

( for CPS SES takes ccredit for ope erator action n to locally co ontrol AFW flow w to the SGs s during a SG GTR event complicated c by a loss off instrument air to the TDDAFW pump flow w control vaalves. For thiis event, if no operator aaction is takeen, the TDAF FW pump flo ow control vaalves will fail open, leading to eventual overfill oof the SGs in n approximattely 45 minu utes, resulting in flooding and a consequ uent failure of o the TDAF W pump.

Commen nts / Referen nce: FSAR Section S 10.4..9 Amendme ent: 106 Page 28 of 48 CPNPP NRCN 2015 ROR Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FSAR Section S 10.4..9 Amen ndment: 106 6

Page 29 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-30 01, Section 2.3, 2 Note prio or to Step Revision: 12 12 Page 30 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/17/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 022 AK1.03 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.0 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Relationship between charging flow and PZR level.

Question 55 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in Mode 1.

Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) 1-01 is in service.

A Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) is hanging a clearance for bearing replacement on Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02.

During the process of hanging the clearance, the NEO closes 1-8471A, CCP 1-01 SUCT VLV instead of 1-8471B, CCP 1-02 SUCT VLV.

CCP 1-01 is severely damaged and trips.

Which of the following correctly completes the statements below?

1. The first action the Reactor Operator should take is to ___(1)___.

2. Once this action is completed, pressurizer level will be slowly ___(2)___.

A. (1) isolate letdown (2) lowering B. (1) isolate letdown (2) rising C. (1) start CCP 1-02 (2) lowering D. (1) start CCP 1-02 (2) rising Answer: A Page 31 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the operational implications of losing reactor coolant makeup and the short term effect on pressurizer level.

Explanation:

A. Correct. As CCP 1-02 is not available since the clearance tagout is in progress, ABN-105 requires that the Reactor Operator take the RNO for the Initial Operator Action and isolate letdown. Once letdown is isolated with no charging flow, pressurizer level will be slowly lowering as a result of the 10-12 gpm seal leakoff flow lost from the RCS.

B. Incorrect. The first part is correct as described in A above. The second part is incorrect as described in A above, but is plausible in that several malfunctions including pressurizer level instrument failures result in the isolation of letdown. During almost all of these failures, pressurizer level slowly rises due to seal injection being maintained at a flow rate above seal leakoff and thus the RCS inventory increases. This however, is not the case with no charging pump running.

C. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect but plausible as the expected response on a charging pump trip per ABN-105 is to start a CCP. However, based on the order of clearance tagouts the electrical supplies and discharge valve of CCP 1-02 should already be tagged out thus making CCP 1-02 not readily available. The second part is correct as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect as described in C above. Second part is incorrect as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-105 Attached w/ Revision # See STI-605 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21ABN105OB103 Analyze the response to a Charging Pump Trip in accordance with ABN-105, CVCS System Malfunctions Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 3 55.43 Page 32 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 05 Revision: 7 Page 33 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STI-605 5 Revision: 2 Page 34 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A W/E11 EK3.03 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.8 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation): Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

Question 56 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation is in progress.

RWST level has reached empty and ALL ECCS pumps taking suction from the RWST have been stopped.

Steam Generator pressures are 690 psig.

Step 35 is in progress to depressurize the Steam Generators (SG) to inject accumulators.

Which of the following correctly completes the statements below?

1. The operator is to depressurize the Steam Generators using the ___(1)___ valves.

2. In order to obtain the desired results from the accumulator injection, the depressurization is performed ___(2)___.

A. (1) Steam Dump (2) rapidly B. (1) Steam Dump (2) slowly C. (1) SG Atmospheric Relief (2) rapidly D. (1) SG Atmospheric Relief (2) slowly Answer: B Page 35 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the manipulation of controls during a Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation to obtain the desired operational results.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in B below. The second part is incorrect but plausible as the secondary depressurizations to 700 psig in Step 34 is done at maximum rate.

B. Correct. The preferred steam release path for the depressurization is via the Steam Dump valves.

As the condenser is available the preferred path would be used. Incorrect: The second part is correct in that ECA-1.1A Step 35 Bases, states that the depressurization should be done slowly to extend the time to depletion of the accumulators.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect as the ARVs would be used if the condenser was not available.

The second part is incorrect as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect as described in C above. The second part is correct as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) ECA-1.1A Step 35 and Bases Attached w/ Revision # See 1-PCIP Window 1.4 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21ERGC11OB105 State the bases for operator actions, notes and cautions from ECA-1.1.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # ILOT7264 (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 36 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-1.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 37 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-1.1 1A Revission: 8 Page 38 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Original Question: ILOT7264 In ECA-1.1A, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, after the RWST is empty (9%) and any ECCS pumps taking suction from the RWST are stopped, the SGs are depressurized.

Which of the following describes:

1) The manner in which the SGs are depressurized; and,

2) The reason for depressurizing the SGs in this manner?

A. 1) Depressurize SGs slowly

2) Keep the core covered, while extending the time to depletion of the accumulators B. 1) Depressurize SGs slowly

2) Keep the core covered, while using the accumulator contents to increase the recirc sump inventory as quickly as possible C. 1) Depressurize SGs rapidly

2) Keep the core covered, while extending the time to depletion of the accumulators D. 1) Depressurize SGs rapidly

2) Keep the core covered, while using the accumulator contents to increase the recirc sump inventory as quickly as possible Answer: A Page 39 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/4/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 003 G.2.4.21 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.0 Dropped Control Rod: Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.).

Question 57 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is initially at 100% power.

Annunciator 1-ALB-06D, Window 3.7, ANY ROD AT BOT alarms.

Digital Rod Position Indication shows that Control Bank D Rod D-4 (near Power Range N44) has dropped into the core.

1. Over the next several hours the overall core Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) will ___(1)___.

2. Within one hour, action must be taken to verify or restore ___(2)___.

A. (1) lower (2) QPTR B. (1) lower (2) Shutdown Margin C. (1) raise (2) Shutdown Margin D. (1) raise (2) QPTR Answer: C Page 40 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the maintenance of the safety function SDM and parameters which will be affected in the core as a result of the dropped rod.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Reduction of QPTR value is plausible if the applicant confuses the actual power change in the fuel assembly with the quadrant power tilt. Power produced in the assembly and in that quadrant overall would be lowered. The lowered power produced in that quadrant results in an increase in the value of the quadrant power tilt ration (i.e., the power in that quadrant compared to the power in the other quadrants). Second part is plausible since there is a Tech. Spec. associated with QPTR (3.2.4) and it would apply if the ratio was out of spec. If it did apply, the Completion Time is not within one hour; it is two hours.

B. Incorrect. Second part is correct. First part plausibility described in "A" above.

C. Correct. As a result of the dropped, indication on N-44 will be lower than the on the other three power ranges. This will result in an indicated power tilt in that quadrant. Over the next several hours, Xenon will build in at the dropped rod assembly, further suppressing power in that location (and quadrant) and thus raising the severity of the quadrant power tilt. Tech. Spec. 3.1.4 Condition A (One or more rods inoperable) applies with a Completion Time of one hour to verify and restore SDM.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part plausibility described in "A" above.

Technical Reference(s) 1-ALB-06D, Window 3.7 Attached w/ Revision # See Tech. Spec. 3.1.4 Condition A Comments / Reference Tech. Spec. 3.2.4, Condition A ABN-712, Section 3.0 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SSTRODOB100 ) DESCRIBE the operation of the Rod Control system in accordance with IPO-003A/B, ODA-102, and Operations Guideline 3 and evaluate the effects of system malfunctions on plant operation in accordance with ABN-712.

Question Source: Bank # Industry Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 Page 41 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-0 06D, Window w 3.7 Revision: 6 Page 42 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Tech. Spec. 3.1.4 Condition C A Revision: Amendmeent 164 Page 43 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Tech. Spec. 3.2.4, Condition C A Revision: Amendmen nt 164 Page 44 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-712, Section 3.0 3 Revision: 10 Page 45 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/30/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 005 AA2.01 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.3 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: Stuck or inoperable rod from in-core and ex-core NIS, incore or loop temperature measurements.

Question 58 In accordance with ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction which of the following is one of the redundant indications specified for determining whether or not there is an actual problem that could indicate a stuck rod is misaligned?

A. Compare initial turbine load to current turbine load.

B. Compare initial Plant Computer thermocouple map to current thermocouple map.

C. Compare initial Loop Hot Leg temperatures to current Hot Leg temperatures.

D. Compare initial Loop Cold Leg temperatures to current Loop Cold Leg temperatures.

Answer: B Page 46 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate what method they would use from the incore thermocouples to ascertain that a stuck rod is actually misaligned.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible because Turbine load can affect rod position, however, information is not specified in ABN-712.

B. Correct. Per ABN-712, observation of Plant Computer thermocouple maps which indicate approximately equal temperatures is an acceptable method to determine that all rods are aligned.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because Rod movement near the Hot Legs could affect Hot Leg temperature but would not be recognizable unless the inserted rod was near the Hot Leg. Information is not specified in ABN-712.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because Rod movement near the Hot Legs could affect Hot Leg temperature which in turn could affect Cold Leg temperatures but is incorrect for same reason as above.

Information is not specified in ABN-712.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-712, Section 4.3, Step 6 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SSTRODOB100 ) DESCRIBE the operation of the Rod Control system in accordance with IPO-003A/B, ODA-102, and Operations Guideline 3 and evaluate the effects of system malfunctions on plant operation in accordance with ABN-712.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT8169 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 Page 47 of 48 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 49 to 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-712, Section 4.3, 4 Step 6 Revision: 10 Page 48 of 48 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 49 to 5 58

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 024 AK3.02 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.2 Emergency Boration: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Emergency Boration: Actions contained in EOP for emergency boration.

Question 59 Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 just tripped from 100% power.

Three control rods are NOT fully inserted.

In accordance with EOP-0.0B, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection foldout page:

1. The MINIMUM required amount of 7000 ppm boric acid for emergency boration is ___(1)___.

2. The reason for this requirement is to ensure adequate shutdown margin while accounting for the maximum reactivity for each stuck rod during ___(2)___.

A. (1) 3600 gallons (2) small break LOCA B. (1) 5400 gallons (2) small break LOCA C. (1) 3600 gallons (2) Main Steam Line Break D. (1) 5400 gallons (2) Main Steam Line Break Answer: D Page 1 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the reason for the emergency boration required when three control rods fail to insert on a reactor trip.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 3600 gallons is plausible, since in the industry there are facilities that only require that emergency boration requirements be based on stuck rods beyond an assumed single highest reactivity worth rod (e.g., Palisades). A small break LOCA is plausible as the most limiting accident and of the highest concern for shutdown margin, since an applicant could confuse the concept of shutdown margin and believe that a small break LOCA is the most severe type of accident, as far as core geometry, subcooling, and a myriad of other concerns.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct. Plausibility of second part described in "A" above.

C. Incorrect. Second part is correct. Plausibility of first part described in "A" above..

D. Correct. The requirement of EOP-0.0B, Attachment 1.A foldout page is to emergency borate 1800 gallons of 7000 ppm boric acid for each control rod not fully inserted. 3 x 1800 = 5400 gallons.

Per guidance in the applicable safety analysis for Tech. Spec. 3.1.1, Shutdown Margin, the most limiting accident is the Main Steam Line Break. See excerpt below. The Boron Dilution Accident mentioned in the Technical Specification Bases as limiting does not involve any stuck rods and is only limiting in time for the operator to identify the condition. Thus Inadvertent Boron Dilution would not be correct for the given conditions as a limiting accident.

Technical Reference(s) EOP-0.0B, Attachment 1.A, Step 2 Attached w/ Revision # See Tech. Spec. 3.1.1 Bases, Safety Analysis Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ERGE0AOB107 ) DISCUSS EOP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection including the Purpose, Applicability, Symptoms/Entry Conditions, Operator Actions, Bases, Foldout Pages and Attachments.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT8310 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 2 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-0.0 0B, Attachm ment 1.A, Ste ep 2 Revision: 8 Page 3 of o 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Tech. Spec. 3.1.1 Bases B Safetyy Analysis Revision: 67 Page 4 of o 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 665

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A W/E03 EA1.02 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.7 LOCA Cooldown - Depress: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization: Operating characteristics of the facility.

Question 60 Given the following conditions:

A small break LOCA has occurred.

No RCPs are running.

The crew is performing the actions of EOS-1.2A, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

There is a void in the reactor vessel head.

The crew is preparing to start RCP 1-04.

Which of the following should be the expected pressurizer level and subcooling response when the RCP is started?

A. Pressurizer level will decrease and Subcooling will degrade.

B. Pressurizer level will increase and Subcooling will degrade.

C. Pressurizer level will decrease and Subcooling will improve.

D. Pressurizer level will increase and Subcooling will improve.

Answer: A Page 5 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to determine the effect on the plant of starting a RCP during LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization with a void in the reactor vessel head.

Explanation:

A. Correct. Starting an RCP with a void in the reactor vessel head will cause a decrease in pressurizer level and RCS subcooling will degrade as the void is collapsed.

B. Incorrect. Plausible to think that starting RCP 1-04 will cause an increase in pressurizer level due to the pressurizer surge line being connected to RCS loop 4. RCS subcooling is correct as described in A above.

C. Incorrect. Pressurizer level is correct as described in A above. Plausible to think that RCS subcooling will improve when starting an RCP with no RCPs running.

D. Incorrect. Plausibility of both parts previously described.

Technical Reference(s) EOS-1.2A Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: (LO21ERGE12OB105 ) Given a procedural step, or sequence of steps, from EOS-1.2, state the purpose/basis for the step.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT0869 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 Page 6 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-1.2 2A Revision: 8 Page 7 of o 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-1.2 2A Revision: 8 Page 8 of o 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/4/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 037 AK3.03 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.1 Steam Generator Tube Leak: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: Comparison of makeup flow and letdown flow for various modes of operation.

Question 61 Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

The crew is in ABN-106, High Secondary Activity, due to a steam generator tube leak.

Main Steam Line radiation monitor 2-RE-2327 (MSL-280) MAIN STEAM LINE 2-03 is in RED (HIGH) alarm and rising.

Main Steam Line N-16 monitor 2-RE-2327A (N16-276) MAIN STEAM LINE 2-03 LEAK RATE is in RED (HIGH) alarm reading 150 gpd and stable.

2-FI-121A, CHRG FLO is indicating 185 gpm and stable.

2-FI-132, LTDN FLO is indicating 43 gpm and stable.

CCP 2-01 and CCP 2-02 are both running.

PRZR LVL has lowered from 53% to 46% in the last three minutes and continues to lower.

1. The above conditions are indicative of a leak rate of approximately ___(1)___ gpm.

2. In accordance with ABN-106, the required action is to ___(2)____.

A. (1) 140 (2) reduce power to < 50% in one hour and be in MODE 3 in the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> B. (1) 140 (2) trip the reactor and actuate Safety Injection C. (1) 300 (2) trip the reactor and actuate Safety Injection D. (1) 300 (2) reduce power to < 50% in one hour and be in MODE 3 in the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Answer: C Page 9 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to makeup and letdown flows to determine the size of the steam generator tube leakage.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 140 gpm is plausible if only subtracting charging from makeup (185 - 43 = 142) however, this would be ignoring seal leakoff flow and the decrease in pressurizer level. Reducing power to < 50% in one hour is plausible since that would be correct for certain conditions involving a steam generator tube leak.

B. Incorrect. Second part is correct. First part plausibility described in "A" above.

C. Correct. This is the correct leakage as calculated by considering the difference in charging, letdown and seal leakoff (185 - 43 + 10 = 152) added to the volume lost in the pressurizer which from ABN-103 is approximately 65 gal/% ((53-46) x 65 = 455/3 min = 152 gpm). Then adding the two values (152 + 152 = 304). As the applicant will use thumb rules the 300 gpm value is approximate. Step 4.b directs the operators to trip the reactor, since pressurizer level is decreasing in an uncontrollable manner.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Plausibility of second part described in "A" above.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-106, Section 3.3, Steps 1-4 Attached w/ Revision # See ABN-103, Attachment 1 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ANALYZE the response to a Steam Generator Tube Leakage greater than or equal to 75 gpd in accordance with ABN-106, High Secondary Activity.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # ILOT8045 (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 10 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 06, Section 3.3 3 Revision: 10 Page 11 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 06, Section 3.3, 3 Steps 1--4 Revision: 10 Page 12 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 03, Attachme ent 1 Revision:: 9 PCN 1 Page 13 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Original Question ILOT8045 Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

The crew is performing ABN-106, High Secondary Activity, due to a steam generator tube leak.

Main Steam Line radiation monitor 2-RE-2327 (MSL-280) MAIN STEAM LINE 2-03 is in RED (HIGH) alarm and rising.

Main Steam Line N-16 monitor 2-RE-2327A (N16-276) MAIN STEAM LINE 2-03 LEAK RATE is in RED (HIGH) alarm reading 150 gpd and stable.

2-FI-121A, CHRG FLO is indicating 185 gpm and stable.

2-FI-132, LTDN FLO is indicating 43 gpm and stable.

CCP 2-01 and CCP 2-02 are both running.

PRZR LVL has lowered from 53% to 46% in the last three minutes and continues to lower.

Which of the following describes:

1) The significance of the alarms, regarding primary to secondary leakage; and,

2) Which of the following actions is required?

A. 1) Leakage is greater than 75 gpd and less than 2.5 gpm

2) Initiate a plant shutdown. Be in MODE 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

B. 1) Leakage is greater than 75 gpd and less than 2.5 gpm

2) Initiate a plant shutdown. Be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

C. 1) Leakage is greater than 2.5 gpm

2) Trip the reactor, actuate Safety Injection, and go to EOP-0.0B, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

D. 1) Leakage is greater than 2.5 gpm

2) Reduce power to < 50% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND be in MODE 3 in the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Answer: C Page 14 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/20/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A W/E02 EK2.02 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.5 Safety Injection Termination: Knowledge of the interrelations between (SI Termination) and the following: Facilities heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and the relationship between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Question 62 Given the following conditions:

Following a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, the crew has transitioned to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination.

Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02 and both Safety Injection Pumps have been stopped and placed in standby.

Normal Charging flow has been established.

Containment pressure is 1.2 psig and stable.

Reactor Coolant System subcooling is currently 19ºF and slowly degrading.

Pressurizer level is 18% and slowly decreasing.

Which of the following actions is to be taken in accordance with the Foldout Page of EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination?

Manually A. control Charging flow as necessary and continue in EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination.

B. operate Emergency Core Cooling Pumps as necessary and continue in EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination.

C. operate Emergency Core Cooling Pumps as necessary and transition to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

D. control Charging flow as necessary and transition to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Answer: C Page 15 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the proper operation of ECCS Systems with respect to Safety Injection Termination and proper flow path through facility procedures.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is plausible since this is the action required if adequate subcooling existed but pressurizer level is below 13%. However, in accordance with the Bases of the Foldout Page if the Charging Pump is selected the pump must be realigned to the injection flowpath and the normal charging path isolated, thus making the distractor to control charging flow incorrect. The second part is incorrect as the Foldout page requires that a transition be made to EOP-1.0.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct in accordance with the Foldout Page. The second part is incorrect but plausible if believed that further actions in EOS-1.1A, would allow the completion of SI termination. However, a transition to EOP-1.0 is required.

C. Correct. In accordance with the Foldout Page of EOS-1.1A, with subcooling being less than 25°F, ECCS Pumps must be started as necessary and a transition made to EOP-1.0. Knowledge of the Foldout Page items is required RO level knowledge including the procedure transition.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in A above. The second part is plausible in that in accordance with Step 14 of EOS-1.1A, if pressurizer level cannot be maintained after attempting to control charging flow then the a transition to EOP-1.0A would still be required.

Technical Reference(s) EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.A Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: (LO21ERGE11OB107) Identify the items on EOS-1.1, Safety Injection Termination Foldout Page including any equipment, parameter, set point or condition.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT5805 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam CPNPP June 2014 Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 16 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-1.1 1A, Attachm ment 1.A R Revision: 8 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-1.1 1A R Revision: 8 Page 17 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-1.1 1A R Revision: 8 Page 18 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 2/23/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 060 AK2.02 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 2.7 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel.: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release and the following: Auxiliary building ventilation system.

Question 63 Given the following conditions:

An approved release from Gas Decay Tank 1 is in progress.

The Waste Gas Compressor is running and compressing gas into Gas Decay Tank 2.

The relief valve on Gas Decay Tank 2 (minimally decayed) develops a significant leak.

It is determined that the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System needs to be isolated.

