Text

Initial Exam 2013-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML14078A517
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/19/2014
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	;
References
	50-424/13-301, 50-425/13-301
	Download: ML14078A517 (317)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _Vogtle Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, MOL, steady state operations.

(Base IC #14, snapped to IC #171 for HL18 NRC Exam)

Eguiment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B)

Turnover: Maintain 100% power. Spent fuel movement in progress in the spent fuel pool. Mike Chance is Fuel Handling Coordinator. Containment mini-purge is in service for a Containment entry on the next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ES21 A FHB HVAC Train A Auto Actuation Failure ES21 B FHB HVAC Train B Auto Actuation Failure TU1OB Main Turbine EHC Pump B Auto Start Failure CV16B Block Auto Start on CCP B Overrides HS-51 32A to OPEN (this will prevent closure of valve from QMCB)

HS-9378A to CLOSE (cause HV-9378A1B to close)

Event Maif. Event Event No. No. Type* Description Ti RM-008, I-UO Dropped Fuel Assembly during fuel shuffle for impending outage on 2532A1B, l-SS Unit 2.

2533A1B

@ 20% TS-SS TR 13.3.6 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation (Common System), Condition A TR 13.9.5 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System Condition A T2 CVO5 C-OATC CVCS Letdown Hx Tube Leak.

@ 50% C-SS TS-SS LCO 3.4.13 Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Condition A 3 NI A N-OATC Places Excess Letdown in service.

N-SS 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malt. Event Event No. No. Type* Description T4 PRO2A I-OATC Controlling PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high.

@ 100%. I-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 Condition A, FU 6 Condition E, LCO 3.3.1 EU 8a Condition M, LCO 3.3.1 EU 8b Condition E, LCO 3.3.2 Condition A, EU id Condition D, LCO 3.3.2 EU 8b Condition L (One hour action),

LCO 3.4.1 a Condition A T5 TU1 1 C-UO Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with failure of standby EHC pump to C-SS automatically start.

T6 SGO1 B R-OATC Steam Generator # 2, 30 gpm SGTL requiring a rapid down power.

@3% N-UO R-SS TS-SS LCO 3.4.13 Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Condition B 7 SGO1 B M-ALL DBA SGTR on SG #2 (450 gpm)

@45%

Ramp 180 seconds T8 CVO6A C-OATC A CCP trips on SI, B CCP fails to auto start.

Critical C-SS 9 Preload C-UO MDAFW discharge throttle valve to SG # 2 will not shut from QMCB.

Critical C-SS Ti 0 Insert C-OATC HV-9378A & B to Containment fail shut on SI (this will prevent Trigger on C-SS opening of PRZR sprays or Auxiliary Spray to force using PORVs for SI depressurization to refill PRZR during 19030-C, E-3 performance).

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UNIT 1 REACTIVITY BRIEFING SHEET Shift: Day Date: 4/9/13 Burnup: 11170.93 MWD/MTU Asof 4/9/13 8:57 MINIMUM SHIFT REACTIVITY INFORMATION TO BE BRIEFED Power: 100 Rod Motion: AUTO Current Temperature Control Strategy: DILUTION Currently Making Up: 50.0 gal Every: 1 to 2 hrs The desired Tavg operating band is 585.5 +1- 0.05 degrees F CVCS makeup system boric acid flow per 100 gal makeup: 13.0 gallons/i 00 CVCS makeup system pot setting(FIC-01 10): 3.24 BTRS Strategy: none AFO Strategy: Maintain on target plus/minus 1 AFD units Reactivity System Components Degraded/OOS:

I None Activities expected that may affect core reactivity (Reactivity Focus Items):

I None CURRENT CORE REACTIVIITY PARAMETERS Boron Worth: 8.5 pcm/ppm PCM per 1% pwr change: 17.9 Current MTC value: HFP: -17.9 pcm/F HZP: -3.9 pcm/F Current BAST Cb: 7000 ppm Current RCS Cb: 907 ppm Boration required per: degree F: 21.3 gallons 1% pwr change: 21.3 gallons 10% pwr change: 212.8 gallons 30% pwr change: 638.5 gallons Dilutions required per: degree F: 143.1 gallons 1% pwr change: 143.1 gallons Boration required for stuck rods: 3182.2 gallons for 2 stuck rods 4837.3 gallons for 3 stuck rods

lf more than 3 rods are stuck begin boration and calculate for actual number of stuck rods*

Human Performance tools:

Peer check Three-way communication Placekeeping Procedure Use STAR Time-Out Situational Awareness Valid for PTDB Cycle 18 Tab 1.0 rev 29 approved 9/29/12 and Tab 16.0 rev 19 approved 1 0/5/12 S:WORKGROUPSSNC SOUTHERN REACT! VI TYSHEETXLS

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

Dropped fuel assembly results in FHB High Radiation with failure of FHB HVAC to auto actuate.

Requires manual operation of FHB ventilation.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manually actuates FHB Isolation using 13320-C using AHS-2532A or AHS-2533A.

UO Resets FHB Actuation using AHS-2532B or AHS-2533B.

UO Shuts down the desired Post Accident Filter Unit by placing either AHS-2540 or AHS-2541 to STOP.

Technical Specifications:

TR 13.3.6 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation (Common System), Condition A TR 13.9.5 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System, Condition A Event 2:

CVCS Letdown Hx Tube leak rupture requiring manual isolation of CVCS letdown due to high radiation on 1 RE-i 950 as directed per ARP-1 7100-C.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Closes Letdown Orifices HV-8149A, B, C and Letdown Isolations LV-459 and LV-460 to isolate the letdown leak to the ACCW Hx.

OATC Isolates letdown by closing Letdown Containment Isolations HV-8152 and HV-8160.

OATC Adjust PV-0131, sets to max pressure. Adjust TV-0130, sets to max. temperature.

CREW Direct closing of Letdown Heat Exchanger of manual valves as follows:

(AB-A08) 1-1 208-U6-041

(AB-A17) i-1217-U4-126

(AB-108) i-1217-U4-129.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13, Condition A (Note: Leakage is isolated after OATC closes the Letdown Orifices and Isolations) 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3:

Excess Letdown will be placed in service to the seal return header to control PRZR level.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Sets 1 HC-1 23 to closed. (0% demand).

OATC Opens Excess Letdown Isolation valves 1 -HV-81 53 / 1 -HV-81 54.

OATC Adjusts 1 HC-123 to establish maximum allowable Excess Letdown flow (-.30 gpm).

OATC Adjusts 1FIC-121 and 1HC-182 to control charging and seal injection flows.

Event 4:

Controlling PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PORV 455A opening and both PRZR sprays fully open, RCS pressure will be lowering rapidly.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Perform lOAs of 18001-C by closing PRZR sprays, closing PORV 455A, and operating heaters as necessary to control PRZR pressure.

OATC Manually closes PORV Block Valve 1 HV-8000A to stop LOCA to PRT.

OATC Controls PRZR heaters and sprays to control PRZR pressure.

OATC Sets PRZR Master Controller to 25% demand.

OATC Selects channel 457 / 456 on PRZR Pressure control switch PS-455F.

OATC Places PRZR heaters and PORV 455A in AUTO and ensures proper operation.

OATC Places PRZR Pressure Master Controller in AUTO and verifies proper operation.

OATC Selects channel PT-457 as controlling channel on pressure recorder PS-455G.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation Condition A LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation FU 6, Condition E LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation EU 8a, Condition M LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation EU 8b, Condition E LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Eeatures Actuation System (ESEAS) Condition A LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Eeatures Actuation System (ESEAS) EU id, Condition D LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESEAS) EU 8b Condition L (one hour)

LCO 3.4.1 .a RCS Pressure, Temperature, & Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 5:

Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with failure of the standby pump to automatically start.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Starts EHC pump B prior to Main Turbine! Reactor trip on low EHC pressure of 1100 psig.

This will prevent an unnecessary Turbine I Reactor trip and transient on the plant.

Technical Sjecifications:

None Event 6:

A 30 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #2 requiring a rapid down power per 18013-C, this is to preclude the tube leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI Guidelines.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Borates as necessary for rapid down power to maintain Tavg Tref matched.

UO Reduces Turbine load at < 5% per minute to maintain Tavg Tref matched.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 7, 8, 9, 10:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring a plant trip and safety injection.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually trips the reactor using either QMCB hand switch, manually actuates safety injection, and adjusts seal injection to ROPs between 8 to 13 gpm after the SI.

OATC Manually starts COP B which will not auto start on the Safety Injection signal.

Note: CCP B may already be running as a mitigation measure for the SGTL. If so, this action will not be performed other than verifying that the pump is still running & providing flow.

UO Places SGBD hand switches in hard closed to prevent water hammer to SGBD system.

UO Throttles AFW flow to maintain SG levels 10 65%.The UO may perform an early operator action and isolate AFW flow to SG #2 once SG # 2 level is> 10% NR with SS permission.

UO Isolates ruptured SG # 2 by performing the following.

Adjusts SG # 2 ARV potentiometer set point to 7.73 (to control at 1160 psig)

Closes 1HV-3019, SG #2 steam supply to TDAFW pump

Closes SG # 2 MSIV and Bypass valves

Isolates FW flow to SG # 2 (MFIV, MFRV, BFIV, BFRV, TDAFW, MDAFW valves all shut)

UO Blocks Low Steam line Pressure SI and SLI when RCS pressure <2000 psig (P-il) and then places the steam dumps in Steam Pressure Mode and opens the 3 cool down steam dumps for a maximum rate Cooldown.

UO Closes the steam dumps after selected CETC is reached and controls CETC below this temperature (usually this is 51 8°F or 506°F depending on ruptured SG pressure).

OATC Arms COPS and depressurizes RCS a PORV to refill the pressurizer.

The scenario may be stopped after step # 41 with chief examiner approval.

6

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Starts CCP which will NOT start on the SI actuation signal, with the other CCP tripping on the SI actuation signal, High Head Safety Injection will NOT be available unless the CCP is manually started no later than step 2.b RNO of AOP 18009-C, or step 3.a RNO, OATC INITIAL ACTIONS, of EOP 19000-C.

2) Isolates SG #2 to limit secondary contamination and potential release environment by performing the following actions no later than the 19030-C procedure steps. These are steps 6 through 11 of 19030-C.

Adjusts SG # 2 ARV potentiometer set point to 7.73 (to control at 1160 psig).

Closes 1 HV-301 9, SG # 2 Steam Supply to TDAFW pump

Closes SG # 2 MSIV and Bypass valves.

Isolates FW flow to SG #2 (MFIV, MFRV, BFIV, BFRV, TDAFW, MDAFW, and SGBD and Sample valves all shut)

MDAFW pump B discharge valve HV-5132 will NOT shut, the crew will have to either place MDADW pump B in PU or dispatch personnel to manually close HV 5132 OR direct an operator to manually isolate HV-5132 using a local manual isolation valve.

3) Depressurizes PRZR to refill the PRZR with ECCS injection and to limit break flow using a single PRZR PORV to meet conditions of step 37 of 19030-C.

7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses high radiation in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB).

Symptoms I alarms:

. ALBO5-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM

. ALBO5-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM

. ALBO5-A03 FHB EXH RAD MONITOR EQUIP TROUBLE Indications:

. ARE-2532AJB and ARE-2533A1B red and amber lights LIT on the Safety Related Display Console (SRDC).

. ARE-2532A1B and ARE-2533A1B IPC points in HIGH alarm.

. 1 RE-0008 IPC points in HIGH alarm.

OATC References 17005-1, Window C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM UO 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE A high alarm on one or more of the Radiation Monitor Channels.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS The following actions will occur if a High Level Radiation Alarm is actuated on the associated monitor.

6. A-RE-2532A or B or A-RE-2533A or B, Fuel Handling Building Effluent Radiogas Monitors: Fuel Handling Building Isolation (FHBI).

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS uO NONE 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check the Safety Related Display Console (QRM2), the RMS Communications Console (QRM1) and the Plant Computer to determine the monitor in alarm and Go To 17100-1, Annunciator Response Procedure For the Process and Effluent Radiation Monitor System (RMS) or 17102-1, Annunciator Response Procedure for the Safety Related Display Console QRM2 as appropriate.

2. Initiate a CR documenting alarm condition.

5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS Monitor Plant Computer for radiation alarms if annunciator is inoperable or in solid.

UO References 17102-1, Annunciator Response Procedure for the Safety Related Display Console (QRM2).

PROBABLE CAUSE

1. High airborne radioactivity in the Fuel Handling Building.

2. Equipment malfunction.

Note to Sim Booth Operator: Call & notify the Control Room of a damaged fuel assembly in the SEP area.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time

] Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Switches the Normal Fuel Handling Building Ventilation to Accident Mode Ventilation.

INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Evacuate the Fuel Handling Building UO SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Verify Fuel Handling Building is in the Accident Mode of ventilation per manual actuation of FHB Isolation section of 13320-C, Fuel Handling Building HVAC System (actions are on page #10)

2. Refer to 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementation Instructions.

3. Notify Health Physics to sample and analyze the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust air.

4. IF the alarm is an actuation resulting from Fuel Handling, initiate 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, as appropriate.

NOTE: Exhaust gasses are again monitored at the plant vent by Plant Vent Monitors 1 -RE-i 2442 A, B and C.

5. Check the radiation monitor CRT or the QRM1 Control Console for level of radiation read by 1-RE-i2442A, B, and C.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS continued SS 6. IF sampling an analysis determine that the channel has malfunctioned.

a. Comply with Technical Requirement TR 13.3.6.

b. Place A-HS-2532C on QESF to TEST BLOCK CHAN 1.

c. Request Chemistry to investigate and take corrective action.

COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE NOTE: Steps for 1 8006-C Fuel Handling Event start on the next page.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Enters 1 8006-C, Fuel Handling Event SS 1. Suspend any core alteration or fuel handling activity currently in progress.

2. Secure any suspended loads while staying clear of damaged areas.

3. Announce of the Public Address System to evacuate the affected area, specifying the following:

. The applicable unit.

. Containment and/or Fuel Handling Building.

. That personnel exiting Containment should remain in the vicinity until accountability and radiological monitoring is complete. (N/A)

4. Check affected area CONTAINMENT. (NO)

RNO

4. Go to Step 6

6. Check affected area FUEL HANDLING BUILDING. (YES) 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 7. Perform the following:

a. Verify large missile doors, small missile door, and roof penetration closed.

b. Verify FHB isolation has actuated on AHS-2532A or AHS-2533A (NO, until UO manually actuates, actions are on page# 10)

c. Initiate 13320-C, FUEL HANDLING BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM to:

1) Verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.

2) Verify only one FHB Post Accident Exhaust Filtration Unit Is operating.

NOTE Actions from I 3320-C for UO to perform are on Page 1 0 SS 8. Notify Shift Supervisor and Reactor Engineering of the damaged assembly location.

9. Initiate NMP-EP-1 10, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION. (Notifies SM)

10. Notifies Security to control access to the evacuated area.

11. Notifies HP to survey personnel involved in the event.

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event Nod: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS NOTE: The FHS will give the SS a report to include the following

. Fuel assembly was dropped, fuel movement suspended and all suspended loads are secure.

. Large and small missile doors are closed.

. The roof penetration is closed.

. Fuel assembly was damaged while attempting to enter Unit 1 Spent Fuel location HH24

. Spent fuel pool level was stable at the normal level 218 6.

. The fuel transfer canal gate valve is closed.

SS 12. Check Spent Fuel Pool and Reactor Cavity level:

a. Spent Fuel Pool level STABLE (YES)

b. Reactor Cavity level STABLE. (N/A)

13. Check fuel transfer canal gate valve 121 3-U6-086 CLOSED.

(YES)

14. Check entry into affected area PERMITTED BY HP.

(Not at this time)

15. Notify Reactor Engineering staff to evaluate the extent of the damage.

16. Consult the Reactor Engineering staff on methods of recovering the damaged fuel assembly.

17. Return to procedure and step in effect.

NOTE to examiners: Tech Spec actions are on the following page.

7

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ss TR 13.3.6 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System Instrumentation (common system)

TR 13.3.6 The fuel handling building (FHB) post accident ventilation actuation instrumentation identified in Table 13.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel is in either storage pooi.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Apply required Actions of In accordance with FHB ventilation actuation TR 13.9.5 TR 13.9.5 Instruments inoperable.

Table 13.3.6-1 FHB Post Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation Instruments Required Channels Surveillance Trip Setpoint Requirements

1. Manual Initiation 1 TRS 13.3.6.5 NA

2. FHB Exhaust Duct 1 TRS 13.3.6.1 (a)

Radiation Signal TRS 13.3.6.2 (ARE-2532 A&B) TRS 13.3.6.4

3. Automatic 1 TRS 13.3.6.3 NA Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (a) Setpoints will not exceed the limits of TS 5.5.4.g.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS TR 13.9.5 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System (common system)

TR 13.9.5 Two independent Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel is in either storage pool.

NOTE TR 13.0.3 is not applicable.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Two Fuel Handling B.1 Suspend all operations Immediately Building Post Accident involving movement of Ventilation Systems irradiated fuel in the fuel Inoperable. handling building, movement of new fuel over irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building, or crane operation with loads over irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building until Required Action A.1 above is met.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position

{ Applicants Action or Behavior UO NOTE to examiners: The following steps are from 1 3320-C, Fuel Handling Building HVAC System Section 4.2 for manual actuation, UO NOTES

If normal FHB HVAC supply and exhaust units are running, damper isolation will trip them on low air flow after a time delay.

Performing the next step will bring in annunciator 1 ALB39-D02 if Supply # 1 and Exhaust # 1 are presently running, or 1ALB39-D03 if Supply # 2 and Exhaust # 2 are running due to tripping on low air flow. These alarms will not clear until their associated HVAC hand switches are taken to the stop normal position.

Annunciators 1ALB54-A01 and A02, FHB Post Accident Filter 1(2) trouble will both momentarily come in until air flow increases above setpoint.

Trip of normal FHB HVAC supply fans due to actuation will bring in annunciator 1ALB54-A03 or A04. Trip of normal exhaust units on low flow will illuminate annunciator 1ALB54-B03 or 1ALB54-B04.

When starling a Post Accident Filter Unit, QALB31-D02 BEN Volt REG MODE CHANGE ALARM may be momentarily received. No action per procedure 17031 -1 (2) is required.

Heat Trace Panel 1-181 7-U3-007A temperature circuits Cl-il, 13, 14; C2-i, 4, 6, ii and 12 should ALL be verified

>87°F for a non-emergency start of FHB Post Accident Filter Unit.

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO ALBO54-AOi(A02) FHB POST ACCIDENT FLTR 1(2) TROUBLE ALBO54-A03(A04) FHB SPLY F-i (2) LO FLOW/TEMP TRIP ALBO54-B03(B04) FHB EXH F-i(2) LO AIR FLOW CAUTION The Train B Post Accident Filter Unit and the normal exhaust HVAC system discharge to the same exhaust header. They should not be aligned to discharge to their common exhaust stack at the same time.

UO 4.2.1 Actuate FHB ISOLATION by momentarily placing either trains hand switch to ACTUATE position.

FHB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION AHS-2532A (A54)

FHB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION AHS-2533A (A55)

UO 4.2.2 Verify FHB Isolation

a. FHB Isolation actuated.

Red Light at Fl-lB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION, AHS-2532A (A54) LIT.

. Red Light at FHB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION, AHS-2533A (A55) LIT.

ii

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position

} Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.2.2 Verify FHB Isolation (continued)

b. POST ACCIDENT FILT!EXH FANS:

Train A: A-i542-N7-OOi (C54) RUNNING Train B: A-1542-N7-002 (055) RUNNING

c. Verify Post Accident FILT/EXH FAN dampers open:

. Fan-i INLET AHV-12510 (AZLB-62) OPEN e Fan-i EXH AH V-i 2512 (AZLB-62) OPEN

. Fan-2 INLET AHV-125i 1 (AZLB-64) OPEN

. Fan-2 EXH AHV-i 2513 (AZLB-64) OPEN 12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.2.2 Verify FF18 Isolation (continued)

d. FHB NORM HVAC SPLY DMPRS:

. A-HV-2529 AHS-2529 (A56) CLOSED

. A-HV-2528 AHS-2528 (A57) CLOSED

e. NORM HVAC UNIT SPLY HDR ISO DMPRS:

. A-HV-2535 AHS-2535 (B56) CLOSED

. A-HV-2534 AHS-2534 (B57) CLOSED

f. FHB ISO DMPRS TO NORM EXH:

. A-HV-12479 AHS-12479 (D56) CLOSED

. A-HV-12480 AHS-12480 (D57) CLOSED

g. FHB ISO DMPERS TO STACK:

. A-HV-1248i AHS-12481 (C56) CLOSED

. A-HV-12482 AHS-i2482 (C57) CLOSED UO 4.2.3 Record the filter unit started in the Control Room Log.

UO 4.2.4 Verify the FHB Normal Supply Units STOPPED:

. FHB NORMAL SPLY UNIT FAN-i: AHS-2520 (A52)

. FF18 NORMAL SPLY UNIT FAN-2: AHS-252i (852) 13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.2.5 Verify the FHB Normal Exhaust Units STOPPED:

. FHB NORM EXH UNIT FAN-i: AHS-i2534 (A53)

. FHB NORM EXH UNIT FAN-2: AHS-i2536 (B53)

NOTE to examiners: The UO should stop one Post Accident Filter Unit by continuing with the steps below or using section 4.13 of 18006-C (Page 15.)

NOTE If a FHB Isolation Signal is still present and either trains handswitch is taken to reset, then that Trains Isolation logic is rendered inoperable. A corresponding White Light will be LIT on AHS-2532B (AHS-2533B), and a corresponding alarm is received on the Unit One and Unit Two SSMP Panels and will bring in annunciators on Both Unit One and Unit Two (i/2ALB-4-E01 (E02).

UO 4.2.6 Reset FHB Isolation on QHVC if required as follows:

a. Momentarily place the desired FHB Isolation reset handswitch to the RESET OVERRIDE position and release:

Train A: AHS-2532B (B54) RESET OVERRIDE Train B: AHS-2533B (B55) RESET OVERRIDE 14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.2.7 Verify the FHB Isolation has been reset by observing a green light indication:

FHB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION, AHS-2532A (A54), green light LIT FHB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION, AHS-2533A (A55), green light LIT NOTE If Section 4.6 Post Accident Cleanup Of The FHB Using The Normal Exhaust Units is to be performed, Train B FHB post accident filter unit should be secured.

