ML15142A392

Initial Exam 2009302 Final Simulator Scenarios

ML15142A392
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/27/2010
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Florida Power & Light Co
References
Download: ML15142A392 (314)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: HLC-19 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

SOP:

Initial Conditions: IC #3 45% power, Xenon building in, 6 gpm dilution rate. MDL. 2C Charging Pump OOS for repack. 2A AFW Pump QOS to repair oil leak. Both Main Feedwater pumps running.

Turnover: Unit was down powered due to an oil leak on the 28 Main Feedwater Pump. Oil leak has been repaired and the 2B Main Feedwater Pump was just started. 2A AFW pump has been QOS for four hours, expected to be returned to service in one hour. The crew is to perform an up power to 100%.

Critical Tasks:

. Start 28 Emergency Diesel Generator

. Establish Feedwater to 2A or 28 SG Event Maif. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R I RO & Power Increase to 100% power SRO N / BOP 2 1 I I SOP DEH swaps to Turbine manual 3 2 I I RO Non Selected Pressurizer level channel LIC-1I1OY fails low and T.S. SRO PCV-1100E fails as is.

4 3 C / SOP HVS-1 C Containment fan cooler trips. HVS-1 D starts manually T.S/SRO 5 4 Cl RO Letdown flow controller HIC-1 110 goes to at Maximum Flow 6a 5 M I All Letdown line leak in Containment RCS leakage (50 gpm) 6b 6 M I All Letdown line leak in Containment SBLOCA (150 gpm) 7 7 Cl BOP 2A MFW recirc valve will not open resulting in 2A MEW pump trip.

2A MFW 15% Bypass valve does not open post trip. A AFW pump does not start manually or on AFAS and MV-09-1 1 2C AFW to 2A SG does not open. MV-09-12 2C AFW to 28 SG opens 30% and trips as is.

8 8 C I BOP B side electrical does not swap to SU transformers. 28 EDG does not auto start. 2B EDG can be manually started by the GOP.

9 9 C I BOP Upon AFAS the 2B AFW does not start.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 St. Lucle The Unit will be turned over to the Crew at 45% power. 2C Charging Pump is out of service for repack.

Both Main Feedwater Pumps are running and the Crew is to perform an up power to 100%.

During the up power the DEH system will swap to Turbine manual. No alarm is annunciated with this failure. The up power is to be conducted with the Turbine in manual control.

As the up power progresses, the non-selected Pressurizer level controller LIC-1 11 OY fails low and PCV I100E fails as is. This will require selecting PCV-1100F. All heaters will be lost, the B side 4.16 PZR heater breaker tripping open and unable to be re-closed. Key #98 will be required to be taken to the level position to regain the A side Pressurizer heaters. SRO is to evaluate T.S. on loss of heaters. (T.S. 3.4.3)

Containment Cooler HVS-1C trips and is not recoverable. Containment cooler HVS-1D will start manually.

The Crew is required to monitor Containment temperature to ensure temperature is maintained less than 120°F. SRO is to evaluate T.S. on loss of one train of Containment cooling. (T.S. 3.6.2.1)

HIC-11 10 Letdown controller fails causing full letdown flow. The RO is to take manual control of the letdown flow controller to re-gain control of letdown flow. When flow control is re-gained, the letdown line in the containment will leak at approximately 50 gpm resulting in excessive RCS leakage. The leak will then increase to 150 gpm resulting in a SBLOCA. Pressurizer level will not be maintainable and the Crew should manually trip the Unit.

Upon Unit trip the B side will not swap to the SU transformers and the 2B Diesel will not automatically start. The 28 Diesel will start from the control room since there is no lockout.

Upon the Unit trip the 2A MFW recirc. valve will not open. This will result in the 2A MEW tripping on low flow. Eventually AFAS will actuate but MV-09-1 1 2C AFW to 2A SG does not open. MV-09-1 2 2C AFW to 2B SC opens to 70 gpm flow but then the valve motor breaker trips. 2B AFW pump does not start on AFAS but can be manually started. AFAS lockout will occur on the A side due tFW pressure when B side pressurizes. Duo to the small break LOCA this scenario makes starting the 2B Diesel and restoring feedwator critical.

2-EOP-03, LOCA should be implemented to mitigate the small break (150 gpm) from the letdown line. If the crew has difficultly establishing feedwater they may elect to enter 2-EOP-1 5, Functional Recovery which is acceptable but may delay the recovery. The scenario may be terminated when feedwater is restored to at least one Sc, the RCS is being cooled down and depressurized while maintaining subcooling.

Procedures Used

• 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1

• 2-GOP-I 01, Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes

• 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control

• NOP-100.02 Axial Shape Index Control

• 2-ONP-22.03, DEH Turbine Control System

• 2-0120035, Pressurizer Pressure and Level

• 2-ONP-25.01, Loss of RCB Cooling Fans

• 2-ONP-02.03 Charging And Letdown

• 2-0120031, Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage

• 2-EOP-0l, Standard Post Trip Actions

• 2-EOP-03 Loss of Reactor Coolant Technical Specifications Entered

• 3.4.3 Pressurizer

• 3.6.2.1 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # I Event # 1 Page 3 of 22 Event

Description:

Power increase from 45% to 100%

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

• Initiate IC #3 45% power. Xenon building in, 9 gpm dilution rate. MOL. 2C Charging Pump OOS for repack. 2A AFW Pump OOS to repair oil leak (008 for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Expected to be returned to service in another 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) Start 2B MFW pump and leave In recirc. position. Place 2A AFW pump and 2C Charging pump to stop.

Indications Available:

NOTE: Inform the crew 2-GOP-201 step 6.131 has been signed off by RE and power ascension is anroved. Sten 6.13011 Is complete. Start at sten 6.130.13.

SRO Direct power increase lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.132 Control Rx power and ASI lAW 2-GOP-lOl Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached pages 4-5)

Raise dilution rate for power increase lAW 2-NOP-02.24 step 6.5.12 RO (attached page 6)

Withdraw CEAs to control Rx power and ASI lAW 2-GOP-lOl Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached page 4)

. CEA Withdrawal, select MS on the CEDMCS Control Switch

• Move the IN/HOLD/OUT Switch to the OUT direction Divert to WMS by placing V2500 to WMS. Step 6.5.14 (attached page 6)

Program DEH for power increase at a rate lAW 2-GOP-lOl step 6.1.2.D Category 4. (attached page 4)

• Set reference by ensuring REF selected and then depress BOP desired MW endpoint, select ENTER

• Depress LOAD RATE type in desired load rate and select ENTER

. Depress GO pushbutton Next scenario page = 7

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

9B REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY 6 f 15 PROCEDURE NO.: STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 2-GOP-i 01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Power Level Escalations NOTE CEAs should be above the Long-term Steady State Insertion Limit (102 inches withdrawn on Group 5) before reaching 20% core power and at a position to begin controlling ASI at the ESI between 20% and 50% power.

Refer to NOP-1 00.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for further guidance.

1. As Main Generator loading commences, MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref by:

A. CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

AND/OR B. Boron concentration changes in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

2. At or above 50% power:

A. All planned reactivity additions should be made by boration or dilution in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

B. USE CEAs for ASI control, CONSIDER the reactivity effect of CEAs when adjusting ASI.

C. REFER to NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for specific instructions regarding ASI control during power escalations.

D. ¶J When raising Reactor power, all power escalation rates should be within the following fuel preconditioning guidelines:

Max Equivalent Turbine Category Max Core Power Escalation Rate Generator Load Rate 1 3%/HR at or above 15% Power .42 MW/MIN 2 3%/HR above 50% Power .42 MW/MIN 3 20%/HR above 50% Power 2.80 MW/MIN 4 30%/HR above 50% Power 4.2 MW/MIN 4

viv ,,.. II 98 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY PROCEDURE NO. STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.1 Power Level Escalations (continued)

2. D. (continued)

NOTE 1 Appendix B, Fuel To determine the correct category for a power escalation Preconditioning Guidelines Worksheet, may be used. Contact Reactor Engineering if further assistance is required.

Category Definitions:

1. Category 1:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been previously sustained in this core cycle for at least 72 continuous hours.

2. Category 2:

a. INCREASE in power following 30 contInuous days or more at a power level less than 70% of rated thermal power.

OR

b. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been maintained for more than 3 continuous hours during the past 60 days.

3. Category 3:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been maintained for 3 continuous hours or more during the past 8 days.

4. Category 4:

a. INCREASE In power to a level which been maintained for 3 continuous hours or more during the past 8 days.

3. If available, fl ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating.

If necessary, START an additional Charging Pump in accordance with 2NOP-02.O2, Charging and Letdown.

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation in accordance with Appendix A, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.

5. CONTINUE to load the Main Generator in accordance with 2-GQP-201, Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1.

END OF SECTION 6.1

REVISION NO. PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE:

24A BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL PROCEDURE NO 20 of 75 2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution (continued)

CAUTION To preclude lifting the VCT relief valve while using V-2525, do NOT allow PMW flowrate to exceed the running Charging pump(s) capacity.

12, C 0 0 C ADJUST FIC-2210X PMW Flow in AUTO or MANUAL to desired flowrate (and if using V.2525 do NOT exceed the flowrate for the number of running Charging Pumps).

13. 0 0 0 C MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent, as needed.

14. 0 0 0 0 If necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, flj DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position:

A. C C0 0 ENSURE V2500 VCT Divert Valve indicates OPEN.

B, 00 0C When the desired VCT level is reached, PLACE V2500 in AUTO.

C. C00 C ENSURE V2500 indicates CLOSED.

15. 0 0 0 0 When the desired amount of primary water has been added, Then CLOSE FCV-2210X, Primary Makeup Water.

16. 00CC ilV2512 ReactorMakeupWaterStopVlvwasopened,Then PLACE V2512 in CLOSE ENSURE it Indicates CLOSED.

17, 0 C 0 0 !IV-2525 Boron Load Control Valve was opened, Then PLACE V-2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

18. 0 0 0 0 ENSURE FIC-2210X, PMW Flow controller is in MANUAL and RECUCE output to MINIMUM.

19. 0 0 0 D MONITOR for any abnormal change in T .

1 0 20, CDC0 §i RECORD on Data Sheet 1, Boration 1 Dilution Log, the number of gallons of Primary Makeup Water added as Indicated on FQI-2210X, PMW Flow Totalizer.

21. 0 C C C ]. additional dilutions are desired, or if the expected changes to or Boron concentration are NOT achieved, flsa REPEAT Steps 6.5.1 through 6.5.20.

6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 4 of 22 Event

Description:

DElI swaps to Turbine Manual Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger EVENT 2, DEH swap to manual when directed by examiner. If requested, I&C reports up power can be continued using turbine manual.

Indications Available: No audible alarm associated with this failure. DEH panel indicates:

• Turbine manual light is lit

• OP Auto light is off

• Trans Relay 24V monitor light on NOTE: this Is not a full loss of DEH computer so CONT RESET light will not be lit on Operator Console B Recognizes turbine manual light is lit, OP auto light is off.

CHANGE load using the following pushbuttons (2-ONP-22.03 DEH BOP Turbine Control System) (step 6.2.2.A)

Manipulates_GV_Raise NOTE: small pushes (< I sec.) of GV Raise will pick up 3-6 megawatts. Holding the pushbutton depressed causes an exponential increase in speed.

Implements 2-ONP-22.03 DEH Turbine Control System SRO Step 6.2 (attached pages 8-9)

Directs performance of Data Sheet 1 (attached page 10)

Contacts Shift Manager to report failure, and entry into 2.ONP-22.03 DEH Turbine Control System Contacts l&C to investigate DEH failure and swap to turbine manual.

Monitors primary plant parameters during DEH manual operation.

RO Adjusts dilution rate as needed.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Observe coordination between RO & BOP during power ascension in turbine manual.

Next scenario page = 11

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

9 DEH TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM 8 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2ONP-22.O3 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 62 Loss Of DEH Computer INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1, P RECORD initial conditions on Data Sheet 1 Initial Conditions.

NOTE

• The GV Raise and GV Lower pushbuttons operate on an exponential component. The longer the pushbutton is depressed, the faster the change in load will be made.

Changing Turbine load will change Reactor power.

2. II load changes are necessary, fl PERFORM the following:

A. CHANGE load using the following pushbuttons:

• GV Raise

• CV Lower B. PERFORM load changes in accordance with ONE of the following:

• 2-GOP-201 Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1.

• 2-GOP..123, Turbine Shutdown Full Load to Zero Load.

3. NOTIFY l&C.

4. CHECK the following indication:

• CONT OFF light NOT LIT on Operator Console A.

• CONT RESET light LIT on Operator Console B.

8

REVISION NO.: IPRODURE TITLE: PAGE:

9 I DEH TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP.22.O3 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Loss Of DEH Computer (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

5. DEPRESS the CONT RESET pushbutton on Operator Console B.

6. VERIFY the CONT RESET light NOT LIT.

7. When ready to return to automatic operation, flj GO TO Appendix A, Return To Automatic Operation, END OF SECTION 6.2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

9 DEH TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM 24 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-22.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 DATA SHEET I INITIAL AND FINAL CONDITIONS (Page lofI)

1. P RECORD initial conditions existing prior to transfer to TURBINE MANUAL, as directed.

2. RECORD final conditions prior to initiating transfer to OPER. AUTO, as directed.

INITIAL FINAL PARAMETER INITIALS INITIALS CONDITIONS CONDITIONS TURBINE MANUAL ()

OPER AUTO (q)

SEQ VALVE (q)

SINGLE VALVE (1)

MW GV 1 position (%)

GV 2 position (%)

GV 3 position (%)

GV 4 position (%)

Keyboard location 4412 (Flow Demand)

GVC volts (if used) N/A N/A Reviewed by: ...... Date:

US/SM END OF DATA SHEET I 10

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 5 of 22 Event

Description:

Non Selected Pressurizer level channel LIC-111OY fails low Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger EVENT 3, Pressurizer level fails low (LIC-IIIOY non selected channel) and PCV-IIOOE falls as is, when directed by examiner Indications Available: Annunciators:

• A-9 Pzr Htr Xfmer 2B3 trouble

• H-18 Pzr Channel Y Level High/Low

• LB-Il PZR channel Y Level Low Low

• H-29 PZR Proportional HTR low level trip/Interlock

• H-30 Pzr Backup HTR low level trIpISS isol/intlk.

Heaters: P-2, B-4, B-5, B-6 no power available. P-I, B-I, 8-2, B-3 power available but off.

Heater transformer breaker B side 2-20403 open.

Recognizes all Pressurizer heaters de-energized. Monitors RCS pressure to ensure spray valves closing in response to loss of heaters.

RO Reports failed 111OY channel, heaters status, and RCS pressure to US.

Recognizes failure of PCV-1 I OOE to close as expected and selects operable PCV-1100F when directed.

NOTE: B side heaters will not be available due to breaker 2-20403 unable to be closed.

Implement 2-01 20035 Pressurizer Pressure and Level step 7.2.2.G SRO (attached page 15)

Recognizes entry into DNB Tech Spec 3.2.5 and announces to crew (attached page 14).

Recognizes Tech. Spec. entry (3.4.3) due to unable to regain B side Pressurizer heaters [72 hour action statement (3.4.3.a)] (attached T SRO page 13). Should also refer to T.S. 3.3.3.5 remote shutdown instrumentation for loss of channel Y. 30 day action statement.

Directs backup interlock bypass keyswitch taken to LEVEL position.

This will regain only the A side heaters.

Next scenario page = 12 11

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 6 of 22 Event

Description:

Non Selected Pressurizer level channel LIC-111OY fails low Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Contacts Shift manager to report failure of LIC-1 11 OY and PCV I WOE, entry into 2-0120035 Pressurizer Pressure and Level, and above Tech Specs, and swap to Spray Valve PCV-1 1 OOF When directed, places backup interlock bypass keyswitch to the RO LEVEL position. (step 7.2.2.G.1 .a)

Resets all A side Pressurizer heaters. (step 7.2.2.G.1 .b)

Monitors RCS pressure. Controls heaters to ensure 2250 psia.

Next scenario page = 16 12

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 314.4.3 PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a minimum water level of greater than or equal to 27% indicated level and a maximum water level of less than or equal to 68% indicated level and at least two groups of pressurizer heaters capable of being powered from 1 E buses each having a nominal capacity of at least 150 kW.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a, With one group of the above required pressurizer heaters inoperable, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REDUIREMENTS 4.4.3.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4.4.3.2 The capacity of each of the above required groups of pressurizer heaters shall be verified to be at least 150 kW at least once per 92 days.

4.4.3.3 The emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that on an Engineered Safety Features Actuation test signal concurrent with a loss of offsite power:

a. the pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from the emergency power sources, and

b. the pressurizer heaters can be reconnected to their respective buses manually from the control room after resetting of the ESFAS test signal.

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 Amendment No. $, 11 13

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS DNB PARAMETERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.5 The following DNB-related parameters shall be maintained within the limits shown on Table 3.2-2:

a. Cold Leg Temperature

b. Pressurizer Pressure

c. Reactor Coolant System Total Flow Rate

d. AXIAL SHAPE INDEX APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce THERMAL POWER to < 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.5.1 Each of the parameters of Table 3,2-2 shall be verified to be within their limits by instrument readout at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4.2.5.2 The Reactor Coolant System total flow rate shall be determined to be within its limit by measurement* at least once per 18 months.

Not required to be performed until THERMAL POWER is 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 314 2-14 Amendment No. 69, 145 14

vvvrct TITLE PAGE.

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 11 of 15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 2, (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE With less than 27% level on Channel X, the A pressurizer heater transformer feeder breaker (2-20204) trips and the B side 480V power supplies deenergize. With less than 27% level on Channel Y, the B pressurizer heater transformer feeder breaker (2-20403) trips and the A side 480V power supplies deenorgize. The backup Interlock bypass keyswitch selected to the level position, allows the 480V heater power supplies to be reset.

0. Verify pressurizer level indicating 0. j pressurizer heaters are controllers (selected and non- deonergized or level indicating selected) are operating properly and controller(s) failed, Then power is available to pressurizer perform the following:

heaters.

1. f either level control channel has failed, Then shift to the operable channel and reset heaters as follows:

a. Place the backup interlock bypass keyswitch (RTOB-203) to the LEVEL position.

(This regains power to the proportional and backup heater banks controlled by the selected channel.)

b. Reset pressurizer heater banks as needed.

OR 15

Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 7 of 22 Event

Description:

HVS-1 C Containment fan cooler trips. HVS-1 D starts manually.

Time f Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger EVENT 4, toss of Containment fan cooler when directed by examiner. (HVS-IC trips)

Indications Available: Annunciator T-12 CNTMT Fan CLR HVS-IC OVRLD I Trip Responds to annunciator when HVS-1 C trips. Recognizes HVS-1 C GOP has tripped.

Implements 2-ONP-25.O1 Loss of RCB Cooling Fans step 6.4.1 SRO (attached pages 17-18).

Directs starting of HVS-1 D Step 6.4.1 .B Directs monitoring Containment temperature to ensure 120°F maintained. Step 6.4.2 Contacts Electrical Maintenance Step 6.4.1 .C Contacts Shift manager to report failure of HVS-1 C and entry into 2-ONP-25.O1 Loss of RCB Cooling Fans.

Recognizes Tech. Spec. entry 3.6.2.1 loss of one containment cooling T SRO train. Restore within 7 days (attached page 19).

Places HVS-1 D control switch to the START position and verifies Red BOP light ON and Green light OFF.

Next scenario page = 20 16

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

3 LOSS OF RCB COOLING FANS PROCEDURE NO.. 13 of 19 2-ONP-25.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.4 Loss of Containment Fan Cooler INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION

§1,2 Sufficient Containment Fan Coolers (HVS-1A, HVS-1B, HVS-1C or HVE-ID) are required to be in operation to maintain Containment air temperature loss than or equal to 120°F. This is necessary to maintain the reactor vessel support structure within design basis. Operator action is required within 45 minutes, to restore air temperature to less than or equal to 120°F or initiate reactor trip and cooldown to at least Hot Shutdown. The total time from the loss of Containment Fan Coolers to Hot Shutdown is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

1. ATTEMPT one start of the standby 1. standby fan does NOT start, Containment Fan Cooler. Ihn PERFORM the following:

A. PERFORM Appendix D, Containment Cooling Fan Local Breaker Operations.

B. ATTEMPT one start of all available Containment Fan Coolers.

C. jf any fan does NOT start, jJ the following:

• Maintenance Supervisor

• EM D. REFER TO Tech Specs 3.6.2.1, 17

E VISION NO: PROCEDURE TITLE. PAGE:

3 LOSS OF RCB COOLING FANS PROCEDURE NO 14 of 19 2.QNP-25.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.4 Loss of Containment Fan Cooler (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 2, CHECK Containment air 2. II Containment air temperature temperature less than or equal to greater than 120°F, ]i2 120°F. PERFORM the following:

A. INITIATE a rapid shutdown using 2-ONP-22.01, Rapid Downpower.

B. REFER TO Tech Specs 3.6.1.5.

C. il Containment air temperature is NOT less than 120°F within 45 minutes, I PERFORM the following:

1. TRIP the reactor.

2. TRIP the turbine.

3. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

4. COOL DOWN to at least Hot Shutdown within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Irom the loss of the fan in accordance with 2-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown.

18

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 314.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Containment Spray System: MODES 1, 2, and MODE 3 with Pressurizer Pressure 1750 psia.

Containment Cooling System: MODES 1 2, and 3.

ACTION:

1. Modes 1, 2, and 3 with Pressurizer Pressure 1750 osia:

a. With one containment spray train inoperable, restore the inoperable spray train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and within 10 days from initial discovery of failure to meet the LCO; otherwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within the following 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br />.

b. With one containment cooling train inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling train to OPERABLE status within 7 days and within 10 days from initial discovery of failure to meet the LCO; otherwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

c. With one containment spray train and one containment cooling train inoperable, concurrently implement ACTIONS a. and b. The completion intervals for ACTION a. and ACTION b. shall be tracked separately for each train starting from the time each train was discovered inoperable.

d. With two containment cooling trains inoperable, restore one cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; otherwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

e. With two containment spray trains inoperable or any combination of three or more trains inoperable, enter LCO 3.0.3. immediately.

2. Mode 3 with Pressurizer Pressure < 1750 øsia:

a. With one containment cooling train inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; otherwise be in MODE 4 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b. With two containment cooling trains inoperable, enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 2, 70 19

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 8 of 22 Event

Description:

Letdown flow controller HIC-1 110 goes to maximum flow Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger EVENT 5, letdown flow controller HIC-IllO when directed by examiner (HIC-IllO goes to maximum flow)

Examiners NOTE: Allow pressure to recover above 2225 prior to initiating event #5.

Indications Available: Annunciators:

. M-5 Letdown Press HighlLow

. M-13 Letdown Flow High

. LC-15 Letdown Relief V2345 Oisch Temp High Letdown flow increasing to 150 gpm Responds to letdown flow alarm. Recognizes letdown flow is at RO maximum.

When directed places HIC-illO in manual lAW steps 6.0.12.A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4. of 2-ONP-02.03 Charging and Letdown (attached page 29).

Manually control letdown flow to maintain Pressurizer level.

Implements 2-ONP-02.03 Charging and Letdown step 6.0.12 SRO (attached page 29).

Directs HIC-illO placed in manual. Step 6.0.12.A.1. Directs letdown flow controlled to maintain/regain Pressurizer level.

Contacts Shift Manager to report HIC-illO failure and entry into 2-ONP-02.03 Charging and Letdown NOTE: Crew may elect to isolate letdown if letdown flow is not controlled and letdown relief continues to lift. If letdown is isolated, charging pumps are required to be stopped. Crew should re-establish charging and letdown as soon as possible with HIC-1 110 in manual. It is not the intent of this scenario for the crew to need to isolate letdown, but if they should do so they will proceed as follows.

Directs that letdown be isolated and charging pumps secured SRO (attached page 23).

Directs Pressurizer level to be maintained within +1- 2% of setpoint by starting and stopping charging pump as necessary (attached page 24)

Next scenario page = 21 20

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 9 of 22 Event

Description:

Letdown flow controller HIC-1 110 goes to maximum flow Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs Charging and Letdown to be restored lAW 2-ONP-02.03 SRO Charging and Letdown step 6.0.11 (attached pages 25-29) (1-NOP-02.02 Charging and Letdown may also be used)

Ion exchanger bypass valve V2520 should be placed in bypass if letdown flow is not recovered in a timely manner. This is lAW annunciator response M-13.

Isolates Letdown

• CLOSE V2515, Stop Valve-IC RO

• CLOSE V-2516, Containment lsol Valve-IC.

• CLOSE V2522, Containment Isol Valve-CC.

Secures all running charging pumps. (attached page 23).

Starts and stops a charging pump as necessary to maintain Pressurizer level within +1- 2% of setpoint. (attached page 24)

Restores Charging and Letdown lAW step 6.0.11 of 2-ON P-02.03 Charging and Letdown (attached pages 25-29) (1-NOP-02.02 Charging and Letdown may also be used).

. Ensures adequate VCT level.

e Ensures Level and Pressure Control selector switches appropriately selected.

. PLACES HIC-1110, Level, controller in MANUAL

. ENSURE PIC-2201, Pressure controller is in AUTO and set to maintain 150 psig

. PLACES the Position Limiter Bypass key switch in the BYPASS position.

. ENSURES the Level Control Valves are CLOSED.

. BYPASSES Letdown Ion Exchangers.

STARTS one charging pump and verify charging flow.

NOTE: If 2515 closel due to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Temp High, it may be necessary to cycle V2515 while opening the PZR Level control valve until flow is adequate to clear the hiah temperature alarm.

• VERIFIES the regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm M-28, SIAS R-6, or CIS P-3 alarms are NOT present.

• OPENS V2515, Stop Valve-IC.

• OPENS V2516, Containment Isol Valve-IC.

• OPENS V2522, Containment Isol Valve- OC.

• ESTABLISHES approximately 5 gpm letdown flow.

Next scenario page = 22 21

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 10 of 22 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Letdown flow controller HIC-1 110 goes to maximum flow Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION: Prolonged use of charging without letdown could result in the Pressurizer going solid. Pressurizer level must be closely monitored.

NOTE: TI-2229, Charging Temp Outlet Regen HX should NOT be allowed to increase more than 60°F per minute.

• RAISES letdown flow at a rate NOT to exceed 5 to 10 gpm over at least a 4 minute period.

• Maintains letdown pressure at 150 psig.

• Leaves HIC-illO in manual

• PLACES the Position Limiter Bypass key switch to the NORM position.

• RAISES PIC-2201, Pressure, setpoint to 430 psig and maintain 430 psig.

• NOTIFIES Health Physics dose rates near CVCS ion exchangers and piping may change when ion exchanger is placed in service.

• PLACES the Letdown Ion Exchangers back in service.

Next scenario page = 30 22

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE; 15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 5 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. If letdown flow is lost, Then STOP the charging pumps.

A. RETURN the charging pump control switches to AUTO.

CAUTION Severe thermal stress and flashing may occur in the Regenerative Heat Exchanger if letdown flow is NOT immediately isolated.

2. If charging flow is lost, 2.1 ISOLATE Letdown by the Then ISOLATE letdown. following:

A. CLOSE V2515, Stop Valve-IC B. CLOSE V-2516, Containment Isol Valve-IC.

C. CLOSE V2522, Containment Isol Valve-CC.

NOTE With Charging and Letdown isolated pressurizer level will lower slowly due to RCP controlled bleedoff flow.

3. charging and letdown flow has been lost, Then MAINTAIN Reactor power and RCS temperature constant to minimize pressurizer level deviations.

4. VERIFY all applicable automatic actions have occurred.

Appendix A contains a listing of expected automatic actions.

23

REVISION NO,: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 6 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Prolonged use of Charging without Letdown could result in the Pressurizer exceeding the Technical Specification limit of 68%. Pressurizer level must be closely monitored.

5. §i MAINTAIN Pressurizer level 5.1 § II Pressurizer level can NOT between 27% and 68% and be maintained between 27%

within 2% of setpoint as and 68%, Then BE in at follows: least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers OPEN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

A. As Pressurizer level reduces to approximately 2% less than setpoint, START one Charging Pump.

B. When Pressurizer level is approximately 2% greater than setpoint, THEN STOP the running Charging Pump.

C. PLACE the previously running Charging Pump Control Switch in AUTO.

6. II charging and letdown flow has been lost, Then DETERMINE the cause.

7. If a charging system leak has occurred, Then ISOLATE the leak and refer to applicable Technical Specifications for guidance.

8. 1! the normal charging flow path becomes unavailable, Then REFER TO Appendix B, Alternate Charging Flow Path through A HPSI Header.

24

REVISION NO.: PAGE; 1 5B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 7of26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. letdown is unavailable, Then MAINTAIN pressurizer level by temporarily cycling charging pumps.

NOTE

§ If one or more charging pumps have lost pumping ability, gas binding may have occurred. This can result from pumping the VCT dry (hydrogen binding) or rupture of a charging pump suction accumulator (nitrogen binding). If this occurred, the charging pumps must be vented after restorincj a source of water to the suction.

10. the charging pumps are gas bound, Then REFER TO Appendix C, Venting a Gas Bound Charging Pump.

II. If charging and letdown has 11.

been lost and can be restored, Then RE-ESTABLISH charging and letdown flow as follows:

A. ENSURE adequate VCT A.1 RESTORE the VCT level is indicated. to a normal level in accordance with 2-ONP-02.O1, Boron Concentration Control.

B. ENSURE the Level Control Valve selector switch and the Pressure Control Valve selector switch are selected to the level and pressure control valves presently in service.

25

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 8 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

C. PLACE HIC-lilO, Level, controller in MANUAL.

D. ENSURE PIC-2201, Pressure controller is in AUTO and set to maintain 150 psig.

E. PLACE the Position Limiter Bypass key switch in the BYPASS position.

F. ENSURE the Level Control Valves are CLOSED.

G. BYPASS Letdown Ion Exchangers by placing V2520 Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve to the BYPASS RESET POSITION.

H. START one charging pump I. VERIFY charging flow is indicated.

NOTE If V251 5 closed due to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Temp High, it may be necessary to cycle V251 5 while opening the PZR Level control valve until flow is adequate to clear the high temperature alarm.

J. VERIFY the regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm M-28, SIAS R-6 or CIS P-3 alarms are NOT present.

26

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 9 0 f 26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

K. OPEN V2515, Stop Valve-IC.

L. OPEN V2516, Containment Isol Valve-IC.

M. OPEN V2522, Containment Isol Valve-DC.

N. SLOWLY OPEN the Level Control Valve ESTABLISH approximately 5 gpm letdown flow.

CAUTION Prolonged use of charging without letdown could result in the pressurizer going solid. Pressurizer level must be closely monitored.

NOTE Tl-2229, Charging Temp Outlet Regen HX should NOT be allowed to increase more than 60°F per minute.

0. WHEN Letdown 0.1 II letdown cannot be temperature stabilizes on restored, TIC-2221, Temp Regen Then INITIATE charging Hx Tube Out, as required for restoring Then RAISE letdown pressurizer level, or flow at a rate NOT to boration.

exceed 5 to 10 gpm over at least a 4 minute period.

P. ENSURE PIC-2201, Pressure controller is maintaining letdown pressure at 150 psig.

27

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 10 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

Q. When PZR level is at its setpoint, Then PERFORM the following:

1. BALANCE HIC-lilO, LEVEL, controller AUTO to MANUAL output signals, using the BIAS control knob while previewing the AUTO signal.

2. PLACE HIC-lilO, LEVEL, controller to AUTO.

3. MONITOR pressurizer level for abnormal trends.

R. PLACE the Position Limiter Bypass key switch to the NORM position.

CAUTION I V2345, LTDN CNTL VLV STATION SAFETY RELIEF, will open at 600 psig.

S. SLOWLY RAISE PIC-2201, Pressure, setpoint to 430 psig.

T. ENSURE letdown pressure is being maintained at 430 psig.

28

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 11 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

U. NOTIFY Health Physics that dose rates near CVCS ion exchangers and piping may change when ion exchanger is placed in service.

V. PLACE the Letdown Ion Exchangers back in service by placing V2520 Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve to the AUTO Position.

12. If Letdown Level control is 12.

malfunctioning, Then PERFORM the following:

A. VERIFY the output of A.1 PLACE HIC-IllO in MANUAL by HIC-illO, LEVEL, is performing the following:

responding as expected

1. BALANCE HIC-lilO to current plant MANUAL to AUTO conditions.

controller output signals by previewing and using the MANUAL control knob to match the manual and auto controller output signals.

2. PLACE HIC-IllOto MANUAL.

3. ADJUST letdown flow to a value consistent with the current plant conditions.

4. PERFORM a system walkdown observing for leaks or lifting relief valves.

B. VERIFY the selected B.1 PLACE the Alternate Level control level control valve is valve in service in accordance responding as expected with 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and to HIC-lilO output. Letdown.

29

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6a Page 11 of 22 Event

Description:

Letdown line leak in containment (Excessive RCS leakage)

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger EVENT 6a, Letdown line break, when directed by examiner (Excessive RCS leakage of 50 gpm)

Indications Available: Annunciator N-46 Rx cavity leakage High Recognizes cavity sump level leakage recorder increasing, letdown RO flow lowering.

Uses H IC-li 10 to manually adjust letdown flow in attempt to maintain Pressurizer level (attached page 33).

Closes LCV-07-1 1 A or LCV-07-1 1 B (to isolate sump from pumping to the EDT) when directed (attached page 35).

Starts additional charging pumps as necessary and when directed.

Closes letdown isolation valves V2515, V2516, V2524 when directed.

Recognizes and announces entry into DNB Tech Spec (3.2.5).

Implements 2-0120031 Excessive Reactor Coolant System SRO leakage. Directs LCV-07-1 1 A or LCV-07-1 1 B closed lAW step 7.2.2.K (attached page 32-36).

NOTE: IF TIME PERMITS, may enter T.S. action statement for RCS leakage >1 gpm. (T.S. 3.4.6.2, reduce leakage within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) and may contact shift manager to report entry into 2-0120031 Excessive Reactor Coolant System leakage step 7.2.2.0 (attached page 36).

Direct termination of up power if not previously done NOTE: SRO should state DNB T.S. entered when Pressurizer pressure reaches 2225 psia.

Next scenario page = 37 30

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6a Page 12 of 22 Event

Description:

Letdown line leak in containment (Excessive RCS leakage)

Time j Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs starting additional charging pumps and isolating letdown as SRO necessary to maintain Pressurizer level.

Evaluates source of leakage and determines approximate leak rate Determines plant shutdown is required and conducts crew brief.

Next scenario page = 37 31

REVISION NO. PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

24A EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 6 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.: LEAKAGE 2-0120031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 7.1 Immediate Operator Actions

1. None 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS If In Modes I thru 3 and SIAS Is NOT blocked, fli!J! go to step 2.

If in Modes 3 thru Mode 6 and SIAS Is blocked, go to step 3.

2. ACTIONS WHEN IN MODES I THRU MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

A. j. RCS leakage is indicated, Then analyze the information available and determine as accurately as possible the magnitude and seriousness of the leak.

B.  ! at any time RCS leakage exceeds the capacity of the charging pumps and pressurizer level cannot be maintained, Then:

I. In Modes I and 2, trip the reactor and turbine and perform 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

2. in Mode 3 (SIAS is NOT Blocked), Then enter 2-EOP-03, Loss 01 Coolant Accident.

C. j the containment CIS radiation C. Manually actuate CIAS.

monitors exceed the present alarm point level, ]J ensure containment isolation signal is actuated.

32

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

24A EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 7 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.: LEAKAGE 2-0120031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTiNGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

D. pressurizer PORV or safety valve leakage is indicated, Then ensure ONOP 2-0120036, Pressurizer Relief I Safety Valve, has been implemented.

NOTE RCV-14-1 CCW Surge Tank Vent, will align to the Chemical Drain Tank on high CCW activity.

E. U a CCW high activity alarm is received, Then refer to 2-ONP-14.02, Component Cooling Water Excessive Activity.

F. Ensure charging and letdown is F. Manually control charging and automatically controlling pressurizer letdown as required to level, maintain pressurizer level.

G. f If plant conditions permit, Then determine the primary leak rate, per 2-OSP-01 .03, Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance.

33

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

24A EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 8 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.: LEAKAGE 2-01 20031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued)

NOTE

• Pressure Boundary Leakage is defined as leakage from any pressure containing components of the Reactor Coolant System, such as pressure vessels, piping, pumps and valves (Not Seat Leakage), which are:

a. Part of the RCS, or

b. Connected to the RCS, up to and including any and all of the following:

1. The outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment,

2. The second of two valves normally closed during normal reactor operation in system piping which does not penetrate containment,

3. The RCS safety and relief valves.

• Isolable (as defined in EPIP-01), personnel must be able to promptly close valve(s) which isolates the leak within the context of initial operator actions*.

Initial Operator Actions are actions taken within:

• 15 minutes (Control Room)

• 30 minutes (local/field)

H. Initiate the emergency plan if necessary, in accordance with EPIP-Ol, Classification of Emergencies.

§j an increase in unidentified leakage has occurred that is less than Technical Specification limit (1 GPM), Then refer to Appendix A.

J. After determining the magnitude of the leak, continue to evaluate all available information to identify leakage source.

34

rE VISION NO. PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE:

24A EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 9 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.: LEAKAGE 2O1 20031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE When using the Reactor Cavity Sump Level instrument (LIS-07-6) on RTGB-205, 1 is approximately equal to 46 gallons.

K. II leak appears to be inside containment as indicated by an increase in cavity sump level, fl close LCV-07-1IA or LCV-07-115 to isolate sump from pumping to the EDT.

L. II leak appears to be outside containment, flj consider the following:

1. Local sample valve isolation, refer to Appendix B.

2. Isolating letdown.

3. Isolating RCS sample lines:

V5200 thru V5205.

4. Inspect charging pumps for increased seal leakage.

M. j Charging pump seal leakage is the suspected source of leakage, perform Appendix C, Charging Pump Local Seal Leakage Determination, while continuing.

N. Monitor secondary radiation levels N. ]! secondary radiation levels for increasing trends on the are increasing. fl refer to condenser air ejector, blowdown and ONOP 2-0830030, Steam main steamline monitors. Generator Tube Leak.

35

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

24A EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM lOaf 26 PROCEDURE NO.: LEAKAGE 2-0120031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued)

0. Refer to Technical Specifications to ensure compliance with all applicable actions.

P. Evaluate the need to perform a plant shutdown and / or cooldown.

Q. 1! a plant shutdown is desired, Then perform a plant shutdown per 2-GOP-I 23, Turbine Shutdown Full -

Load to Zero Load.

R. j a plant cooldown is desired, Then perform a plant cooldown per 2-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown.

3. ACTIONS WHEN IN MODES 3 (SIAS 3.

BLOCKED) THRU MODE 6 NOTE If conditions continue to degrade this procedure is NOT succeeding in or stabilizing plant conditions, then the Low Mode Off-Normal Procedure (LMONP) for the current plant condition should be implemented.

A. Perform safety function status check per Low Mode Off-Normal Procedure, Appendix A, for the current plant condition every 15 minutes until exit conditions are met.

B. j[ the containment CIS radiation B. Manually actuate CIAS.

monitors exceed the present alarm point level, Then ensure containment isolation signal is actuated.

36

Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6b Page 13 of 22 Event

Description:

Letdown line leak in containment (SBLOCA)

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger EVENT 6b, Letdown line break when directed by examiner (SBLOCA of 150 gpm)

Indications Available:

SRO Directs isolating letdown (if not already done)

Directs manual Reactor trip when Pressurizer level cannot be maintained lAW 2-0120031 Excessive Reactor Coolant System leakage step 7.2.2.B.1 (attached page 32).

Closes letdown isolation valves V2515, V2516, V2524 when directed RO (if not already done).

Trips the reactor when directed (attached page 32).

Next scenario page = 38 37

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 ScenarIo # 1 Event # 7,8 Page 14 of 22 Event

Description:

Upon trip, 2A MEW trips on low flow due to its recirc valve (ECV-09-1A2) failing to open. MV-09-1 1 2C AFW to 2A SG does not open. MV-09-12 2C AFW to 28 SG opens 30% then loses power (fails as is). B side electrical does not swap to SU transformers. 28 Diesel does not automatically start.

Time I Position I AoDlicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Examiners Note: 2A MFW pump trips on low flow due to recirc valve FCV-09-1A2 not opening.

Indications Available: No lockout alarms.

SRO Critical Directs GOP to make one attempt to start the 2B (attached page 56)

Task Directs implementation of 2-EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions:

. RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat Removal

. GOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS Heat removal, Containment Conditions Contacts STA to report to the control room to assist with the event.

Closes MSR block valves. (Reheat panel reset pushbutton must be BOP depressed due to loss of power to two MSR block valves)

Recognizes 28 Diesel Generator did not start and that there is no lockout alarm.

Critical Starts the 2B DIG. Confirms D/G parameters (voltage, amperes, frequency) normal, DG breaker closes, the 2B3 bus energizes, and Task loads sequence onto the 2B3 Gus as expected. (attached page 56)

Notify NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99.