Subsequently:

The following radiation monitors are in high alarm:

X-RE-5250, Waste Gas Radiation Monitor X-RE-5701, Aux. Bldg. Vent Duct Monitor

1. Auxiliary Building Ventilation will be isolated ___(1)___ .

2. X-HCV-0014, Waste Gas Discharge Control Valve will automatically close as a result of the high alarm on ___(2)___.

A. (1) only with manual action by the operators (2) X-RE-5250 B. (1) automatically due to the high alarm on X-RE-5701 (2) X-RE-5250 C. (1) only with manual action by the operators (2) X-RE-5701 D. (1) automatically due to the high alarm on X-RE-5701 (2) X-RE-5701 Answer: C Page 19 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the relationship between the auxiliary building ventilation system and an accidental gaseous release.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is correct. It seems plausible that a radiation monitor labeled "Waste Gas Radiation Monitor" would monitor waste gas, including releases, and initiate automatic protective actions, if needed. This monitor is used by the operators, but only to provide indication of high activity at the suction of the Waste Gas Compressor.

B. Incorrect. Plausible since X-RE-5701 does have an associated automatic action, and highly plausible that a monitor titled "Aux Bldg. Ventilation Duct Monitor", and knowing that it does have an automatic action, that the automatic action would be directly associated Aux. Bldg. ventilation.

Automatic actuation related to Aux. Bldg. ventilation is also plausible since there is an automatic action for Aux. Bldg. ventilation, but it is for auto start of a standby fan .

C. Correct. There is an automatic action for Aux. Bldg. ventilation, but not for realignment for isolation of the system on a high rad. It is for auto start of a standby fan. If the operators decide that isolation of the Aux. Bldg. ventilation system is needed, they will need to manually make these realignments. Per the references, if X-RE-5701 goes into high alarm it will close the waste gas discharge valve automatically.

D. Incorrect. Second part is correct. Plausibility of first part described in "B" above.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-902, Section 2.2 Attached w/ Revision # See Study Guide for Gaseous Waste Comments / Reference Processing ALM-3200, DRMS, Attachment 3 ALM-0401, Gaseous Waste Panel, Window 1.8 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSRWSOB103 ) DESCRIBE the components of the Gaseous Waste system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 11 55.43 Page 20 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-90 02, Section 2.2 2 Revision: 7 Page 21 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen 200, DRMS, Attachment 3 nce: ALM-32 Revision: 4 Page 22 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen 401, Gaseous Waste Pa nel, Window nce: ALM-04 w Revision: 5 1.8 Page 23 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for Gaseous Waste Revision:

Processing From Controlled Access Ventilation Study Guide (for plausibility of auto actuation of the Aux. Bldg. Ventilation Instrumentation & Control PRIMARY PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEM Instrumentation and controls for the Primary Plant Ventilation System is located on ventilation control panels CV-01, CV-02 and CV-03 in the control room.

Controls and indication are provided for all the supply and exhaust units in the Primary Plant Ventilation System, as well as:

Damper position lights Damper closed alarm, if damper does not open automatically within 20 seconds of starting fan.

Alarms indicating abnormal operation of fans, dampers or filters Thermostats and status lights for supply heaters Auto start feature for Auxiliary Building Ventilation Equipment Supply and Exhaust fans, will start the standby fan on low pressure across the operating fan Radiation monitor is provided in exhaust Temperature indication for areas cooled Separate alarms for ESF and NON-ESF exhaust fan/heater trips.

From Controlled Access Ventilation Study Guide to show that operators will need manual action to isolate the ventilation system:

Radiation Monitors Radiation monitors are located in each plant ventilation discharge vent to monitor all effluent discharged to the environment. An additional radiation monitor is located in the main exhaust header from each Safeguards Building, the Fuel Handling Building, and the Auxiliary Building. A high radiation signal from any one of these is annunciated in the control room and allows the operator to isolate the respective area or the entire system as well as switch the control room HVAC system to emergency operation.

Page 24 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for Gaseous Waste Revision:

Processing The Gaseous Waste Processing System is a collection and holdup system for radioactive waste gases. In the Gaseous Waste Processing System, the waste gases can be stored for a period of several years. This eliminates the need for regularly scheduled discharges of waste gases from the system to the atmosphere. Since the system has a relatively large waste gas holdup capability, the system functions to minimize the release of gases during all operating conditions.

The Gaseous Waste Processing System is designed so that individual gas decay tanks can be sampled, isolated, and then discharged in a controlled manner. Radiation monitors are installed in discharge piping to ensure that releases are made within the allowable discharge limits.

The gas portion of the Gaseous Waste Processing System is a closed loop consisting of two waste gas compressors, two catalytic hydrogen recombiners, eight gas decay tanks for normal power service, and two gas decay tanks for service at shutdown and startup. The system also includes a gas decay tank drain pump, four gas traps, and a waste gas drain filter to permit maintenance and normal operation draining of the Gaseous Waste Processing System. All the equipment is located in the Auxiliary Building.

Page 25 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/17/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 067 AK1.01 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 2.9 Plant Fire On-site: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Plant Fire on Site:

Fire classifications, by type.

Question 64 Given the following conditions:

The following alarms are received on the Main Fire Detection Board; Window 1.8, UNIT 1 CSR Window 2.8, UNIT 1 CSR HALON SYS ACT

1. Halon initiation ___(1)___.

2. Halon is used to extinguish ___(2)___ fires.

A. (1) is preceded by a TWO minute delay to allow sufficient time for personnel to exit the area (2) Class D B. (1) is preceded by a TWO minute delay to allow sufficient time for personnel to exit the area (2) Class C C. (1) is preceded by a ONE minute delay to allow sufficient time for personnel to exit the area (2) Class D D. (1) is preceded by a ONE minute delay to allow sufficient time for personnel to exit the area (2) Class C Answer: D K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to identify the fire classification by type for a fire occurring on-site.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because Halon initiation is delayed, however, the time period is one minute and the reason is to allow personnel to evacuate. The second part is plausible as Class D is another classification of fire, but is for ignitable metals which would normally not be present in the Cable Spread Room.

B. Incorrect. First part as described in A above. Second part is correct.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part as described in A above.

D. Correct. Automatic initiation of Cable Spread Room Halon is preceded by a one minute delay to allow personnel to exit the area. Halon is used to extinguish in the cable spreading room as electrical fires are Class C which Halon use is the preferred fire suppressant.

Page 26 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for Fire Protection Attached w/ Revision # See FPI-505 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the components of the Fire Suppression system including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # ILOT7009 (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8 55.43 Page 27 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Study Guide G for Fire e Protection R Revision: 4-1 19-2011 Cable Sp pread Room m Halon Sysstem Operattion A main reserve r selecctor switch determines d baank dischargge response tto a fire. Haalon systemss are automatically actuateed by ion sm moke detectorrs (at least 22) within the serviced areea. Actuatioon will initiate a fire alarm liight and horn n at the locaal panel. 60 sseconds lateer the Halon will be dischharged.

A blue paanel light ind dicates the completion c of o bank dischharge.

The locall fire alarm is i also indicaated at the coontrol room fire panel. T The alarm wwill provide ffor damper closure c or, in n the case off the cable sppreading room m, stop the ssupply and eexhaust fans.

If it is neecessary or desirable d to shift s over to the t remaininng bank, it caan be dischaarged by seleecting the selecttor switch to o the chargedd reserve ban nk. To clearr the alarm fr from the pannel, the systemm reset pushbutto on (inside caabinet) shoulld be pressed d. Providedd the alarm coondition is cclear, this acttion will clear the alarm, if thee conditions resulting in the alarm sttill exist, the alarm will rreinstate itseelf. The silence button will silence the ho orn at the Halon panel.

The paneel abort butto ons allow a delay d of Halon dischargee, so long ass the button iis depressed.

The systeem dischargee switch allo ows release of o the on serrvice bank affter the 60 seecond timer and will activate thet fire alarm m.

Commen nts / Referen nce: FPI-505 5 Revision: 3 Page 28 of 34 CPNPP NRCN 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Original Question: ILOT7009 Which of the following statements is correct regarding the automatic actuation of the Cable Spread Room Halon Fire Suppression System?

A. A five minute delay precedes the Halon initiation to allow sufficient time for dampers to isolate in the affected area.

B. Halon initiation is immediate in order to protect sensitive plant equipment given the chemical's minimal personnel hazard.

C. Halon initiation can be delayed for five minutes by momentarily depressing the ABORT pushbutton at the associated panel.

D. A one minute delay precedes the Halon initiation to allow personnel adequate time to leave the area.

Answer: D Page 29 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/20/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 068 AA1.03 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.1 Control Room Evac.: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: S/G level.

Question 65 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Shift Manager has implemented ABN-905A, Loss of Control Room Habitability.

Steam Generator (SG) Level is to be maintained between an ACTUAL Level of 84% and 92%

while operating the unit from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

The plant has been cooled down from an RCS Cold Leg temperature of 557ºF to 400ºF and depressurized from 2235 psig to 1000 psig and stabilized to allow isolating the Safety Injection Accumulators Which of the following satisfies the required INDICATED SG Wide Range Level?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. Between 67% and 72%

B. Between 70% and 75%

C. Between 73% and 78%

D. Between 76% and 81%

Answer: C Page 30 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to monitor indicated SG level and translate to actual SG level when operating from outside the Control Room.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible as the band of 6% is maintained constant in all answers. The applicant must correctly determine both an upper and lower band indication.

B. Incorrect. Plausible as the band of 6% is maintained constant in all answers. The applicant must correctly determine both an upper and lower band indication.

C. Correct. Per ABN-905A, Attachment 16 is required for temperature correction.

D. Incorrect. Plausible as the band of 6% is maintained constant in all answers. The applicant must correctly determine both an upper and lower band indication.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-905A, Step 14 & Attachment 16 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: ABN-905A, Attachment 16 Learning Objective: ( LO21ABN803OB102 ) ANALYZE the response to a Loss Of Control Room Habitability in accordance with ABN-905, Loss Of Control Room Habitability.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # ILOT6396 (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 31 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-90 05A, Step 14 4 Revision: 9 Page 32 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-90 05A, Attachm ment 16 Revision:: 9 Page 33 of 34 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 59 to 6 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Original Question ILOT6396 Given the following conditions:

The Shift Manager has implemented ABN-905A, Loss of Control Room Habitability.

Pressurizer Level is to be maintained between an ACTUAL level of 25% and 50%

while operating the unit from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

The plant has been cooled down from 557ºF to 400ºF and depressurized from 2235 psig to 1000 psig and stabilized to allow isolating the Safety Injection Accumulators.

Which of the following satisfies the required INDICATED Pressurizer Level band while isolating the accumulators?

A. Between 15% and 34%.

B. Between 20% and 42%.

C. Between 30% and 50%.

D. Between 35% and 64%.

Answer: C Page 34 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 59 to 65

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/4/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.1.5 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 2.9 Conduct of Operations: Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

Question: 66 Given the following:

Unit 1 is in MODE 4.

Unit 2 is in MODE 1.

The shift is manned to the minimum composition.

The shift has 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> remaining.

The Unit 2 RO has become ill and must leave the site.

Which of the following describes the requirements regarding:

(1) The shift composition (2) The MINIMUM required action in this situation A. (1) The Unit 2 RO may turnover responsibilities to the Unit 1 BOP, but must remain onsite until a replacement arrives.

(2) A replacement must arrive within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

B. (1) The Unit 2 RO may turnover responsibilities to the Unit 1 BOP, but must remain onsite until a replacement arrives.

(2) A replacement must arrive within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

C. (1) The Unit 2 RO may leave the site immediately after turnover of responsibilities to the Unit 2 BOP.

(2) A replacement must arrive within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

D. (1) The Unit 2 RO may leave the site immediately after turnover of responsibilities to the Unit 2 BOP.

(2) A replacement must arrive within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Answer: C Page 1 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to use procedures related to shift staffing at turnover.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible as the turnover of responsibilities is allowed, however if the actual situation requires invoking this exception the operator is allowed to leave site. The second part is correct.

B. Incorrect. The first part is plausible as described in A above. Second part is plausible as described in D below.

C. Correct. Per ODA-102, the operations shift crew composition may be one less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements.

D. Incorrect. The first part is correct as described in C above. The second part is incorrect as 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> exceeds to the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> requirement. This time is plausible as an operator can work as much as 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> in excess of the normal shift without exceeding work hour rules.

Technical Reference(s) ODA-102, Attachment 8A Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ADMXA3OB101 ) STATE requirements for Conduct of Operations in accordance with ODA-102, ODA-407 and Operations Guideline 3.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT8051 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 2 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-10 02, Attachme ent 8A R Revision: 27 Page 3 of o 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-10 02, Attachment 8A Revision: 27 Page 4 of o 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-10 02, Attachment 8A Revision: 27 Page 5 of o 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/17/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.1.8 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.4 Conduct of Operations: Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room.

Question: 67 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The crew is in ABN-807A, Response to Fire in the Containment Building.

The BOP operator dispatches a Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) to perform Attachment 1, Actions to Be Taken by the Nuclear Equipment Operator.

In accordance with ABN-807A, Attachment 1:

1. The NEO is required to ensure ___(1)___ the Pressurizer PORV power supply breakers on 1ED1 and 1ED2.

2. The MAXIMUM time limit for completing this action is ___(2)___.

A. (1) open (2) 5 minutes B. (1) open (2) 30 minutes C. (1) closed (2) 5 minutes D. (1) closed (2) 30 minutes Answer: A Page 6 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to coordinate timed actions of operators outside the control room.

Explanation:

A. Correct. Per ABN-807A, Att. 1, the first two steps are performed to remove power from several components in containment to prevent spurious operation, during a fire event. The PORV power supplies must be de-energized within 5 minutes.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in A above. 30 minutes is plausible since this is a common time frame for numerous requirements such as taking manual control of AOVs with a loss of instrument air.

C. Incorrect. Plausible to make sure that a critical component such as a PORV would remain available for operation, especially during an event with potentially unknown consequences as a fire in containment. The time limit is correct as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in C above. Second part as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-807A, Attachment 1 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSFP1OB104 ) EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operations of the Fire Protection system.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 7 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-80 08A, Attachm ment 1 Revision: 8 Page 8 of o 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/17/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.1.13 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 2.5 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital/controlled access.

Question: 68 Of the following personnel who desire access to the "At the Controls" area of the control room, the

______ requires specific approval from a member of the currently assigned control room staff.

A. PROMPT Team Supervisor B. Site Vice President C. All operations personnel assigned to the control room D. Duty Manager Answer: A K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to identify facility requirements for controlling access to a vital area.

Explanation:

A. Correct. Maintenance and engineering personnel, including managers, are not exempt from having to obtain permission to enter the At the Controls area, per STA-616. The PROMPT Team Supervisor is plausible as they work rotating shifts with the same Operations crew. It is plausible that they would be granted additional access.

B. Incorrect. Plausible since some facilities do require anyone not on the immediate operating staff to obtain permission to enter the At the Controls area.

C. Incorrect. Plausible to believe that non-licensed operations personnel would still need to request permission, since they are not licensed individuals; but STA-616 excludes all operations personnel assigned to the control room from the requirement.

D. Incorrect. Plausible to believe that someone, even if it is the Duty Manager, would require permission especially carrying a beverage, but this situation is not prohibited by STA-616..

Technical Reference(s) STA-616, Section 6.1 Attached w/ Revision # See MDA-101 Comments / Reference Page 9 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ADMXA3OB101 ) STATE requirements for Conduct of Operations in accordance with ODA-102, ODA-407 and Operations Guideline 3.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 10 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-616, Section 6.1 6 Revision: 8 Page 11 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-616, Section 6.1 6 Revision: 8 Page 12 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: MDA-10 01 Revision: 9 Page 13 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: MDA-10 01 Revision: 9 Page 14 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.2.12 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.7 Equipment Control: Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Question: 69 Which is the primary difference between tests which are part of the Operations Test Manual (OPTs) and tests that are part of the Equipment Test Procedures (ETPs)?

A. OPTs are performed for Technical Specification (TS) surveillances assigned to Operations and ETPs are performed for TS surveillances assigned to System Engineering.

B. OPTs are performed for ALL surveillances assigned to Operations of specific components and ETPs are performed for ALL surveillances assigned to Operations that are integrated plant tests.

C. OPTs are performed for TS surveillances assigned to Operations and ETPs are assigned for TRM and ODCM surveillances assigned to Operations.

D. OPTs are performed for ALL surveillances assigned to Operations and ETPs are performed for non-surveillance tests or inspections assigned to Operations.

Answer: D K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate a generic knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible as OPTs are performed for TS surveillances assigned to Operations, but also TRM and ODCM surveillances assigned to Operations. ETPs are not performed for TS surveillances assigned to System Engineering as these would be PPTs.

B. Incorrect. Plausible, since the first part of the answer appears correct except OPTs are for component, system and integrated testing evolutions that are assigned to Operations. ETPs are not for surveillance procedures.

C. Incorrect. Plausible if it was thought that the distinction between OPTs and ETPs was the requirement document, however, all surveillances are performed by OPTs to ensure the appropriate level of scrutiny is maintained.

D. Correct. Per STA-202 the difference between OPTs and ETPs is delineated.

Technical Reference(s) STA-202, Attachment 8.A Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Page 15 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective: ( LO21ADMXA5OB105 ) DISCUSS the requirements of STA-702, Surveillance Program, including the Master Surveillance Test List.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 16 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-202 2 Revision: 36 PCN 6 Page 17 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-202 2 Revision: 36 PCN 6 Page 18 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/4/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.2.13 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.1 Equipment Control: Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

Question: 70 In accordance with STI-605,01, Work Control and Clearance and Safety Tagging, which of the following correctly completes the statements associated with hanging and verifying tags on the Main Control Board (MCB)?

1. An individual ___(1)___ have to possess a USNRC license (SRO or RO) in order to affix a tag to the front side of the MCB.

2. An individual ___(2)___ have to possess a USNRC license (SRO or RO) in order to verify a tag affixed to the front side of the MCB.

A. (1) does (2) does B. (1) does NOT (2) does C. (1) does (2) does NOT D. (1) does NOT (2) does NOT Answer: C Page 19 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate a specific knowledge of the tagging and clearance procedures.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is correct. Plausible that since affixing the tag requires a licensed individual, that it would have the same requirement for verifying the tag. But STI-605.01 clearly directs that any Qualified Operator (including shift NEOs) can verify the tag.

B. Incorrect. Plausible that an individual would not need to be licensed to affix a tag in this location, since the control room is under the constant scrutiny of licensed individuals on watch, and because practically all of the tagging in the plant does NOT require that the individual be licensed in order to affix a tag. Plausible as most of the tagging is done by non-licensed operators that either the placement or verification would need to be done by a licensed operator on the MCB.

C. Correct. Per STI-605.01 only a licensed RO or SRO may actually affix a tag on the front of the Main Control Boards, but any Qualified Operator may verify the tag (does NOT require them to hold a license)..

D. Incorrect. First part as described in B above. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) STI-605-01, 6.4.1.C Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21WCCXA1OB107 ) STATE the purpose of the CPNPP Clearance and Tagging program.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 20 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STI-605 5-01, 6.4.1.C C Revision: 2 Page 21 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.3.7 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.5 Radiation Control: Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions..

Question 71 With regards to Escorted Radiation Worker requirements, complete the following statements (Consider each statement separately):

1. The MINIMUM level position which can authorize Escorted Radiation Worker status is

____(1)____.

2. During emergencies, in accordance with STA-656, Radiation Work Control. unqualified or offsite personnel that need to enter an RCA should be granted access as an Escorted Radiation Worker and should ____(2)____.

A. (1) a qualified Radiation Protection Technician (2) obtain a whole body count prior to RCA entry B. (1) a qualified Radiation Protection Technician (2) have the whole body count prior to RCA entry waived C. (1) the RP Supervisor (2) obtain a whole body count prior to RCA entry D. (1) the RP Supervisor (2) have the whole body count prior to RCA entry waived Answer: B Page 22 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of RWPs (Radiation Work Control) requirements for escorted radiation workers.

Explanation:

A. 1st part is correct. A qualified radiation protection technician can grant escorted radiation worker status. 2nd part is incorrect because in this situation, per STA-656, Radiation Work Control, the whole body count requirement should be waived. It is plausible because this is not the normal practice and if something were to happen, there is no baseline data for internal exposure.

B. 1st part is correct. 2nd part is correct.

C. 1st part is incorrect because an RP Tech can grant this status. It is plausible because Supervisors typically have to approve things such as General Access Permits for RCAs. 2nd part is incorrect but plausible (see A).