UO 4.2.8 As directed by the SS, stop one of the Post Accident FiItIExh Unit Fans:

Train A: A-i 542-N7-OO1 AHS-2540 (C54)

Train B: A-i 542-N7-002 AHS-2541 (C55)

UO 4.2.9 Verify Post Accident Filter Fan dampers close for the fan stopped.

Fan-i INLET AHV-i2510 (AZLB-62) CLOSED Fan-i EXH AHV-i25i2 (AZLB-62) CLOSED Fan-2 INLET AHV-i25i i (AZLB-64) CLOSED Fan-2 EXH AHV-i 2513 (AZLB-64) CLOSED 15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE If the Normal FHB HVAC System is returned to service within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after shutdown, FHB temperature monitoring per the following step need not be completed.

UO 4.2.10 Initiate area temperature monitoring for the fuel handling building Units 1 and 2, per 14915, Special Conditions Surveillance Logs.

UO 4.2.1 1 Reset annunciators 1ALB39-D02 (D03) by resetting Amber lights on Fuel Handling Building Normal Supply and Exhaust units handswitches as required:

. FHB NORM EXH UNIT FAN-i AHS-1 2534 (A53)

. FHB NORM EXH UNIT FAN-2 AHS-i 2536 (B53)

. FHB NORM HVAC UNIT-i FAN-i AHS-2520 (A52)

. FHB NORM HVAC UNIT-2 FAN-i AHS-252i (B52)

UO 4.2.i2 Verify associated annunciators iALB54-AOi and 1ALB54-A02 have extinguished 16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Note to Examiner: Students may use the following section UO 4.13 SHUTDOWN OF A FHB POST ACCIDENT FILTER UNIT AS DIRECTED FROM 18006-C FUEL HANDLING EVENT UO 4.13.1 Check FHB Isolation Signal NOT present on QHVC:

. Red Light at FHB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION, AHS-2532A (A54) NOT LIT

. Red Light at FHB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION, AHS-2533A (A55) NOT LIT UO 4.13.2 IF any red lights are LIT, verify at SRDC that FHB Radiation Monitors are NOT in high alarm.

. A-RE-2532A

. A-RE-2532B

. A-RE-2533A

. A-RE-2533B 17

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

[ Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior UO NOTES

. The FHB Isolation Signal must be reset prior to starting the Normal HVAC System.

. If a FHB Isolation Signal is present as a result of a failed or inoperable radiation monitor it may be necessary to block its input per 13508-1 prior to placing FHB Normal HVAC system into service.

. If a FHB Isolation Signal is still present and either trains handswitch is taken to reset, then that Trains Isolation logic is rendered inoperable. A corresponding alarm is received on the Unit One and Unit Two SSMP Panels and will bring in annunciators on BOTH Unit One and Unit Two (1/2ALBO4-E01(E02) TRAIN A(B) SYS STATUS MON PNL ALERT.

UO 4.13.3 IF any Red lights in Step 4.13.1 are lit AND FHB Rad monitors are in high alarm, it will be necessary to over ride the actuation signal to shutdown a Post Accident Filter Unit.

If required, perform the following steps, otherwise proceed to Step 4.13.4.

a. Notify SS that over riding the FHB Isolation Signal will INOP that train(s) of FHB activation logic and may require entry into TR13.3.6.

18

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO NOTE The SSMP annunciator and FHB Actuation logic override white light indication will clear when the FHB Rad Monitor high rad condition is reset.

b. Notify Unit One and Unit Two control room operators that annunciator 1/2ALBO4-EO1 TRAIN A SYS STATUS MON PNL ALERT and/or annunciator 1/2ALBO4-E02, TRAIN B SYS STATUS MON PNL ALERT will illuminate.

UO c. Reset the actuation signal using the associated handswitch.

. Train A AHS-2532B (B54) RESET OVERRIDE

. Train B AHS-2533B (B55) RESET OVERRIDE UO d. Verify Associated FHB Isolation Signal is over ridden on QHVC:

(1) Train A LAMP SWITCH STATUS

. RED AHS-2532A (A54) NOT LIT

. GREEN AHS-2532A (A54) LIT

. WHITE AHS-2532B (B54) LIT (2) Train B LAMP SWITCH STATUS

. RED AHS-2533A (A55) NOT LIT

. GREEN AHS-2533A (A55) LIT

. WHITE AHS-2533B (B55) LIT

e. Proceed to Step 4.13.5 19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A dropped fuel assembly in the FHB will result in multiple high radiation annunciators with a FHBI auto actuation failure. The UO will have to manually actuate FHBI, then shut down one FHB Filtration Unit to comply with 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.13.4 IF any red lights in Step 4.13.1 are energized BUT NO FHB Rad Monitors are in high alarm, reset the actuation signals as follows:

a. Momentarily place the desired FHB Isolation reset handswitch to the RESET OVERRIDE position AND release.

Train A AHS-2532B (B54)

Train B AHS-2533B (B55)

b. Verify the FHB Isolation has been reset by observing a green light.

FHB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION, AHS-2532A (A54) green light LIT.

FHB ISOLATION MANUAL ACTUATION, AHS-2533A (A55) green light LIT.

UO 4.13.5 Shutdown the desired Post Accident Filter Unit by placing its handswitch in stop:

a. POST ACCIDENT FILT!EXH UNIT FAN A-1542-N7-OO1 AHS-2540 (C54)

b. POST ACCIDENT FILTIEXH UNIT FAN A-i 542-N7-002 AHS-2541 (C55)

END OF EVENT #1, PROCEED TO EVENT #2.

20

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on Fl-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate and High Radiation Alarm (within 2 minutes) on i-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Indications: (The folIowihgwM be reflashá!arms)

. Intermediate and High Radiation Alarms Annunciate.

. 1 RE-i 950 ACCW System showing alarm condition on IPC and will trend upward.

OATC/UO 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE A high alarm on one or more of the Radiation Monitor Channels.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS The following actions will occur if a High Level Radiation Alarm is actuated on the associated monitor:

1. 1 -RE-0002 or 1 -RE-0003, Containment Low Range Area Monitor: Containment Ventilation (CVI).

2. A-RE-014, Waste Gas Processing System Effluent Radiogas Monitor: Closes valve A-RV-OOi 4 to the Waste Gas Processing System discharge.

3. i-RE-0018, Waste Liquid Effluent Monitor: Closes i-RV-0018 to isolate the Liquid Waste Discharge Line.

4. 1-RE-002i, Steam Generator Blowdown Liquid Process Monitor: Isolates Steam Generator Blowdown Processing System.

5. i-RE-0848, Turbine Building Drain Effluent Monitor:

Diverts Turbine Building Drains to Dirty Drains Tank.

6. A-RE-2532 A or B or A-RE-2533 A or B, Fuel Handling Building Effluent Radiogas Monitors: Fuel Handling Building Isolation (FHBI).

7. 1 -RE-2565 A, B or C, Containment Ventilation Effluent Monitors: Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI).

21

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on Fl-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate and High Radiation Alarm (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-i 950 will annunciate.

Time] Position Applicants Action or Behavior

8. 1-RE-12i16 and i-RE-i2i17, Control Room Intake Airborne Monitors: Control Room Ventilation Isolation (CR1).

9. i-RE-i 2839 C, Condenser Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhauster Effluent Monitor: Diverts air ejector discharge to filtration.

iO. A-RE-50003, Technical Support Center Air Intake Monitor: Technical Support Center Ventilation Isolation.

3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check the Safety Related Display Console (QRM2),

the RMS Communications Console (QRMi) and the Plant Computer to determine the monitor in alarm and Go To 17100-i, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Process And Effluent Radiation Monitor System (RMS) or i71 02-i, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Safety Related Display Control QRM2 as appropriate, NOTE: CREW Determines 1 -RE-i 950 In HIGH Alarm.

2. Initiate a CR documenting Alarm condition.

5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS Monitor Plant Computer for radiation alarms if annunciator is inoperable or in solid.

22

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on Fl-i 21A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate and High Radiation Alarm (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-i 950 will annunciate.

Time

] Position

] Applicants Action or Behavior UO References ARP 17100-1 Annunciator Response Procedure For The Prdcess An Effluent Radiation Monitor Systern RMS) fOr:1 RE-SS / UO ARP 17100-1, 1 RE-i 950 Actions:

Step 1. Request Chemistry to sample and analyze the ACCW.

SS I UO Step 2. Notify Health Physics of the alarm, CREW Step 3. Locate the source of the in-leakage.

a. Check IPC points T0145, P01 35, and F0134 (IPC Group 21) for changes, in an attempt to determine if a Letdown HX tube leak. (YES)

NOTE: Identifies changes and DIAGNOSES Letdown HX tube leakage.

b. Check IPC points T2714, T2716, T2718, and T2720 (IPC Group 242) for changes, in an attempt to determine if leakage is from RCP thermal barrier. (NO)

SS Step 4. Isolate the source if possible.

OATC Step 5. IF 1 -RE-i 950 is reading high due to LTDN HX tube leakage:

NOTE: SS May direct actions of ARP 17100 To Either OA TC or UO.

a. Place LETDOWN TO DEMINNCT 1-TV-Ol29totheVCT position using 1-HS-0129.

(1) Verify 1-TV-0129 aligns to the VCT.

b. Place VCT HUT LETDOWN DIVERT 1-LV-0i 12A to the HUT position using 1-HS-0112A.

(1) Verify 1 -LV-0i 1 2A aligns to the RHUT.

23

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on Fl-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate and High Radiation Alarm (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 5. Cont.

c. Isolate letdown. Verify closed: (CV required)

(1) 1-HV-8149A, B, C.

(2)1 -LV-0459.

(3)1 -LV-0460.

(4)1 -HV-81 52.

(5)1 -HV-81 60.

(6)1 -PV-01 31, set to max pressure.

(7) 1-TV-0130, set to max temperature.

d. Shut Letdown Heat Exchanger manual valves:

(1) (AB-A08) 1-1208-U6-041.

(2) (AB-A17) 1-1217-U4-126.

(3) (AB-108) 1-1 21 7-U4-129.

SS/UO

e. Notify Chemistry.

SS

f. Initiate 18007-C, CVCS MALFUNCTION to deal with the loss of letdown.

NOTE: SS Should Have UO Complete Steps In ARP While He Transitions To 18007-C.

UO Step 6. Obtain detector trend from the IPC computer UO Step 7. Monitor the channel for further changes.

UO Step 8, Step 9 and Step 10 are N/A.

SS Initiates AOP 18007-C, CVCS MALFUNCTION per Step 5f. above 24

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on Fl-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate and High Radiation Alarm (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-i 950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 18007-C,CVCS MALFUNCTION Section A, TOTAL LOSS OF LETDOWN FLOW OATC Al. Isolate letdown relief flowpath by performing the following:

a. Close letdown orifice isolation valves:

. HV-81 49A

HV-8149B

. HV-8149C

b. Close letdown isolation valves:

. LV-459

. LV-460 NOTE: Ala. andb. Previously performed in ARP 17100-1 OATC A2. Adjust HC-182 and FIC-121 as necessary to establish the following:

Seal injection flow to all RCPs 8 TO 13 GPM.

-AND

Charging flow APPROXIMATELY 10 GPM GREATER THAN TOTAL SEAL INJECTION FLOW.

NOTE Steps A3 THROUGK Steps A5 Do NotApply Under This ConditIons A3. Check pipe break protection valves OPEN. (YES).

. HV-15214

. HV-8160 A4. Check instrument air to containment ESTABLISHED. (YES) 25

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate and High Radiation Alarm (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior A5. Check CVCS letdown to BTRS flowpath: (YES)

a. Check TV-0381 B BTRS Demin In let Temperature Control OPEN. (HS-10351 DILUTE or OFF lights lit.)

b. Check HV-81 15 LETDOWN DIVERT TO BTRS OPEN.

A6. Identify and correct cause for loss of letdown.

NOTE: Identified as CVCS LTDN HX tube leak earlier.

SS / OATC A7. Check normal letdown AVAILABLE.

RNO A7. Perform the following:

a. Establish Excess Letdown by initiating 13008, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM EXCESS LETDOWN.

b. Go to Step Ag.

NOTE: Steps for placing Excess Letdown in service are listed in Event 3 starting on Page 26. Once Excess Letdown is in service, return to Page 25 of this event to finish the Loss of Letdown steps.

26

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.; 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on Fl-i 21A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate and High Radiation Alarm (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-i 950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS CONTINUES WITH 18007-C, CVCS MALFUNCTION A7.b. RNO Go to Ste Ag.

OATC I UO A9. Initiate Continuous Actions Page.

OATC *A1 0. Verify PRZR level TRENDING TO PROGRAM.

SS I OATC *Ai 1 Check normal letdown flow ESTABLISHED.

RNO

Ai 1. Perform the following:

a. WHEN normal letdown capability is restored, THEN restore normal letdown by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

b. Evaluate the impact of continued power operation with normal letdown out of service.

SS Return to procedure and step in effect. (1 2004-C)

Crew will call C & T to request I & C, Maintenance support, and notification of the Operations Management.

Tech Spec LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational LEAKAGE, Condition A END OF EVENT #2, PROCEED TO EVENT #4.

27

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess Letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the Letdown Hx tube leakage. The OATC will use 13008-1, to place Excess Letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13008.1, Excess Letdown OATC .. .

NOTE: Independent Verifications performed within Section 4.1 are documented on Checklist 1.

4.1 EXCESS LETDOWN TO SEAL RETURN HEADER NOTE: 1-1 208-X4-086 and 1-1 208-X4-096 should be vented once per shift when excess letdown is in service to prevent gas buildup within the NCP discharge header. (SER2-05)

OATC 4.1.1 Verify Reactor power is maintained < 3622.5 MWT while Excess Letdown is in service and LEFM is in service. IF LEFM is NOT in service, maintain power < 3562 MWT per guidance of 12004-C.

OATC 4.1 .2 Verify that a CVCS Charging Pump is running.

OATC 4.1.3 Verify CLOSED RX HEAD VENT TO EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION 1-HV-8098.

28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess Letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the Letdown Hx tube leakage. The OATC will use 13008-1, to place Excess Letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.4 Verify flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN, 1 HC-123 is set to closed (0% demand).

OATC 4.1.5 Verify OPEN RCPs Seal Leakoff Isolation valves:

. 1-H V-81 00 RCPS SEAL LEAKOFF ORC ISOLATION

. 1-HV-8112 RCPS SEAL LEAKOFF IRC ISOLATION OATC 4.1.6 Verify EXCESS LETDOWN TO VCT, 1HS-8143 is in the OPEN VCT position.

OATC 4.1.7 Verify Reactor power is maintained < 3622.6 MWT while Excess Letdown is in service and LEFM is in service. IF LEFM is NOT in service, maintain power 3562 MWT per guidance of 1 2004-C.

29

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess Letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the Letdown Hx tube leakage. The OATC will use 13008-1, to place Excess Letdown in service.

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.8 Open EXCESS LETDOWN LINE Isolation Valves:

. 1-HV-8153 EXCESS LETDOWN ISO VLV

. 1HV-8154 EXCESS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV OATC 4.1.9 Record the following:

. Pressure on indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1 P1-124.

. Temperature on indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1TI-122.

Note to examiner: ALB63-A06 FILTERS BACKFLUSH PNL ALARM will illuminate shortly after placing Excess Letdown in service.

OATC 4.1.10 While establishing excess letdown, perform the following:

. Monitor pressure rise on pressure indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1 P1-124 and verify it remains less than 50 pounds above pressure recorded in Step 4.1.9.

. Monitor temperature rise on temperature indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1TI-122 and verify it remains less than 165 degrees.

30

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess Letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the Letdown Hx tube leakage. The OATC will use 13008-1, to place Excess Letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.1 1 Slowly adjust output flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN 1 HC-1 23 to establish maximum allowable flow (estimated to be approximately 30 gpm).

OATC 4.1 .12 Perform the following as required to maintain desired pressurizer level:

. Adjust charging using CHARGING LINE CONTROL, 1FIC-121.

. Adjust seal injection using SEAL FLOW CONTROL, 1HC-182.

OATC 4.1.13 If normal letdown is isolated, align the outlet of the Seal Water Heat Exchanger to the Volume Control Tank spray nozzle as follows: (IV REQUIRED) (N/A if previously performed).

a. Unlock and open, CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO VCT, 1-1 208-U6-1 04 (KEY 1 OP2-281)

b. Close CVCS SEALS WATER HX OUTLET TO NCP SUCTION, 1-1208-U6-106. (RA-26) 31

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

The OATC places Excess Letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the Letdown Hx tube leakage. The OATC will use 13008-1, to place Excess Letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.14 IF directed by SS to transfer excess letdown to the RCDT, perform the following:

a. Verify RCDT system is aligned to accept Excess Letdown flow per 13002-1, Reactor Drain Tank Operation.

b. Place EXCESS LETDOWN TO VCT, 1 HS-8143 to the OPEN VCT position.

c. Monitor temperature rise on EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET lTl-122 and verify it remains less than 165 degrees.

d. Slowly raise output on flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN, 1HC-123 to establish maximum allowable flow.

e. If swap to RCDT is being performed for Chemistry control or level control Step 4.2.8.

f. Perform the following as required to maintain desired pressurizer level:

Adjust charging using CHARGING LINE CONTROL, 1 FIC-121

Adjust seal injection using SEAL FLOW CONTROL, 1HC-182.

ENDOFEVENT#3 32

3ppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time 1 Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose the high failure of PRZR Pressure channel PT-455.

Symptoms / alarms:

. ALB11-B03 PRZR HI PRESS

. ALB11-C03 PRZR HI PRESS CHANNEL ALERT

. ALB12-D03 PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK

ALB12-E04 PV-0455A OPEN SIGNAL

ALBO6-F06 CSFST TROUBLE Indications:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 off scale high.

. PRZR Pressure channels PT-456, 457, and 458 rapidly lowering.

Both PRZR Sprays full open.

OATC AOP 18OOi-C. Sótiór[.C IMMEDIATEACTIONS Cl. Check RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING. (NO)

RNO:

Cl. Perform the following:

Close spray valves.

Close affected PRZR PORV.

Operate PRZR heaters as necessary.

SS Enters AOP 18001-C, Section C and verifies immediate operator actions properly completed.

33

3ppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 02. Check controlling channel OPERATING PROPERLY. (NO)

RNO:

C2. Perform the following:

a. Place HS-455A in close.

b. Place PRZR spray valve controllers in manual.

OATC C3. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO OATC 04. Control PRZR pressure using heaters and sprays BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG.

OATC C5. Check PIC-455A Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller IN AUTO WITH OUTPUT SIGNAL APPROXIMATELY 25%.

(NO)

RNO:

05. Place PIC-455A in manual and adjust controller output to approximately 25%.

OATC 06. Check affected channel selected on PS-455F PRZR PRESS CNTL SELECT. (YES) 34

3ppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 07. Select unaffected channels on PS-455F:

Failed Channel Select P455 CH457/456 P456 CH455/458 P457 CH455/456 P458 0H4551456 OATC C8. Perform the following:

a. Check PRZR pressure STABLE AT APPROXIMATELY 2235 PSIG.

b. Place PRZR heaters in AUTO.

c. Place PRZR spray valve controllers in AUTO.

RNO:

a. Adjust PRZR pressure to approximately 2235 psig using PRZR heaters and sprays.

Cue to Simbooth: IF asked, the Shift Manager has given permission to place the PRZR pressure control system in auto.

OATC C9. Place PORVs in AUTO and verify proper operation.

OATC Cl 0. Return PRZR pressure Master Controller to AUTO.

35

3ppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time 1 Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Cli. Select same channel on PS-455G PRZR PRESS REC SEL as selected on PS-455F.

457 OATC 012. Check P-il status light on BPLB indicates correctly for plant condition within one hour.

OFF OATC 013. Notify I&C to initiate repairs.

SS will call typically call the SSS to perform the following:

. Notify Operations Duty Manager of the AOP entry

. Write a Condition Report

. Notify l&C OATC 014. Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509 0, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

NOTE: SS is NOT expected to bypass failed channel.

36

3ppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 015. Trip the affected channel bistables and place the associated MASTER TEST switches in TEST position per TABLE Cl within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

NOTE: SS expected to leave bistables untripped during allowed out of service time to facilitate troubleshooting by I&C.

SS 016. Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS 3.3.1 Reactor Trip Function Condition LCO 3.3.1 A (Immediate) 6 OT1T E (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) 8a Low PRZR pressure M (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) 8b High PRZR pressure E (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months )

TS 3.3.2 ESFAS Function Condition LCO 3.3.2 A (Immediate) id SI low PRZR pressure D (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) 8b P-li Interlock L (one hour action)

TS 3.4.1 .a DNB RCS pressure < 2199 psig B (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 37

3ppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PRZR PORV 455A and both PRZR Sprays fully opening. The OATC will have to take manual action to prevent a Reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS C17. Check repairs and surveillances COMPLETE.

RNO:

C17. Perform the following:

a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step C18.

b. Return to procedure and step in effect.

END OF EVENT #4, PROCEED TO EVENT #5.

38

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnoses trip of EHC pump:

Alarms:

ALB33-B07 480V SWGR 1 NBO2 TROUBLE ALB2O-D05 HYD FLUID LO PRESS (after several minutes)

Indications:

EHC pump 1 (HS-6539):

RedOFF Amber ON-Green ON EHC pressure (P1-6338) <1600 psig and lowering.

EHC Pump 1 amps (11-40073) drop to 0 amps.

UO Refers to ARP 17033-1 for Window B07.

(480V SWGR 1 NBO2 TROUBLE) 39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO ARP 17033-1 WINDOW B07 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE

1. One of the breakers on Switchgear 1 NBO2 tripped due to a fault.

2. Bus ground fault.

3. Potential transformer/fuse failure.

4. Loss of bus voltage from Switchgear 1 NAO4.

5. Transformer 1 NBO2X winding high temperature.

6. Loss of 1 25V DC control power from Panel 1 ND21.

7. Loss of power to transformer temperature monitor.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE 40

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO NOTE: Loss of 125V DC control power results in loss of breaker remote/local remote operating capabilities and associated control circuit trip features.

3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check for associated alarms and indications.

2. Dispatch an operator to Switchgear 1 NBO2 to check for:

a. Ground fault indications.

b. Other abnormal conditions.

3. IF alarm is due to a breaker tripping on fault or undervoltage:

a. Determine affected loads.

b. Start redundant loads, if applicable.

4. IF alarm is due to a loss of 125V DC control power, dispatch an operator to the switchgear to manually operate breakers, under the direction of the Control Room.

5. IF a bus ground fault is indicated, selectively shift to redundant loads and de-energize components to locate the ground.

