ML14213A099

Notification of Part 21 Report - Potentially Defective Pressure & Temperature Switches

ML14213A099
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse, Browns Ferry, Harris, Watts Bar, Sequoyah, River Bend, Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	07/24/2014
From:	Dirks M SOR
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
50299
Download: ML14213A099 (9)

Text

0712412014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Pare L Part 21 (PAR)

Event#

50299 Rep Org: SOR INC.

Notification Date / Time: 07/23/2014 15:15 (EDT)

Supplier: SOR INC.

Event Date / Time: 07/16/2014 (CDT)

Last Modification: 07/23/2014 Region: 4 Docket #:

City:

LENEXA Agreement State:

Yes County:

License #:

State:

KS NRC Notified by: MELANIE DIRKS Notifications:

MEL GRAY R1DO HQ Ops Officer: STEVE SANDIN RANDY MUSSER R2DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY STEVE ORTH R3DO 10 CFR Section:

GEOFFREY MILLER R4DO 21.21(d)(3)(i)

DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE NRR PART 21 EMAIL PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE PRESSURE & TEMPERATURE SWITCHES The following information was originally received in NRC Region IV on July 16, 2014 via email. Relevant portions of the submittal are provided below without graphs, tables or pictures.

"SOR is a supplier of basic components to the nuclear power industry. The components of concern for this notification are SOR nuclear qualified Pressure and Temperature switches with TA housings manufactured from 2004 through 2009.

"The defect being reported is a potential out of tolerance condition concerning the machined sealing surface for an environmental seal on the SOR nuclear TA housing. Other switches with a similar defect have the potential to not meet their intended safety function.

"Summary: SOR Inc. began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 6/4/14 upon receipt of three SOR pressure switches, model number 5TA-B45-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ (SN's 041100627, 041100628, and 041100629). These were returned from Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (VY) due to inspections which questioned the suitability of the sealing surfaces on the face of the housings where the cover O-ring seals.

"The product evaluation was concluded on 6/24/14 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. If the switch housing has an inadequate machined sealing surface, the potential exists for steam permeation into the switch housing during accident conditions. This could result in an increase in set point as well as allow moisture into the housing potentially causing electrical consequences such as current leakage or a short. It is anticipated that the above noted condition represents a small percentage of the total number of housings from this batch of castings. Also, the potential risk is thought to be small due to a second redundant seal on the cover. This condition is being reported as a conservative measure.

0712412014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Pa-ae 2 "Evaluation: There are 2 (redundant) environmental seals on the cover of the nuclear TA housing. One O-ring seals on the undercut of the cover threads (151 O-ring). This seal is not in question and is not part of this evaluation. The other O-ring seals between the face of the enclosure and the O-ring groove on the cover (042 0-ring). This is the seal that is the subject of this evaluation.

"Redundant O-ring seals are used on the SOR 'TA' cover to minimize steam permeation into the housing during LOCA or HELB conditions. The consequences of permeation are that it can result in an increase in the set point and also allow moisture into the housing which could have electrical consequences. The returned switches have a suspect sealing surface on the face of the housing where one of the two O-rings (the 042 O-ring) is intended to seal. For the purposes of this Part 21 evaluation, consideration needs to be given to whether this suspect sealing surface could result in increased permeation into the switch enclosure.

"Switches #041100627 and 041100628 both have an area on the face of the housing where the casting did not have sufficient material for cleanup when the housing was machined. This area was characterized by use of the SOR CMM and measuring the area where the O-ring is expected to seal.

"Switch #041100629 was different from #041100627 and 041100628 in that it had one small indentation in the sealing surface which was immeasurable but does not meet surface finish requirements.

"The TA housings on the returned switches are clearly out of tolerance. It is SOR's position that the environmental seals on any switch with a similar defect has the potential to not meet its' intended safety function...

"Evaluation of Previous Shipments: SOR has validated shipments for a quantity of 56 pressure and temperature switches with the subject TA housing.