D. 1st part is incorrect but plausible (see C). 2nd part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) STA-656, Radiation Work Control Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 12 55.43 Page 23 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-656 Revision: 19 Page 24 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-656 Revision: 19 Page 25 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-656 Revision: 19 Page 26 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/12/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.3.15 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 2.9 Radiation Control: Knowledge of the radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc..

Question 72 Which of the following identifies the status of an Area Radiation Monitor channel with a dark BLUE background on the PC-11, Digital Radiation Monitoring System?

A. PC-11 Poll Status B. Operate Failure C. Channel Alert Alarm D. Channel High Alarm Answer: B K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the radiation monitoring system and in particular fixed area monitors.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible because there is an alarm associated with PC-11 POLL STATUS, however, it is a white indication.

B. Correct. Designated in the Stem as a dark blue background because an EQUIPMENT FAILURE alarm is a light blue background.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because there is an alarm associated with Channel ALERT, however, it is a yellow indication.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because there is an alarm associated with Channel HIGH, however, it is a red indication.

Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for Digital Rad Monitoring, Attached w/ Revision # See page 39 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Digital Radiation Monitoring System..

Page 27 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Question Source: Bank # ILOT0880 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 11 55.43 Page 28 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Study Guide for Digital Rad Monitoring, Revision: 4-28-2011 page 39 of 56 A monitor that is flashing indicates an alarm condition that has not been acknowledged.

Normal Operation - Green PC-11 Poll Status - White (Gray)

PC-11 Communications - Magenta Operate Failure - Blue Channel High Alarm - Red Channel Alert Alarm - Yellow Equipment Failure - Light Blue Page 29 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/20/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.4.46 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.2 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

Question 73 Unit 1 plant conditions:

RCS heat up is in progress RCS temperature = 340°F LTOP RCS PRESS HI/AUCT TEMP LO is lit AT LO TEMP PORV 455A APPROACHING LMT PRESS is dark PORV 1-PCV-455A is closed Based on the above plant conditions, correctly complete the following statements:

1. 1-PCV-455A ____(1)____.

2. If / when the design LTOP event were to occur, a single PORV ____(2)____adequately relieve pressure sufficiently to prevent system failure.

A. (1) has failed to open and should be opened to relieve RCS pressure (2) could B. (1) has failed to open and should be opened to relieve RCS pressure (2) could NOT C. (1) is in the correct position (2) could D. (1) is in the correct position (2) could NOT Answer: C Page 30 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

This question matches the KA by requiring demonstration of knowledge relating to annunciators reflecting current plant status.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect because the PORV should still be closed. It is plausible because LTOP RCS PRESS HI/AUCT TEMP LO will alarm if RCS pressure exceeds the setpoint, however, in this case it has alarmed because RCS temperature is below 350°F. Second part is correct; one PORV could adequately protect the RCS from the design pressure transient as described in C below.

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible, as described in A above. Second part is incorrect because 1 PORV is adequate, as described in C below. It is plausible because 2 PORVs are required to be operable per Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, PORVs.

C. Correct. First part is correct, the PORV is in the correct position (closed), as noted by the AT LO TEMP PORV 455A APPROACHING LMT PRESS being dark. As RCS pressure approaches the reference pressure for an LTOP actuation (20 psi below) this alarm will annunciate, cueing the operator that an LTOP actuation may be imminent. Second part is correct, in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.4.12, LTOP System, Either one of the PORVs has adequate relief capacity to prevent overpressurization of the RCS for the required coolant input capability.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct, as described in C above. Second part is incorrect, but plausible, as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) LTOP Study Guide Attached w/ Revision # See TS LCO 3.4.12 Bases Comments / Reference TS LCO 3.4.11 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: (LO21SYSPP2OB02) Describe the components of the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System including interrelations with other systems to include interlocks and control loops.

Question Source: Bank # X Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 31 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LTOP Study Guide Revision: 5-2-2011 LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION Study Guide Four wide range temperature instruments (two hot leg and two cold leg) supply continuous analog inputs to two auctioneering devices. Each auctioneering device selects the lowest temperature. The output from one of the auctioneering devices is used as an interlocking (or arming) permissive for the actuation logic of the other PORV (u-PCV-456), and in the annunciation logic for u-ALB-5B, window 4.2, AT LO TEMP PRZR PORV BLK VLV u-8000 A/B CLOSE. This alarm is actuated if valve u-8000B is closed coincident with a low auctioneered temperature below 350F. The alarm alerts the operator to open valve u-8000B, placing PORV u-PCV-456 on-line to provide overpressure protection. The output from the other auctioneering device is the input to the function generator.

The function generator uses RCS temperature to calculate a reference pressure based on the plant's pressure and temperature limits. The reference pressure is compared to the actual RCS pressure measured by the wide range pressure channel to produce an error signal. As RCS pressure increases approaching reference pressure, the decreasing error signal will annunciate Main Control Board alarm u-ALB-6D window 1.11, AT LO TEMP PORV 455A APPROACHING LMT PRESS at 20 psi below the PORV actuation setpoint. When RCS pressure increases further to equal reference pressure, an error signal of zero will generate an actuation signal to open u-PCV-455A and annunciator u-ALB-5B window 2.4, LTOP RCS PRESS HI/AUCT TEMP LO will alarm. If the interlocking permissive from the other train of RCS wide range temperature <350F is present (LTOP armed), u-PCV-455A will open. The LTOP RCS PRESS HI/AUCT TEMP LO alarm is received when either RCS pressure is greater than reference pressure or RCS wide range temperature is <350F.

Upon receipt of the actuation signal, two solenoid valves in series energize to align nitrogen to the u-PCV-455A pneumatic actuator, causing the PORV to open. Upon sufficient mass discharge, the RCS pressure will decrease, clearing the actuation signal. Removal of this signal deenergizes the solenoid valves, isolating the nitrogen supply and venting the PORV actuator. The actuator spring pressure causes the PORV to close. Automatic actuation is defeated when the control mode selector switch is not in AUTO (see Figure 4) and when PORV control is transferred to the Remote Shutdown Panel.

As previously stated, the logic provided to u-PCV-456 (see Figure 3) is identical, utilizing electrically separate RCS wide range temperature and pressure channels. The nitrogen supply provided u-PCV-456 is also independent from that of u-PCV-455A.

Page 32 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referennce: LTOP Study S Guide Revision: 5-2-2011 SYSTEM M OPERAT TION The two pressurizer power p operaated relief vaalves (PORVV's) are pneuumatically opperated, remotely controlled, pressure control c valvees, connected to the presssurizer vapoor space. Thhese valves aare opened automatically a y to dischargge steam from m the pressuurizer when tthe pressurizzer pressure approach hes a pre-determined setp point. This function f is pprimarily asssociated withh normal opeerating pressure and temperaature conditions, preventting an unneecessary reacctor trip on hhigh pressuree caused by a loadd rejection transient.

The POR RVs are supp plied with ad dditional actuuation logic to control thhe RCS at a llower pressuure during loow temperatu ure operation ns (see Figure 1). The L LTOP controol logic provvides redunddant, electricallly separate, automaticallly initiated and a secured,, RCS pressuure control. By monitoring plant opeeration over the entire raange of desig gn pressure aand temperatture, plant opperational fllexibility is maximmized while ensuring e systtem pressuree is maintainned within liimits based oon Appendixx G, Fracture Toughness Requirement R ts. Appendiix G requirem ments are paart of the basses for PTLR R Figures 2-1, 2 2-2 and 2-3, and aree met by operrating withinn these curvees. LTOP iss required whhen any cold leg temperature t is 320°F.

A temperrature permissive for botth valves LT TOP actuation logic autoomatically ddisarms the llogic at temperatu ures greater then the ran nge of Appen ndix G conceerns. This ppermissive, ccurrently set at 350F, prrevents unneecessary systtem actuatio on at normal RCS operatting conditioons in the eveent of a failure in n the processs sensors or instrumentat i tion.

Either onne of the POR RV's has adeequate relieff capacity to prevent oveerpressurizattion if the traansient is limited d to (1) startiing an idle reeactor coolant pump witth the seconddary water teemperature oof that S/G less than or equaal to 50F ab bove RCS co old leg tempeerature, or (22) the start oof two chargiing pumps an nd their injecction into a water w solid RCS.

R Commen nts / Referennce: TS LCO O 3.4.12 Bas ses Amendment: 164 4 Page 33 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: TS LCO O 3.4.11 Amendment: 164 4

Page 34 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/17/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.4.12 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.0 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of general operating crew responsibilities during emergency operations.

Question 74 In accordance with Operations Guideline 3, Attachment 6, Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation, which of the following correctly completes the statement regarding plant transient briefs?

1. The crew members ___(1)___ required to monitor the control boards.

2. The crew members ___(2)___ expected to respond to control board alarms.

A. (1) are NOT (2) are NOT B. (1) are NOT (2) are C. (1) are (2) are NOT D. (1) are (2) are Answer: D K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the expectations for the entire crew during emergency operations.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. The first part is plausible if believed that during a briefing the attention of the board operators can be diverted momentarily from monitoring the control boards to the Unit Supervisor.

The second part is plausible considering that the RO and BOP operators primary attention is to the brief, that they would just silence the alarms until the brief is over.

B. Incorrect. First part as described in A above. Second part is correct.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part as described in A above.

D. Correct. Per OPGD 3 Attachment 6, the crew should devote their primary attention to the brief and are expected to maintain system controls and respond to control board alarms.

Technical Reference(s) OPGD 3 Attachment 6 Attached w/ Revision # See ODA-407, Attachment 8.A Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Page 35 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 36 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: OPGD 3, 3 Attachment 6 Revision::

Page 37 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written EExam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: OPGD 3, 3 Attachment 6 Revision::

Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-40 07, Attachme ent 8.A Revision:: 15 Page 38 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/17/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.4.22 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.6 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.

Question 75 Which of the following correctly completes the following statements?

1. Those Critical Safety Functions with the HIGHEST priority relate to the ___(1)___ barrier to fission product release.

2. If the Core Cooling Status Tree turns Orange during performance of FRP-0.1A while Integrity is still Orange, ___(2)___ takes priority.

A. (1) reactor coolant system pressure boundary (2) FRC-0.2A, Response to Degraded Core Cooling B. (1) reactor coolant system pressure boundary (2) FRP-0.1A, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition C. (1) fuel matrix/cladding (2) FRC-0.2A, Response to Degraded Core Cooling D. (1) fuel matrix/cladding (2) FRP-0.1A, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition Answer: C K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the basis for the priority structure of the critical safety functions during emergency operations.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is plausible as the reactor coolant system pressure boundary is the second barrier to fission product release and events such as ATWT and Loss of Heat Sink can also challenge the reactor coolant system pressure boundary but FRS and FRH are prioritized on the protection of the fuel matrix/cladding first. Second part is correct in that knowledge of the Foldout page would alert the RO that FRC-0.2A is a higher priority than FRP-0.1A. Actual rules of transition are not required to be demonstrated.

B. Incorrect. First part is plausible as described in A above. Second part is plausible because transition from a 1 to a 2 procedure (i.e. P.1 to C.2) is not common, or if the applicant confuses CSF priorities.

C. Correct. The first part is correct in that the first barrier which carries the highest priority in CSF hierarchy is the fuel matrix/cladding barrier. The second part is correct as described in A above.

Page 39 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 D. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in C above. Second part as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) ODA-407, Attachment 8.A, Step 10 Attached w/ Revision # See Introduction to the ERG Procedures Study Comments / Reference Guide Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ERGXG1OB105 ) ANALYZE the Critical Safety Functions to include the barriers that each protects and their implementation priority.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 40 of 42 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Worksheet 66 to 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 RO R Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Introduc ction to the ERG E Proced dures Study Revision: 8/19/2011 Guide Page 41 of 42 CPNPP NRCN 2015 RO R Written E Exam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 ROR Written E Exam Workssheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-40 07, Attachme ent 8.A, Step p 10 Revision:: 15 Page 42 of 42 CPNPP NRC N 2015 RO R Written EExam Worksheet 66 to 7 75

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 2/23/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 011 EA2.10 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.7 Large Break LOCA: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Verification of adequate core cooling.

Question 76 Given the following conditions:

On Unit 1 a large break LOCA has occurred.

1EA1, 6.9 KV Train A Safeguards bus was tripped with an 86-1 Lockout relay.

All automatic actions occurred.

The appropriate procedures were entered.

Containment pressure is 25 psig.

RCS pressure is 25 psig.

Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures are 267ºF and stable.

RVLIS 11" above the core plate is LIT.

Subsequently:

RVLIS 22 above the core plate light illuminates.

1. The reactor core ___(1)___ being adequately cooled.

2. The procedure that will be in effect for the crew to proceed is ___(2)___.

A. (1) is (2) EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant B. (1) is NOT (2) EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant C. (1) is (2) FRC-0.3A, Response to Saturated Core Cooling D. (1) is NOT (2) FRC-0.3A, Response to Saturated Core Cooling Answer: A Page 1 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate the ability to identify if adequate core cooling is occurring following a Large Break LOCA.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) as knowledge of administrative procedures (ERG Rules of Usage) for determining which procedure should be performed is demonstrated.

Explanation:

A. Correct. In accordance with the conditions provided, the core exit temperature is at saturation and level is rising in the vessel. These two indications indicate that the core is being adequately cooled by saturated liquid and that ECCS injection is adequate to raise vessel level and thus continue to maintain the core covered. In accordance with ODA-407 the yellow path on the core cooling safety function should only be addressed if needed for recovery and EOP-1.0A maintains priority. As no guidance exists in FRC-0.3A which would benefit the crew the correct answer is to proceed in EOP-1.0A.

B. Incorrect. As described in A above the core is being adequately cooled. This answer is plausible as the RCS conditions indicate saturated core cooling. Second part is correct as described in A above.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in A above. Second part is incorrect as described in A above but is plausible as the conditions exists to enter FRC-0.3A, but ERG rules of usage do not support this procedural direction.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in B above. Second part as described in C above.

Technical Reference(s) Core Cooling Study Guide Attached w/ Revision # See ODA-407, Operations Department Comments / Reference Procedure Use and Adherence Core Cooling Status Tree EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Proposed references to be provided during examination: Steam Tables Learning Objective: ( LO21ERGE1AOB104 ) DISCUSS the operator actions, including all cautions, notes, RNOs and bases associated with EOP-1.0.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 2 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-0.0 0A Revision: 8 Page 3 of o 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Core Co ooling Study y Guide Revision: 4-30-2004 Page 4 of o 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Core Co ooling Study y Guide Revision: 4-30-2004 Page 5 of o 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Core Co ooling CSFS ST Revision: 8 Page 6 of o 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-40 07, Operations Departmeent Revision:: 15 Procedurre Use and Adherence A

Page 7 of o 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/14/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A W/E05 AA2.01 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 4.4 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Secondary Heat Sink: Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedure during abnormal and emergency operations.

Question 77 Given the following Unit 2 conditions:

A Reactor Trip has occurred.

While evaluating plant status in EOS-0.1B, Reactor Trip Response, a RED path occurred on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

FRH-0.1B, Loss of Heat Sink is in progress.

Subsequently:

During performance of Step 8, Main Feedwater is established to Steam Generator 2-02.

Steam Generator 2-02 wide range level is rising.

Core Exit Thermocouples are lowering.

Steam Generator 2-02 Narrow Range Level is 1% and slowly rising.

Which of the following correctly completes the statements below?

1. In accordance with FRH-0.1B, operator actions to establish a heat sink ___(1)___ complete.

2. Transition back to EOS-0.1B, ___(2)___ allowed.

A. (1) are (2) is B. (1) are (2) is NOT C. (1) are NOT (2) is D. (1) are NOT (2) is NOT Answer: A Page 8 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to identify the conditions necessary for selection of the appropriate procedure based on the correct plant indications.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) as knowledge of administrative procedures for proper ERG rules of usage are demonstrated in conjunction with decision points in the EOP contingency procedure on when leaving the procedure should occur.

Explanation:

A. Correct. First part is correct as the actions to establish a heat sink are complete. The operator is only instructed to maintain the flow to the SG, which does not require further operator action. The second part is correct as in accordance with the FRH-0.1B Bases as long as flow is verified and CET temperatures are lowering the transition back to the procedure and step in effect is the correct SRO action.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in A above. Second part is incorrect but plausible if thought that the SRO must wait until SG Narrow Range level meets the minimum level for secondary heat sink. This is not correct as the FRH-0.1B Bases states that transition to the procedure and step in effect should be done.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible if believed that the operator must take further action to establish a secondary heat sink level. Second part is correct as described in A above. The combination is also plausible if believed that the current SG level is adequate but further actions must be taken within the procedure as ERG rules of usage do not allow the SRO to leave an FRG until a defined point of transition is reached. However, these indications meet a defined point of transition.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in C above. Second part as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) ODA-407 Attached w/ Revision # See FRH-0.1B Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21.ERG.FH1.OB104 Given a procedural step, note, or caution, Discuss the reason or basis for the step, note, or caution in FRH-0.1.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 9 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-40 07 Revision: 15 Page 10 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-40 07 Revision: 15 Page 11 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRH-0.1 1B Revision: 8 Page 12 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRH-0.1 1B Bases Revision: 8 Page 13 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 3/30/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 026 G.2.1.20 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.6 Loss of Component Cooling Water: Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

Question 78 Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

100% Reactor Power VCT level is 56% and rising Charging flow is 130 gpm and stable Letdown flow is 120 gpm and stable Makeup to the VCT is NOT in progress ABN-502, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction has been entered due to; annunciator 1-ALB-3B, Window 2.4, CCW SRG TK TRN A LVL HI-HI/LO being LIT Which of the following lists the correct procedure to address the plant conditions and what is the primary operational concern?

A. ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction Chloride contamination of the Reactor Coolant System B. ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction Dilution of the Reactor Coolant System C. ABN-105, CVCS System Malfunctions Chloride contamination of the Reactor Coolant System D. ABN-105, CVCS System Malfunctions Dilution of the Reactor Coolant System Answer: D Page 14 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match: The question matches the K/A because it requires knowledge of the steps in ABN-501 that must be interpreted and executed when CCW is leaking into the CVCS.

SRO Only criteria: The question requires assessment of plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible because if the leak were in the CCW heat exchanger with the CCW shell side depressurized SSW could leak into CCW. 2nd is incorrect but plausible because if SSW leaked into CCW then chlorides could contaminate the RCS vis a CCW leak into CVCS.

B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect (See A). 2nd part is correct because CCW leaking into CVCS via the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger (CCW pressure greater than seal water return pressure) will dilute the water at the suction of the CCPs which dilutes the RCS.

C. Incorrect. 1st part is correct because ABN-501, section 3.3, Step 1 RNO directs transition to ABN-105 when CCW is leaking into the CVCS via the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger. 2nd part is incorrect (See A).

D. Correct. 1st part is correct (See C). 2nd part is correct (See B).

Technical Reference(s) ABN-502 Attached w/ Revision # See SOP-502A Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: COMPREHEND the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Component Cooling Water system. (LO21.SYS.CC1.OB04)

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 15 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-50 02 Revision: 6 Page 16 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-50 02A Revision: 19 Page 17 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/13/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 055 G.2.4.6 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.7 Station Blackout: Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

Question 79 Given the following conditions:

A Station Blackout has occurred.

Unit 1 is performing ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power.

Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 has been started and Safeguards Buses 1EA1 and 1EB1 are energized.

Reactor Coolant System subcooling is 20°F.

The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump tripped on overspeed.

A RED path exists on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

The Unit Supervisor is preparing to transition from ECA-0.0A.

Which of the following describes the proper mitigation strategy?

Transition from ECA-0.0A to A. FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Perform ECA-0.1A, Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required, when FRH-0.1A is complete.

B. FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Perform ECA-0.2A, Loss of All AC Power Recovery With SI Required, when FRH-0.1A is complete.

C. ECA-0.1A, Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required. Perform FRH-0.1A, when directed.

D. ECA-0.2A, Loss of All AC Power Recovery With SI Required. Perform FRH-0.1A, when directed.

Answer: D Page 18 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as the applicant is required to demonstrate the mitigation strategies for station blackout recovery.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) as knowledge of the decision points for contingency procedure implementation is required.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible if believed that transition to the RED path recovery procedure took priority over performance of ECA-0.1A, in accordance with the Notes in ECA-0.1A, FRGs are not to be implemented until following Step 11.

B. Incorrect. Plausible if believed that transition to the RED path recovery procedure took priority over performance of ECA-0.1A, in accordance with the Notes in ECA-0.1A, FRGs are not to be implemented until following Step 11.