Performs EOP-O1 Safety functions as directed for: Maint of Vital Auxiliaries RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Next scenario page = 39 38

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8 Page 15 of 22 Event

Description:

Upon trip, 2A MFW trips on low flow due to its recirc valve (FCV-09-1A2) failing to open. MV-09-1 1 2C AFW to 2A SG does not open. MV-09-12 2C AFW to 28 SG opens 30% then loses power (fails as is). B side electrical does not swap to SU transformers. 2B Diesel does not automatically start.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

. Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

• Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

BOP

. Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 281, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses) NOTE: 2B1 and 2B2 will not be energized due to SU transformer not swapping on trip.

• All vital and non vital DC Buses energized.

RCS Heat Removal

. Verify at least one SG has feedwater available 5350 F

. Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and

. Verify SBCS valves controls Tavg.

• Close MSIV at 750 psia.

. Close Spillover Bypass valve MV-08-814 (unable to be closed due to loss of power)

Containment Conditions

• Verify containment pressure <2 psig

. Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm

. Verify containment temperature is less than 120° F

• Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control, RO Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Next scenario page = 40 39

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8 Page 16 of 22 Event

Description:

Upon trip, 2A MFW trips on low flow due to its recirc valve (FCV-09-1A2) failing to open. MV-09-1 1 2C AFW to 2A SG does not open. MV-09-1 2 2C AFW to 28 SG opens 30% then loses power (fails as is). B side electrical does not swap to SU transformers. 2B Diesel does not automatically start.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Examiners note: Due to the small leak SIAS will not actuate until the crew enters 2-EOP-03 and starts a cooldown.

Reactivity Control

• Verify Reactor power is lowering.

RO

• Verify startup rate is negative.

• Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted.

Inventory Control

. Verify Pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

• Pressurizer level is trending to 30 35% (not trending due to letdown leak)

Pressure Control

• Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia (at 1736 psia verify SIAS and stop RCP in each loop)

• Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia (control manually)

• Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F Core Heat Removal

• Verify at least one RCP running with CCW ( if >10 minutes.

With no CCW must secure RCPs)

• Verify loop delta T is <10° F SRO Performs EQP-01 Diagnostic Flow Chart step 4.0.9.A Next scenario page = 41 40

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # I Event # 9 Page 17 of 22 Event

Description:

AFAS actuation. MV-09-12-2C 2C AFW pump to 28 SG partiafly opens to 70 gpm flow.

28 AFW pump does not start.

Time I Position I AppHcants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Examiners note: Due to the small leak SIAS will not actuate until the crew enters 2-EOP-03 and starts a cooldown.

SRO Implement 2-EOP-03, Loss of Coolant Accident

. Directs BOP to perform SFSCs

. Contact SM to classify the event

• When SIAS, direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SGs be re performed._(attached_page_42-43).

. Ensure SIAS flow adequate per Figure 2 SI flow Vs. RCS pressure. (due to high RCS pressure, ECCS flow will not occur until later in the event) (attached page 44)

. When SIAS. direct CCW restored to RCPs per Appendix J 2-EQP-99 within 10 minutes or stop the running RCPs.(attached pages_45-46)

. Directs RO to isolate letdown (if not already done)

. Direct establishing alternate RCP bleedoff flowpath to the RCPs by opening V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

. Directs BOP to place Hydrogen Analyzer in service per Appendix L (attached pages 47-48)

. Direct RO to perform RCS cooldown not to exceed 100°F in any one hour using ADVs.

Next scenario page = 49 41

rE VISION NO. PROCEDURE TITLE. PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES! TABLES I DATA 156 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2-EQP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train (l) B Train (4) 0 1. a LOOP has occurred, fl PERFORM BOTH of the following:

0 A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

0 B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW N header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train sepaation while safeguards L signals are still present.

NOTE

• HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-1O) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-BA (HCV-14-8B) starts to open

• When SIAS is present, placing the control switches In CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW N header valves, until SIAS is reset O 2. i! SIAS has closed the N Header valves, Ibti RESTORE flow from EITHER A or B CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

• HCV-148A

• HCV-14-9 OR HCV-1 4-88 HCV-1 4-10 42

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA f 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2) 0 3. j CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves,

]J2i OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

0 4 DIRECT Chemistry to perform SIG samples br activity and boron.

O 5. II S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A 43

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES / TABLES I DATA 121 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1)

P R

E S

S U

R E

R P

R E

S S

U R

E p

S a

TOTAL SAFETY INJECTION FLOW (gpm) (P1QP5t2.EOP.992iRevQl) 44

REVISION NO. PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE.

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES / TABLES / DATA 62 of 156 PROCEOURE NO SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX J RESTORATION OF CCW AND OBO TO THE ROPs (Page 1 of 2)

D 1, ENSURE Instrument Air to Containment is available by PLACING HCV-1 8-1 to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW N header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

• HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-1O) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-86) starts to open.

• When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW N header valves, until SIAS is reset.

2. If SIAS has closed the N Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER A or B CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

• HCV-14-8A N Hdr Isol Discharge HCV-14-9 N Hdr Isol Suction OR

• HCV-14-8B N Hdr lsol Discharge

• HCV-14-1O N Hdr lsol Suction D . ALIGN CCW to I from the RCPs by OPENING ALL of the following valves:

HCV-14-1, CCWTo RC PUMP O HCV-14-2, CCW From RC PUMP O HCV-14-7, CCWTo RC PUMP O HCV-14-6, CCW From RC PUMP O 4. j CIAS has isolated controlled bleedoff flow to the VCT, Then OPEN V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv, 45

REVISION NO PROCEOURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 63 of 156 PROCEOURE NO SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUC1E UNIT 2 APPENDIX J RESTORATION OF COW AND CBO TO THE RCPs (Page 2 of 2)

CAUTION RCP Seal Cooler isolation valves automatically close on high Seal Cooler outlet temperature of 200°F. Maintaining the control switch in the OPEN position will override this function. CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to COW leakage should conditions warrant the valve(s) to be maintained in the open position. Consideration should be given to returning the control switch(es) to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.

a 5. ENSURE ALL RCP Seal Cooler Isolation valves are OPEN:

D HCV-1 4-11-Al, CCW From 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler a HCV-1 4-11 -A2, CCW From 2A2 RCP Seal Cooler a HCV-14-11-Bl, CCW From 281 RCP Seal Cooler a HCV-14-11-B2, CCW From 282 RCP Seal Cooler a 6. VERIFY RCP CCW related alarms are CLEAR or have been evaluated and dispositioned.

END OF APPENDIX J 46

REVISION NO: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 65 of 156 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 1 of 2)

A Train () B Train (q) 1, SELECT ONE sample point by PLACING the sample valve selector switch in the desired position. FSE-27-8_ FSE-27-1 2_

(Upper Cntmt. Dome) (Lwr. Cntmt.)

FSE-27-9 FSE-27-13 (Par. Area) (2B2 RCP)

FSE-27-1O FSE-27-14 (2A1 RCP) (281 RCP)

FSE-27-1 1 (2A2 RCP)

2. OPEN the Containment Isolation Valves. FSE-27-1 5_ FSE-27-1 7_

(Sample in to H2 Analyzer)

AND FSE-27-16 FSE-27-18 (Sample out of H2 Analyzer)

3. ENSURE the function selector switch is in the SAMPLE position.

4. PLACE the OFF I STANDBY / ANALYZE switch to ANALYZE.

NOTE 1 If power is interrupted and then restored to an n-service Hydrogen Analyzer (such as after an ESFAS or Undervoltage Relay actuation) the remote control selector pushbutton must be depressed to allow for continued operation of the analyzer from the Control Room.

5, DEPRESS the remote control selector pushbutton.

6. VERIFY the red sample light energizes.

47

REVISION NO: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE; 36A APPENDICES I FIGURES / TABLES I DATA 66 of 158 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2-ECP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 2 of 2)

A Train (I) B Train (q)

7. START the Hydrogen Analyzer Recorder. (switch located inside recorder)

8. Allow five to ten minutes for the Hydrogen Analyzer to stabilize as indicated by the (%) indication leveling off.

END OF APPENDIX L 48

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario # 1 Event # 9 Page 18 of 22 Event

Description:

AFAS actuation. MV-09-12-2C 2C AFW pump to 2B SG partially opens to 70 gpm flow.

28 AFW pump does not start.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

SRO Direct starting 2B AFW pump when identified no start on AFAS.

Critical (attached page 56)

Task May elect to feed 2A SG AND 2B SG by cross tying 2B AFW pump.

SRO This should be done lAW 2-ON P-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater Appendix C step 2. (attached page 50-51)

Closes letdown isolation valves V2515, V2516, V2524 when directed.

RO (if not already done)

Examiners Note: Step 14A of EOP-3.0 is N/A because there is no LOOP Perform cooldown using ADVs not to exceed 100°F in any one hour to regain subcooling (OPS Policy 542).

Monitor subcooling per Figure 1A RCS pressure Temperature (attached page 52)

RO/BOP Identifies 2B AFW pump did not start upon AFAS actuation. Start 2B Critical AFW pump when directed. (attached page 56)

Task When SIAS, restore CCW to RCPs per Appendix J 2-EOP-99 within BOP 10 minutes or stop the running RCPs. (attached pages 45-46)

Examiners Note: A possible new Critical Task may be created by the crew if 10 minutes elapses before CCW is restore by Appendix J.

When directed establish alternate RCP bleedoff flowpath to the RCPs by opening V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

Next scenario page = 54 49

REVISION NO* PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

11 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 20 of 29 PROCEDURE NO.

2-QNP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C CROSS-CONNECTING AFW (Page 2 of 4)

1. (continued) INITIAL H. When the system is to be returned to normal, flj PERFORM the following:

1. CLOSE MV-09-10, Pump 28 Disch To SC 2B Valve.

2. i 2A S/C is being fed ]Jj.j CLOSE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch To SC 2A Valve.

3. STOP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A.

4. CLOSE SE-09-2, 2A Pump Disch To 2A S/C Vlv Key 83.

5. Locally CLOSE MV-09-1 3, 2A To 2B AFW Hdr Cross-tie.

NPO

6. Locally CLOSE MV-09-14, 28 To 2A AFW Hdr Cross-tie.

NPO

7. PERFORM Independent Verification of the following:

COMPONENT POSITION IV INITIAL MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch To SO 2A Valve CLOSED MV-09-1 0, Pump 28 Disch To SO 2B Valve CLOSED SE-09-2, 2A Pump Dlsch To 2A S/C Vlv Key 83 CLOSED MV-09-1 3, 2A To 28 AFW Hdr Cross-tie CLOSED MV-09*14, 28 To 2A AFW Hdr Cross-tie CLOSED NOTE II cross-tying AFW in Modes 1 3, Then the motor driven pump not being used to supply SOs must be declared out-of-service per the applicable Tech. Spec.

2. 28 AFW Pump is to feed 2A SIC, )fl PERFORM the following:

A. ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to 2A SIG Valve, is CLOSED.

8. START Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 28.

C. OPEN SE-09-3, 28 Pump Disch To 28 S/C Vlv Key 84.

50

REVISION NO IPROCEOURE TITLE: PAGE:

11 I AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 21 of 29 PROCEDIJRENO 2-ONP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C CROSS-CONNECTING AFW (Page 3of4)

2. (continued) INITIAL CAUTION Opening both MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 while the unit is in Mode 1, 2,3 could make two independent AFW pump both inoperable.

NOTE Key-switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 are located in 2N26 AFW Pump Room, Two keys are required since the keys are removable in CLOSE only.

D. Locally OPEN MV-09-13, 2A To 28 AFW Hdr Cross-tie.

NPO E. Locally OPEN MV-09-14, 25 To 2A AFW Hdr Cross-tie.

NPO I CAUTION I Ensure total pump flow does not exceed 425 gpm.

F. THROTTLE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch To SC 2A Valve, to establish desired flow rate.

F NOTE I While feeding both S!Cs indicated flow is pump flow to both S/Gs.

G. To feed the 28 SIC, THROTTLE MV-09-1O, Pump 28 Disch To SC 25 Valve, to establish desired flow rate.

H. When the system is to be returned to normal, Then PERFORM the following:

1. CLOSE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch To SC 2A Valve.

2. 1128 S/C is being fed, Then CLOSE MV-09-1O, Pump 25 Disch To SC 28 Valve.

3. STOP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 25.

4. CLOSE SE-09-3, 28 Pump Disch To 25 SIC Vlv Key 84.

51

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES / TABLES I DATA 119 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE IA RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1)

(Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F)

CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EQP-99, Table 13.

2400 C9.lo. 4 i.. W. b4 P. .k4 lay It.bCfl It 1w tlCwaWfl p....,. W .lcy p4 p4 Cp.,. At 4 It.çw a. .p4tnp. wy I.

2200 2000 1500 Maurnum Subcoo4eC 1600 400

¶000 Minimum Subcoo)ed 600 RCP NPSH R,quir.nlerW, 600 400 lflcIul$ I411um,ny Vnm1Iu.y 200 0 ¶00 200 300 400 500 600 700 600 nd.caIu RC5 T.mpei.lu,e (F RCS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooied Margin Reading (Rep CET) 2250 psia to 1000 psia 40 to 180°F 1000 psia to 500 psia 50 to 170°F Less than 500 psia 80 to 160°F 52

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # I Event # 9 Page 19 of 22 Event

Description:

AFAS actuation. MV-09-12-2C 2C AFW pump to 2B SG partially opens to 70 gpm flow.

2B AFW pump does not start.

Time J Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Places the hydrogen analyzer in service per Appendix L of 2-EOP-99 BOP (attached pages 47-48)

Compares SI flow to RCS press, Figure 2.(attached page 44)

Perform Appendix A sampling SGs (attached page 42-43)

When (if) directed contact NPO to open MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 lAW Appendix C of 2-ONP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater step 2.D and 2.E (attached page 51) to feed 2A AND 2B SG.

Suggested termination point:

. RCS Cooldown progressing 100°F per hour

. 2A and I or 2B SG is being fed by 2B AFW pump and level is being restored.

Next scenario page = 54 53

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: A Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 UnIdentified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

Unit was down powered to 45% due to an oil leak on the 2B Main Feedwater Pump. Oil leak has been repaired and the 2B Main Feedwater Pump was just started. 2A AFW pump has been OCS for four hours, expected to be returned to service in one hour. The crew is to perform an up power to 100%. The crew is to begin the up power at step 6.132 of 2-GOP-201. Reactor Engineering has provided guidance on rate of power increase in accordance with the attached RE letter.

Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

2A AFW pump, clear ECO when work complete.

Tech Spec Action Statement:

None.

OPS 513s:

None Locked in Annunciators:

G 2A AFW Pump OVRLD/Trip M-24 2C Charging Pump Suct Press Low/OVRLD/Trip Current Status:

45% power, Xenon building in, 6 gpm dilution rate. MOL.

Equipment Problems:

2C Charging Pump OCS for repack. 2A AFW Pump 005 to repair oil leak.

54

RE Letter 55

Critical Task Evaluation Sheet Critical Task Acceptance Criteria Start 2B Emergency Diesel Generator BOP starts 2B DIG. Observes 2B D/G voltage, amperes, and frequency are normal, the diesel generator breaker closes, Bus 2B3 energizes, and loads sequence onto the 2B3 Bus as expected. If this task is not accomplished, it will result in creating an unnecessary Station Blackout. The failure of this critical task would be the point of entry into EOP-1 0, Station Blackout.

Establish Feedwater to 2A or 2B SG RO/BOP places the 2B AFW pump control switch to the start position. Verifies red light ON & green light OFF, normal pump start & run current, and normal discharge flow to either or both Steam Generators. If this task is not accomplished it will eventually result in loss of heat sink. The failure of this critical task would be if the pump has not been started by the end of Completing the RCS Heat Removal SFSC in EOP-3.0.

56

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: HLC-19 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 100% power 2C Charging Pump QOS for repack. 2A AFW Pump OOS to repair oil leak.

Turnover: 100% power. 2A Heater Drain Pump has a severe shaft seal leak and must be removed from service. Perform down power to remove 2A Heater Drain Pump from service.

Critical Tasks:

. Close 28 MSIV.

. Stop one RCP when TId < 500° F

. Terminate AFW flow to 28 S!G. (Isolate 2B SIG)

Event MaIf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R I RO & Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain Pump from service.

SRO NIBOP 2 1 Cl RO Boric Acid Flow Control Valve FCV-2210Y fails closed 3 2 T.S. SRO 2A Charging Pump trips on low oil pressure 4 3 C I BOP 2A DEH Pump Failure / 28 does not auto start 5 4 T.S. I SRO Containment Pressure PT-07-2A fails high NIBOP 6 5 M / All Steam Leak in Containment on 2B SIG 7 6 Cl RD 28 MSIV fails to close on MSIS 8 7 C I BOP AFAS lockout fails to stop feeding 28 SC from 2B AFW pump 9 Isolate 28 S/C (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 St. Lucle Unit is at 100% power with 2A AFW pump OOS to repair an oil leak. It is expected to be back in service within one hour. The 2C Charging pump is out of service for repack.

The 2A Heater Drain Pump has a severe shaft seal leak and must be removed from service. The crew will perform a down power to approximately 90% to remove the pump from service.

Boric Acid flow control valve FCV-2210Y fails closed and cannot be opened. The crew will implement the Off Normal procedure and use the emergency borate valve to continue the down power.

During the down power the 2A Charging pump will trip on low oil pressure. The SRO will need to make a T.S. 3.1.2.4 & 3.5.2 a2 calls due to one Charging pump operable. If the crew has not started the 2B Charging pump for the down power, procedure requires letdown to be isolated. Charging and Letdown ONP should be implemented and Charging and letdown should be placed back in service if secured. If 28 Charging pump was started prior to the loss of 2A Charging pump, letdown bias will need to be adjusted to maintain Pressurizer level on setpoint.

As the down power progresses the 2A DEH pump trips. The 2B DEH pump does not automatically start and should be manually started.

Containment Pressure PT-07-2B fails high. The SRO should refer to T.S. 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and implement ONP for loss of Tech. Spec. Instrumentation.

A major steam leak in the Containment will develop. The crew should manually trip the Unit prior to any automatic trip. As the leak progresses and a MSIS is received the 2B MSIV does not close. The MSIV can be closed manually from the Control Room.

AFAS lockout will occur but the 2B AFW pump will continue to feed the faulted SIG through MV-09-10 (which will not close). The crew should stop the 2B AFW pump to terminate flow to the 28 S/G.

2-EOP-05 Excess Steam Demand should be implemented. Termination of scenario should be when the 28 S/G is isolated lAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R and RCS temperature and pressure are under control.

Procedures Used

• 2-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown Full Load to Zero Load

• 2-GOP-lOl, Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes

• NOP-1 00.02 Axial Shape Index Control

• 2-ONP-22.01, Rapid Down Power

• 2-ON P-02.01, Boron Concentration Control

• 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown

• ARP D-36 DEH PUMP OVLD

• 2-ONP-99.01, Loss of Technical Specification Instrumentation

• 2-ONP-08.01 Steam Leak Off-Normal Operating Procedure

• 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions

• 2-EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand

• 2-EOP-99, Appendix R Technical Specifications Entered

• 3.1.2.4 Charging Pump Operation

• 3.5.2 ECCS

• 3.3.1 RPS and 3.3.2 ESFAS 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 3 of 19 Event

Description:

Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain Pump from service.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: If crew chooses 2- GOP-I 23, Turbine Shutdown Full load -

To Zero Load, Instead of 2-ONP-22.0I, Rapid Down Power procedure then inform SRO the 2A Heater Drain Pump shaft seal leak is getting worse. The pump needs to be stopped ASAP Booth Operator Response:

Control Room Indications Available:

Supervise/Coordinates Power reduction in accordance with 2-ONP-SRO 22.01 Rapid Down Power. (attached pages 5-20)

Directs RO to borate as necessary per Appendix C 2-ONP-22.0I Rapid Down Power.

Directs RO to insert of 6 inches Lead group CEA step 6.1.2.

Directs ROto program DEH for load rate, step 6.1.3.

When T-ave decrease noted directs GO on the turbine step 6.1 .4.

May direct RO to start additional Charging pump lAW 2-ONP-22.01 Rapid Downpower Appendix D (attached page 18)

May direct RO to place Pzr. on recirc lAW 2-ONP-22.0I Rapid Downpowerr Appendix E. (attached page 19)

Next scenario page = 4 3

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D 1 Scenario # 2 Event # I Page 4 of 19 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain Pump from service.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Booth Operator Response:

Control Room Indications Available:

RO Begins Boration per Appendix C, ONP-22.O1 (attached page 17)

Inserts Lead CEA Group 6 inches.

. Select MANUAL SEQUENTIAL.

. Insert CEAs by taking IN/HOLD/OUT switch to insert.

If directed starts additional Charging pump lAW 2-ONP-22.O1 Rapid Downpower Appendix D. (attached page 18). Notifies HP that an additional charging pump has been started.

if directed, places Pzr. On recirc. lAW 2-ONP-22.O1 Rapid Downpower Appendix E. (attached page 19)

Programs the DEH per ONP-22.01 step 6.1.3 for the desired load reduction rate.

. Set reference by ensuring REF selected and then depress BOP desired MW endpoint, hit ENTER.

. Depress LOAD RATE type in desired load rate and hit ENTER.

. Depress GO pushbutton.

Notifies Plant Dispatcher.

When T-ave decrease is noted, starts Turbine down power per ONP 22.01 step 6.1.4.

Next scenario page = 21 4

PROCEOURE TITLE:

RAPID DOWN POWER 5 of 20 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 6.1 Immediate Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS F- NOTE This Procedure may contain steps that could adversely affect reactivity.

ENSURE that proper consideration and appropriate briefings occur prior to performance of steps that could challenge reactivity.

1. BEGIN boration per Appendix C.

2, INSERT the Lead CEA Group approximately 6 inches to initially lower RCS temperature.

3. PERFORM the following:

A. PROGRAM the turbine DEH for the desired load reduction rate.

B. SET DEMAND I REF to desired power level.

NOTE While performing power maneuvers during which time Tavg and Tref are closely monitored, it may be advantageous to change TR-1 11111121 chart speed from 30 minutes per division to 1 minute per division.

4. When a T 09 decrease is noted, I!MI 4. If In turbine MANUAL, Th DEPRESS the GO pushbutton on the DEPRESS and RELEASE the GV turbine DEH control panel. LOWER pushbutton as necessary to reduce / control the load reduction rate.

END OF SECTION 6.1 5

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15 RAPID DOWN POWER 6 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.

2-ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions INSTRUCTiONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. NOTIFY plant personnel using Gai-tronics and boost function as follows:

Attention all personnel, Unit 2 has commenced a Rapid Down-power due to (reason)

2. NOTIFY System of the rapid down power load reduction.

3. REFER TO Appendix A, Rapid Down Power Conditional Actions MONITOR for potential conditions during the down power.

A. jj any parameter is exceeded, Ibn NOTIFY the SM / US PERFORM the required action.

4. REFER TO Appendix B, Rapid Down Power Parameters MAINTAIN parameters.

A. II any parameter is exceeded, fli NOTIFY the SM / US EVALUATE the problem.

5. If it is desired to place additional charging pumps in service, fl PERFORM Appendix D, CHARGING PUMP GUIDANCE, as time permits.

6. it is desired to Place the pressurizer on recirculation, flj PERFORM Appendix E. PRESSURIZER RECIRCULATION GUIDELINES, as time permits.

7. §i CONTROL Axial Shape Index with CEAs in accordance with NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, as directed by the SM / US.

6

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TIRE PAGE.

15 RAPID DOWN POWER 7 of 20 PROCEDURE NO 2..ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

8. MAINTAIN Tavg within 6.6°F Of Tret Using 8.  ! Tavg can NOT be maintained the following: wIthin 6.6°F of Tre

, ]J NOTIFY 1

• RCS Boration Rate the SM I us,

• CEA Position

• Turbine Load F CAUTION Near the end of core life it may not be possible to stabilize reactor power due to xenon and boron concentrations.

9. if desired power level is reached, ]fl 9, STABILIZE the unit by performing the following:

A. SECURE Boration to the RCS per 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

B. ENSURE Tave and Tref are matched and PLACE turbine on Hold.

C. MATCH Reference and Demand on Turbine Control Panel.

D. COMMENCE a Dilution to the RCS per 2-NOP02.24, Boron Concentration Control, that will compensate for transient Xenon effects and maintain Reactor Power as directed by SM I US.

E. ENSURE that at least two charging pumps are operating per Appendix D.

F. BALANCE Charging and Letdown F. ii letdown is isolated, Itici flows. OPERATE charging pumps as needed to control Pressurizer level.

G. ENSURE the pressurizer is on recirculation per Appendix E.

H. CONTACT Reactor Engineering for specific guidance on Axial Shape Index Control 7

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15 RAPID DOWN POWER 8 of 20 PROCEDURE NO 2ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

10. When power level is approximately 45%, 10.

Then PERFORM the following:

A. STOP one Main Feed Pump.

B. ENSURE Steam Generator levels B. the Steam Generator levels are maintained between 55% and can NOT be maintained 75% narrow range level, between 55% and 75  %

narrow range level, Itr RESTART the Main Feed Pump and evaluate the problem.

C. ENSURE Main Feed Pump suction pressure is stable at greater than 400 psig.

11. When power level is approximately 11.

40% Then PERFORM the following:

A. STOP the Condensate Pump on the same electrical train as the secured Main Feed Pump.

B. ENSURE Main Feed Pump suction B. jj the Main Feed Pump pressure is stable at greater than suction pressure can NOT be 400 psig. maintained stable at greater than 400 psig, 1t12!2 RESTART the Condensate Pump and evaluate the problem.

12. ENSURE FCV12-1, Condensate Hdr Recirc to Condsr, operates to maintain greater than 10000 gpm condensate flow.

8

REVISION NO. PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE 15 RAPID DOWN POWER 9 of 20 PROCEDURE NO 2ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

13. When power level is approximately 13.

35%, Then PERFORM the following:

A. OPEN V38238, Demin Wtr to 2A Htr Drain Pump Gland Quench Seal Isol.

B. STOP 2A Heater Drain Pump.

C. ENSURE Main Feed Pump suction C. il Main Feed Pump suction pressure is stable at greater than pressure can NOT be 400 psig. maintained stable at greater than 400 psig, Itn RESTART 2A Heater Drain Pump and evaluate the problem.

14. When power level is approximately 14.

35%, flj PERFORM the following:

A. OPEN V38239, Demin Wtr to 2B Htr Drain Pump Gland Quench Seal Isol.

B. STOP 28 Heater Drain Pump.

C. ENSURE Main Feed Pump suction C. il the Main Feed Pump pressure is stable at greater than suction pressure can NOT be 400 psig. maintained stable at greater than 400 psig, fl RESTART 2B Heater Drain Pump and evaluate the problem.

9

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITI.E: PAGE.

15 RAPID DOWN POWER 10 or 20 PROCEDURE NO 2-ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE WHEN using Reheat CONTROL Panel, all four 8 steam valves go closed immediately WHEN Rheostat is moved counterclockwise.

15. When power level is less than 30%

both Heater Drain Pumps are stopped, Then REMOVE the MSRs from service as follows:

A. CLOSE MSR TCVs using the MSR Reheat Control panel.

8. CLOSE MV-08-4 and MV-08-10 (A and C MSR block valves).

C. CLOSE MV-08-8 and MV-08-06 (8 and D MSR block valves).

16. When power is approximately 25%

Then TRANSFER station electrical loads from the Auxiliary Transformers to the Startup Transformer by performing the following:

A. INSERT Sync Plug.

B. ROTATE to appropriate ST position.

C. VERIFY SYN-888 is stationary at the 12 oclock position.

D. VERIFY incoming and running voltages are matched.

E. CLOSE the appropriate start-up transformer.

F. Green FLAG the associated Auxiliary Transformer Breaker.

0. REMOVE Sync Plug.

10

REVISION NO* PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE 15 RAPID DOWN POWER 11 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2.ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

17. When power is approximately 25%, 17. If the Main Feed Pump suction Then PLACE the running Main Feed pressure is NOT maintained Pump in the RECIRC position and greater than 400 pslg Steam ENSURE the following: Generator levels are NOT maintained between 55% and 75% narrow range level, ]j PLACE the Main Feed Pump control switch in AUTO RECIRC and evaluate the problem.

A. Main Feed Pump suction pressure is maintained greater than 400 psig.

B. Steam Generator levels are maintained between 55% and 75%

narrow range.

I CAUTION It is NOT desirable to trip the Reactor if Rapid Down Power is due to a Steam Generator Tube Leak.

18. j it is desired to trip the Reactor at this power level (20% to 25%), ]Jafl PERFORM the following:

A. RECORD Main Gen KW Hrs ri the chronological log as indicated on WHM/881.

B. ManualTy TRIP the Reactor.

C. EXIT to 2-EOP-01.

19. When power level is approximately 20%, fl ENSURE FCV-24-100 through FCV-24-108, Turbine Drain Valves, are OPEN.

11

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15 RAPID DOWN POWER 12 of 20 PROCEDURE NO 2-ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

20. 1 a Linear Range Safety Channel nuclear power detector is out of service, Then before lowering reactor power to less than 15%, PLACE High Startup Rate trip bistable for the affected channel in bypass or trip condition.

21. § When power is less than 15% but greater than 5%, ]Jj PLACE y Qj ADV per steam generator in automatic control, if desired.

22. When power is less than 15%, iia 22. II Reactor Loss of Load trip is ENSURE that the Reactor Loss of Load NOT bypassed, ]J2 NOTIFY the trip is bypassed by the following SM / US and evaluate the indications: problem.

• Three out of four RPS channels Nuclear Pwr indications are less than 11%.

, Annunciator L-29, LOSS OF LOAD /

LCL PWR DENS CHNL TRIP BYPASS, is LIT.

23. If the Reactor Loss of Load trip is 23. the turbine TVs and GVs do bypassed, TRIP the turbine and NOT close, fl NOTIFY the VERIFY: SM I US and PERFORM the following:

A. The Turbine TVs and GVs are A. TRIP the reactor.

CLOSED.

B. The OCBs and Exciter supply B. CLOSE NC V-06-1 A, Main breakers are OPEN. Steam Hdr A Isolation Valve.

C. CLOSE HCV-06-1B, Main Steam l-idr B Isolation Valve.

0. ENSURE generator lockout occurs.

E. GO TO 2-EOP.01, Standard Post TrIp ActIons.

12

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15 RAPID DOWN POWER 13 of 20 PROCEDURE NO 2-ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

24. §2 ADJUST boration rate and CEA position to maintain power as directed by the SM I US.

25. MAINTAIN 2A 5/0 level between 60% 25. .!! the Steam Generator level can to 70% narrow range, NOT be maintained between 60%

and 70% narrow range level, Ibn NOTIFY the SM / US and GO TO Main Feedwater Off-Normal procedure 2-0700030.

26. CLOSE MV-09-05, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve.

27. MAINTAIN 28 S/G level between 60% 27. jf the Steam Generator level can to 7O% narrow range. NOT be maintained between 60%

and 7O% narrow range level, Ibr NOTIFY the SM I US and GO TO Main Feedwater Off-Normal Procedure 2-0700030.

28. CLOSE MV-09-06, Stm Gen 28 Reg Block Valve.

29. ENSURE RCS heat removal is 29. il T9 can NOT be maintained, established and MAINTAIN Tev Ij NOTIFY the SM I US and between 531 and 533DF as directed evaluate the problem.

by the SM / US.

30. ESTIMATE Xenon build-in and its effect on reactor power.

31. ¶ VERIFY the reactor is critical. 31. II the reactor is NOT critical, Then NOTIFY the SM I US and evaluate the problem.

32. DILUTE and / or MOVE CEAs as required to maintain reactor power as directed by the SM / US.

13

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE 15 RAPID DOWN POWER 14 of 20 PROCEDURE NO 2-ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6,2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

33. If directed by the SM I US, GO TO 2-GOP-123, TurbIne Shutdown-Full Load to Zero Load, 34, j directed by the SM I US, flj GO TO 2-GOP-203, Reactor Shutdown.

END OF SECTION 6.2 14

REVISION NO. PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE.

15 RAPID DOWN POWER 15 of 20 PROCEDURE NO..

2-ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A RAPID DOWN POWER CONDITIONAL ACTIONS (Page 1 of 1)

1. ft at any time parameters associated with automatic reactor or turbine trips are challenged are NOT recovering, fl!fl prior to the respective parameters reaching an automatic trip set point, TRIP the reactor and turbine and GO TO 2-EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

2. ft at any time during power changes, Tavg is NOT within 66°F of Tref for a given power level and efforts to regain control of temperature are unsuccessful, fl2 TRIP the reactor and GO TO 2-EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

3. ft at any time the unit load is greater than 30% power turbine back pressure is greater than 5.5 inches Hg absolute, ]:J2 TRIP the unit and GO TO 2.EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

4. at any time the unit load is less than or equal to 30% power and turbine back pressure is greater than 3.5 inches Hg absolute, ]J TRIP the unit and GO TO 2-EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

5. ft at any time the differential pressure between the condensers is 2.5 inches of Hg absolute or higher, ]fl TRIP the unit and GO TO 2-EOP.O1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

6. If at any time the rapid down power is terminated, Ib.n ESTIMATE Xenon poison build-in ft ADJUST RCS boron concentration and I or CEA position to maintain reactor power as directed by the SM / US.

7. If at any time plant parameters indicates that a steam generator tube leak has occurred, Then FOLLOW 2-0830030, Steam Generator Tube Leak load rate guidelines.

8. Refer to OPS-530 Pre-Planned Power Change Guidance.

END OF APPENDIX A 15

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE:

15 RAPID DOWN POWER 16 of 20 PROCEDURE NO 2-ONP-22.01 ST. WCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX B RAPID DOWN POWER PARAMETERS (Page 1 of 1)

1. Maximum power reduction rate is 45 MW/minute.

2. Maintain Generator amperes less than or equal to 26 kiloamps per phase.

3. Maintain Generator terminal voltage between 21 KV and 23 Ky.

4. Maintain Exciter field current less than or equal to 310 amps,

5. Maintain 2A3 and 283, 4.16 KV bus voltage between 3.95 KV and 4.35 Ky.

6. Maintain Generator frequency greater than 59.5 HZ.

7. Maintain VCT level between 45% and 65% during power reduction.

8. Turbine bearing maximum bearing metal temperature is 225°F (Turbine Trip Criteria).

9. Turbine bearing maximum oil discharge temperature is 180°F F (Turbine Trip Criteria).

10. Turbine exhaust hood sprays automatic actuation temperature is 160°F.

11. Maintain Steam Generator levels between 55% and 75% narrow range level.

12. T2 Maintain Generator cold gas temperature between 45°F (7.2°C) and 114°F (46.1 °C).

13. Monitor Turbine Cooling Water Pump parameters and operate pumps as necessary to ensure adequate component cooling and pump operation,

14. § Maintain pressurizer level between 2% and 68%,

7 NOTE

§2 Rapid Down power may result in Pressurizer Pressure dropping below DNBR Limit.

15, ¶, Maintain pressurizer pressure between 2225 and 2275 psia, END OF APPENDIX B 16

• VISION NO: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE 15 RAPID DOWN POWER 17 of 20 PROCEDURE NO..

2.ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C RCS BORATION GUIDANCE (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE The steps in this Appendix are applicable when the CVCS is normally aligned, with no RCS boration or dilution in progress, If other than normal alignment, use guidance of 2-NQP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

1. BORATE the RCS by the following:

A. START either Boric Acid Pump 2A or 2B.

B. PLACE FCV-2210Y control switch in AUTO.

C. Lf borating to the VCT, Th OPEN V251 2, Reactor Makeup Water Stop VIv.

D. i borating to the Charging Pump suction, Iti.a OPEN V2525, Boron Load Control Valve.

E. ADJUST FIC-2210Y to the desired flowrate.

NOTE Ensure a minimum of 10 gpm of boric acid flow at all times while BAM pump recirc valve is closed.

F. il desired to maximize the boric acid flow rate, fli CLOSE the running SAM pump recirc valve.

G. MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent as needed.

H. II necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, ]1. DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position.

NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.

END OF APPENDIX C 17

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE, PAGE:

15 RAPID DOWN POWER 18 of 20 PROCEDURE NO:

2-ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX D CHARGING PUMP GUiDANCE (Page 1 of 1)

1. j Charging Pump(s) are to be started, fl PERFORM the following:

A, ENSURE that each Charging pump that Is desired to be started is ready to operate by local inspection by the SNPO, if time permits.

B. il associated Charging Pump Recirc Valve is operable, ]Jjj ENSURE that it is OPEN prior to starting the Charging Pump.

NOTE Placing a second or third charging pump in service will increase letdown flow which may cause the general area dose rates in the vicinity of the letdown line in the 19.5 Pipe Penetration Room or i9.5 Letdown Cubicle Room to exceed 1000 mr/hr (Locked High Radiation Area limit) due to reduced transport time of short-lived radioactive isotopes.

C. START the Charging pump.

D. NOTIFY Health Physics of the chargIng pump alignment.

E. ADJUST the bias on HIC-1 110, Level, using the upper knurled knob to control the letdown flow to maintain the actual Pressurizer Level to program RRS Pressurizer Level for current plant conditions, if required.

F. FlA-2212, Chg Flow to Regen Hx, is in service, Ib VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing FIA-221 2 raise and stabilize for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.

0. If FIA-2212, Charging to Regen Hx, is NOT in service, II VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing Letdown flow and expected changes in Pressurizer level for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.

H. ENSURE the running Charging Pump Reciro Valve is CLOSED.

I. PLAICE the Chrg Pump Sal Running-B/U switch in the proper position for current plant conditions per operator aid placard on RTGB-205. (Charging pump combinations vs. selector switch>

END OF APPENDIX 0 18

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE 15 RAPID DOWN POWER 19 of 20 PROCEDURE NO 2-ONP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX E PRESSURIZER RECIRCULM1QN GUIDELINES (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE

• The purpose of placing the Pressurizer on recirculation is to keep the Pressurizer and RCS boron concentration within 25 ppm when changing RCS boron concentration.

• From measured data, the estimated time in minutes to correct a greater than or equal to 25 ppm boron mismatch by operating 6 Backup Heater Banks may be determined as follows:

• Time (in mm.) to correct mismatch = t(Pzr ppm RCS ppm) 25 ppm] x 3

1. To place the Pressurizer on recirculation:

A. PLACE all available Backup Heater Bank control switches to ON.

B. Slowly REDUCE the AUTO setpoint on PlC-i I QOX or PlC-i I 00, the selected Pressurizer Pressure controller, to maintain normal operating pressure.

C. OBSERVE t-(lC-1 100, Pressurizer Spray output and PCV-1 100E / 1 IOOF, Pressurizer Spray Valve position indication to verify Main Spray flow.

NOTE Normally, the required number of Backup Bank heaters in service is dependent upon:

1 The magnitude of thermal losses from the system, including leakage to the Quench Tank.

2. The number of heater elements out of service.

The normal configuration is to have enough Backup Bank heaters in service to keep the Proportional Bank heaters at approximately 50% output.

END OF APPENDIX E 19

REVISION NO PROCEOURE TITLE: PAGE:

15 RAPiD DOWN POWER 20 of 20 PROCEOLJRE NO 2-ONP-22.O1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX F AXIAL SHAPE INDEX CONTROL (Page 1 of 1)

Unplanned Load Reductions NOTE Contact Reactor Engineering for additional support in planning for or controlling core xenon oscillations.

1. ASI cannot be maintained within transient band due to the inoperability of CEA(s), flj CONTACT Reactor Engineering to assist in determining the load reduction rate which would minimize the effects of ASI being out of the transient band.

CAUTION The duration and magnitude of operation with ASI in excess of the Steady State Band should be limited to the maximum extent possible.

2. Every effort should be made to maintain ASI within limits (+/- 0.5 of the ESI),

however, under extreme conditions (e.g., rapid downpower) the SM I US may direct temporary operation outside this limit. jj operation outside the limit is unavoidable during a rapid downpower, I:

A, MAINTAIN ASI within RPS LPO pre-trip limits.

B. RESTORE ASI to within limits as soon as is practical.

C. Contact Reactor Engineering for evaluation and post-stabilization ASI guidance prior to any power increase.

3. REFER to NOP-100.02 for additional guidance on Axial Shape Index Control.

END OF APPENDIX F 20

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 5 of 19 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain Pump from service.

Time I Position J Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Booth Operator Response:

Control Room Indications Available:

Continues to Supervise/Coordinate Power reduction in accordance SRO with 2-ONP-22.O1 Rapid Down Power Steps 6.2.1 thru 6.2.9.

Refers to Appendices A and B as directed by the SRO per steps 6.2.3 ROIBOP and 6.2.4.

Controls ASI as directed by SRO with CEAs or per NOP-1 00.02, Axial RO Shape Index Control Per step 6.2.7.

RO/BOP Maintains T-avg within 6.6°F of T-ref per step 6.2.8.

RO When desired power level reached, stabilizes unit per step 6.2.9.

BOP When desired power level reached, stabilizes unit per step 6.2.9.

Next scenario page = 22 21

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 ScenarIo # 2 Event # 2 Page 6 of 19 Event

Description:

Boric Acid Flow control Valve FCV-2210Y fails closed Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Boric Acid Flow Control Valve FCV-2210Y failure on examiner cue.