"Potentially affected customers/utilities include: TVA/Watts Bar, TVA/Browns Ferry, TVA/Sequoyah, Entergy NuclearNermont Yankee, Entergy Operations/River Bend, Southern California Edison, Third Qinshan Nuclear/QSNPP-3-A (TQNPC), Fairbanks Morse Engine, STP Nuclear Operating Co., Hydro Quebec /Gentilly II, Progress Energy/Shearon Harris, Control Components Inc./Korea Hydro Nuclear Shin-Kori & Wolsong, Control Components Inc./KHPN Shin Kori 3 & 4, Korea Hydro & Nuclear/KHPN Yonggwang NPP #5, Konan Engineering/Yonggwang Nuclear, and First Energy/Davis-Besse Nuclear. (Total Potentially Affected = 56.

"Root Cause: The returned TA housing castings did not meet print and therefore did not allow enough material for cleanup of the machined sealing surface.

"Permanent Corrective Action: SOR internal documentation is being changed to require 100% inspection of the raw casting height. Also, the 1/8 [inch] minimum finish dimension is being added to the housing machining drawings.

"Action by Nuclear Power Plant: SOR recommends that the application for each switch noted in the above table be reviewed to determine if it is being used in a LOCA or HELB application. If so, SOR recommends an inspection to visually check for an adequate sealing surface of the housing. This inspection is also recommended for switches that have not yet been installed. The minimum required sealing surface is 1/8 [inch] (0.125 [inch]). After inspection, all units should have the 042 and 151 O-rings replaced if the units do not exhibit the deviation.

"SOR will send replacement O-rings at no charge upon request. If units are found that do not meet the acceptance criteria, they will be replaced free of charge by SOR. Contact SOR Director of Customer Service, Greg Barber for the replacements:

"Greg Barber "913-956-3059 "gbarber@sorinc.com"

, EOR MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL 14685 WEST 105TH STREET, LENEXA, KANSAS 66215-2003 913-888-2630 I 800-676-6794 sorinc.com July 16, 2014

SUBJECT:

Notification of Defect SOR is a supplier of basic components to the nuclear power industry. The components of concern for this notification are SOR nuclear qualified Pressure and Temperature switches with TA housings manufactured from 2004 through 2009.

The defect being reported is a potential out of tolerance condition concerning the machined sealing surface for an environmental seal on the SOR nuclear TA housing. Other switches with a similar defect have the potential to not meet their intended safety function.

The attached report describes the defect, recommended actions, evaluation of previous shipments and permanent corrective action taken.

Regards, Melanie Dirks Director of Quality SOR Inc.

Engineered to Order with Off-the-Shelf Speed Form 1486 (08.12),%2012 SOR Inc.

Notification of Defect July 2014 Page 2 of 7 Scope:

Nuclear Pressure and Temperature switches manufactured between 2004 and 2009: The relevant models are designated by a "TA" in the second position of the model number string (Housing designator) and by a "NQ" at the end of the model number (Accessory designator). See model string below:

XXX TA - XX XXX-XX-XXX - XX XXNQ 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

] - Sensor designator 2-Housing designator - Only "TA" is affected 3-Switch designator Z-l Range designator 5-Diaphragm designator 6-Process connection designator 7-Accessory (optional) 8' Accessory (optional) 9-Accessory designator - Only "NQ" is affected Summary:

SOR Inc. began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 6/4/14 upon receipt of three SOR pressure switches, model number 5TA-B45-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ (SN's 041100627, 041100628, and 041100629). These were returned from Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (VY) due to inspections which questioned the suitability of the sealing surfaces on the face of the housings where the cover 0-ring seals. See pictures below.

The product evaluation was concluded on 6/24/14 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. If the switch housing has an inadequate machined sealing surface, the potential exists for steam permeation into the switch housing during accident conditions. This could result in an increase in set point as well as allow moisture into the housing potentially causing electrical consequences such as current leakage or a short.

It is anticipated that the above noted condition represents a small percentage of the total number of housings from this batch of castings. Also, the potential risk is thought to be small due to a second redundant seal on the cover.

This condition is being reported as a conservative measure.

Engineered to Order with Off-the-Shelf Speed

Notification of Defect July 2014 Page 3 of 7 Evaluation:

There are 2 (redundant) environmental seals on the cover of the nuclear TA housing. One O-ring seals on the undercut of the cover threads (151 O-ring). This seal is not in question and is not part of this evaluation. The other O-ring seals between the face of the enclosure and the O-ring groove on the cover (042 O-ring). This is the seal that is the subject of this evaluation. See illustration below.