C. Incorrect. As subcooling is less than 25°F, ECA-0.2A is the proper recovery procedure. ECA-0.1A is plausible as the alternative recovery procedure for a station blackout once power has been restored but plant conditions do not allow this as the correct procedure. In accordance with the Notes in ECA-0.1A, FRGs are not to be implemented until following Step 11, at which time FRH-0.1A would be performed.

D. Correct. As subcooling is less than 25°F, ECA-0.2A is the proper recovery procedure. In accordance with the Notes in ECA-0.2A, FRGs are not to be implemented until following Step 12, at which time FRH-0.1A would be performed.

Technical Reference(s) ECA-0.0A, ECA-0.1A, ECA-0.2A Attached w/ Revision # See Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Comments / Reference Tree Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21ERGC00OB118 State the bases for operator actions, notes and cautions from ECA-0.2.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT0876 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 19 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.0 0A Revision: 8 Page 20 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 21 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.2 2A Revision: 8 Commen nts / Referen nce: ECA-0.2 2A Revision: 8 Page 22 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Heat Sin nk CSFST Revision: 8 Page 23 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/8/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 062 G.2.4.35 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.0 Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

Question 80 Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger 2-01 was leaking excessively and CCWP 2-01 was stopped Station Service Water (SSW) Pump 2-02 motor is tagged out for bearing replacement, the remainder of the train is AVAILABLE Both trains of Component Cooling Water are available CCWP 2-02 was stopped due to CCW Heat Exchanger 2-02 high outlet temperature The reactor was tripped and all Reactor Coolant Pumps stopped Based on the given conditions;

1. The Nuclear Equipment Operators will cross-tie ___(1)___ in accordance with SOP-501B, Station Service Water System.

2. The action taken by the Nuclear Equipment Operators will require MODE 5 entry within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br /> on ___(2)___.

A. (1) Unit 2 Train A and B SSW (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 B. (1) Unit 2 Train A and B SSW (2) Unit 2 ONLY C. (1) Unit 1 Train B and Unit 2 Train B SSW (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 D. (1) Unit 1 Train B and Unit 2 Train B SSW (2) Unit 2 ONLY Answer: B Page 24 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match: The question matches the K/A because it requires knowledge of whether the NEOs will cross-tie SSW trains on the affected unit or cross-tie trains between both units and the operational impact to both units when cross-tying.

SRO Only criteria: The question involves one or more of the following for Technical Specifications:

Application of Required Actions in accordance with application requirements. The question also requires assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting the action (step) that will mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in B below. Second part is incorrect but plausible as it could be thought that both units are required to be shutdown with the Station Service Water system which is the ultimate heat sink significantly degraded on both units.

B. Correct. In accordance with SOP-501B, the first option for cross-tieing is to cross-tie the trains of the same unit. As a pump and train are both available, the procedure would cross-tie the trains together to supply a single train of equipment. Both units will be in Technical Specification Action statements: Unit 2 in LCO 3.0.3 for both SSW trains inoperable and Unit 1 for not having the required SSW pump on the opposite unit operable. However, this is a 7 day Required Action.

C. Incorrect. In accordance with SOP-501B, the first option for cross-tieing is to cross-tie the trains of the same unit. As a pump and train are both available, the procedure would cross-tie the trains together to supply a single train of equipment. It is plausible since Unit 2 CCW Train B is fine with the exception of SSW cooling to the heat exchanger that can be supplied from Unit 1 SSW.

Second part as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. First part as described in C above. Second part is correct as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-501 Attached w/ Revision # See Technical Specification 3.7.8 Comments / Reference Technical Specification 3.0.3 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: APPLY the administrative requirements of the Station Service Water system including Technical Specifications, TRM and ODCM. (LO21.SYS.SW1.OB06)

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 25 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-50 01 Revision: 9 Page 26 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-50 01 Revision: 9 Page 27 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Specification 3.7.8 Revision: 163 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Specification 3.0.3 Revision: 163 Page 28 of 28 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 76 to 8 80

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/8/2015 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A 077 AA2.06 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.5 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbance: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Generator frequency limitations.

Question 81 Given the following conditions:

Significant grid disturbance is in progress 0800 Automatic ERCOT grid load shedding has removed 25% of grid load and both main generator and ERCOT grid frequencies are stable at 58.5 Hz 0802 The safeguards buses on both units are being powered from the emergency diesel generators and the preferred and alternate power supply feeder breakers are in PULL-OUT 0811 Both main generator and ERCOT grid frequencies remains stable at 58.5 Hz No near term grid frequency recovery is anticipated Based on the given conditions;

1. ABN-601, Response to a 138/345 KV System Malfunction requires ___(1)___.

2. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating and OPT-215, Class 1E Electrical Systems Operability two off site power sources ___(2)___ remain OPERABLE.

A. (1) tripping both reactors and entering EOP-0.0A/B (2) do B. (1) maintaining current plant conditions to allow for main generator and grid frequency restoration (2) do C. (1) tripping both reactors and entering EOP-0.0A/B (2) do NOT D. (1) maintaining current plant conditions to allow for main generator and grid frequency restoration (2) do NOT Answer: C Page 1 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A because knowledge of the relationship between grid and generator frequency and the actions required to respond to degraded generator frequency are necessary to answer the question.

SRO Only:

The question requires assessment of plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed. The question involves one or more of the following for Technical Specifications: Application of Required Actions and Surveillance Requirements in accordance with rules of application requirements.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect 1st part is correct because after 9 minutes at < 59.4 Hz ABN-601 requires a reactor trip.

2nd part is incorrect because with the preferred and alternate supply breakers to the 6.9 KV safeguards buses in PULL-OUT the requirements from OPT-215 for off-site power source operability verification are not met. It is plausible that the off-site sources remain operable as the breakers were manually disabled due to frequency and could be restored by if taken from the PULL-OUT position.

B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible because if still within the 9 minute window plant conditions are maintained to allow for frequency recovery. 2nd part is incorrect (See A).

C. Correct. 1st part is correct (See A). 2nd part is correct because OPT-215 requires the preferred and alternate supply breakers to the 6.9 KV safeguards buses be either closed or in standby in order for the off-site power sources to be operable.

D. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect (See B). 2nd part is correct (See C).

Technical Reference(s) ABN-601 Attached w/ Revision # See OPT-215 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: APPLY the administrative requirements of the AC Distribution and Transformers system including Technical Specifications, TRM and ODCM.

(LO21.SYS.AC1.OB05)

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 2 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-60 01 Revision: 12 Page 3 of o 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-60 01 Revision: 12 Page 4 of o 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-60 01 Revision: 12 Page 5 of o 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: OPT-215-1 Revision: 17 Page 6 of o 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/7/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 024 G.2.4.20 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 4.3 Emergency Boration: Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

Question 82 In accordance with ABN-107, Emergency Boration, Attachment 10, MODE 6 - Emergency Boration Via the SI System:

1. Using this method of emergency boration requires that the reactor vessel head be ___(1)___.

2. For the SI System method to be considered an operable emergency boration flowpath, the lineup for the applicable train must be established in accordance with ___(2)___.

A. (1) detensioned but not removed (2) SOP-201A/B, Safety Injection System B. (1) removed from the reactor vessel (2) SOP-201A/B, Safety Injection System C. (1) detensioned but not removed (2) SOP-104A/B, Reactor Makeup and Chemical Control System D. (1) removed from the reactor vessel (2) SOP-104A/B, Reactor Makeup and Chemical Control System Answer: B Page 7 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as Knowledge of the Note/Caution that the Reactor Head is removed.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) as assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed is demonstrated.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Second part is correct. It is plausible for an applicant to misinterpret the significance of the status of the reactor head, since an SI pump is designed to pump forward without having the reactor head removed.

B. Correct. The NOTE at the beginning of ABN-107, Attachment 10 explains that to use the SI System method for emergency boration requires that the reactor vessel head be removed, and the SOP-201A/B establishes the readiness lineup for the SI Train when it is to be credited as an emergency boration flowpath.

C. Incorrect. First part plausibility described in "A" above. SOP-104A/B is plausible as the procedure, since there are many aspects of this procedure regarding boration.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Plausibility of procedure described in "C" above.

Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for Reactor Makeup, page 38 Attached w/ Revision # See SOP-104A, Table of Contents Comments / Reference SOP-201A, Section 5.4.10 ABN-107, Attachment 10 Technical Requirement Manual Revision 88 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SSTCS1OB107 ) DISCUSS ABN-107, Emergency Boration, to include the following: Applicability, Symptoms, Plant Indications, Automatic Actions, Initial Operator Actions.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 8 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRCN 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Study Guide G for Rea actor Makeu up, page 38 Revision: 4-28-2011 From Re eactor Make eup Study Guide G

MODE - 6 EMERGEN NCY BORATION VIA THE SAFETY INJJECTION SYS STEM (FIGU URE 9A)

During Mode M 6 operaations with the t Reactor Vessel V head removed annd the Cold L Leg Injectionn path OPERAB BLE, emergeency boratio on can be acccomplished uusing a Safety Injection Pump (SIP) aligned to the RC CS Cold Leg g Injection lin nes into the Reactor Cooolant System m (RCS). Figgure 9A dispplays the flowpathh for this alig gnment. ABN N-107 Emerg gency Borattion providess the directioon for this emergenccy boration path.

p Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-10 04A, Table of o Contents Revision: 15 Page 9 of o 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-20 01A, Section 5.4.10 Revision: 17 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 07, Attachme ent 10 Revision: 9 Page 10 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Requirem ment Manual Revision: 88 Page 11 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Requirem ment Manual Revision: 88 Page 12 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Requirem ment Manual Revision: 88 Page 13 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/8/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 037 AA2.11 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.8 Steam Generator Tube Leak: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: When to isolate one or more S/Gs.

Question 83 Given the following Unit conditions:

The Unit is at 100% power.

A steam generator tube leak initiates on SG 1-04.

Due to the leak size, the crew enters ABN-106, High Secondary Activity, Section 3.0, Steam Generator Tube Leakage Greater Than or Equal to 75 GPD (0.52 GPM).

Subsequently:

The tube leakage rises to 125 gpd.

The Unit Supervisor directs a power reduction to 50% and subsequent MODE 3 entry.

(Note the following summary of actions contained in ABN-106, Section 3.0. Action numbers are for sequential numbering only, and do not represent actual step numbers in the procedure.)

Action 1 Power reduction begins.

Action 2 Chemistry samples obtained and confirm SG 1-04 tube leakage.

Action 3 Adjust SG 1-04 Atmospheric Relief Valve setpoint.

Action 4 Place 1-HS-2452-1, AFWPT STM SPLY VLV MSL 4 in Pull-out.

Action 5 Enter MODE 3.

Action 6 Initiate emergency boration.

Action 7 Start RCS cooldown.

In accordance with ABN-106:

1. The step "Isolate the leaking SG" will be performed ___(1)___.

2. A CONDITION in LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System, ___(2)___ be entered during this event.

A. (1) after Action 2 and before Action 5 (2) should B. (1) after Action 2 and before Action 5 (2) should not C. (1) after Action 6 and before Action 7 (2) should D. (1) after Action 6 and before Action 7 Page 14 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 (2) should not Answer: C K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to determine when the SG will be isolated in the performance of the recovery actions.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) as knowledge that placing the TDAFW Pump steam supply valve in pull-out requires entry into the Actions of LCO

3.7.5. Explanation

A. Incorrect. Once the tube leakage is confirmed to be in a particular steam generator, it is plausible to believe that isolation activities could begin at that point. Also plausible to believe that isolation activities would be commence prior to MODE 3 entry by reasoning that before starting boration and a cooldown the steam generator with the tube leak should be isolated. Second part is correct.

B. Incorrect. Plausibility of first part described in "A" above. Plausible that the Tech Spec for AFW would not be entered with these conditions, since there are no conditions affecting the motor driven AFW pumps. Further, as only one of the two steam admission valves is required for full functionality of the TDAFW Pump as both are 100% capacity. However, both are Technical Specification required. Thus this distractor is incorrect as the applicant has failed to recognize that taking the steam supply control to pull-out requires Condition A to be entered.

C. Correct. ABN-106, Section 3.3, Step 16 is for "Isolating the leaking SG". This step is performed after emergency boration (Step 15) and prior to commencing an RCS cooldown (Step 17). LCO 3.7.5 is entered because the TDAFW pump has been rendered inoperable due to disabling its steam supply valves.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Plausibility of second part described in "B" above.

Technical Reference(s) Tech. Spec. 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater Attached w/ Revision # See System, Condition A Comments / Reference ABN-106, Section 3.3, Steps 3, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ABN106OB102 ) ANALYZE the response to a Steam Generator Tube Leakage greater than or equal to 75 gpd in accordance with ABN-106, High Secondary Activity..

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X Page 15 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 10 CFR Part P 55 Content: 55.4 41 55.4 43 2 Commen nts / Referen nce: Tech. Spec. 3.7.5, Auxiliary A Fee edwater Revision: Amendmeent 150 System, Condition A Page 16 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 06, Section 3.3, 3 Step 3 Revision: 10 Page 17 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 06, Section 3.3, 3 Steps 6, 7 Revision: 10 Page 18 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 06, Section 3.3, 3 Step 8 Revision: 10 Page 19 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 06, Section 3.3, 3 Step 14 Revision: 10 Page 20 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 06, Section 3.3, 3 Step 15 Revision: 10 Page 21 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 06, Section 3.3, 3 Step 16 Revision: 10 Page 22 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 06, Section 3.3, 3 Step 17 Revision: 10 Page 23 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 2/23/2015 Tier 1 Change: Group 2 K/A 067 G.2.4.11 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.2 Plant Fire On-site: Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

Question 84 Given the following conditions:

Both Units are at 100% power.

A fire occurs in the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room.

Both Units are required to be shut down.

The Shift Manager is injured and cannot perform assigned duties.

In accordance with ABN-803A, Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading room:

1. The ___(1)___ will assume the duties of the Shift Manager.

2. ___(2)___ will control systems common to both Units.

A. (1) Duty Manager (2) Unit 1 B. (1) Clearance Process Center (CPC) Supervisor (2) Unit 1 C. (1) Duty Manager (2) Unit 2 D. (1) Clearance Process Center (CPC) Supervisor (2) Unit 2 Answer: B K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as Knowledge of the Abnormal Condition Procedure for a plant fire in the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room is demonstrated.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) as knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures is demonstrated.

Page 24 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible that the Duty Manager would assume the responsibilities as they are trained to assume the Emergency Coordinator duties if required. With both unit crews relocating to the Remote Shutdown Panel, someone who can move between the locations as necessary is plausible. Second part is correct.

B. Correct. Per ABN-803A, 2.3, NOTE prior to Step 6, the CPC Supervisor will assume the duties of the Shift Manager in the Shift Manager's absence. Per the NOTE prior to 1, Unit 1 will control manipulation of systems and equipment common to both units.

C. Incorrect. Plausibility of first part described in "A" above. Plausible to believe that with a fire in Unit 1 cable spreading room, Unit 2 would assume control of common equipment.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Plausibility of second part described in "C" above.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-803A, Section 2.3, page 6, 7 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ANALYZE the response to a Fire in the Electrical or Control Building in accordance with ABN-803, Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable Spreading Room..

Question Source: Bank # ILOT8073 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 25 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-80 03A, Section 2.3, 5 NOT E, page 7 Revision: 11 Page 26 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-80 03A, Section 2.3, page 6 Revision: 11 Page 27 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/10/2015 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A 074 EA2.08 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.6 Inad. Core Cooling: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Inadequate Core Cooling: The effect of turbine bypass valve operation on RCS temperature and pressure.

Question 85 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The crew is in FRC-0.1A, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling Steam is being dumped to the main condenser The Centrifugal Charging Pumps and Safety Injection Pumps are not available Both Residual Heat Removal Pumps are running on minimum flow Based on the given conditions, in accordance with FRC-0.1A complete the following:

1. Secondary depressurization is performed ___(1)___ until less than 170 psig.

2. Following secondary depressurization to less than 170 psig, if RCS hot leg temperatures are greater than 380°F and core exit thermocouple temperature is still greater than 1200°F then

___(2)___.

A. (1) at a rate NOT to exceed 100°F/hr (2) transition to SACRG-1, Severe Accident Control Room Guideline Initial Response B. (1) at maximum rate (2) transition to SACRG-1, Severe Accident Control Room Guideline Initial Response C. (1) at a rate NOT to exceed 100°F/hr (2) start a RCP in an idle loop D. (1) at maximum rate (2) start a RCP in an idle loop Answer: D Page 28 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A because the ability to dump steam in the FRC-0.1A conditions are demonstrated with expected outcome of the action if not successful in achieving the desired RCS temperature and pressure response.

SRO Only:

The question requires knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involve transitions to event specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible as a rate not to exceed 100°F/hr is specified in numerous ERGs to avoid challenging the Integrity of the RCS including FRC-0.2A, Degraded Core Cooling. In FRC-0.1A, the Core Cooling Safety Function which is a higher priority than Integrity is being challenged and maximum rate is prescribed in the procedure. 2nd part is incorrect because FRC-0.1A directs starting RCPs one at a time in an attempt to provide core cooling while other actions continue to establish long term recovery of core cooling. Transition to SACRG-1 is not made until after RCP start has been attempted.

B. Incorrect. 1st part as described in A above. 2nd part as described in A above.

C. Incorrect. 1st part as described in A aboe. 2nd part is correct as described in A aboe.

D. Correct. As described in A aboe.

Technical Reference(s) FRC-0.1A Attached w/ Revision # See FRC-0.2A Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: Given a procedural Step, NOTE, or CAUTION, DISCUSS the reason or basis for the Step, NOTE, or CAUTION in FRC-0.1. (LO21.ERG.FC1.OB04)

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 29 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRC-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 30 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRC-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 31 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRC-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 32 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRC-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 33 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRC-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 34 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRC-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 35 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRC-0.2 2A Revision: 8 Page 36 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRC-0.2 2A Revision: 8 Page 37 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/8/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 004 G.2.1.7 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.7 Chemical and Volume Control: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

Question 86 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) 1-01 is running The following indications are observed:

Annunciator 1-ALB-5A, Window 1.6, ANY RCP SEAL INJ FLO LO is intermittent Annunciator 1-ALB-6A, Window 3.4, CHRG FLO HI/LO is intermittent 1-PI-120A, CHRG HDR PRESS is fluctuating rapidly 1-FI-121A, CHRG FLO is fluctuating rapidly VCT level is 54% and slowly rising VCT to charging pump suction valves 1-LCV-112B and 1-LCV-112C indicate OPEN Pressurizer level is 59% and slowly lowering Based on the given conditions, complete the following:

The crew should respond by entering ___(1)___ due to ___(2)___.

A. (1) ABN-105, CVCS System Malfunctions, Section 7.0, Gas Binding/Cavitation of Charging Pumps (2) Loss of CCP Net Positive Suction Head B. (1) ABN-105, CVCS System Malfunctions, Section 2.0, Pressurizer Level Decreasing Below Program Level (2) Loss of CCP Net Positive Suction Head C. (1) ABN-105, CVCS System Malfunctions, Section 7.0, Gas Binding/Cavitation of Charging Pumps (2) Charging pump suction leak D. (1) ABN-105, CVCS System Malfunctions, Section 2.0, Pressurizer Level Decreasing Below Program Level (2) Charging pump suction leak Answer: A Page 38 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A because knowledge of instrumentation response is required to diagnose charging pump gas binding in order to make an operational judgment.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in that requires assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations.

Explanation:

A. Correct. 1st part is correct as the indications support a loss of NPSH of the running CCP which requires entry into ABN-105, Section 7.0. 2nd part is correct even though two of the indications also support PRZR level lowering below program, when all the indications are reviewed in the aggregate gas binding is the issue. A charging pump suction leak would have other indications such as Auxiliary Building sump run indication, plant vent stack radiation alarms, etc.

B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect as the indications in the aggregate support entering ABN-105, Section 7.0 not Section 2.0. Section 2.0 does not lead the operator to Section 7.0 so the correct diagnosis of a loss of NPSH must be made to enter the correct procedure section. 2nd part is correct (See A).

C. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (See A). 2nd part is incorrect but plausible because indications could lead someone to the false conclusion that a charging leak exists but there is a lack of supporting indications and VCT level would be lowering rapidly for the charging pump discharge pressure and flow to be fluctuating rapidly.

D. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect (See B). 2nd part is incorrect (See C).

Technical Reference(s) ABN-105 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Chemical and Volume Control system.

(LO21SYSCS1OB104)

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 39 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 05 R Revision: 7 Page 40 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 05 Revision: 7 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 05 Revision: 7 Page 41 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 05 Revision: 7 Page 42 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 05 Revision: 7 Page 43 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/20/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 007 A2.01 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.2 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions of operations on the PRTS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Stuck open PORV or code safety.