41

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

[ Time Position 1 Applicants Action or Behavior uo 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

6. Initiate maintenance as required to correct cause of the alarm.

5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Initiate maintenance to correct problem (i.e., restore alarm).

2. IF after three days the alarm has NOT been restored, initiate a Temporary Modification per 00307-C, Temporary Modifications to clear the bad input(s).

Record this action required on Figure 5 of 10018-C, Annunciator Control.

42

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior uo ARP 17020-1 WINDOW D05 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE

1. Failure of Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) Fluid Pumps.

2. Clogged strainers and filters in pump suction or discharge.

3. EHC Fluid System leak.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS

1. If pressure drops below 1400 psig, the standby EHC Fluid Pump will start.

2. If pressure continues to drop to 1100 psig, the Turbine will trip.

3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. IF a reactor trip occurs, Go To 19000 C, E 0 Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

2. Verify standby EHC Fluid Pump is on, if needed.

4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION EHC fluid is a fire resistant fluid that may be harmful to personnel. Observe proper safety precautions when in contact with this fluid.

1. Dispatch an operator to the Hydraulic Power Unit to check for system leaks or pump failure.

2. IF equipment failure is indicated, initiate maintenance as required.

43

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump 1 trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure. The UO will refer to ARP-17033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO NOTE: Student notices green and amber lights for EHC pump 1 and then starts EHC pump 2 with SS permission.

NOTE: After starting EHC pump 2 EHC pressure returns to 1600 psig.

UO Will call SSS to:

SS

CaIIC&T

. idition report

. .,LIl) i.

1 tenance

. Notify Operations Management END OF EVENT #5, PROCEED TO EVENT #6.

44

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 gpm tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL>5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required.

This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose SG Tube Leakage.

Symptoms I alarms (These are reflash alarms)

. ALBO5-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM

. ALBO5-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM

. RE-0724 Primary to secondary leakage monitor (IPC)

. RE-0810 SJAE low range monitor (IPC)

. RE-12839C SJAE monitor (IPC)

Indications:

. Charging flow increases if in auto. (expect manual control)

PRZR level slowly lowers.

SS Enters AOP 1 8009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak and directs actions of OATC / UO listed in the following steps.

1 8009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak OATC

1. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

NOTE to examiner: The following are the applicable continuous actions steps from the 1 8009-C Continuous Actions Page.

Step 2 Maintain PRZR at program level.

Step 3 Try to identify affected SG.

Step 4 Maintain VCT level using automatic or manual makeup control.

45

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 gpm tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required.

This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 2. Maintain PRZR level:

a. Adjusting charging flow as necessary to maintain program level.

b. Check PRZR STABLE OR RISING.

RNO

b. Perform the following:

1) Isolate letdown by closing:

a. Letdown Orifice Valves.

b. Letdown Isolation Valves.

c. Excess Letdown Valves.

2) Start an additional Charging Pump as necessary.

3) IF PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a. Trip the Reactor.

b. WHEN Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI.

c. Go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

46

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 gpm tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required.

This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

3. Try to identify affected SG.

SS a. Direct Chemistry to attempt to identify the leaking SG by initiating 31 120-C.

UO b. Check SG level indications stable or rising with relatively lower feedflow rate.

OATC CAUTION The NCP will NOT have miniflows when the CCP normal miniflows valves closed.

4. Verifies VCT level maintained with automatic makeup control.

OATC 5. Check leak rate < 5 gpm as determined by [(charging + seal SS leakoff)] mismatch.

Note to examiner: Leak rate will be 30 gpm.

RNO

5. Perform the following:

a. Initiate 18013-C, RAPID POWER REDUCTION

b. Be in Mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

c. Go to Step 12.

47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 gpm tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required.

This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction SS Initiates a unit shutdown per AOP-18013-C Rapid Power Reduction.

Entry Condition Target Aprrox. Time @ 3-%Imin 1701 5-D05 MFPT High Vibrations < 70% RTP 5-8 minutes 1701 5-E01 1701 9-B04 Condenser Low Vacuum >22.42 Hg 1 8025-C Vacuum and STABLE or or Circ Water Pump Trip RISING or Loss of Utility Water 18009-C SG Tube Leak (75 gpd <50% RTP within 1 10-17 minutes with an ROC 30 gpd/hr) hour 18009-C SG Tube Leak (>5 Gpm) 20% RTP within 1 16-27 hour & trip reactor minutes 18039-C Confirmed Loose Part 20% RTP quickly 16-27 minutes SS determination based As determined by on plant conditions the SS 48

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 gpm tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL>.5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required.

This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Performs SHUTDOWN BRIEFING METHOD

Auto rod control should be used.

Reduce Turbine Load at approximately 3% RTP per minute (approx. 36MWe) up to 5% RTP (approx 60 MWe).

Borate considering the calculations from the reactivity briefing sheet and BEACON.

Maintain AFD within the doghouse.

SS (or SRO designee) Maintain supervisory oversight.

AN rod withdrawals will be approved by the SS.

Approval for each reactivity manipulation is not necessary as long as manipulations are made within the boundaries established in this briefing (i.e. turbine load adjustment up to 60 MWe, etc).

A crew update should be performed at approximately every 100 MWe power change.

If manpower is available, peer checks should be used for all reactivity changes.

49

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 gpm tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required.

This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS OPERATIONAL LIMITS

. Maintain TAVG within +/- 6°F of TREE. If TAVG/TREF mismatch

>6°F and not trending toward a matched condition or if TAVG 551oF, then trip the reactor.

. If load reduction due to a loss of vacuum, every effort should be made to maintain the steam dumps closed. (Permissive C-9

>24.92 Hg).

INDUSTRY OE

. Shift supervision must maintain effective oversight and exercise conservative decision making.

Correction of significant RCS TAVG deviations should only be via secondary plant control manipulations and not primary plant control manipulations. (i.e., do not withdraw control rods or dilute).

OATC 2. Verify rods in AUTO.

UO 3. Reduce Turbine Load at the desired rate up to 5%/mm (60 MWe/min).

OATC NOTE to examiner: IF, the Rod Bank Lo-Lo Limit alarm illuminates, the crew will be required to emergency borate the RCS per the ARP.

4. Borate as necessary by initiating 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

NOTE to examiner: Boration steps from 13009 start on Page 53, IF, crew Emergency Borates, steps from 13009 start on Page 59.

50

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 gpm tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required.

This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 5. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO OATC 6. Check desired ramp rate LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MIN.

uO OATC 7. Maintain Tavg within 6°F of Tref:

a. Monitor Tavg/Tref deviation (UT-0495)

b. Verify rods inserting as required.

c. Energize Pressurizer back-up heaters as necessary.

OATC 8. Maintain reactor power and turbine power MATCHED.

UO

a. Balance reactor power with secondary power reduction using boration and control rods.

b. Check rate of reactor power reduction ADEQUATE FOR PLANT CONDTIONS.

c. Check RCS Tavg GREATER THAN 551°F (TS 3.4.2)

d. Check RCS Tavg WITHIN 6°F OF TREE.

51

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 gpm tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required.

This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 9. Maintain PRZR Pressure AT 2235 PSIG.

OATC 10. Maintain PRZR Level - AT PROGRAM.

UO 11. Maintain SG Level BETWEEN 60% AND 70%.

SS 13. Notify SM to make the following notifications as appropriate:

Plant Management Notifications using 10000-C, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS NMP-EP-1 10, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION 00152-C, FEDERAL AND STATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS Chemistry Technical Specification sampling for load reductions greater than 15% using 351 bC, CHEMISTRY CONTROL OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

QC to perform a NOPT inspection using 84008, RPV ALLOY 600 MATERIAL INSPECTIONS AND REPORTS for reactor shutdowns.

NOTE Event will continue until adequate power maneuver completed as determined by the NRC Chief Examiner, at that point, the SGTR will occur and the crew will trip the plant lAW 1 8009-C, step 3.b RNO.

END OF EVENT #6, PROCEED TO EVENTS # 7-10.

52

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13009-1, Section 4.2 Boration OATC 4.2 BORATION 4.2.1 Determine the existing RCS boron concentration from Boron Meter 1-Al-40134 OR by sample analysis.

4.2.2 To determine the number of gallons of boric acid required to borate the RCS, perform the following.

IF borating to required boron for a xenon free cool down, obtain the maximum boron concentration for the cool down range from the PTDB Tab 1.3.4-Ti and T2.

OR IF borating to a desired boron concentration, determine the desired change in boron concentration by subtracting the existing concentration from the desired concentration.

THEN Determine the amount of boric acid necessary to accomplish the desired change in boron concentration using PTDB Tab 2.3 and correct the obtained value using PTDB Tab 2.1.

Note to examiner: The OATC may also use a Beacon Book calculation to obtain a boron addition target for the Rapid Power Reduction. For a power reduction to 20%, this will be a boron addition of 800 gallons at 30 gpm.

OATC 4.2.3 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

OATC 4.2.4 Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in BOR.

53

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

[ Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE If necessary, boric acid flow may be adjusted using 1 -FIC-Ol 10 with SS concurrence. Changes to pot setting should be logged in the Control Room Log and restored at completion of activity.

OATC 4.2.5 Adjust potentiometer on Boric Acid Blender Flow Controller 1-FIC-OllO as desired and verify in AUTO.

CAUTION Digital counter setting on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1-FQI-0110 reads in tenth-gallon increments.

OATC 4.2.6 Set BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1-FQI-0110 to the desired amount of Boric Acid.

54

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.7 Verify the following:

. BA TO BLENDER 1 -HS-01 1 OA is in AUTO.

. BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT 1 -HS-01 1 OB is in AUTO.

One Boric Acid Transfer Pump in AUTO or START.

. RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER 1 -FV-O1 11 A is closed with 1HS-O111A in AUTO.

. BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1 -FV-O1 11 B is closed with 1HS-O111B in AUTO.

NOTES

. Boration can be manually stopped at any time by placing 1 -HS-40001 B in STOP.

. VCT pressure, 1 -P1-115 should be maintained between 20 and 45 psig.

OATC 4.2.8 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START and perform the following:

. Verify Boric Acid Transfer Pump is running.

. Verify 1 -FV-01 1 OB is open.

. Verify 1 -FV----01 1 OA throttles open to provide desired flow on 1-FI-O11OA.

. Monitor BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1 -FQI-01 10.

55

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event Nofl: 6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.9 WHEN 1-FQI-0i 10 BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator reaches its setpoint, verify boration stops and the following valves close.

. 1-FV-O11OA, BATO BLENDER

. 1-FV-01 lOB, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT OATC 4.2.10 Flush approximately 15 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water through 1-FV-0i lOB by performing the flowing:

a. Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A to ALT DIL.

b. Set TOTAL MAKEUP integrator 1-FQI-0111 for 13 to 15 gallons.

c. Place BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1 -HS-01 11 B in CLOSE.

d. Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START.

e. Verify flow is indicated on 1-Fl-Oil OB.

f. WHEN TOTAL MAKEUP integrator 1-FQI reaches the desired setpoint, verify the following valves close:

l-FV-O111A, RX MU WTRTO BA BLENDER

1-FV-O11OB, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT 56

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

[ Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.1 1 Verify 1 -FIC-Ol 10 potentiometer is set to setting recorded prior to boration (or as directed by SS).

OATC 4.2.12 Align Reactor Makeup Control system for automatic operation as follows:

COMPONENT NAME POSITION

a. 1-HS-I1OB BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT AUTO

b. 1HS-40001A VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT AUTO

c. 1-HS-40001B VCT MAKEUP CONTROL START OATC 4.2.13 IF BA TRANSFER PUMP was placed in START at Step 4.2.7, return to AUTO or as directed by SS.

OATC 4.2.14 Monitor RCS Tavg, source range countrate, and Reactor Power as applicable.

OATC 4.2.15 Operate the Pressurizer Back-up Heaters as necessary to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and the Pressurizer.

57

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior QATC 4.2.16 Verify desired boration through sample analysis or from Boron Concentration Meter 1-1208-T6-006. (1-Al-40134)

Return to EVENT # 6, Rapid Power Reduction, Page # 50, Step 4.

58

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, Steps for Emergency Boration if crew opts to perform.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction Emergency Boration steps.

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup (Emergency Boration)

NOTE: Table 1 provides a convenient tool for checking Emergency Boration flow path alternatives.

OATC 4.9.1 Emergency Boration Through 1-HV-8104 OATC 4 9 1 1 Start one (1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump OATC 4.9.1.2 Verify a Charging Pump is running.

OATC 4.9.1.3 Open EMERGENCY BORATE valve 1-HV-81 04.

NOTE: The following step assumes that with 12 gpm of seal return, 30 gpm will be supplied to the RCS.

OATC 49 1 4 Place 1-FIC-0121 in MANUAL OATC 4 9 1 5 Adjust 1-FIC-0121 to maintain flow greater than 42 gpm NOTES:

. IPC computer point for Boric Acid flow Rate is FO183 (GPM).

Computer point for Boric Acid Totalized Flow is UF0183 (Gallons)

OATC 4.9.1.6 Verify Emergency Boration flow 1 -Fl-01 83 greater than 30 gpm.

59

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, Steps for Emergency Boration if crew opts to perform.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction Emergency Boration steps.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.9.1.7 If flow is less than 30 gpm, start the second Boric Acid Transfer Pump.

OATC 4.9.1.8 Operate the Pressurizer Backup Heaters as necessary to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and the Pressurizer.

OATC 4.9.1.9 Check plant conditions are consistent with the boration of the RCS:

RCS Tavg may be dropping.

NIS may be dropping.

OATC 4.9.1.10 Determine the amount of boric acid required to allow termination of Emergency Boration.

NOTE: Monitor Boric Acid Flow Rate computer point F0183. After flow has started the totalized flow should be reset by selecting Reset Boric Acid Flow Totalizer from the IPC System Menu.

OATC 4.9.1.1 1 When the determined amount of boric acid has been added to the RCS, close 1-HV-8104.

OATC 4.9.1.12 Return the Boric Acid Transfer Pumps to the desired system configuration.

OATC 4.9.1.13 Restore 1-FIC-0121 to the AUTO position.

60

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, Steps for Emergency Boration if crew opts to perform.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction Emergency Boration steps.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.9.1.14 Direct Chemistry to sample and report the RCS boron concentration, or monitor the Boron Meter 1 -Al-401 34 if available.

Return to EVENT #6, Rapid Power Reduction, Page # 50, Step 4.

61

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test NoW: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7,8,9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1 9000-C. E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety lnjectiox.

CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 1 9000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Makes a page announcement of Reactor Trip.

OATC 1. Check Reactor Trip:

. Rod Bottom Lights LIT (YES)

. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN (YES)

. Neutron Flux LOWERING (YES)

UO 2. Check Turbine Trip:

All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED (YES)

UO 3. Check Power to AC Emergency Buses.

a. AC Emergency Busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED. (YES)

. 4160 AC 1 E Busses

b. AC Emergency Busses ALL ENERGIZED. (YES)

. 416OVAC 1E Busses

480V AC 1 E Busses OATC 4. Check if SI is actuated.

Any SI annunciators LIT (YES)

SI ACTUATED BPLP window LIT (YES)

SS Go to Step 6.

62

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 6. Initiate the Foldout Page.

CREW SS 7. Perform the following:

OATC

OATC Initial Actions Page (Note to examiner, start Page 64)

UO

UO Initial Actions Page (Note to examiner, start Page 67)

NOTE: SS initiates step 8 after OATC/UO Initial Actions completed.

63

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

1. Check both trains of ECCS equipment ALIGNING FOR INJECTION PHASE: (YES)

. MLB indication OATC 2. Check Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED. (YES)

CIA MLB indication OATC 3. Check ECCS Pumps and NCP status:

a. CCPs RUNNING. (NO, CCP A is tripped, CCP B did not start)

RNO Critical a. Perform the following for available CCP(s):

1) Place alternate miniflow valve handswitch in ENABLE PTL:

HS-8508A HS-8508B

2) Start CCP B

b. SI Pumps RUNNING. (YES)

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. (YES, RHR pump A is tagged out)

d. NCP TRIPPED. (YES)

OATC 4. Verify CCW Pumps ONLY TWO RUNNING TRAIN B. (YES) 64

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

5. Verify proper NSCW system operation: (YES)

a. NSCW Pumps ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

b. NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN hand switches IN AUTO:

. HS-1669A

. HS-1668A OATC 6. Verify Containment Cooling Units: (YES)

a. ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED. (YES)

. MLB indication

b. NSCW Cooler isolation valves OPEN. (YES)

. MLB indication OATC 7. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation.

a. Dampers and Valves CLOSED. (YES) 65

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

8. Check Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21.5 PSIG.

(YES)

OATC 9. Check ECCS flows:

a. BIT flow (YES)

b. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1625 PSIG. (YES)

c. SI Pump flow. (YES)

d. RCS pressure LESS THAN 300 PS 1G. (NO)

RNO

d. GotoSteplO.

OATC 10. Check ECCS Valve alignment PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs. (YES)

OATC 11. Check ACCW pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING. (YES)

OATC 12. Adjust Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 GPM.

OATC 13. Dispatch Operator to ensure one train of SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING in service per 13719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM.

END OF OATC INITIAL ACTIONS RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OF 19000-C CONTINUING AT STEP 8, Page 70.

66

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7,8,9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS

1. Check AFW Pumps RUNNING. (YES)

MDAFW Pumps

. TDAFW Pump, if required.

Note to examiners: The UO may request to perform an Early Operator Action to isolate AFW flow to SG # 2. The MDAFW pump B discharge valve HV 5132 will NOT close from the QMCB It is anticipated the crew will place MDAFW pump 8 inPTLtostopflow to SG # a:

Note to examiners: SG # 2 level is required to be> 10% NR before flow is isolated from AFW.

UO 2. Check NR level in at least one SG GREATER THAN 10%.

(32% ADVERSE). (YES)

UO 3. Check if main steamlines should be isolated: (NO)

a. Check for one of more of the following conditions:

Any steam line pressure LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 585 PSIG.

Containment pressure GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG.

Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate ON TWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLINE.

RNO

a. GotoStep4.

67

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS

4. Verify FW Isolation Valves closed: (YES)

. MFIVs

. BFIVs

. MFRVs

BFRVs UO 5. Verify SG Blowdown isolated: (YES)

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, Cahd D in the

SG Sample Isolation Valves CLOSED.

UO 6. Verify Diesel Generators RUNNING. (YES)

UO 7. Throttle total AFW flow as necessary to maintain SG NR levels between 10% (32% ADVERSE) and 65%.

See NOTES at step 1 of UO INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS regarding isolation of AFW flow to SG # 2.

UO 8. Verify both MFPs TRIPPED. (YES) 68

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 9. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN. (YES)

OATC BACK TO 1 9000-C PROCEDURE MAIN BODY, Page 70, Step 8.

uO 69

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7,8,9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 19000-C, E-0 MAIN BODY.

CREW 8. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC 9. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F.

-OR-Without RCP(s) running RCS WA COLD LEG TEMPERATURES.

RNO (IF needed)

9. IF temperature is less than 557°F and lowering, THEN perform the following as necessary:

a. Stop dumping steam.

b. Perform the following as appropriate:

IF at least one SG NA level greater than 10%

(32% ADVERSE), THEN lower total feed flow.

-OR IF all SG NR levels less than 10% (32% ADVERSE), THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 gpm.

c. If cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

d. If temperature greater than 557°F and rising, THEN dump steam.

70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTION: A PRZR PORV Block Valve which was closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV should not be opened unless used to prevent challenging the PRZR Safeties.

10. Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:

a. PRZR PORVs CLOSED AND IN AUTO. (YES)

b. Normal PRZR Spray Valves CLOSED. (YES)

c. Power to at least one Block Valve AVAILABLE. (YES)

d. PRZR PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (NO)

RNO

d. Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.

OATC 1 1. Check if RCPs should be stopped:

a. ECCS Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING: (YES)

CCPorSlPump

b. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 PSIG. (NO)

RNO

b. GotoStepl2.

Note to examiner: It is expected RCP pressure will be above 1375 psig at this time.

71

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7,8,9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 12. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. SG Pressures:

Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner. (NO)

-OR Any completely depressurized. (NO)

RNO

a. Go to Step 13.

72

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 with complications. During the OATC Initial Operator Actions, CCP B will not auto start requiring the OATC to manually start CCP B. The Instrument Air valve to containment 1 HV-9378 will NOT open after closing on the SI actuation requiring the OATC to use a PRZR PORV to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR. MDAFW pump discharge valve to SG # 2 will not shut requiring the UO to manually stop the MDAFW pump B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 13. Check SG Tubes intact:

a. Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b. Secondary Radiation NORMAL. (NO)

MAIN STEAM LINE MONITORS

RE-13120(SG1)

RE-13121 (SG2)

RE-13122(SG3)

RE-13119(SG4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839

RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation:

RNO

b. Go to 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.

Note to examiner: 19030-C, E-3 SGTR actions next.

73

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1 9030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture CREW 1. Initiate the following:

. Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.

Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 1 9200-C, F-O CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCITON STATUS TREE.

SS 2. Initiate NMP-EP-1 10, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

OATC 3. Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 GPM.

OATC 4. Check if RCPs should be stopped:

a. ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING: (YES)

CCP or Sip Pump

b. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 PSIG. (NO)

RNO

b. IF RCS pressure lowers to less than 1375 psig prior to initiation of RCS cooldown in Step 17.

THEN stop all RCPs and return to Step in effect.

Go to Step 5.

74

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 5. Identify ruptured SG(s) by any of the following conditions.

Unexpected rise in any SG NR level.

High radiation from any SG sample.

High radiation from any SG steamline.

High radiation from any SG blowdown line.

Note to examiner: SG # 2 level will be rising with AFW flow throttled. However, this is a hard call for the candidate until the TDAFW steam supply is isolated in later steps since steam is being supplied to the TDAFW pump causing the level rise to NOT be as pronounced.

CAUTION: At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS

cooldown.

UO 6. Isolate ruptured SG(s):

Critical a. Adjust ruptured SG ARV(s) controller setpoint to 1160 psig (pot setting 7.73)

b. Check ruptured SG ARV(s) CLOSED.

PV-3000 (SG 1)

PV-301 0 (SG 2)

PV-3020 (SG 3)

PV-3030 (SG 4) 75

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

[ Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION: If TDAFW Pump is the only available AFW pump, maintain at least one steam supply OPEN.

UO 7. Close affected TDAFW Pump Steam supply valve(s):

HV-3009 (SG 1) LP-1 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP-1.

Critical HV-301 9 (SG 2) LP-2 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP-1.