Examiners Note: Failure should be inserted after downpower is started approx 97-95%

power (and while power is still decreasing and boration is still in progress.

Booth Operator Response: When requested by l&C to Investigate failure of FCV 2210Y respond will investigate. Response after Investigation, valve diaphragm has failed resulting in the valve being unable to open.

Control Room Indications Available: Boric acid flow goes to full scale low, indicating lights for FCV-2210Y goes from dual to green. No associated alarms RO Recognizes closed indication on FCV-221 OY and notifies SRO.

Directs RO actions in accordance with 2-ONP-02.O1 Boron SRO Concentration Control Off-Normal Operating Procedure steps 6.0.9 A E. (attached page 23)

Directs RO to secure boration line-up.

Directs BOP to go to hold on the turbine.

Ensures either Boric Acid pump is running.

Directs OPENING V2514, Emergency Borate.

Directs Placing Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL.

Directs cycling the Boric Acid pump as necessary to control boric acid addition rate and rate of power change.

Directs monitoring for any abnormal change in T-avg.

Next scenario page = 24 22

PAGE:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

REVISION NO.:

78 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 15 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.O1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 5.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Prol onge d use of V25 14, Eme rgen cy Borate, can lead to uncontrolled l to the charging pump power reduction rates. Boric Acid flow rate is equa e.

flow rate when using the emergency borate valv

9. If FCV-221 OY, Boric Acid Valve, fails to OPEN when a power reduction is required, jJj PERFORM the following:

A. START either Boric Acid pump.

B. OPEN V2514 C. PLACE Makeup Mode Selector switch in MANUAL.

D. CYCLE the Boric Acid pump as necessary to control boric acid addition rate and the rate of power reduction.

E. MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tave END OF SECTION 6.0 23

Appendix D Operator Action Forn, ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 7 of 19 Event

Description:

Boric Acid Flow control Valve FCV-2210Y fails closed Time L Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Booth Operator Response:

Control Room Indications Available:

Notifies shift manager of FCV-221 OY failure and entry into 2-ONP-SRO 02.01 Boron Concentration Control. Notifies l&C.

Directs securing 2A HDP when power less than 92%

RO Starts a Boric Acid pump if none are running.

OPENS V2514, Emergency Borate.

o (This will cause annunciator M-42 Emergency Borate V2514 OPEN/OVLD/SS Isol to alarm.)

Places Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL.

Cycles the Boric Acid pump as necessary to control boric acid addition rate and rate of power change.

Monitors for any abnormal change in T-avg.

BOP Puts turbine on HOLD as directed. (if already started)

Monitors plant parameters while event in progress.

Secure 2A HPDP lAW 2-GOP-I 23 step 6.22.1 (attached page 25)

Next scenario page = 26 24

REViSION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

30 TURBINE SHUTDOWN FULL LOAD TO PROCEDURE NO.: ZERO LOAD 2-GOP-I 23 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.21 ENSURE FCV-12-l, Condensate Hdr Recirc to Condsr, operates to maintain approximately 10,000 GPM condensate flow.

NPO NOTE The two substeps in the following step may be performed in any order, and they may be perform ed at any time PRIOR to reaching 35% if the Heater Drain Pump( s) need to be stoppe d due to plant conditions.

6.22 When power is approximately 35%, Ib PERFORM the following:

1. STOP the 2A Heater Drain Pump as follows:

A. OPEN V38238, Demin Wtr to 2A Htr Drain Pump Gland Quench Seal lsol.

NPO B. STOP the 2A Heater Drain Pump.

C. ENSURE LCV-I I-18A, 4A LP Htr Alt Drain, OPENS to control the level in the 4A Heater.

NPO D. VER1FY Main Feed Pump suction pressure is being maintained greater than or equal to 400 PSIG as indicated on P1219_A, Feedwater Pumps Header Pressure Suction.

E. jf Main Feed Pump suction pressure is NOT being mainta ined greater than or equal to 400 P510, ]J RESTART the Heater Drain Pump and evaluate the problem.

25

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 8 of 19 Event

Description:

2A Charging Pump trips on low oil pressure

- Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 2A Charging Pump trip on examiner cue.

Booth Operator Response: SNPO reports the 2A charging pump tripped on low oil pressure and there is oil all over the floor.

Indications Available: 2A Charging Pump Red light ON, Green light OFF Annunciator M-14 Charging Pump Flow Low, M-30 2A Charging Pump Trouble if ONLY 2A Charging pump was running.

RO Recognizes 2A Charging Pump trip, and reports to US.

SRO if only One Charging pump was running, directs RO to isolate letdown:

Directs RO lAW 2-ONP-02.03 Charging and Letdown section steps 6.0.2 thru 6.0.6, 6.0.9, and 6.0.1 1 (attached pages 27-29)

SRO Recognizes entry into T.S. 3.1.2.4 and T.S 3.5.2 Action a.2 (both are T.S. 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> actions to restore a Charging pump).(attached page 30-3 1)

Notifies shift manager of 2A Charging pump trip and entry into 2-ONP-02.03 Charging and Letdown.

As directed performs 2-ONP-02.03 Charging and Letdown steps RO 6.0.2 thru 6.0.6, 6.0.9, and 6.0.11. (attached page 27-29)

If Two Charging pumps were running, directs RO to maintain SRO Pressurizer level on program setpoint.:

Notifies shift manager of 2A Charging pump trip and entry into 2-ONP-02.03 Charging and Letdown.

Performs crew brief Adjusts Letdown bias to maintain Pressurizer level on program RO setpoint.

Next scenario page = 32 26

VISION NO IPROCEDURE TITLE PAGE 1 5B I CHARGING AND LETDOWN 5 of 26 PROCEDURE NO 7

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS NSTRUCTONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. If letdown flow is lost,

[fl STOP the charging pumps.

A. RETURN the charging pump control switches to AUTO.

CAUTION Severe thermal stress and flashing may occur in the Regenerative Heat Exchanger if letdown flow is NOT immediately isolated.

2. charging flow is lost, 2.1 ISOLATE Letdown by the Itin ISOLATE letdown, following:

A. CLOSE V2515, Stop Valve-IC B. CLOSE V-2516, Containment Isol Valve-IC.

C. CLOSE V2522, Containment lsol Valve-OC.

NOTE With Charging and Letdown isolated pressurizer level will lower slowly due to RCP controlled bleedoff flow.

3. f charging and letdown flow has been lost, fl MAINTAIN Reactor power and RCS temperature constant to minimize pressurizer level deviations.

4. VERIFY all applicable automatic actions have occurred.

Appendix A contains a listing of expected automatic actions.

27

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE.

15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 6 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.

2-ON P-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Prolonged use of Charging without Letdown could result in the Pressurizer exceeding the Technical Specification limit of 68%. Pressurizer level must be closely monitored.

5. § MAINTAIN Pressurizer level 5.1 §i Pressurizer level can NOT between 27% and 68% and be maintained between 27%

within 2% of selpoint as and 68%, fli BE in at follows: least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers OPEN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, A. As Pressurizer level reduces to approximately 20/Q less than setpoint, START one Charging Pump.

B. When Pressurizer level is approximately 2% greater than setpoint, THEN STOP the running Charging Pump.

C. PLACE the previously running Charging Pump Control Switch in AUTO.

6. 11 charging and letdown flow has been lost, Then DETERMINE the cause.

7. j a charging system leak has occurred, Then ISOLATE the leak and refer to applicable Technical Specifications for guidance.

8. lithe normal charging flow path becomes unavailable, fl REFER TO Appendix B, Alternate Charging Flow Path through A HPSI Header.

28

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE 1 5B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 7 0 f 26 PROCEDURE NO 2-QNP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6,0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 9, II letdown is unavailable, Ib&ti MAINTAIN pressurizer level by temporarily cycling charging pumps.

NOTE

§ If one or more charging pumps have lost pumping ability, gas binding may have occurred, This can result from pumping the VCT dry (hydrogen binding) or rupture of a Charging pump suction accumulator (nitrogen binding). If this occurred the charging pumps must be vented after restoring a source of water to the suction.

10. ijthe charging pumps are gas bound, Then REFER TO Appendix C, Venting a Gas Bound Charging Pump.

11. If charging and letdown has 11.

been lost and can be restored, Ib. RE-ESTABLISH charging and letdown flow as follows:

A. ENSURE adequate VCT A.1 RESTORE the VCT level is indicated, to a normal level in accordance with 2-ONP-02.01, Boron Concentration Control.

B. ENSURE the Level Control Valve selector switch and the Pressure Control Valve selector switch are selected to the level and pressure control valves presently in service.

29

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE MARGIN status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN limit at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two chargin g equivalent to its COLR within the next pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4.1 At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that each pump develops a flow rate of greater than or equal to 40 gpm when tested pursuant to the lnservice Testing Program.

atically on 4.1.2.4.2 At least once per 18 months verify that each charging pump starts autom an SIAS test signal.

ST. LtJCIE UNIT 2 3/4 1-10 Amendment No. 8,25, 94, 105 30

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 314.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS OPERATING -

IrIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump,

b. One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and

c. An independent OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the atically refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and autom ment sump on a Recirc ulation Actuat ion transferring suction to the contain Signal, and ci, One OPERABLE charging pump.

3*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and ACTION:

a. 1. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable only because its associated LPSI train is inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next S hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ion

2. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable for reasons other than condit al., restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and HOT SHUT DOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

r t

b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reacto Coolan Specia l Report shall be prepar ed and submit ted to the Comm ission System, a stances of pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circum the actuation and the total accum ulated actuati on -cyces to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affecte d safety injecti on nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whene ver its value exceed s 0.70.

With pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 1750 psia.

Amendment No. 406, 119 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 31

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 9 of 19 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

2A DEH pump trips Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator instructions: Trigger 2A DEH pump trip on examiner cue.

Booth Operator Response: NPO reports breaker has tripped but there is no apparent problem Indications Available: No light indication on 2A DEH pump, 2B does not start on decreasing DEH header pressure.

Annunciator D-36 DEH Pump OVRLD D-47, DEH Pump DISCH PRESS HiqhlLow SRO Recognizes the 2A DEH pump tripped.

Recognizes the 2B DEH pump did not start.

Directs BOP to manually start 2B DEH pump.

Notifies Shift Manager of 2A DEH pump trip.

Directs BOP to contact NPO and maintenance services to investigate pump trip.

RO Monitors primary plant parameters during event.

BOP Recognizes the 2A DEH pump tripped.

Recognizes the 2B DEH pump did not start. Should have started at 1550 psia.

Refers to Annunciator summary for D-36 DEH pp overload and D-47 DEH Pump Disch Press High/Low (attached pages 33-34)

Manually starts 2B DEH pump as directed.

Contacts NPO and maintenance services to investigate pump trip Next scenario page = 35 32

REVISION NO: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL:

0 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE D PROCEDURE NO: WiNDOW; 2-ARP-01-D36 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 36 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 DEH 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 PUMP OVRLD 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 D-36 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT:

74/720 Bkr 2-40832 on MCC 2A1 De-energized 49/720 Bkr 2-40832 On MCC 2A1 Thermal Overload 74/721 Bkr 2-40610 on MCC 281 De-energized 49/721 Bkr 2-40610 on MCC 2B1 Thermal Overload ALARM CONFIRMATION:

1. Green light LIT on the previously running DEH Pump indicates the thermal overload has actuated.

2. Loss of both indicating lights on RTGB-201 for the affected pump indicates loss of Control power or breaker open.

OPERATOR ACTIONS:

1. ENSURE the standby DEH Pump is RUNNING.

2. il the standby pump did NOT start, PLACE the control switch to START.

3. I P1-22-26, Emergency Trip Header Pressure, is approaching 1000 psig and dropping, I!fl PERFORM the following:

A. CHECK status of annunciator L-29, LOSS OF LOAD! LCL PWR DENS CHNL TRIP BYPASS.

BIt annunciator L-29 is CLEAR, Then PERFORM the following:

1. TRIP the Reactor and Turbine.

2. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions.

. i! the Turbine trips, ]j IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions, if applicable.

5. PLACE the previously running standby DEH Pump control switch to STOP.

6. DISPATCH an operator to the applicable DEH pump breaker:

Bkr 2-40832, Elect Hydraulic Gov Fluid Pp 2A, on MCC 2A1.

Bkr 2-40610, Elect Hyd Gov Fluid Pump 2B, on MCC 281.

7. PERFORM the following at the applicable breaker:

A. CHECK the breaker CLOSED.

B. PRESS the Thermal Overload RESET button.

I! the breaker is CLOSED and indicating lights are NOT LIT, ]J ENSURE the control power fuse is checked and replaced as necessary.

LJ the breaker is TRIPPED the thermal overload repeatedly actuates, Then CONTACT EM for troubleshooting and repairs.

CAUSES: This alarm may be caused by either of the following for either DEH Pump:

• Thermal Overload (49) Relay actuating due to motor overload.

• Control power loss due to a blown fuse or the breaker is open.

REFERENCES:

1. CWD 2998-8-327 sheets 720 and 803

2. 2998-31 33

REVISION NO: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL:

0 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE D PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW:

2-ARP-01-D47 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 47 ANNUNC :IATOR PANEL D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 DEH 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 PUMP 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 DISCH PRESS T EF148 495 HIGHILOW 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 D-47 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT:

PS-22-1 19 (High) TGB/TG TERM BOX ER 2225 psig PS-22-120 (Low) TGBITG TERM BOX ER 1550 psig ALARM CONFIRMATION:

P1-22-24, EH Fluid, on RTGB-201.

OPERATOR ACTIONS:

1.If pressure is less than 1550 psig, In PERFORM the following:

A. ENSURE the Standby EH Pump is running.

DEH pressure continues to drop, ]fln PREPARE for turbine trip.

Q. j.f P1-22-26, Emergency Trip Header Pressure, is approaching 1000 psig and dropping, Then PERFORM the following:

1. CHECK status of annunciator L-29, LOSS OF LOAD/ LCL PWR DENS CHNL TRIP BYPASS.

2.If annunciator L-29 is CLEAR, fl PERFORM the following:

a. TRIP the Reactor and Turbine.

b. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

D.lf DEH pressure returns to normal, STOP the DEH Pump that was initially running.

E. CONTACT MM for trouble shooting and repairs.

2.lf pressure is greater than 2225 psig, I!n PERFORM the following:

A. START the Standby DEH Pump.

B. LOCALLY VERIFY the Standby Pump is operating normally with discharge pressure between 1700 and 2100 psig.

C. STOP the DEH Pump that was initially running.

D. CONTACT MM for trouble shooting and repairs.

CAUSES: A high pressure alarm may be caused by DEH filter clogging or failure of DEH Pump Pressure Control Valves. A low pressure alarm may be caused by DEH Reservoir HP Relief lifting, loss of a DEH Pump, or a system leak.

REFERENCES:

1. CWD 2998-8-327 sheets 721 and 803

2. 2998-31

3. TEDB 34

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page lOof 19 Event

Description:

Containment Pressure PT-07-2A fails high Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger PT-07-2A failure on examiner cue.

Booth Operator Response:

Control Room Indications Available: RTGB-206 PIS-07-2A Indicates high Annunciators in alarm:

Q-2 ESFAS ATI, Q-3 CNTMT Press SIAS Channel Trip, S-17 CNTMT Press High Channel Trip, P-13 CNTMT Press High CIS Channel Trip, P-23 CNTMT Press High CIS Channel Pre Trip, L-5 CNTMT Press High Channel Trip, L-13 CNTMT Press High Channel Pre Trip SROIBOP Recognize numerous alarms. Identifies failed pressure transmitter.

Directs implementation of 2-ONP-99.O1, Loss of Tech Spec SRO Instrumentation step 6.3.2.E.1 or 6.3.2.E.2. (attached page 36)

SRO Recognize entry into T.S. 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1.5 action 2 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place in trip or bypass) and 3.3.2 action 13, 18a & 18b. (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place in T.S. trip or bypass) (attached pages 37-41)

Notifies Shift Manager of PT-07-2A failure and entry into 2-ONP-99.O1, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation.

RO Monitors primary plant parameters during event.

Obtains keys 109,127128, & 129 and Bypasses, or, Trips Channel A BOP trip units as directed per of 2-ONP-99.O1, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation step 6.3.2.E.1 or 6.3.2.E.2. (attached page 36)

Contacts l&C to troubleshoot failure of PT-07-2A Next scenario page = 42 35

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE 21 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 17 of 37 PROCEDURE NO 2-ONP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.3 ESFAS Channel Malfunction (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE e Containment pressure monitors are covered by Tech Spec 3.3,1, Table 3.3-1 for RPS and Tech Spec 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3 for ESFAS.

• ESFAS cabinet door key, key 114, is required for bypassing ESFAS.

• Containment Pressure SIAS and MSIS share the same bistable and isolation modules.

E. Containment Pressure E.1 PERFORM ONE of the following:

instrumentation indication P(S-07-2A/B/C/D.

1, BYPASS the following channels affected by the failed Containment Pressure instrument:

• Hi Cntmt Press RPS trip unit (key 109)

• Cont Press SIAS (key 127)

• Cntmt Press CIS (key 129)

• Cntmt Press CSAS (key 128)

OR

2. PLACE the affected RPS and ESFAS trip units in TRIP in accordance with Appendix A, Placing Trip Units in Trip.

36

TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

1. Manual Reactor Trip 4 2 4 1, 2 1 4 3*4*5* 5 4 2

2. Variable Power Level High 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

3. Pressurizer Pressure High 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

4. Thermal Margin/Low Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

5.

Containment Pressure High 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

6. Steam Generator Pressure Low 4/SG 2ISG(b) 3/SG 1, 2 2#

7. Steam Generator Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

Difference High

8. Steam Generator Level Low 4/SG 2ISG 3/SG 1. 2 2#

9. Local Power Density High 4 2(c)(d) 3 1 2#

10. Loss of Component Cooling Water 4 2 3 1 2 2#

to Reactor Coolant Pumps

11. Reactor Protection System Logic 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

3* 4* 5* 5

12. Reactor Trip Breakers 4 2(f) 4 1, 2 4 3* 4* 5* 5

13. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor

a. Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power 4 2(e)(g) 3 1, 2 2#

High

b. Shutdown 4 0 2 3, 4, 5 3

14. Reactor Coolant Flow Low 4/SG 2ISG(a)(d) 3/SG 1, 2 2#

15. Loss of Load (Turbine 4 2c 3 1 2#

Hydraulic Fluid Pressure Low)

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 60

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 2 - a. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

b. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:

1. Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

2. All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below:

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Safety Channel Nuclear Instrumentation Wide Range Rate of Change of Power High (RPS)

Linear Range Variable Power Level High (RPS)

Local Power Density High (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

2. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure High (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure Low (ESF)

3. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure High (RPS)

Containment Pressure High (ESF)

4. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure Low (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)

Steam Generator Pressure Low (ESF)

5. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

SL LUCIE - UNIT 2 Amendmenl No. 48, 3, 149 38

TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 3 1,2,3 13*,14

b. Containment Pressure 4 2 High 3 1,2,3(a) 13*, 14

c. Pressurizer Pressure 4 2 Low 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

d. Automatic Actuation 2 Logic

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) c.) 3 1(b), 2(b), 3(b) 18a*, 18b*, 18c

b. Containment Pressure 4 2 High-High 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

c. Automatic Actuation Logic

3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

a. Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons)

b. Safety Injection (SIAS) See Functional Unit 1 for all Safety Injection Initiating Functions and Requirements 3 1,2,3 13*,14

c. Containment Pressure 4 2 High 3 1,2,3 13*,14

d. Containment Radiation 4 2 High 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

e. Automatic Actuation Logic 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. 132 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is less than 1836 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal to 1836 psia.

(b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below 700 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 700 psia.

The provisions of Specification 3,0,4 are not applicable.

ACTION OF STATEMENTS ACTION 12 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 13 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure High (SIAS, CIAS, CSAS)

Containment Pressure High (RPS)

2. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure Low (MS IS)

AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Steam Generator Pressure Low (RPS)

3. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

4. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure High (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure Low (SIAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

ST LUCIE - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 28, 3, 149 40

TABLE 3.3-3 (ContInued)

TABLE NOTATION ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the inoperable channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, then place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition.

b. With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed in ACTION 13.

c. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may proceed provided one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and the other inoperable channel has been placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Restore one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition. If OPERABILiTY can not be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ST LIJCIE UNIT 2 Amendment No. 132 41

ppendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6,7,8 Page 11 of 19 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Containment on 28 SIG, 2B MSIV fails to close on MSIS, AFAS lockout fails to stop feeding 2B S/G from 2B AFW pump and MV-09-1 0 will not close.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Steam Leak in Containment on examiner cue.

Ensure 2B MSIV failure to close on MSIS is enabled.

Booth Operator Response:

Indications Available: RTGB- 206 rising Containment Building pressure, lowering SIG pressures, RCS temperatures dropping, reactor power increasing.

Annunciators in alarm: T-9, CONTMNT Fan CLR HVS-IAIIB TEMP High T-15. CONTMNT Fan CLR HVS-ICIID TEMP Hiah SRO 1 Recognizes S/G pressure dropping and Containment Building pressure rising.

Directs RD to trip reactor prior to Auto trip and MSIS.

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions as follows:

RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

SRO Directs one RCP stopped when Td approaches 500°F. (attached Critical page 60)

Task Directs RO to stop 1 RCP in each loop on SIAS on low Pzr pressure.

Directs Emergency boration due to uncontrolled cooldown at 500°F.

SRO Directs manual closure of 2B MSIV following failure to close on MSIS.

Critical (attached page 60)

Task Calls to request the STA to report to the Control Room to assist with the event Next scenario page = 43 42

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 7, 8 Page 12 of 19 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Containment on 2B SIG, 2B MSIV fails to close on MSIS, AFAS lockout fails to stop feeding 28 S/G from 2B AFW pump and MV-09-1 0 will not close.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Booth Operator Response:

Control Room Indicahons Available:

Manually trips reactor prior to auto trip. Performs EOP-O1 Safety RO Functions as directed for Reactivity Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal.

Emergency borates when directed. (from RCS Heat Removal Safety Function)

. Places Makeup Mode Selector Switch in Manual.

. Ensures V2525 Load control valve closed.

. Starts 2A or 28 8AM Pump.

. Closes V2650 Tank 2A Recirc valve.

. Closes V2651 Tank 2B Recirc valve.

. Opens V2514 Emergency Borate valve.

Reactivity Control e Verify Reactor power is lowering.

. Verify startup rate is negative.

. Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted.

Inventory Control

. Verify Pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

. Pressurizer level is trending to 30 35%.

Pressure Control

. Verifies RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia. (at 1736 psia verify SIAS and stop RCP in each loop.)

. Verifies RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia. (control manually)

. Verifies RCS subcooling is >20°F.

Next scenario page = 44 43

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 7, 8 Page 13 of 19 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Containment on 28 SIG, 28 MSIV fails to close on MSIS, AFAS lockout fails to stop feeding 2B S/G from 28 AFW pump and MV-09-1 0 will not close.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Booth Operator Response:

Control Room Indications Available:

Core Heat Removal

• Verifies at least one RCP running with CCW. ( if >10 minutes RO with no CCW must secure)

• Verifies loop delta T is <10°F.

RO Critical Stops one RCP when directed as TId <500°F (attached page 60)

Task RO Critical Manually closes 2B MSIV as directed. (attached page 60)

Task Verifies turbine trip on reactor trip. Performs EOP-01 Safety functions BOP as directed for: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions.

Closes MSR reheat Block Valves and Ensures MSR Warmup Valves are CLOSED.

Notifies NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99. (outside CR actions)

Closes Spillover Bypass valve MV-08-814.

Next scenario page = 45 44

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 7, 8

, Page 14 of 19 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Containment on 28 SIG, 28 MSIV fails to close on MSS, AFAS lockout fails to stop feeding 28 SIG from 28 AFW pump and MV-09-1O will not close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

. Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed.

• Verifies GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter BOP Breaker.)

• Verifies all vital and non vital AC Buses energized.

• Verifies all vital and non vital DC Buses energized.

RCS Heat Removal

• Verify at least one SG has feedwater available

• Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535° F

• Verify SBCS valves controls Tavg.

. Close MSIV at 750 psia.

• Close Spillover Bypass valve MV-08-814 (unable to be closed due to loss of power)

Containment Conditions

• Verifies Containment pressure <2 psig. (Pressure is increasing ensures 4 Containment Cooling fans on.)

• Verifies NO Containment radiation monitors in alarm.

• Verifies Containment temperature is less than 120°F.

(Temperature is increasing)

• Verifies NO secondary plant radiation alarms.

Re-establishes CCW to RCPs lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix J as directed or stop all RCPs if CCW lost >10 minutes. (this may be done in 2-EOP-01) (attached pages 52-53)

Examiners note: The crew could create another critical task if Appendix J is not completed to restore CCW to the RCPs within 10 minutes..

Next scenario page = 46 45

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 7, 8 Page 15 of 19 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Containment on 2B SIG, 2B MSIV fails to close on MSIS, AFAS lockout fails to stop feeding 28 SIG from 28 AFW pump and MV-09-1O will not close.

Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator instructions:

Booth Operator Response: If dispatched, NPO reports the manual operator on MV-09-1O is broken and it cannot be closed locally.

Control Room Indications Available:

SRO Evaluates diagnostic flow chart of 2-EOP-O1.

Exits EOP-O1 and enters 2-EOP-05 ESD after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart.

Directs BOP/STA perform Safety Function Status Checks.(SFSC)

Directs Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SIGs.(attached pages 54-54)

If SIAS present verify SI flow lAW Figure 2.(attached page 51)

Directs BOP to contact NPQ to locally close MV-09-1O.

Directs one RCP/LOOP stopped when SIAS received on low RCS pressure. (may have been directed in 2-EOP-O1)

Directs CCW restored to RCPs per Appendix J 2-EOP-99.(may have been completed in 2-EOP-O1) (attached pages 52-53)

Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify.

When SIG 2B reaches dry out (WR level near zero and pressure starts to increase), directs RCS temperature stabilized within the limits of Figure IA using 2A ADVs. (attached page 48)

Next scenario page 47 46

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario # 2 Event # 6 7, 8

, Page 16 of 19 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in Containment on 28 S/G, 2B MSIV fails to close on MSIS, AFAS lockout fails to stop feeding 28 SIG from 2B AFW pump and MV-09-1O will not close.

Time I Position ] Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Booth Operator Response:

Control Room Indications Available:

Opens A ADVs to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of RO Figure 1A when 2B SG blown dry. See Ops Policy 539. (attached page 48-50)

Stops one RCP/LOOP when directed. (may have been completed in 2-EOP-01)

Performs SFSCs EOP-05 when directed.

STA

. Verify SI flow lAW Figure 2 (attached page 51)

Performs EOP-99 Appendix J CCW restoration to RCPs when BOP directed. (may have been completed in 2-EOP-01 (attached pages 52-53)

Performs Appendix A when directed.(attached pages 54-55)

Recognizes that AFAS lockout has failed and 2B S/G is being fed SRO/BOP/RO from 28 AFW pump.

Directs RO to stop feeding 28 S/G by stopping 2B AFW pump.

Takes 2B AFW pump control switch to STOP as directed.

Next scenario page = 56 47

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

36A APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA 119 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE IA RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1)

(Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F)

CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EOP-99, Table 13.

4 W.. .P (C*.

6*0 *%W IDTW WØ W** p.t.a.. *t&natfl.

iV*.0pe..a. *a p-I 4p-.g* **...tf 2200 2000 (800 Mamum Subco)ed 1600 400 (200 I (000 800 Mirwnum S.,bcooI 800 400 Into.. InItr.Jrn.n( Unc.,1.nO,$

200 0

0 100 200 300 400 500 500 700 800 Indcaled RCS TempeaIwre (F) *-.

ROS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooied Margin Reading (Rep CT)1 2250 psia to 1000 psia 40 to 180°F 1000 psia to 500 psia 50 to 170°F Less than 500 psia 80 to 160°F 48

ST. LUCIE PLANT OPS-539 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT POLICY Rev. 1 Date 06/02/09 RCS COOLDOWN GUIDANCE Page lof2 THIS POLICY HAS BEEN COMPLETELY REWRITTEN The purpose of this guidance is to precisely control the plant during RCS cooldowns.

RCPs in The limit, at which the RCS is cooled, is determined by the plant configuration (e.g.,

of SGs available status of subcoollng, etc). The method of cooldown will operation, number ADVs, and Safety Injection be determined by the availability of condenser vacuum, SBCS, flow rate. When cooling down the RCS:

The US will:

1. Direct the RCO to commence a cooldown of the RCS using ADVs or S8CS.

2. Give the RCO a limit (e.g., Do not exceed 100°F in any one hour period).

The RCO will:

1. Document RCS T-cold (the starting point will always be 532°F post trip). Document and report RCS T-cold and cooldown rate to the US every 10 minutes.

2. Commence a cooldown of the RCS. Ensure that the limits of Figure 1A or 1 B are being restored or maintained.

3. Using SBCS for recovery of subcooling or during a Steam Generator Tube Rupture cooldown to T-hot less than 510°F:

a. Place the SBCS in manual operation.

b, Fully open PCV-8801. If PCV-8801 is unavailable, use the next available SBCS valve.

4. Using ADVs for recovery of subcooling or during a Steam Generator Tube Rupture cooldown to 510°F:

a. Place an ADV on each Steam Generator in service, preferably in Auto-Manual (if available) or Manual-Manual.

b. For Unit 1, open the ADV on each Steam Generator to 50% open.

c. For Unit 2, fully open one ADV on each Steam Generator.

49

lJCL ST. LUCIE PLANT Qp539 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT POLICY Rev, 1 Date 06/02/09 RCS COOLDOWN GUIDANCE oPE4flO)SDEARThENT Page 2 of 2 the

5. Once subcooling is restored or the cooldown limit Is being approached, adjust the cooldown limit-will not be exceed ed.

position of the ADVs or SBCS to ensure that cool down W0°F in a few minutes and then stop the cool The objective here is not to be down for the remainder of the hour. After the Initial opening, ADVs or SBCS should adjusted to achieve a rate of 100°F/hour, based on each 10 minute plot. Continued lowering of steam flow may be necessary if ECCS flow is present. If after the first 10 minutes the rate is still >100°F/hour, then adjust ADVs or SBCS to 75% open.

to 50%

If after the next 10 mInute plot it is still >100°F/hour, then adjust ADVs or SBCS open and so on until a balance is achieved between steami ng and ECCS flow.

If ECCS flow alone in contributing to RCS cool down at >100°F/hour, then steaming should be secured.

adjust

6. Once 5 10°F T-hot is reached for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture cooldown, of ADVs or SBCS to ensure that the cooldown limit will not be exceed ed.

the position Demand has terminated, The RCS temperature will be stabilized when the Excessive Steam or the Steam Genera tor has blown dry.

The US will:

RCS T-cold.

Direct the RCO to stabilize RCS temperature using ADVs at the lowest The RCO will:

wasnt performed Determine the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS T-cold (If this first then the saturat ion pressu re will be prior to dry-out, the ADV[s] will be opened determined).

a. For Unit 1: open the ADV on the non-faulted Steam Generator to 100% open, in manual, then adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS T-cold and place it in auto.

b. For Unit 2: open one ADVs on the non-faulted Steam Generator tolOO% open, in manual, then adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS T-cold and place it in auto. Open the second ADV on the non-faulted Steam Generator to 100% open, In manual, then adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS T-cold and place it In auto.

Approved: (David Lanyi Signature on File)

Assistant Operations Manager St. Lucie Plant so

IRE VISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 121 of 156 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1) 1300- .. . . _.,.... ....

I .-=-.-

IVV This curve represents minimum expected I I SI Flow. It measured flow is less than this!

1100 . - .. I figure, Then SI System lineup should be -

R . jivorified . -::;_

1000 ..

F 900 . .

-.- I V.:., V -

s0Q 700 . ..

S eooL.

.i--.--....i 1 Full Train

.. L._ ._:

4-V 2 Full Trains in Operation I 4, I 300 .

200 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 TOTAL SAFETY INJECTION FLOW(gpm) cplopsJ2.Eop.gRcR:

51

E VISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE 36A APPENDICES / FIGURES I TABLES / DATA 62 of 156 PROCEI)URE NO SHEETS 2EOP99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX J RESTORATION OF COW AND CBO TO THE RCPs (Page 1 of 2) 0 1. ENSURE Instrument Air to Containment is available by PLACING HCV-18-1 to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW N header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

• HCV14-9 (HCV-14-1Q) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open.

• When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW N header valves, until SIAS is reset.

0 2. If SIAS has closed the N Header valves,

] RESTORE flow from EITHER A or B CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

• HCV-14-BA N Hdr Isol Discharge

• HCV-149 N Hdr Isol Suction OR

• HCV-14-86 N Hdr Isol Discharge

• HCV-14-1O N Hdr lsol Suction 0 3. ALIGN CCW to I from the RCPs by OPENING ALL of the following valves:

0 HCV-1 4-1, CCW To RC PUMP O HCV-1 4-2, CCW From RC PUMP O HCV-1 4..7, CCW To RC PUMP O HCV-14-6, CCW From RC PUMP O 4. j CIAS has isolated controlled bleedoff flow to the VCT, Itin OPEN V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

52

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE.

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES / DATA 63 of 156 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2-EOP99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX J RESTORATION OF CCW AND CBO TO THE RCPs (Page 2 of 2)

CAUTION RCP Seal Cooler isolation valves automatically Close on high Seal Cooler outlet temperature of 200°F. Maintaining the control switch in the OPEN position will override this function. CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage should conditions warrant the valve(s) to be maintained in the open position. Consideration should be given to returning the control switch(es) to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.

0 5. ENSURE ALL RCP Seal Cooler Isolation valves are OPEN:

0 HCV-1411-A1, CCW From 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler O HCV-14-1 1-A2, CCW From 2A2 RCP Seal Cooler O HCV14-11B1, CCW From 281 RCP Seal Cooler O HCV-1 4-11 -B2, CCW From 282 RCP Seal Cooler o 6. VERIFY RCP CCW related alarms are CLEAR or have been evaluated and dlspositioned.

END OF APPENDIX J 53

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES / TABLES I DATA 3 of 156 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train (q) B Train ()

D 1. If a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

O A. ENSURE 2A6 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

O B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW N header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE HCV-14-9 (HCV.14-1O) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW N header valves, until SIAS is reset 0 2. If SIAS has closed the N Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER A or 8 CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

• HCV-14-8A

• HCV-14-9 OR

• HCV-14-86

• HCV-14-1O 54

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE:

36A APPENDICES / FIGURES I TABLES / DATA of 156 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)

D 3. !i CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE / OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

D 4. DIRECT Chemistry to perform S/G samples for activity and boron.

[3 5. If S/Gs cannot be sampled,

]jjjj DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A 55

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 17 of 19 Event

Description:

Isolate 2B SIG Time I Position I Acolicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Booth Operator Response: When directed, initiate Isolate 2BA SG per App R.

Control Room Indications Available:

SRO Directs isolation of 2B SIG, 2-EOP-99 Appendix R section 2. (step 11 Critical stops 2B AFW pump)(attached page 60)

Step BOP Performs Appendix R section 2 to isolate the 2B S/G when directed.

Critical (attached pages 57-58) (attached page 60)

Step Calls NPO to perform Appendix R section 2 step 17 Waits until report back from NPQ that step 17 is complete before reporting that Appendix R is complete Scenario Termination Cue:

. 2B SIG is isolated lAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R

. RCS temperature and pressure are stabilized and are under control.

Next scenario page = 57 56

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36 APPENDICES / FIGURES I TABLES / DATA 93 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 4 of 6)

Section 2: 2B Steam Generator Isolation CAUTION If S/G isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

C 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1B, Main Steam Header B Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.

C 2. If HCV-08-1 B did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

C 3. ENSURE MV-08-1 B, MSIV Header B Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.

C 4. ENSURE HCV-09-2A, Main Feedwater Header B Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

C 5. ENSURE HCV-09-2B, Main Feedwater Header B Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

C 6. BOTH HCV-09-2A HCV-09-2B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 2B, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

C A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

C MV-09-6, Stm Gen 2B Reg Block Valve C LCV-9006, 28 15% Bypass C MV-09-4, 2B 100% Bypass C B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

C 7. ENSURE FCV-23-5, 2B SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

57

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 94 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 5 of 6)

Section 2: 2B Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

8. ENSURE FCV-23-6, 28 SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

9. ENSURE MV-08-19B, 2B S/G Atmos Dump VIv, is CLOSED.

D 1O.CLOSE MV-08-17, 28 S/G ADV Isol.

11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2B, in STOP.

D 12.ENSURE MV-09-1O, Pump 2B Disch to SG 28 Valve, is CLOSED.

D 13.ENSURE MV-09-12, Pump 2C to SG 2B, is CLOSED.

C 14.PLACE MV-08-12, SG 2B Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

O 15.ENSURE MV-08-18B, 2B SIG Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

0 16.CLOSE MV-08-16, 28 SIG ADV Isol.

0 17.PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

0 A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09158, 2C AFW Pump to 2B SIG Isolation.

0 B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09136, 28 AFW Pump to 28 SIG Isolation.

0 C. CLOSE SE-08-1, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.

O D. j SE-08-1, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08883, SE-08-1 Inlet Isolation.

(continued on next page) 58

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: A Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

2A Heater Drain Pump has a severe shaft seal leak and must be removed from service, Perform down power to remove 2A Heater Drain Pump from service.

Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

2A AFW release ECO when work is complete.

Tech Spec Action Statement:

None.

OPS 513s:

None Locked in Annunciators:

G-28 - 2A AFW Pump OVRLD/Trip M-24 2C Charging Pump Suct Press Low/CVRLD/Trip Current Status:

Unit 2 is at 100% power, steady state, MOL Equipment Problems:

2C Charging Pump QOS for repack.

2A AFW Pump OCS to repair oil leak. (is expected to be back in service within one hour) 59

Critical Task Evaluation Sheet Critical Task Acceptance Criteria Close 2B MSIV. Places the 28 MSIV control switch in the CLOSE position. Verifies red light OFF & green light ON. This action is critical to prevent continued steaming of a faulted S/G and resultant excessive cooldown. The MSIV must be closed prior to completion of step 4.0.7.A of 2-EOP-05 to comDlete the task successfully.

Stop one RCP when Td < 500°F If T,,ld approaches 500°F and SIAS has not caused the crew to already secure one RCP in each loop, stopping one pump becomes a critical task due core uplift concerns. The pump must be stopped before going below 500°F to successfully complete the task.

Terminate AFW flow to 25 SIG. Places the 2B AFW pump control switch to the STOP (Isolate 28 SIG) position. Verifies red light OFF & green light ON. This task is critical in order to stop feeding a faulted SIG and thus minimizes cooldown. Must be performed at least by the completion of Appendix R to successfully complete the task.

60

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: HLC-19 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

GOP:

Initial Conditions: lC-14, 30% power, MOL. 6 gpm dilution to compensate for Xenon. 26 Main Feedwater pump is out of service to replace the oil cooler. 2C Charging pump is out of service for repack.

Turnover: Crew is to perform an up power to 45% power. 2B Main Feedwater pump is out of service to replace the oil cooler. Not expected back this shift. 2C Charging pump is out of service for repack. Chemistry limits have been cleared to perform an up power within the capacity of the operating Main Feedwater pump.

Critical Tasks:

• Close 2A Diesel output breaker

• Crosstie 2A AFW pump to feed 26 SG Event Ma If. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R I RO & Power increase to approximately 45%.

SRO NIBOP 2 1 C I RO Loss of 2B Component Cooling Water Pump T.S. SRO 3 2 I I RO Selected Pressurizer Level Channel LT 111 OX fails high 4 3 T.S. SRO PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor fails high 5 4 I I BOP Reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-9013D, T.S. SRO LT-9005 and LT-901 2 to fail high.

1 6 5 M I All LOOP I Loss of Feedwater 7 6 C / BOP 2B Diesel does not start. 2A Diesel output breaker does not close 8 7 Cl BOP 2C AFW pump trips and MV-09-9 2A AFW pump to 2A SG fails to open 9 8 C / BOP Crosstie 2A AFW pump to feed 2B Steam Generator (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 St. Lucie The unit will be turned over to the crew at 30% power. The 2B Main Feedwater Pump is out of service to replace the oil cooler. The crew will increase power to approximately 45%.

A loss of the 2B Component Cooling water pump will require the crew to swap the AB electrical to the B side to take T.S. credit for the 2C Component Cooling water pump.

Selected Pressurizer Level LT 111 OX fails high requiring the RO to swap level channels.

Acoustic monitor for PORV 1474 will annunciate and fail high. The crew will determine this failure is only instrument failure and not a leaking PORV. The SRO is to evaluate T.S. for accident monitoring.

The reference leg fails on 2A Steam Generator causing LT-9013D, LT-9005 and LT-9012 to fail high.

The crew will need to take manual control of 2A FRV (FCV-901 1) to restore level to normal in 2A S/G A LOOP combined with a loss of feedwater will occur. The 2B Diesel will not start and the 2A Diesel output breaker will not close. The output breaker can be closed from the RTGB. The 2C AFW pump will trip on AFAS or manual start and cannot be restarted. The 2A AFW pump MV-O9-9, 2A AFW pump to 2A SG, will not open. The crew is expected to crosstie the 2A AFW pump to feed the 2B 5G.