Question 87 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is at 100% power when the following occurs.

Temperature indication 1-TI-464, PRZR SFTY VLV C OUT TEMP begins to rise.

1-ALB-5B, Window 4.1, PRZR ANY SFTY RLF VLV OUT TEMP HI is alarming.

The crew enters ABN-103, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage.

The pressurizer safety valve indicates excessive seat leakage.

PRT pressure, temperature, and level increase confirm safety valve seat leakage.

Attempts to reseat the pressurizer safety valve during the past 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> have not been successful.

Based on the given conditions, complete the following:

1. In accordance with ALM-0052A (1-ALB-5B), ___(1)___ is used to determine if RCS leakage is within Technical Specification limits.

2. If a 12 gpm leak rate is calculated, a controlled Unit shutdown is ___(2)___ in accordance with LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage.

A. (1) ABN-103, Attachment 1, RCS Gross Leakage Estimate (2) required B. (1) ABN-103, Attachment 1, RCS Gross Leakage Estimate (2) NOT required C. (1) OPT-303, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory (2) required D. (1) OPT-303, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory (2) NOT required Answer: C Page 44 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A because knowledge is required to select the correct procedure for determining RCS leak rate based on estimated size of the leak And then based on the size of the leak determine the action required to mitigate the consequences of the leak.

SRO Only:

The question is SRO only in that it requires assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. The question also requires knowledge of facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect as ALM-0052A directs performance of OPT-303 when PRT parameters confirm safety excessive seat leakage. Selecting ABN-103 is plausible in that it is the procedure normally used to address RCS leakage however ALM-0052A provides specific steps for PRZR safety leakage. ABN-103 Attachment 1 further Cautions that OPT-303 shall be used to ensure RCS leakage is within Technical Specification limits. 2nd part is correct as RCS leakage from an identified source is calculated at greater than 10 gpm. Attempts have been made to reseat the safety so the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> have already been utilized.

B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect (See A). 2nd part is incorrect but plausible in that if the examinee does not determine that the failed attempts to reseat the safety valve make the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to reduce the leakage to within limits an action that is not possible. If the examinee thought that 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to reduce leakage to within limits is the correct action then selecting a unit shutdown is NOT required could be chosen.

C. Correct. 1st part is correct (See A). 2nd part is correct (See A).

D. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (See A). 2nd part is incorrect (See B).

Technical Reference(s) ALM-0052A Attached w/ Revision # See TS 3.4.13 Comments / Reference ABN-103 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ANALYZE the response to Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage in accordance with ABN-103, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage.

(LO21ABN103OB102)

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 45 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ALM-00 052A Revision: 5 Page 46 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Specification 3.4.13 Amendm ment: 164 Page 47 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-10 03 Revision: 9 Page 48 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/20/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 026 A2.05 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 4.1 Containment Spray System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Containment Spray System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of chemical addition tanks to inject.

Question 88 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 Train B Containment Spray Pumps are DANGER tagged in support of maintenance activities.

A LOCA has occurred on Unit 1.

During performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Step 13 Check if SG Tubes are Not Ruptured; Containment Pressure increases to 18.2 psig.

When Containment Spray alignment is verified on 1-MLB-4A3, the Blue light for 1-LV-4754 CHEM ADD TK DISCH OPEN is Dark.

Which of the following correctly completes the statements below?

1. The Unit Supervisor should direct that 1-HS-4574, CHEM ADD TK DISCH VLV be opened in accordance with ___(1)___.

2. Failure to open 1-HS-4574 has the potential to impact the Containment Spray System in that the system is unable to inject sufficient NaOH and the resulting containment sump pH of greater than a MINIMUM of ___(2)___ cannot be ensured.

A. (1) FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure (2) 8.25 B. (1) EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (2) 8.25 C. (1) FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure (2) 7.1 D. (1) EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (2) 7.1 Answer: D Page 49 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A because it requires demonstration of the ability to predict the impact on the Containment Spray System and determination of the procedure used to correct the condition.

SRO Only:

The question is SRO only because it requires knowledge of Technical Specification Bases.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part as described in C below. Second part as described in B below.

B. Incorrect. First part as described in D below. Second part is incorrect but plausible if confusion exists on values of containment pH as the prior value contained in the Technical Specification Bases until Technical Specification Amendment 147 was 8.25.

C. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect but plausible if believed that since EOP-0.0A Step 7 had already been performed and a transition out of EOP-0.0A will occur during the next step that actions should be performed in accordance with FRZ-0.1A. Second part as described in D below.

D. Correct. The first part is correct in accordance with ODA-407 Rules of Usage, EOP-0.0A Step 7 which is a continuous action step should be performed as a transition has not yet been made out of EOP-0.0A. The second part is correct in accordance with the TS Bases in that injection of the NaOH tank ensures a containment sump pH greater than 7.1.

Technical Reference(s) EOP-0.0A Attached w/ Revision # See FRZ-0.1A Comments / Reference ODA-407 Technical Specification Bases Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21.SYS.CT1.OB106 Given a set of plant conditions identify the proper transitions through/out of EOS-1.3.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 50 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-0.0 0A Revision: 8 Page 51 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-0.0 0A, Attachm ment 6 Revision:: 8 Page 52 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRZ-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 53 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRZ-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 54 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-40 07 Revision: 15 Page 55 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-40 07 Revision: 15 Page 56 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Specification 3.6.7 Ba ases Revission: 72 Page 57 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Specification 3.6.7 Ba ases Revission: 72 Page 58 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Specification 3.6.7 Ba ases Revission: 53 (Superce eded)

Page 59 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/10/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 078 A2.01 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 2.9 Instrument Air: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the IAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Air dryer and filter malfunctions.

Question 89 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is at 100% power.

Instrument Air Dryer 1-01 is in service.

The following alarm is received:

1-ALB-1, Window 3.4, INSTR AIR DRYR PNL 1/2 TRBL In accordance with applicable procedures:

1. ___(1)___ alarm conditions for this annunciator will cause an interruption of air flow through the in service chamber.

2. The alarm procedure directs use of SOP-509A, Instrument Air System, Attachment 6, (Instrument Air Dryer Diagnostic Guide) for diagnosing the malfunction. This Diagnostic Guide

___(2)___ provide instructions for checking after filter P and placing the standby after filter in service.

A. (1) ANY of the (2) does not B. (1) NONE of the (2) does not C. (1) ANY of the (2) does D. (1) NONE of the (2) does Answer: D K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to predict the impact of the alarm condition and also demonstrate an understanding of the Diagnostic Guide to mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) as knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points are demonstrated.

Page 60 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Plausible that any of the alarm conditions (there are approx. 6 conditions) would cause alarm because of interruption in air flow through the inservice chamber, since that is part of the function of an alarm. But the alarm procedure is clear in explaining that NONE of the alarm conditions cause an interruption in air flow.

Plausible that the diagnostic guide would not contain detailed step instructions for placing a standby filter in service because the name (diagnostic) could imply it is only for the purpose of determining WHAT the problem is, not to also fix the problem, since there are detailed instructions for placing the standby filters inservice in the main body of SOP-509A. The reason this is important from an SRO perspective, is that the diagnostic guide is designed to be handed to the auxiliary operator to take to the equipment; rather than the entire procedure B. Incorrect. First part is correct. Plausibility of second part described in "A" above.

C. Incorrect. First part plausibility described in "A" above. Second part is correct.

D. Correct. A statement in both 1-ALB-1, Window 3.4, and in the Diagnostic Guide in SOP-509A, Attachment 6 explains the design is that NO interruption of air flow through the inservice drying chamber will occur as a result of any of the alarm conditions. SOP-509A, Attachment 6, Instrument Air Dryer CP1-CIDYIA-01 Diagnostic Guide, Section E.1, contains all the steps and instructions needed to check the filter dp and to place the standby filter in service.

Technical Reference(s) 1-ALB-1, Window 3.4 Attached w/ Revision # See SOP-509A, Attachment 6 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSIA1OB105 ) EXPLAIN the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of the Instrument Air system.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 61 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-1 1, Window 3.4 Revision: 10 Page 62 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: SOP-50 09A, Attachm ment 6 Revision: 22 Page 63 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/8/2015 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A 103 G.2.4.41 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.6 Containment: Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.

Question 90 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 has received a bomb threat involving potential damage to the Containment from an explosive device inside the Personnel Airlock.

An Emergency Entry into Unit 1 Containment in accordance with STA-620, Containment Entry is being performed to establish threat credibility.

Due to the nature of the threat the entry will be made through the Emergency Airlock.

As the containment entry is being made an explosion occurs in the Unit 1 Personnel Airlock.

Control Room indications show NO sign of degraded performance.

A field report indicates that the Unit 1 Personnel Airlock is damaged and the outer door is not operable.

The Security Shift Supervisor has informed the Shift Manager that the explosion is considered a hostile action against the plant.

Based on the given conditions complete the following:

1. In accordance with STA-620, Containment Entry, the ___(1)___ must approve the entry.

2. The Hazard Emergency Action Level classification is ___(2)___.

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. (1) Security Shift Supervisor (2) Alert B. (1) Shift Manager (2) Alert C. (1) Security Shift Supervisor (2) Site Area Emergency D. (1) Shift Manager (2) Site Area Emergency Answer: D Page 64 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as knowledge of the EALs and how they are used in conjunction to an event in containment is demonstrated.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only as it requires know ledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible because it could be thought that to enter Containment to look for a bomb would require Security Shift Supervisor approval, however containment entry regardless of the situation shall be approved by the Shift Manager in accordance with STA-620. 2nd part is incorrect but plausible because it could be thought that the Alert due to the explosion is the correct classification.

B. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (See D). 2nd part is incorrect (See A).

C. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect (See A). 2nd part is correct (See D).

D. Correct. 1st part is correct because in accordance with STA-620 the Shift Manager must approve all emergency entries into Containment. 2nd part is correct because in accordance with the EAL charts Hazards (H), 4 (Security), Site Area Emergency (HS4.1) is met as a hostile act has led to an explosion in the Protected Area.

Technical Reference(s) STA-620, Containment Entry Attached w/ Revision # See EAL charts Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: Hazards Section of EAL Charts & Bases Learning Objective: APPLY the administrative requirements of the Containment system including Technical Specifications, TRM and ODCM.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # ILOT1582 (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 65 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-620, Containm ment Entry Revision: 13 Page 66 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: CPNPP EAL Matrix Revision: 12A Page 67 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: CPNPP EPP-201, EAL E Tech Baases Revision: 0 Page 68 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: CPNPP EPP-201, EAL E Tech Baases Revision: 0 Page 69 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Workssheet 81 to 9 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Original Question: ILOT 1582 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 has received a credible site-specific security threat notification involving potential damage to the Containment structure and/or components within the Containment from an explosive device.

The Shift Manager has requested an Emergency Entry into Unit 1 Containment in accordance with STA-620, Containment Entry.

Due to the nature of the threat the entry will be made through the Emergency Airlock.

Which of the following lists requirements for the Containment Entry in accordance with STA-620, Containment Entry?

A. Security Supervisor must approve the entry.

The Containment entry should be documented by filling out a General Access Permit (GAP) specifically for the Emergency Entry.

B. Shift Manager must approve the entry.

The Containment entry should be documented by filling out a General Access Permit (GAP) specifically for the Emergency Entry.

C. Security Supervisor must approve the entry.

Provide a backup team ready to enter Containment for assistance.

D. Shift Manager must approve the entry.

Provide a backup team ready to enter Containment for assistance.

Answer: D Page 70 of 70 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 81 to 90

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/8/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 056 A2.05 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 2.5 Condensate: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Condenser tube leakage.

Question 91 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is at 100% power.

A main condenser tube begins to leak.

The following alarm has been received:

1-ALB-7B, SEC SMPL PNL TRBL In accordance with ABN-304, Main Condenser and Circulating Water System Malfunction, as a result of the above condition:

1. 1-PV-2242, CNDS POL BYP VLV ___(1)___ automatically repositioned to its full open position.

2. If Steam Generator Blowdown Sodium is 80 PPB, the time allowed to have Unit 1 at less than 50% power is ___(2)___ hours.

A. (1) is (2) 24 B. (1) is not (2) 24 C. (1) is (2) 12 D. (1) is not (2) 12 Answer: B Page 1 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to predict the impact on the condensate system as a result of the alarm received and to utilize detailed recovery procedural knowledge to mitigate the consequences.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) as knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the ABN are demonstrated.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. Second part is correct. Condensate polishing system response is plausible, since there is an automatic function associated with the bypass valve, but it is for pressure, as explained in the Study Guide for Condensate Polishing System, page 13 and 14.

B. Correct. The Study Guide for Condensate Polishing describes the operation of 1-PV-2242, and explains that there is an automatic bypass function, but it is for a high differential pressure. ABN-304, Section 4.3, Step 5 RNO (SGBD not less than or equal to 50 PPB) requires a power reduction to achieve less than 50% power within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for Unit 2). The Unit 1 time is twice as long as the Unit 2 time as Unit 1 has relatively new Steam Generators comprised of Inconel 690 which is more resilient to adverse secondary water chemistry.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part is incorrect but plausible as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is the Unit 2 time allowed.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part plausibility described in "C" above.

Technical Reference(s) Study Guide for Condensate Polishing Attached w/ Revision # See System, p.13, 14 of 57 Comments / Reference 1-ALB-7B, Window 3.5 ABN-304, Section 4.3, Step 5 FSAR Section 5.4.2A Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SSTCO1OB105 ) During normal plant operations, DESCRIBE the Operator response to a Circulating Water Pump Trip, Main or Auxiliary Condenser Vacuum Decreasing, Main or Auxiliary Condenser Tube Leak or Turbine Building Elevation 758' Flooding per ABN-304.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 2 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRCN 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Formm ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Study Guide G for Conndensate Po olishing Revision:

System, p. 13, 14 CP Systeem Bypass PV-2242 P

Condensate Polishing g System By ypass Valve PV-2242 (F Figure 5) funnctions to byppass the Conndensate Polishingg System durring abnorm mal situationss to ensure addequate sucttion is mainttained to thee Main Feed Pum mps. The diffferential preessure acrosss the condennsate polishinng system is measured aand transmittted by u-PDIIT-2242. Thee calibrated range of u-P PDIT-2242 iis 0 - 75 PSID D. This transmitter inputs intto PDIC-224 42, which inn turn controlls PV-2242.

The highh alarm setpo oint is 40 PSID. When th he differentiaal pressure eexceeds this setpoint, thee u-PDAH-2242 SYSTE EM D/P HIGH alarm wiill be activatted. Upon thhe activation of this alarm m, valve u-PV-224 42 will be fo orced to its full fu open. On nce this occuurs it must bee manually rreset by the ooperator pressing the F15 High D/P Reseet push-buttton on the S SYSTEM O OVERVIEW CRT display.

Commen nts / Referen nce: 1-ALB-7 7B, Window 3.5 Revision: 7 Commen nts / Referen nce: FSAR Section S 5.4.2 2A Amendmen nt 106 Page 3 of o 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-30 04, 4.3, Step 5 Revision: 8 Page 4 of o 47 CPNPP NRRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/8/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 035 A2.01 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.6 Steam Generator System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SGS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Faulted or ruptured steam generators Question 92 Given the following conditions:

A Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) has occurred on Unit 2.

Actions have been taken in EOP-3.0B, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to the point where a recovery procedure will be selected.

Which of the following procedures is the preferred method of conducting a post-SGTR cooldown, and describe the advantage of using this procedure?

A. EOS-3.3B, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Steam Dump.

Provides fastest means of depressurizing the Reactor Coolant System.

B. EOS-3.3B, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Steam Dump.

Minimizes radiological release.

C. EOS-3.1B, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill.

Provides fastest means of depressurizing the Reactor Coolant System.

D. EOS-3.1B, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill.

Minimizes radiological release.

Answer: D Page 5 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A because it requires the operator to predict based on a Ruptured Steam Generator the recovery path which should be selected based on the advantages provided.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only because it requires assessing plant conditions and then selecting a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect in that the EOP-3.0 Bases states that the preferred method is EOS-3.1B, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill not EOS-3.3B, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Steam Dumps. The second part is a correct reason for choosing EOS-3.3B, but is incorrect in that EOS-3.1B is not the preferred method.

B. Incorrect. First part as described in A above. Second part is correct as described in D but does not fit as the reason for choosing EOS-3.3B.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in D below. Second part is as described in A above and is a correct statement but does not fit as the reason for choosing EOS-3.1B.

D. Correct. In accordance with the bases of EOP-3.0B Step 41, the preferred method is EOS-3.1B, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill which minimizes radiological release.

Technical Reference(s) EOP-3.0B, Step 41 Bases Attached w/ Revision: See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: Given a set of plant conditions (or an actual or simulated Control Room status) and a set of Critical Safety Function Status Trees, correctly DETERMINE the status of the Critical Safety functions and IDENTIFY any applicable Functional Restoration Guidelines.

Question Source: Bank X Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam June 2014 Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 6 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOP-3.0 0B Revision: 8 Page 7 of o 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/20/2015 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A 086 G.2.2.38 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.5 Fire Protection: Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Question 93 Given the following conditions:

OPT-220, Fire Suppression Water System Operability Test Section 8.2, Diesel Fire Pump X-05 Operability is being performed.

The Pump Discharge Pressure (X-PI-4090B) indicated 155 psig throughout the 30 minute pump run.

Which of the following correctly completes the statements below?

1. With respect to the pump discharge pressure, Diesel Fire Pump X-05 is ___(1)___.

2. IF a Diesel Fire Pump were declared inoperable, the MAXIMUM time allowed to restore the pump to OPERABLE status without providing a backup pump or water supply is ___(2)___ days.

A. (1) inoperable (2) 7 B. (1) inoperable (2) 14 C. (1) operable (2) 7 D. (1) operable (2) 14 Answer: C Page 8 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires knowledge of internal organizations which are to be notified following an event, operability test of the X-05 pump, related to system operation and status.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only as it requires OPERABILITY determination based on the test parameters which is a task specifically delineated for the SRO license level at CPNPP.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible in that OPT-220 lists the nominal discharge pressure for the X-05 pump discharge pressure as 160 psig. 155 psig falls below this nominal value and thus the pump could be thought to be inoperable. The second part is correct in that STA-738 allows 7 days to restore a diesel pump to operable status or provide compensatory measures.

B. Incorrect. 1st part is correct as described in A above. Second part is incorrect but plausible in that 14 days are allowed to restore fire detection equipment or provide compensatory measures.

C. Correct. 1st part is correct as OPT-220 lists the acceptance criteria for the X-05 pump discharge pressure as 150 - 165 psig. Maintaining a 155 psig discharge pressure throughout the run demonstrates operable performance. 2nd part is correct as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. 1st part is correct as described in C above. 2nd part is incorrect as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) OPT-220 Attached w/ Revision # See STA-738 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EXPLAIN the Fire Protection administrative requirements contained in Station Administrative procedures. (LO21ADMFP1OB103)

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 1 Page 9 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: OPT-22 20 Revision: 11 Page 10 of 47 CPNPP NRRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: OPT-22 20 Revision: 11 Commen nts / Referen nce: OPT-22 20 Revision: 11 Page 11 of 47 CPNPP NRRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nce: STA-738 nts / Referen Revision: 7 Page 12 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/10/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.1.37 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.6 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

Question 94 Given the following conditions:

A Reactor Startup is in progress on Unit 1.

A Reactivity SRO has been assigned to the startup.

Reactor Power is currently 103 cps on the source range nuclear instrumentation.

Complete the following statements in accordance with ODA-102, Conduct of Operations, Attachment 8.B, Operations Reactivity Management:

1. The Unit Supervisor ___(1)___ required to be positioned in the proximity of the Reactor Operator.

2. The Reactivity SRO___(2)___ provide peer checks for reactivity manipulations.

A. (1) is NOT (2) can B. (1) is NOT (2) can NOT C. (1) is (2) can D. (1) is (2) can NOT Answer: A Page 13 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires knowledge of procedures used for reactivity management.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only as it requires knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Explanation:

A. Correct. 1st part is correct in that ODA-102, Attachment 8.B specifies that if a Reactivity SRO has been assigned that the Unit Supervisor is NOT required to be positioned in proximity to the Reactor Operator. 2nd part is correct as ODA-102; Attachment 8.B allows the Reactivity SRO to perform peer checks on reactivity manipulations.

B. Incorrect. 1st part is as described in A. 2nd part is incorrect but plausible because even though ODA-102 allows the Reactivity SRO to provide peer checks for reactivity manipulations it also states that peer checks by the Reactivity SRO should not routinely be used.

C. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible as the Reactivity SRO is assigned to assist the Unit Supervisor. The Unit Supervisor does not relinquish responsibility of the unit to the Reactivity SRO and it is therefore plausible that the Unit Supervisor is to remain in the proximity of the Reactor Operator.. 2nd part is correct as described in A above.

D. Incorrect. 1st part as described in C above. 2nd part as described in B above.

Technical Reference(s) ODA-102 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: STATE requirements for Conduct of Operations in accordance with ODA-102, ODA-407 and Operations Guideline 3. (LO21ADMXA3OB101)

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 14 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-10 02, Attachmeent 8.B Revision:: 27 Page 15 of 47 CPNPP NRRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ODA-10 02, Attachmeent 8.B Revision:: 27 Page 16 of 47 CPNPP NRRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/3/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.2.5 Level of Difficulty: 2 Importance Rating 3.2 Equipment Control: Knowledge of the process for making design or operating changes to the facility.

Question 95 In accordance with STA-707, 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR72.48 Reviews and STA-716, Modification Process:

1. The purpose of a 10CFR50.59 Evaluation is to determine if the proposed change requires

___(1)___.

2. System Turnover (Operations Acceptance) of a plant modification is complete when the work order status is ___(2)___.

A. (1) prior NRC approval via a license amendment (2) CLOSED B. (1) prior NRC approval via a CoC (Certificate of Compliance) amendment (2) CLOSED C. (1) prior NRC approval via a license amendment (2) ACOMP D. (1) prior NRC approval via a CoC (Certificate of Compliance) amendment (2) ACOMP Answer: C Page 17 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires knowledge of the 50.59 process for plant modification and the work control process for system turnover to operations.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only because it requires knowledge of facility licensee procedures required to obtain authority for design and operating changes in the facility.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 1st part is correct as STA-707 states that the 10CFR50.59 evaluation is required to determine if prior NRC approval via license amendment is required for a proposed change to the facility. 2nd part is incorrect but plausible because it could be thought that the work order for a modification must be closed to complete the turnover process, however once the work order is statused as ACOMP (filed work complete) it is accepted by Operations for use.

B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible because the purpose of a 10CFR72.48 evaluation is to determine if the proposed activity requires prior NRC approval via a CoC (Certificate of Compliance) amendment, however a 10CFR72.48 evaluation applies to dry cask storage only. 2nd part is incorrect (See A).

C. Correct. 1st part is correct (See A). 2nd part is correct (See A).

D. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect (See B). 2nd part is correct (See A).

Technical Reference(s) STA-707 Attached w/ Revision # See STA-716 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 3 Page 18 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-707 Revision: 20 Page 19 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-716 Revision: 24 Page 20 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/12/2015 Tier 3 Change: Group K/A G.2.2.25 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 4.2 Equipment Control: Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Question 96 Which of the following correctly completes the statements below?

1. LCO 3.0.4 b allows entry into a MODE with the LCO not met if a risk assessment is performed

___(1)___.

2. LCO 3.0.4 b is Not Applicable for certain important to risk systems and components.

Specifically MODE 3 entry would not be allowed per LCO 3.0.4 b for the inoperability of

___(2)___.

A. (1) separately for each inoperable Technical Specification system or component (2) Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02 B. (1) inclusively for all inoperable Technical Specification systems and components (2) Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-02 C. (1) separately for each inoperable Technical Specification system or component (2) Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-02 D. (1) inclusively for all inoperable Technical Specification systems and components (2) Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02 Answer: B Page 21 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the Technical Specification Bases for LCO 3.0.4.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) as knowledge of LCO 3.0.4 Technical Specification Bases is required.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as Technical Specifications are primarily written such that the inoperability of other equipment is not required to be considered unless a Loss of Safety Function has been determined. As such, it is plausible that the risk assessment can be performed independently for the inoperable system or component. The second part is incorrect but plausible as LCO 3.0.4 b is Not Applicable for a CCP for MODE 4 entry per LCO 3.5.3 but is not restricted for MODE 3 entry per LCO 3.5.2.

B. Correct. Per Technical Specification LCO 3.0.4 b Bases, in order for a MODE change to be made under LCO 3.0.4 b Risk Assessment, the risk assessment must account for all inoperable Technical Specification equipment. The MDAFW Pump is an exception to LCO 3.0.4 b for MODE 3 entry per LCO 3.7.5.

C. Incorrect. First part as described in A above. Second part is correct as described in B above.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in B above. Second part as described in A above.

Technical Reference(s) T.S.B. 3.0.4 Attached w/ Revision # See TS 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.7.5 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21RLSSL1OB106 ) EXPLAIN the bases for the Safety Limits.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 22 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRCN 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: T.S.B. 3.0.4 3 Revision: 72 Commen nts / Referen nce: T.S.B. 3.0.4 3 Revision: 72 Page 23 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRCN 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: T.S 3.5.2 Ammendment 16 64 Page 24 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRCN 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: T.S 3.5.3 Ammendment 16 64 Page 25 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRCN 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: T.S 3.7.5 Ammendment 16 64 Page 26 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 5/8/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.3.6 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 3.8 Radiation Control: Ability to approve release permits.

Question 97 Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

The Unit is at 100% power.

A Liquid Effluent Release Permit for Plant Effluent Tank (PET) X-01 has been approved with the following data:

PET X-01 was isolated and sampled at 0800 on March 2nd.

PET X-01 has remained isolated since it was sampled.

The release concentration, as determined by sample is 2.9 E-6 µci/cc.

Prior to commencing the release at 0900 on March 4th the following information is noted:

Radiation Monitor X-RE-5253 (LWE-076) is declared inoperable.

Completed STA-603-13, Batch Radioactive Effluent Release Verification Sheet is attached to the release permit.

Which of the following correctly completes the statement concerning the Liquid Effluent Release Permit?

In accordance with STA-603, Control of Station Radioactive Effluents the Liquid Effluent Release initial sample time ___(1)___ preclude the release from being approved and the inoperability of X-RE-5253

___(2)___ preclude the release from being approved.

A. (1) does (2) does NOT B. (1) does (2) does C. (1) does NOT (2) does NOT D. (1) does NOT (2) does Answer: C Page 27 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the release permit approval.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(4) as knowledge of the process for liquid release approvals, i.e. release permits is demonstrated.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because there is no sample time requirement for batch liquid releases but there are 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> time allowances on other releases such as from containment. Second part is correct as described in C below.

B. Incorrect. First part as described in A above. Second part as described in D below.

C. Correct. There is no time limit for sample of the PET prior to release and the STA-603-13 allows release with X-RE-5253 inoperable. Thus neither attribute precludes the release from being approved.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct as described in C above. Second part is incorrect but plausible if thought that there is no compensatory action that allows release with monitor inoperable.

Technical Reference(s) STA-603, 6.1.9 and 6.4.6 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21SYSRWSOB112 ) Given conditions that warrant a radioactive effluent release, EVALUATE and DETERMINE the proper methodology for review and authorization of the release permit.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT7387 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 4 Page 28 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-603, 6.1.9 Revision: 21 Commen nts / Referen nce: STA-603, 6.4.6 Revision: 21 Page 29 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/3/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.3.14 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 3.8 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

Question 98 Given the following conditions; A Unit 1 plant shutdown was in progress due to RCS specific activity levels exceeding the limits of Technical Specification LCO 3.4.16 Dose equivalent I-131 sample value = 75 µCi/gm XE-133 sample value = 400 µCi/gm A small break LOCA occurred initiating an automatic reactor trip and safety injection The crew transitioned from EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection through EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant into EOS-1.2A, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization CCW to RCPs has been maintained throughout the event The crew is preparing to establish RCP seal return flow by opening RCP seal water return isolation valves; 1/1-8100 and 1/1-8112 Based on the given conditions complete the following:

1. Opening the RCP seal water return isolation valves will raise ___(1)___.

2. The isotope that led to the plant shutdown is ___(2)___.

A. (1) safeguards building radiation levels (2) XE-133 B. (1) reactor coolant system inventory loss (2) XE-133 C. (1) safeguards building radiation levels (2) I-131 D. (1) reactor coolant system inventory loss (2) I-131 Answer: C Page 30 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator knowledge of how actions from EOS-1.2A could lead to increased radiation levels in the Safeguards Building.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only requiring knowledge of radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions. The question also requires knowledge of facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. 1st part is correct (See C). 2nd part is incorrect (See C).

B. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect but plausible as it could be thought that restoring seal water return would be a loss of RCS that was previously isolated, however seal water return was being sent to the RCDT via relief valve so restoration of normal seal water return flow will not raise RCS inventory loss.

C. Correct. 1st part is correct as the bases for step 29 of EOS-1.2A state that restoring normal RCP seal water return flow to the VCT may raise radiation levels in the safeguards building especially with high RCS activity. 2nd part is correct as Technical Specification LCO 3.4.16 requires I-131 or XE-133 above limit to be restored to with limit with 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or initiate a unit shutdown. Also if I-131 is above 60 µCi/gm a unit shutdown is required.

XE-133 great than 500 µCi/gm is needed to initiate a unit shutdown due to XE-133.

D. Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect (See B). 2nd part is (See C).

Technical Reference(s) EOS-1.2 Attached w/ Revision # See Technical Specification 3.4.16 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: REVIEW plant chemistry data to ensure compliance with station requirements and INITIATE actions to correct the cause of parameters outside their normal values. (OPD1.ADM.XA1.OB17)

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 4 Page 31 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-1.2 2A Revision: 8 Page 32 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: EOS-1.2 2A Revision: 8 Page 33 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Specification 3.4.16 Amendm ment: 164 Page 34 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Specification 3.4.16 Amendm ment: 164 Page 35 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Specification 3.4.16 Amendm ment: 164 Page 36 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/10/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.4.18 Level of Difficulty: 4 Importance Rating 4.0 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

Question 99 Given the following conditions:

A Small Break LOCA has occurred on Unit 1.

The Reactor Operator attempts to trip the reactor and actuates Safety Injection.

All efforts to trip the reactor from the control room have failed.

FRS-0.1A, Response to Nuclear Generation / ATWT is in progress.

The reactor is at 40% power with the Reactor Trip Breakers closed.

Subcooling is 0°F.

Containment pressure is 6 psig and rising.

All ECCS pumps are operating properly.

Which of the following correctly completes the statements?

1. The Reactor Coolant Pumps ___(1)___ be tripped at this time by the Reactor Operator.

2. The reactor should be verified subcritical by power range indication below 5% on ___(2)___.

A. (1) should (2) 1-NI-50A-1, NEUT FLUX WR B. (1) should NOT (2) 1-NI-50A-1, NEUT FLUX WR C. (1) should (2) 1-NI-41B, PR POWER CHAN I D. (1) should NOT (2) 1-NI-41B, PR POWER CHAN I Answer: B Page 37 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of the bases to specific EOPs in particular FRS-0.1A.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) as knowledge of diagnostic steps and transitions associated with contingency procedures.

Explanation:

A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as the conditions for tripping the RCPs on loss of subcooling with ECCS operating are met. However, these actions cannot be taken until the reactor is verified subcritical in Step 8. The second part is correct as described in B below.

B. Correct. In accordance with the Bases of FRS-0.1A, Step 18 the RCPs should not be tripped until subcritical conditions less than 5% power are verified. FRS-0.1A, Step 8 Bases states that with containment pressure in excess of 5 psig, the Neutron Flux Wide Range instrumentation should be used to verify the reactor is subcritical.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect as described in A above. Second part is incorrect but plausible in that with containment pressure less than 5 psig either instrument would be acceptable for the verification but above 5 psig only accident qualified instrumentation should be used.

D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part as described in C above.

Technical Reference(s) FRS-0.1A Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: LO21ERGFS1OB104 Given a procedural Step, Note or Caution, Discuss the reason or basis for the Step, Note or Caution in FRS-0.1A/B Response to Nuclear Generation/ATWT.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 38 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRS-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 39 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRS-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 40 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: FRS-0.1 1A Revision: 8 Page 41 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Rev. Date: 4/13/2015 Tier 3 Group K/A G.2.4.32 Level of Difficulty: 3 Importance Rating 4.0 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.

Question 100 Given the following Unit 2 conditions:

The Unit is at 100% power.

ABN-740B, Control Room Annunciators System and Status Light Malfunction, Section 2.0, Loss of All Control Room Annunciators, was just entered.

Which of the following Technical Specifications / Technical Requirements and associated frequency must be addressed during this event?

Technical Specifications / Technical Requirements Limiting Condition for Operation A. Technical Requirement LCO 13.2.32, Axial Flux Difference (AFD), monitor and log AFD within 30 minutes and hourly thereafter.

B. Technical Requirement LCO 13.2.32, Axial Flux Difference (AFD), reduce Reactor power to less than 50% within 30 minutes.

C. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.15, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation, perform OPT-303, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory, a MINIMUM of Once per Shift.

D. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.15, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation, perform OPT-303, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory a MINIMUM of Once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Answer: A Page 42 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Match:

The question matches the K/A as it requires the operator to demonstrate actions which must be performed in response to a loss of all annunciators.

SRO Only:

The question satisfies the criteria for SRO only in accordance with 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) as application of Required Actions for the TRM are demonstrated.

Explanation:

A. Correct. Technical Requirement LCO 13.2.32, Axial Flux Difference requires monitoring and logging AFD within 30 minutes and hourly thereafter when the AFD alarm is out of service (per TRS 13.2.32.1).

B. Incorrect. Plausible because Technical Specification LCO 3.2.3 Axial Flux Difference (AFD)

Relaxed Axial Offset Control (RAOC) Methodology not being met requires lowering Reactor power to less than 50% within 30 minutes, however, the AFD alarm is what is affected in this condition which requires monitoring and logging AFD within 30 minutes and hourly thereafter.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because surveillance for Technical Specification LCO 3.4.15, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation, must be performed, however, it must be completed every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in this condition. 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> frequency is the normal surveillance frequency for Technical Specification LCO 3.4.15.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because surveillance for Technical Specification LCO 3.4.15, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation, must be performed, however, it must be completed every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in this condition. 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> frequency is the normal surveillance frequency for Technical Specification LCO 3.4.15.

Technical Reference(s) ABN-704B, Section 2.0, Step 9, Rev. 1 Attached w/ Revision # See ABN-704B, Attachment 1 Comments / Reference Technical Requirement 13.2.32 TRS 13.2.32.1 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: ( LO21ABNSELFOB740 ) ABN-740.

Question Source: Bank # ILOT8512 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 43 of 47 CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-70 04B, Section 2.0, Step 9 Revision: 1 Page 44 of 47 CPNPP NRRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: ABN-70 04B, Attachm ment 1 Revision: 1 Page 45 of 47 CPNPP NRRC 2015 SR RO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: Technic cal Requirem ment 13.2.322, Axial Flux Revision: 79 Differenc ce Page 46 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SR RO Written EExam Worksheet 91 to 100

ES-401 CPNPP NRC N 2015 SRO S Written Exam Workksheet Form m ES-401-5 Commen nts / Referen nce: TRS 13.2.32.1 Revision: 79 Page 47 of 47 CPNPP NR RC 2015 SRRO Written E Exam Worksheet 91 to 100

ANSWER KEY CPNPP 2015 NRC RO Exam 1 B 26 B 51 D 2 C 27 B 52 A 3 A 28 B 53 B 4 D 29 A 54 B 5 A 30 D 55 A 6 B 31 B 56 B 7 A 32 D 57 C 8 C 33 A 58 B 9 B 34 A 59 D 10 C 35 D 60 A 11 B 36 D 61 C 12 A 37 D 62 C 13 C 38 C 63 C 14 D 39 D 64 D 15 A 40 D 65 C 16 B 41 A 66 C 17 A 42 D 67 A 18 B 43 C 68 A 19 B 44 D 69 D 20 A 45 A 70 C 21 B 46 C 71 B 22 B 47 C 72 B 23 B 48 A 73 C 24 C 49 C 74 D 25 A 50 C 75 C

ANSWER KEY CPNPP 2015 NRC SRO Exam 1 B 26 B 51 D 76 A 2 C 27 B 52 A 77 A 3 A 28 B 53 B 78 D 4 D 29 A 54 B 79 D 5 A 30 D 55 A 80 B 6 B 31 B 56 B 81 C 7 A 32 D 57 C 82 B 8 C 33 A 58 B 83 C 9 B 34 A 59 D 84 B 10 C 35 D 60 A 85 D 11 B 36 D 61 C 86 A 12 A 37 D 62 C 87 C 13 C 38 C 63 C 88 D 14 D 39 D 64 D 89 D 15 A 40 D 65 C 90 D 16 B 41 A 66 C 91 B 17 A 42 D 67 A 92 D 18 B 43 C 68 A 93 C 19 B 44 D 69 D 94 A 20 A 45 A 70 C 95 C 21 B 46 C 71 B 96 B 22 B 47 C 72 B 97 C 23 B 48 A 73 C 98 C 24 C 49 C 74 D 99 B 25 A 50 C 75 C 100 A

CPNPP NRC 2015 RO Written Exam Reference List

1. NRC Generic Fundamentals Equation Sheet

2. ABN-905A, Loss of Control Room Habitability Attachment 16, SG Level Temperature Correction

3. Steam Tables

GENERIC FUNDAMENTALS EXAMINATION EQUATIONS AND CONVERSIONS HANDOUT SHEET EQUATIONS



Q  pT mc P = Po10SUR(t)



Q 

mh P = Poe(t/)

 A = Aoe-t Q UAT CRS/D = S/(1 - Keff)

  m Q

3

 Nat Circ CR1(1 - Keff1) = CR2(1 - Keff2) 2 T  m  Nat Circ 1/M = CR1/CRX Keff = 1/(1 - ) A = r 2

= (Keff - 1)/Keff F = PA SUR = 26.06/ m = Av eff W 

mP Pump eff E = IR 5 eff

 Thermal Efficiency = Net Work Out/Energy In 1  eff g(z2 - z1) + (v22 - v12) + (P2 - P1) + (u2 - u1) + (q - w) = 0 5* = 1 x 10-4 sec gc 2gc eff = 0.1 sec-1 (for small positive ) gc = 32.2 lbm-ft/lbf-sec2 2 2 DRW  tip / avg CONVERSIONS 1 Mw = 3.41 x 106 Btu/hr 1 Curie = 3.7 x 1010 dps 1 hp = 2.54 x 103 Btu/hr 1 kg = 2.21 lbm 1 Btu = 778 ft-lbf 1 galwater = 8.35 lbm (C = (5/9)((F - 32) 1 ft3water = 7.48 gal (F = (9/5)((C) + 32 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ABN-905A LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 59 OF 74 ATTACHMENT 16 PAGE 1 OF 1 SG LEVEL TEMPERATURE CORRECTION NOTE: Normal SG level for Hot Standby and Cooldown (60 - 75% NR) is between 83% and 90%

actual wide range. Operating outside this range could cause uncovering AFW nozzle OR ESF actuation OR moisture carryover. Approximate critical levels (actual wide range) are:

! Lo-Lo (ESF actuation) Unit 1 - 74%

! AFW Nozzle Unit 1 - 83%

! Hi-Hi (moisture carryover) 92%

(L) 100.0 551 0 F 90.0 RCSCold LegTemp. 500 0 F 80.0 ACTUAL SG WIDE RANGE LEVEL (%)

3500 F 400 0 F 70.0 700 F 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 INDICATEDSG WIDE RANGE LEVEL (%)

Attachment 16

CPNPP NRC 2015 SRO Written Exam Reference List

1. NRC Generic Fundamentals Equation Sheet

2. ABN-905A, Loss of Control Room Habitability Attachment 16, SG Level Temperature Correction

3. Steam Tables

4. Hazard EAL Charts and Bases

GENERIC FUNDAMENTALS EXAMINATION EQUATIONS AND CONVERSIONS HANDOUT SHEET EQUATIONS



Q  pT mc P = Po10SUR(t)



Q 

mh P = Poe(t/)

 A = Aoe-t Q UAT CRS/D = S/(1 - Keff)

  m Q

3

 Nat Circ CR1(1 - Keff1) = CR2(1 - Keff2) 2 T  m  Nat Circ 1/M = CR1/CRX Keff = 1/(1 - ) A = r 2

= (Keff - 1)/Keff F = PA SUR = 26.06/ m = Av eff W 

mP Pump eff E = IR 5 eff

 Thermal Efficiency = Net Work Out/Energy In 1  eff g(z2 - z1) + (v22 - v12) + (P2 - P1) + (u2 - u1) + (q - w) = 0 5* = 1 x 10-4 sec gc 2gc eff = 0.1 sec-1 (for small positive ) gc = 32.2 lbm-ft/lbf-sec2 2 2 DRW  tip / avg CONVERSIONS 1 Mw = 3.41 x 106 Btu/hr 1 Curie = 3.7 x 1010 dps 1 hp = 2.54 x 103 Btu/hr 1 kg = 2.21 lbm 1 Btu = 778 ft-lbf 1 galwater = 8.35 lbm (C = (5/9)((F - 32) 1 ft3water = 7.48 gal (F = (9/5)((C) + 32 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 1 ABN-905A LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REVISION NO. 9 PAGE 59 OF 74 ATTACHMENT 16 PAGE 1 OF 1 SG LEVEL TEMPERATURE CORRECTION NOTE: Normal SG level for Hot Standby and Cooldown (60 - 75% NR) is between 83% and 90%

actual wide range. Operating outside this range could cause uncovering AFW nozzle OR ESF actuation OR moisture carryover. Approximate critical levels (actual wide range) are:

! Lo-Lo (ESF actuation) Unit 1 - 74%

! AFW Nozzle Unit 1 - 83%

! Hi-Hi (moisture carryover) 92%

(L) 100.0 551 0 F 90.0 RCSCold LegTemp. 500 0 F 80.0 ACTUAL SG WIDE RANGE LEVEL (%)

3500 F 400 0 F 70.0 700 F 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 INDICATEDSG WIDE RANGE LEVEL (%)

Attachment 16

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category H - Hazards EAL Group: ANY (EALs in this category are applicable to any plant condition, hot or cold.)