UO 8. Verify SG Blowdown Isolation Valves CLOSED WITH Critical HANDSWITCHES IN CLOSE POSTION.

Note to examiner: HV-7603B should have been close during UO Initial Operator Actions.

OATC 9. Isolate flow from the ruptured SG(s) by closing its Main Critical Steamline isolation and Bypass Valves.

Note to examiner: HV-301 6A I B, HV-1 3007A I B.

76

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE LTime Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTIONS:

. This procedure should be performed in a timely manner to assure that break flow in the ruptured SG(s) is terminated before water enters the SGs main steam piping.

. Any ruptured SG that is also faulted, should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown or SG activity sample.

UO 10. Check ruptured SG(s) level:

a. SG NR level GREATER THAN 10% (32% ADVERSE).

(YES)

b. Step feed flow to ruptured SG(s).

Critical Close the TDAFW and MDAFW valves to SG #2.

(Note to examiner: 1 HS-51 25A and 1 HS-51 32A)

(Note to examiner: IF HV-5132 was NOT previously closed during performance of E-0, it is required to be closed now, since the valve will NOT shut, it is anticipated the crew will stop MDAFW pump B by placing the pump in PTL UO 11. Check ruptured SG(s) pressure GREATER THAN 290 PSIG.

(YES)

NOTE: When the low steam line pressure Sl/SLl is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur is the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

77

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

12. Check if low steamline pressure SI/SLI should be blocked:

UO a. Steam dumps AVAILABLE. (YES)

OATC b. PRZR pressure LESS THAN 2000 PSIG. (YES)

UO c. High steam pressure rate alarms CLEAR. (YES)

d. Block low steam line pressure Sl/SLI using the following:

e HS-40068 e HS-40069 UO 13. Align steam Dumps for RCS cooldown:

a. IF Steam Dumps are in T AVG mode, (YES)

THEN UO 1) Match demand on SG Header Pressure Controller PlC-507 and SD demand meter U 1-500.

UO 2) Transfer Steam Dumps to STM PRESS mode using HS-500C.

b. RCS temperature GREATER THAN 550°F.

UO c. As RCS cooldown is initiated, hold HS-0500A and HS-0500B in the BYPASS INTERLOCK position until RCS temperature is less than 550°F.

UO 14. Raise intact SG levels prior to maximum rate cooldown.

78

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 15. Check at least one RCP RUNNING. (YES)

SS 16. Determine required core exit temperature for cooldown.

Lowest Ruptured SG Core Exit Pressure (psig) Temperature (°F) 1200 and greater 530 llOOto 1199 518 1000 to 1099 506 900 to 999 493 800 to 899 479 700 to 799 463 600 to 699 445 500 to 599 424 400 to 499 399 300 to 399 366 290 to 299 350 Note to examiner: Expect to pick either 518 or 506.

79

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 1 9030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 17. Initiate RCS cooldown:

a. Dump steam to Condenser from intact SG(s) at maximum rate using Steam Dumps by slowly raising demand on PIC-507.

OATC 18. Check if RCS cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core Exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

(NOT AT THIS TIME)

RNO

a. WHEN core exits are less than required, THEN perform steps 18.b and 18.c.

Note to examiner: This will take several minutes to reach CET target temperate of either 518 or 506.

UO b. Stop RCS cooldown.

c. Maintain Core Exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

Note to examiner: The UO will use steam dumps to maintain.

80

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 19. Check intact SG levels:

a. NR level AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10%. (32%

ADVERSE) (YES)

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% (32% ADVERSE) and 65%.

c. NR level ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (NO)

RNO

c. GotoStep2o.

OATC 20. Check PRZR PORVs and Block Valves:

a. Power to PRZR PORV Block Valves AVAILABLE. (YES)

b. PRZR PORVs-CLOSED. (YES)

c. PRZR PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (NO)

RNO

c. IF Block Valve NOT closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV, AND WHEN PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig, THEN verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve.

81

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTIONS:

If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation.

. RHR Pumps

SI Pumps

Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units

Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal)

. ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CR1 is reset)

OATC 21. Reset SI.

CAUTION:

Repositioning Phase A Isolation Valves may cause radiation problems throughout the plant.

OATC 22. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A.

Note to Sim Booth Operator: If not already performed, initiate trigger to maintain IA to CNMT isolated in next steps.

82

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 23. Establish Instrument Air to Containment.

a. Instrument Air pressure GREATER THAN 100 PSIG.

(YES)

b. Open INSTR AIR CNMT ISO VLV HV-9378. (NO, valve will NOT open)

c. Verify PRZR Spray Valves operating as required. (NO)

OATC 24. Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:

a. RHR Pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST. (YES)

b. RCS pressure GREATER THAN 300 PSIG. (YES)

c. Stop RHR Pumps.

OATC 25. IF RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 300 psig.

THEN restart RHR Pumps.

83

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 26. Check if RCS cooldown should be stopped.

a. Core Exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

(YES, depending on how fast crew is, if NO, the crew will wait until < 518 or 506 and stop the cooldown per the RNO of this step)

RNO

a. Do NOT proceed until core exit TCs less than required temperature.

b. Stop RCS cooldown.

c. Maintain Core Exit TC5 LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

CAUTION:

Ruptured SG pressure and RCS subcooling should begin to rise as RCS pressure recovers after the cooldown is stopped.

UO 27. Check ruptured SG(s) pressure STABLE OR RISING. (YES)

OATC 28. Check RCS Subcooling GREATER THAN 44°F.

(58°F ADVERSE) (YES) 84

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ]j OATC 29. Check all of the following:

RCS pressure GREATER THAN RUPTURED SG(s)

PRESSURE. (YES)

PRZR level LESS THAN 75% (52% ADVERSE). (YES)

30. Check Normal PRZR Spray AVAILABLE. (NO)

RNO

30. Go to Step 32.

85

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 32. Check at least one PRZR PORV AVAILABLE. (YES)

33. Check at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve AVAILABLE (YES)

NOTE: The Upper Head region of the vessel may void during RCS depressurization if RCPs are not running. This will result in a rapidly rising PRZR level.

CAUTIONS

. The PRT may rupture if a PRZR PORV is used to depressurize the RCS. This may result in abnormal Containment Conditions.

Cycling of the PRZR PORV should be minimized.

34. Depressurize RCS using a PRZR PORV to refill PRZR.

a. Arm one available train of COPS and check PRZR PORV Block Valve OPEN.

b. Open one PRZR PORV.

a. GotoStep37.

86

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 1 9030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 37. Check if ANY of the following conditions are satisfied.

BOTH of the following:

Critical 1) RCS pressure LESS THAN RUPTURED SG(s)

PRESSURE.

AND Critical 2) PRZR level GREATER THAN 9%. (37% ADVERSE)

-OR RCS Subcooling LESS THAN 24°F (38°F ADVERSE)

-OR Critical PRZR level GREATER THAN 75% (52% ADVERSE)

Note to examiner: Due to the nature of a DBA SGTR at Vogtle, it will be very close on whether it is BOTH RCP pressure & PRZR level as highlighted above OR PRZR level> 75% only. The OATC will close the PORV valves based on the 1 st parameter obtained.

87

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event Non: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 38. Terminate RCS depressurization:

a. Verify Normal PRZR Spray valve(s) CLOSED. (YES)

Critical b. Verify PRZR PORV(s) CLOSED. (NO, OATC will shut the PORV at this time).

c. Block COPS.

d. Check Auxiliary Spray IN SERVICE (NO)

RNO

d. Go to step 39.

OATC 39. Check RCS pressure RISING. (YES)

CAUTION ECCS FLOW SHOULD BE TERMINATED when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfilling of the ruptured SGs.

88

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

DBA SGTR actions from 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Time Position

{ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 40. Check if ECCS flow should be terminated.

a. RCS Subcooling GREATER THAN 24°F (38°F ADVERSE)

(YES)

b. Secondary Heat Sink:

UO Total feed flow to SGs GREATER THAN 570 GPM AVAILABLE (YES)

-OR NR level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 10%

(32% ADVERSE) (YES)

OATC c. RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING. (YES)

d. PRZR level GREATER THAN 9% (37% ADVERSE) (YES).

OATC 41. Stop ECCS Pumps and place in standby.

. SI Pumps

. All but one CCP Note to examiner: This is the termination point for the scenario.

Without Instrument Air, placing Safety Grade Charging and Letdown in service is an extended evolution involving local field operations.

END OF EVENTS #7,8,9, 10 END OF SCENARIO #2.

89

UNIT 1 REACTIVITY BRIEFING SHEET Shift: Day Date: 4/9/13 Burnup: 11166.70 MWD/MTU As of 4/9/13 MINIMUM SHIFT REACTIVITY INFORMATION TO BE BRIEFED Power: 100 Rod Motion: AUTO Current Temperature Control Strategy: DI LUTION Currently Making Up: 50.0 gal Every: 1 to 2 hrs The desired Tavg operating band is 585.5 +1- 0.05 degrees F CVCS makeup system boric acid flow per 100 gal makeup: 13.0 gallons/i 00 CVCS makeup system pot setting(FIC-01 10): 3.24 BTRS Strategy: none AFD Strategy: Maintain on target plus/minus 1 AFD units Reactivity System Components DegradedlOOS:

I None Activities expected that may affect core reactivity (Reactivity Focus Items):

I None CURRENT CORE REACTIVIITY PARAMETERS Boron Worth: 8.5 pcm/ppm PCM per 1% pwr change: 17.9 Current MTC value: HFP: -17.9 pcm/F HZP: -3.9 pcm/F Current BAST Cb: 7000 ppm Current RCS Cb: 907 ppm Boration required per: degree F: 21.3 gallons 1% pwr change: 21.3 gallons 10% pwr change: 212.8 gallons 30% pwr change: 638.5 gallons Dilutions required per: degree F: 143.1 gallons 1% pwr change: 143.1 gallons Boration required for stuck rods: 3182.2 gallons for 2 stuck rods 4837.3 gallons for 3 stuck rods

lf more than 3 rods are stuck begin boration and calculate for actual number of stuck rods*

Human Performance tools:

Peer check Three-way communication Placekeeping Procedure Use STAR Time-Out Situational Awareness Valid for PTDB Cycle 18 Tab 1.0 rev 29 approved 9/29/12 and Tab 16.0 rev 19 approved 1 0/5/12 S:W/ORKGROUPSSNC SOUTHERN NUCLEARPL NWOGTLEOPERATIONSPLA YERSTURNEROVERU1UI REACTIVInSHEET.XLS

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Facility: Voqtle Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at approximately 22% power, EOL, start-up in progress.

(Base IC #17, snapped to IC # 172 for HL18 NRC Exam)

Equipment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B)

Turnover: Raise reactor power and synchronize the main generator to the grid per 12004DF-1 (Power Operation, Model), Section 4.1; Surveillance 14901 was completed 21 days ago. Containment mini-purge is in service in preparation for a containment entry next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

TU1 8 Auto Turbine Trip Failure dfw_078a LV-5245_DOP BFRVC Primary ESO1 Reactor Fails to Auto Trip ES1 0 Train A MSL Auto Isolation Failure ES1 1 Train B MSL Auto Isolation Failure CSO1 B Containment Spray Pump B Fails to Auto Start Overrides:

HS-40007 Neutral (C panel Rx. Trip hand switch)

NOTE to SIMBOOTH: Be sure to provide signed off steps for 12004DF-1, Power Operations.

Event Maif. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A R-OATC Raise reactor power to 25% in preparation for synchronizing Main R-SS Generator with the Grid per 12004DF-l 2 N/A N-UO Synchronize Main Generator with Grid per 12004DF-1 and 13830-1 N-SS T3 GEO3 Main Generator Exciter fails when UO raises load after synchronizing causing a Main Generator trip Pre- TU18 C-UO Turbine fails to auto trip on generator trip loaded C-SS T4 CV2O @ C-OATC Seal Injection Filter Blockage requires OATC to manually adjust 80% C-SS charging and injection flow Note to SimBooth: delete malfunction 5 minutes after being requested to shift filters.

1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Maif. Event Event No. No. Type* Description T5 SGO3A1 TS-SS SG PT-514 fails low.

0%

LCO 3.3.2, Condition A, EU le, Condition D, Eu 4d(1) Condition D ILCO 3.3.3, Condition A, EU 8 LCO 3.3.4, EU 13, Condition A 6 OVR C-OATC Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PV-455C fails open SPRAY= 0-55 TRUE, then TS-SS LCO 3.4.1, Condition A 4550 prcv to 0.6 T7 ELO7A C-All Loss of 1AAO2 due to faulted bus TS-SS LCO 3.8.1, Condition A, B, & E LCO 3.8.9, Condition A LCO 3.7.5, Condition B (already in effect)

T8 Ovation C-UO #3 BFRV fails closed. SGWL may reach the Lo-Lo Reactor Trip DEW C-SS setpoint unless a pre-emptive reactor trip performed.

T8 FW1 5A C-UO A shaft shear of the only operating MFP will require the crew to 60 sec C-SS manually trip the reactor. SGWL will reach the Lo-Lo Reactor Trip delay setpoint unless a pre-emptive reactor trip is performed.

9 ESOl C-OATC If the SGWL Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint is reached for event 8, the Pre- C-SS reactor will not automatically trip requiring the crew to perform a loaded manual reactor trip Pre- HS-40007 C-OATC The first reactor trip handswitch used by the OATC will fail to trip the loaded Neutral C-SS reactor, the second handswitch will perform a reactor trip T1O FWO6C @ M-All #3 SG Eaulted (ELB, IRC) followed by High Containment Pressure 20-30%

11 ES1 0 C-UO Train A Main Steam Line Auto Isolation Failure Pre- ES1 1 C-SS Train B Main Steam Line Auto Isolation Failure loaded 12 CSO1 B C-OATC Containment Spray Pump B fails to auto start Pre- Critical C-SS loaded (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2

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UNIT 1 REACTIVITY BRIEFING SHEET Shift: Day Date: 4/9/13 Burnup: 20256.77 MWD/MTU Asof 4/9/13 6:54 MINIMUM SHIFT REACTIVITY INFORMATION TO BE BRIEFED Power: 22 Rod Motion: MANUAL Current Temperature Control Strategy: DILUTION Currently Making Up: 50.0 gal Every: 1 to 2 hrs The desired Tavg operating band is 566.1 +1- 0.05 degrees F CVCS makeup system boric acid flow per 100 gal makeup: 6.9 gallons/i 00 CVCS makeup system pot setting(FIC-01 10): 1.73 BTRS Strategy: none AFD Strategy: Maintain on target plus/minus 1 AFD units Reactivity System Components Degraded/OOS:

I None Activities expected that may affect core reactivity (Reactivity Focus Items):

I None CURRENT CORE REACTIVIITY PARAMETERS Boron Worth: 9.3 pcm/ppm PCM per 1% pwr change: 24.8 Current MTC value: HFP: -31.5 pcm/F HZP: -13.6 pcm/F Current BAST Cb: 7000 ppm Current RCS Cb: 483 ppm Boration required per: degree F: 31.9 gallons 1% pwr change: 25.2 gallons 10% pwr change: 251.5 gallons 30% pwr change: 754.6 gallons Dilutions required per: degree F: 432.4 gallons 1% pwr change: 340.3 gallons Boration required for stuck rods: 2970.0 gallons for 2 stuck rods 4510.8 gallons for 3 stuck rods

If more than 3 rods are stuck begin boration and calculate for actual number of stuck rods*

Human Performance tools:

Peer check Three-way communication Placekeeping Procedure Use STAR Time-Out Situational Awareness Valid for PTDB Cycle 18 Tab 1.0 rev 29 approved 9/29/12 and Tab 16.0 rev 19 approved 1 0/5/12 S:!WORKGROUPS!SNC SOUTHERN NUCLEAR!PLANTVOGTLEOPERATIONS!PLAYERS!TURNEROVERjUI!U1 REACT! VITYSHEET.XLS

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

Reactor power is approximately 22%. Power must be raised to 25% in order to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid per 1 2004DF-1 (Power Operation, Mode 1).

Verifiable Actions:

OATC withdraw control rods and/or dilute to establish a positive SUR and raise power to 25%

as read on the Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 2:

At 25% reactor power, the main generator is synchronized to the grid per 1 2004DF-1, and 13830-1, Main Generator Operation.

Verifiable Actions:

UO synchronizes the main generator to the power grid.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 3:

Main generator excitation is lost causing the generator to trip when the UO raises turbine load per 13800-1. The turbine will fail to automatically trip on the generator trip.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manually trip turbine.

CREW control reactor response per AOP 18011-C, Turbine Trip Below P9.

Technical Specifications:

None 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4:

The reactor coolant pump seal injection filter becomes clogged/blocked reducing seal injection flow below the minimum acceptable value.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC operate charging flow and seal injection flow control valves to restore seal injection flow to required operating band.

Technical Srecifications:

None Event 5:

Steam Generator # 1 Pressure Channel PT-51 4 fails low.

Verifiable Actions:

None Technical Srecifications:

LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS, Condition A, FU le, Condition D, LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS, FU 4d(1), Condition D, ILCO 3.3.3, PAMS, Condition A, EU 8, LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation EU 13, Condition A Event 6:

Pressurizer spray valve (1 PV-455C) fails partially (approximately 60%) open causing an uncontrolled drop in pressurizer pressure.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC perform IOA of AOP 1 8000-C and close PV-455C.

OATC takes manual control of pressurizer heaters to restore pressure normal operating band.

Technical Specifications:

LCQ 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits the crew may respond quickly enough to prevent violating this LCO.

4

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 7:

Fault on 1 E switchgear results in loss of power to 1 AAO2. This fault will prevent automatic and manual actuation of all Train A EGGS components. AOP 18031-C, Section A.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Emergency trips DG-1A, reduces TDAFW pump flow, reduces turbine load as necessary.

OATC Verifies reactor power stays below license limit by using Control Rods and RCS boron as necessary.

UO Aligns Containment HVAC to Train B.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.8.1 AC Electrical Sources, Conditions A, B and E, 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating, Condition A & 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater, Condition B.

Event 8:

3 BFRV fails closed. SGWL may lower to the Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint. If the SGWL Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint is reached, the reactor will fail to automatically trip. Additionally, when the reactor is attempted to be tripped manually, the first reactor trip handswitch used will fail to cause a reactor trip.

Shaft shear of the only operating MFP causes a complete loss of feedwater flow to all steam generators. SGWL may lower to the Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint. If the SGWL Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint is reached, the reactor will fail to automatically trip. Additionally, when the reactor is attempted to be tripped manually, the first reactor trip handswitch used will fail to cause a reactor trip.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Perform IOA of AOP 18016-C to restore and control feedwater flow and SGWL.

OATC Recognize the need for a manual reactor trip, if required OATC Perform IOA of EOP 19000-C UO Perform IOA of EOP 19000-C Technical Specifications:

None 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events 9,10,11,12:

A fault occurs on Steam Generator # 3 Feed Line, IRC. The fault is non-isolable resulting in the SG blowing down into containment and rising containment pressure. Rising containment pressure will result in automatic SI, SLI, and Containment Spray actuations; additionally, CVI &

CIA actuations will occur. The crew must also isolate #3 SG. Furthermore, Train A & B Auto SLI will fail to initiate and Containment Spray Pump B will fail to automatically start on Train B Containment Spray actuation.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Verifies proper actuation of SI, CVI and CIA functions.

UO Manually actuate SLI.

UO Isolate all influent sources to (MEW & AFW) and effluent loads from (Blowdown, Sampling, Main Steam, ARVs) #3 SG.

OATC manually start Containment Spray Pump B.

Technical Specifications:

None The scenario may be stopped after the crew transitions to E-1 or ES1 .1 as required with NRC Chief Examiner approval.

CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Isolates Main Steam Lines, ARVs, Blowdown and Sampling from SG #3 in E-0 and/or E 2 to limit Reactor power excursion, RCS uncontrolled cool down to limit positive reactivity addition and limit PTS concerns prior to receiving an Orange path on CSFST Integrity Status Tree. Automatic isolation of Main Steam Lines will NOT occur, which require an operator action to prevent a PTS condition.

Close Main & Bypass SlVs from SG #3 (step 3 of 19020-C)

Close ARV from SG # 3 (step 9 of 19020-C)

Close Blowdown & Sampling valves from SG #3 (step 10 of 19020-C)

2) Isolates Main and Auxiliary Feedwater to # 3 SG to limit Containment Pressure rise prior to receiving an Orange path on CSFST Containment Status Tree.

Close Main & Bypass FlVs to SG # 3 (step 5 of 19020-C)

Close Motor & Turbine Driven AFW pump throttle valves to SG # 3 (step 6 of 19020-C)

3) Manually start Containment Spray Pump B (no later than step 5.c RNO of 19251-C.) With the failure of AAO2, no Train A components will start. Leaving only one train of containment coolers operating in slow speed to mitigate the rising containment pressure.

Containment Spray Pump B is required to ensure heat & iodine removal capability for Containment atmosphere in an adverse environment. Automatic isolation of Main Steam Lines will NOT occur requiring an operator action to prevent a Containment overpressure condition.

6

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Reactor Power Ascension from approximately 22% RTP to 25% in preparation for synchronizing the main generator to the grid.

[ Time Position I Applicants Action or Behavior OATC I UO 120040F-1,Power Operation (Mode 1)

Uses steam dumps in steam pressure mode to maintain Tave within 2°F of program Tave during power ascension.

CAUTION During power ascent, as feedwater flow is increase, Condensate Demineralizer flow must be periodically monitored and adjusted to prevent inadvertent opening of the Condensate Demineralizer bypass valve on high dP. Inadvertent valve opening may cause fuel condition power rate limits to be exceeded. Ref: 87073-C.

OATC i IJO 4.1.28 Continue with the Unit power ramp by concurrently,

a. Raising REACTOR POWER to 25%, AND NOTE Manual adjustment of the steam dumps may be necessary during turbine rolling in order to maintain constant steam pressure.

b. Rolling the Main Turbine to operating speed per 13800, Main Turbine Operation.

OATC 4.1.29 At 25% REACTOR POWER verify the RPS bistable trips for Intermediate Range and Power Range High Flux Trips activate by observing the PR HI Q Low and IR HI Q status lights illuminate at TSLB-4.

UO 4.1.30 WHEN the Main Turbine reaches 1800 rpm adjust the hydrogen analyzer per 13810, Generator Gas System.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Reactor Power Ascension from approximately 22% RTP to 25% in preparation for synchronizing the main generator to the grid.

Time Position L Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE Tech Spec SR 3.3.1.14 and SR 3.3.1.16 can be also satisfied by observation of energized QMCB, TSLB-2, Status Lights (TSLB-2)

TURB STP VLV CLOSED and TURB, AUTO STOP lights as documented in 12006-C, section A4.3 or 12006-C, Attachment 2 step 1.1.4, following the last reactor shutdown or trip, if the observation is performed within 31 days of rolling the turbine.