The Crew will enter 2-EOP-09. LOOP, LOFC prior to entering 2-EOP-O6 due to AFAS-2 actuating approximately 15 minutes after the trip and AFAS-1 actuating approximately 20 minutes after the trip.

2-EOP-06 Total Loss of Feedwater may not be entered if feed is restored to the 26 SIG in EOP-09.

The scenario can be terminated when the crew has closed the 2A Diesel output breaker and the 2B SG is being fed by the 2A AFW pump.

Procedures Used

• 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1

• 2-GOP-i 01, Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes

• 2-GOP-502, Data Sheets Required for Heatup

• 2-0310030, Component Cooling Water Off- Normal Operation

• 2-NOP-52.O2 Alignment Of 2AB Buses And Components

• 2-0120035, Pressurizer Pressure and Level

• 2-0700030, Main Feedwater

• 2-EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions

• 2-EOP-06, Total Loss of Feedwater

• 2-ONP-09.O2, Auxiliary Feedwater

• 2-EOP-09, LOOP Technical Specifications Entered

• 3.7.3 Component Cooling Water System

• 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # I Page 3 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

Power increase to approximately 45%.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate IC #14 30% power. Xenon building in, 6 gpm dilution rate. MOL. 2C Charging Pump OOS for repack. 2B MFW Pump OOS to repair oil cooler.

Indications NOTE: Inform the crew 2-GOP-201 step 6.1.27 has been completed and power ascension is approved.

SRO Direct power increase lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.128 (attached page 4)

Directs Placing MSRs in service 300 MW per 2-GOP-502, Data Sheets Required For Heatup, Appendix AA (attached page 5-8) as directed.

Directs Control of Rx power and ASI lAW 2-GOP-lOl Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached, page 9-10)

Commences dilution for power increase lAW 2-NOP-02.24 step 6.5 RO (attached page 11-13)

Withdraws CEAs to control Rx power and ASI lAW 2-GOP-i 01 Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached page 9-10)

. CEA Withdrawal, select MS on the CEDMCS Control Switch

. Move the IN/HOLD/OUT Switch to the OUT direction Programs DEH for power increase at a rate lAW 2-GOP-lOl step 6.1.2.D Category 4. (attached page 9-10)

. Set reference by ensuring REF selected and then depress BOP desired MW endpoint, select ENTER

. Depress LOAD RATE type in desired load rate and select ENTER

. Depress GO pushbutton Places MSRs in service 300 MW per 2-GOP-502, Data Sheets Required For Heatup, Appendix AA as directed. (attached page 5-8)

Next scenario page =14 3

JPROCEOURE TITI,E. 1 P AGE.

L* VISION NO 60 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 51 of 69 OURE NO 2-GOP-201 ST. LLJCIE UNIT 2 6.125 (continued) INITIAL

6. !f Exhaust Hood temperatures are less than 150°F (TR..22.6B points 3, 7, 6 arid 10), Then:

A. CLOSE V12396, 2A LP Turb Spray Hdr TCV-22-61A Bypass.

B, CLOSE V12403, 2B LP Turb Spray Hdr TCV-22-618 Bypass.

6.126 When Turbine load is approximately 250 MW, Ijj VERIFY that secondary chemistry values are less than the minor inleakage limits of ONOP 2-0610030, Secondary Chemistry Off Normal.

CHEM pI Based on JPN Engineering Evaluation, the RE Supervisor, may recommend to Operations that any or all of the 30% Reactor Power level surveillance may be performed at 45% following a power ascension that was NOT as a result of a refueling outage.

6.127 3j If required, prior to Reactor Power reaching 30% as indicated on the highest reading instrument, PERFORM the following:

1. STOP the power ascension.

2. NOTIFY SCE or l&C to perform OCS Steam Generator Feedwater Discharge Coefficients Verification per 2-NOP-102.0i.

SCE / l&C

3. PERFORM 2.OSP-69.01 Nuclear! Delta T Power Calibration.

4, ENSURE scheduled incore surveillance have been performed,

5. ENSURE the lncore Detection System Is OPERABLE in accordance with OSP-64.01, Reactor Engineering Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations.

QI The power ascension may continue while the MSRs are being placed in service.

6.126 jyjj Turbine load Is approximately 300 MW, flj PERFORM Appendix AA of 2*QOP-502, Placing MSRs In Service.

4

PROCEOUR TITt.E PAGE REVISION NO 51A DATA SHEETS REQUIRED FOR HEATUP 124 of 127 PROCEDURE NO 2.GOP-502 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX AA PLACING MSR iN SERVICE (Page 1 of 4)

INITIAL Date

1. DEPRESS the Reset pushbutton on the Reheater Control System.

2. VERIFY locally the MSR TCVs are positioned as follows:

COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POSITION INITIAL TCV.O8.i MS to 2A MSR CLOSED TCV*O67 MS to 2A MSR CLOSED CV-OB-3 MS to 28 MSR CLOSED TCV-08-9 MS to 2B MSR CLOSED TCV-OB-4 MS to 2C MSR CLOSED TCV.O8-1O MS to 2C MSR CLOSED TCV.082 MS to 2D MSR CLOSED TCVO88 MS to 20 MSR CLOSED I 2Ig A Large steam demand may occur while opening the MSR Block Valves The MSR Block Valves should be opened one at a tsme, allowing time for the RCS to stabilize.

3, POSITION the MSR Block Valves as follows:

EMPONENT DESCRIPTION POSITION INITIA[1 FV-O8 -4 2A Block TCV OPEN MV-O86 2D Block TCV OPEN f MV-08.8 28 Block TCV OPEN F MV-O81O 2C Block TCV OPEN 5

IE VISION NO IPROCEOJR TIRE IPAOE 51A DATA SHEETS REQUIRED FOR HEATUP I 125 of 127 PROCEOURE NO 2-GOP.502 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I APPENDIX AA RACING MSRs IN SERVICE (Page 2 of 4)

INITIAL 2IE Quench water to the MSRs will be supplied immediately upon opening the MSR Block Valves.

4. the MSR Block Valves are open, Th THROTTLE OPEN the following components to adjust MSR subcooling flow to app 5 to 7 gpm on applicable indicator:

COMPONENT DESCRIPTION INDICATOR INITIAL V09322 SE-09.1A 2A, MSR Subcooling FI.09-4A = 5 Dwnstrm lsol to 7 gpm V09319 SE-09-1B 28 MSR. Subcooling Fl-09-4B 5 Dwnstrm Isot to 7 gpm V09326 SE.09.1C 2C MSR, Subcooling Fl-09-4C 5 Dwnstrm_Isol to_7_gpm V09325 SE-09-ID 2D MSR, Subcooling Fl-09-4D = S j_ Dwnstrm_Isol to_7_gpm When the MSR TCVs have started the warm up period by either automatic or manual control, the Turbine startup should continue.

If the wrong pushbutton is depressed, the controller can be reset by depressing the Reset pushbutton Ramp starts a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> timed opening of TCV06-7. 6, 9 and 10 (small TCVs), This is followed by a 30 minute time delay and then a 10 minute timed opening of TCV-08-1, 2, 3 and 4 (large TCVs). Total time is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 40 minutes until TCV-08-1, 2, 3 and 4 indicate open.

5.  ! automatic startup is desired, DEPRESS the Ramp pushbutton.

6

REVISONNO IPROC0VRTITL IPAGE 5iA DATASHEETS REQUIRED FOR HEATUP II 12601127 PROCEQVRE NO 2.GOP*502 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX AA PLACING MSRs IN SERVICE (Page 3 of 4)

INITIAL CAUTiON If the manual valve positioner is NOT on zero before pushing the Manual Valve Position pushbutton, the TCVs will OPEN to a position relative to the manual valve positioner setpoint and possibly damage the MSRs from the resultant thermal stresses.

If manual startup is desired, ]Jj PERFORM the following:

A. ENSURE the manual valve positioner is on zero.

B. DEPRESS the Manual Valve Position pushbutton.

C. Slowly OPEN the TCVs by rotating the manual valve positioner.

Manual opening of the MSR TCVs should take approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

7. flt the MSR TCVs are OPEN, Th PERFORM the following:

A. POSITION the small TCV isolation valves as follows.

COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POSITION INITIAL V08381 TCV*O6-7 Isol -

CLOSED V08370 TCV-O67 Isol CLOSED V08378 TCV-08.8 Dwnstm Isol CLOSED V08382 TCV.08.B Upstrm lsol CLOSED V08383 TCV-0B-9 Isol CLOSED V08372 TCVO8.9 Isol CLOSED V08375 TCV.08.1O Isol CLOSED V08384 TCVO6.iO lsol CLOSED B. ALIGN the MSR vents to the 5A and 58 Feedwater Heaters as follows

( COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POSITION INITIAL Vi 1446 2A MSR to Extr Stm Isol OPEN VI 1451 28 MSR To Extr Stm Isol OPEW Viii 17 2C MSR To Extr Stm Isol OPEN Viii 22 20_MSR_To_Extr_Stm_Isol OPEN 7

REVISION NO PROCEDURE IITLE PAO 51A DATA SHEETS REQUIRED FOR HEATUP 127 of 127 PROCEDURE NO 2-GOP-502 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX AA PLACING MSR; IN SERVICE (Page 4 01 4)

7. (continued) INITIAL C. ALIGN the MSR vents to the Condenser as follows:

COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POSITION INITIAL 1 Vi 1508 2B Cndsr Vent From 2A MSR Isol CLOSED Vi 1507 2B Cndsr Vent From 28 MSR Isol CLOSED V11520 28 Cndsr Vent From 2C MSR lsI CLOSED Vi 1227 2A Cndsr From 2D MSR Tube CLOSED

. Bundle Venl IsoI D, ALIGN the MSR Warm Up Valves as follows I COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POSITION INITIAL MV-08-5 Warmup 2A MSR CLOSED MV-08.7 Warmup 2D MSR CLOSED MV-08-9 Warmup 28 MSR CLOSED MV-081i Warmup2CMSR CLOSED RevIewed by Date 1 /

SRO END OF APPENDIX AA 8

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TIT1E PAGE 95 .j REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY 6 of 15 PROCOI.)RE NO STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 2-GOP-lOl ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6,0 INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Power Level Escalations NOTE CEAs should be above the Long-term Steady State Insertion Limit (102 inches withdrawn on Group 5) before reaching 2O% core power and at a position to begin controlling ASI at the ESI between 20% and 50°/a power Refer to NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for further guidance.

1. As Main Generator loading commences, MAINTAIN T-avg at T.ref by:

A. CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

AND f OR

5. Boron concentration changes in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

2. At or above 50% power:

A. All planned reactivity additions should be made by boration or dilution in accordance with 2-NOP-02 24, Boron Concentration Control.

8. USE CEAs for ASI control, CONSIDER the reactivity effect of CEAs when adjusting ASI.

C. REFER to NOP-100,02, Axial Shape Index Control, for specific instructions regarding ASI control during power escalations.

0. When raising Reactor power, all power escalation rates should be within the following fuel preconditioning guidelines:

Max Equivalent Turbine egory Max Core Power Escalation Rate Generator Load Rate 1 3%/HR at or above 15% Power .42 MW/MIN 2 3%/HR above 5O% Power .42 MWIMIN I 20%IHR above 50% Power 2.80 MW/MIN 4 30%/HR above 50% Power 4.2 MWIMIN 9

PROCEQURE 1lftC PAGE kfI51ON NO 98 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY 7 °1 1 PROCEQURE NO STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 2.GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.1 Power Level Escalations (continued)

2. 0. (continued) rTo determine the correct category brtLQI a power escalation, Appendix B, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines Worksheet, may be used. Contact Reactor Engineering if further assistance is required.

Category Definitions:

1, Category 1:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been previously sustained in this core cycle for at least 72 continuous hours.

2. Category 2:

a. INCREASE in power following 30 continuous days or more at a power level less than 70% of rated thermal power OR

b. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been maintained for more than 3 continuous hours during the past 60 days.

3. Category 3:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been maintained for 3 continuous hours or more during the past 8 days.

4. Category 4:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has been maintained for 3 continuous hours or more during the past 8 days.

3, II available, fl ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating.

lb necessary, START an additional Charging Pump in accordance with 2-NOP.02.02, Charging and Letdown.

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation in accordance with Appendix A, Pressurizer Recirculatiori Guidelines.

5. CONTINUE 10 toad the Main Generator in accordance with 2GOP201, Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1.

END OF SECTION 6.1 10

PROCEOURE TITI.E PAGE EVISION NO 24A BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 19 of 75 PROCEDURE NO 2.NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205 PNL Ne. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placard.

• The Operations Supervisor SHALL be notified and a CR submitted of any unexplained or unplanned Reactivity change in accordance with OPS Policy 534 (i e., >.5 deg Tcold change or >.5% power change).

• If a Reactivity management issue occurs, refer to procedure ADM-09.11, Reactivity Management.

• If constant dilution is desired then ensure flow on FIC-2210X is observable Engineering Assessment of FIC-22 lox PMW Flow, shows that there could be an error up to -t 0.5 gpm, and the recommended minimum gpm rate is 2 flow

1. 0 0 0 C ENSURE Section 3.0, Prerequisites is completed at least once per shift

2. C C C 0 ENSURE Section 40, Precautions I Limitations, has been reviewed at least once per shift.

3. CC00 ¶ ENSURE calorimetric power is less than 100.00% prior to any dilutions by obtaining a DCS calorimetric power.

4. C C C 0 DETERMINE the desired volume of primary water to be added

5. 0 C C C PLACE the Makeup Mode Selector switch in MANUAL.

6. C C C C ENSURE FIC-22 lOX, PMW Flow, is in MANUAL and REDUCE the controller output to ZERO

7. C 0 C 0 ENSURE FIC-2210Y, Boric Acid Flow is in MANUAL and REDUCE the controller output to ZERO.

8. C C C C ENSURE either Primary Makeup Water Pump is running.

9. C C 0 0 PLACE FCV.22 lOX, Primary Makeup Water Control Switch in Auto

10. 0 C C C 11 diluting lo the VCT, Ib.i OPEN V-2512, Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv.

11. 0 C C 0 j diluting to the Charging Pump suction, Then OPEN V-2525, Boron Load Control Valve.

11

VISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE 24A BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 20 of 75 PROCEDURE NO 2.NOP-02,24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6,5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution (continued)

F CAUTION To preclude lifting the VCT relief valve while using V.2525, do NOT allow PMW flowrate to exceed the running Charging pump(s) capacity.

12. C C C C ADJUST FIC-22 lOX PMW Flow in AUTO or MANUAL to desired flowrate (and if using V.2525 do NOT exceed the flowrate for the number of running Charging Pumps).

13. C C 0 0 MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent, as needed.

14. C C C C jj necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, I!n DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position:

A. CC CC ENSURE V2500 VCT Divert Valve indicates OPEN B. CCC C When the desired VCT level is reached, PLACE V2500 in AUTO.

C. C CC C ENSURE V2500 indicates CLOSED.

15. C U C C S!fl the desired amount of primary water has been added, It&n CLOSE FCV.2210X, Primary Makeup Water.

16. C C C C jjV.2512 Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv was opened, Then PLACE V.2512 in CLOSE ENSURE it indicates CLOSED

17. C C C C If V-2525 Boron Load Control Valve was opened, Then PLACE V.2525 in CLOSE ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

1$. C C C C ENSURE FIC-22 lOX. PMW Flow controller is in MANUAL and RECUCE output to MINIMUM

19. C C C C MONITOR for any abnormal change in T ,.

1

20. C C0 C § RECORD on Data Sheet 1, Boration / Dilution Log, the number of gallons of Primary Makeup Water added as indicated on FQI-22 lOX, PMW Flow Totalizer.

21. 0 0 0 C If additional dilutions are desired, or if the expected changes to Tav, or Boron concentration are NOT achieved, Then REPEAT Steps 6 5 1 through 6.5 20 12

REVISION NO PKOItI.)UNt iIIL 1

24A BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL PROCEQIJRE NO 2.NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution (continued)

22. D Q Q If it is desired to restore the Boron Concentration Control system to the Automatic Mode of Operation, ]fl REFER to Section 6.1 Aligning for Automatic VCT Makeup.

23. After review by the Unit Supervisor is complete, this document may be discarded.

END OF SECTION 6.5 13

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 4 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

Loss of 2B Component Cooling Water Pump Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, trigger Loss of 2B CCW pump.

Trigger AB Battery Charger when requested by Control Room.

SNPO reports 2B CCW motor outboard bearing is very hot and discolored.

Indications Available: Increasing amps on 2B CCW pump.

Alarms: S-2: 2B CCW Hdr Flow High/Low S-32: 2B CCW PUMP OVRLDI TRIP, alarms and will clear after pump trip.

S-26: 2C CCW PUMP HDR VALVESIAB BUS MISALIGNMENT, while aligning 2C pump.

S-15: Fuel Pool HX CCW Flow High/Low T-4(T-5,T-6, U-I): CNTMT Fan CLR HVS-IA (18, IC, ID) CCW Flow Low SROIROI Recognize loss of 28 CCW pump.

TS Enters T.S. 3.7.3. (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action to restore 2 CCW pumps, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to ensure valve lineup commensurate with electrical lineup) (Attached SRO page 18)

NOTE: SRO May elect to stop the power increase (go to hold on the turbine).

Enters 2-031 0030, Component Cooling Water Off-Normal Operation (attached pages 15-16), and directs lineup of 2C CCW pump to replace 2B CCW pump per step 6.2.3.B 1 & 2 Directs swapping of 2AB bus to the B side per step 6.2.3.8.4 thru 2-NOP-52.02, Alignment Of 2AB Buses And Components, step 4.1.4 A thru C (attached page 17)

Directs starting the 2C CCW pump per step 6.2.3.B.5 Directs placing 28 CCW pump to Pull To Lock positions per step 6.2.3.8.7 Next scenario page = 19 14

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE.

37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER-f 23 PROCEDURE ND OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 2-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 B.2 Subsequent Action (continued)

3. A. (continued)

CAUTION If 2A8 AC and DC Busses are not all completely powered from the A side, Ib do NOT fake Technical Specification Credit for the 2C CCW pump until alignment has been completed.

6. VERIFY the pressures and flows return to normal.

7. PLACE the 2A CCW pump control switch to the PULL TO LOCK position.

8. If the 460V Load Center 2A0 and DC bus 2A6 are NOT completely aligned to the A side, ]j3 REALIGN the 480V Load Center 2AB and DC bus 2AB to the A side per 2-NOP*52.02, Alignment of 2AB Busses and Components.

B. Loss of the 2B CCW Pump.

1. ENSURE Closed:

MV.14-1, 2C CCW Pump Discharge to A Header AND MV-14-3, 2C CCW Pump Suction from A Header

2. ENSURE Open:

MV-14-2, 2C CCW Pump Discharge to B Header AND MV-14.4, 2C CCW Pump Suction from B Header j SDC is in service and CCW is completely lost to an SDC Heat Exchanger, jj SOC flow must be terminated to the affected heat exchanger prior to restoring CCW flow. REFER to ONOP 2-0440030, Shutdown Cooling Off-Normal.

4. ¶ I! the 2C CCW Pump is NOT electrically aligned to the B Electrical Bus AND the Unit is in Modes 1-4, Then REALIGN the 2AB 4.16KV Bus to the B Side per 2-NOP.52.02 PR1OR 10 starting the 2C CCW Pump on the 2B COW Header.

15

REVISION NO PROcOuRE riT PAcE.

37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER 8 12 PROCL)URE NO OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 2-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 Subsequent Action (continued)

3. B. (continued)

5. START the 2C CCW Pump.

QAVTION 2A8 AC and DC Busses are not all completely powered from the B side, In do NOT take Technical Specification Credit for the 2C CCW pump until ali9nment has been complete.

6. VERIFY the pressures and flows return to normal.

7. PLACE the 28 CCW pump control switch in the PULL TO LOCK position.

3. b It the 480V Load Center 2AB and DC bus 2A8 are NOT completely aligned to the B side, fl! REALIGN the 480V Load Center 2A8 and DC bus 2A6 to the 8 side per 2-NOP-52.02, Alignment of 2A8 Busses and Components.

C. Loss of two (2) CCW Pumps CAUTION REFER to off-normal operating procedure 2-ONP-25.01, Loss of RCB Cooling Fans, br appropriate direction

• § Sufficient Containment Fan Coolers (HVS.1A, HVS-1B, HVS-1C or HVS-1D) are required to be in operation to maintain Containment air temperature less than or equal to 120°F. This is necessary to maintain the reactor vessel support stwcture within design basis Operator action is required within 45 minutes, to restore air temperature to less than or equal to 120°F or initiate reactor trip cooldown to at least Hot Shutdown.

1. jf the health and safety of the public is in jeopardy, Ii&i ATTEMPT ONLY ONE restart.

16

HvS0i NO PROCOURE TFII.E 12 c)EDUfl NO J ALIGNMENT OF 2AB BUSES AND COMPONENTS 12 of 37 2.NOP52 02 ST LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of 2A8 Buses and Components from A Side to B Side (continued) 2Ig Whde performing Section 4 1 Step 4, the following annunciators will be received

, B-48. 4 16KV SWGR 480V LC/MCC 2A3 UV (RTGB 201)

• S-26. 2C CCW PUMP HDR VALVES/AB BUS MISALIGNMENT (RTGB 206)

4. ALIGN 4160V Bus 2AB to 8 side, as follows:

A. At RTGB 201. VERIFY the following tie breakers are OPEN:

• Bkr 1-20501, lAB 4 16KV BUS SBO TIE

• Bkr 2-20501, 2AB 4 16KV BUS SBO TIE B. VERIFY the following pump control switches are in PULL-TO-LOCK:

• Component Cooling Water Pump 2C (RTGB 206)

• Intake Cooling Water Pump 2C (RTGB 202)

C. At RTGB 201, PERFORM the following:

(1) OPEN Bkr 2.20505, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB!2A3.

(2) OPEN Bkr 2-20208, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2A3/2A8.

() CLOSE Skr 2-20409, 4 16KV BUS TIE 2S312AB (4) CLOSE Bkr 2-20504, 4 16KV BUS TIE 2AB/2B3.

5. ALIGN 480V Load Center 2A8 to B side, as follows A. REFER TO Technical Specificalions 33 3 1 lot the PIanI Vent Stack Radialion Monitor B, IF Charging Pump 2C is running. THEN ALIGN charging pumps per 2-NOP-02 02, Charging and Letdown, to prepare for the loss of Charging Pump 2C 17

PLANT SYSTEMS 314.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3 At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3 At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on an SIAS test signal.

When CCW pump 2C is being used to satisfy the requirements of this specification, the alignment of the discharge valves shall be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Upon receipt of annunciation for improper alignment of the pump 2C motor power in relation to any of its motor-operated discharge valves positions, restore proper system alignment within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-13 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario# 5 Event# 2 Page 5 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

Loss of 2B Component Cooling Water Pump Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Examiners Note: Due to the time needed to swap the 2AB 480V and 2AB DC bus, consider moving on with scenario and initiate Event 3. (Typical time for crews to perform the below is 30-40 minutes)

If time permits directs realignment of 2AB 480VAC Load Center and SRQ DC bus 2AB to B side per 2-NOP-52.02, alignment of 2A8 Busses and Components, steps 4.1.1 thru 4.1.3, 4.1.5, 4.1.6 (attached page 20-30)

Contacts Shift manager to report trip of 2B CCW pump and entry into 2-0310030, Component Cooling Water RO Monitors primary plant and adjusts dilution rate as necessary.

BOP Goes to Hold on turbine if directed.

Lines up 2C CCW pump per step 6.2.3.B 1 & 2 (attached pages 15-16)

Swaps of 2AB bus to the B side as directed per step 6.2.3.B.4 thru 2-NOP-52.02, Alignment Of 2A8 Buses And Components, step 4.1.4 A thru C (attached pages 20-30). This causes annunciators B-48 (4.16KV SWGR 480V LC/MCC 2A8 UV) and 5-16 ( EMERG 125VDC/4.I6KV/480V AB Busses Misaligned) to alarm Starts the 2C CCW pump as directed per step 6.2.3.B.5 Places 2B CCW pump to Pull To Lock position per step 6.2.3.B.7 If directed realign the 2AB 480VAC Load Center and DC bus 2AB to B side as directed per 2-NOP-52.02, alignment of 2AB Busses and Components steps 4.1.1 thru 4.1.3, 4.1.5, 4.1.6 T.S. T.S. 3.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, action 27 Plant Vent SRO on 480 VAC SWGR swap loss of power.(72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action)

Next scenario page 31 19

PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE ALIGNMENT OF 2A8 BUSES AND COMPONENTS 7 of 37 ST LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4.1 Transfer of 2A8 Buses arid Components from A Side to B Side REMOVE the Vital AC SUPS Rectifier from service by performing the following:

A. At 12W DC Bus 2D, ENSURE Bkr 2.61303, PLANT VITAL AC SUPS, is ON B. At 480V MCC 2A8, ENSURE Bkr 2-42434, CONST.

VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER, is ON.

C. At Vital AC SUPS Inverler, PERFORM the following (1) ENSURE the following breakers are ON

• CB1. BATTERY INPUT

• C84. ALTERNATE SOURCE AC INPUT (2) NOTIFY Control Room to expect the receipt of annunciator 8-33. 120 VAC VITALJSECURITY!FIRE INVTR TROUBLE (RTGB 201), alarm.

(3) PLACE CB3, AC INPUT, in OFF.

(4) VERIFY INVERTER SUPPLYING LOAD light remains ON.

(5) VERIFY the following lights are ON:

• INVERTER ON DC BATTERY POWER

• 460 VOLTS AC FAILURE FAN FAILURE D. At 480V MCC 2AB, PLACE Bkr 2-42433, INVERT ER RECTIFIER, ri OFF E. NOTIFY Control Room the Vital AC SUPS rectifier is removed from service F. VERIFY annunciator 8-33, 120 VAC VITALJSECURITY/FIRE INVTR TROUBLE (RTGB 201), alarm received 20

RFSION NO PROCEDURE TITLE -- - - PAQE:

2 ALIGNMENT OF 2A8 BUSES AND COMPONENTS B of 37 4OC)VRC HO 2.NOP52 02 ST LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of 2A8 Buses and Components from A Side to B Side (continued)

2. REMOVE the Fire and Security SUPS Rectifier from sece by performing the following:

A. At 125VDC Bus 20, ENSURE Bkr 2-61305, SECURITY VITAL SUPS, is ON B. At 480V MCC 2C. ENSURE Bkr 2-42506. PS & FD iNVERT, is ON.

C. Al Fire Detection & Station Security Vital AC. SUPS Inverter, PERFORM the following (1) ENSURE the following breakes are ON:

CB1,BATTERYINPUT C84, ALTERNATE SOURCE AC INPUT (2) NOTIFY Control Room to expect the receipt of 8-33, 120 VAC VITAIJSECURITY FIRE INVTR TROUBLE (RTGB 201). alarm (3) PLACE CB 403. AC INPUT, in OFF (4) VERIFY INVERTER SUPPLYING LOAD light remains ON (5) VERIFY the following lights are ON:

• FAN FAILURE

• AC POWER FAILURE

• BATTERY CURRENT

0. At 450V MCC 2AB, PLACE Bkr 2-424 15. INVERTER SEC SUPS RECT., in OFF E. NOTIFY Control Room the Fire and Security SUPS Rectifier is removed from service F. VERIFY annunciator 8-33, 120 VAC VITAUSECURITY FIRE INVTR TROUBLE (RTGB 201), alarm received 21

r4rSoNNo PROCEDVRE TITLE PP.GE I 12 AUGNMENT OF 2AB BUSES AND COMPONENTS 9 of 37 NO 2.NOP52 02 ST UJCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of ZAB Buses and Components from A Side to B Side (continued)

3. TRANSFER DC Bus 2A8 to DC Bus 2B by performing the following:

A, VERIFY Battery Charger 2A and/or 2-M is supplying power to 125V DC Buses 2A and 2M.

B. VERIFY Battery Charger 28 andlor 28B is supplying power to 125V DC Buses 28 and 28B.

C. At 480V MCC 2A8, ENSURE Bkr 2-42413, BATTERY CHARGER 2A8, is positioned to ON.

D. At Battery Charger 2A8, PERFORM the following:

(1) ENSURE the OFF/ON switch is positioned to ON.

(2) ENSURE 2AB BATTERY CHARGER AC INPUT BREAKER is positioned to ON.

CAUTION charger warm up, the lIthe AC input breaker is in OFF then to ensure proper AC input breaker should be positioned to ON at least 15 minutes prior to placing the DC output breaker to ON.

(3) ENSURE 2A8 BATTERY CHARGER DC OUTPUT BREAKER is positioned to ON.

(4) VERIFY DC output voltage is 132 to 137 VDC in the float mode (5) IF DC voltage is outside the 132 to 137 VDC range, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. PLACE 2A8 BATTERY CHARGER DC OUTPUT BREAKER in OFF

b. PLACE 2A8 BATTERY CHARGER AC INPUT BREAKER in OFF

c. NOTIFY the US/N WE (6) IF the DC output voltage is satisfactory, THEN PLACE Battery Charger 2A8 in the equalize mode by turning the equalizer timer to HOLD.

22

PROCEOURE Trli.E PAGE L VUN NO 12 ALIGNMENT OF 2A5 BUSES AND COMPONENTS 10 of 37 fCCI.)VRE NO 2.NOP-52 02 ST LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of ZAB Buses and Components from A Side to B Side (continued)

3. (continued)

The following alarms on RTGB 201 may be received during the performance of Section 4 1 Step 3 E through Section 4.1 Step 3..) due to no charge conditions on the respective side

• A20, 12W DC BATT CHOR 281266 TROUBLE

• ASO, 125V BATT CHGR 2AB TROUBLE

• 620, 12W DC BATT CHGR 2A/2M TROUBLE E. At 125V DC Bus 2A6, PLACE Bkr 2-60326, CKT #26 (Battery Charger 2A8), in ON.

F. IF DC amperage on Battery Charger 2AB does NOT increase as expected, THEN PERFORM the following (1) Immediately PLACE Bkr 2-60326. CKT #26 (Battery Charger 2AB), in OFF (2) CONTACT US/NWE for further instructions.

0. NOTIFY Control Room that Battery Charger 2AB is powering 125V DC Bus 2A6.

NOTE When performing Section 4 1 Step 3.H. the following annunciators will ALARM:

S-iS, EMERO 125VDC14.16KV1480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB 206) 8-60, EMERG 125VDC14.I6KVI48OVAB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTG8 201)

H. At RTGB 201. PERFORM the following:

(1) OPEN Bkr 2-60335. TIE 2ABI2A.

(2) OPEN 81cr 2.60143, TIE 2N2A8.

23

[TsO4 NO PROCEDURE TITLE PAGE:

12 ALIGNMENT OF ZAB BUSES AND COMPONENTS 11 of 37 PROCECJRE NO 2.NOP.52 02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of ZAB Buses and Components from A Sida to B SIde (continued)

3. H. (continued)

(3) CLOSE Bkr 2-60243, TIE 28l2A8.

(4) CLOSE Bkr 2-60333. TIE 2AB/28 I, VERIFY the following annunciators are in AlARM 5-16, EMERG 125VDC/4.16KV/4BOVAB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTG8 206)

B-60, EMERG 125V DCI4,16KV1480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB 201)

J. Al Battery Charger 2A8, TURN the equalizer timer to zero (0).

K, VERIFY Battery Chargers 2B and/or 2-BB are carrying some load L. At 12W DC Bus 2A8, PLACE Bkr 2-60326, CKT 26 (Battery Charger 2AB), in OFF.

M. NOTIFY Control Room that Battery Charger 2A8 is in hot standby.

N. ENSURE the following battery charger trouble alarms are CLEAR by resetting their associated reflash panels, if necessary 8-20. 125V DC BATT CHGR 2N2M TROUBLE (RTGB-201)- Reflash Panel RA-RAB-11/8-20 (RAB/49/RA2/RAJ) and Reflash Panel RA-RAB-26/B-20 (RAB/48/N.RA4/E-RAK)

A-20, 125V DC BATT CHGR 2B/2B6 TROUBLE (RTGB-201) Reflash Panel RA-RAB-10/A-20 (RAB/48/N.RA3/E.RAK) and Reflash Panel RA-RAB-27/A-20 (RAB/48/S-RA3)W-RAK)

A.50, 125V DC BAfl CHOR 2AB TROUBLE (RTG8.201) Reflash Panel RA-RAB-12/A-50 (RA8/45/N-RA2/E.RAL) 24

RE,lSLJN NO 12 J PROCOURE TITLE PAGE ALIGNMENT OF 2AB BUSES AND COMPONENTS 13 ci 37 NOCFOVE NO 2.NOP52 02 ST LUCIE UNIT 2 4,1 Transfer of 2A6 BU5es and Components from A Side to B Side (continued)

5. (continued)

C. IF Control Room NC HVNACC-3C is operating. THEN ALIGN Control Room air conditioning per 2-NOP.25.07, Control Room Ventilation System, to prepare for the loss ot HVNACC-3C T

I Refer to Attachment 2, Expected Alarms When Transferring 460V Load Center

[2A8 Power Source, for alarms received when performing the following step.

0. Al RTGB 201, PERFORM the following:

(1) OPEN 61cr 2-40702, 480V BUS TIE 2A6/2A2.

(2) OPEN Ski 2-40220, 480V BUS TIE 2A2/2AB (3) CLOSE 61cr 2-40504. 460V BUS TIE 282/2A8.

(4) CLOSE Bkr 2-40705, 480V BUS TIE 2AB/2B2.

6. VERIFY the following annunciators are CLEAR B-60. EMERO 125V DCI4 16KV1460V AS BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB 201) 5-16, EMERO 125VDC/4.16KV/4BOVAB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB 206)

Section 4 1, Steps 7 through 19, may be completed in any order

7. ENSURE N-45, WASTE MANAGEMENT LOCAL ALARM (RTGB-205) is CLEAR by locally acknowledging alarms on Waste Management Panel, ii necessary.

8. VERIFY annunciators listed in Attachment 2 are CLEAR

9. RESTORE charging pumps to Ihe desired lineup per 2-NOP-02,02, Charging arid Letdown 25

PROCEDURE TTI.E PAGE; fl vISiON NO 12 ALIGNMENT OF 2A8 IJSES AND COMPONENTS 14 of 37 cEL)uR NO 2.NOP52 02 ST LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of ZAB Buses and Components from A Side to B Side (continued)

10. At RTCB.206, ALIGN 2C CCW Pump to 28 CCW header as follows:

A. CLOSE MV14-1, PUMP 2C DISCH TO HEADER A.

Iv B. CLOSE MV.14-3, HEADER A TO PUMP 2C Iv C. OPEN MV-14.4, HEADER B TO PUMP 2C.

Iv

0. OPEN MV.14.2, PUMP 2C DISCH TO HEADER B, IV E. VERIFY annunciator S-26, 2C CCW PUMP HDR VALVES/A5 BUS MISALIGNMENT, is CLEAR.

F. IF 2C CCW Pump is required to be running, THEN START 2C CCW Pump per 2-NOP14.O2. Component Cooling Waler System Operation.

11. ALIGN 2C ICW Pump to 2B ICW header, as follows:

A. LOCK CLOSED S521 165, 2C ICW PUMP X-TIE DISCH To A TRAIN SQL (INTK/9/N..4/W.C).

Iv B. LOCK OPEN S82121 1, 2C ICW PUMP X-TIE DISCH To B TRAIN ISOL (INTKI9IN-41W.C)

IV C. IF 2C 1GW Pump is required to be running. THEN START 2C 1GW Pump per 2-NOP-21 03. Intake Cooling Water System Operation 26

PROCEDURE TITLE PA,QE Fvs0 NO L 12 PIlCCtiY,JHE NO ALIGNMENT OF ZAB BUSES AND COMPONENTS ST LUCIE UNIT 2 15 of 37 2.NOP52 02 4,1 Transfer of 2A8 Buses and Components from A Side to B Side INmAI.

(continued)

12. ALIGN HVNACC.3C, Control Room Area Supply Air Handling Unit.

CCW supply and return headers to the 28 CCW header as follows:

A. LOCK CLOSED V14510, SUPPLY HDR A TO HVNACC3C CNTL ROOM NC ISOL (RABrTOIS.RA2M-RA)),

lv B. LOCK CLOSED V14516, HVNACC.3C CNTL ROOM NC TO RETURN HDR A ISOL (RAB/70/S.RA2/E.RAJ).

lv C. LOCK OPEN V14506, SUPPLY HOR B TO HVNACC.3C CNTL ROOM NC ISOL (RAB/70/N-RA2A-RAI)

IV 0, LOCK OPEN V14514, HVNACC-3C CNTL RM NC TO RETURN HOR B ISOL (RAB!70/S-RA2IE.RAJ).

IV

13. IF HVNACC-3C is required for operation, THEN START HVNACC-3C per 2.NOP.25.07. Control Room Ventilation System 14, IF the Instrument Air Emergency Cooling System radiator fan and recirculation pump were in service. THEN PERFORM the following:

A. Locally START Recirculation Pump (TGB/241241E-B)

8. Locally START Radiator Fan (T08124124/E-B) 27

PROCEDURE flUE PAGE; 1E vSON NO 12 ALIGNMENT OF 2A8 BUSES AND COMPONENTS 16 of 37 cqcCOuRE NO 2.NOP.52 02 ST. LLICIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of ZAB Buses and Components from A SIde to B Side (continued)

NOTE Verification of proper Plant Vent Stack Radiation Monitor operation includes pump restart when power is restored.

, Tech Spec 3 3 3.1 is applicable 15, VERIFY proper operation of RC26-9O. PLT VENT STACK RAD MONITOR. by performing the following.

A. On Plant Auxiliary Control Board No 2, VERIFY OPER green LED is ON for the following LOW RANGE

• EFF LEVEL B. On PC1 1 Radiation Monitor, VERIFY the following parameters on Grid 4 are GREEN (normal):

AAL621 ME624 C. If indications are NOT normal, PRESS the FLOW pushbutton On RC26-90, PLT VENT STACK RAD MONITOR panel to start sample flow

0. II indications are still NOT normal, CONTACT l&C.

16. IF HVE-37, PASS Room Fan, was running, THEN locally VERIFY restart of the fan

17. VERIFY annunciator N.45, WASTE MANAGEMENT LOCAL ALARM (RTGB 205). is clear

18. RESTORE the Vital AC SUPS Rectifier to service by performing the following A. At 460V MCC 2A8. PLACE Bkr 2-42433, INVERTER RECTIFIER, in ON 28

REVISlO4 NO PROCOJRE fluE 12 ALIGNMENT OF 2AB BUSES AND COMPONENTS 17 of 37 PRO(DURE NO

?NOP.52 02 ST WCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of ZAB Buses and Components from A Side to B Side (continuOd)

18. (continued)

B, At Vital AC SUPS Inverter, PERFORM the following:

(1) VERIFY PRE-CHARGE light is ON.

(2) PLACE C3. AC iNPUT. in ON

() VERIFY INVERTER SUPPLYING LOAD light remains ON (4) VERIFY the following indicating fights are OFF

• INVERTER ON DC BATTERY POWER

• 480 VOLTS AC FAILURE FAN FAILURE (5) MONITOR AC INPUT A C AMPERES meter for an increase indicating the rectifier has picked up the load C, NOTIFY Control Room the Vital AC SUPS rectifier is returned to service

19. RESTORE the Fire and Security SUPS Rectifier to service by performing the following.

A. At 480V MCC 2A5, PLACE Bkr 242415, INVERTER SEC SUPS RECT in ON.

B. Al Fire and Security SUPS Inverler, PERFORM the following:

(1) ENSURE PRE-CHARGE light is ON (2) PLACE CB 403. AC INPUT. breaker in ON (3) VERIFY INVERTER SUPPLYING LOAD is ON 29

PROCEDURE *?IILE PAGE rvsoN NO 12 ALIGNMENT OF 2A8 BUSES AND COMPONENTS 18 of 37 PROCEDURE NO 2NOP52 02 j ST WCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of ZAB Buses and Components from A Side to B Side (continued)

19. B. (continued)

(4) VERIFY the folIowrg indicating lights are off:

AC POWER FAILURE BATTERY CURRENT FAN F AILU RE (5) MONITOR AC INPUT AC AMPERES meter for an increase indicating the rectifier has picked up the load.

C. NOTIFY Control Room the Fire and Security SUPS Rectifier is returned to service.

Zo. VERIFY annunciator 8-33, 120 VAC VITAL/SECURITYIFIRE INVIR TROUBLE, alarm CLEAR (RTOB 201).

21. VERIFY Sewage Lift Station (located in the NE corner of the Turbine Building) is operating properly, as evidenced by the sound of the solenoids energizing and de-energizing 30

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 6 of 21 I 9A Event

Description:

Selected Pressurizer Level Channel LT iii OX fails high Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, trigger LT IIIOX fails high.

Indications Available: Alarms H-17 Pzr Channel X Level HighlLow LA-5 Pzr Channel X Level High Recognizes numerous alarms, Letdown increases to maximum, and SRQ RO diagnoses that Selected Pressurizer Level Channel LT 111OX failed high.