Hazards are non-plant, system-related events that can directly or indirectly affect plant operation, reactor plant safety or personnel safety.

The events of this category pertain to the following subcategories:

1. Natural or Destructive Phenomena Natural events include hurricanes, earthquakes or tornados that have potential to cause plant structure or equipment damage of sufficient magnitude to threaten personnel or plant safety. Non-naturally occurring events that can cause damage to plant facilities and include aircraft crashes, missile impacts, etc.

2. Fire or Explosion Fires can pose significant hazards to personnel and reactor safety. Appropriate for classification are fires within the site Protected Area or which may affect operability of equipment needed for safe shutdown

3. Hazardous Gas Non-naturally occurring events that can cause damage to plant facilities and include toxic, asphyxiant, corrosive or flammable gas leaks.

4. Security Unauthorized entry attempts into the Protected Area, bomb threats, sabotage attempts, and actual security compromises threatening loss of physical control of the plant.

Page 141 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases

5. Control Room Evacuation Events that are indicative of loss of Control Room habitability. If the Control Room must be evacuated, additional support for monitoring and controlling plant functions is necessary through the emergency response facilities.

6. Judgment The EALs defined in other categories specify the predetermined symptoms or events that are indicative of emergency or potential emergency conditions and thus warrant classification. While these EALs have been developed to address the full spectrum of possible emergency conditions which may warrant classification and subsequent implementation of the Emergency Plan, a provision for classification of emergencies based on operator/management experience and judgment is still necessary. The EALs of this category provide the Emergency Coordinator the latitude to classify emergency conditions consistent with the established classification criteria based upon Emergency Coordinator judgment.

Page 142 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area EAL:

HU1.1 Unusual Event Seismic event identified by any two of the following:

x Annunciator 2A- 2.1, SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM ACTIVATION, received x Earthquake felt in plant x National Earthquake Information Center Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL is categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of concern to plant operators.

Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate.

As defined in the EPRI-sponsored Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake, dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is: An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators on duty at the time, and (b) for plants with operable seismic instrumentation, the seismic switches of the plant are activated.

The National Earthquake Information Center can confirm if an earthquake has occurred in the area of the plant.

Page 143 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Plant-Specific The seismic trigger, CP1-SIATAS-03, is set to activate the strong motion recording system 1

at an acceleration level slightly above normal ambient vibrations (0.01g) and well below the postulated OBE free field ground acceleration (0.06g horizontal). This causes an alarm in the control room to alert the operator. (ref. 1, 2) The seismic recorders (strong motion accelerators) monitor earth vibration and, when triggered, store data in the recorder. Triaxial SMAs are installed at appropriate locations to provide data on the frequency, amplitude, and phase relationship of the seismic response of the containment structure and the seismic input to other seismic Category I structures, systems, and components. The Seismic Monitoring System instrumentation consists of strong motion accelerograph (triaxial time history accelerograph system), triaxial peak accelerograph recorders, passive response spectrum recorders, a response spectrum switch, and a seismic switch. Except for sensors for the active instrumentation, all electronics for processing and storage of the seismic data are located in the seismic instrumentation panel CPX-ECPRCV-11 in the control room. There is no additional seismic instrumentation required for Unit 2. However, alarms from seismic instrumentation in Unit 1 are duplicated in Unit 2. The time history accelerograph system is fully operational within 0.1 second after the seismic trigger is actuated. It will operate continuously during the period in which the earthquake exceeds the seismic trigger threshold (0.01g) plus 5 seconds (minimum) beyond the last seismic trigger signal. The 0.01g criteria was selected to provide an appropriate action point which excludes noise or minor tremors not of interest to the NRC or with any effect on the plant.

This event escalates to an Alert under EAL HA1.1 if the earthquake exceeds Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) levels.

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. ABN-907 Acts of Nature

2. DBD-EE-077 Seismic Instrumentation 1

3. 1,2-ALB-2A-2.1 SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM ACTIVATION Page 144 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area EAL:

HU1.2 Unusual Event Tornado striking within the Protected Area boundary OR Sustained high winds > 80 mph Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL is categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of concern to plant operators.

This EAL is based on a tornado striking (touching down) or high winds within the PROTECTED AREA.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on VISIBLE DAMAGE, or by other in plant conditions, via EAL HA1.2.

Plant-Specific All seismic category I structures are designed to withstand sustained winds of 80 mph and gusts that are a factor of at least 1.1 above the design wind speed (ref. 1). The wind speed instrument can measure wind speeds of up to 100 mph (ref. 2). Category I structures (which are required for safe shutdown): are designed to withstand the effects of a tornado and the most severe wind phenomena encountered. (ref. 3, 4)

Page 145 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases The National Weather Service (NWS) has a continuous radio broadcast service of weather conditions in the Dallas-Ft. Worth area. A receiver capable of receiving and decoding the NWS alert tone for severe weather notifications is monitored in the Control Room and Alternate Access Point for the issuance or cancellation of Severe Thunderstorm and Tornado Watches. Security personnel on duty in the Alternate Access Point will keep the Control Room informed of all watches or warnings issued or canceled by the NWS. Visual observations will be made by Security Officers and Safety Services personnel during the performance of their normal duties when a watch has been issued. The Control Room will be kept informed of visual observations regarding weather conditions by radio or telephone.

Plant Equipment Operators are trained as SKYWARN spotters and may be utilized to determine weather severity. (ref. 5)

The Protected Area refers to the designated security area around the process buildings and is depicted in FSAR Figure 1.2-1 Plot Plan (ref. 6).

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. FSAR Section 3.3.1.1

2. FSAR Table 2.3-34, Meteorological Instrumentation Comanche Peak Operational Meteorological Program

3. DBD-ME-028 Classification of structures, Systems and Components

4. DBD-CS-081 General Structural Design Criteria

5. ABN-907 Acts of Nature

6. FSAR Figure 1.2-1 Plot Plan Page 146 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area EAL:

HU1.3 Unusual Event Internal flooding that has the potential to affect safety-related equipment required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode in the Safeguards Building or Turbine Building Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL is categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of concern to plant operators.

This EAL addresses the effect of internal flooding caused by events such as component failures, equipment misalignment, or outage activity mishaps.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based VISIBLE DAMAGE via EAL HA1.3, or by other plant conditions.

Plant-Specific The internal flooding areas of concern are the Safeguards Building and Turbine Building. .

The CPNPP PRA includes an extensive evaluation of the plant with respect to its susceptibility to internal floods. Internal flooding sources are distinguished from those attributable to external events, such as heavy rainfall. The internal flood initiating event assessment evaluated the potential flood sources in the plant, the propagation pathways the water (or other liquid) would follow throughout the plant, and the equipment that could be failed if submerged in the flood waters.

Page 147 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases For the flood analysis, a detailed analysis was performed to identify flood tight doors in the plant, curbs that would keep water from entering a room, maximum potential water depths, potential operator actions to stop the flood or mitigate its consequences. The internal flood analysis assumes a failure of all the equipment located in the flood zone where the flood initiates, and a failure of the equipment below the flood depth in the rooms into which the flood waters propagate (ref. 1).

Flooding in these areas could have the potential to cause a reactor trip and could result in consequential failures to important systems. The potential for flooding in this area was determined by an examination of piping systems in the area and also considered propagation of water from one area to another (ref. 1).

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP PRA Accident Sequence Analysis Internal Flooding Sequences Page 148 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area EAL:

HU1.4 Unusual Event Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic These EALs are categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of concern to plant operators.

This EAL addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Generator seal damage observed after generator purge does not meet the intent of this EAL because it did not impact normal operation of the plant.

Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Actual FIRES and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via EAL HU2.1 and EAL HU3.1.

This EAL is consistent with the definition of a UE while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be to EAL HA1.4 based on damage done by PROJECTILES generated by the failure or in conjunction with a steam generator tube rupture. These latter events would be classified by the Category R EALs or Category F EALs.

Page 149 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Plant-Specific The turbine generator stores large amounts of rotational kinetic energy in its rotor. In the unlikely event of a major mechanical failure, this energy may be transformed into both rotational and translational energy of rotor fragments. These fragments may impact the surrounding stationary parts. If the energy-absorbing capability of these stationary turbine generator parts is insufficient, external projectiles will be released. These ejected projectiles may impact various plant structures, including those housing safety related equipment.

In the event of projectile ejection, the probability of a strike on a plant region is a function of the energy and direction of an ejected projectile and of the orientation of the turbine with respect to the plant region.

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. ABN-401 Main Turbine Malfunction

2. ABN-402 Main Generator Malfunction Page 150 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area EAL:

HU1.5 Unusual Event Safe Shutdown Impoundment level > 794.7 ft (lake)

OR Safe Shutdown Impoundment level < 769.5 ft (inside traveling screens)

Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL is categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of concern to plant operators.

This EAL addresses other site specific phenomena that can also be precursors of more serious events.

Plant-Specific This EAL addresses external flooding or low water levels caused by external events.

Squaw Creek Reservoir level should normally be maintained between 773 ft and 775 ft per SOP-901. 1-ALB-1 1.0 SSI LVL LO annunciator is received when Traveling Screen water level is d 771 ft elevation (ref. 5).

The maximum level reached in the Safe Shutdown Impoundment (SSI) during the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) is computed to be 790.5 ft, leaving a freeboard in the SSI of 5.5 ft.

(ref. 1)

Page 151 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases The plant grade is at elevation 810 ft. The PMF, as determined by imposing the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) intensity of 39.1 inches in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, will reach an elevation of 789.7 ft in Squaw Creek Reservoir. The maximum water elevations reached at the plant site, Squaw Creek Dam and the SSI dam, due to wave runup and setup, are 794.7 ft, 793.7 ft and 791.3 ft, respectively. All plant facilities are either above the maximum water elevation of 794.7 ft or are not considered to be adversely affected by such an elevation of water (ref.

2). Therefore, the value of 794.7 ft (lake) has been selected to indicate a potential decrease in the level of plant safety due to external flooding. Lake level is specified for the high level threshold because differential pressure across the traveling screens can depress the level inside the traveling screens.

The single source of safety-related cooling water and the ultimate plant heat sink for CPNPP is the SSI. This reservoir contains a volume of water, including evaporative contingency, that is sufficient to provide cooling for a period of over 30 days without makeup to safely limit the effects of an accident in one unit, to permit the safe shutdown of the other unit, and to maintain them both in a safe shutdown condition (ref. 4).

Safety-related cooling water is withdrawn from the SSI by four 17,000-gpm-capacity service water pumps. All pumps are located in the Service Water Intake Structure, a seismic Category I building. The seismic Category I dam and canal maintain the water level of the SSI at 769.5 ft in the event of accidental water loss from the Squaw Creek Reservoir (ref.

6). Therefore the value of 769.5 ft has been selected to indicate a potential decrease in the level of plant safety due to low SSI level. Level inside the traveling screens is specified for the low level threshold because differential pressure across the traveling screens can depress the level below the lake level.

SSI level is indicated on CR Panel CB01 on X-LI-4288 and 4289 with a range of 762 ft to 788 ft.

Page 152 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. FSAR Section 2.4.3.7 Flood Evaluations for Safe Shutdown Impoundment

2. DBD-CS-071 Maximum Probable Flood

3. ABN-907 Acts of Nature

4. FSAR Section 2.4.11.5 Plant Requirements

5. 1-ALB-1 1.0 SSI LVL LO

6. FSAR Section 2.4.11.6 Heat Sink Dependability Requirements Page 153 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting Vital Areas EAL:

HA1.1 Alert Seismic event > OBE as indicated by annunciator 2A-3.1, OBE EXCEEDED, or yellow OBE light on Seismic Monitoring system panel AND Earthquake confirmed by any of the following:

x Earthquake felt in plant x National Earthquake Information Center x Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on System Malfunction EALs.

Seismic events of this magnitude can result in a VITAL AREA being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to plant safety systems.

The National Earthquake Information Center can confirm if an earthquake has occurred in the area of the plant.

Plant-Specific Seismic events of this magnitude can result in a areas needed for safe shutdown being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to plant safety systems.

Page 154 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases A conservative Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) having a peak horizontal ground acceleration at the top of bedrock of 0.12 g has been selected for design (FSAR Section 2.5.2.6). The Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) is equal to 1/2 the SSE (ref. 1).

When the seismic recorder indicates that the OBE has been exceeded, System Engineering must evaluate and determine whether the reactor must be shut down and remain shutdown until inspection of the facility shows that no damage has been incurred which would jeopardize safe operation of the facility or until such damage is repaired. CPNPP was designed such that, for ground motion less than the OBE, the features of the plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. Any ground motion in excess of this results in an uncertainty as to the extent of the damage which must be resolved before continued operation can be considered safe (ref. 2).

The seismic trigger, CP1-SIATAS-03, is set to activate the strong motion recording system 1 at an acceleration level slightly above normal ambient vibrations (0.01g) and well below the postulated OBE free field ground acceleration (0.06g horizontal). This causes an alarm in the control room to alert the operator. (ref. 2, 3) The seismic recorders (strong motion accelerators) monitor earth vibration and, when triggered, store data in the recorder. Triaxial SMAs are installed at appropriate locations to provide data on the frequency, amplitude, and phase relationship of the seismic response of the containment structure and the seismic input to other seismic Category I structures, systems, and components. The Seismic Instrumentation consists of strong motion accelerograph (triaxial time history accelerograph system), triaxial peak accelerograph recorders, passive response spectrum recorders, a response spectrum switch, and a seismic switch. Except for sensors for the active instrumentation, all electronics for processing and storage of the seismic data are located in the seismic instrumentation panel CPX-ECPRCV-11 in the control room. There is no additional seismic instrumentation required for Unit 2. However, alarms from seismic instrumentation in Unit 1 are duplicated in Unit 2. The time history accelerograph system is fully operational within 0.1 second after the seismic trigger is actuated.

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases It will operate continuously during the period in which the earthquake exceeds the seismic trigger threshold (0.01g) plus 5 seconds (minimum) beyond the last seismic trigger signal.

As defined in the EPRI-sponsored Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake, dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is: An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that:

(a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators on duty at the time, and (b) for plants with operable seismic instrumentation, the seismic switches of the plant are activated.

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. FSAR Section 2.5.4.9 Earthquake Design Basis

2. ABN-907 Acts of Nature

3. DBD-EE-077 Seismic Instrumentation 1

4. 1,2-ALB-2A-3.1 OBE EXCEEDED

5. DBD-ME-028 Classification of Structures, Systems and Components Page 156 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting Vital Areas EAL:

HA1.2 Alert Tornado striking or sustained high winds > 80 mph resulting in EITHER:

x Visible damage to any Table H-1 structures x Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL escalates from HU1.2 in that the occurrence of the event has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to plant structures or areas containing equipment necessary for a safe shutdown, or has caused damage to the safety systems in those structures evidenced by control room indications of degraded system response or performance.

The occurrence of VISIBLE DAMAGE and/or degraded system response is intended to discriminate against lesser events. The initial report should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The significance here is not that a particular system or structure was damaged, but rather, that the event was of sufficient magnitude to cause this degradation.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on System Malfunction EALs.

This EAL is based on a tornado striking (touching down) or high winds that have caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

Page 157 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Plant-Specific Category I structures are designed to withstand sustained winds of 80 mph and gusts that are a factor of at least 1.1 above the design wind speed (ref. 1, 2).

Table H-1 structures contain systems/equipment the operation of which may be needed to ensure the reactor safely reaches and is maintained shutdown (ref. 3, 4).

All seismic Category I structures which are required for safe shutdown, contain equipment required for safe shutdown, are required to protect reactor coolant system integrity, or which protect stored fuel assemblies are designed to withstand the effects of a tornado and the most severe wind phenomena encountered (ref. 1, 5).

The wind speed instrument can measure wind speeds of up to 100 mph. (ref. 6)

The National Weather Service (NWS) has a continuous radio broadcast service of weather conditions in the Dallas-Ft. Worth area. A receiver capable of receiving and decoding the NWS alert tone for severe weather notifications is monitored in the Control Room and Alternate Access Point for the issuance or cancellation of Severe Thunderstorm and Tornado Watches. Security personnel on duty in the Alternate Access Point will keep the Control Room informed of all watches or warnings issued or canceled by the NWS. Visual observations will be made by Security Officers and Safety Services personnel during the performance of their normal duties when a watch has been issued. The Control Room will be kept informed of visual observations regarding weather conditions by radio or telephone.

Plant Equipment Operators are trained as SKYWARN spotters and may be utilized to determine weather severity. (ref. 7)

The Protected Area refers to the designated security area around the process buildings and is depicted in FSAR Figure 1.2-1 Plot Plan (ref. 8).

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. DBD-CS-081 General Structural Design Criteria

2. FSAR Section 3.3.1.1

3. CPNPP Fire Protection Report, Section 5.0 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment List

4. FSAR Section 7.4 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown

5. DBD-ME-028 Classification of structures, Systems and Components

6. FSAR Table 2.3-34, Meteorological Instrumentation Comanche Peak Operational Meteorological Program

7. ABN-907 Acts of Nature

8. FSAR Figure 1.2-1 Plot Plan Page 159 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting Vital Areas EAL:

HA1.3 Alert Internal flooding in the Safeguards Building or Turbine Building resulting in EITHER:

x An electrical shock hazard that precludes access to operate or monitor systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown x Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on System Malfunction EALs.

This EAL addresses the effect of internal flooding caused by events such as component failures, equipment misalignment, or outage activity mishaps. It is based on the degraded performance of systems, or has created industrial safety hazards (e.g., electrical shock) that preclude necessary access to operate or monitor safety equipment. The inability to access, operate or monitor safety equipment represents an actual or substantial potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Flooding as used in this EAL describes a condition where water is entering the room faster than installed equipment is capable of removal, resulting in a rise of water level within the room.

Classification of this EAL should not be delayed while corrective actions are being taken to isolate the water source.

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Plant-Specific The internal flooding areas of concern are the Safeguards Building and Turbine Building.

The CPNPP PRA includes an extensive evaluation of the plant with respect to its susceptibility to internal floods. Internal flooding sources are distinguished from those attributable to external events, such as heavy rainfall. The internal flood initiating event assessment evaluated the potential flood sources in the plant, the propagation pathways the water (or other liquid) would follow throughout the plant, and the equipment that could be failed if submerged in the flood waters. For the flood analysis, a detailed analysis was performed to identify flood tight doors in the plant, curbs that would keep water from entering a room, maximum potential water depths, potential operator actions to stop the flood or mitigate its consequences. The internal flood analysis assumes a failure of all the equipment located in the flood zone where the flood initiates, and a failure of the equipment below the flood depth in the rooms into which the flood waters propagate (ref. 1).

Flooding in these areas could have the potential to cause a reactor trip and could result in consequential failures to important systems. The potential for flooding in this area was determined by an examination of piping systems in the area and also considered propagation of water from one area to another (ref. 1).

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP PRA Accident Sequence Analysis Internal Flooding Sequences Page 161 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting Vital Areas EAL:

HA1.4 Alert Turbine failure-generated projectiles resulting in EITHER:

x Visible damage to or penetration of any Table H-1 structures x Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL escalates from HU1.4 in that the occurrence of the event has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to plant structures or areas containing equipment necessary for a safe shutdown, or has caused damage to the safety systems in those structures evidenced by control room indications of degraded system response or performance.