SS 4.1.31 IF not performed in the previous 31 days, complete 14901, Turbine Trip Reactor Trip Actuating Device Operational Test.

Note to examiner: as part of the turnover, the following items will have already been completed:

1) Main Turbine rolling at 1800 rpm

2) Hydrogen analyzer adjustment

3) Operational Test 14901 on 21 days before the date of the exam at 1335.

END OF EVENT # 1, PROCEED TO EVENT #2.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Following Reactor Power Ascension to 25%, the crew synchronizes the main generator onto the power grid and raises turbine load.

Time [ Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13830-1 Main Generator Operation CAUTION Avoid operation of the Main Turbine below 100 MWe for prolonged periods (> 60 mm). Low load operation will cause increased rates of moisture erosion of the latter stage buckets and may cause exhaust hood overheating and/or differential expansion problems. These parameters must be closely monitored during low load operation.

uO 4.1.32 Notify Shift Supervisor (SS) and obtain System Operators approval from the Power Control Center (PCC) to synchronize the generator onto the power grid.

Note to examiner: as part of the turnover, the following items have already been completed:

1) System Operators approval has been obtained from the Power Control Center (PCC) to synchronize the generator onto the power grid.

2) Field excitation is established.

3) System Operator has previously been contacted regarding raising turbine load and has approved up to 120 MWe.

UO 4.1.33 Establish field excitation and synchronize the main generator to the power grid and assume 60-80 MWe load, per 13830, Main Generator Operation Note to examiner: the synchronization procedure steps start on Page 4.

UO 4.1.34 Raise Turbine load as needed per 13800, Main Turbine Operation.

Coordinate power changes with System Operator.

Note to examiner: the turbine loading procedure steps start on Page 9.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Following Reactor Power Ascension to 25%, the crew synchronizes the main generator onto the power grid and raises turbine load.

[ Time J Position [ Applicants Action or Behavior UO References 13830, Main Generator Operation, section 4.1.3, Synchronizing the Main Generator to the Grid.

NOTES

. Phone number for the System Operator is 8-506-6965

Phone number for HVSH is 3702 4.1.3.1 Perform the following:

a. Contact Switchyard Coordinator (or his designee).

b. Notify him that the Unit one Main Generator Output breaker will be closed.

c. Request Switchyard Coordinator (or his designee) to alert personnel working in the HVSW to stand clear.

d. Switchyard Coordinator (or his designee) has verified that personnel in HVSW are clear of area.

UO 4.1.3.2 Select one PCB for synchronizing:

230 kV PCB NORM SPLY TO BUS-i 161710 230 kV PCB NORM SPLY TO GOS-WHT (3) 161810 UO 4.1.3.3 Place the Synchronize Switch for the selected PCB in the R (running) position:

PCB 161710 1-SS-BUS 1 PCB 161810 1-SS-GOS WHT (3)

UO 4.1.3.4 Place Unit 1 Synchronize Switch 1-SS-U1 in the I (incoming) position.

UO 4.1.3.5 Verify rotation of 230kV System Synchroscope 1SI-40125.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Following Reactor Power Ascension to 25%, the crew synchronizes the main generator onto the power grid and raises turbine load.

Time Position [ Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.1.3.6 Using the 230kV Voltage/Frequency Selector Switch 1-VS-US1:

a. Select the PCB to be CLOSED JQ note the 230 kV System voltage (1 El-401 24).

PCB-161710 BUS-i PCB-1 61 810 GOS-WHT (3)

b. Select Unit 1 position NQ note the Unit 1 230 kV voltage (1 El-40124).

UO 4.1.3.7 Use the VoltsNARs RAISE/LOWER Pushbutton on the COI display to slowly adjust Unit 1 230 kV voltage to read between zero J4J 1.0 kV higher than 230 kV System voltage for selected PCB.

UO 4.1.3.8 Adjust Turbine speed using the INCREASE LOAD AND DECREASE LOAD Pushbuttons until 1SI-40125 Pointer is rotating very slowly in FAST (clockwise) direction.

SS 4.1.3.9 Make plant page announcement that the Unit One Main Generator Output breaker will be closed and to stand clear.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Following Reactor Power Ascension to 25%, the crew synchronizes the main generator onto the power grid and raises turbine load.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.1.3.10 jfautomaticsynchronizing is required:

a. Position Synch Mode Sel Switch 1 -TS-US1 to the PCB selected for synchronizing:

PCB-1 61710 PCB-1 61810

b. Monitor 230 kV System Synchroscope 1SI-40125.

c. Verify the Synch roscope Pointer is rotating very slowly (approximately 10 to 15 second rotation) in the FAST (clockwise) direction.

d. WHEN the Synchroscope Pointer nears the 12 oclock (straight up) position, observe the red AUTO SYNC PERMISSIVE light illuminates.

NOTE Pushbutton should be depressed and held for several seconds until the PCB closes.

e. As the Synchroscope Pointer passes the 11 oclock position, depress and release the Automatic Synchronizing Pushbutton for the selected PCB:

BUS-i AUTO SYNC PERMISSIVE PCB 161710 GOS-WHT (3) AUTO SYNC PERMISSIVE PCB 161810

f. Verify the selected PCB CLOSES by observing the following:

Red light indication on the selected PCB handswitch

Current indicated on amp meter on each phase of Main Generator output Q on IPC Computer Points:

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Following Reactor Power Ascension to 25%, the crew synchronizes the main generator onto the power grid and raises turbine load.

Time Position [ Applicants Action or Behavior IPC Point Amp Meter J2832 111-40127 J2833 111-40128 J2834 111-40129

g. jf current is NQI indicated on all three phases, THEN trip the Turbine AND initiate 18011-C, Turbine Trip Below P-9.

h. Verify 52G Breaker CLOSED on the COI display for the exciter to operate in the online mode.

i. Select 1/2%/Mm Loading Rate Limit pushbutton.

j. Raise load to between 60 MWe 80 MWe using the LOAD INCREASE Pushbutton per 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation.

k. Use the Volts/VARs RAISE/LOWER Pushbutton on the COt display to maintain kVAR loading in accordance with section 4.2.1.

I. Match Control Switch status to the status of the PCB that was just CLOSED by placing its Control Switch to CLOSE:

PCB-161710 1-HS-161710 PCB-161810 1-HS-161810

m. Place the Synchronize Switch for the PCB that was just CLOSED in the OFF position:

PCB-1 61710 1-SS-BUS 1 PCB-1 61 810 1-SS-GOS WHT (3)

n. Place Synch Mode Sel Switch 1-TS-US1 in NORMAL.

o. Proceed to Step 4.1.3.12 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Following Reactor Power Ascension to 25%, the crew synchronizes the main generator onto the power grid and raises turbine load.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.1.3.12 Close the other PCB as follows:

a. Place the Synch Mode Selector Switch 1-TS-US1 in the NORMAL position.

b. Place the Unit 1 Synchronize Switch 1-SS-U1 in the I (incoming) position.

c. Place the Synchronize Switch for the PCB that is still OPEN in the R (running) position:

PCB-1 61710 1-SS-BUS 1 PCB-161810 1-SSGOS WHT (3)

d. Verify 230kV System Synchroscope 1SI-40125 Pointer is stationary in the straight up position.

e. Place the Control Switch for the selected PCB to the CLOSE position:

PCB-161710 1-HS-161710 PCB-161810 1-HS-161810

f. Check the selected PCB CLOSES by red light indication on the selected PCB handswitch.

g. Place the following Synchronize Switches in the OFF position:

1-55-ui

1-SS-BUS 1

1 -SS-GOS WHT (3)

SS 4.1.3.13 Verify the Stator Leak Monitoring System in service per 13820-1, Stator Cooling System Operation.

Note to examiner: Stator Leak Monitoring System operation is verified locally UO 4.1.3.14 On EX2100 Exciter Control Room COI Control Panel Touchscreen Commands, press DISABLE.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Following Reactor Power Ascension to 25%, the crew synchronizes the main generator onto the power grid and raises turbine load.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO References 13800, Main Turbine Operation, Sec 4.2, Loading NOTES

After Extraction Steam is placed in service, Turbine load changes between 100 MWe and 200 MWe results in rapid temperature changes in the 6th stage Feedwater Heaters. Loading and Extraction Steam isolation valve position changes in this MWe range should be performed slowly while monitoring Feedwater Heater temperatures.

Generator Hydrogen (H2) Cold Gas temperature lTl-7097 should be monitored as the unit is loaded. The desired temperature is 100°F with a minimum temperature of 86°F and maximum of 115°F. H2 Cold Gas temperature is controlled by 1 -TV-7097.

H2 Cold Gas temperature differential between the exciter end (T2815) and Turbine end (T2814) should be maintained below 5°F, per 13721-1, TPCW System, Section 4.2.4.

CAUTION To reduce wear and minimize vibration on the Low Pressure Turbine blades:

a. While the Turbine is operating at less than 30% (340 MWe) the Condenser Vacuum shall be greater than 26 in. Hg. With Turbine load above 30% (340 MWe), the Condenser Vacuum shall be greater than 25 in. Hg.

b. If during plant operation, Condenser Vacuum is less than 25 in. Hg., plant load should be reduced until proper Condenser Vacuum is obtained, If load reduction to the 30% level does not improve vacuum to greater than the 25 in. Hg. limit, the unit should be tripped.

4.2.1 Main Turbine Loading 4.2.1 .1 Trend first stage shell and reheat temperatures on Plant Computer Points UR0229 and UR0230 and monitor for alarms (points will alarm red) based on the following heatup rate limits being exceeded:

150°F/hr for UR0229

125°F/hr for UR0230 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Following Reactor Power Ascension to 25%, the crew synchronizes the main generator onto the power grid and raises turbine load.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.2.1.2 Depress the 1/2 LOADING RATE LIMIT %/MIN pushbutton to select the initial Loading Rate.

NOTES

The slowest available fixed Turbine loading rate is 1/2%/rn in (30%/hr). If a more restrictive loading rate limit is in effect, load should be raised by a bump and wait method.

To stop Turbine loading during a ramp increase, slowly bump the Load Set down until the AT SET LOAD light is LIT and the LOAD INCREASING light is QI LIT.

If Turbine loading with the Load Limit active (set a few percent higher than actual load) is desired, its potentiometer setting must be raised (turned clockwise) as load increases to maintain the Turbine under Load Set control.

CAUTIONS The most restrictive of the following loading rate limits should be adhered to by adjusting the Load Set or Loading Rate as required:

a. Core power escalation limits per 87073-C, Limitations And Conditions For Fuel Operation, applicable above 30% Reactor power,

b. Turbine heatup rate limits of:

(1) First stage temperature (UR0229) rise of 150°F/hr or less, and (2) Reheat Steam temperature (UR0230) rise of 125°F/hr or less.

Avoid operation of the Main Turbine below 100 MWe for prolonged periods

(>60 mm). Low load operation will cause increased rates of moisture erosion of the latter stage buckets and may cause Exhaust Hood overheating and/or differential expansion problems. These parameters must be closely monitored during low load operation.

UO 4.2.1.3 Raise load using the LOAD INCREASE pushbutton.

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Following Reactor Power Ascension to 25%, the crew synchronizes the main generator onto the power grid and raises turbine load.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO NOTES As Turbine loading is increased and during load conditions, H2 Cold Gas Temperature Controller 1TIC-7097 should be controlling H2 Cold Gas at approximately 100°F in AUTO or MANUAL.

CAUTIONS Exhaust Hood temperatures should be maintained less than 175°F by Automatic spray.

4.2.1 .4 At or above 5% load (about 60 MWe), initiate closure of the Group A Turbine Drains:

a. Place the Main Steam Drain Pot handswitches in AUTO (QMCB near Steam Dump Controls):

- MN STM SV-1 & 2 DRN POT VLV 1 HS-6288

- MN STM SV-3 & 4 DRN POT VLV 1 HS-6287

b. Hold TURB DRN STOP VLV 1HS-6121 in CLOSE for 10 seconds after the handswitch lights indicate fully closed.

c. Hold TURBINE CONTROL VALVE BEFORE SEAT DRN 1HS-6021 in CLOSE for 10 seconds after the handswitch lights indicate fully closed.

Note to examiner: shortly after load increased following synchronizing the generator to the grid, the next event will proceed.

END OF EVENT #2, PROCEED TO EVENT #3.

11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

A main generator exciter failure leads to a generator trip after the main generator has been synchronized to the grid. The turbine fails to trip on the generator trip and the UO will have to manually trip the main turbine. The crew will enter AOP 18011-C for turbine trip below P-9.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Simbooth The malfunction should be triggered no later than approximately 10% turbine power.

CREW Diagnoses loss of the main generator and that a loss of the main turbine should have followed.

Symptoms / alarms:

ALB2O-D01 LOW ETS PRESS TURB TRIP

ALB3O-C05 230KV PCB TRIPPED

ALB31 -AOl GEN LOSS OF FLD LOR TRIP

ALB31-D03 EX2100 EXCITER ALARM/GAS MONITOR TROUBLE

ALB31-F05 GEN VOLT REG PT SIGNAL FAILED Indications:

Main generator output breakers (PCB1671O and 16810) are open

Main generator field excitation voltage and current read 0 volts/amps, respectively

Turbine stop valves are open Note to examiner: The crew may go directly to 18011-C, TURBINE TRIP BELOW P-9 OR may use the guidance from ABL2O-D01 or ALB31 -AOl to reference them to the AOP, then transition to 18011-C.

12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

A main generator exciter failure leads to a generator trip after the main generator has been synchronized to the grid. The turbine fails to trip on the generator trip and the UO will have to manually trip the main turbine. The crew will enter AOP 18011-C for turbine trip below P-9.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Ketçciu-i, vi 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE Malfunction in the Emergency Trip System (ETS) portion of the Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) System due to:

a. Valve failure or orifice blockage.

b. System leakage.

c. Normal post turbine trip alarm.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Turbine trip is initiated.

3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION EHC fluid is a fire resistant fluid that may be harmful to personnel. Observe proper safety precautions when in contact with this fluid.

1. IF a reactor trip has occurred, Go To 19000-C, E-O Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

2. IF reactor trip has not occurred Go To 18011-C, Turbine Trip Below P-9.

4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

A main generator exciter failure leads to a generator trip after the main generator has been synchronized to the grid. The turbine fails to trip on the generator trip and the UO will have to manually trip the main turbine. The crew will enter AOP 18011-C for turbine trip below P-9.

Time

{ Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4

uO NOTE Loss of either Main Generator PTs or bus 1 NAA PTs into EX21 00 PT inputs initiates EX2100 2PT alarm which actuates the 374 relay.

1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE Loss of Excitation System 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS

1. Turbine/Generator trip.

2. Trip, lock-out and initiate breaker failure scheme for the following:

a. PCB 161710

b. PCB 161810

3. Trip and lock-out the following:

a. Switchgear 1 NAA NORM INCM BRKR 1 NAAO3

b. Switchgear 1 NAB NORM INCM BRKR 1 NABO3

c. Switchgear 1NAO1 NORM INCM BRKR 1NAO1O3

d. Switchgear 1NAO4 NORM INCM BRKR 1NA0403

e. Switchgear 1 NAO5 NORM INCM BRKR 1 NA0503

4. Initiate an auto-transfer of auxiliary load at the 13.8 and 4.16kV busses.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

A main generator exciter failure leads to a generator trip after the main generator has been synchronized to the grid. The turbine fails to trip on the generator trip and the UO will have to manually trip the main turbine. The crew will enter AOP 18011-C for turbine trip below P-9.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. IF a reactor trip has occurred, Go To 19000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

2 IF a reactor trip has NOT occurred, Go To 18O11-C Turbine TripBeIow P-9 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

A main generator exciter failure leads to a generator trip after the main generator has been synchronized to the grid. The turbine fails to trip on the generator trip and the UO will have to manually trip the main turbine. The crew will enter AOP 18011-C for turbine trip below P-9.

E Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 18011-0 TurLineTripBeIpwP-9 ss Entrsl80I1-C, TURBINE TRIP8ELOW P9 UO 1. Verify turbine trip

. All turbine stop valves CLOSED (NO)

RNO 1. Perform the following:

a. Triptheturbine OATC I 2. Initiate Continuous Actions Page.

uO OATC / 3. Control reactor power:

SS

a. Place control rods in manual

b. Adjust control rods to control reactor power and RCS temperature

c. Check reactor power within capacity of steam dumps (YES)

d. Maintain Tavg at program UO 4. Verify steam dumps OPERATING (YES) 16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

A main generator exciter failure leads to a generator trip after the main generator has been synchronized to the grid. The turbine fails to trip on the generator trip and the UO will have to manually trip the main turbine. The crew will enter AOP 18011-C for turbine trip below P-9.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 5. Check TURB BRG OIL pressure (P1-6315) GREATER THAN 31 PSIG (YES)

NOTE Post-trip response of the steam dumps will cause RCS Tavg to be lower than normal due to the setpoint that is dialed into PIC-507 when it is matched with Ul-500 STEAM DUMP DEMAND in the next step.

UO 6. Transfer steam dumps to STEAM PRESSURE mode:

a. Check Condenser AVAILABLE (YES)

b. Place PIC-507 STEAM DUMP CONTROL in MAN

c. Match demand on PIC-507 and Ul-500 STEAM DUMP DEMAND

d. Place HS-500C STEAM DUMP CONTROL MODE SELECT in STM PRESS

e. Control Tavg for current power level:

Manual control

-OR Place PIC-507 in AUTO at desired setpoint 17

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

A main generator exciter failure leads to a generator trip after the main generator has been synchronized to the grid. The turbine fails to trip on the generator trip and the UO will have to manually trip the main turbine. The crew will enter AOP 18011-C for turbine trip below P-9.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 7. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN. (YES)

UO 8. Check the following on all SGs:

. Steam and feed flow MATCHED. (YES)

. NR level STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 65%. (YES)

OATC 9. Check PRZR Pressure:

a. PRZR Pressure STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG. (YES)

b. GotoStepil.

OATC 1 1. Check PRZR level control:

a. Check level GREATER THAN 17%. (YES)

b. Check charging and letdown IN SERVICE. (YES)

c. Verify PRZR level TRENDING TO PROGRAM. (YES)

SS 12. Dispatch an operator to lower SGBD condensate cooling return Temperature controller setpoints to 80°F.

18

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

A main generator exciter failure leads to a generator trip after the main generator has been synchronized to the grid. The turbine fails to trip on the generator trip and the UO will have to manually trip the main turbine. The crew will enter AOP 18011-C for turbine trip below P-9.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 13. Check non-i E 4.16kV buses ENERGIZED:

. NAO1 (YES)

. NA04 (YES)

. NA05 (YES)

OATC 14. Check reactor power change LESS THAN 15%. (YES)

SS 15. Identify and correct cause of turbine trip. (NO)

RNO 15. Consult SM to determine if unit should hold at present status or shutdown.

SS 16. Initiate 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1) for further actions.

Note to Examiner Call to C & T for notification to OPS for AOP entry, write a Condition Report, nctify Maintenance END OF EVENT #3, PROCEED TO EVENT #4.

19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

The RCP seal injection filter becomes clogged reducing seal injection flow below the minimum acceptable value.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose degraded seal injection flow:

Alarms:

ALB63-A06, FILTERS BACKFLUSH PNL ALARM (First alarm)

(The following alarms come in with a 2 minute tame delay)

ALBO8-E06, RCP SEAL WATER INJ FILTER HI AP ALBO8-F06, RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW Indicaflons:

. Significantly lowered seal injection flow (approximately 4 gpm/RCP)

OATC References ALB63-A06 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE Malfunction of a process channel on the Backflushable Filters Panel 1-1224-P5-FBP.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS None 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 20

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

The RCP seal injection filter becomes clogged reducing seal injection flow below the minimum acceptable value.

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Dispatch an operator to the Backflushable Filters Panel to determine the specific channel causing the alarm.

NOTE to SIM BOOTH: Report back that seal injection filter # 1-1208-F4-004 is reading >20 psid.

2. Perform the appropriate portion of 1721 8-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB On Backflushable Filter Control Panel 5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE Alarms:

ALB63-A06, FILTERS BACKFLUSH PNL ALARM ALBO8-E06, RCP SEAL WATER INJ FILTER HI zP ALBO8-F06, RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW Indications:

Significantly lowered seal injection flow (approximately 4 gpm/RCP) 21

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

The RCP seal injection filter becomes clogged reducing seal injection flow below the minimum acceptable value.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC References 17008-1, Wrndow E0&

1.0 PROBABLECAUSE

1. End of filter service life.

2. Excessive seal injection flowrate.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Adjust Charging Flow Control Valve 1 -HV-1 82 for minimum seal injection flow.

2. IF the alarm does not clear, place the Standby Seal Injection Filter in service per 13213-1, Backflushable Filters System.

3. Adjust 1 -HV-1 82 for normal seal injection flow.

4. Backflush the dirty filter per 13213-1, Backflushable Filters System.

5.0 COMPENSATORY ACTIONS NONE 22

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

The RCP seal injection filter becomes clogged reducing seal injection flow below the minimum acceptable value.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Rferénóes 17008-i, WihdóiO6 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE

1. Improper setting for Charging Flow Control 1-FV-0121 orThrottle 1-HV-0182.

2. Loss of charging flow.

3. Seal Injection Isolation Valve closed:

a. RCP1: HV-8103A,

b. RCP2: HV-8103B,

c. RCP 3: HV-8103C,

d. RCP 4: HV-8103D.

4. High differential pressure at Seal Injection Filter.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Verify proper operation of 1 -FV-01 21.

2. Adjust 1 -HV-01 82 and attempt to raise seal injection flow.

23

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

The RCP seal injection filter becomes clogged reducing seal injection flow below the minimum acceptable value.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

3. Check Seal Injection Filter differential pressure and take action per ALBO8-E06 if necessary.

4. Implement 18007-C, Section B, if a loss of charging or seal injection control has caused the alarm.

5. Go To 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation for instructions covering Reactor Coolant Pump operation with seal malfunctions.

5.0 COMPENSATORY ACTIONS NONE END OF EVENT #4, PROCEED TO EVENT #5.

24

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Loop 1 Pressure Channel PT-514 Fails Low.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose failure of main steam pressure channel:

Alarms:

ALB13-A04 STM GEN 1 LO STEAMLINE PRESS ALERT ALB13-F03 STM GEN 1 DIGITAL FW SYS TROUBLE ALB14-A02 STM GEN 1 HI STM PRESS RATE ALERT Indications:

. 1PI-514A indicates 0% steam flow Note to examiner: The crew may go directly to 18001 -C, SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION OR may use the guidance from ALB13-A04 and/or ALB14-A02 to reference them to the AOP, then transition to 18001-C.