Redundant O-ring seals are used on the SOR "TA" cover to minimize steam permeation into the housing during LOCA or HELB conditions. The consequences of permeation are that it can result in an increase in the set point and also allow moisture into the housing which could have electrical consequences. The returned switches have a suspect sealing surface on the face of the housing where one of the two O-rings (the 042 O-ring) is intended to seal. For the purposes of this Part 21 evaluation, consideration needs to be given to whether this suspect sealing surface could result in increased permeation into the switch enclosure.

Switches #041100627 and 041100628 both have an area on the face of the housing where the casting did not have sufficient material for cleanup when the housing was machined. This area was characterized by use of the SOR CMM and measuring the area where the O-ring is expected to seal. The graphs below represent the worst case measurements taken on Serial #041100627 and 041100628. The "1.625" on the X axis represents the radius to the inside of the O-ring seal gland. Eleven measurements were taken at 0.010" increments. The Y axis represents the deviation from the machined surface on the face of the housing. The O-ring groove is 0.104" wide X 0.052+/-0.002" deep. The 042 O-ring has a 0.070" diameter cross section and will be a snug fit on the ID of the groove. From the illustration below, it can be seen that approximately 50% of the O-ring groove will have less than the intended compression. While the O-ring may be suitable with less compression, it was not qualified this way.

Engineered to Order with Off-the-Shelf Speed Form 1486 (08.12) ý62012 SOR Inc.

Notification of Defect July 2014 Page 4 of 7 I 01$

Actual 0-ring Gland S/N 041100627 (Approximately to scale)

Actual 0-ring Gland S/N 041109628 (Approximately to scale)

Engineered to Order with Off-the-Shelf Speed

Notification of Defect July 2014 Page 5 of 7 Switch #041100629 was different from #041100627 and 041100628 in that it had one small indentation in the sealing surface which was immeasurable but does not meet surface finish requirements.

The TA housings on the returned switches are clearly out of tolerance. It is SOR's position that the environmental seals on any switch with a similar defect has the potential to not meet its' intended safety function. There must be at least 1/8" of machined sealing surface on the housing as measured from the 3-5/32" diameter counter-bore to ensure an adequate seal.

Evaluation of Previous Shipments:

SOR has validated shipments for a quantity of 56 pressure and temperature switches with the subject TA housing.

The table listed below provides the total potentially affected and their shipment history.

Date Customer, Utility Name &

Serial SOR Shipped Purchase Order Number Quantity Numbers Model Number SOR SO 8/23/04 Tennessee Valley Authority 2

40604704, 201TA-B125-U9-C7A-JJTTNQ 422041-1 Watts Bar 40604705 00037620 8/23/04 Tennessee Valley Authority 3

40604706, 201TA-BB125-U9-C7A-422041-2 Watts Bar

40604707, JJTTNQ 00037620 40604708 6/5/06 Tennessee Valley Authority 1

60511049 201TA-B125-U9-C7A-JJTTNQ 455055-1 Watts Bar, 00001682. REL.00693 5/17/05 Tennessee Valley Authority 1

50207568 201TA-B125-U9-C7A-JJTTNQ 433824-1 Browns Ferry, 614317 3/16/06 Tennessee Valley Authority 5

51206511, 9TA-BB5-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ 448080-1 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

51206512, 00001682.REV003.REL.00614

60109536, 60109537, 60109538 5/14/07 Tennessee Valley Authority 1

70304432 9TA-BB5-U1-C1A-JJTTNQ 468864-1 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 0001682 REL.00815 10/1/07 Tennessee Valley Authority 5

70701763, 201TA-B125-U9-C7A-JJTTNQ 474034-1 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

70701764, 00063289

70701765, 70701766, 70701767 2/1/05 Entergy Nuclear 5

41100625, 5TA-B45-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ 428483-1 Vermont Yankee