Enters 2-0120035, Pressurizer Pressure And Level. (attached page SRQ 32-34)

Directs verify operable RRS channel selected Enters T.S 3.3.3.6a Accident Monitoring Table 3.3-10.12 Action A (7 1S/ SRQ day action) (Attached pages 35-36)

Directs verifying proper operation of the Letdown system Directs selecting operable PZR Level Channel LT 11IOY.

Contacts Shift manager to report failure of LT Ill OX and entry into 2-0120035 Pressurizer Pressure And Level RO Recognizes that Letdown flow increases to maximum..

Ensures operable channels selected for RRS and PZR level (attached pages 32-34).

Monitors balance of plant and contacts l&C when directed to BOP troubleshoot problem with LT ii lox.

Next scenario page = 37 31

PROCEDURE T1TI.,E PAGE E ViSION NO 26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 9of15 PROCEOURENO 2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCT1ONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. (continued)

G. If (LOOP) Loss of 011 site Power has occurred with diesel generators supplying power pressurizer level is greater than 27°6, Iiii perform the following to regain pressurizer heaters:

1. Manually close the breakers for pressurizer healer on 4160V buses Bkr 2-20204 on 2A3 bus 81cr 2-2040:3 on 283 bus.

2, Manually reset the backup heater breakers 81 and 84 only (200 kw each).

2. ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER LEVEL 2.

CONDITION NOTE Appendix B contains a listing of pressurizer levels which are associated with automatic actions.

A. Verify selected RRS channel is A. If the selected RRS channel operaling properly has failed, fl shift to the operable channel.

1. NAVIGATE to the SBCS inputs screen on either FW FPD and reset the TAVE signal, if required B. Ensure backup charging pump starts B. If automatic actions have NOT and letdown flow is decreasing, or occurred, manually the backup charging pump stops and control charging and letdown letdown flow is increasing, whichever flow as required.

is applicable. (Appendix B contains expected automalic responses 32

E VISION NO IPROCEOURE TITLE PAGE 26 I PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 10o115 PROCEOiRENO 2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

C. Verify level anomaly is NOT caused C. Slow the rate of change of by a large rate of change in T-avg. T-avg or stabilize until level anomaly is controlled.

0. Verify Letdown Isol. Valves. 0. II letdown has isolated, Then V-2515, V-2516, and V.2522 are secure charging and refer to open. 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

E. Verify selected pressurizer level E, I! selected level control valve is control valve (LCV.2110P I NOT operating properly, Then LCV-21 100) is operatng properly, take manual control of level control valve and refer to 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

F. Verify selected letdown pessure F. II selected pressure control conirol valve (PCV-2201P I valve is NOT operating PCV.2201Q) is operaling properly. properly, jJfl take manual control of pressure control valve and refer to 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

33

RE,SON NO PROCEOURE TITLE PAGE 26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 11 of 15 OCEOURENO 2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE With less than 27% level on Channel X, the A pressurizer heater transformer feeder breaker (2-20204) trips and the 8w side 480V power supplies deenergize Wilh less than 27% level on Channel Y, the 8 pressurizer heater transformer feeder breaker (2-20403) trips and the side 480V power supplies deenergize. The backup interlock bypass keyswitch selected to the level position, allows the 480V heater power supplies to be reset.

G. Verify pressurizer level indicating 0. i( pressurizer healers are controllers (selected and non- doenergized or level indicating selected) are operating properly and controller(s) failed. Then power is available to pressurizer perform the following:

heaters.

1. If either level control channel has tailed, Then shift to lhe operable channel and reset heaters as follows:

a. Place the backup interlock bypass keyswitch (RTGB.203) to the LEVEL position (This regains power to the proporlional and backup heater banks controlled by the selected channel

b. Reset pressurizer healer banks as needed.

OR 34

INSTRUMENTATION ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION; a.* With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3,3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b.* With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

c.** With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

d.** With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> if repairs are feasible without shutting down or:

1. Initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory; and

2. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event out lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status, and

3. Restore the Channel to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling.

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

Action statements do not apply to Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System, Containment Sump Water Level (narrow range) and Containment Sump Water Level (wide range) instruments.

Action statements apply only to Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System, Containment Sump Water Level (narrow range) and Containment Sump Water Level (wide range) instruments.

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

- 314 3-41 Amendment No. 4, 45 35

TABLE 3.3-10 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED NUMBER MINIMUM CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS OPERABLE

1. Containment Pressure 2 1

2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature THOt 2 1 (Wide Range) 2 1

3.

Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature TCOId (Wide Range)

4. Reactor Coolant Pressure Wide Range 2 1

5. Pressurizer Water Level 2 1

6. Steam Generator Pressure 2/steam generator 1/steam generator

7. Steam Generator Water Level Narrow Range 1/steam generator llsteam generator

8. Steam Generator Water Level Wide Range 1/steam generator* 1/steam generator*

9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level 2 1

10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate (Each pump) 1/pump* 1/pump*

11. Reactor Cooling System Subcooling Margin Monitor 2 1

12. PORV Position/Flow Indicator 2/valve*** 1 /valve**

13. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator 1/valve** 1/valve**

14. Safety Valve Position/Flow Indicator 1/valve*** 1/valve***

15. Containment Sump Water Level (Narrow Range) 1****

16. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) 2 1

17. lncore Thermocouples 4/core quadrant 2/core quadrant

18. Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System 1 These corresponding instruments may be substituted for each other.

Not required if the PORV block valve is shut and power is removed from the operator.

If not available, monitor the quench tank pressure, level and temperature, and each safety valve/PORV discharge piping temperature at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The non-safety grade containment sump water level instrument may be substituted.

Definition of OPERABLE: A channel consists of eight (8) sensors in a probe of which four (4) sensors must be OPERABLE.

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 3/4 3-42 Amendment No. 3. 1-9, 109

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 7 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor fails high Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, trigger PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor fails high Indications Available: Alarms LC-I PZR PORVISAFETY OPEN Examiners Note: If Applicants realize that only the Acoustic Monitor has failed, they may elect to swap PORV Block valves. (Open V1477 and Close VI 476 and open breaker) This will allow T.S. 3.3.3.6 to be exited.

SRQ/ROI Recognize that PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor is in alarm.

Enters 2-0120036, Pressurizer Relief! Safety Valve (attached page SRO 38)

TS Evaluates T.S. 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation action a.),

may refer to 2-OSP-1 00.17, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation SRO Monthly Channel Check, step 7.1.18 (attached pages 39-41)

Directs checking plant parameters to determine if PORV is open by 2-0120036 Pressurizer Relief! Safety Valve, steps 7.2.1 by checking PQRV 1474 Position indicating light, Discharge line temperature and Quench Tank parameters and documenting using Data Sheet 30.

Determines that only the PQRV 1474 Acoustic Monitor has failed.

Contacts Shift manager to report PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor has failed and entry into 2-0120036 Pressurizer Relief! Safety Valve Observes tailpipe temperatures, pressurizer pressure stable, and BOP/RO determines PORV 1474 is not open.

Checks as directed plant parameters to determine if PORV is open by 2-0120036, steps 7.2.1 by checking PORVI 474 Position indicating BOP/RO light, Discharge line temperature and Quench Tank parameters.

Documents using Data Sheet 30.

BOP/RO Monitors balance of plant.

Next scenario page = 42 37

PROCEDURE TiTi.E PAQE.

viSO4 NO 14 PRESSURIZER RELIEF I SAFETY VALVE 5 of 8 PRQCtUURE NO 2-0120036 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 7.1 Immediate Operator Actions

1. None 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS RELIEF VALVE FAILURE OR 1.

LEAIAGE:

A. Determine which PORV is open or A. )lt is NOT known which leaking by observing acoustic flow PORV is stuck open, Then monitors or PORV position indicating immediately close both block lights. valves (V-1476 and V.1477).

B. a PORV has failed OPEN, Iti B. lithe relief valve does NOT place the control switch to close and pressurizer pressure OVERRIDE position and verify valve is less than 2300 psia, closure by immediately close the applicable block valve (V.1476 or V.1477).

1. Posilion indicating lights

2. Acoustic flow monitoring

3. Discharge line temperature

4. Quench tank parameters.

38

INSTRUMENTATION ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3,3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b.* With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

c. With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

d.** With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> if repairs are feasible without shutting down or:

1. Initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory; and

2. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event out lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status, and

3. Restore the Channel to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling.

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

Action statements do not apply to Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System, Containment Sump Water Level (narrow range) and Containment Sump Water Level (wide range) instruments.

Action statements apply only to Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System, Containment Sump Water Level (narrow range) and Containment Sump Water Level (wide range) instruments.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 49, 45 39

TABLE 3.3-10 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED NUMBER MINIMUM CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS OPERABLE

1. Containment Pressure 2 1 2 1

2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature TH t 0

(Wide Range) 2 1

3.

Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature TCOkJ (Wide Range) 2 1

4. Reactor Coolant Pressure Wide Range

5. Pressurizer Water Level 2 1

6. Steam Generator Pressure 2/steam generator 1/steam generator

7.

Steam Generator Water Level Narrow Range 1/steam generator 1/steam generator

8.

Steam Generator Water Level Wide Range 1/steam generator* 1/steam generator*

9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level 2 1 1/pump* llpump*

10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate (Each pump)

11. Reactor Cooling System Subcooling Margin Monitor 2 1 2lvalve*** 1/valve**

12. PORV Position/Flow Indicator

13. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator 1 Ivalve** 1 /valVe**

1Ivalve(* 1/valve***

14. Safety Valve Position/Flow Indicator

15. Containment Sump Water Level (Narrow Range) 1**

16. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) 2 1

17. Incore Thermocouples 4/core quadrant 2/core quadrant

18. Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System 2*** 1 These corresponding instruments may be substituted for each other.

Not required if the PORV block valve is shut and power is removed from the operator.

If not available, monitor the quench tank pressure, level and temperature, and each safety valve/PORV discharge piping temperature at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The non-safety grade containment sump water level instrument may be substituted.

Definition of OPERABLE: A channel consists of eight (8) sensors in a probe of which four (4) sensors must be OPERABLE.

Amendment No. , 49. 109 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 3/4 3-42

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 11 0f 17 PROCEDURE NO.: MONTHLY CHANNEL CHECK 2-OSP-100.17 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.1 (continued) INITIAL

16. *Verify PORV block valve position indicators are illuminated and indicate desired position (not required if the PORV block valves are closed and power is removed).

A. V1476 B. V1477

17. *Verify PORV Valve Position Indicators are illuminated and indicate desired position.

A. V1474 B. V1475

18. *Verify the following on the PORV and Safety Valve acoustic flow monitor (Fl-Cl-i, FI-O1-2, Fl-O1-3, Fl-O1-4 & FI-O1-5):

A. No flow indication Red LEDs is illuminated.

B. Power available Red LEDs are illuminated.

7.2 If it has been evaluated that an accident monitoring instrument has failed the channel check, Then ensure that a plant work order is initiated and the instrument is entered in the equipment out-of-service program.

Additionally, ensure those instruments determined to be satisfactory are removed from the equipment out-of-service program. Equipment out-of-service entries for CETs and HJTCs are documented on a form similar to Table 1 of this data sheet. A single generic EOOS entry is utilized.

Table 1 will be maintained in the EOOS notebook along with the green PWO tags associated with the individual plant work orders. A single yellow dot will be affixed to the QSPDS monitor to identify that the system has pending work orders.

7.3 Ensure that Table 1 is placed in the review file at the beginning of each fuel cycle and a new Table 1 is initiated (transferring all existing EOOS entries to the new Table 1).

7,4 ¶ *The Accident Monitoring Instrumentation checked by this Data Sheet has been verified against and meets the requirements of Tech Spec 3.3.3.6, Table 3.3-10.

41

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 8 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

Reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-9013D, LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, trigger Reference leg failure on 2A SIG Indications Available: G-1: 2A SIG Level HighlLow SRO/ROI Recognizes FRV FCV-901 1 (2A S/G) going closed and subsequently BOP diagnoses cause to be an instrument failure (reference leg failure).

SRO Enters 2-07000030, Main Feedwator.(attached pages 44-47)

Directs taking manual control of FCV-901 I (2A SIG) and restoring normal SIG level, step 6.1.1.

Examiners Note: If 2 or more SG Narrow Range Level Safety Channels on either SG indicate less than 50% and lowering, the crew would be required to trip the reactor at this time. Step 6.1.2 .(attached paqes 44-47))

Examiners Note: If the failure has not yet been diagnosed as a reference leg failure the SRO may direct performance of step 6.2.1 to compare DCS levels with the NR Level Safety Channels. .(attached pages44-471 May direct BOP to perform step 6.2.1 to ensure the FRV itself is working correctly. .(attached pages 44-47)

Enters 2-ONP-99-01 Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation step 6.3.2.H (attached page 54)

Directs BOP to bypass affected failed instrument channels lAW 2-ONP-99-01 Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation step 6.3.2.H Recognizes entry into Tech Spec 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1.8 Action 2.a (attached pages 48-50) and Tech Spec 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3.7.C Action 20.a (attached pages 51-53)

Contacts Shift manager to report reference leg failure and entry into 2-07000030, Main Feedwater and 2-ONP-99-01 Loss of Tech Spec Next scenario page = 55 42

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 9 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

Reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-901 3D, LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high.

Time I PosWon Applicants Actions or Behavior I Instrumentation Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Takes manual control of FCV-901 1 (2A S/C) and restores normal S/C RO level, step 6.1.1. This action causes annunciator G-18, 2A FW Reg Sys in manual Bypasses affected failed instrument channels per 2-ONP-99-O1 Loss BOP of Tech Spec Instrumentation step 6.3.2.H Next scenario page = 55 43

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 9 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

Reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-901 3D, LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high.

Time I Position I Aoolicants Actions or Behavior I I Instrumentation Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Takes manual control of FCV-901 1 (2A S/G) and restores normal S/G RO level, step 6.1.1. This action causes annunciator G-18, 2A FW Reg Sys in manual Bypasses affected failed instrument channels per 2-ONP-99-O1 Loss BOP of Tech Spec Instrumentation step 6.3.2.1-1 Next scenario page = 55 44

EVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

38 MAIN FEEDWATER PROCEDURE NO.:

6 0 f 59 1-0700030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 6.1 Abnormal Steam Generator Level Immediate Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS j feedwater valve controller is malfunctioning, Then TAKE manual control and RESTORE normal SIG level.

2. 112 or more SG Narrow Range Level Safety Channels on EITHER SG:

• INDICATE less than or equal to 50%

and lowering, OR

• areAPPROACHING5O%

UNCONTROLLABLY, Then PERFORM the following:

A. TRIP the reactor.

B. TRIP the turbine.

C. GO TO 1-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

3. jf 2 or more SG Narrow Range Level Safety Channels on EITHER SG INDICATE greater than or equal to 80%

with a rising trend on SG wide range level ONE of the following exists:

• Reactor power is greater than or equal to 15%

OR

• Loss of Load trip is ENABLED (L-35 IS NOT IN ALARM).

Then PERFORM the following:

A. TRIP the reactor.

B. TRIP the turbine.

C. GO TO 1-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

45

REVISION NO,: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

38 MAIN FEEDWATER 8 0 f 59 PROCEDURE NO.:

1-0700030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.2 Abnormal Steam Generator Level (Subsequent Actions)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION

• If Main Feed Regulating Valve(s) is pinned open and a Rx trip occurs, Main Feedwater Block Valve(s) must be CLOSED.

• ENSURE appropriate considerations and/or briefings occur prior to the initiation of actions in this procedure that could adversely affect reactivity.

• With one NR SG level channel bypassed and the remaining channel becomes inaccurate (signal drift or fail on scale), the FWCS will control to the inaccurate signal which could result in major FW valve and flow swings.

• If a SG NR level channel is bypassed, stationing a dedicated RCO at the FW controls should be considered.

NOTE

• A 1% change in wide range level is approximately equal to a 5% change in narrow range level.

• S/C wide range level indication will lead narrow range level indication by approximately 30 seconds to 2 minutes as feedwater flow to the steam generator changes. Therefore, wide range level should be used as a predictor in determining the need for changes in feedwater flow while feedwater regulating valves and/or bypass valves are in manual. For example, if narrow range level is falling but wide range level is stable or increasing, stop increasing feedwater flow to the S/C and wait for narrow range level to turn around. If S/G narrow range level is used as the only level trend indication, an overfeed condition could occur, and a feedwater isolation and/or turbine trip on high S/C level is extremely likely.

• Steam generator level control will be adversely effected by changes in steam generator pressure. For example, if steam generator pressures are not stable due to fluctuations in SBCS operation, this will be seen in steam generator level perturbations.

• If S/G level reaches 20.5% narrow range, a Rx trip will occur.

• 2 out of the 3 SC level channels used by the DCS on both Trains share a reference leg with each other as well as sharing it (i.e., same reference leg) with a Safety Level Channel (MD on A and MA on B Train). Because of this configuration, a reference leg leak would not only cause all 3 channel indicators to rise but would cause the DCS Arbitration logic to choose the failing (rising) NR level control channel resulting in an actual lowering of SC level. Any SC level alarms or DCS indications (particularly High Level) should be immediately compared against all four Safety Level Channels in order to ascertain actual SC level.

46

REVISION NO.: ,ROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

38 MAIN FEEDWATER PROCEDURE NO.:

9 0 f5 1-0700030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.2 Abnormal Steam Generator Level (Subsequent Actions) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS VERIFY SG level by comparing DCS indicated level with NR level Channels MA MD on RTGB 102.

A. ii DCS and NR level channels agree in direction, Then proceed to Step 2, B. the DCS NR and VALIDATED SG NR level indicators are High and I or rising the majority of the NR level channels are indicating low and I or are lowering, Then PERFORM the following:

1. GO TO the 1A (1B) S/G FW INPUTS screen.

2. SELECT BYPASS for the NR Control Channel that is indicating High Level.

3. VERIFY the VALIDATED SG level Output signal matches actual SG level.

4. VERIFY that the Feedwater Control valves are Opening to return SG level back to setpoint.

5. Check NR SG level channels and take appropriate actions for any deviating channels.

6. Inform l&C and Engineering.

47

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

38 MAIN FEEDWATER 11 of 59 PROCEDURE NO.:

1-0700030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.2 Abnormal Steam Generator Level (Subsequent Actions) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE With the high power feedwater valve (FCV-901 1/9021) in MANUAL and the low power feedwater valve (FCV-9005/9006) in AUTO the DCS algorithm provides a demand signal to the low power feedwater valve whenever the high power feedwater valve is re-positioned. This demand signal is designed to compensate for movement of the high power feedwater valve such that there is no net impact to flow (essentially an opposite signal).

This signal may override the normal level and steam / feed flow demands if a large demand is placed on the high power valve (low power valve will open if high power valve is rapidly closed).

C. VERIFY FCV-901 1 (FCV-9021), SG C.1 f FCV-901 1 (FCV-9021), SG 1A (IB) FEED REG Valves are IA (IB) FEED REG Valves controlling SG levels at setpoint. are NOT controlling SG levels at setpoint, Then PERFORM the following:

1. ENSURE that the applicable control station, LIC-9005 for SG A (or LIC-9006 for SG B), LOW PWR M/A STA is selected to AUTO (A).

2. PLACE applicable control station, FIC-901 1 (FIC-9021), HIGH PWR M/A STA in MANUAL (M).

3. CLOSE S/G IA (1B) FEED REG Valve using the Manual Down Arrow until the 15% BYPASS Valve OPENS to 20% to 50% as indicated on the LOW PWR M/A STA POS indicator.

48

314.3 INSTRUMENTATION 314.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the Total No. of Channels column of Table 3.3-1.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 67 49

TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

1. Manual Reactor Trip 4 2 4 1, 2 1 2 4 3*4*5* 5 4

2. Variable Power Level High 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

3. Pressurizer Pressure High 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

4. Thermal Margin/Low Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

5. Containment Pressure High 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

6. Steam Generator Pressure Low 4ISG 2/SG(b) 3/SG 1, 2 2#

7. Steam Generator Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

Difference High

8. Steam Generator Level Low 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2 2#

9. Local Power Density High 4 2(c)(d) 3 1 2#

10. Loss of Component Cooling Water 4 2 3 1 2 2#

to Reactor Coolant Pumps

11. Reactor Protection System Logic 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

3* 4* 5* 5

12. Reactor Trip Breakers 4 2(f) 4 1, 2 4 3* 4* 5* 5

13. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor

a. Startup and Operating Rate of Change of Power 4 2(e)(g) 3 1, 2 2#

High

b. Shutdown 4 0 2 3, 4, 5 3

14. Reactor Coolant Flow Low 415G 2/SG(a)(d) 3/SG 1, 2 2#

15. Loss of Load (Turbine 4 2(c) 3 1 2#

Hydraulic Fluid Pressure Low)

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 60

TABLE 3.3.1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 2 - a. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

b. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:

1. Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

2. All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below:

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Safety Channel Nuclear Instrumentation Wide Range Rate of Change of Power High (RPS)

Linear Range Variable Power Level High (RPS)

Local Power Density High (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

2. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure High (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure Low (ESF)

3. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure High (RPS)

Containment Pressure High (ESF)

4. Steam Generator Pressure Steam Generator Pressure Low (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)

Steam Generator Pressure Low (ESF)

5. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-28, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 4-8, 3, 149 51

INSTRUMENTATION 314.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4, APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation.

The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.2.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.

Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the Total No.

of Channels column of Table 3.3-3.

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

- 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 67 52

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

6. LOSS OF POWER (LOV)

a. (1) 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) 2/Bus 2/Bus 1/Bus 1, 2, 3 17 (2) 480 V Emergency Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus 1, 2, 3 17 3/Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)

b. (1) 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 3/Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus 1, 2, 3 17 Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) 01

(,) (2) 480 V Emergency Bus 3/Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus 1, 2, 3 17 Undervoltage_(Degraded_Voltage)

7. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 4/SG 2ISG 4/SG 1, 2, 3 15

b. Automatic Actuation Logic 4/SG 2ISG 3/SG 1, 2, 3 15

c. SG Level (2A/2B) Low 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2, 3 20a*, 20b*, 20c

8. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ISOLATION

a. SG 2A SG 2B Differential Pressure 4/SG 2ISG 3/SG 1, 2, 3 20a*, 20b*, 20c

b. Feedwater Header 2A 2B 4ISG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2, 3 20a*, 20c Differential Pressure ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 314 3-14 Amendment No. 2, , 132

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION ACTION 20 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If an inoperable SG level channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, then AFAS-1 or AFAS-2 as applicable in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition.

If an inoperable SG DP or FW Header DP channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, then both AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

b With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed in ACTION 13.

c, With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may proceed provided one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and the other inoperable channel placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Restore one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-16b Amendment No. 432, 149 54

REVISION NO: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

21 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION PROCEDURE NO.:

21 of 37 2-ONP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.3 ESFAS Channel Malfunction (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE

• S/C level indicators are covered by Tech Spec 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1 for RPS and Tech Spec 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3 for ESFAS.

• ESFAS cabinet door key, key 114, is required for bypassing ESFAS.

H. Steam Generator Level H.1 PERFORM ONE of the following:

instrumentation indication:

• LIC-901 3NB/CID 1. BYPASS the following channels affected by the failed

• LIC-9023AB/C/D instrument:

• Lo Lvi SC RPS trip unit (key 104)

• [1 SG-2A, Then AFAS-1 AFAS cabinet door key 202 chanAkey2O3 chan B key 204 chan Ckey 205 chan Dkey 206

• ii SG-2B, Then AFAS-2 AFAS cabinet door key 202 chanAkey2O3 chan Bkey 204 chan Ckey 205 chan Dkey 206

• Place the affected channel steam generator Hi Lvl Override Keyswitch to bypass.

chan Akey 15 chan 8 key 16 chan Ckey 17 chan Dkey 18 OR 55

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event# 6,7 Page 10 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

LOOP I Loss of Feedwater, 28 Diesel does not start. 2A Diesel output breaker does not close.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, trigger LOOP I Loss of Feedwater, 28 EDG should not auto start and 2A output breaker does not close.

Indications Available:

When SNPO called by Control Room Local 2B EDG alarms in are:

6-1: 2B EDG TRIPILOCKOUT 6-2: START DC FAILURE! SS ISOL If asked, one minute later state, lockout unable to be reset.

If requested, SNPO reports breaker 60221 has not tripped.

SRO/ROI Multiple alarms, recognize Reactor ITurbine trip BOP Directs implementation of 2-EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions as follows:

. RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, SRO Core Heat Removal

. BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.(2B EDG does not auto start)

Recognizes that the 2B EDG did not start and that 2B EDG has alarm A-26, 2B Emerg D/G Lockout/SS lsol.

Contacts the STA to report to the control room to assist with the event.

Critical Recognizes that 2A EDG breaker did not close.

Task Directs BOP to close the 2A EDG breaker.

SRO Recognizes that the 2B EDG did not start and that 2B EDG has alarm BOP A-26, 2B Emerg D/G LockoutlSS Isol.

Critical Recognizes that 2A EDG breaker did not close.

Task Close the 2A EDG breaker when directed.

Next scenario page = 74 56

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7 Page 11 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

LOOP / Loss of Feedwater, 28 Diesel does not start. 2A Diesel output breaker does not close.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

GOP Contacts SNPO to check out problem with 2B EDG Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control, RO Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Reactivity Control

. Verify Reactor power is lowering.

. Verify startup rate is negative.

. Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted.

Inventory Control

. Verify Pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

. Pressurizer level is trending to 30 35%

Pressure Control

. Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia

. Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia

. Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F Core Heat Removal

. Verify at least one RCP running with CCW. (LOOP, no RCPs running)

• Verify loop delta T is <100 F Verifies turbine trip on reactor trip. Performs EOP-01 Safety BOP functions as directed for: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions.

Next scenario page = 74 57

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC. Scenario# 5 Event# 6,7 Page 12 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

LOOP I Loss of Feedwater, 28 Diesel does not start. 2A Diesel output breaker does not close.

Time I Position I Aøplicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Ensures MSR Warmup Valves are CLOSED. Calls NPO to BOP manually close due to loss of oower Notifies NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99.

Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

. Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

. Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

. Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (closes 2A EDG output breaker)

. All vital and non vital DC Buses energized.

RCS Heat Removal

. Verify at least one SIG has feedwater available.

. Verify RCS T-avg is between 525 and 535°F by:

. Places one ADV on A side and one ADV on B side in Auto /

Auto Containment Conditions

. Verify Containment pressure <2 psig.

. Verify NO Containment radiation monitors in alarm.

. Verify Containment temperature is less than 120°F.

. Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms.

Next scenario page = 74 58

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario# 5 Event# 8,9 Page 13 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

2C AFW pump trips and MV-09-9 2A AFW pump to 2A SC fails to open, Crosstie 2A AFW pump to feed 2B Steam Generator Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Restore Instrument Air when contacted by Control Room Indications Available:

SRO Performs Diagnostic Flow Chart Exits EOP-O1 to EOP-09, LOOP (attached pages 61-65)

Directs STA SFSCs for EOP-09 performed every 15 minutes.

Directs Appendix A of EOP-99, to Sample Steam Generators.

(attached_page_66-67)._Directs HP to_perform_secondary_surveys.

Directs Ensure EDG Loading Directs Appendix H of EOP-99, Restore Instrument Air Examiners Note: If Instrument air is restored after 30 minutes with RCP CCW valves in auto, the CCW valves will re-open, which is in violation of above step.

Ensure RCP Seal; Cooling Examiners note: If not completed within 30 minutes of loss of CCW, ensure CCW NOT restored to RCPs.

Directs RCS depressurized to 1800 to 1850 psia using auxiliary sprays._(key_76 and 77 to_operate_SE-02-3 and_SE-02-4)

Directs closing of MS IVs Directs closing of S/G blowdown and sample valves Next scenario page = 74 59

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event# 8,9 Page 14 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

2C AFW pump trips and MV-09-9 2A AFW pump to 2A SG fails to open, Crosstie 2A AFW pump to feed 2B Steam Generator Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When contacted by Control Room perform 2-ONP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater Appendix C steps IA thru IH as directed.

Indications Available: Alarm: G-46, 2C AFW PUMP TURBINE FAILUREITrip!OVRLDISS ISOL SRO Directs Stabilize RCS Temperature.

Directs Ensure S/C Level 60 to 70%

If AFAS NOT actuated, direct AFW restored by manual starting of pumps and opening of valves lAW 2-NOP-09.O2Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation (attached page 68-69)

If Appendix H, Restore Instrument Air not completed within 30 RO minutes of loss of CCW, ensures CCW is NOT restored to RCPs.

RCS depressurized to 1800 to 1850 psia using auxiliary sprays as directed.

Cycles a charging pump on and off as necessary to maintain Pressurizer level.

Stabilizes RCS Temperature as directed.

Ensures SIC Level 60 to 70% as directed Informs NPO to perform Appendix H, 2-EOP-99 restore Instrument Air, BOP as directed Resets Instrument Air Compressors when notified by NPO Next scenario page = 74 60

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # 8, 9 Page 15 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

2C AFW pump trips and MV-09-9 2A AFW pump to 2A SG falls to open, Crosstie 2A AFW pump to feed 2B Steam Generator Time I Position I ApplicanVs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: 2C AFW overspeed trip linkage will not reset. MV 09-9 manual operator will not engage allowing opening the valve.

Reports to the Control Room that MV-09-9 is stuck and will not open.

Indications Available:

Aligns and initiates AFW flow to 2A and 26 SG lAW 2-NOP-09.02 BOP Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation (attached page 68-69)

Contacts SNPO to open MV-09-9 locally Closes the MSIVs as directed.

Closes the SIG blowdown and sample valves as directed.

Performs EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 (attached page 70-75) as directed Recognizes 2C AFW pump trips when started. 2B AFW pump discharge valve solenoid fails to open.

IF Crew responds to Safety Function Status Check on RCS Heat Removal, based on AFW and SG levels, within the required 15 minutes, they may use the appropriate ONP and NOP to restore AFW.

EXAMINERS NOTE: IF this happens, they will not transition to EOP-6.

See 2-NOP-09.02, Step 4.4.1, 2A AFW PUMP to 26 S/G (attached pages 59-67), and 2-ONP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater, Appendix C, Cross-Connect AFW (attached pages 70-71).

Next scenario page = 74 61

REVIStON NO.: :uJRE TITLE: PAGE:

15 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER/LOSS OF FORCED 6 of 27 PROCEDURE NO.: CIRCULATION 2-EOP-09 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE

• Instruments should be channel checked when one or more confirmatory indications are available,

• Steps designated with an

• may be performed non-sequentially or are to be performed continuously.

1. Confirm Diagnosis VERIFY LOOP/LOFC Safety 1.1 REDIAGNOSE the event using Function Status Check acceptance 2-EOP-01 Chart 1, Diagnostic criteria are satisfied every Flow Chart, 15 minutes. jj GO TO ONE of the following:

• The appropriate Optimal Recovery Procedure

• 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery E12. Classify Event EVALUATE EPIP Classification criteria for present plant conditions and Emergency Plan Actions.

REFER TO EPIP-O1 Classification of Emergencies.

1:3. Implement Placekeeping OPEN the Placekeeper NOTE the time of EQP entry.

1:4. Sample Steam Generators Sample S/Gs.

REFER TO Appendix A, Sampling Steam Generators.

62

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER/LOSS OF FORCED 7 of 27 PROCEDURE NO,: CIRCULATION 2-EOP-09 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

5. Ensure EDG Loading a LOOP has occurred, Itn ENSURE the following for EACH Vital 4.16 Ky Bus:

A. EDG has STARTED. A.1 Locally START the EDG.

REFER TO Appendix C, Diesel B. EDG Output Breaker is CLOSED. Generator Local Start.

C. LOOP Loads are ENERGIZED. C.1 Manually ALIGN EDG loads.

REFER TO Table 8, Emerg. Diesel Generator Loading (LOOP).

6. Restore Instrument Air If a LOOP has occurred,

]Jjj PERFORM BOTH of the following:

A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

63

REVISION NO,: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER/LOSS OF FORCED 8 of 27 PROCEDURE NO,: CIRCULATION 2-EOP-09 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

7. Ensure RCP Seal Cooling A. VERiFY CCW to the RCPs. A.1 j an SIAS or CIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then RESTORE CCW.

REFER TO Appendix J, Restoration of CCW and CBO to the RCPs.

A.2 CCW is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

A. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.

B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.

B. jf BOTH of the following conditions exist,

• RCPs have CCW flow

• CIAS has isolated the normal RCP bleedoff fiowpath to the VCT Then ESTABLISH the alternate RCP bleedoff flowpath to the Quench Tank by OPENING V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop VIv.

64

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER/LOSS OF FORCED 9 f 27 PROCEDURE NO.: CIRCULATION 2-EOP-09 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Annunciator R-8 SIAS Channel NB Actuation Block Permissive, alarms at a setpoint of 1836 psia.

El 8. Depressurize the RCS A. COMMENCE depressurizing the RCS to between 1800 and 1850 psia.

B. MAINTAIN pressurizer level between 10 and 68%.

9. Protect Main Condenser A. jf a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following to protect the Secondary Plant:

1. ENSURE MSIVs are CLOSED.

2. ENSURE SGBD is ISOLATED.

B. STABILIZE the Secondary Plant.

REFER TO Appendix X, Secondary Plant Post Trip Actions, Section 2.

10. Stabilize RCS Temperature 10.1 II RCS TCOLD is greater than 535°F, Then VERIFY MSSV5 are ENSURE RCS TCOLD is less than controlling RCS temperature.

535°F and controlled by operation of ANY of the following: 10.21! ADVs are unavailable, Then use alternate steaming

• SBCS paths.

REFER TO Table 12, Alternate

• ADVs SIG Heat Removal Paths.

65

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER/LOSS OF FORCED 10of27 PROCEDURENO.: CIRCULATION 2-EOP-09 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. EnsureSlGLevel6Oto70%NR ENSURE at least ONE SIG has level being maintained or restored to between 60 and 70% NR.

12. Verify Pzr Level 12.1 OPERATE charging pumps and letdown as necessary to restore VERIFY Pressurizer level meets level.

BOTH of the following conditions: ]j A. Within 10 to 68%.

B. Trending to between 30 to 35%.

13. Maintain RCS Within Figure IA 13.1 If the RCS is over-subcooled, Limits RCS pressure exceeds the upper limits of Figure 1A, RCS MAINTAIN the RCS less than the Pressure Temperature, upper limits of Figure IA, RCS RESTORE subcooling or Pressure Temperature, by performing pressure to within the appropriate ANY of the following: limit:

A. OPERATE Auxiliary Pressurizer A. STABILIZE RCS sprays. temperature.

B. OPERATE Pressurizer heaters. B. DEPRESSURIZE the RCS using Auxiliary Pressurizer spray.

66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA 3 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

ATrain(I) BTrain(q) 0 1. If a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

0 A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an*

energized bus.

0 B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 26 Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW N header should only be aligned to ONE I essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

• HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-1O) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open

• When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW N header valves, until SIAS is reset O 2. If SIAS has closed the N Header valves,

]J RESTORE flow from EITHER A or B CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

• HCV-14-8A

• HCV-14-9 OR

• HCV-14-88

• HCV-14-1O 67

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES! FIGURES I TABLES / DATA 4 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2) 0 3. If CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE / OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

0 4. DIRECT Chemistry to perform SIG samples for activity and boron.

0 5. If S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A 68

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION 16 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.4 Using Auxiliary Feed Pump Discharge Cross tie Valves INITIAL 4.4.1 2A AFW PUMP to 2B SIG.

NOTE Control switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 Cross-Tie valves are located in the 2A / 2B AFW PP Room. The control switches are key operated (#301).

Two keys are necessary as the keys are removable in CLOSE only.

CAUTION Opening both MV-09-13, 2A to 2B AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, and MV 09 14, 2B to 2A AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, while in Modes 1, 2, or 3 can only be performed by declaring one AFW train inoperable. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 1)

1. ENSURE PUMP 2A is running.

2. OPEN SE-09-2, 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A S/G VLV. (KEY 83)

3. ENSURE the RCS is in MODEs 4, 5, or 6.

Current plant MODE_______

4. PLACE MV-09-13, 2A to 28 AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, key switch

(#301) to OPEN.

5. VERIFY valve is OPEN by local control box indication.

6. PLACE MV-09-14, 2B to 2A AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, key switch

(#301) to OPEN.

7. VERIFY the valve is OPEN by local control box indication.

NOTE MV-09-9 should be closed unless feeding of both S/Gs is desired.

8. THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 2B DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2B S/C.

69

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION 17 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.4.1 2A AFW PUMP to 28 51G. (continued) INITIAL

9. IF flow is desired to the 2A S/C while filling the 2B S/C, THEN THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SC 2A VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2A S/C.

10. IF desired, THEN STOP flow to the 28 S/C from the 2A AFW PUMP by performing the following:

A. CLOSE MV-09-1O, PUMP 2B DISCH TO SC 28 VALVE.

B. CLOSE MV-09-14, 28 to 2A AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, by taking local key switch to CLOSE and removing key.

IV C. CLOSE MV-09-13, 2A to 28 AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, by taking local key switch to CLOSE and removing key.

IV

11. IF desired then STOP flow to the 2A S/C from the 2A AFW PUMP by CLOSING MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SC 2A VALVE.

12. CLOSE SE-09-2, 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A S/C VLV.

13. IF steam generator feed is no longer desired, THEN STOP PUMP 2A.

Performed By:

Print/Sign Initials Date Verified By:

Print/Sign Initials Date 70

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 115 of 156 PROCEDURE NO. SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 5 of 8)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 1. ENSURE ONLY ONE MFW Pump is RUNNING, the control switch in RECIRC.

O 2. ENSURE ONLY ONE Condensate Pump is RUNNING.

0 3. If AFAS has actuated, O 3.1 If AFAS has NOT actuated and use of Main Feectwater is jj use of Main Feedwater is desired, desired, fl PERFORM ALL of the fl PERFORM ALL of the following: following:

0 A. ENSURE AFAS is RESET. C A. ENSURE BOTH SIG (Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.

0 B. ENSURE BOTH S/G (Main C B. For EACH MFW header to FRVI Block valves CLOSED. be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.

1. MV-09-5

2. MV-09-6 C C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power C C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL. M/A Stations in MANUAL.

O D. For EACH MFW header to be C D. DEPRESS BOTH placed in service, ENSURE pushbuttons to RESET the the associated MFIVs are Low Power Feedwater OPEN. Valves.

O E. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons C E. ADJUST the Low Power MIA to RESET the Low Power Stations AS NECESSARY to Feeciwater Valves. control SIG levels.

71

REVISION NO. PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES / DATA 116 of 156 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 6 of 8)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

3. (continued)

D F. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control S/G levels.

0 0. RESTORE AFW to the standby alignment.

0 4. ENSURE BOTH Heater Drain Pumps are STOPPED.

0 5. ENSURE BOTH of the following:

O A. Bearing Oil Pump C A.1 ENSURE Emergency Bearing Oil Seal Oil Backup Pump Pump RUNNING.

RUNNING.

a B. When the turbine reaches 600 rpm Bearing Oil Lift Pump RUNNING.

0 6. ENSURE the Turbine Drain Valves are OPEN.

0 7. ENSURE ONLY ONE Turbine Cooling Water Pump is RUNNING.

0 8. VERIFY Turbine Generator Bearing a 8.1 DIRECT a field operator to adjust Oil temperature between 110 to TCW to the in-service TLO Cooler 1 20°F. to maintain outlet Oil temperature between 110 to 120°F.

72

1SION NO PROCEDURE TITLE: PM3E:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 117 of 156 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 7 of 8)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS C 9. When Turbine speed reaches ZERO C 9.1 PERFORM ALL of the following:

rpm, Then VERIFY the turning gear automatically ENGAGES.

UJ A. PLACE Turning Gear in MANUAL.

C B. VERIFY the Turning Gear Permissive Light is ON.

O C. Locally ENSURE the Turning Gear is ENGAGED.

0 0. Locally START the Turning Gear.

C 1O.j Reactor power history is low,

]fl CONSIDER reducing steam generator blowdown flow to maintain RCS temperature.

C 11. Place Boron Dilution Alarm C 11.1 If BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System in Operation, System channels are NOT operating, When indicated Reactor power is fljj PERFORM applicable less than iO%, actions of ONP-02,O1 Boron Iiiii PERFORM BOTH of the Concentration Control.

following:

C A. ENERGIZE BOTH channels of Startup Nuclear Instrumentation to place the Boron Dilution Alarm System in operation.

C B. VERIFY BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System Channels are operating.

73

REVISION NO PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDiCES / FIGURES / TABLES I DATA 118 of 156 PROCEDURE NO SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX K SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 8 of 8)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I NOTE Excessive moisture can build up in CEDMCs room, and impact equipment

[abiIity if 15 KW heaters are not energized after plant shutdown.

D 11.NOTIFY SNPO to energize 15 KW heater located in the CEDMCs room to minimize humidity build-up per 2-NOP-25.1O, CEDMCS Air Conditioning System Operation.

O 12.CONSIDER contacting the Division Load Dispatcher for a switching order to OPEN the Main Generator disconnects.