UO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

AOP 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation Fl. Check steam and feed flows MATCHED on ALL SGs (YES)

SS Directs actions of UO / OATC using AOP 18001 -C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation (Crew Update)

F2-F5. Unit 2 only SS/UO F6. On Unit 1 only, at the OWS bypass the affected channel using the signal bypass button on the affected loops graphical display.

OATC/UO F7. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO F8. Check SG level control maintains NR level AT 65%. (YES)

SS F9. Notify I&C to initiate repairs.

25

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Loop 1 Pressure Channel PT-514 Fails Low.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS FlO. Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509-C,Bypass Test Instrumentation (BTI) Panel Operation, if desired.

NOTE: Not Desired SS Fl 1. Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per Table F2 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (TS 3.3.2)

NOTE: NOT EXPECTED.

SS F12. Initiate the applicable actions of Technical Specification 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 3.3.4. (3.3.3 FU8INFO LCO ONLY)

LCO 3.3.2 EU le Condition D LCO 3.3.2 FU 4d(1) Condition D CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One channel D.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months LCO 3.3.4 FU 13 Condition A CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore required Function to 30 days required OPERABLE status Functions inoperable SS *F13. Check repairs and surveillances complete. (NO)

RNO. Perform the following:

a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step Fl 3.

b. Return to procedure and step in effect.

C.

Note to examiner Call to C & T for Condition Report, Notify Ops Duty person and notify Maintenance.

END OF EVENT #5, PROCEED TO EVENT #6.

26

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Loop 1 Pressure Channel PT-514 FaIs Low.

Time j Position j Applicants Action or Behavior N N I N 27

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

An auto failure of 1 PC-455C will cause 1 PV-455C to open.

This failure will cause an uncontrolled lowering of Pressurizer and RCS pressure.

The OATC wilt be required to place 1 PC-455C in manual (to regain control of 1 PV 455C) and shut 1 PV-455C per AOP 18000-C. The OATC will also need to energize pressurizer heaters to restore Pressurizer and RCS pressure to their normal values. The OATC actions must be timely to avert a reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose Loop 1 Spray Valve (1 PV-455C) has failed open:

Symptoms I alarms:

. ALB1 1 -D02 PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS ON

. ALB12-D03 PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK Indications:

. PRZR pressure lowering rapidly

. Spray Valve Loop 1 red and green lights lit

. Spray Valve Loop 4 green light lit, red light out

. Spray Valve Loop 1 controller red light lit, demand at 60%

PORV Block Valves 1 HV-8000A and 1 HV-8000B close Note to examiner: The crew should go directly to 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety Or Relief Valve Malfunction. The guidance from ALB1 1 -D02 may be used as a follow-up procedure.

27

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

An auto failure of 1 PC-455C will cause 1 PV-455C to open.

This failure will cause an uncontrolled lowering of Pressurizer and RCS pressure.

The OATC will be required to place 1 PC-455C in manual (to regain control of 1 PV 455C) and shut 1 PV-455C per AOP 18000-C. The OATC will also need to energize pressurizer heaters to restore Pressurizer and RCS pressure to their normal values. The OATC actions must be timely to avert a reactor trip and SI.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1 8000-C. Pressurizer Spray, Safety Or Relief Valve OATC Malfunction.

IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Verify PRZR Spray Valves CLOSED.

Note to examiner: The OATC will manually close the Loop 1 PRZR Spray Valve by taking the controller and depressing the down arrow until the green light is lit, demand s 0, and PRZR Spray Valve has only a green light lit.

SS Enters 18000-C, PRESSURIZER SPRAY, SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVE MALFUNCTION (Crew Update)

OATC 2. Operate PRZR Heaters as necessary.

OATC 3. Verify PRZR PORVs - CLOSED. (YES)

OATC 4. Check PRZR Safety Valves CLOSED (YES)

OATC 5. Check PIC-455A Pressurizer Master Controller OPERATING PROPERLY: (YES)

. Reference FIGURE 1.

Note to examiner: FIGURE 1 is located on Page 30.

OATC 6. Check associated instrumentation OPERATING PROPERLY.

(YES) 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

An auto failure of 1 PC-455C will cause 1 PV-455C to open.

This failure will cause an uncontrolled lowering of Pressurizer and RCS pressure.

The OATC will be required to place 1 PC-455C in manual (to regain control of 1 PV 455C) and shut 1PV-455C per AOP 18000-C. The OATC will also need to energize pressurizer heaters to restore Pressurizer and RCS pressure to their normal values. The OATC actions must be timely to avert a reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 7. Comply with applicable Technical Specifications:

3.4.1 (DNB-only one applicable for this event, if setpoint is reached) 3.4.10 3.4.11 3.4.12 3.4.13 29

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

An auto failure of 1 PC-455C will cause 1 PV-455C to open.

This failure will cause an uncontrolled lowering of Pressurizer and RCS pressure.

The OATC will be required to place 1 PC-455C in manual (to regain control of 1 PV 455C) and shut 1 PV-455C per AOP 18000-C. The OATC will also need to energize pressurizer heaters to restore Pressurizer and RCS pressure to their normal values. The OATC actions must be timely to avert a reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Refers to Technical Specifications LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:

a. Pressurizer pressure > 2199 psig;

b. RCS average temperature 592.5°F; and

c. RCS total flow rate > 384,509 gpm.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 Note to examiner: The NOTE does not apply during this event.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more RCS A.1 Restore RCS 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months DNB parameters not DNB parameter(s) to within limits within limit C. Required Action C.1 Be in Mode 2 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and associated Completion Time not met SS 8. Return to procedure and step in effect.

30

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 31 of 6 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

An auto failure of 1 PC-455C will cause 1 PV-455C to open.

This failure will cause an uncontrolled lowering of Pressurizer and RCS pressure.

The OATC will be required to place 1 PC-455C in manual (to regain control of 1 PV 455C) and shut 1PV-455C per AOP 18000-C. The OATC will also need to energize pressurizer heaters to restore Pressurizer and RCS pressure to their normal values. The OATC actions must be timely to avert a reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior AOP 18000-C, FIGURE 1 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROLLER BAND PREF PROPORTIONAL SPRAYS PROPORTIONAl-HEATERS 2260 2355 ERROR SIGNAL(PSIG) -40 17 -15 1

0 15 25 I

75 120 MASTER I III I I I 71.9 100 0 9.4 14A 15.6 25 34.4 40.6 CONTROLLER OUTPUT (%)

31

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 32 of 6 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

An auto failure oil PC-455C will cause 1 PV-455C to open.

This failure will cause an uncontrolled lowering of Pressurizer and RCS pressure.

The OATC will be required to place 1 PC-455C in manual (to regain control of 1 PV 455C) and shut 1 PV-455C per AOP 18000-C. The OATC will also need to energize pressurizer heaters to restore Pressurizer and RCS pressure to their normal values. The OATC actions must be timely to avert a reactor trip and SI.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC References 17011-1, Window D02 Response 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE

1. Pressurizer Pressure Control System malfunction

2. Pressurizer Spray or Relief Valve Malfunction 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Pressurizer backup heaters will energize 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Check pressurizer pressure indications:

. If an instrument failure is indicated, initiate 18001 -C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction

. IF a failed PRZR Spray Valve, Safety Valve, or PORV is indicated, initiate 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety Or Relief Valve Malfunction

. AT 1965 psig and lowering trip RX and go to 1 9000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 32

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time

] Position j Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose loss of power to 1AAO2:

Alarms:

DG1A EMERGENCY START ALB36-A01, 4160V SWGR 1AAO2 TROUBLE Indications:

Electric fault on 1AAO2 Control room lighting dims due to loss of 1/2 of the lights 1AAO2 white bus potential lights go out DG-1 A starts but fails to tie to bus 18031 -C, Loss of Class I E Electrical Systems SS Enters AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems (Crew Update)

UO *1. Check power to 1 E 41 60V Emergency busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED:

. 41 60V AC 1 E Busses. (YES, 1 BAO3)

OATC *2 Check Reactor power LESS THAN 100%:

. UQ1 118 LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100% MWT for the applicable unit. (YES)

. NIs LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%. (YES)

liT LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%. (YES)

UO 3. Check affected train Diesel Generator RUNNING. (YES) 33

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1 AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior j UO 4. Verify NSCW status on affected train:

a. PUMPS - TWO RUNNING (NO)

RNO 4. Perform the following

1) Trip affected DG by depressing both EMERGENCY STOP pushbuttons.

2) Then Go to Section A. LOSS OF POWER WITH DG FAILING TO TIE TO BUS.

18031-C, SECTION A: LOSS OF POWER WITH DG FAILING tO TIE TO BUS UO Al. Verify NSCW pumps on unaffected train (B) TWO RUNNING.

(YES)

OATC A2. Verify charging pump RUNNING:

NCP. (Yes-expected)

-OR Unaffected train CCP. (CCP-B)

UO A3. Verify CCW pumps on unaffected train TWO RUNNING.

(YES)

Note to examiner: While the unaffected train pumps will not initially be running, the word verify implies the action to start the pumps before executing the RNO. Therefore, it is expected that the crew will start the unaffected CCW pumps and verify their operation before moving on to the next step or executing the RNO.

34

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1 A will start, but will not re-energize 1 AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time j Position j Applicants Action or Behavior SS / OATC A4. Check RHR status:

a. Check RHR - REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING.

(NO)

RNO A4. Go to Step A5.

OATC I UO A5. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO *A6 Check AFW status:

a. Check AFW system - NEEDED TO MAINTAIN SG LEVELS. (NO)

RNO A6.a. Perform the following:

1) Reduce TDAFW pump speed to not less than 1535 rpm.

2) Go to Step A7.

UO A7. Verify ACCW pump on unaffected train RUNNING. (YES) 13120-1, Containment Building Cooling System UO A8. Verify four CNMT cooling units on unaffected train running in high speed using 13120, CONTAINMENT BUILDING COOLING SYSTEM.

NOTE: Will start Train B CNMT Coolers 3,4,7,8 on high speed using step 4.2.3 or 4.8.5 of SOP 13120-1:

Step 4.2.3 Select one of the following four combinations and start the Containment Coolers one pair at a time, in high speed, by SimuItaneousy placing both handswitches to the start position.

Fan 3, 1 HS 12583D Fan 7, 1 HS 12585D Fan_4,_1_HS_2583D Fan_8,_1_HS_2585D 35

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1 AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO A9. Verify CRDM fans on unaffected train TWO RUNNING.

NOTE: STARTS CRDM FAN #4 by placing 1HS-12276A to Start.

UO AlO. Verify reactor cavity cooling unit on unaffected train ONE RUNNING.

NOTE: STARTS REACTOR CAVITY COOLING Fan # 2 by placing 1 HS-2651 to Start. Fan # 1 red light will be LIT (A Train) even though not actually operating.

UO All. Verify SEP cooling pump on unaffected train running using 13719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM IPC Points:

ZD3405 ZD3411 UO Al 2. Verify the following unaffected train Class 1 E 480V load centers

- ENERGIZED:

Train B

BBO6 (YES)

. BBO7 (YES)

. BB16(YES)

NB1O (YES)

UO Al3. Verify unaffected MCCs energized by observing - NO TROUBLE ALARMS. (NONE) 36

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1 AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time

] Position Applicants Action or Behavior

]

SS A14. Open doors that have installed door stops in the following AFFECTED Control Building rooms:

UNIT 1

TR A B52, B55, B76 NOTE: Phones SSS to dispatch CBO to open Doors.

SS A15. Initiate the following:

a. 14230, OFFSITE AC CIRCUIT VERIFICATION AND CAPACITY / CAPABILITY EVALUATION.

b. Verify SAT energized using 13418 C, STANDBY AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER.

NOTE: THIS STEP PERFORMS THE 1 HOUR ACTIONS FOR LCO 3.8.1 FOR OFF-SITE SOURCES AND THE SAT.

OATC A16. Verify DRPI - ENERGIZED. (YES)

UO *A17 Check DC bus loads:

a. Verify 125V DC battery loads - LESS THAN THE FOLLOWING LIMITS:

. AD1 B 300 AMPS expect 200 amps

. BD1 B 300 AMPS expect 0 amps

CD1 B 100 AMPS expect 80 amps

. DD1B 80 AMPS -expectOamps

b. Monitor all 1 E battery bus voltages - REMAIN GREATER THAN 105V DC.

37

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1 AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC / UO A18. Check Reactor Makeup System:

a. Unaffected boric acid transfer pump RUNNING OR SELECTED TO AUTO. (NO)

RNO a. Perform the following:

. Manually start unaffected boric acid transfer pump as necessary.

-OR Place unaffected pump handswitch in AUTO Places 1 HS-277A in AUTO.

OATC / UO Al 8 cont.

b. Unaffected reactor makeup water pump RUNNING OR SELECTED TO AUTO. (NO)

RNO b. Perform the following:

. Manually start unaffected reactor make-up water pump, as necessary.

-OR

. Place unaffected pump handswitch in AUTO.

Places 1 H S-7763 in AUTO.

38

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1 AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

b Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 9. Verify battery charger in service for non-i E batteries:

. ND1 (NO)

. ND2 (YES)

. ND3A (NO)

ND3B (YES)

NOTE: WILL DIRECT CONTROL BUILDING OPERATOR TO PLACE BATTERY CHARGERS IN SERVICE FOR 1ND1 AND 1ND3A USING 13406-1, 125V DC NON 1E ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM USING SECTION 4.1.3 UO A20. Transfer any de-energized NYS, NYRS, and NYR busses to alternate sources by initiating i 3432, i 20V AC NON i E INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

NOTE: 1NYRS AND 1NYR WILL NEED TO BE TRANSFERRED TO ALTERNATE POWER SOURCES.

SS A2i. Check Control Room Emergency Lighting:

a. Check bus loss of power expected duration - GREATER THAN 90 MINUTES. (YES)

b. Transfer emergency lighting to the unaffected unit by placing MAIN CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING LOSP TRANSFER SWITCH on AFFECTED unit to LOSP position:

NOTE: STEP A21.b. IS PERFORMED LOCALLY.

SS A22. Initiate applicable Technical Specification requirements listed in ATTACHMENT A.

NOTE: THE FOLLOWING APPLICABLE TS FROM ATTACHMENT A ARE LISTED STARTING ON NEXT PAGE.

39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time j Position Applicants Action or Behavior EXAMINER MAY PROCEED TO NEXT EVENT DUE TO TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR IDENTIFYING ALL REQUIRED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS FAILURE AND HAVE EXAMINEE IDENTIFY TS LATER.

SS LCO 3.7.5 CONDITION C AFW CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Two AFW trains C.1 Be in MODE 3 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months inoperable AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months LCO 3.8.1 CONDITIONS A, B, and E AC Sources CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for required 1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months offsite circuit OPERABLE offsite circuit.

AND inoperable Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months AND thereafter A.2 Declare required feature(s) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from with no offsite power available discovery of no offsite inoperable when its redundant power to one train required feature(s) is inoperable. concurrent with inoperability of redundant required AND feature(s)

A.3 Restore required offsite circuit to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

AND 14 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO 40

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One DG B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable required offsite circuit(s).

AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Thereafter 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND Once per 12 B.2 Verify SAT available, hours thereafter 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of B.3 Declare required feature(s) Condition B supported by the inoperable DG concurrent with inoperable when its required inoperability of redundant feature(s) is inoperable, redundant required feature(s)

AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months B.4.1 Determine OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months B.4.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG.

AND NOTE Required Action B.5.1 is only applicable if the combined reliability of the enhanced black-start combustion turbine generators (CTG) and the black-start diesel generator is E 95%. Otherwise, Required Action B.5.2 applies.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B.5.1 Verify an enhanced blackstart CTG is functional by verifying the OR CTG and the black-start diesel generator starts and achieves Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months steady state voltage and prior to entry into frequency. Condition B 41

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1 A will start, but will not re-energize 1 AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior N

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One DG OR inoperable (continuation) B.5.2 Start and run at least one 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months CTG while in Condition B.

OR Prior to entry into Condition B for preplanned maintenance AND B.6 Restore DG to OPERABLE 14 days from status. discovery of failure to meet LCO E. One required NOTE offsite circuit Enter applicable Conditions and inoperable Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems Operating, AND when Condition E is entered with no AC power source to one or more trains.

One DG inoperable E.1 Restore required offsite circuit to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OPERABLE status.

OR E.2 Restore DG to OPERABLE status. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SS LCO 3.8.9 CONDITIONS A Distribution Systems CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore AC electrical power 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months AC electrical distribution subsystems to power OPERABLE status. AND distribution subsystems 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from 42

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1 AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031 -C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include shifting electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

[ Time Position inoperable Applicants Action or Behavior discovery of failure to

]

meet LCO Note: No loss of safety function exists.

SS A23. Check the fault condition cleared. (NO)

RNO A23. Return to Step Al END OF EVENT #7, PROCEED TO EVENT #8.

43

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1 NXRA) supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

ATTACHMENT A Potential Applicable LCOs & TRs Requiring Short Term Response LCOITR Mode Limiting Condition Required Actions 3.1.7 1-2 Lost Rod Pos md Immediately enterTS 3.0.3 3.4.15 1-4 All RCS leak detection instrumentation Immediately enterTS 3.0.3 mop 3.7.10 All Both CREFS trains in one unit mop Immediately place other unit trains in 3.7.11 emergency mode 3.7.12 3.4.6 4 Required RCS loops and/or RHR trains Immediately restore reqd loops/trains to 3.4.7 5 service 3.4.8 5 3.5.3 4 Required ECCS train mop Immediately initiate restoration 3.8.2 5,6 Loss of required AC Source Immediately declare required systems w/o offsite power mop or suspend fuel movement 3.8.5 5,6 Loss of required DC Sources Immediately declare affected features mop or suspend fuel movement activities 3.9.5 6 RHR train requirements are not met for Immediately stop fuel movement and dilutions 3.9.6 refueling and restore required trains and/or water level 13.9.5 All One or both FHB HVAC trains mop Immediately verify remaining train operable or suspend fuel movement activities 13.1.8 3-5 Lost required DRPI Immediately open RTB5 13.1.9 13.1.2 5,6 Required boric acid injection source Immediately suspend fuel movement and/or 13.1.4 and/or pump mop reactivity changes 3.6.3 1-4 Both CNMT pen iso valves are mop 1 hr: Isolate affected penetrations 3.8.1 1-4 Loss of offsite source 1 hr: Complete 14230 Loss of DG 1 hr: Verify SAT Operable 4 hr: Determine redundant safety features operable 3.4.5 3 Required RCS loops mop with RTBs 1 hr: Restore ioop or open RTBs closed 3.8.4 1-4 Loss of DC source due to other than mop 2 hrs: Restore all 4 DC sources to operable battery 44

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AAO2 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1 E bus 1 BAO3, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

The above Technical Specifications and the following additional Specifications should be referenced for long term required actions:

3.3.2 1-2 ESFAS instrumentation FU 6d: Loss of AFWAS from trip of both MFPs 3.3.3 1-3 PAMS instrumentation FU 19: Loss of CNMT H2 monitor heat tracing.

(Note cross train relationship; Train A heat tracing fed from Train B power.

Train B heat tracing fed from Train A power.

3.3.4 1-3 Remote shutdown system 3.4.9 1-3 Pressurizer 2 heater groups each with 150 kw capacity and capable of being powered from emergency source 3.4.16 All RCS activity Chemistry notified if power changed more than 15% in one hour (SR 3.4.16.2) 3.5.2 1-3 ECCS 3.6.6 1-4 CNMT spray and CNMT clrs 3.7.4 1-3 SG ARVs Also affects 3.3.4 3.7.5 1-3 AFW pumps & disch vlvs 2 or more trains may be mop 3.7.7 1-4 CCW system 3.7.8 1-4 NSCW system 3.7.9 1-4 Ultimate heat sink 3.7.13 1-4 Piping pen units 3.7.14 1-4 ESF chillers 3.8.9 1-4 Distribution Systems - OPERATING Condition A 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months 13.1.3 1-4 Boration flow paths 13.1.5 1-4 Charging pumps - operating 13.7.4 All Thermal barriers 3.4.12 4-6 COPS ODCM All RE-12444, RE-i 2442, RE-2565, RE-2562 are affected by loss of heat tracing for sample lines.

45

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

BFRV # 3 fails shut with inability of UO to manually control.

The UO can take manual control of MFRV # 3. Shortly after the #3 SG BFRV fails (approx 1 mm), the A-MFPT shaft will shear resulting in a loss of all FW flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses shut BFRV on #3 SG Alarm(s):

. ALB13-CO1 STM GEN 3 FLOW MISMATCH

. ALB13-F05 STM GEN 3 DIGITAL FW SYS TROUBLE Indication(s):

. BFRV demand at 0.

. BFRV green light lit, red light out on ZLB.

. MFRV green & red light lit (green light may be out if DEW system as completely opened the valve.)

SG#3FWfIowatOMPPH.

Note to examiner The crew should go directly to 18016-C, CONpNST AND FEEWATER MALFUNCTION. ARP1 3-CO 1 may be referenced afterwards.

46

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

BFRV # 3 fails shut with inability of UO to manually control.

The UO can take manual control of MFRV # 3. Shortly after the #3 SG BFRV fails (approx 1 mm), the A-MFPT shaft will shear resulting in a loss of all FW flow.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 18016-C IMMEDIATE:OpERATORACTIONS Dl. Check proper operation of BFRVs and MFRVs. (NO)

RNO Dl. Perform the following:

. Take manual control of affected SG MFRVs and/or BFRVs to match steam and feed flows.

. Control SG levels between 60% and 70%.

. IF SG levels cannot be maintained greater than 41 %

-OR Less than 79%, THEN perform the following:

1) Trip the reactor.

2) Go to 1 9000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

BFRV # 3 fails shut with inability of UO to manually control.

The UO can take manual control of MFRV # 3. Shortly after the #3 SG BFRV fails (approx 1 mm), the A-MFPT shaft will shear resulting in a loss of all FW flow.

Time

{ Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 1801 6-C IM MEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS contd)

D2. Verify feed water isolation valves open. (YES)

a. BFIVs (YES)

b. MEl Vs (YES)

SS Enters 18016-C, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION, Section D for Main Feedwater Valve Malfunction.