41100626, VY018974

41100627, 41100628, 41100629 4/4/05 Entergy Nuclear 2

50202265, 29TA-B45-U1-C1A-JJTTNQ 432798-1 Vermont Yankee 50202266 VY01 9418 8/26/08 Entergy Nuclear 4

80709351, 29TA-B45-U1-C1A-JJTTNQ 492310-1 Vermont Yankee

80709352, 10202738

80709353, 80709354 9/1/09 Entergy Nuclear 1

90606577 12TA-B45-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ 506962-1 Vermont Yankee 10242835 Engineered to Order with Off-the-Shelf Speed

Notification of Defect July 2014 Page 6 of 7 Date Customer, PO &

Serial SOR Shipped Utility Name Quantity Numbers Model Number SOR SO 2/14/10 Entergy Operations, Inc.

1 91101205 20XTA-BB125-U9-C7A-TTNQ 512576-2 10/13/10 River Bend 30190 10258267 1/27/06 Southern California Edison 1

50806569 201TA-W125-U9-C7A-JJTTNQ 442181-1 6G216003 5/19/06 Southern California Edison 1

60400344 201TA-W125-U9-C7A-452775-1 6L236024 JJTTNQX 5/4/07 Third Qinshan Nuclear 2

70203416, 6TA-B5-U8-C1A-JJRRTTNQ 467009-1 QSNPP-3-A (TQNPC) 70203417 2007-SOR-1 7/19/07 Fairbanks Morse Engine 1

70704378 201TA-B125-U9-C7A-JJTTNQ 474450-1 FAIRBANKS. MORSE. SAMPLE 1/8/08 Fairbanks Morse Engine 2

71205152, 201TA-B125-U9-C7A-JJTTNQ 481832-1 1099787REV1 71205153 11/19/07 STP Nuclear Operating Co 2

70709479, 6TA-B3-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ 475156-1 Stock Code 501-74266 70709480 90296 12/5/07 Hydro Quebec 3

70808012, 4TA-B4-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ 476320-1 Gentilly II

70808013, 4502016557 70808014 10/6/08 Progress Energy 2

80707379, 6TA-B5-U8-CIA-JJTTNQ 492020-1 Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant 80707380 00389275.REV001 8/11/08 Control Components Inc.

4

80200099, 6TA-BB5-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ 483633-1 Korea Hydro Nuclear

80200100, Shin-Kori & Wolsong

80200101, 603876 80200102 12/8/08 Control Components Inc.

4

81005472, 6TA-BB5-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ 496234-1 KHPN Shin Kori 3 & 4

81005473, 604751

81005474, 81005475 2/27/09 Korea Hydro & Nuclear 1

81204791 6TA-BB5-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ 498838-1 Yonggwang NPP #5 Y080660651 10/27/08 Konan Engineering 1

80810115 6TA-BB5-U8-C 1A-JJTTNQ 493782-1 Yonggwang Nuclear KPOS-080828 2/2/09 First Energy 1

81202736 201TA-BB125-U9-C7A-498532-1 Davis-Besse Nuclear JJTTNQ 45288635 Total Potentially Affected 56 Root Cause:

The returned TA housing castings did not meet print and therefore did not allow enough material for cleanup of the machined sealing surface.

Permanent Corrective Action:

SOR internal documentation is being changed to require 100% inspection of the raw casting height. Also, the 1/8" minimum finish dimension is being added to the housing machining drawings.

Engineered to Order with Off-the-Shelf Speed

)k 14

Notification of Defect July 2014 Page 7 of 7 Action by Nuclear Power Plant:

SOR recommends that the application for each switch noted in the above table be reviewed to determine if it is being used in a LOCA or HELB application. If so, SOR recommends an inspection to visually check for an adequate sealing surface of the housing (reference picture below). This inspection is also recommended for switches that have not yet been installed. The minimum required sealing surface is 1/8" (0.125"). After inspection, all units should have the 042 and 151 0-rings replaced if the units do not exhibit the deviation.

<V.>

SOR will send replacement 0-rings at no charge upon request. If units are found that do not meet the acceptance criteria, they will be replaced free of charge by SOR. Contact SOR Director of Customer Service, Greg Barber for the replacements:

Greg Barber 913-956-3059 gbarber@sorinc.com Engineered to Order with Off-the-Shelf Speed