END OF APPENDIX X 74

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario# 5 Event# 8,9 Page 16 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

2C AFW pump trips and MV-09-9 2A AFW pump to 2A SG fails to open, Crosstie 2A AFW pump to feed 2B Steam Generator Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: No AFW flow available EXAMINERS NOTE: Crew may not perform based on SFSC response in EOP-09.

Re diagnose using diagnostic flow chart and exit to EOP-06 Total SRO Loss of Feedwater Direct STA perform SFSCs for EOP-06 performed every 15 minutes.

Direct HP to perform secondary surveys if not already performed.

Direct RCS depressurized to 1800 to 1850 psia using auxiliary sprays if not already performed.

Direct Appendix H, restore Instrument Air, of EOP-99 if not already performed.

If Appendix H, Restore Instrument Air not completed within 30 minutes of loss of CCW, ensure CCW NOT restored to RCPs if not already performed.

NOTE: When AB Bus is swapped in App-H AFW flow indication on RTGB will be restored.

Direct closing of S/G blowdown and sample valves if not already performed.

Direct closing of MSIVs if not already performed.

Direct EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 if not already performed.

75

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event# 8,9 Page 17 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

2C AFW pump trips and MV-09-9 2A AFW pump to 2A SG fails to open, Crosstie 2A AFW pump to feed 2B Steam Generator Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

SRO Critical Direct Restore SIG Inventory by using 2-ONP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwator Appendix C steps 1A thru 1 H (attached pages 77-78) if not Task already performed.

BOP Performs as directed SFSCs for EOP-06 every 15 minutes.

RCS depressurized to 1800 to 1850 psia using auxiliary sprays SE RO 3 and SE-0204, as directed if not already performed.

If Appendix H, Restore Instrument Air not completed within 30 minutes of loss of CCW, ensures CCW is NOT restored to RCPs.

Contacts NPO to perform local steps in Appendix H, restore BOP Instrument Air, of EOP-99 if not already performed.

Resets Instrument Air Compressors when notified by NPO if not already performed.

Closes the MSIVs as directed if not already performed.

76

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC- Scenario # 5 Event # 8, 9 Page 18 of 21 1 9A Event

Description:

2C AFW pump trips and MV-09-9 2A AFW pump to 2A SG fails to open, Crosstie 2A AFW pump to feed 2B Steam Generator Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by NPO (after appropriate time delay),

trigger MV-09-13 and 14 open, and throttle MV-09-1O as directed.

Indications Available:

Closes the S/G blowdown and sample valves as directed if not already performed.

Performs EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 as directed if not already performed.

BOP Critical Restores S/G Inventory by using 2-ONP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater Appendix C steps IA thru 1H as directed. Contacts NPO to perform Task steps (attached pages 77-78)

NOTE: When NPO locally opens MV-09-1O this may cause an AFAS-1 lockout so 1-SE-09-2 will need to be opened.

NOTE: The crew may not need to enter EOP-06 if feed is restored to the 2B S/G in EOP-09.

Suggested termination point:

. 2A Diesel output breaker has been closed and

. 2B SIG is being fed by the 2A AFW pump.

77

REVSION NO PROCEDURE TIT PAGE ii AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 19 of 29 0 DUNE NO 2-ONP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C CROSS-CONNECTING AFW (Page 1 of 4)

INITIAL r NOTE II cross-tying AFW in Modes 1 3, Then the motor driven pump not being used to supply SGs must be declared out-of-service per the applicable Tech. Spec.

If 2A AFW Pump is to feed 28 SIC, ]J2 PERFORM the following:

A. ENSURE MV-09-1O, Pump 28 Disch To SIC 28 Valve, is CLOSED.

B. START Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A.

C, OPEN SE-09-2, 2A Pump Disch To 2A SIC Vlv Key 83.

CAUTION Opening both MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 while ri Modes 1, 2, 3 could make two independent AFW flow path inoperable.

NOTE Key-switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 are located in 2A/2B AFW Pump Room Two keys are required since the keys are removable in CLOSE only.

D. Locally OPEN MV-09-13, 2A To 25 AFW Hdr Cross-tie.

NPO E. Locally OPEN MV-09-14, 28 To 2A AFW Hdr Cross-tie.

NPO CAUTION Ensure total pump flow does not exceed 425 gpm.

F. THROTTLE MV-09-1O, Pump 25 Disch To SC 26 Valve, to establish desired flow rate.

F NOTE While feeding both S/Cs indicated flow is pump flow to both S/Cs.

C, To feed lhe 2A S/C, THROTTLE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch To SC 2A Valve, to establish desired flow rate.

78

O PROCEDURE TIrLE PAOE r._V$ION 11 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 20 of 29 PROCEDURE NO 2.ONP*09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C CROSS-CONNECTING AFW (Page 2 of 4)

(continued) INITIAL H. &L! the system is to be returned to normal, Th PERFORM the following:

1. CLOSE MV-09-1O, Pump 28 Oisch To SG 25 Valve.

2. II 2A SIC is being fed, fl CLOSE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch To SO 2A Valve.

3. STOP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A.

4. CLOSE SE-09-2, 2A Pump Disch To 2A SIC Vlv Key 83.

5. Locally CLOSE MV-09-13, 2A To 28 AFW Hdr Cross-tie.

NPO

6. Locally CLOSE MV-09-14, 25 To 2A AFW Hdr Cross-tie.

NPO

7. PERFORM Independent Verification of the following:

COMPONENT POSITION jiv INITIAL MV-09-9 Pump 2A Disch To SO 2A Valve CLOSED MV-09-10. Pump 28 Disch To SC 28 Valve CLOSED E-O92. 2A Pump Disch To 2A S/C VIv Key 83 CLOSED MV 13, 2A To 2B AFW Hdr Cross-tie CLOSED MV-09-14. 26 To 2A AFW Hdr Cross-tie CLOSED NOTE If cross-lying AFW in Modes 1 3, Then the motor driven pump not being used 10 supply SOs must be declared out-of-service per the applicable Tech. Spec.

2. If 28 AFW Pump is to feed 2A S/C, Thi PERFORM the following A. ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to 2A S/C Valve, is CLOSED.

8. START Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 28 C. OPEN SE-09-3, 28 Pump Disch To 28 5/0 Vlv Key 84.

79

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: A Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: .03 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

28 MFW pump 005 for cooler replacement, Not expected back this shift. .2C Charging pump out for repack, Chemistry limits have been cleared to perform an up power within the capacity of the operating Main Feedwater pump.

Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None.

Tech Spec Action Statement:

None.

OPS 513s:

None Locked in Annunciators:

P-38, 2A28 MFW Pump Disch MV-09-1/2 OVLD M-48, 2C Charging Pump SS Isol V2553 OVLD G-1 1, 28 FW Pump Trouble Current Status:

29% power, MOL, 6gpm dilution, Chemistry limits checked OK to raise power per step 6.128 of 2-GOP-201.

Longstanding Problems:

None.

80

Inter-Office Correspondence RE:PSL 10-001 To: Shift Manager Date: January 11,2010 From: Walter D. Mead, Jr. Department: Reactor Engineering

Subject:

UNiT 2 POWER ASCENSION.

The following recommended guidance is provided by RE to raise reactor power from 30% to 45%. The Main Feed pump is scheduled to return Thursday night at 2300, and ascension to full power is expected to commence at midnight. A supplemental guidance letter will be released prior to the return to full power.

1. ASI is currently moving toward the top of the core (negative AS! movement) and is expected to trend in this manner until approximately 2300 this evening (1/1 1/10).

2. Raise power without withdrawing CEAs beyond 126.

3. The recommended power ascension rate is 20%/hr (3 MW/mm).

Please contact Reactor Engineering should the need for additional guidance arise.

Walter Mead / John Harmon Reactor Engineering / Reactor Engineerirnz Supervisor For Exam Use Only 81

Critical Task Evaluation Sheet Critical Task Acceptance Criteria cdlose 2A Diesel output breaker BOP starts 28 DIG. Observes 28 DIG voltage, amperes, and frequency are normal, the diesel generator breaker closes, Bus 2B3 energizes, and loads sequence onto the 2B3 Bus as expected. If this task is not accomplished, it will result in creating an unnecessary Station Blackout. The failure of this critical task would be the point of entry into EOP-1 0, Station Blackout.

Crosstie 2A AFW pump to feed 2B SG RO/BOP Ensure 2A AFW pump is running. Verifies red light ON & green light OFF, normal pump start & run current, and normal discharge flow to 2B SIG through the crosstie. If this task is not accomplished it will eventually result in loss of heat sink. The failure of this critical task would be if it is required to initiate Once Through Cooling per EOP-15, Functional Recovery.

82

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No: 8 Op Test No.: NRC HLC-19A Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 2-3 % power, SOC. 2C Charging pump QOS for repack.

Turnover: 2-3% power. BOC, 1622 PPM boron, MTC approximately 0. 2C Charging pump OOS for repack. MFW and SBCS are in service. Vacuum has been drawn in the Condenser. Directions for the shift: Raise power and place the Turbine on line.

Critical Task:

. Start 2A HPSI pump Event MaIf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description R I RO Perform up power to 10%

2 1 T.S. SRO CIS RM RIS-26-4-2 (B Channel) fails high. Bypass ESFAS bistable 3 2 C I RO Individual CEA does not move out with group 4 3 C / RO 2A2-2A3 Spurious Opening resulting momentary deenergization of C / SOP 2A3 4.16 KV bus T.S. i SRO MCC 2A8 Fails to energize after bus re-energized 5 4 C / SOP CCW B header rupture. HCV-14-10 fails to close 6a 5 C / ALL SGTL 2B Steam Generator 6b 6 M / All SGTR 26 Steam Generator 7 7 M / All 2A Steam Generator MSSV opens. Closes at 500 psia 8 8 C / RO Failure of MSIS requires manual actuation 9 9 C I BOP On SIAS 2A HPSI pump fails to start 10 C / BOP Isolate the 2A SG per Appdx R (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Next Scenario Page = 4

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 8 St. Lucie Unit 2 The crew assumes the shift at 2-3% power. The 2C Charging pump is out of service to replace shaft seals. The crew will be instructed to raise power and place the unit on line.

Shortly after turnover, CIS RM-26-4-2 fails high. This is a T.S. SRO call and the channel must be bypassed lAW 2-ON P-99.01.

As the RO is withdrawing CEAs one CEA in the group will not move. I/C should be notified to investigate.

The individual CEA movement issue will be resolved and that CEA will be realigned with its group. If the CEA movement issue is not noticed prior to misaligned greater than 7 inches this should be a T.S. call.

A spurious opening of the 2A2-2A3 Tie Breaker will cause the 2A3 4.16KV bus to de-energize. As designed, the bus will be de-energized for about 10 seconds and then the 2A Diesel Generator closes onto the bus. The spurious opening of the tie breaker will be resolved and the breaker will be manipulated to parallel with the grid. When the 2A3 bus is tied back to the grid, the 2A Diesel Generator will be shut down. When 2A3 bus is reenergized, MCC 2A8 will fail to energize (not required for scenario). This will require a Tech Spec call by the SRO. MCC 2A8 can be re-energized after the Tech Spec call. Pressurizer heaters, charging and letdown will have to be restored. Additional manipulations of the SBVS, CR ventilation and SBCS DCS input will also have to be manipulated (not necessary to continue).

CCW header B will rupture causing the surge tank to lower. The N header should isolate, however HCV 14-10 fails to close. The Operator should recognize this and manually close HCV-1 4-10. CCW can then be restored to the RCP5 via the A header.

A SGTL occurs on the 2B Steam Generator followed by a SGTR. This will require a Reactor shutdown.

When the unit is tripped a Main Steam Safety valve on the 2A Steam Generator opens and fails to close until 500 psia steam pressure on the generator. MSIS fails to actuate at 700 psia and must be manually actuated. The crew should exit EOP-01 to EOP-15 due to a dual event (ESD and SGTR). NOTE:

Operations management written guidelines state if a MSSV fails to reseat when designed the Steam Generator is considered faulted until the MSSV is gagged.

Upon SIAS the 2A HPSI pump fails to start. It can be manually started. This is a critical step due to the rupture of the B CCW header, the 28 HPSI pump is considered inoperable.

The exercise can be terminated when the 2A Steam Generator is isolated. A cool down is in progress using the 2B Steam Generator.

Procedures used

• 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1

• 2-NOP-25.07, Control Room Ventilation System

• 2-ONP-25.02, Ventilation Systems

• 2-ONP-99.01, Loss of Technical Specification Instrumentation

• 2-0120035, Pressurizer Pressure and Level

• 2-0110030, CEA Off-Normal Operation and Realignment

• 2-0310030, Component Cooling Water Off- Normal Operation

• 2-ONP-47.01. Loss of A Safety Related AC Bus

• 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown

• 2-ONP-26.02, Area Radiation Monitors

• 2-0830030, Steam Generator Tube Leak

• 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions

• 2-EOP-1 5, Functional Recovery 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 8 Technical Specifications entered

• 3.3.2 ESFAS Table 3.3-3

• 3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 1 Page 4 of 24 I 9A Event

Description:

Raise Reactor power Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

. Initiate IC #78 and ensure 2C Charging Pump out of service

. Sign off applicable steps in 2-GOP-201 up to step 6.10

. Hand out 2-GOP-201 signed off up to step 6.10.

Direct power increase to 10-12% lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.10 in SRO preparation to roll the Turbine. (attached pages 5-8) 2-GOP-201 step 6.11, When Reactor is in Mode 1, direct maximize SG blowdown lAW 2-NOP-23.02 Steam Generator Blowdown System Operations, (attached pages 9-10)

Direct CEA Group 5 withdrawn to raise Reactor power (may direct dilution)

If directed commence Dilution for power increase lAW 2-NOP-02.24 RO step 6.5.12, 13, 14 (attached pages 11-12) M-26 expected.

Withdraw CEAs in Manual Sequential as directed to control Rx power.

NOTE: Power should be raised initially by CEAs. CEAs should be withdrawn to at least 102 prior to 20% power to meet LTSSIL BOP Monitor SBCS for proper operation during power increase.

When directed call Unit 1 to determine SG blowdown flow rate.

Adjust SG blowdown to no more than 100 gpm per SG. lAW 2-NOP-23.02 Steam Generator Blowdown System Operations step 6.5.1.C (2A SG). Step 6.5.2.C (28 SG)(attached pages 9-10)

Next Scenario Page = 13 4

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

60 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP MODE 2 TO MODE 1 25 of 69 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.8 (continued)

2. P. (continued)

6. Using the Single Down Arrow, CONTINUOUSLY and FULLY CLOSE LCV-9006, 2B 15% BYPASS Valve while VERIFYING FCV..9021, SG 2B FEED REG Valve OPENING SG level being maintained at setpoint.

3. RESTORE the AFW system to its normal standby lineup in accordance with 2-NOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation.

NOTE If the SBCS is already in service or Turbine startup on ADVs is desired, the next step Is NOT required to be performed.

6.9 j desired PLACE SBCS in service as follows:

1. ENSURE the Steam Bypass Permissive switch Is in the AUTO position.

2. ENSURE all five SBCS controllers are in AUTOMATIC.

3. NAVIGATE to the SBCS OVERVIEW screen and if the INFO TAG COND VAC RESET REQ UIRED is on the SBCS OVERVIEW screen, Then PERFORM the following:

A. SELECT the [COND VAC RESET] Button to bring up the COND VAC RESET Button Overlay.

B. SELECT the [COND VAC RESET] Button and VERIFY this Button momentarily flashes from Gray to White.

C. VERIFY the INFO TAG KCOND VAC RESET REQUIRED disappears from the screen.

4. Slowly CLOSE the ADVs and ENSURE the SBCS valves begin to open and control RCS temperature at approximately 532°F.

6.10 When the Main Feedwater Control System and SBCS are in service, raise reactor power between 10% to 12%.

5

,tvIIvr rj.; jPROCDUR T1TL:

60 IREACTOR PLANT STARTUP MODE 2 TO MODE 1 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INfTL 6.11 When Reactor is in Mode 1, fl MAXIMIZE Steam Generator Blowdown per Chemistry direction. REFER to 2-NOP-23.02, Steam Generator Blowdown System Operations.

NOTE Steps 6.12 through 6.20 may be performed concurrently aridlor in any order.

6.12 ENSURE Step 6.3, of this procedure is COMPLETE.

SRO Date I Time I 6.13 ENSURE the Reactor is critical and the RCS is at approximately 532°F and 2250 PSIA.

SRO 6.14 ENSURE that Steam Generators are being maintained between 60%

and 70% narrow range level.

SRO 6.15 ENSURE the DEH System is iii service in accordance with 2-NOP-22.03, DEH System Operation.

SRO 6.16 ENSURE the status of the Main Generator disconnects are as follows:

1. ENSURE 8G50, Unit 2 Generator Disconnect, is CLOSED and clear of switching clearance tags.

Switchman

2. ENSURE 8G51, Unit 2 Generator Disconnect, is CLOSED and clear of switching clearance tags.

Switchman 6

,EVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

60 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE ii PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I

NOTE The following indicating lights are located inside the lower cubicle, south side, center panel of the Excitation Switchgear.

6.17 ENSURE the excitation switchgear power supply is properly aligned to the 2C DC Bus as follows:

1. VERIFY the Normal Available light is LIT.

2. j the Normal Available light is NOT LIT, Then ENSURE bkr 2-60601 Ckt#1 on the 125V DC Bus Power Panel 2C Is ON.

3. VERIFY the Emergency Available light is LIT.

4. jf the Emergency Available light is NOT LIT, fl ENSURE bkr 2-61310 Ckt#10 on the 125V DC bus 2D is ON.

5, VERIFY the Load Connected to Normal light is LIT.

6. lithe Load Connected to Normal light is NOT LIT and the Load Connected To Emergency light is LIT, HOLD the Reset toggle switch to the RESET position.

7. When the Load Connected To Normal light LIGHTS and the Load Connected to Emergency light is NO longer LIT, Then RELEASE the Reset toggle switch.

6.1 8 ENSURE alarms in the voltage regulator cubicle are acknowledged and reset.

6.19 ENSURE the Hydrogen Control Panel is in service as follows:

1. ENSURE bkr 2-60201 Ckt #1 on the 125V DC Bus Power Panel 2B is ON.

2. ENSURE all unexplained alarms are reset.

3. ENSURE the Purity Meter Blower switch located in the lower back half of the Hydrogen Control Panel is On.

6.20 ENSURE one lsophase Bus Cooling Fan is in operation.

7

CD 0 .1 -j -I CO < I I I z z z I

a) 0 Z

a) z I

a, zwzWCOU wzw z LU

> U) Qww wwwwww 2zz zzzzzz LU LU LU WLU LU LU LU to JCOW Cl) 0 - U) U) Co Cl) Cl) Cl) U) Co 1-C I-UJCO 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 Q.Qa-Q0Q a) Q-OQ-OQ-OQ- 0 C -J--J-j-J--J--j I 00000000 V

C 0oo0 E 0

C) 00 00 00 a CO a- Cl) 0 Cu C.) a) a) a) -D

-C a) 0 0 C 0 0 0 - 0 I-0 0 (0 e 0 (ft .2 V

C a, n Cl) Cl)

CO 0

0.

(0 a) 0, z__)_

C 0 z > z 0 a) 0 C

0 a)

U) I C

jz O-E.E,E .E z > a 0 Q* U)

U) -

O2CO Lj 2U)e Co .0 C)

I. a)

C) ..E Cl) U) 0 QQCZ U) C co (0 0 0 z

00

>0) uj a)Cj Cw CO.-)( b.c- X CW Eo LU 0

3

0. CO LU U) Co COCo Cl) Cl) Co Cl)

U) uj 0 0 0 00 C)D.!!

U) 00 0 0 i. 4.0 U, uJ O>0>2> ,2 a)

CO 0) <<c aaQ0 Co COCOc)o,-s I I I I I I I I U) t V 0 -C cJc.J cu = coc0cocoCO 000 000 00 V

t 0 000 00000 I I I I I I I CCl) cCI) c I

a) >

.0 00 0 CO

-C U) Cl) Cod) Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) a) 00000000 cO<COcocoO< ZQ C) p-I--I h Coo 00 C ,

z WCOor, Co Cl)

LU 0

LL I C.IC LU D .2 CO a,

z LU.-ocju 0

LU C

Z0t0CDC-C4 Cl LU a, LU

,.%0 0000 co 00 LIJo.

ZCDr-c--C)C)C) CD cc 0 b 01CJ > I I I I I I I coaocococ0co 0 I- - -1 -

a->>>>>>> I. 0 0 0 000 0 0 dcJ Do, L. -- - - v 000O0t 00 >>>>,->>>

o OZQ..

CD w Q Co 0

> o,-- 0 Wo

.. C*4 C-) C.)

C) p c.1

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

13C STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM f PROCEDURE NO.: OPERATION 2-NOP-23.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Adjusting Steam Generator Blowdown Flow CHECK NOTE

• If the respective Steam Generator Pressure Control Valve is Bypassed or in Manual, monitor and adjust as required.

• High total Steam Generator Blowdown flows (In excess of 200 gpm total) may require use of two Closed Blowdown Cooling pumps to maintain Closed Blowdown outlet temperature less than 140 degrees F.

Refer to 2-NOP-34.02, Blowdown Cooling System Closed, to start the second Closed Blowdown Cooling Pump.

1. PERFORM the following to adjust 2A Steam Generator Blowdown Flow.

A. If PCV-23-2 is in SERVICE, STATION an OPERATOR at PCV-23-2 to ensure pressure is maintained approximately 300 psig as indicated on PIC-23-2.

B. If PCV-23-2 is BYPASSED, STATION an OPERATOR at V23252, PCV-23-2 Bypass, to adjust pressure to maintain approximately 300 psig as indicated on PIC-23-2.

C. If FCV-23-1 2 is in AUTO, SLOWLY Adjust the setpoint on FIC-23-12 to desired flow.

D. If FCV-23-12 is in MANUAL, SLOWLY depress the raise!

lower pushbuttons on FIC-23-12 to obtain the desired flow.

E. j FCV-23-12 is bypassed, Then THROTTLE V23124, FCV-23-12 Bypass, as necessary to adjust flow.

2. PERFORM the following to adjust 2B Steam Generator Blowdown Flow.

A. If PCV-23-3 is in SERVICE, STATION an OPERATOR at PCV-23-3 to ensure pressure is maintained approximately 300 psig as indicated on P1C-23-3.

B. If PCV-23-3 is BYPASSED, STATION an OPERATOR at V23255, PCV-23-3 Bypass, to adjust pressure to maintain approximately 300 psig as indicated on PIC-23-3.

C. If FCV-23-14 is in AUTO, SLOWLY Adjust the setpoint on FIC-23-14 to desired flow.

9

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

EVISION NO.:

13C STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM 20 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.: OPERATION 2-NOP-23.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Adjusting Steam Generator Blowdown Flow (continued) O1IECI(

2. (continued)

D. If FCV-23-14 is in MANUAL, SLOWLY depress the raise I lower pushbuttons on FIC-23-14 to obtain the desired flow.

E. j FCV-23-14 is bypassed, flj THROTTLE V23149, FCV-23-14 Bypass, as necessary to adjust flow.

END OF SECTION 6.5 10

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

24A BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 19 of 75 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution NOTE

• An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205 PNL UN. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placard.

• The Operations Supervisor SHALL be notified and a CR submitted of any unexplained or unplanned Reactivity change in accordance with OPS Policy 534 (i.e., .5 deg Tcold change or .5% power change).

• If a Reactivity management issue occurs, refer to procedure ADM-09. 11, Reactivity Management.

• If constant dilution is desired then ensure flow on FIC-221 OX is observable.

• Engineering Assessment of FIC-2210X PMW Flow, shows that there could be an error up to +/- 0.5 gpm, and the recommended minimum flow rate is 2 gpm.

1. aaCC ENSURE Section 3.0, Prerequisites is completed at least once per shift.

2. aCCa ENSURE Section 4.0, Precautions I Limitations, has been reviewed at least once per shift.

3. CC aC ¶ ENSURE calorimetric power Is less than 100.00% prior to any dilutions by obtaining a DCS calorimetric power.

4. C C C C DETERMINE the desired volume of primary water to be added.

5. aaaC PLACE the Makeup Mode Selector switch in MANUAL.

5. CaCC ENSURE FIC-2210X, PMW Flow, is in MANUAL and REDUCE the controller output to ZERO.

aaaC ENSURE FIC-2210Y, Boric Acid Flow is in MANUAL REDUCE the controller output to ZERO.

a. aaCC ENSURE either Primary Makeup Water Pump is running.

9. aaCC PLACE FCV-22 lOX, Primary Makeup Water Control Switch in Auto.

10. a a a a 1! diluting to the VCT, OPEN V-2512, Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv.

ii. a a a a ii diluting to the Charging Pump suction, )j OPEN V.2525, Boron Load Control Valve.

11

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:.

24A BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 20 of 75 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution (continued)

F CAUTION I To preclude lifting the VCT relief valve while using V-2525, do NOT allow I PMW flowrate to exceed the running Charging pump(s) capacity.

12. ID ID ID ID ADJUST FIC-2210X PMW Flow in AUTO or MANUAL to desired flowrate (and if using V-2525 do NOT exceed the flowrate for the number of running Charging Pumps).

13. ID C ID C MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent, as needed.

14. aaaC If necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, Then DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position:

A. a ID I] ID ENSURE V2500 VCT Divert Valve indicates OPEN.

B. C ID ID C When the desired VCT level is reached, PLACE V2500 in AUTO.

C. ID ID C a ENSURE V2500 indicates CLOSED.

15. ID ID ID C When the desired amount of primary water has been added, j CLOSE FCV-22 lOX, Primary Makeup Water.

16. C ID a ID ilV-2512 Reactor Makeup Water Stop VIv was opened, )Jj PLACE V-2512 in CLOSE ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

17. aaDC j!V-2525 Boron Load Control Valve was opened, Then PLACE V-2525 in CLOSE ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

16. C C ID C ENSURE FIC-2210X, PMW Flow controller is in MANUAL and RECUCE output to MINIMUM.

19. ID a a a MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tay..

20. 0 ID ID a § RECORD on Data Sheet I, Boration I Dilution Log, the number of gallons of Primary Makeup Water added as indicated on FQI-22 lOX, PMW Flow Totalizer.

21. aaaa j additional dilutions are desired, or if the expected Changes to Tave or Boron concentration are NOT achieved, Then REPEAT Steps 6.5.1 through 6.5.20.

12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 1 Page 5 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

Raise Reactor power Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

• If NPO asked to ensure MSR tube side vents aligned to condenser (step 6.212-GOP-201) state this step has been verified

• If Chemistry asked for SG Blowdown flow rate, state 100 gpm per SG.

• If asked from SNPO state PCV-23..2 and PCV-23-3 SG blowdown PCVs are in auto.

• If Unit I asked for SG blowdown flow rate state 40 gpm per SG.

If directed depress RESET pushbutton on Reheat Control Panel. Step BOP 6.21.1. Notify NPO to verify locally TCVs closed.

When Reactor power reaches 5%, make plant announcement BOP/RO Reactor is in Mode 1 RO Resets variable High Power resets.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 2 Page 6 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

CIS RM RIS-26-4-2 (B Channel) fails high Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

• When In Mode I trigger E2-CIS RM RIS-26-4-2 falls high.

Control Room Indications:

• Channel B Containment Radition instrument failed high

• Annunciator o P-5 CNTMT Rad High CIS Channel Trip o P.15 CNTMT Rad High CIS Channel Pre Trip o Q-2 Engineered Safeguards ATI Fault

• Containment evacuation alarm EXAMINER NOTE: Event 3 may occur before Event 2 if examiner does not request Event 2 during power ascension.

SRO Direct actions lAW 2-ONP-99.O1, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation section 6.3.2.D. Refer to TS 3.3.2 Action b. (Table T.S, 3.3-3) (attached pages 15-19) Action 13 and 14 May enter 2-ONP-26.02, Area Radiation Monitors (including Appendix A), to verify validity of the alarm. (attached pages 20-22)

Plant announces disregard invalid alarm Contacts Shift Manager to report failure of RM RIS-26-4-2, and entry into 2-ONP-99.O, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation.

RO Recognize Channel B ESFAS CIS rad monitor failed high Verify PC-I I channel indications and that only one channel is in alarm.

GOP Make plant announcement to disregard Cont. Evac alarm When directed Bypass ESFAS channel MB instrument RIS-26-4-2 (Key 130)

Next Scenario Page = 23 14

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

21 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 16 of 37 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 5.3 ESFAS Channel Malfunction (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE

• Containment radiation monitors are covered by Tech Spec 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3.

• ESFAS cabinet door key, key 114, is required for bypassing ESFAS.

D. Containment radiation D.1 PERFORM ONE of the following:

instrumentation indication:

• RIS-26-3-2 (MA) 1. BYPASS the CIS channel affected by the failed radiation

• RIS-26-4-2 (MB) monitor using key 130.

• RIS-26-5-2 (MC) OR

• RIS-26-6-2 (MD) 2. PLACE the affected ESFAS trip unit in TRIP in accordance with Appendix A, Placing Trip Units in Trip 15

INSTRUMENTATION 314.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITiON FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpolnt column of Table 3.3-4.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoirit value.

b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION 4.3-2.

TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation.

The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.2.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.

Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the Total No.

of Channels column of Table 3.3-3.

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 3/4 3-11 Amendmnt No. 87 16

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is less than 1836 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal to 1836 psia.

(b) An SIAS signal Is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below 700 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 700 psia.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION OF STATEMENTS ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 13 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure High (SIAS, CIAS, CSAS)

Containment Pressure High (RPS)

2. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure Low (MSIS)

AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Steam Generator Pressure Low (RPS)

3. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

4. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure High (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure Low (SIAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 3/4 3-15 Amendment No. 25, , 140 17

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION ACTION 14 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

b. All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed/Tripped

1. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure High (SIAS, CIAS, CSAS)

Containment Pressure High (RPS)

2. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure Low (MSIS)

AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Steam Generator Pressure Low (RPS)

3. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-28, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

4. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure High (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure Low (SIAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and In HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the Inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.

ACTION 17 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br /> or place the inoperable channel In the tripped condition and verify that the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per SpecIfication 4.3.2.1.

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 314 3-16 Amendment No. $, 73 18

TABLE 3.3-3 UMENTATION ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTR MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS

1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

a. Manual (Thp Buttons) 2 3 1,2,3 13*,14

b. Containment Pressure 4 2 High 13*, 14 2 3 1,2.3(a) 4

c. Pressurizer Pressure Low 1 2 1,2,3,4 12 atic Actuation - 2

d. Autom Logic

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 3 1(b), 2(b), 3(b) 18a*, 18b*. 18c

b. Containment Pressure 4 2 (D

High-High 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

c. Automatic Actuation 2 Logic

3. CONTAiNMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

a. Manual CIAS (Trip 2 Buttons)

Functions

b. Safety Injection (SIAS) See Functional Unit I for all Safety Injection Initiating and Requirements 1,2,3 13*,14 4 2 3

c. Containment Pressure High 13*,14 2 3 1,2.3 4

d. Containment Radiation High 1 2 1,2,3,4 12

e. Automatic Actuation 2 Logic 3143-12 Amendment No. 132 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

6 AREA RADIATION MONITORS 4 of 18 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-26.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Containment Isolation Radiation Monitors INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE If a containment evacuation alarm sounds with personnel inside containment, the Radiation Protection Manager or on-site designee must approve re-entry into the containment.

1. If a containment evacuation alarm has actuated and personnel are in the containment, ):

A. ANNOUNCE over the Gaitronics for all personnel to leave their work in a safe condition and evacuate the containment.

B. NOTIFY HP to commence an evaluation of the containment radiological conditions.

C. CONTACT Security to perform personnel accountability for the evacuation.

0. ANNOUNCE over Gaitronics restoration of containment access when advised by Radiation Protection Manager that radiological conditions are safe for return to work.

20

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 AREA RADIATION MONITORS 5 0 f 16 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-26.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Containment Isolation Radiation Monitors (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE A Containment Isolation signal is generated when at least two of the following monitors exceed the HIGH alarm setpoint:

RC-26-3 / RC-26-4 I RC-26-5 I RC-26-6

2. DETERMINE alarm validity: 2.1 ft the alarm is NOT valid, fl GO TO Appendix A, Inoperable A. VERIFY PC-i I channel display Monitor.

for the affected channel is NOT blue (indicating system or 2.2 If PC-il Driver hang alarm equipment failure) magenta appears refer to Appendix C.

(indicating PC-i i communications failure).

B. VERIFY PC-il channel indication agrees with indication on the Control Room monitor for the affected channel (i.e., alert or high alarm):

• RC-26-3, CIS

• RC-26-4, CIS

• RC-26-5, CIS

• RC-26-6,CIS C. VERIFY increased or increasing trend for the affected channel:

• RR-26-3, CIS

• RR-26-4, CIS

• RR-26-5, CIS

• RR-26-6, CIS D. ft only one CIS monitor is alarmed, Ib CHECK the other CIS monitors for increasing radiation level trends.

21

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 AREA RADIATION MONITORS 15 of 18 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-26.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A INOPERABLE MONITOR (Page 1 of 1)

INITIAL

§i NOTIFY Health Physics to PERFORM surveys of the affected area as required (if accessible).

2. CHECK local operation of the affected area as required (if accessible).

3; Ji required, flj NOTIFY l&C to check the affected Monitor.

4. j monitor is inoperable, PERFORM the following:

A. REFER to 2-NOP-26.01, Radiation Monitors, for operating instructions, B. INITIATE a NPWO in accordance with ADM-1 0.02, Plant Work Request! Order Origination. Identify on Work Request if Monitor is in continuous alarm.

C. NOTIFY Health Physics to perform surveys of the affected area in accordance with HPP-4, Scheduling of Health Physics Activities.

D. II the inoperable monitor is any of the following:

• Fuel Storage Pool Area

• Containment Isolation (CIS)

• Control Room Isolation

• Containment Area (High Range)

Then REFER TO Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring, for required actions.

END OF APPENDIX A 22

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 3 Page 7 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

CEA does not move with group Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

. Trigger CEA #57 fails to withdraw.(soon after passing through 7% power)

. When IIC called wait 5 minutes and report ACTM card toggle switch has been reset and recommend attempt to move CEA (REMOVE MALFUNCTION)

Control Room Indications: Deviation will be first picked up on CEA Display Monitor

. Annunciators: K-Il CEA Motion Inhibit (if not picked up before 4)

K-30 CEA Position Deviation Motion Block (ADS)

EXAMINERS NOTE: RO should recognize CEA failure prior to CEA deviation alarm.

RO Recognize CEA #57 failure to move with group Place CEDMCS panel in OFF implement 2-0110030, CEA Off-Normal Operation and Realignment. If CEA misaligned >7 inches direct implementation of SRO Appendix C, Appendix A, and/or Appendix H to realign. (attached pages 25-34)

Contacts Shift Manager to report failure of CEA #57, and entry into 2-0110030, CEA Off-Normal Operation and Realignment. Also informs Reactor Engineering If CEA misaligned by >7 inches implement T.S. 3.1.3.1 Realign to within 7 inches of CEAs within group within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Appendix C.

Directs I/C to trouble shoot lAW Appendix A of 2-0110030, CEA Off Normal Operation and Realignment.

When called by I/C on request to move CEA #57 direct RO to perform Appendix A 2-0110030, CEA Off-Normal Operation and Realignment.

23

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 3 Page 8 of 24 I 9A Event

Description:

CEA does not move with group Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger step to allow CEA to move.

When IIC called wait 5 minutes and report the ACTM card toggle switch has been reset and recommend attempt to move CEA SRO When Appendix A complete, direct realignment lAW Appendix H Request Rx Eng direction on CEA#57 realignment RO When directed perform Appendix C (attached pages 28-29)

When directed perform Appendix A (attached pages 30-32)

When directed to realign perform Appendix H (attached pages 33-34)

Next Scenario Page = 35 24

PAO CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 6 of 33 REALIGNMENT ST. LUCIEUNIT2 7.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 7.1 Immediate Operator Actions:

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. Place CEDMCS panel in OFF.

2. j continuous CEA withdrawal is indicated, while CEDMCS panel is OFF, Then trip the reactor and turbine and carry out 2-EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

3. j a mismatch between reactor power and turbine power (T-avg arid T-ref) exists, Ibn adjust turbine power to equal reactor power.

NOTE If two CEAs are misaligned, with one misaligned greater than or equal to 15 inches and the other misaligned greater than 7.0 inches, then actions of two CEAs misaligned from any other CEA in its group by greater than or equal to 15 inches would apply.

4. [12 or more CEA5 are misaligned from any other CEA in their group by greater than 15 inches and for dropped, while in Mode I or 2, flj manually trip the reactor and turbine and carry out 2-EOP-O1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

25

rKV,tUUKb III FPL CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 7 of 33 REALIGNMENT ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions:

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE This Procedure may contain steps that could adversely affect reactivity.

ENSURE that proper consideration and appropriate briefings occur prior to performance of steps that could challenge reactivity.

jj continuous CEA insertion is indicated, while the CEDMCS panel is OFF, fl locally open the disconnect for the affected CEA(s) at the CEDM coil power supply panels in the cable spreading room.

2. Notify Reactor Engineering, Operations Supervisor and Operations Manager of time of CEA misalignment.

• NOT required if in Mode 3.

• If unable to reach the Operations Manager, NOTIFY the Plant General Manager or any of his direct reports.

3. Refer to the appropriate appendix listed below and apply the instructions as required.

26

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

57A CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 8 f 33 PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions: (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Guidance for realigning misaligned CEAs during performance of Preop 3200091, Reload Startup Physics Testing is provided in Appendix I of Preop 3200091, Reload Startup Physics Testing.

• CEAs on the hold bus will still de-energize on a reactor trip.

• Respond to all CEA alarms by use of the appropriate appendix in this procedure.

• More than one appendix may be required.

• If two CEAs are misaligned, with one misaligned greater than or equal to 15 inches and the other misaligned greater than 7.0 inches, the actions of Appendix E will apply.

CEA MALFUNCTION APPENDIX CEA investigation for operability A One or more CEAs inoperable B One or more CEAs misaligned greater than 7 inches but less than or equal to C 15 inches.

One CEA misaligned greater than 15 inches. D Two CEAs dropped or misaligned greater than 15 Inches. E One dropped CEA F CEA position indication malfunction 0 CEA realignment (Modes 1, 2 and 3) H Realignment of one dropped CEA (Mode 1) I j

Hi gripper voltage alarm CEDMCS Trouble Alarm K

4. 1! conditions require a unit shutdown (per Tech Spec), fl implement the E-Plan as required.

27

PROCEDURE TiTLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

57A CEA 0FF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 14 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C ONE OR MORE CEA(S) MISALIGNE D FROM ANY OTHER CEA IN ITS GROUP BY GREATER THAN 7 INCHES BUT LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 15 INCHES (Page 1 of 2)

NOTE Refer to T.S. 3.1.3.1.f

1. Ensure the following:

A. CEDMCS panel in OFF.

B. Turbine power adjusted to equal reactor power.

C. CEA motion inhibit.

2. Determine from symptoms and CEA position indications, the operability of the CEA in accordance with Appendix A.

3. During determination of the cause of the misaligned CEA, maintain reactor power at or below, but NOT to exceed the power level which resulted from the CEA insertion.

friction or mechanical

4. it CEA(s) determined to be inoperable due to excessivewith the steps of this appendix as interference, refer to Appendix B and continue applicable.

NOTE If this procedure is employed while in Mode 3, the one hour time restriction does NOT apply.

5. §i 11 CEA(s) are operable, In realign the CEA(s) within one hour from the initial misalignment in accordance with Appendix H.

5. § If CEA inoperable:

A. Within one hour from the initial misalignment, realign the remainder of operable CEAs in the group within 7 inches of inoperable CEA while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits shown in Fig. I (COLR Fig. 3.1-2). The thermal power level shall be restricted pursuant to specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.

7. §i if unable to perform Step 5 or Step 6, Thcn be in at least Hot Standby within six hours.

8. If a CEA becomes misaligned greater than 15 inches, but does NOT drop while performing the above section, Then proceed to Appendix D.

28

PAGE:

REVISION NO.: f PROCEDURE TITLE:

57A CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 15 of 33 PROCEDURENO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C ONE OR MORE CEA(S) MISALIGNE D FROM ANY OTHER CEA IN ITS GROUP BY GREATER THAN 7 INCHES BUT LESS THAN OR EQUAL 7015 INCHES (Page 2 of 2)

9. lithe CEA drops while performing the above section, Then proceed to Appendix F.

10. Upon ascertaining that plant conditions are normal, continue with the reactor startup or return to the desired operating power level in accordance with 2-GOP-I 01, Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Change. The guidelines for ASI oscillation control should be implemented appropriately.

END OF APPENDIX C 29

PAGE; REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

57A CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND of 33 PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A CEA INVES TIGAT ION FOR OPERABILITY (Page 1 of 3)

CAUTION

• Reactor Power shall NOT be increased above the stable power level established following the CEA(s) misalignment.

• Criticality shall be anticipated any time CEAs are being withdrawn.