(Crew Update)

CREW D3. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO D4. Perlorm channel check of instrumentation NORMAL: (YES)

SG levels

. SG pressure

SG Steam Flows

. SG Feed Flows OATC D5. Check Rated Thermal Power NOT BEING EXCEEDED:

(YES)

. DeItaT< 100%

. Nis<100%

. UQ1118<100%MWt.

48

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

BFRV # 3 fails shut with inability of UO to manually control.

The UO can take manual control of MFRV # 3. Shortly after the #3 SG BFRV fails (approx 1 mm), the A-MFPT shaft will shear resulting in a loss of all FW flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO D6. Check SGs NR levels AT 65%. (# 3 is not)

RNO D6. Take manual control of affected SG MFRVs and/or BFRVs to Control SGs levels between 60% and 70%.

SS D7. Refer to Technical Specification 3.7.3 for required action.

SS D8. Notify Maintenance to initiate repairs.

SS D9. Return to procedure and step in effect.

49

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

BFRV # 3 fails shut with inability of UO to manually control.

The UO can take manual control of MFRV # 3. Shortly after the #3 SG BFRV fails (approx 1 mm), the A-MFPT shaft will shear resulting in a loss of all FW flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

] [

Diagnoses Loss of Feedwater Flow:

CREW Alarm(s):

. ALB13-A06(B06, C06, D06) STM GEN 1 (2,3,4) HI/LO LVL DEVIATION

. ALB15-B05 MFPT DISCH HDR LO PRESS Indication(s):

. Unexpected Change in MFP Speed or AP

. Uncontrolled lowering of SG water levels Note to examiner: The crew should transition to Section A of 1801 6-C, CONDENSATE AND FEEWATER MALFUNCTION for a Loss of Main Feed Pump.

OATC/UO 18016-C IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS Al. Check reactor power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 70%.

(YES)

OATC/UO A2. Check at least on MFP RUNNING AND PROVIDING FLOW.

(NO)

RNO A2. Perform the following:

a. Trip the reactor

b. Got to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION END OF EVENT #8, PROCEED TO EVENT #9.

50

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 9 Event

Description:

If the Lo-Lo SGWL Reactor Trip setpoint is reached for Event 8, the reactor will not automatically trip requiring the crew to perform a manual reactor trip. The C panel Rx Trip switch will not trip the Rx, however the A panel Rx Trip switch will function normally.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1 9000-C E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 1 9000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (NOTE: lOAs are steps 1 through 4)

SS Makes a page announcement of Reactor Trip (and SI if appropriate).

OATC 1. Check Reactor Trip:

Rod Bottom Lights LIT (NO)

. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN (NO)

. Neutron Flux LOWERING (NO)

RNO 1. Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches. (YES)

UO 2. Check Turbine Trip:

. All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED (YES)

UO 3. Check Power to AC Emergency Buses:

a. AC Emergency Busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

. 4160 AC 1 E Busses (YES, 1 BAO3)

b. AC Emergency Busses ALL ENERGIZED.

. 41 60V AC 1 E Busses (NO)

480V AC 1 E Busses (NO)

RNO 3.b. Try to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus while continuing with Step 4.

51

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 9 Event

Description:

If the Lo-Lo SGWL Reactor Trip setpoint is reached for Event 8, the reactor will not automatically trip requiring the crew to perform a manual reactor trip. The C panel Rx Trip switch will not trip the Rx, however the A panel Rx Trip switch will function normally.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4. Check if SI is actuated:

. Any SI annunciator LIT (NO)

SI ACTUATED BPLP window LIT (NO)

RNO 4. Check if SI is required:

IE one or more of the following conditions has occurred:

. PRZR pressure less than or equal to 1870 psig. (NO)

. Steam line pressure less than or equal to 585 psig. (NO)

. Containment pressure greater than or equal to 3.8 psig. (NO)

. Automatic alignment of ECCS equipment to injection phase.

(NO)

THEN actuate SI and go to Step 6.

UO 5. Peform the following to limit RCS cooldown:

a. Check NA level in at least one SG greater than 10%. (YES)

b. Reduce AFW flow.

c Go to 19001-C, ES-0 1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE 52

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 9 Event

Description:

If the Lo-Lo SGWL Reactor Trip setpoint is reached for Event 8, the reactor will not automatically trip requiring the crew to perform a manual reactor trip. The C panel Rx Trip switch will not trip the Rx, however the A panel Rx Trip switch will function normally.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Enters 19001-C, ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION (Crew Update).

Note to examiner: the feedline break malfunction will be inserted after the crew completes step 8. When the crew recognizes the conditions to transition back to 1 9000-C, go to Page 56.

SS Directs actions of OATC and UO.

CREW 1. Initiate the following:

Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.

Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

SS 2. IF SI actuation occurs during this procedure, THEN go to 19000-C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

UO 3. Limit RCS cooldown:

a. Verify AFW flow to SGs. (YES)

b. Trip both MFPs.

c. Check SGs NR level AT LEAST ONE GREATER THEN 10%.

(YES)

d. Throttle AFW flow as necessary

e. Verify SG Blowdown Isolation Valves CLOSED WITH HANDSWITCHES IN CLOSE. (YES) 53

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 9 Event

Description:

If the Lo-Lo SGWL Reactor Trip setpoint is reached for Event 8, the reactor will not automatically trip requiring the crew to perform a manual reactor trip. The C panel Rx Trip switch will not trip the Rx, however the A panel Rx Trip switch will function normally.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F With RCP(s) running RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE. (YES)

UO 5. Check FW status:

a. Average RCS temperature LESS THAN 564oF. (NO)

RNO 5.a. WHEN average RCS temperature is less than 564F, THEN perform Step 5.b Go to Step 6.

UO 6. Check total feed flow capability to SGs GREATER THEN 570 GPM AVAILABLE. (YES)

OATC 7. Check all Rods FULLY INSERTED. (YES)

UO 8. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN. (YES)

END OF EVENT 9, PROCEED TO EVENTS # 10, 11, & 12 54

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10,11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) -

CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to SIMBOOTH Insert FW Line Break at this point

9. Perform the following:

a. Check 18009-C, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK IN EFFECT. (NO)

RNO 9.a Go to Step 9.d.

SS 9.d Check other AOPs IN EFFECT. (NO)

RNO 9.d. Go to Step 10.

OATC 10. Check PRZR level control:

a. Instrument Air AVAILABLE. (YES)

b. PRZR Level GREATER THAN 17%. (YES)

c. Charging and letdown IN SERVICE. (YES)

d. Maintain PRZR level at 25%. (YES)

OATC 1 1. Check PRZR pressure:

a. Pressure GREATER THAN 1870 PSIG. (YES)

b. Pressure STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG. (YES) 55

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) -

CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position] Applicants Action or Behavior UO 12. Check SG levels:

a. NR level AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10%. (YES)

b. Maintain NR level between 10% AND 65%.

c. NA level - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (NO)

RNO 12.c. Go to Step 13.

UO 13. Check AC Busses:

a. Emergency Buses ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER. (NO-A Train lost previously)

b. All Non-1E 4160/480V Busses ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER.

(YES)

Note to examiner: by this point the crew is expected to have identified a Hi Containment Pressure SI actuation and transitioned back to 1 9000-C, E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

56

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose Main Feed Line #3 faulted IRC OATC Symptoms / alarms:

ALBO1-E06 CNMT HI TEMP ALB01-F06 CNMT HI MSTR Indications:

Containment pressure indications rapidly rising.

OATC Recognize High Containment Pressure SI at 3.8 psig on Containment Pressure.

SS Note to examiner: Containment pressure rises rapidly and the crew may attempt to enter 18008-C, SECONDARY COOLANT LEAKAGE but will not have time to take significant actions.

SS Transitions from 19001-C to 19000-C due to auto safety injection on Hi Containment Pressure. (Crew Update)

CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP or SAFETY INJECTION.

SS Makes a page announcement of Safety Injection.

OATC 1. Check Reactor Trip:

. Rod Bottom Lights LIT (YES)

Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN (YES)

Neutron Flux LOWERING (YES)

UO 2. Check Turbine Trip:

. All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED (YES) 57

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10,11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001 -C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 3. Check Power to AC Emergency Buses:

a. AC Emergency Busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

4160 AC 1 E Busses (YES, 1 BAO3 only)

b. AC Emergency Busses ALL ENERGIZED.

. 41 60V AC 1 E Busses (NO)

480V AC 1 E Busses (NO)

RNO 3.b. Try to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus while continuing with Step 4.

OATC 4. Check if SI is actuated:

Any SI annunciators LIT (YES)

. SI ACTUATED BPLP window LIT (YES)

SS Go to Step 6.

SS 6. Initiate the Foldout Page.

CREW SS 7. Perform the following:

OATC

OATC Initial Actions (Page 58)

UO

UO Initial Actions (Page 62)

NOTE: SS initiates Step 8 after OATC/UO Initial Actions completed.

58

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMSOATCINlTlALACTIONSofEO,i9O0O

1. Check both trains of ECCS equipment ALIGNING FOR INJECTION PHASE:

. MLB indication (NO)

RNO 1. Actuate SI. (A train will not actuate due to loss of 1 AAO2).

OATC 2. Check Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED:

CIA MLB indication (YES)

OATC 3. Check ECCS Pumps and NCP status:

a. CCPs RUNNING. (YES)

b. SI Pumps RUNNING. (YES)

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. (YES, B only, A DTO)

d. NCP TRIPPED. (YES)

OATC 4. Verify CCW Pumps ONLY TWO RUNNING EACH TRAIN. (YES, Train B only) 59

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001 -C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

5. Verify proper NSCW system operation:

a. NSCW Pumps ONLY TWO RUNNING EACH TRAIN. (YES, Train B only)

b. NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN hand switches IN AUTO:

. HS-1668A

. HS-1669A OATC 6. Verify Containment Cooling Units:

UO

a. ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED

. MLB indication (NO, Train B only)

b. NSCW Cooler isolation valves OPEN

. MLB indication (YES)

OATC 7. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

a. Dampers and Valves CLOSED

CVI MLB indication (YES) 60

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AA02. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

8. Check Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21.5 PSIG.

(NO)

RNO 8. Verify the following:

a. Containment Spray actuated. (YES)

b. Containment Spray Pump discharge valves open. (YES)

Critical c. Containment Spray Pumps running. (NO)

Note to examiner: The OATC will start Containment Spray Pump B to satisfy the Critical Step.

OATC 9. Check ECCS flows:

a. BIT flow. (YES)

b. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1625 PSIG. (YES)

c. SI Pump flow. (YES)

d. RCS pressure LESS THAN 300 PSIG. (NO)

RNO 9.d. Go to Step 10.

61

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10,11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

10. Check ECCS Valve alignment PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs. (YES)

OATC 11. Check ACCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING. (YES)

OATC 12. Adjust Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC 13. Dispatch Operator to ensure one train of SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING in service per 13719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM.

END OF OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS, return to E-0 Step 8 (Page 65) 62

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10,11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS

1. Check AFW Pumps RUNNING.

. MDAFW Pumps. (YES, B only, A Danger Tagged)

TDAFW Pump, if required. (YES)

UO 2. Check NR level in at least one SG GREATER THAN 10%. (32% ADVERSE).

(NO)

RNO 2. Establish AFW flow greater than 570 gpm by starting pumps and aligning valves as necessary.

UO 3. Check if main steamlines should be isolated: (YES)

a. Check for one or more of the following conditions:

Any steam line pressure LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 585 PSIG.

Containment pressure GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG.

Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate ONE TWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLINE.

b. Verify Main Steam line Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED. (YES)

Note to examiner: on first verification, the UO will recognize that automatic SLI has failed for both trains. The UO will then manually actuate Main Steam line Isolation and then re-verify Main & Bypass Steam Isolation Valves CLOSED.

63

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS

4. Verify FW Isolation Valves closed:

. MFIVs (YES)

. BFIVs (YES)

. MFRVs (YES)

BFRVs (YES)

UO 5. Verify SG Blowdown isolated:

. Place SG Blowdown isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, C, and D in the CLOSE position. (YES)

Note to examiner: The UO will place the HS-7603 valves in the hard closed position.

SG Sample Isolation Valves CLOSED. (YES)

UO 6. Verify Diesel Generators RUNNING. (YES, B only)

UO 7. Throttle total AFW flow as necessary to maintain SG NR levels between 10%

(32% ADVERSE) and 65%.

UO 8. Verify both MFPs TRIPPED. (YES)

UO 9. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN. (YES)

END OF UO INITIAL ACTIONS, return to step 8 of E-0. (Page 65) 64

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-O REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position Appaicants Action or Behavior 1 9000-C, E-0 actions begrnning with step 8 OATC 8. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO OATC 9. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F:

With RCP(s) running RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE. (NO)

RNO 9. IF temperature is less than 557°F and lowering, (it is)

THEN perform the following as necessary:

a. Stop dumping steam.

b. Perform the following as appropriate:

IF at least one SG NR level greater than 10%. (32% ADVERSE),

THEN lower total feed flow.

-OR-If all SG NR levels less than 10% (32% ADVERSE),

THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 gpm.

c. If cooldown continues, THEN close MSlVs and BSIVs.

d. If temperature greater than 557°F and rising, THEN dump steam.

65

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10,11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTION: A PRZR PORV Block Valve which was closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV should not be opened unless used to prevent challenging the PRZR Safeties.

10. Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:

a. PRZR PORVs CLOSED AND IN AUTO. (YES)

b. Normal PRZR Spray Valves CLOSED. (YES)

c. Power to at least one Block Valve AVAILABLE. (YES)

d. PRZR PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (NO)

RNO 1 0.d. Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.

OATC 1 1. Check if RCPs should be stopped.

a. ECCS Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING: (YES)

. CCPorSlPump

b. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 PSIG. (YES)

c. Stop all RCPs.

66

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11, & 12 Event

Description:

Following a loss of all feedwater flow and a reactor trip the crew transitioned to 19001-C ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE from 19000-C E-O REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing 19001-C, a feedwater line break occurs on Steam Generator #3 IRC with complications. CS pump B will fail to auto start but may be manually started by the crew (OATC) CS pump A will not operate due to previous fault on 1 AAO2. Both trains of Main Steam Line Auto Isolation will fail to actuate but may be manually actuated by the crew (UO).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 12. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. SG Pressures:

Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner. (YES)

-OR-Any completely depressurized.

b. Go to 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

SS Transitions to 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

67

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (E-2 Actions)

Event

Description:

19020-C E-2 actions for Faulted Steam Generator.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior j

CREW 1. Initiate critical safety function status trees per 1 9200-C, F-O CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

SS 2. Initiate NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

Note to examiner:

1) The SS will call the Simbooth to have the Shift Manager implement NMP-EP 110.

2) Once CSFST monitoring has begun, the crew may transition to 19251 -C, FR Z.1 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE once a valid orange or red condition exists. In this case, go to Page 72 for 19251-C procedure. When that procedure is completed, return to the applicable page/step in this procedure.

OATC CAUTION: At least one SG should be available for RCS cooldown.

UO 3. Verify Main Steam line Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED.

(YES)

UO 4. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. Identify intact SG(s): (# 1, 2, and 4 are intact)

. SG pressures ANY STABLE OR RISING (YES)

b. Identify faulted SG(s).

ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

(YES, SG # 3)

-OR ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (maybe by now, SG #3) 68

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (E-2 Actions)

Event

Description:

1 9020-C E-2 actions for Faulted Steam Generator.

[ Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior UO 5. Isolate Main Feedwater to the faulted SG(s):

Close affected MFIVs:

HV-5227 (SG 1)

HV-5228 (SG 2)

HV-5229 (SG 3)

HV-5230 (SG 4)

Close affected BFIVs:

HV-15196 (SG 1)

HV-1 51 97 (SG 2)

HV-1 51 98 (SG 3)

HV 15199 (SG 4)

UO 6. Isolate Auxiliary Feedwater to the faulted SG(s):

. Close affected MDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:

HV-5139-SG 1 FROM MDAFW PMP-A HV-5132 SG 2 FROM MDAFW PMP-B Critical HV-5134 SG 3 FROM MDAFW PMP-B HV-5137 SG- 3 FROM MDAFW PMP-A

Close affected TDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:

HV-5122SG 1 FROM TDAFW HV-5125 SG- 2 FROM TDAFW Critical HV-5127 SG 3 FROM TDAFW HV-51 20 SG 3 FROM TDAFW Note to examiner: The valves bolded above are critical at this time IF not already previously closed.

UO 7. Check at least one MDAFW Pump RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF FEEDING SG(s) NEEDED FOR RCS COOLDOWN. (YES) 69

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (E-2 Actions)

Event

Description:

1 9020-C E-2 actions for Faulted Steam Generator.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 8. Close affected TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve(s): (Not Applicable)

UO 9. Verify affected SG ARV(s) CLOSED:

PV-3000 (SG 1)

PV-3010 (SG 2)

Critical PV-3020 (SG 3)

PV-3030 (SG 4)

UO 10. Align SGBD valves:

. Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches in CLOSE position.

. Close sample valves.

HV-9451 (SG 1)

HV-9452 (SG 2)

Critical HV-9453 (SG 3)

HV-9454 (SG 4)

UO 11. Verify faulted SG(s) remains isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown or SG activity sampling.

UO 12. Check CST level GREATER THAN 15%. (YES) 70

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (E-2 Actions)

Event

Description:

1 9020-C E-2 actions for Faulted Steam Generator.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 13. Initiate checking if SG Tubes intact:

a. Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b. Secondary radiation NORMAL. (YES)

MAIN STM LINE MONITORS

RE-13120(SG1)

RE-13121 (SG2)

RE-13122(SG3)

RE-13119(SG4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839C

RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019(Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation.

c. Check SG levels ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

RNO 13.c. Go to Step 14.

NOTE to SIMBOOTH OPERATOR: If faulted SG #3 has blown down at this time, report back Chemistry has no pressure or sample flow from SG # 3.

71

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (E-2 Actions)

Event

Description:

1 9020-C E-2 actions for Faulted Steam Generator.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 14. Check if ECCS flow should be reduced:

a. RCS Subcooling GREATER THAN 24°F. (38°F ADVERSE) (YES)

b. Secondary Heat Sink: (YES)

Total feed flow to intact SGs GREATER THAN 570 GPM.

-OR-Narrow range level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 10%.

(32% ADVERSE)

c. RCS pressure STABLE or RISING. (YES)

d. PRZR level GREATER THAN 9%. (37% ADVERSE) (Maybe)

e. Goto 19011-C, ES-1.1 SI TERMINATION.

RNO 14.e. Go to Step 15.

Note to examiner Oepending on the timing and how fast the crew makes it through the procedures, PRZR level may be above 37% ADVERSE or NOT IF> 37%, the crew will go to 19011-C, SI TERMINATION IF < 37% ADVERSE, the crew will transition to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

15. Go to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

END OF SCENARIO, freeze the simulator if a NRC Chief Examiner concurs.

72

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (FR-Z.1 Actions)

Event

Description:

19251-C FR-Z.1 actions for Hi Containment Pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Trahsiiion to a Yellow, Orange or Red condition 0nCSFST.

(crew Update CREW 1. Initiate the following:

Continuous Actions Page.

SS

NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

Note to examiner: The SS will call the Sim booth to have the Shift Manager implement NMP-EP-1 10.

OATC 2. Check RWST level GREATER THAN 29%. (YES)

OATC 3. Check Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED.

CIA MLB indication (YES)

UO 4. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

a. Dampers and Valves CLOSED:

CVI MLB indication (YES) 73

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (FR-Z.1 Actions)

Event

Description:

19251-C FR-Z.1 actions for Hi Containment Pressure.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 5. Check if Containment Spray is required:

a. Containment pressure HAS RISEN TO GREATER THAN 21.5 PSIG.

(YES)

b. CS- ACTUATED. (YES)

c. CS Pumps - RUNNING. (NO)

Critical RNO 5.c. Start pumps (Only CS Pump B is capable of being run.)

Note to examiner: the above bolded step is a critical step IF pump not previously started.

OATC/UO 6. Check containment spray valve alignment:

a. Check RWST level GREATER THAN 8%. (YES)

b. Check Containment Spray injection phase alignment:

1) CS Pump RWST suction valves OPEN

HV-9017A CNMT SPRAY PUMP A RWST SUCT ISO VLV. (YES)

. HV-9017B CNMT SPRAY PUMP B RWST SUCT ISO VLV. (YES)

2) CNMT SPRAY ISO VLVOPEN

. HV-9001A (YES)

. HV-9001 B (YES)

c. GotoStep8 74

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (FR-Z.1 Actions)

Event

Description:

19251-C FR-Z.1 actions for Hi Containment Pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION Local observation of CS Pump suction and discharge pressure gauges should only be performed if radiation levels permit.

UNIT 1 (AB D75) UNIT 2 (AB D06)

SS 8. Check proper CS operation using the following indications, if available:

Train B CS:

Pump suction pressure P1-0973 GREATER THAN 7 PSIG.

Pump discharge pressure P1-0975 APPROXIMATELY 185 PSIG ABOVE SUCTION PRESSURE.

OATC/UO Containment pressure STABLE OR LOWERING. (YES)

Note to examiner: the SS will need to dispatch an operator to locally observe CS pump suction & discharge pressures should radiation levels permit.

UO 9. Verify Containment Cooling Units::

a. ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED:

. MLB indication (NO, Train B only, Train A de-energized due to loss of 1 AAO2)

b. NSCW Cooler isolation valves OPEN

MLB indication (YES)

UO 10. Verify Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED. (YES)

UO CAUTIONS

. At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

. If all SGs are faulted, at least 30 gpm feed flow should be maintained to each SG.

75

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (FR-Z.1 Actions)

Event

Description:

19251-C FR-Z.1 actions for Hi Containment Pressure.

[ Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior UO 1 1. Check if feed flow should be isolated to any SG:

a. Pressure in all SGs:

ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

(YES, SG #3)

-OR-ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (maybe, SG #3)

UO 12. Isolate Main Feedwater to the faulted SG(s):

Close affected MFIVs:

HV-5227 (SG 1)

HV-5228 (SG 2)

HV-5229 (SG3)

HV-5230 (SG 4)

Close affected BFIVs:

HV-15196 (SG 1)

HV-15197 (SG 2)

HV-15198 (SG 3)

HV-1 51 99 (SG 4) 76

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 10, 11 & 12 (FR-Z.1 Actions)

Event

Description:

1 9251-C FR-Z.1 actions for Hi Containment Pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 13. Isolate AuxiHary Feedwater to the faulted SG(s):

Close affected MDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:

. HV-5139SG 1 FROM MDAFW PMP-A

. HV-5132 SG 2 FROM MDAFW PMP-B

. HV-51 34 SG 3 FROM MDAFW PMP- B

. HV-51 37 SG

- 4 FROM MDAFW PMP-A

Close affected TDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:

. HV-5122 SG 1 FROM TDAFW

. HV-5125 - SG 2 FROM TDAFW

. HV-51 27 - SG 3 FROM TDAFW

. HV-51 20 SG 4 FROM TDAFW SS 14. Return to procedure and step in effect.