The occurrence of VISIBLE DAMAGE and/or degraded system response is intended to discriminate against lesser events. The initial report should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The significance here is not that a particular system or structure was damaged, but rather, that the event was of sufficient magnitude to cause this degradation.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on System Malfunction EALs.

This EAL addresses the threat to safety related equipment imposed by PROJECTILEs generated by main turbine rotating component failures. Therefore, this EAL is consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that the potential exists for actual or substantial potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Plant-Specific Table H-1 structures contain systems/equipment the operation of which may be needed to ensure the reactor reaches and is maintained in shutdown (ref. 1, 2).

The turbine generator stores large amounts of rotational kinetic energy in its rotor. In the extremely improbable event of a major mechanical failure, this energy may be transformed into both rotational and translational energy of rotor fragments. These fragments may impact the surrounding stationary parts. If the energy-absorbing capability of these stationary turbine generator parts is insufficient, external projectiles will be released. These ejected projectiles theoretically could impact various plant structures, including those housing safety related equipment.

In the event of projectile ejection, the probability of a strike on a plant region is a function of the energy and direction of an ejected projectile and of the orientation of the turbine with respect to the plant region. The probability of generating external turbine projectiles resulting from a hypothetical LP turbine disk failure which could adversely affect safety related SSCs is less than the NRC threshold of 1E-07 per year for favorably oriented turbines. The turbines are oriented to prevent low-trajectory projectiles from impacting safety related SSCs (ref. 3, 4). See Figure H-1.

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Fire Protection Report, Section 5.0 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment List

2. FSAR Section 7.4 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown

3. FSAR Section 3.5.1.3.2 Turbine Missiles

4. FSAR Figure 3.5.3 Turbine Missile Strike Zone - Plan View Page 163 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Figure H-1 Turbine Missile Strike Zone Page 164 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area EAL:

HA1.5 Alert Safe Shutdown Impoundment level > 796.0 ft (lake)

OR Safe Shutdown Impoundment level < 761.5 ft (inside traveling screens)

Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL addresses other site specific phenomena that result in VISIBLE DAMAGE to VITAL AREAS or results in indication of damage to safety structures, systems, or components containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant that can also be precursors of more serious events.

Plant-Specific Squaw Creek Reservoir level should normally be maintained between 773 ft and 775 ft per SOP-901. 1-ALB-1 1.9 SSI LVL LO annunciator is received when Traveling Screen water 1 level is d 771 ft elevation (ref. 5)

The maximum level reached in the Safe Shutdown Impoundment (SSI) during the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) is computed to be 790.5 ft, leaving a freeboard in the SSI of 5.5 ft (ref. 1).

The plant grade is at elevation 810 ft. The operating deck of the Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) is at elevation 796.0 ft with the pump discharge centerline at elevation 800.0 ft (ref. 2). This elevation also corresponds to the top of the Squaw Creek Dam (ref. 7).

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Therefore the elevation of 796.0 ft has been selected as the high level threshold for this EAL as it represents a significant threat to plant safety. Lake level is specified for the high level threshold because differential pressure across the traveling screens can depress the level inside the traveling screens.

The single source of safety-related cooling water and the ultimate plant heat sink for CPNPP is the SSI. This reservoir contains a volume of water (including evaporative contingency) that is sufficient to provide cooling for a period of over 30 days without makeup to safely limit the effects of an accident in one unit, to permit the safe shutdown of the other unit, and to maintain them both in a safe shutdown condition (ref. 4).

Safety-related cooling water is withdrawn from the SSI by four 17,000-gpm-capacity service water pumps. All pumps are located in the Service Water Intake Structure, a seismic Category I building. The Service Water Intake Structure sump descends to elevation 755.0 ft and the service water pump impeller blades descend to elevation 758.0 ft. Each pump is designed to operate with a minimum submergence requirement of 4.5 ft above the bellmouth flare (el. 757.0 ft). As a result, a minimum water elevation of at least 761.5 ft is necessary for service water pump operation and has been selected as the low level threshold for this EAL as it represents a significant threat to plant safety (ref. 4). Level inside the traveling screens is specified for the low level threshold because differential pressure across the traveling screens can depress the level below the lake level.

SSI level is indicated on CR Panel CB01 on X-LI-4288 and 4289 with a range of 762 ft -

788 ft.

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. FSAR Section 2.4.3.7 Flood Evaluations for Safe Shutdown Impoundment

2. DBD-CS-071 Maximum Probable Flood

3. ABN-907 Acts of Nature

4. FSAR Section 2.4.11.5 Plant Requirements

5. 1-ALB-1 1.9 SSI LVL LO 1

6. FSAR Section 2.4.11.6 Heat Sink Dependability Requirements

7. DBD-CS-100 Design Basis for Squaw Creek Reservoir Page 166 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting Vital Areas EAL:

HA1.6 Alert Vehicle crash resulting in EITHER:

x Visible damage to any Table H-1 plant structures x Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic The occurrence of VISIBLE DAMAGE and/or degraded system response is intended to discriminate against lesser events. The initial report should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The significance here is not that a particular system or structure was damaged, but rather, that the event was of sufficient magnitude to cause this degradation.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on System Malfunction EALs.

This EAL addresses vehicle crashes within the PROTECTED AREA that results in VISIBLE DAMAGE to VITAL AREAS or indication of damage to safety structures, systems, or components containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Plant-Specific Table H-1 structures contain systems/equipment the operation of which may be needed to ensure the reactor reaches and is maintained in shutdown (ref. 1, 2). Personnel access to Table H-1 structures may be an important factor in monitoring and controlling equipment operability.

This EAL addresses events such as plane, helicopter, barge, car or truck crashes, or impact of projectiles into an area housing equipment needed for safe shutdown.

The Protected Area refers to the designated security area around the process buildings and is depicted in FSAR Figure 1.2-1 Plot Plan (ref. 3).

If the vehicle crash is determined to be hostile in nature, the event is classified under EAL HA4.1.

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Fire Protection Report, Section 5.0 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment List

2. FSAR Section 7.4 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown

3. FSAR Figure 1.2-1 Plot Plan Page 168 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 2 - Fire or Explosion Initiating Condition: Fire within the Protected Area not extinguished within 15 min. of detection or explosion within the Protected Area EAL:

HU2.1 Unusual Event Fire not extinguished within 15 min. of Control Room notification or verification of a Control Room fire alarm in any Table H-1 area (Note 4)

Note 4: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL addresses the magnitude and extent of FIRES that may be potentially significant precursors of damage to safety systems. It addresses the FIRE, and not the degradation in performance of affected systems that may result.

As used here, detection is visual observation and report by plant personnel or sensor alarm indication.

The 15 minute time period begins with a credible notification that a FIRE is occurring, or indication of a fire detection system alarm/actuation. Verification of a fire detection system alarm/actuation includes actions that can be taken within the control room or other nearby CPNPP location to ensure that it is not spurious. An alarm is assumed to be an indication of a FIRE unless it is disproved within the 15 minute period by personnel dispatched to the scene. In other words, a personnel report from the scene may be used to disprove a sensor alarm if received within 15 minutes of the alarm, but shall not be required to verify the alarm.

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases The intent of this 15 minute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate against small FIRES that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket).

Plant-Specific Table H-1 applies to buildings and areas housing equipment needed for safe shutdown (ref.

1, 2).

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Fire Protection Report, Section 5.0 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment List

2. FSAR Section 7.4 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown Page 170 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 2 - Fire or Explosion Initiating Condition: Fire within the Protected Area not extinguished within 15 min. of detection or explosion within the Protected Area EAL:

HU2.2 Unusual Event Explosion of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the Protected Area Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL addresses the magnitude and extent of EXPLOSIONS that may be potentially significant precursors of damage to safety systems. It addresses the EXPLOSION, and not the degradation in performance of affected systems that may result.

This EAL addresses only those EXPLOSIONS of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the PROTECTED AREA.

No attempt is made to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the EXPLOSION is sufficient for declaration.

The Emergency Coordinator also needs to consider any security aspects of the EXPLOSION, if applicable.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on EAL HA2.1.

Plant-Specific The Protected Area refers to the designated security area around the process buildings and is depicted in FSAR Figure 1.2-1 Plot Plan (ref. 1).

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases A steam line break or steam explosion that damages surrounding permanent structures or equipment would be classified under this EAL. This does not mean the emergency is classified simply because the steam line break occurred. The method of damage is not as important as the degradation of plant structures or equipment. The need to classify the steam line break itself is considered in fission product barrier degradation monitoring (EAL Category F).

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. FSAR Figure 1.2-1 Plot Plan Page 172 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 2 - Fire or Explosion Initiating Condition: Fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown EAL:

HA2.1 Alert Fire or explosion resulting in EITHER:

x Visible damage to any Table H-1 structures x Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic VISIBLE DAMAGE is used to identify the magnitude of the FIRE or EXPLOSION and to discriminate against minor FIRES and EXPLOSIONS.

The reference to structures containing safety systems or components is included to discriminate against FIRES or EXPLOSIONS in areas having a low probability of affecting safe operation. The significance here is not that a safety system was degraded but the fact that the FIRE or EXPLOSION was large enough to cause damage to these systems.

The use of VISIBLE DAMAGE should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. The declaration of an Alert and the activation of the Technical Support Center will provide the Emergency Coordinator with the resources needed to perform detailed damage assessments.

The Emergency Coordinator also needs to consider any security aspects of the EXPLOSION.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, will be based on EALs in Category S, Category F or Category R.

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Plant-Specific The reference to Table H-1 structures is included to discriminate against fires or explosions in areas having a low probability of affecting safe operation (ref. 1, 2).

A steam line break or steam explosion that damages permanent structures or equipment would be classified under this EAL. The method of damage is not as important as the degradation of plant structures or equipment. The need to classify the steam line break itself is considered in fission product barrier degradation monitoring (EAL Category F).

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Fire Protection Report, Section 5.0 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment List

2. FSAR Section 7.4 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown Page 174 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 3 - Hazardous Gas Initiating Condition: Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases deemed detrimental to normal plant operations EAL:

HU3.1 Unusual Event Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases in amounts that have or could adversely affect normal plant operations Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL is based on the release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases of sufficient quantity to affect NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

The fact that SCBA may be worn does not eliminate the need to declare the event.

This EAL is not intended to require significant assessment or quantification. It assumes an uncontrolled process that has the potential to affect plant operations. This would preclude small or incidental releases, or releases that do not impact structures needed for plant operation.

An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerous levels.

Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosed environment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level of around 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on EAL HA3.1.

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Plant-Specific The following documents provide additional information on hazardous substances and spills.

x ABN-902 Release of Radioactive/Toxic Gas (ref. 1) x Regulatory Guide 1.78, Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release, Table 1, Toxicity Limits (IDLH Limits) for Some Hazardous Chemicals (ref. 2)

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. ABN-902 Release of Radioactive/Toxic Gas

2. Regulatory Guide 1.78, Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release, Table 1, Toxicity Limits (IDLH Limits) for Some Hazardous Chemicals Page 176 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 3 - Hazardous Gas Initiating Condition: Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases deemed detrimental to normal plant operations EAL:

HU3.2 Unusual Event Recommendation by local, county or state officials to evacuate or shelter site personnel based on offsite event Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on EAL HA3.1.

Plant-Specific This EAL is based on the existence of uncontrolled releases of toxic or flammable gas affecting normal plant operations or the health of plant personnel. The release originated offsite and local, county or state officials have reported the need for evacuation or sheltering of site personnel. Offsite events (e.g., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.) are considered in this EAL because they may adversely affect normal plant operations.

State officials may determine the evacuation area for offsite spills by using the Department of Transportation (DOT) Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials.

Should an explosion or fire occur due to flammable gas within an affected plant area, an Alert may be appropriate based on EAL HA2.1.

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

None Page 177 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 3 - Hazardous Gas Initiating Condition: Access to a Vital Area is prohibited due to release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shut down the reactor EAL:

HA3.1 Alert Access to a Vital Area is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shut down the reactor (Note 3)

Note 3: If the equipment in the stated area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then EAL HA3.1 should not be declared as it will have no adverse impact on the ability of the plant to safely operate or safely shutdown beyond that already allowed by Technical Specifications at the time of the event.

Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic Gases in a VITAL AREA can affect the ability to safely operate or safely shutdown the reactor.

The fact that SCBA may be worn does not eliminate the need to declare the event.

Declaration should not be delayed for confirmation from atmospheric testing if the atmosphere poses an immediate threat to life and health or an immediate threat of severe exposure to gases.

This could be based upon documented analysis, indication of personal ill effects from exposure, or operating experience with the hazards.

If the equipment in the stated area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then this EAL should not be declared as it will have no adverse impact on the ability of the plant to safely operate or safely shutdown beyond that already allowed by Technical Specifications at the time of the event.

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerous levels.

Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosed environment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level of around 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death.

An uncontrolled release of flammable gasses within a facility structure has the potential to affect safe operation of the plant by limiting either operator or equipment operations due to the potential for ignition and resulting equipment damage/personnel injury. Flammable gasses, such as hydrogen and acetylene, are routinely used to maintain plant systems (hydrogen) or to repair equipment/components (acetylene - used in welding). This EAL assumes concentrations of flammable gasses which can ignite/support combustion.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, will be based on EALs in Category S, Category F or Category R.

Plant-Specific None CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Fire Protection Report, Section 5.0 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment List

2. FSAR Section 7.4 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown

3. ABN-902 Release of Radioactive/Toxic Gas

4. Regulatory Guide 1.78, Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release, Table 1, Toxicity Limits (IDLH Limits) for Some Hazardous Chemicals Page 179 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 4 - Security Initiating Condition: Confirmed security condition or threat which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant EAL:

HU4.1 Unusual Event A security condition that does not involve a hostile action as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor OR A credible site-specific security threat notification OR A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

Security events which do not represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases under 10 CFR 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under EAL HA4.1, EAL HS4.1 and EAL HG1.1.

A higher initial classification could be made based upon the nature and timing of the security threat and potential consequences. The licensee shall consider upgrading the emergency response status and emergency classification level in accordance with the CPNPP Safeguards Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan.

First Condition Reference is made to security shift supervision because these individuals are the designated personnel on-site qualified and trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred.

Training on security event classification confirmation is closely controlled due to the strict secrecy controls placed on the CPNPP Safeguards Contingency Plan.

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CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases This threshold is based on site specific security plans. CPNPP Safeguards Contingency Plans are based on guidance provided by NEI 03-12.

Second Condition This threshold is included to ensure that appropriate notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner. This includes information of a credible threat. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Unusual Event.

The determination of credible is made through use of information found in the CPNPP Safeguards Contingency Plan.

Third Condition The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the aircraft threat are made in a timely manner and that OROs and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. It is not the intent of this EAL to replace existing non-hostile related EALs involving aircraft.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an aircraft threat from NRC. Validation is performed by calling the NRC or by other approved methods of authentication. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Unusual Event.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Escalation to Alert emergency classification level via EAL HA4.1 would be appropriate if the threat involves an airliner within 30 minutes of the plant.

Plant-Specific None CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Safeguards Contingency Plan

2. ABN-915 Security Events Page 181 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 4 - Security Initiating Condition: Hostile action within the Owner Controlled Area or airborne attack threat EAL:

HA4.1 Alert A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the Owner Controlled Area as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor OR A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 min. of the site Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

This EAL addresses the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. They are not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack or is an identified attack target with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires a heightened state of readiness and implementation of protective measures that can be effective (such as on-site evacuation, dispersal or sheltering).

First Condition This condition addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the OCA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Page 182 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Note that this condition is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.

Second Condition This condition addresses the immediacy of an expected threat arrival or impact on the site within a relatively short time.

The intent of this condition is to ensure that notifications for the airliner attack threat are made in a timely manner and that OROs and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. Airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant.

This condition is met when a plant receives information regarding an airliner attack threat from NRC and the airliner is within 30 minutes of the plant. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Alert.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Plant-Specific None CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Safeguards Contingency Plan

2. ABN-915 Security Events Page 183 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 4 - Security Initiating Condition: Hostile action within the Protected Area EAL:

HS4.1 Site Area Emergency A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the Protected Area as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This condition represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert in that a HOSTILE FORCE has progressed from the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA to the PROTECTED AREA.

This EAL addresses the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. It is not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires ORO readiness and preparation for the implementation of protective measures.

This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION.

It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the PROTECTED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on actual plant status after impact or progression of attack.

Plant-Specific None Page 184 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Safeguards Contingency Plan

2. ABN-915 Security Events Page 185 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 4 - Security Initiating Condition: Hostile action resulting in loss of physical control of the facility EAL:

HG4.1 General Emergency A hostile action has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain any of the following safety functions:

x Reactivity control x RCS inventory x Secondary heat removal Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL encompasses conditions under which a HOSTILE ACTION has resulted in a loss of physical control of VITAL AREAS (containing vital equipment or controls of vital equipment) required to maintain safety functions and control of that equipment cannot be transferred to and operated from another location.

If control of the plant equipment necessary to maintain safety functions can be transferred to another location, then the threshold is not met.

Plant-Specific None CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Safeguards Contingency Plan

2. ABN-915 Security Events Page 186 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 4 - Security Initiating Condition: Hostile action resulting in loss of physical control of the facility EAL:

HG4.2 General Emergency A hostile action has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling systems AND Imminent fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic This EAL addresses failure of spent fuel cooling systems as a result of HOSTILE ACTION if IMMINENT fuel damage is likely, such as when a freshly off-loaded reactor core is in the spent fuel pool.

Plant-Specific A freshly off-loaded core in pool is defined to exist during the period of time when core off-load begins (RFO-402, Step 5.25) until core reload is complete (RFO-402, Step 5.5.8) (ref.

3).

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. CPNPP Safeguards Contingency Plan

2. ABN-915 Security Events

3. RFO-402 Refueling Operation Page 187 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 5 - Control Room Evacuation Initiating Condition: Control Room evacuation has been initiated EAL:

HA5.1 Alert Control Room evacuation has been initiated Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or other emergency response facilities may be necessary.

Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

Plant-Specific ABN-905A,B Loss of Control Room Habitability and ABN-803A,B Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room provide the instructions for tripping the unit, and maintaining RCS inventory and Hot Shutdown conditions from outside the Control Room. The Shift Manager (SM) determines if the Control Room is inoperable and requires evacuation. Control Room inhabitability may be caused by fire, dense smoke, noxious fumes, bomb threat in or adjacent to the Control Room, or other life threatening conditions.

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. DBD-ME-003 Control Room Habitability

2. ABN-905A Loss of Control Room Habitability

3. ABN-905B Loss of Control Room Habitability

4. ABN-803A Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room

5. ABN-803B Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room Page 188 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Category: H - Hazards Subcategory: 5 - Control Room Evacuation Initiating Condition: Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant control cannot be established EAL:

HS5.1 Site Area Emergency Control Room evacuation has been initiated AND Control of the plant cannot be established within 15 min.

Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic The intent of this EAL is to capture those events where control of the plant cannot be reestablished in a timely manner. In this case, expeditious transfer of control of safety systems has not occurred (although fission product barrier damage may not yet be indicated).

The intent of the EAL is to establish control of important plant equipment and knowledge of important plant parameters in a timely manner. Primary emphasis should be placed on those components and instruments that supply protection for and information about safety functions.

Typically, these safety functions are reactivity control (ability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it shutdown), reactor water level (ability to cool the core), and decay heat removal (ability to maintain a heat sink).

The determination of whether or not control is established at the remote shutdown panel is based on Emergency Coordinator judgment. The Emergency Coordinator is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within the site specific time for transfer that the licensee has control of the plant from the remote shutdown panel.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be by EALs in Category F or Category R.

Page 189 of 323

CPNPP EPP-201, EAL Tech Bases Rev. 0 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Plant-Specific Either ABN-905A, B Loss of Control Room Habitability or ABN-740A, B Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room provides the instructions for tripping the unit, and maintaining RCS inventory and Hot Shutdown conditions from outside the Control Room. The Shift Manager determines if the Control Room is inoperable and requires evacuation. Control Room inhabitability may be caused by fire, dense smoke, noxious fumes, bomb threat in or adjacent to the Control Room, or other life threatening conditions.

CPNPP Basis Reference(s):

1. DBD-ME-003 Control Room Habitability

2. ABN-905A Loss of Control Room Habitability

3. ABN-905B Loss of Control Room Habitability

4. ABN-803A Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room

5. ABN-803B Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room Page 190 of 323