1. For the affected CEA(s), perform the following to determine operability:

A. Place the mode select switch in the manual individual mode.

8. Select the affected CEA on the individual CEA selection switches.

C. Select the group of the affected CEA on the group select switch.

D. it CEA motion inhibit is present, ]:

1. Depress and hold the CEA motion inhibit bypass pushbutton.

2. Depress then release the bypass enable pushbutton.

withdraw the affected CEA until core E. 1! the CEA was dropped, I!i first electric al limit lights both deeriergize.

mimic CEA bottom light and lower CAUTION Do NOT exceed +/- 10 inches of the original position without permission from the US.

F. Insert and withdraw the affected CEA and check for smooth operation and normal indications.

G. If CEA is determined to be operable proceed to the applicable appendix for CEA realignment.

30

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

57A CEA 0FF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 10 f 3 PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A CEA INVESTIGATION FOR OPERABILITY (Page 2 of 3)

NOTE Tripped CEA disconnect and / or loss of CEA subgroup logic function will cause dropped CEAs.

2. il the CEA(s) does NOT operate (move), Then check the status of the CEDM coil power supply panels in the cable spreading room:

A. Symptoms:

1. CEA disconnect in OFF; red light off, green light on.

2. CEA disable lights are red for the affected CEA.

3. Timer failure lights are red for the affected CEA.

B. Trouble Shooting:

1. j CEA disconnect is off, Then:

a. Turn ON disconnect switch.

b. Reset ACTM card toggle switch. (located inside cabinet, top switch, UG ENGD light should remain on).

2. If CEA disconnect is not off, Then:

a. Reset ACTM card toggle switch.

C. Check the air conditioning system for proper operation.

0. Check the cooling fans for proper operation.

E. Contact the I&C Dept. for assistance and notify them of the problem and any abnormalities found.

1. Check the CEDMCS and CEA drive system for alarms that might indicate the CEA problem.

CAUTION Do NOT exceed +/- 10 inches of original position without permission from the US.

2. Withdraw and insert the CEA(s) in manual individual or manual group at the direction of l&C to support troubleshooting.

31

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE; REVISION NO.:

57A CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 11 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A CEA INVESTIGA TION FOR OPERABILITY (Page 3 of 3)

2. (continued)

F. Have I & C perform the following as necessary.

1. Check associated power supplies and fuses.

2. Obtain coil current traces and voltage measurements to determine the location of trouble.

NOTE Two or more CEAs simultaneous ly transferring to the lower gripper could indicate CEDMCS noise caused by system grounds.

3. 1! two or more CEAs simultaneously transfer to the lower gripper, Then perform the following:

a. Direct I&C to troubleshoot for possible system grounds.

b. Minimize movement of CEAs.

G. Proceed to the applicable Appendix for CEA realignment or to Appendix B if CEA is determined to be inoperable.

END OF APPENDIX A 32

,EVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

57A CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 24 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX H CEA REALIGNMENT (MODES 1.2 AND 3)

(Page 1 of 2)

1. While realigning CEAs, observe the following:

A. Regulating CEAs shall be withdrawn in sequence and overlap between groups shall QI exceed 54 inches.

B. Do LQI exceed a sustained SUR of 1.4 DPM (alarm 1.3 DPM).

C. Criticality shall be anticipated any time CEAs are being withdrawn.

D. If deviation between CEAs in any group approaches 3 inches, stop group withdrawal and realign CEAs.

E. While CEA is misaligned, individual CEA positions within the group shall be determined at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> except when the CEA position deviation circuit is out of service, then verify CEA positions at least once every four hours.

2. Misaligned CEA(s) while in Modes 2 and 3 (subcritical).

A. Place the mode select switch in the manual individual mode.

B. Select the misaligned CEA on the individual CEA selection switches.

C. Select the group of the misaligned CEA on the group select switch.

D. j CEA motion inhibit is present

1. Depress and hold the CEA motion inhibit bypass pushbutton.

2. Depress then release the bypass enable pushbutton.

E. REALIGN the CEA by performing ONE of the following:

• INSERT the remainder of the group to the misaligned CEA and then withdraw the group to the pre-misaligned position.

• ALIGN the misaligned CEA to the remainder of the group.

F. Check the position of all CEA5 in the group for proper alignment (CEDMCS and DCS).

33

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

57A CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 25 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX H CEA REALIGNM ENT (MODES 1.2 AND 3)

(Page 2 of 2>

3. Misaligned CEA(s) while in Modes I and 2 (critical).

CAUTION Reacto r Power shall NOT be increas ed above the stable power level established following the CEA(s) misalignment.

A. Prior to realigning of CEA, contact Reactor Engineering and supply them with the following information.

1. Power level at which recovery is to be made.

2. Rate of CEA movement during recovery.

3. Movement of other CEAs to support recovery.

B. Place the mode select switch in the manual individual mode.

C. Select the misaligned CEA on the individual CEA selection switches.

D. Select the group of the misaligned CEA on the group select switch.

E. jf CEA motion inhibit is present, Ifl:

1. Depress and hold the CEA motion inhibit bypass pushbutton.

2. Depress then release the bypass enable pushbutton.

F. Realign CEA to the group position while borating as necessary to maintain Reactor Power at or below the power level which resulted from the CEA insertion.

G. Check the position of all CEAs in the group for proper alignment (CEDMCS and DCS).

H. Using manual group mode, readjust the group positions for proper automatic sequencing as necessary.

END OF APPENDIX H 34

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 4 Page 9 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

2A2-2A3 Spurious Opening resulting momentary deenergization of 2A3 4.16KV bus Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger OPEN 2A2- 2A3 Tie Breaker de energizing the 2A3 4.I6KV bus. 2A EDG will start and load onto the 2A3 4.16KV Bus.

Booth Operator instructions: When NPO directed to investigate loss of bus, wait three minutes and state maintenance person was walking down an ECO and bumped the door tie-breaker cubicle door and breaker opened. No apparent damage to the breaker.

Control Room Indications:

Key Annunciator:

B-9 PZR HTR XFMR 2A3 Trouble B-29 480V LC 2A312AB Load Shed RLY Failure H-29 PZR SAFETY VI 202 DISCH TEMP HIGH H-30 QUENCH TANK LEVEL HIGHILOW M-5 LETDOWN PRESS HIGHILOW Recognize 2A3 4.16KV bus is momentarily de-energized and 2A SRO Diesel Generator has started and closed onto the bus.

Implements 2-ONP-47.0I, Loss of Safety Related A.C. Bus (attached pages 36-43)

Recognizes loss of letdown, direct charging pumps to be stopped and control switches place in AUTO Contact EM and l&C Implements 2-ONP-47.0I, Loss of Safety Related A.C. Bus Appendix A (attached pages 38-43)

May implement 2-0120035, Pressurizer Pressure and Level, due to the need to select an operable pressure control channel and RRS channel and to reset heaters. (attached pages 44-50)

If up power in progress, directs stopping power ascension places turbine on HOLD Next Scenario Page = 51 35

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

7 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED A.C. BUS 7 of 54 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-47.O1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions CAUTION Various instruments and equipment that are normally used for the assessment of critical safety functions may .QI be operable. Use all available indications.

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTiONS j letdown flow is lost, Th:

A. SECURE charging.

B. ENSURE all operable charging pump control switches are returned to AUTO.

2. INVESTIGATE DETERMINE which electrical bus was lost.

VERIFY URCP CCW Flow Low 10 Minute 3. jf RCP 10 Minute Time Delay Trip 3.

TM annunciator is NOT in alarm.

Timing is in alarm, Then:

A. ISOLATE N Header supply RETURN valves from the Inoperable CCW train OR B. ISOLATE CCW to the Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger.

4. jf plant is in mode 3 through 6 (SIAS Blocked), fl PERFORM safety function status check of Low Mode Off-Normal Procedure for the current plant condition.

36

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

7 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED A.C. BUS 8 0 f 54 PROCEDURE NO:

2-ONP-4701 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE If more than one electrical bus has been lost, several appendices may be required to restore electrical lineup to normal. Figure 1 contains a diagram of the main power distribution system to aid in the performance of this orocedure.

5. RESTORE power to the deenergized bus per the appropnate Appendix below:

VOLTAGE DEENERGIZED BUS APPENDIX 4160 2A3 A 4160 2B3 B 4160 2AB C 480 L.C. 2AB D 480 L.C. 2A2 E 480L.C. 2B2 F 480L.C. 2A5 G 480L.C. 2B5 H 480 M.C.C. 2A5 I 480 M.C.C. 2B5 J 480 M.C.C. 2A6 K 480 M.C.C. 286 L 480 M.C.C. 2A7 M 480 M,C.C. 2B7 N 480 M.C.C. 2A8 0 480 M.C.C. 288 P 480 M.C.C. 2A9 Q 480 M.C.C. 2B9 R 480 M.C.C. 2AB S

6. j RAB electrical equipment room ventilation has been lost, fl RESTORE per 2-NOP-25.06, RAB Ventilation System.

7. EVALUATE Technical Specifications for lost electrical busses and equipment.

37

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

,EVIS ION NO.:

7 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED A.C. BUS 10 of 54 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ON P.47.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A RESTORATION OF 2A3 4160V BUS (Page 1 of 6)

INITIAL

1. lithe deeriergized bus is the 2A3 4160V bus, Then PROCEED as follows:

CAUTION Various instruments and equipment that are normally used for the assessment of critical safety functions may not be operable. Use all available indications.

NOTE Table I contains a listing of the major loads that have been lost.

A. With less than two CCW pumps running, MONITOR RCP bearing and seal temperatures closely.

B. ISOLATE N header supply and return valves from the CCW Train, if necessary, to increase cooling to the RCPs.

• HCV-14-8A

• HCV-14-9 C. ENSURE ICW pump does NOT start on a depressurized header, PERFORM the following if required:

1. PLACE the 2A ICW pump (or 2C, if aligned to the A train) switch in the PULL to LOCK position.

AND

2. Locally THROTTLE 2A ICW pump (or 2C, if aligned to the A train) discharge valve approximately 10 turns open.

j[ a differential current lockout has occurred, (Annunciators B-14),

Then DISPATCH an operator to the switchgear to check for any relay indications or other apparent problems. (iCurrent Relay located on 2A CCW pump breaker cubicle).

38

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

7 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELJJED A.C. BUS 11 f 54 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-47.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A RESTORATION OF 2A3 4160V BUS (Page 2 of 6)

(continued) INITIAL CAUTION Resetting the differential current lockout relay will immediately result in the diesel output breaker closing and the diesel loading onto the bus.

E. If rio apparent damage exists, 2 attempt may be made to reset the lockout.

F. ATTEMPT to energize the bus from the 2A diesel generator, as follows:

1. VERIFY the 2A diesel generator is up to full speed and voltage. ATTEMPT a manual start of the engine If necessary.

2. When the diesel generator is ready to synchronize, INSERT the synchronize plug and make only one attemot to close in the 2A diesel output breaker 2-20211.

3. If the diesel generator did NOT start or is NOT running correctly, SEND an operator to the diesel building to investigate.

G. REFER to applicable appendices to re-power load centers.

H. If the bus has NOT been reenergized, Ib ATTEMPT to cross tie the bus to the 2A2 4160V bus as follows:

1. ENSURE breakers to be closed are first green flagged.

2. ENSURE the 2A2 4160V bus is energized, if deeriergized, perform the following as necessary:

a. a differential current lockout has occurred, (Annunciator B-13), Then DISPATCH an operator to the switchgear to check for any relay indications or other apparent problems. (Current Relay located on 2-20110 breaker cubicle).

b. If no apparent damage exists, one attempt may be made to reset the lockout.

39

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

EVISION NO.:

7 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED A.C, BUS 12 of 54 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-47.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A RESTORATION OF 2A3 4160V BUS (Page 3 of 6)

H. 2. (continued) INITIAL 1.

c. INSERT sync plug and turn to position ST-2A2 MAKE only one attempt to Close Startup Transformer breaker 2A 2-20102.

OR INSERT sync plug and turn to position AT-2A2 MAKE only one attempt to Close Aux Transformer breaker 2A 2-20101.

d. llthe 2A2 4160V bus can NOT be energized, jj PROCEED with Step 1.H.

3. MAKE one attempt to close the 2A2/2A3 tiebreaker 2-20109.

4. INSERT the sync plug and turn to position TIE-2A3 MAKE only one attempt to close the 2A312A2 tiebreaker 2-20209.

I. CALL the Electrical Department for assistance, if breaker(s) will NOT close.

J. If NOT done previously, DISPATCH an operator to the switchgear to check for relay indications and any other possible problems.

K. If the diesel generator is loaded on the bus and the bus can be powered from an auxiliary I startup transformer, PERFORM the following if desired:

1. ENSURE breakers to be closed are first green flagged.

2. CLOSE breaker 2-20109 2A2 to 2A3 tie breaker.

NOTE The EDG Governor Control Amber light must be lit to ensure the EDO governor motor operated potentiometer is set to 60 cycles PRIOR to selecting the sync plug to position TIE-2A3.

3. ENSURE amber light is lit on the diesel generator governor control.

40

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

7 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED A.C. BUS 13 of 54 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ON P-47.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A RESTORATION OF 2A3 4160V BUS (Page 4 of 6)

1. K. (continued) INITIAL CAUTION Potential for diesel generator trip exists. Prior to closing the bus tie breaker, verify there are no diesel generator trips locked in (Annunciators B-26).

4. PLACE the synchronize plug in the TIE 2A3 position MATCH voltages using the DO voltage control.

5. With the DO governor control, MAKE the synchroscope go slow in the counter-clockwise direction.

6. CLOSE breaker 2-20209 2A3/2A2 just before the needle on the synchroscope passes through the 12 oclock position. Immediately GO TO raise on the diesel governor control HOLD it there until the Diesel has stabilized (to prevent reverse power trip).

7. UNLOAD 2A diesel generator to 100KW and open 2A diesel generator output breaker.

8. STOP 2A diesel generator VERIFY proper restart conditions by amber light indications on voltage regulator and governor controls.

a. COMPLETE all of the activities associated with shutdown of the Emergency Diesel Generators lAW normal operating procedures, including draining the accumulated water from the day tanks.

9. REMOVE the sync plug.

41

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

7 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED A.C. BUS 14 of 54 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-47.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A RESTORATION OF 2A3 4160V BUS (PageS of 6)

1. (continued) INITIAL the L. jt the bus can NOT be reenergized quickly, Then PERFORM following:

NOTE The HVE-218 CEDM Cooling Fan breaker may have to be RECLOSED manually due to an undervoltage trip condition on the A side bus.

1. ENSURE the following are running:

a. HVE-21B CEDM cooling fan

b. HVS-2B Rx cavity cooling fan

c. HVE-3B Rx support cooling fan

d. HVS-IC & ID containment coolers

2. REFER to 2-ONP-25.01, Loss of RCB Cooling Fans, due to the loss of two containment coolers.

3. ENSURE that Pressurizer level and pressure controllers are selected to the unaffected V channel, then REFER to ONOP 2-0120035, Pressurizer Pressure and Level, to restore the PZR heaters as necessary.

4. If the 2AB 480V load center was aligned to the A bus, REALIGN it to the energized B bus as follows:

a. OPEN 2-40702 2A2 Tie Breaker to 2AB 480V LC.

b. OPEN 2-40220, 2A2 Tie Breaker to 2AB 480V load center.

c. CLOSE 2-40504 282 Tie breaker to 2AB 480V load center.

5. CLOSE 2-40706, 2B2 Tie breaker to 2AB 480V load center.

42

PAGE:

REVISION NO: IPROCEDURE TITLE:

7 I LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED A.C. BUS 15 of 54 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-47.01 I ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A RESTORATION OF 2A3 4160V BUS (Page 6 of 6)

L. (continued) INITIAL

6. If the 2AB 4160V bus was aligned to the deenergized A bus, REALIGN it to the energized B bus as follows:

a. OPEN 2-20505, 2A3 tie breaker to 2AB 4160V bus.

b. OPEN 2-20208, 2A3 tie breaker to 2A8 4160V bus.

C. CLOSE 2-20409 2B3 tie breaker to the 2AB 4160V bus.

d. CLOSE 2-20504 283 tie breaker to the 2AB 4160V bus.

7. START the 2C ICW pump on the depressunzed header per 2-NOP-21.03C, 2C Intake Cooling Water System Operation.

8. START 2C CCW pump per ONOP 2-0310030, Component Cooling Water Off Normal Operation.

9. 1! shutdown cooling has been lost, RESTORE SDC per ONOP 2-0440030, Shutdown Cooling Off-Normal.

10. RESTORE charging and letdown, if necessary, per 2-ON P-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

11, ALIGN the 2A8 battery charger to the 2A DC bus per 2-NOP-50.OIA, 125V DC Bus 2A (Class IE) Normal Operation.

12. MONITOR the 2A diesel fuel oil day tank levels, as they will NOT automatically refill.

END OF APPENDIX A 43

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 4 Page 10 of 24 I 9A Event

Description:

2A2-2A3 Spurious Opening resulting momentary deenergization of 2A3 4.16KV bus Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

. If requested, the Shift Manager andlor Electrical Maintenance Supervisor give OK to reclose the 2A2-2A3 Tie Breaker.

. When directed to reset non-essentials, call and state the 2A8 MCC non-essentials will not reset. Appears MCC still de-energized.

Direct restoration of CR ventilation and SBVS/FueI Pool ventilation SRO systems. Recognize must reenergize MCC 2A8 before restoring Fuel Pool ventilation.

From Appendix A step K direct the 2A3 KV bus powered from the Startup transformer and the 2A Diesel unloaded and stopped.

(attached pages 40-41)

Direct non-essential loads reset.

Resets DCS TAVE signal on SBCS or FW FPD input screens if required. Using 2-0120035, Pressurizer Pressure and Level (attached page 48)

EXAMINERS NOTE: When 2A3 4.16 KV bus re-energized 2A8 MCC load center breaker tripped deenergizing the bus.

SRO Recognize T.S. 3.8.3.1 Action a re-energize within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

T.S. NOTE: Also applied when the bus was initially de-energized.

Contacts Shift Manager to report failure of 2A2-2A3 Tie 8reaker, and entry into 2-ONP-47.O1, Loss of Safety Related A.C. Bus.

44

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 4 Page 1 1 of 24 19A Event

Description:

2A2-2A3 Spurious Opening resulting momentary deenergization of 2A3 4.16 Ky bus Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Recognize loss of letdown, STOPS Charging pumps and places RO control switches in AUTO Recognizes loss of power to the LIC 1100 X and PlC 11 OOX requiring RO/BOP selection of the Y controllers to regain PZR heaters.

Recognize and announce DNB Tech Spec entry if applicable.

Selects operable Pressurizer pressure control and RRS channels and resets Pressurizer heaters lAW 2-0120035, Pressurizer Pressure and Level. Obtains key 98 for backup interlock bypass keyswitch.

Places key in LEVEL position and reset B side heaters. (attached pages 44-50)

Monitors adequate CCW flow to the RCPs. Monitors RCP bearing and seal temperatures.

When directed restore Charging and letdown lAW 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown step 6.0.11 (attached pages 53-57)

Next Scenario Page = 58 45

REVtSION NO.; PROCEDURE TITLE; PAGE:

26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 5 of 15 PROCEDURE NO.;

2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 7.1 Immediate Operator Actions

1. None 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE

• Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation, and 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, are applicable for Pressurizer Level and Pressure Instrumentation malfunctions.

• If SIAS has actuated, SIAS must be RESET before Pressurizer Heaters can be energized.

ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER 1.

PRESSURE CONDITION NOTE Appendix A contains a listing of pressurizer pressures which are associated with automatic actions.

A. Verify pressurizer spray, proportional A. j system is NOT operating and back-up heaters are operating properly in automatic, flj property in automatic. Refer to perform the following as Appendix A for expected automatic necessary:

responses.

1. 1! selected pressure channel has failed, shift to the operable pressure channel.

2. II selected pressure channel has failed high (greater than 2340 psia),

Then after selecting the operable channel, reset heater control switches on RTGB 203.

46

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 6 of 15 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. A. (continued) 1. A. (continued)

3. j both pressure channels are failed or automatic pressure control does NOT operate properly, fl operate spray controller in manual and energize or deenergize heaters as necessary.

NOTE Divergence of Spray Line Temperature s between 231 and 282 Spray lines may indicate a stuck open spray valve. The stuck open spray valve would have the spray line with the higher temperature approaching cold leg temperature.

B. Verify PCV 1100E, Spray Valve 2B2, B. I! either spray valve is OPEN, and PCV hOOF, Spray Valve 281, Then perform the following:

CLOSED by observing BOTH of the following:

1. CLOSED valve position 1. PCV I100E, Spray Valve indication. 2B2, is OPEN, )J PLACE the spray valve selector switch in PCV hOOF.

2. TlA1 103, Spray Line 2B1 2. if PCV 11 OOF, Spray Valve Temperature, and TIA-1104, 231, is OPEN, Then Spray Line 2B2 Temperature, PLACE the spray valve approximately equal. selector switch in PCV 1IOOE.

47

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 7 of 15 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. (continued) 1. B. (continued)

3. pressure continues to decrease due to a failed open main spray valve, Then consider performing the following:

• Trip the reactor and turbine

• StoptheRCPinthe affected loop.

PCV 1IOOE-2B2 RCP PCV 1100F-2B1 ROP

4. lithe RCP in the affected loop has been secured and pressure continues to decrease, Ib consider securing both 2B1 and 2B2 RCPs.

C. Verify SE-02-03, and SE-02-04, C. I! auxiliary spray valve(s) is Auxiliary Spray Valve(s), CLOSED. OPEN, Th:

1. Attempt to close using key switch.

2. ii auxiliary spray valves will NOT close, Then stop all charging and isolate letdown. Refer to 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

3. ReviewAP 0010134, Component Cycles and Transients, for applicability when plant is stabilized.

48

PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 8 f 15 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. (continued) 1. (continued)

NOTE Normally one PORV is isolated at power.

D. Verify power operated relief valves D. if PORV is OPEN and are closed. pressure is less than 2300 psia, Then close PORV block valve(s) V-1476 and I or V-1477. Refer to 2-0120036, Press urizer Relief I Safety Valve Off-Normal Operating Procedure.

E. Ensure that PORVs V-1474 and V-i 475 hand switches are in the proper position for existing plant conditions; see below:

Switch in NORMAL RANGE: Switch in LTOP:

1. (Lift Setpoint 2370 psia) 1. (Lift Setpoint 490 psia)

RCS temperature greater than RCS temperature less than 255°F during heatup or greater 255°F during heatup or less than 240°F durina a cooldown. than 240°F durina cooldown.

F. Verify pressure anomaly is NOT F. Slow the rate of change of caused by a large rate of change of T-avg or stabilize until T-avg. pressure anomaly is controlled.

49

PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 9 of 15 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. (continued)

G. If (LOOP) Loss of Offsite Power has occurred with diesel generators supplying power pressurizer level is greater than 27%, Itin perform the following to regain pressurizer heaters:

1. Manually close the breakers for pressurizer heater on 4160V buses Bkr 2-20204 on 2A3 bus Bkr 2-20403 on 2B3 bus.

2. Manually reset the backup heater breakers 81 and 84 only (200 kw each).

2. ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER LEVEL 2.

CONDITION Appendix B contains with automatic actions.

a listing of NOTE pressurizer levels which are associated I

A. Verify selected RRS channel is A. lithe selected RRS channel operating properly. has failed, Then shift to the operable channel.

1. NAVIGATE to the SBCS inputs screen on either FW FPD and reset the TAVE signal, if required.

B. Ensure backup charging pump starts B. jj automatic actions have NOT and letdown flow is decreasing, or occurred, Then manually the backup charging pump stops and control charging and letdown letdown flow is increasing, whichever flow as required.

is applicable. (Appendix 8 contains expected automatic responses.)

50

jPROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

REVISION NO.:

26 I PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL lOofl5 PROCEDURENO.:

2-01 20035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

C. Verify level anomaly is NOT caused C. Slow the rate of change of by a large rate of change in T-avg, T-avg or stabilize until level anomaly is controlled.

D. Verify Letdown Isol. Valves, D. if letdown has isolated, Then V-251 5, V-251 6, and V-2522 are secure charging and refer to open. 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

E. Verify selected pressurizer level E. selected level control valve is control valve (LCV-2110P I NOT operating properly, ]jj LCV-2110Q) is operating properly, take manual control of level control valve and refer to 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

F. Verify selected letdown pressure F. if selected pressure control control valve (PCV-2201 P 1 valve is NOT operating PCV-2201Q) is operating properly, properly, Then take manual control of pressure control valve and refer to 2-ONP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

51

rEVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 11 0 f 1 5 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE With less than 27% level on Channel X, the A pressurizer heater transformer feeder breaker (2-20204) trips and the B side 480V power supplies deenergize. With less than 27% level on Channel Y, the B pressurizer heater transformer feeder breaker (2-20403) trips and the A side 480V power supplies deenergize. The backup interlock bypass keyswitch selected to the level position, allows the 480V heater power supplies to be reset.

C. Verify pressurizer level indicating C. pressurizer heaters are controllers (selected and non- deenergized or level indicating selected) are operating properly and controller(s) failed, Ibn power is available to pressurizer perform the following:

heaters.

1. j. either level control channel has failed, fl shift to the operable channel and reset heaters as follows:

a. Place the backup interlock bypass keyswitch (RTGB-203) to the LEVEL position.

(This regains power to the proportional and backup heater banks controlled by the selected channel.)

b. Reset pressurizer heater banks as needed.

OR 52

REVISION NO,: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN

? of 26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS j letdown is unavailable, fl MAINTAIN pressurizer level by temporarily cycling charging pumps.

NOTE

§ If one or more charging pumps have lost pumping ability, gas binding may have occurred. This can result from pumping the VCT dry (hydrogen binding) or rupture of a charging pump suction accumulator (nitrogen binding). If this occurred, the charging pumps must be vented after restoring a source of water to the suction.

10. lithe charging pumps are gas bound, Then REFER TO Appendix C, Venting a Gas Bound Charging Pump.

11. Lcharging and letdown has 11.

been lost and can be restored,

)J RE-ESTABLISH charging and letdown flow as follows:

A. ENSURE adequate VCT A.1 RESTORE the VCT level is indicated, to a normal level In accordance with 2-ON P-02.O1, Boron Concentration Control.

B. ENSURE the Level Control Valve selector switch and the Pressure Control Valve selector switch are selected to the level and pressure control valves presently in service.

53

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TiTLE: PAGE;.

15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 8 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 5.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

C. PLACE HIC-IllO, Level, controller in MANUAL.

D. ENSURE PIC-2201, Pressure controller is In AUTO and set to maintain 150 psig.

E. PLACE the Position Limiter Bypass key switch in the BYPASS position.

F. ENSURE the Level Control Valves are CLOSED.

G. BYPASS Letdown Ion Exchangers by placing V2520 Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve to the BYPASS RESET POSITION.

H. START one charging pump I. VERIFY charging flow Is indicated.

NOTE If V251 5 closed due to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Temp High, it may be necessary to cycle V251 5 while opening the PZR Level control valve until flow is adequate to clear the high temperature alarm.

J. VERIFY the regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm M-28, SIAS R-6 or CIS P.3 alarms are NOT present.

U w

54

EVSION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE 15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 9 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

K. OPEN V2515, Stop Valve-IC.

L. OPEN V2516, Containment Isol Valve-IC.

M. OPEN V2522, Containment Isol Valve OC.

N. SLOWLY OPEN the Level Control Valve jj ESTABLISH approximately 5 gpm letdown flow.

CAUTION Prolonged use of charging without letdown could result in the pressurizer going solid. Pressurizer level must be closely monitored.

NOTE TI-2229, Charging Temp Outlet Regen HX should NOT be allowed to increase more than 60°F per minute.

0. WHEN Letdown 0.1 j letdown cannot be temperature stabilizes on restored, TIC-2221, Temp Regen INITIATE charging Hx Tube Out, as required for restoring Then RAISE letdown pressurizer level, or flow at a rate NOT to boration.

exceed 5 to 10 gpm over at least a 4 minute period.

P. ENSURE PIC-2201, Pressure controller is maintaining letdown pressure at 150 psig.

55

CHARGING AND LETDOWN 10 of 26 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

Q. When PZR level is at its setpoint, Then PERFORM the following:

1. BALANCE HIC-IllO, LEVEL, controller AUTO to MANUAL output signals, using the BIAS control knob while previewing the AUTO signal.

2. PLACE HIC-IllO, LEVEL, controller to AUTO.

3. MONITOR pressurizer level for abnormal trends.

R. PLACE the Position Limiter Bypass key switch to the NORM position.

CAUTION I V2345, LTDN CNTL VLV STATION SAFETY RELIEF, will open at 600 pslg.

S. SLOWLY RAISE PIC-2201, Pressure, setpoint to 430 psig.

T. ENSURE letdown pressure is being maintained at 430 pslg.

56

- njsNL.IJwn,.. uI CHARGING AND LETDOWN 11 of 26 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

U. NOTIFY Health Physics that dose rates near CVCS ion exchangers and piping may change when ion exchanger is placed in service.

V. PLACE the Letdown Ion Exchangers back in service by placing V2520 Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve to the AUTO Position.

12. ] Letdown Level control is 12.

malfunctioning, Then PERFORM the following:

A. VERIFY the output of A.1 PLACE HIC-illO in MANUAL by HIC-IllO, LEVEL, is performing the following:

responding as expected

1. BALANCE HIC-IllO to current plant MANUAL to AUTO conditions.

controller output signals by previewing and using the MANUAL control knob to match the manual and auto controller output signals.

2. PLACEHIC-IllOto MANUAL.

3 ADJUST letdown flow to a value consistent with the current plant conditions.

4. PERFORM a system walkdown observing for leaks or lifting relief valves.

B. VERIFY the selected B.1 PLACE the Alternate Level control level control valve is valve in service in accordance responding as expected with 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and to HIC-IllO output. Letdown.

57

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 4 Page 12 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

2A2-2A3 Spurious Opening resulting momentary deenergization of 2A3 4.16KV bus Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

• SNPO report load center Bkr 2-40352 has tripped but can see no reason for the trip.

Recognize key annunciator 8-22 4.16KV SWGR 2A2-2A3 TIE BKR BOP OVRLD TRIP. Verify breaker 2-20109 and 20209 are open.

Verifies 2A EDG has started and loaded onto 2A3 Bus.

When directed, calls NPO and SNPO to checkout breakers 2-20109 and 20209 respectively.

When directed energize the 2A3 4.16 KV bus from the Startup.

transformer lAW Appendix A step K (attached pages 40-41)

Restore shield building/fuel pool ventilation system using 2-ONP-26.02 Area Radiation Monitors. (attached pages 59-60)

Resets DCS TAVE signal on SBCS or FW FPD input screens if required. (attached pages 48)

Next Scenario Page = 61 58

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 AREA RADIATION MONITORS 16 f 18 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-ONP-26.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX B FUEL. POOL VENTILATION RESTORATION (Page 1 of 2)

1. RESET the Fuel Pool High Radiation interlocks as follows (HVAC Panel):

A. PRESS the Fuel Pool HVAC HI RAD A Reset pushbutton.

B. PRESS the Fuel Pool HVAC HI RAD B Reset pushbutton.

2. STOP the operating Shield Building Exhaust Fan(s):

• HVE-6A, SBVS Exhaust Fan

• HVE-6B, SBVS Exhaust Fan

3. ENSURE the following components are positioned as indicated:

COMPONENT ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION FCV-25-32 SBVS Isolation Valve OPEN FCV-25-30 Fuel Handling Emerg Vent Vlv CLOSED FCV-25-1 1 Outside Cooling Air to SBVS CLOSED D-29 Fuel Pool Inlet Damper OPEN D-31 Fuel Pool Outlet Damper OPEN 0-33 Fuel HdIg Bldg Inlet Damper OPEN 0-35 Fuel Hdlg Bldg Outlet Damper OPEN FCV-25-33 SBVS Isolation Valve OPEN FCV-25-31 Fuel Handling Emerg Vent VIv CLOSED FCV-25-12 Outside Cooling Air to SBVS CLOSED D-30 Fuel Pool Inlet Damper OPEN D-32 Fuel Pool Outlet Damper OPEN D-34 Fuel HdIg Bldg Inlet Damper OPEN 0-36 Fuel Hdlg Bldg Outlet Damper OPEN

4. PLACE Fuel Pool Ventilation in service as follows:

A. START a Fuel Pool Exhaust Fan:

• HVE-16A, Fuel Pool Exhaust Fan

• HVE-16B, Fuel Pool Exhaust Fan B. VERIFY HVS-6, Fuel Pool Supply Fan, starts.

59

EVISION NO.: IPR0CE0U TITLE: PAGE:

6 I AREA RADIATION MONITORS 17 of 18 PROCEDURE NO.: 1 2-ON P-26.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX B FUEL POOL VENTILATION RESTORATION (Page 2 of 2)

5. NOTIFY the SNPO to place Fuel Handling Building Ventilation in service as follows:

A. START HVE-15, Fuel Handling Bldg Exhaust Fan.

B. VERIFY HVS-7, Fuel Handling Bldg Supply Fan, starts.

C. START HVE-17, Fuel Handling Bldg Swgr Area Exhaust Fan.

END OF APPENDIX B 60

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: HLC Scenario# 8 Event# 5 Page 13 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

ccw Header B rupture HCV-14-1O fails open Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger CCW header B rupture Control Room Indication available:

Annunciators:

LA-b, CCW Surge Tank Compartment A Level Low LB-b, CCW Surge Tank Compartment B Level Low L-14, REACTOR COOLANT FLOW LOW CHANNEL PRE TRIP EXAMINERS NOTE: If crew manually trips the reactor due to failure of restoring the N header within 10 minutes, insert SGTL I SGTR SRO Recognizes low CCW surge tank alarms Implements 2-031 0030, Component Cooling Water Off-Normal Operation step 6.2.5 (attached pages 63-67)

Directs verification of N header valves closing Direct closing HCV-14-10 when informed failed to close Directs stopping 2B CCW pump Directs restoring N header from A side (step 6.2.5.C.2)

Directs Nuclear Watch Engineer to send someone to CCW Platform.

NOTE: CCW N header must be restored within 10 minutes or the Reactor should be tripped and the RCPs should be turned off.

Direct placing 2B HPSI and Containment Spray Pumps to STOP.

SRO Step 6.2 5.C.3.

Contacts Shift Manager to report CCW header B rupture, HCV-1 4-10 failure, and entry into 2-0310030, Component Cooling Water Off-Normal Operation.

61

REVISION NO: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER- 14 of 23 PROCEDURE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 2-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Action (continued)

4. B. 8. (continued)

c. Non-running Containment Cooler (approx. 1300 GPM)

COMPONENT ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL MV-14-9 CCW Supply to HVS-1A CLOSED MV-14-11 CCW Supply to HVS-IB CLOSED MV-14-13 CCW Supply to HVS-IC CLOSED MV-i4-15 CCW Supply to HVS-ID CLOSED

9. PLACE the following pump control switches in STOP on RTGB-206:

. 2BHPSIPump

• 2B Containment Spray Pump

10. CONSULT Tech Spec 3.7.3 due to loss of a Heat Exchanger.

5. if a CCW Header is ruptured, Th PERFORM the following:

NOTE Annunciators LA-b, CCW Surge Tank Compartment A Level Low, and LB-10, CCW Surge Tank Level High I Compartment B Level Low, will alarm on a rupture of either the A, B, or N CCW Header, or failure of the makeup system.

A. VERIFY that the N Header automatically isolates from the A and B Headers due to low levels in both compartments of the CCW Surge Tank by closure of the following:

. HCV-14-8A

. HCV-14-88

. HCV-14-9

. HCV-14-b0 62

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE; 37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER -

17 of 23 PROCEDURE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 2-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Action (continued)

5. (continued)

NOTE CCW has been isolated to the following B Essential Header Components:

2B HPSI Pump 2B CS Pump 2C arid 2D Containment Fan Coolers 2B SDC Heat Exchanger 23 Control Room NC Unit Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger CAUTION Loss of component cooling water flow through any of the heat exchangers listed below can result in severe thermal stress and flashing upon re-admittance of cooling flow:

2B KPSI Pump 2B CS Pump 2C and 20 Containment Fan Coolers 2B SDC Heat Exchanger 3B Control Room NC Unit 3C Control Room NC Unit, if aligned to B Essential Header Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger, if aligned to B Essential Header C. If Annunciator LA-i 0, CCW Surge Tank Compartment A Level Low, alarm clears, indicating that the rupture is in the B Essential CCW Header, Then PERFORM the following:

1. STOP the CCW Pump currently supplying the B Header:

• 2BCCWPump OR

• 2C CCW Pump

2. RESTORE CCW to the N Header from the A Essential Header by performing the following:

a. CLOSE HCV-14-8A.

b. CLOSE HCV-14-9.

c. OPEN HCV-14-8A.

d. OPEN HCV-14-9 (5 second time delay to open).

63

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER -

18 of 23 PROCEDURE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 2-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Action (continued)

5. C. (continued)

3. PLACE the following pump control switches in STOP on RTGB-206:

• 28 HPSI Pump

• 2B Containment Spray Pump j the plant is on Shutdown Cooling, Then the primary side of the 28 SDC Heat Exchanger must be isolated by closing V3658, 2B Soc HX Inlet From LPSI Pump.

5. DISPATCH an operator to verify local CCW Surge Tank level indications that the Ah Surge Tank level has been restored.

6. LOCATE and ISOLATE the leak, if possible.

7. j it is deemed necessary to restore CCW to the Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger from the A Essential Header prior to determining the source of the leak on the B Header, PERFORM the following:

a. CLOSE MV-i 4-17 and MV-14-19.

b. OPEN MV-14-18 and MV-14-20.

c. j the A Essential Header begins to depressurize or Annunciator LA-b, CCW Surge Tank Compartment A Level Low, alarms indicating that the wpture is in the header to or from the Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger, ]2 CLOSE MV-14-18 and MV-14-20.

64

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TiTLE: PAGE:

37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER -

19 of 23 PROCEDURE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 2-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Action (continued)

5. (continued)

NOTE CCW has been lost to the following:

Reactor Coolant Pumps CEDM Coolers Letdown HX Sample HXs 2A and 2B Waste Gas Compressors CAUTiON Loss of component cooling water flow through any of the heat exchangers listed below can result in severe thermal stress and flashing upon ]j re-admittance of cooling flow:

Reactor Coolant Pumps CEDM Coolers Letdown Heat Exchanger Sample Heat Exchangers

- 2A and 2B Waste Gas Compressors

0. itArinunciators LA-lO, CCW Surge Tank Compartment A Level Low, and LB-10, CCW Surge Tank Level High I Compartment B Level Low, both clear, indicating that the rupture is in the N Header, PERFORM the following:

1. TRIP the Reactor and the Turbine.

2. TRIP all four RCPs.

3. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

4. LOCATE and ISOLATE the leak, if possible.

E. 11 Annunciators LA-iC, CCW Surge Tank Compartment A Level Low, and LB-IC, CCW Surge Tank Level High I Compartment B Level Low, do not clear, Ij GO TO Step 6.2.6.B, Low Level in the CCW Surge Tank.

65

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TIRE: PAGE; 37 COMPONENT COOLING WATER -

20 o f 23 PROCEDURE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 2-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Action (continued)

NOTE CCW Surge Tank vent (RCV-14-1) diverts from atmosphere to the Chemical Drain Tank on high radioactivity in the CCW system.

8. if abnormal level conditions exist in the CCW surge tank, jj PERFORM the following:

A. High Level in the CCW Surge Tank.

1. CHECK the CCW Radiation Monitors (RM-26-1 and RM-26-2) for abnormal trends. If high radiation is indicated, REFER to 2-ONP-14.02, Component Cooling Water Excessive Activity.

2. CHECK the CCW Surge Tank Makeup Flow meter (FQ-14-14) for flow. If makeup flow is indicated, CLOSE V14100, Makeup Isol, and VERIFY V14101, Alternate Makeup Supply, is closed.

3. EVALUATE S/G Blowdown Sample Heat Exchangers as a source of in leakage.

B. Low Level in the CCW Surge Tank

1. CHECK the CCW Surge Tank Makeup Flow Meter (FQ-14-14) for flow:

a. If no flow is indicated:

1. VERIFY LCV-14-1, CCW Surge Tank Fill Valve, and V14100, Makeup Isol, are open.

2. VERIFY a Demin Water Pump is running.

I CAUTION I Use the fire system as a makeup source only as a last resort.

b. If flow is indicated:

1. COMMENCE a visual search of the CCW System for evidence of leakage.

2. REFER to Appendix A to aid in the leak search.

3. ISOLATE the leak, if possible.

66

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 5 Page 14 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

CCW Header B rupture HCV-14-1O fails open Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: As SNPO report leak at drain valve VI 4478 and will not isolate.

T.S. 3.7.3 Action statement 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore 2 trains NOTE: SRO may direct securing Charging and Letdown Recognizes low CCW surge tank alarms and recognizes HCV-14-1O BOP failure to close and notifies US When HCV-14-1O closed, recognizes annunciator LA-b, CCW Surge Tank Compartment A Level Low clears indicating rupture is on B header BOP Stops 2B CCW pump when directed When directed perform step 6.2.5.C.2 to restore N header from A side. (attached pages 64-65)

Places the 2B HPSI and 2B Containment Spray Pump in STOP.

RO Monitors RCP bearing and seal temperatures Sets CCW Makeup valve to .85 If directed, secures Charging and Letdown Next Scenario Page = 68 67

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 6a Page 15 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

SGTL / SGTR Time I Position I Anolicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

. When directed by examiner trigger SGTL, This will result in a 20 gpm SGTL Control Room Indications available:

. Lowering Pressurizer pressure and level

. PC-Il SJAE and Blowdown alarms Recognize Steam generator tube leak occurring on 2B SG

• SJAE alarm on PC-Il SRO . 2B SG Blowdown radiation

. Mismatch Chg I Letdown

. Recognize entry into DNB Tech Spec 3.2.5 EXAMINERS NOTE: May refer to 2-0120031 Excessive RCS Leakage if Charging and Letdown mismatch identified prior to SJAE radiation alarm.

Implement 2-0830030, Steam Generator Tube Leak (attached SRO pages 69-82)

. Implement Appendix A and refer to Figure 2

. Directs or Brief if leak becomes >capacity of charging pumps we will manually trip reactor

. Estimate primary to secondary leakage using daily chemistry report.

. Contact HP and inform of present plant conditions, conduct secondary surveys

. Direct Chemistry to implement COP-06.05 High activity in a SG

. Step 1 1, Consider isolating U-l Vacuum drag

. Step 12 Verify SGBD not aligned to Discharge Canal

. Direct field operators to perform step 13, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Appendix A (attached pages 79-81)

. Contact Chemistry for secondary sampling SRO Determine T.S. 3.4.6.2. c (Action a) HSB within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> T.S.

Next Scenario Page=83 68

ctuict ii LE: PAGE:

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 5 of 35 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 7.1 Immediate Operator Actions

1. None 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. 1! In Mode I through Mode 3 (SIAS NOT Blocked), Then PERFORM Appendix A and refer to Figure 2 as needed.

2. j in Mode 3 through Mode 6 (SIAS is blocked), Then PERFORM Appendix B and refer to Figure 3 as needed.

j continued use of SBCS is desired, Ibn block automatic Initiation of MSIS at 700 psia (annunciators P-18, P.20), as follows:

A. Block MSIS by turning MSIS block key switches (21 and 22) on RTGB 206 to the block position.

B. Ensure annunciators P-8 and (P-b),

MSIS Actuation Channel A (B)

Blocked, alarm when blocked.

4. Maintain steam generator level in the operating band (60% 70% narrow range) using main or auxiliary feedwater system.

69

EVISON NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 9 of 35 PROCEDURE NO:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 1 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I. i! at any time RCS leakage exceeds the capacity of the charging pumps and pressurizer level cannot be maintained, I:

A. If in Modes 1 and 2, I trip the reactor and turbine and implement 2EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

B. ] in Mode 3 (SIAS NOT Blociced),

Then implement 2-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

NOTE

¶Ti Quick diagnosis of a tube leak and subsequent rapid isolation of the effected S/G will minimize secondary contamination and radiation exposure. Observation of SIG Blowdown Radiation Monitors may assist in validating SJAE Radiation Monitor indications, and may become the primary measured indication if the SJAE Radiation Monitor is out-of-service. Even before contirmation of a tube leak has been established, planning and preparation for unit shutdown and mitigating the affects should commence, by performing notifications, procedure reviews, crew briefings, and ensuring resources are available to tend to the unit conditions.

2. Ensure sufficient charging pumps are 2. jj pressurizer level is NOT being operating and maintaining pressurizer maintained, isolate letdown to level, assist in maintaining pressurizer level.

3. jf the steam generator blowdown rad 3. Manually close the SIG blowdown monitor is in High Alarm, flj ensure and sample valves from the affected steam generator blowdown and sample steam generator.

valves from the affected steam generator have closed on high radiation.

4. Notify Health Physics of present plant conditions and to conduct secondary area radiation surveys.

70

rEVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 10 f PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 2 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE

• A time delay may exist between an increase in SJAE monitor reading and Steam Generator Blowdown monitor readings.

• Steam Generator Blowdown sample isolates on Steam Generator Blowdown process monitor high radiation signal.

CAUTION IF conditions of Steam Generator Tube Leakage Change, THEN REDIAGNOSIS of shutdown conditions is REQUIRED to ensure compliance with EPRI guidelines and Technical Specifications.

5. CHECK Air Ejector and / or Steam 5. it Steam Generator sample flow is Generator Blowdown monitor reading. isolated due to CIAS or high radiation, Then perform the

• Log radiation monitor readings every following, to regain sample flow only:

15 minutes. (Data Sheet 2)

• PLACE control switch for FCV-23-7/9 to CLOSE I OVERRIDE position

• OPEN FCV-23-719

6. Li Air Ejector and I or Steam Generator Blowdown monitor shows step rise or continuous rise, perform the following:

A. DIRECT Chemistry to implement COP-06.05, High Activity in a Steam Generator.

B. ESTIMATE primary to secondary B. I! it is not possible to estimate leakage by comparing Air Ejector primary to secondary leakage or monitor (preferred) and / or Steam the radiation monitors are out-of-Generator Blowdown monitor reading service, Then determine leak rate with Daily Chemistry Report. by Chemistry sample.

71

rEVISlON NO.: PROCEDURE TiTLE: PAGE; 36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 11 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 3 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

6. (continued) 6. (continued)

CAUTION Downpower load rate should be consistent with allowed time. Use of most of the time allowed for the downpower will minimize possible plant prturbatIons.

NOTE

• The following step is used to estimate an increase in the rate of change of the leak.

Example: Initially estimated leak rate is 80 gpd. 30 minutes later estimated leak rate is 95 gpd. 95 gpd 80 gpd = 15 gpd increase in 30 minutes, which is an increase of 30 gpd I hr.

• Data Sheet 1 is available to facilitate monitoring leakage.

C.  ! BOTH the following conditions exist, C. Go TO Step 6.0 of Appendix A.

• §3, 4 Estimated primary to secondary leakage is 75 gpd.

• Estimated rate of change in primary to secondary leakage is 30 gpd I hr (as measured by an increase of 15 gpd in 30 minutes>

I!n PERFORM the following:

I. REDUCE power at a rate of 10 mw/mm to 50% in 1 hr and be in Mode 3 in the next 2 hrs, in accordance with 2-ONP-22.01, Rapid Downpower.

2. Go to Step 16 of Appendix A.

72

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 12 ° f PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 4 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

6. (continued) 6. (continued)

NOTE 150 gpd = 0.1 gpm D. j RCS inventory balance or plant D. Go TO Step 6.E of Appendix A.

indications confirm primary to secondary leakage exceeds Tech Spec limits.

OR Valid SJAE and I or SIG Blowdown Radiation Monitor indicates S/G tube leakage is 150 gpd, Th PERFORM the following:

I. COMMENCE a plant shutdown at a rate of 3 mw/mm, be in Mode 3 in s 6 hrs, in accordance with ONE of the following:

• 2-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown

- Full Load to Zero Load

• 2-ONP-22.01, Rapid Downpower

2. GO TO Step 16 of Appendix A.

73

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 13 0 f 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 5 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

6. (continued) 6. (continued)

CAUTION Downpower load rate should be consistent with allowed time. Use of most of the time allowed for the downpower will minimize possible plant perturbation.

E. ft BOTH the following conditions exist, E. Go TO Step 6.F of Appendix A.

• §., Estimated primary to secondary leakage is 75 gpd.

• There is no operable SJAE or affected SIG Blowdown radiation monitor, Then PERFORM the following:

I. REDUCE power at a rate of 3 mw/mm and be in Mode 3 in the next 6 hrs, in accordance with 2-ONP-22.01, Rapid Downpower.

2. Go to Step 16 of Appendix A.

74

rEVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 14 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 6 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

6. (continued) 6. (continued)

CAUTION Downpower load rate should be consistent with allowed time. Use of most of the time allowed for the downpower will minimize possible plant perturbation.

F. 1! either of the following condition F. Go TO Step 6.G of Appendix A.

exists:

• The estimated primary to secondary leakage is greater than or equal to 75 gpd and is sustained for greater than or equal to one hour.

OR

• §2 Primary to secondary leak rate is unstable or increasing AND both SJAE and S!G Blowdown radiation monitors become inoperable.

]Jj PERFORM the following:

I. COMMENCE a plant shutdown at a rate of 3 mw/mm and be in Mode 3 in less than or equal to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, in accordance with one of the following:

• 2-GOP-i 23, Turbine Shutdown Full Load to Zero Load

• 2-ONP-22.0i, Rapid Downpower

2. Go to Step 16 of Appendix A.

75

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 15 of 35 PROCEDURE NO,:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 7 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTiNGENCY ACTIONS

6. (continued) 6. (continued)

NOTE A stabilized leak rate is when the rate of change is less than or equal to 10% of the last determined leak rate.

G. jj estimated primary to secondary G. GO TO Step 6.H of Appendix A.

leakage is less than 75 gpd but greater than or equal to 30 gpd, flj PERFORM the following:

1. DETERMINE the affected Steam Generator.

2. ESTIMATE primary to secondary leakage by comparing Air Ejector and S/G Blowdown rad monitor readings with the daily Chemistry report using the following schedule.

a. if the primary to secondary leak rate is not stable, Itn PERFORM the monitoring comparison every 15 minutes.

b. j the leak rate has been stable for more than one hour, flj PERFORM the monitoring comparison every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

c. If the leak rate has been stable for more than one 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, Then CONTINUE monitoring in accordance with Chemistry requirements.

3. CONSULT with Chemistry on the contaminated water plan for operational requirements.

76

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 16 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 8 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

6. G. (continued) 6. G. (continued)

4. With concurrence from Chemistry, CONTACT I&C to adjust process monitor alarm setpoints.

5. GO TO Step 7 of Appendix A.

H. 1! estimated primary to secondary H. GO TO Step 7 of Appendix A.

leakage is less than 30 gpd but greater than or equal to 5 gpd, ]jj PERFORM the following:

1. DETERMINE the affected Steam Generator

2. QUANTIFY Steam Generator leakage

3. RETURN out-of-service radiation monitoring instrumentation to service.

4. INCREASE monitoring frequency of radiation monitors to hourly.

5. With concurrence from Chemistry, CONTACT l&C to adjust process monitor alarm setpoints.

77

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 17 of 35 PROCEDURE NO:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

I (Page 9 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE A full isotopic analysis of steam generator water activity could take up to an hour. If an expeditious indication of gross activity is required, a frisk in the Secondary Lab or a quick count gamma analysis in the Hot Lab, will yield the necessary information to determine the gross magnitude and source of the leak.

7. Notify Chemistry of present plant conditions and to sample both steam generators for activity. J! a CIAS or high radiation signal has closed the steam generator sample valves, fljj they may be opened to permit sampling as follows:

A. Place control switch for FCV-23-7/9 to CLOSE I OVERRIDE position and then take switch to OPEN position.

NOTE A prompt determinatio n of the leak rate takes precedence over fulfilling the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> time requirement of Data Sheet 1.

8. Determine the primary to secondary leak rate, per 2-OSP-01 .03, Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance.

NOTE

• § 1! total tube leakage is greater than .1 GPM, Then the reactor must be in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Reference Daily Chemistry Report for projected Condenser Air Ejector Reading (C PM) with a .1 GPM Primary I Secondary Leak.

• A prompt expeditious shutdown is desired, however a controlled shutdown with minimal pressure transients takes precedence over a short duration to shutdown.

9. NOTIFY Plant Management of potential plant shutdown.

76

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

368 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 18 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 10 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

10. REVIEW procedures and CONDUCT shift briefs as needed for plant shutdown.

11. CONSIDER isolating blowdown and vac drag on Unit 1,

12. VERIFY steam generator blowdown is not aligned to the discharge canal.

13. DIRECT a field operator to the SGBTF to perform ALL of the following:

A. ENSURE SGBTF Truck Bay (roll-up) door is CLOSED.

B. ENSURE SGBTF ventilation systems are in operation:

• Supply Fans HVS-1OA or HVS-1OB

]j

• Exhaust Fans HVE-41A or HVE-418

• SGBTF Ventilation Process Monitor

14. VERIFY RCS water inventory balance 14. RETURN TO Step 6.B of and I pr Chemistry samples indicate Appendix A.

primary to secondary leak rate is less than or equal to 30 gpd.

15. j RCS Inventory balance and / or 15. RETURN to Step 6.8 of Chemistry samples indicate primary to Appendix A.

secondary leak rate is less than 5 gpd, EXIT this procedure and continue with the normal monitoring program.

79

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TflLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 19 of 35 PROCEDURE NO,:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 11 ofl3)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Downpower load rate should be consistent with allowed time. Use of most of the time allowed for the downpower will minimize possible plant perturbation.

16. PERFORM ALL of the following:

• jj necessary, Then INITIATE the Emergency Plan.

• CONTINUE to monitor process monitors for changing conditions due to Steam Generator tube leakage every 15 minutes.

• CONSULT with Chemistry to implement Contaminated Water Plan.

17. DIRECT a field operator to the SGBTF to perform ALL of the following:

A. ENSURE SGBTF Truck Bay (roll-up) door is CLOSED.

B. ENSURE SGBTF ventilation systems are in operation:

• Supply Fans HVS-IOA or HVS-1OB

• Exhaust Fans HVE-41A or HVE-41B

• SGBTF Ventilation Process Monitor 80

REVISION NO.: JPROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B I STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 20 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 12 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION To reduce the release of potentially radioactive steam from turbine auxiliary feedwater pump exhaust, motor driven auxiliary feedwater or main feedwater pumps should be used. If the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are not available, steam from the unfaulted or least affected steam generator should be used to drive the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

18. Capture the CTCS sponge ball in accordance with 2-NOP-21 .01, Condenser Tube Cleaning System Operation.

19. Ensure condenser air ejector is aligned to the plant vent.

20. Locally isolate auxiliary steam to auxiliary priming ejectors by closing V08245.

21. When the turbine is tripped the reactor 21. 1! the reactor is shutdown, )j go is NOT shutdown, ]J shutdown the to Step 22 of Appendix A.

reactor as follows:

A. REFER TO 2-GOP-203, Reactor Shutdown.

B. Verify that shutdown margin is within the limits specified in COLR in accordance with 2-NOP-100.04, Surveillance Requirements for Shutdown Margin Modes 2, 3, 4 & 5 Subcritical.

81

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: HLC Scenario# 8 Event# 10 Page 21 of 25 1 9A Event

Description:

Enter 2-EOP-1 5 Functional Recovery. Isolate 2A SG per Appendix R Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Implements 2-EOP-15 Functional Recovery:

SRO Implement Stepsi-9 (attached page 91-99)

Direct SFSCS to be performed every 15 minutes.

Identify Success Paths (Attachment 3 )(attached page 98)

Perform success path step 12 A-C (attached page 96)

Determines Containment Isolation Safety function NOT met (most affected SG not yet isolated). (attached page 98)

Directs cooldown and isolation of the 2A SG using per RCS and Core Heat Removal HR-2 (attached pages 103-112)

Directs isolation of the 2A SG using Appendix R of EOP-99, per RCS and Core Heat Removal HR-2 (attached pages 100-102)

When Appendix R complete determines Containment Isolation Safety Function met per Success Path Cl-i Suggested termination point:

• 2A SG isolated

. All safety functions met

. Initiate Cooldown 82

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 6 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTiON A harsh containment condition exists if containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure IA should be used for determination of saturation margin when indicated containment temperature is less than or equal to 200°F. Figure 15 should be used when Indicated containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure IA should also be used If containment temperature had exceeded 200°F during event progression but was lowered to 200°F or less by containment cooling systems.

NOTE

. Instruments should be channel checked when one or more confirmatory indications are available. Reg Guide 1.97 designated instruments should be used for diagnosis of events and confirmation of safety functions.

Steps designated with an

• may be performed non-sequentially or are to be performed continuously. -

1. ClassIfy Event EVALUATE EPIP Classification criteria for present plant conditions and Emergency Plan Actions.

REFER TO EPIP-Ol, Classification of Emergencies.

2. Implement Placekoeplng OPEN the Placekeeper NOTE the time of EOP entry.

83

REVISION NO,: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE;, -

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 0 PROCEDURE NO,:

2-.EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

3. RCP Trip Strategy A. Lf ANY of the following conditions exist,

• 2Aor2BAFWPumpisthe ONLY source of Feedwater

• RCS pressure is less than 1736 psia

• RCS Temperature is less than 500°F Thn STOP ONE RCP in EACH loop.

B. jf ANY of the following conditions exist,

• Main or Auxiliary Feedwater flow can NOT be re-established

• RCS subcooling is less than minimum subcooling

• CCW is LOST to the RCPs for greater than 10 minutes Iin STOP ALL RCPs.

84

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 8 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

4. Ensure RCP Seal Coollng A. VERIFY CCW to the RCPs. Al SIAS has Isolated CCW to the RCPs, fl RESTORE CCW.

REFER TO Appendix J, Restoration of CCW and CBO to the RCPs.

A.2 j CCW is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

A. ENSURE 0GW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.

B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleed off will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.

B. 1! BOTH of the following conditions exist,

• RCPs have CCW flow

• CIAS has isolated the normal RCP bleedoff flowpath to the VCT Then ESTABLISH the alternate RCP bleedoff fiowpath to the Quench Tank by OPENING V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

85

EVION NO.: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 9 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

5. VerIfy RCP Operating LImits 5.1 STOP RCPs that do NOT satisfy operating limits.

it RCPs are RUNNING, Ibn VERIFY RCP operating limits are satisfied.

REFER TO Table 13, RCP Operating Limits.

[2 6. Sample SIGs Sample BOTH S/Gs for activity boron.

REFER TO Appendix A, Sampling Steam Generators.

[2 7. Place Hydrogen Analyzers In Service PLACE BOTH Hydrogen Analyzers in service.

REFER TO Appendix L, Placing Hydro9en Analyzer in Service.

El 8. Protect Main Condenser PERFORM BOTH of the following:

A. jj a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following to protect the Secondary Plant:

1. ENSURE MSIVs are CLOSED.

2. ENSURE SGBD is ISOLATED.

B. STABILIZE the Secondary Plant AS NECESSARY.

REFER TO Appendix X, Secondary Plant Post Trip Actions, Section 2.

86

-EVISION NO.: PROCEDURE T$TLE: PPsGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY . .10 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LIJCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. Restore Instrument Air jf a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 28 Instrument Air Compressors.

10. Perform Safety Function Status Checks PERFORM the Safety Function Status Checks every 15 minutes.

REFER TO Attachment 1, Safety Function Status Check Sheet.

11. Identify Success Paths IDENTIFY the success paths to be used to satisfy each safety function.

REFER TO Attachment 3, Functional Recovery Success Paths.

87

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TrftE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 11 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

[] 12. Perform SUCCeSS Path Instructions PERFORM ALL of the following IN THE ORDER LISTED.

A. Instructions for a success path MOST LIKELY to be met for safety functions that are NOT met by ANY success path.

B. Instructions for success paths for safety functions that are NOT met by Success Path 1.

C. Instructions for ALL other success paths for safety functions met by Success Path 1.

13. Perform Long Term Actions When ALL Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied, Thç PERFORM Long Term Actions.

REFER TO Section 4.10, Long Term Actions.

END OF INITIAL ACTIONS 88

REVISION NO,: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY i47 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Cl-I - Success Path 1 AutomatklMsinjaf (continued) Isolation (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION jf there is a conflict between isolating a SIG with indications of SIG tube leakage or isolating a SIG with an unisolable steam leak,

]j the SIG with the ESO should be isolated. At least ONE S!G must remain available for heat removal.

El 2. Determine If SGTR Present a SGTR has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following,

• SIG activity

• Main steam piping radiation

• SIG level change when NOT feeding

• SIG blowdown activity

• ONE SIG level rising faster than the other with feed and steaming rates being essentially the same for BOTH

• Feedflow mismatch between SIGs

• Steam flow vs. feed flow mismatch in a SIG PRIOR to the trip Ibn IDENTIFY and ISOLATE the MOST affected SIG.

REFER TO Heat Removal Success Path HR-I or HR-2, and RETURN TO this success path when the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.

89

REVISION NO,: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 207 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY SUCCESS PATHS (Page 1 ofi)

Safety Functions Success Paths 123456 Reactivity Control RC-1, CEA Insertion RC-2, Boration via CVCS RC-3, Boration via SIAS Maint of Vital Aux DC MVA-DC-1, Batteries/Chargers Maint of Vital Aux AC MVA-AC-1, Startup Transformers MVA-AC-2, EDGs MVA-AC-3, Unit Crosstie RCS Inventory Control IC-I, CVCS IC-2, Safety Injection RCS Pressure Control PC-i, Subcooled Control PC-2, PORVs/Pzr Vent PC-3, Saturated Control RCS & Core Heat HR-I, SIG Without SIAS HR-2, S!G With SIAS HR-3, Once Through Cooling Containment lsol Cl-i, Automatic/Manual lsol Cntmt Press & Temp CTPC-1, Normal Cntmt Fans CTPC-2, Cntmt Coolers CTCP-3, Cntmt Spray Cntmt Comb Gas CCGC-1, Hydrogen <3.5%

CCGC-2, Hydrogen >3.5%

END OF ATTACHMENT 3 90

EV(SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 176 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT I SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK SHEET (Page 12 of 16)

6. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Automatic/Manual Isolation, Cl-I SAFETY ACCEPTANCE FUNCTION CRITERIA CHECK 9 CIS Radiation Monitors No valid alarms L I I I I I unexplained rising trends OR CIAS Actuated I I I I I I AND Containment Pressure Less than 3.5 psig I I I I I I OR CIAS Actuated I I I I I I AND Secondary Plant No valid alarms I I I I I I Activity unexplained rising (Condenser Air Ejector, trends Slowdown OR Main Steamline Radiation Monitors)

If a SGTR exists The MOST affected I I I I I I I

$10 is ISOLATED AND The MOST affected I I I I I I SIG pressure is less than 915 pslg (930 psia)

AND No Steam Release from I I I I I I I the MOST affected $10 END OF SAFETY FUNCTION 6 91

VISION NO.; PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 90 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

0 1. ENSURE HCV08-1A, Main Steam Header A Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.

0 2. it HCV-08-1A did not close remotely, flj PERFORM local closure.

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

0 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header A Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.

0 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header A Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

O 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1B, Main Feedwater Header A Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

0 6. j BOTH HCV-09-1A HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to S/G 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, I!in PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

0 A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

0 MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve O LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass O MV-09-3, 2A 100% Bypass 0 B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

O 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

92

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES / DATA 91 of 156 PROCEDURE NO,: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

O 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

O 9. ENSURE MV-08-18A, 2A S/G Atmos Dump VIv, is CLOSED.

O 1O.CLOSE MV-08-14, 2A SIG ADV Isol, O 11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2A, in STOP.

O 12.ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve, is CLOSED.

0 13.ENSURE MV-09-11, Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

a 14.PLACE MV-08..13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

0 15.ENSURE MV-08-19A, 2A SIC Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

0 16.CLOSE MV-08-15, 2A SIG ADV isol.

a 17.PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

0 A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation.

O 8. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120, 2A AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation.

a C. CLOSE SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.

a 0. ft SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08884, SE-08-2 Inlet Isolation.

(continued on next page) 93

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES / DATA of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EQP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

17. (continued) 0 E. j MV-08-13, SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Itn PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

0 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

0 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:

O a. CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

O b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

0 V08622, CB #67 Drain O V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol O V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol End of Section 1 94

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 90 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL Success Path 2 SIG With SIAS HR-2 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS Ensure Safety Injection Actuation 1.1 Manually START/ALIGN SIAS components.

jf ANY of the following conditions REFER TO Table 1, Safety exist, Injection Actuation Signal.

• RCS pressure is less than 1736 psia

• Containment pressure is greater than 3.5 psig Then ENSURE SIAS has ACTUATED.

2. Maximize SI Flow II SIAS is present, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:

A. ENSURE ALL available SI Pumps are RUNNING.

B. VERIFY adequate SI flow. B.1 TAKE actions to restore SI flow:

REFER TO Figure 2, Safety Injection Flow vs. RCS Pressure. A. ENSURE electrical power to SI pumps and valves.

B. ENSURE correct SI valve alignment.

C. ENSURE operation of necessary auxiliary systems.

C. ENSURE ALL available C.1 II the Charging Header is NOT Charging Pumps are RUNNING. available, Then CONSIDER charging to the HPSI header.

REFER TO Appendix T, Alternate Charging Flow Path to RCS Through A HPSI Header.

95

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 91 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

3. Depressurize RCS for SI Flow j[ Safety Injection flow is inadequate due to high RCS pressure, Then DEPRESSURIZE the RCS:

A. CONTROL RCS temperature.

B. CONTROL pressurizer heaters main or auxiliary spray.

C. OPERATE the PORVs or Pressurizer Vents AS NECESSARY.

4. Maintain RCS Subcooling (SBO)

If Station Blackout has occurred, at least ONE vital 4.16 KV AC bus is NOT energized, Then MAINTAIN RCS subcooling:

A. PERFORM a plant cooldown A.1 ENSURE BOTH of the following AS NECESSARY to maintain conditions exist, RCS subcooling based on Rep CET temperature.

• At least ONE S/G has level maintained or restoring to between 60 and 70% NR

• Rep GET temperature is NOT more than 22°F superheated B. VERIFY the reactor will remain B.1 if projected Shutdown Margin shutdown for 50°F less than the indicates that the reactor will NOT indicated TCOLD and boron remain shutdown, concentration at the time of the Then STOP the cooldown.

event initiation, at 50°F intervals.

96

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 92 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Cooldown rates up to 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcooling.

L15. Cooldown RCS it at least ONE Vital 4.16 KV bus is energized, Then PERFORM the following:

A. COOLDOWN the RCS using A.1 COOLDOWN using ADVs.

SBCS.

A.2 COOLDOWN using alternate

1. ii RCPs are operating, steaming paths.

Then COOLDOWN not to REFER TO Table 12, Alternate exceed 100°F in ANY SIG Heat Removal Paths.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.

2. If RCPs are NOT operating, Then COOLDOWN not to exceed 50°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.

3. If RCPs are NOT operating and a S/G is ISOLATED for a SGTR event, Then COOLDOWN not to exceed 30°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.

B. BORATE the RCS until Shutdown Margin is greater than the value required by the COLR.

REFER TO 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

97

REVISION NO.; PROCEDURE TITLE; PAGE; 30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 93 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.;

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL Success Path 2 SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

6. Verify Single Phase Natural 6.1 ENSURE proper control of SIG Circulation feeding and steaming.

jf NO RCPs are operating, Then VERIFY natural circulation flow in at least ONE loop by ALL of the following:

• Loop zsT (THOT minus TCOLD) less than 50°F

• Hot leg temperature constant or lowering

• Cold leg temperature constant lowering

• RCS subcooling is greater than minimum subcooling, based on Rep CET temperature

• NO abnormal difference (greater than 20° F) between THOT and Rep CET temperature 98

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 94 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL Success Path 2 SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

7. Ensure Two Phase Natural Circulation ILNO RCPs are operating, single phase natural circulation can NOT be maintained, Then ENSURE ALL of the following conditions exist,

• ALL available Charging pumps are RUNNING

• SI flow is within the SI flow delivery curve.

REFER TO Figure 2. Safety Injection Flow vs. RCS Pressure

• At least ONE S/C is available for RCS heat removal with level being restored to or maintained between 60 and 70% NR

• Rep CET temperature is less than 22°F superheated CAUTION Containment Conditions safety functions should be under positive control prior to blocking safeguards signals. Safety functions should be closely monitored for degradation. Manual actuation of ESFAS may be necessary should conditions warrant.

El 8. Block MSIS As the RCS cooldown and depressurization proceed, PERFORM the following:

A. MSIS is NOT present, Then BLOCK automatic initiation of MSIS.

99

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: I PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY II 95of207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL Success Path 2 S!G With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION there is a conflict between isolating a S/G with indications of S/G tube leakage or isolating a S/G with an unisolable steam leak, Then the S/G with the ESD should be isolated. At least ONE S/G must remain available for heat removal.

9. Determine If ESD Present it an ESD has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following,

• High steam flow from SIC

• Lowering S/C pressure

• Lowering SIC level

• Lowering RCS cold leg temperature

• Lowering Pressurizer pressure

• Lowering Pressurizer level Then DETERMINE the MOST affected steam generator.

E 10. If No ESD, GO TO Step 15 ft there are NO ESD indications, Then GO TO Step 15.

11. Isolate the MOST Affected SIG If MSIS has NOT isolated the leak, Then ISOLATE the MOST affected SIG.

REFER TO Appendix R, Steam Generator Isolation.

100

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 97 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS El 13. Stabilize RCS Temperature 13.1 Steam using 2C AFW Pump and alternate steaming flow paths.

it there are NO indications of a LOCA REFER TO Table 12, Alternate or SGTR, S/G Heat Removal Paths.

Then STABILIZE RCS temperature by performing ALL of the following:

A. STEAM the LEAST affected SIG using the ADV.

B. CONTROL feedwater to the LEAST affected S/G.

C. ENSURE the RCS is within the limits of Figure IA or I B, RCS Pressure Temperature.

D. if BOTH of the following conditions are met,

• NO RCPs are RUNNING

• The limits of Figure IA or I B were exceeded Then PERFORM BOTH of the

1. RECORD the temperature, pressure and time when control of RCS temperature was regained.

2. MAINTAIN RCS Pressure and Temperature stable for a minimum of TWO hours.

101

REVISION NO.: PAGE:

30 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 98 of 207 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-1 5 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Cooldown rates up to 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcooling.

L114. Cooldown RCS if indication of a LOCA or SGTR exists, Then PERFORM the following:

A. COOLDOWN the RCS using A.1 COOLDOWN using ADV5.

SBCS.

A.2 COOLDOWN using alternate

1. if RCPs are operating, steaming paths.

Then COOLDOWN not to REFER TO Table 12, Alternate exceed 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> SIG Heat Removal Paths.

period.

2. f RCPs are NOT operating, Then COOLDOWN not to exceed 50°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.

3. if RCPs are NOT operating, a S/G is ISOLATED for a SGTR event, Then COOLDOWN not to exceed 30°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.

B. BORATE the RCS until Shutdown Margin is greater than the value required by the COLR.

REFER TO 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

102

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36B STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 21 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

20830030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A ACTIONS IN MODE I THROUGH MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

(Page 13 of 13)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

22. When the reactor is shutdown, Th!i 22.

PERFORM BOTH of the following:

A. COMMENCE an RCS cooldown until A. j the SBCS is NOT available, hot leg temperature is less than 510°F Thçjj PERFORM both of the using the SBCS. following:

I. Steam to the atmosphere using the atmospheric steam dump valves.

2. Reevaluate the E-Plan classification.

B. DEPRESSURIZE the ROS and maintain 20°F to 50°F subcooling per Figure 1, RCS Pressure I Temperature.

23. jf RCS pressure and level are being controlled, Then when RCS pressure reaches 1836 psia and annunciator R-8, SIAS Channel Block Permissive alarms, perform the following:

A. Block channels A and B of SIAS by turning the SIAS block key switches (99 & 100) on RTGB 206 to the block position.

B. Ensure annunciators R-9 and R-10 SIAS Actuation Channel A (B) Blocked have annunciated.

24. GO TO Step 3 of main procedure.

END OF APPENDIX A 103

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 6a Page 16 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

SGTL I SGTR Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

. Notify Control Room Appendix A steps 13, 17, 18, 19 and 20 are complete approximately 10 minutes after request.

Indications Available:

. Charging and letdown mismatch.

. PC-Il SJAE trending up and eventual alarm

. PC-Il Blowdown trending up (10-15 minutes after SJAE)

BOP/RO Recognize Steam generator tube leak occurring

. SJAE radiation alarms

. Mismatch Chg. / Letdown Determines approximate leak rate of 20 gpm based on Charging /

RO Letdown mismatch.

Direct RO to isolate Letdown (Close V2515, V2516, V2522) as leak SRO increases.

Notifies SM of SGTL and power reduction Direct power reduction to Mode 3 lAW step 6.F.1 then goes to step 16 of Appendix A. (attached page 80) 104

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 6b Page 17 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

SGTL / SGTR Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger SGTR when directed by examiner EXAMINERS NOTE: Trigger SGTR prior to commencing plant SID BOP/RO Recognize Steam generator tube leak increasing

. Blowdown radiation trending up

. Mismatch Chg. / Letdown Directs Reactor tripped when notified Pressurizer level cannot be SRO maintained.

BOP Monitors and maintains SG levels 60-70%

Communicate with HP and Chemistry as directed by SRO Makes plant announcement of Unit shutdown RO Isolate letdown when directed as leak increases Trips the Reactor when directed by SRO Recognize Pressuirzer level lowering with letdown isolated and both Charging pumps running.

Inserts CEAs in Manual Sequential when directed, to place the plant in Mode 3 Trips the Reactor when directed by SRO 105

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 7, 8, 9 Page 18 of 24 I 9A Event

Description:

Reactor trip 2A MSSV fails open. Failure of MSIS to actuate. Failure of 2A HPSI pump to start.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

. When directed by Control Room to perform Appendix X of EOP-99 wait one minute and report back stating there is a MSSV stuck open on the 2A SG.

EXAMINERS NOTE: The MSSV will reset at 500 psia SG pressure Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions as follows:

. RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, SRO Core Heat Removal

. BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions, Requests STA to report to the control room to assist with the event.

Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions for Reactivity Control, Inventory RO Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Reactivity Control

. Verify Reactor power is lowering

. Verify startup rate is negative.

. Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted.

Inventory Control

. Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

. Pressurizer level is trending to 30 35% (take manual control of chg pumps and isolate letdown if not already isolated)

Pressure Control

. Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia (at 1736 psia verify SIAS and stop RCP in each loop)

. Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia (control manually)

. Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F 106

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 7, 8, 9 Page 19 of 24 I 9A Event

Description:

Reactor trip 2A MSSV fails open. Failure of MSIS to actuate. Failure of 2A HPSI pump to start.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: If asked to gag the SG safety, report back in three minutes, the gag, normally on the steam trestle is missing.

CRITICA Upon SIAS (1736 psia) recognize 2A HPSI failed to start. Request SRO permissive to start 2A HPSI pump. Starts 2A HPSI pump.

RO RO Stops one RCP I LOOP when SIAS on low Pzr. Pressure CRITICAL TASK Direct 2A HPSI pump started SRO Direct CCW restored to RCPs per Appendix J (attached pages 88-SRO 89) when isolated by SIAS. If not restored within 10 minutes, direct stopping RCPs Core Heat Removal

. Verify at least one RCO running with CCW ( if >10 minutes RO with no CCW must secure)

. Verify loop delta T is <10 F Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Vital Auxiliaries, BOP RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

. Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

. Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

. Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)

. All vital and non vital DC Buses energized.

107

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 7, 8, 9 Page 20 of 24 1 9A Event

Description:

Reactor trip 2A MSSV fails open. Failure of MSIS to actuate. Failure of 2A HPSI pump to start.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Approximately 2 minutes after being directed to perform Appdx. X section 1, NPO reports the 2A MSSV is lifting.

RCS Heat Removal

. Verify at least one SG has feedwater available (AFW or MFW)

BOP

• Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535 F

• Verify SG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig.

• Ensure MSR Block valves and warmup valves closed Recognizes MSIS fails to actuate at 700 psia. Recommends to SRO BOP to manually actuate MSIS. Manually actuates MSIS when directed.

SRO Concurs / Gives direction to manually actuate MSIS.

Containment Conditions

. Verify containment pressure <2 psig

. Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm.

BOP

. Verify containment temperature is less than 120 F

• Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms (SG Blowdown may be in alarm Upon unit trip, notify NPO to perform App.X sect.1 of EOP-99.

Restore CCW to RCPs per Appendix J (attached pages 88-89)

EXAMINERS NOTE: If Appendix J not completed in 10 minutes, potential new Critical Task Evaluate diagnostic flow chart of 2-EOP-01 Determines SGTR and SRO ESDE. Directs entry to 2-EOP-1 5, Functional Recovery Next Scenario Page = 90 108

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PPGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 62 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX J RESTORATION OF CCW AND CBO TO THE RCPs (Page 1 of 2) 0 1. ENSURE Instrument Air to Containment is available by PLACING HCV-18-1 to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

CAUTION Under SIAS Conditions the CCW N header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

• HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-1O) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open.

• When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW N header valves, until SIAS is reset.

0 2. ] SIAS has closed the N Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER A or B CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

• HCV-14-8A N Hdr Isol Discharge

• HCV-14-9 N Hdr lsot Suction OR

• HCV-14-8B N Hdr lsol Discharge

• HCV-14-1O N Hdr Isol Suction 0 3. ALIGN CCW to I from the RCPs by OPENING ALL of the following valves:

0 HCV-14-1, CCWT0 RC PUMP 0 HCV-14-2, CCW From RC PUMP O HCV-14-7, CCWTO RC PUMP O HCV-14-6, CCW From RC PUMP O 4, 11 CIAS has isolated controlled bleedoff flow to the VCT, Then OPEN V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

109

iEVtSI0N NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 63 of 156 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX J RESTORATION OF CGW AND CBO TO THE RCPs (Page 2 of 2)

CAUTiON RCP Seal Cooler isolation valves automatically close on high Seal Cooler outlet temperature of 200°F. MaIntaining the control switch in the OPEN position will override this function. CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage should conditions warrant the valve(s) to be maintained in the open position. Consideration should be given to returning the control switch(es) to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.

D 5. ENSURE ALL RCP Seal Cooler Isolation valves are OPEN:

O HCV-14-11-A1, CCW From 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler O HCV-14-1 1-A2, CCW From 2A2 RCP Seal Cooler O HCV-14-11-B1, CCW From 2B1 RCP Seal Cooler O HCV-14-11-B2, CCW From 2B2 RCP Seal Cooler

6. VERIFY RCP CCW related alarms are CLEAR or have been evaluated and clispositioned.

END OF APPENDIX J 110

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC Scenario # 8 Event # 10 Page 22 of 25 1 9A Event

Description:

Enter 2-EOP-1 5 Functional Recovery. Isolate 2A SO per Appendix R Time I Position I nnI,.n+

nr Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Perform 2-EOP-99 Appendix A, Sampling SGs (attached pages 113-BOP 114)

Perform Appendix R to isolate 2A SG (attach pages 100-102)

Monitor RCP operating limits.

Suggested termination point:

• 2A SG isolated

• All safety functions met

• Initiate Cooldown 111

REVISION NO,: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES! DATA of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

ATrain() 5 Train (J) 0 1. If a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

C A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

C B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW N header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

• HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-1O) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open

• When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW N header valves, until SIAS is reset O 2. j SIAS has closed the N Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER A or B CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

• HCV-14-8A

• HCV-14-9 OR

• HCV-14-85

• HCV-14-1O 112

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE; PAGE:

36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS of 156 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)

D 3. j CIAS or high radiation has closed the SOBO Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

D 4. DIRECT Chemistry to perform SIG samples for activity and boron.

0 5. j S/Gs cannot be sampled,

]J DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A 113

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: A Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

Raise power and place the Turbine on line starting with step 6.10 of 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1.

Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None.

Tech Spec Action Statement:

None.

OPS 513s:

None Locked in Annunciators:

D-1 9 DEH DC Supply Trouble.

D-29 Hydrogen Alarm Panel Trouble D-59 Generator Condition Monitor Alarm.

K-6 CEA Auto Motion Low Power Prohibit.

K-I 8 Auto Withdrawal Prohibit.

L-1 2 Steam Bypass Demand AWP.

L-23 CEA Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit.

L-29 Loss of Load/LCL PWR DENS Channel Trip Bypassed.

L-41 Start-Up Rate Trip in Service.

M-48 2C Charging Pump SS 1SOLN2553 OVRLD.

Current Status:

2-3% power. BOC, 1622 PPM boron, MTC approximately 0. MFW and SBCS are in service.

Vacuum has been drawn in the Condenser.

All Surveillances are completed and approvals given to go to Mode 1.

Reactor Engineering Guidance recommends Gp 5 at 102 at 20% Power.

Eciuipment Problems:

2C Charging pump QOS for repack.

114

Inter-Office Correspondence RE:PSL 10-001 To: Shift Manager Date: January 12, 2010 From: Walter D. Mead, Jr. Department: Reactor Engineering

Subject:

UNIT 2 POWER ASCENSION.

The following recommended guidance is provided by RE to return the unit to full power operation.

1. Low power physics testing has confirmed that MTC is 0 pcm/°F.

2. Group 5 CEAs should exceed 102 prior to reaching 20% power.

3. Raise power in preparation for turbine roll with CEAs only.

4. Power ascension greater than 15% power shall be at 0.42 MW/mm (3%!hr).

5. Nuclear! Delta T Power Calibrations shall be required at 30% power, 45% power, 80% power, and 98% power.

Please contact Reactor Engineering should the need for additional guidance arise.

Walter Mead /

J,L John Harmon

/%----

Reactor Engineering / Reactor Engineering Supervisor For Exam Use Only 115

Critical Task Evaluation Sheet Critical Task Acceptance Criteria Start 2A HPSI pump RO identifies failure of the 2A HPSI pump to start on SIAS. He starts the 2A HPSI pump and verifies Red light ON and Green light OFF and proper flow indication. The pump must be started prior to loss of subcooling in order to successfully complete the task.

116