77

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Exam iners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, EOL, steady state operations.

(Base IC # 19, snapped to IC # 173 for HL18 NRC Exam)

Eguiment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B)

Turnover: Maintain power operations per 12004DF-1 (Power Operation, Mode 1) section 4.3.

Containment Mini-Purge in service for containment entry next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ESO1 Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip ESO2 Failure of Manual Reactor Trip SI08NB RWST Sludge Mixing Valve 10957/1 0958 Auto Closure Failure ES1 9A CVI Train A Auto Actuation Failure ES19B CVI Train B Auto Actuation Failure Overrides HS0456A B Train PORV CLOSE HV-81 04 Emergency Borate valve to CLOSE Event Malt Event Event No. No. Type* Description Ti NI1OB © I-OATC PRNI-42 fails high causing automatic inward rod motion. Following 100% I-SS completion of bA, switches are repositioned at NI Cab to remove N-UO failed detector from service.

TS-SS LCO 3.3.1-1, Condition A (immediately); Function 2.a, Condition D; Function 2.b, Condition E; Function 3, Condition E; Function 6, Condition E; Function 16.blcld, Condition S (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ); Function 16.e, Condition R (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ).

T2 CV13 © l-OATC CVCS VCT level transmitter LT-112 fails high 100% I-SS 3 RFTKO2 C-UO RWST sludge mixing line pipe break with valve auto closure failure.

(95%-88% C-SS Malfunction will be deleted when candidate manually closes Sludge 20 minute mixing valves.

ramp) TS-SS LCO 3.5.4, Condition B & Condition D (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months )

TR 13.1.7, Condition D (Immediate)

Pre- SIO8A loaded SIO8B 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event MaIf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description T4 RM0002 C-UO Cnmt Area Lo Range RE-0002 fails high, CVI fails to actuate.

@ 100% C-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.6, FU3.d, Condition A Pre- ES19A loaded ES19B 5 MFP A hi R-OATC Rapid power reduction due to MFPT A high vibrations vib=TRUE N-UO MFP A Hi R-SS Vibes=6.0 T6 FWO1 B M-ALL Trip of B MFPT due to remote switch failure requiring a reactor trip.

The reactor will fail to trip leading to an ATWT condition. ( 90% PRX)

T7 RDO7 C-OATC ATWT Auto rod motion fails after 1 minute (1:10 mm C-SS (Manual rod insertion or establishment of Emergency Boration flow is delay) Critical a critical step).

NOTE These malfunctions are to force crew to LOHS and are part of the overall MAJOR event. ( 50% PRX)

T8 AFO2A M TDAFW trips on overspeed T8 AFO3B M B MDAFW pump coupling shears T8 FWO1A M Trip of A MFPT due to excessive vibrations from increased speed following trip of B MFPT 9 HS0456A C-OATC B Train PORV fails to open automatically or manually, requires use Pre C-SS of Reactor Vessel Head Vents during Feed and Bleed of LOHS.

load Critical 10 Delete TDAFW mechanical over speed trip is repaired allowing restart of the AFO2A pump to feed the SGs.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2

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UNIT 1 REACTIVITY BRIEFING SHEET Shift: Day Date: 4/9/13 Burnup: 21167.69 MWD/MTU Asof 4/9/13 7:12 MINIMUM SHIFT REACTIVITY INFORMATION TO BE BRIEFED Power: 100 Rod Motion: AUTO Current Temperature Control Strategy: DILUTION Currently Making Up: 50.0 gal Every: 1 to 2 hrs The desired Tavg operating band is 585.5 +1- 0.05 degrees F CVCS makeup system boric acid flow per 100 gal makeup: 2.3 gallons/i 00 CVCS makeup system pot setting(FIC-0i 10): 0.59 BTRS Strategy: none AFD Strategy: Maintain on target plus/minus 1 AFD units Reactivity System Components Degraded/OOS:

I None Activities expected that may affect core reactivity (Reactivity Focus Items):

I None CURRENT CORE REACTIVIITY PARAMETERS Boron Worth: 9.5 pcm/ppm PCM per 1% pwr change: 26.6 Current MTC value: HFP: -33.0 pcm/F HZP: -14.7 pcm/F Current BAST Cb: 7000 ppm Current RCS Cb: 164 ppm Boration required per: degree F: 31.4 gallons 1% pwr change: 25.2 gallons 10% pwr change: 252.5 gallons 30% pwr change: 757.5 gallons Dilutions required per: degree F: 1322.2 gallons 1% pwr change: 1061.3 gallons Boration required for stuck rods: 2828.2 gallons for 2 stuck rods 4292.7 gallons for 3 stuck rods

f more than 3 rods are stuck begin boration and calculate for actual number of stuck rods*

Human Performance tools:

Peer check Three-way communication Placekeeping Procedure Use STAR Time-Out Situational Awareness Valid for PTDB Cycle 18 Tab 1.0 rev 29 approved 9/29/12 and Tab 16.0 rev 19 approved 1 0/5/12 S:WORKGROUPSSNC SOUTHERN NUCLEARPLANWOGTLEOPERATIONSPLA YERSTURNEROVERU1UI REACTIVITYSHEET.XLS

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

PRNI-42 fails high causing automatic inward rod motion. Following completion of bA, switches are repositioned at NI Cab to remove failed detector from service.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Recognize failure of PRNI OATC Perform bOA of AOP 18002-C.

UO Perform subsequent operator actions for failed PRNI at NI Cabinet Technical SQecifications:

3.3.1-1, Condition A (immediately)

Function 2.a, Condition D Function 2.b, Condition E Function 3, Condition E Function 6, Condition E Function 16.blc/d, Condition S (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months )

Function 16.e, Condition R (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ).

Event 2:

CVCS VCT level transmitter LT-1 12 fails high.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually places VCT divert valve LV-1 1 2A in the VCT position to stop letdown diversion to the RHUT and loss of VCT inventory.

OATC Aligns VCT for manual makeup to maintain VCT level when makeup is necessary.

Technical Srecifications:

None Event 3:

An RWST sludge mixing line pipe break will occur with auto closure failure of the sludge mixing line isolation valves LV-1 09571LV-1 0958.

Verifiable Actions.

UO Manually closes either LV-10957 or LV-10958 to isolate the sludge mixing line break. The valve hand switches are located on the QPCP.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.5.4, ECCS, Condition B and Condition D (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months action)

TL LCO 13.1.7, (Condition D Immediate Action) 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4:

Containment High Range Radiation monitor RE-0002 fails high.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manually closes CVI dampers and starts the Piping Penetration Area Filtration Units.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.6, FU3.d, Condition A Event 5:

MFPT A will develop high vibrations requiring a rapid power reduction to < 70% power to remove MFPT A from service.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Inserts control rods and adjusts RCS boron concentration to facilitate the down power.

UO Reduces Turbine load per direction of 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 6, 7:

During rapid power reduction, B MFPT trips due to remote switch failure requiring a reactor trip.

The reactor will fail to trip leading to an ATWT condition. (-. 90% PRX)

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Initiates a rapid control rod insertion to reduce reactor power. After about 1 minute, auto rod motion will fail requiring the OATC to manually insert control rods.

OATC Initiates an emergency boration of the RCS through LV-1 1 OA and LV-1 1 OB since HV 8104 Emergency Boration valve will not open.

UO Manually trips the turbine which will not automatically trip. This will preserve SG levels during the ATWT event.

Technical Specifications:

None 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 8, 9:

TDAFW will trip on over speed coincident with a coupling shear of B MDAFW pump. MDAFW pump A is tagged out and no AFW flow will be available, leading to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink condition. PORV 456 will fail to open in auto or manual requiring the UO to open the reactor vessel head vents for improved heat removal capability. Additionally, A MFPT will trip from increased vibrations due to increased speed following the trip of B MFPT. (.- 50% PRX)

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Stops all running RCPs.

OATC Manually actuates SI (if not actuated on the Turbine Trip failure)

OATC Manually arms COPS and opens PORV-455.

UO Manually opens all Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation and Throttle valves.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 10:

A report from the field will indicate the TDAFW mechanical overspeed trip linkage has been repaired and the TDAFW pump may be used to regain AFW flow.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Closes TDAFW pump discharge throttle valves.

UO Holds HV-51 06 TDAFW Steam Admission valve closed to reset governor ramp circuit while closing HV-15129 the TDAFW Trip and Throttle Valve.

UO Opens HV-1 51 29 and HV-5106 to start the TDAFW pump.

UO Opens desired TDAFW throttle valves to re-establish AFW flow.

The scenario may be stopped after the TDAFW pump is started and AFW flow is established with NRC Chief Examiner approval.

CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Either of the following:

a. Manually insert control rods following automatic & manual reactor trip per step 1 RNO of 19211-C, or

b. Emergency borate the RCS per step 4 of 19211-C

2) Arms COPS and opens PORV-455 to establish bleed path.

3) Establishment of reactor vessel head vent path for reactor bleed on loss of heat sink per step 38 RNO of 19231-C.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

PR N42 fails high resulting in inward rod motion, OATC will be required to place rods in Manual per IOAs of 18002, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnoses the failure of N42 Power Range NIS.

Symptoms / alarms:

. ALB1O-A03 POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLX HI SETPOINT ALERT

. ALB1O-C02 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION

. ALB1O-D03 OVERPOWER ROD STOP

. ALB1O-F02 POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLX RATE ALERT

. ALB1O-E06 RADIAL TILT (after a short delay)

. ALB1 2-A05 TAVG I TREE DEVIATION (may or may not come in depending on how far rods insert).

Indications:

. Rapid inward motion of control rods in automatic control.

Green RODS IN light illuminated on vertical section of QMCB

. Power Range Trip Status lights illuminated.

. Erratic, inconsistent or divergent indication between PR channels.

1 8002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction OATC IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS Bi. Place ROD;BANKSELETOR$WITGFUnMANL position.

SS Enters 18002-C, NUCLEAR INSTUMENTATION SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, section B POWER RANGE DRAWER N41, N42, N43, N44 MALFUNCTION.

UO 82. Terminates any load change in progress.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

PR N42 fails high resulting in inward rod motion, OATC will be required to place rods in Manual per lOAs of 18002, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B3. Checks THERMAL POWER - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 75%.

RNO B3. GotoStepB5.

SS B4. Direct Engineers to perform 88015-C, QUADRANT POWER TILT MEASUREMENT USING MOVEABLE INCORE DETECTOR SYSTEM as required by Tech Spec SR 3.2.4.2.

UO B5. Perform the following:

a. Select the affected channel on:

. ROD STOP BYPASS switch. (BPLP light 3-3 lights up)

COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch.

. POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch.

UPPER SECTION switch.

. LOWER SECTION switch.

b. Reset Rate Trip.

NOTE: The UO will receive credit for a normal evolution for performance of step B5.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

PR N42 fails high resulting in inward rod motion, OATC will be required to place rods in Manual per lOAs of 18002, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B6. Restore Tavg to program.

Note to examiner: It is expected the OATC will withdraw rods to restore Tavg to program.

OATC B7. Place rods in AUTO if desired.

Cue to Simbooth: IF asked, the Shift Manager has given permission to place the rods in auto.

B8. Check the operable Power Range Channel(s) indicating OATC properly on NR-45. (they are)

SS B9. Notify I & C to initiate repairs.

Note to examiner: It is expected a crew member will call C & T for a work order, duty manager notification, and to contact I & C.

SS B10. Bypass affected channel NIS and NSSS grouping using 13509-C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION.

Note to examiner: It is NOT expected the SS will BTI the channel, I & C usually likes to leave the channel as is for troubleshooting and it will be bypassed at their request.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

PR N42 fails high resulting in inward rod motion, OATC will be required to place rods in Manual per lOAs of 18002, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Bi 1. Within one hour, check the following interlocks are in required state for existing unit conditions: (TS 3.3.1) (they are)

. P-7

. P-8

. P-9

. P-b SS B12. Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , place the inoperable Power Range Channel in trip by performing the following: (TS 3.3.1)

a. Remove the AC Control Power Fuses on the affected drawer.

b. Trip Overtemperature bistables for the affected channel.

CHANNEL CAB FRAME B/S SWITCHES

/CARD N-41 1 8/22 3 TS-41 1 C 1 8/22 4 TS-41 1 D N-42 2 8/22 3 TS421C 2 8/22 4 TS-421 D N-43 3 8/22 3 TS-431C 3 8/22 4 TS-431 D N-44 4 8/22 3 TS-441C 4 8/22 4 TS-441 D SS B13. Initiate 14915, SPECIAL CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE LOGS.

Note to examiner: The crew will call C & T to perform this. This will be data sheet 7 for One Power Range NI Channel Inoperable.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

PR N42 fails high resulting in inward rod motion, OATC will be required to place rods in Manual per lOAs of 18002, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Bi 4. Initiate the applicable actions of the following Technical Specifications:

Table 3.3.1-1 Function 2a, Cond D, Function 2b INFO Table 3.3.1-1 Function 3 Table 3.3.1-1 Function 6 Table 3.3.1-1 Function 16b (INFO), c, d, e, Cond R & S SR 3.2.4.2 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Note to examiner:

. EU 2a and 2b, Conditions D, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action.

. EU 3, Condition E, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action.

. FU 6, Condition E, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action.

. EU 16b, c, d, e, Conditions S and R, both 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months actions.

SS B15. This step is N/A at this time.

SS B16. Initiate 13501, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM when repairs and surveillances are complete.

SS B17. Return to procedure and step in effect.

End of EVENT #1, Proceed to EVENT #2.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

ime Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses that CVCS VCT level transmitter 1 LT-1 12 failed high.

Indications:

ALBO7-E05 VCT HI/LO LEVEL Annunciator Automatic makeup initiates.

OATC References ARP 17007-1 Window E05 VCT HIILO LEVEL AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

NOTE VCT automatic makeup should have started at 30 percent or stopped at 50 percent.

1. Letdown flow diverts to the HUT WHEN 1 -HS-01 1 2A is in AUTO with VCT high level of 97 percent.

2. Charging Pump suction auto swaps to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) upon a Lo-Lo VCT level of 5.7 percent.

3. A summary of instrument setpoints associated with the VCT levels include:

OATC LI-0112 VCT LEVEL Ll-0185 Tripopen 112A 97% Modulate ll2Afull divert (if LIC-0185 pot @8.70)

Hi level alarm 92%

11 2A Trip Open signal 87% 11 2A starts to divert (if Resets LIC-0185 pot @8.70)

Auto Makeup stops 50%

Auto Makeup starts 30%

Low level alarm 20% Low level alarm RWST auto swapover 5.7% (2 of 2) RWST auto swapover 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS ALBO7-E05:

1. Check VCT level using 1-LI-0185 on the QMCB AND compare to 1-LI-Ol 12 on the IPC OR on Trend Recorder XR-40053.

OATC 2. IF equipment failure is indicated by EITHER LT-O1 85 LT-O1 12 failed high, perform the following: (YES)

a. Place 1 HS-1 1 2A to the VCT position NOTE Pump cavitation may be indicated by fluctuating discharge L pressure and/or erratic flow.

b. Monitor charging pump(s) for signs of cavitation, if cavitation is observed: (NO)

(1) Isolate letdown, (2) Stop any running charging pumps, (3) Initiate 18007-C Section B.

c. Initiate Manual VCT Makeup per 13009-C.

d. Contact maintenance to initiate repairs.

NOTE: 1 8007-C, CVCS, Loss of VCT Makeup actions start on page 9 NOTE: 13009-1, CVCS MU System Actions begin on page 12 OATC 3. IF level is low AND makeup is lost, initiate 18007-C, Chemical And Volume Control System Malfunction. (see tab 1 for actions of procedure 18007-C)

OATC 4. IF level is low due to system leakage, initiate 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage. (N/A) 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1 LT-1 12 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS ALBO7-E05:

OATC Step 1: IF VCT level is high:

a. Stop Makeup.

b. Divert letdown flow to the Recycle Holdup Tank (HUT position) using 1-HS-01 12A on the QMCB.

c. Operate makeup per 13009-1, CVCS.

d. Reactor Makeup Control System.

SS Step 2: IF equipment failure is indicated, initiate maintenance as required.

Contacts SSS to perform the following:

. Notify I&C to initiate repairs

. Write a Condition Report

. Notify OPS Duty Manager OATC Step 3: IE an operating charging pump fails due to suspected gas binding (fluctuating discharge pressure AND flow), THEN the standby pump SHALL JQI be started UNTIL the cause of the gas binding is understood all effected piping and components have been vented.

NOTE: This Step Does Not Apply SS Directs OATC to Initiate Manual VCT Makeup per 13009-1 as Required to Maintain VCT Level Between 30 and 50%.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 18007-C, SétionC. LOSS OF VT MAKEUP OATC Cl. Stabilize plant conditions:

Reactor Power RCS Temperature PRZR Pressure ss NOTE Charging Pump suction shifts to RWST when VCT level lowers to less than 6%

OATC C2. Check the following:

a. At least one Boric Acid Transfer Pump RUNNING.

b. At least one Reactor Makeup Water Pump RUNNING.

c. VCT makeup valve alignment CORRECT FOR SELECTED MODE.

d. Letdown divert valve LV-1 12A ALIGNED TO VCT.

RNO

a. Start standby Boric Acid Transfer Pump.

b. Start standby Reactor Makeup Water Pump.

c. Align valves to establish VCT makeup using 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

d. Align LV-112AtoVCT.

OATC C3. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC C4. Check VCT makeup flow RESTORED.

RNO Perform the following:

a. WHEN VCT makeup is restored, THEN perform the following:

1) Verify charging pump suction aligned to VCT.

2) Place LV-1 12A in AUTO.

3) Return to procedure and step in effect.

b. GotoStepC6.

SS C5. Return to procedure and step in effect.

OATC C6. Maintain seal injection flow to all RCPs 8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC C7. Check VCT level LESS THAN 20%.

RNO C7. ReturntoStep Cl.

OATC C8. Makeup to RCS using RWST:

a. Open one RWST TO CCP A&B SUCTION valve:

LV-112D

-OR LV-1 12E

b. Turn on PRZR Backup Heaters.

c. Commence power reduction as necessary to maintain Tavg at program by initiating 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1).

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1 LT-1 12 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position j Applicants Action or Behavior OATC C9. Check VCT level GREATER THAN 30%.

RNO C9. Return to Step C8.

OATC ClO. Realign charging pump suction to the VCT:

a. Verify VCT OUTLET ISOLATION valves OPEN:

LV-01 12B LV-01 12C

b. Close any open RWST TO CCP A&B SUCTION valve(s):

LV-1 12D LV-1 12E SS Cli. Return to Step C2.

End of 18007-C, Loss of VCT Makeup 11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 13009-I, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM 13009-1 Section 4.6 Manual Makeup CAUTIONS

. If Manual Makeup is being performed to maintain VCT level when letdown is being diverted, letdown should not exceed 75 gpm.

. BAST concentration is inaccurate until sampled following batching.

Temperature and power should be closely monitored following manual makeup to the VCT with the BAST concentration inaccurate.

OATC Step 4.6.1 Manual Makeup At 100 GPM Total Flow NOTE Volumetric change in VCT is equal to 19.2 gallons per percent change in level.

OATC Step 4.6.1.1 Set TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1 -FQI-01 11 to the desired amount of Total Makeup Water.

CAUTION Digital counters and thumbwheel settings on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1-FQ-01 10 read in tenth-gallon increments.

OATC Step 4.6.1.2 Set BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator 1-FQI-0110 to the amount of boric acid as follows:

a. Calculate estimated volume of Boric Acid using the following calculation.

Gallons of Boric Acid = Total M/U x RCS Cb BAST Cb 12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.6.1.2 continued:

b. Review logs for recent makeups to confirm calculated volume of Boric Acid is appropriate.

NOTE Minor adjustments from the calculated boric acid volume and recent makeup data may be required based on burnup, plant conditions, and desired RCS temperature response.

c. Adjust Boric Acid to Blender Integrator 1 -FQI-01 10 to the desired volume based on plant conditions and desired reactivity response.

OATC Step 4.6.1.3 Adjust BORIC ACID Flow Controller 1 -FIC-Ol 10 pot setting using the following formula and verify controller is in AUTO:

1 -FIC-Ol 10 pot setting = RCS BAST Cb OATC Step 4.6.1.4 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

OATC Step 4.6.1.5 Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in MAN.

OATC Step 4.6.1.6 Verify the following:

BATO BLENDER 1-HS-O11OA in AUTO.

RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER 1-HS-O111A in AUTO.

One Boric Acid Transfer Pump in AUTO or START.

One Reactor Makeup Water Pump in AUTO or START.

. Verify TOTAL MAKEUP Flow controller 1 -FIC-Ol 11 is in AUTO with pot is set for 100 gpm (approximately 6.25) total flowrate.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE While letdown is configured for 120 gpm, the preferred flow path for Manual Makeup is through 1 -FV-01 1 OB BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT. The design capacity of the VCT spray nozzles would be challenged with 120 gpm letdown in service and the addition of the makeup flow upstream of the VCT (1X6AHO4-00024).

This could prevent makeup from reaching the desired flow rate. Thus, 1 -FV-01 1 1 B should only be used if 1 -FV-01 1 OB is not available.

CAUTION With either Blender Outlet valve handswitch in the open position, an automatic isolation will not occur due to a Boric Acid and/or Total Makeup Flow Deviations OATC Step 4.6.1.7 Open one of the following valves:

BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT 1-FV-01 lOB

-OR-BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1 -FV-01 11 B OATC NOTES

Manual makeup can be stopped at any time by placing 1 -HS-40001 8 in STOP.

. VCT level should be maintained between 30 and 87 percent. (1-LIC-0185 controller pot should normally be set to 8.7.)

VCT Pressure 1 -P1-115 should be maintained between 20 and 45 psig.

Step 4.6.1.8 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START and perform the following:

. Verify Boric Acid Transfer Pump is running.

. Verify Reactor Makeup Water Pump is running.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

. Verify BORIC ACID TO BLENDER 1 -FV-01 1 OA throttles open to provide the correct flow of boric acid.

. Verify REACTOR MU WTR TO BLENDER 1 -FV-O1 1 1 A throttles open to provide correct total flow.

. If desired, control Boric Acid Flow controller 1 -FIC-01 10 by adjusting pot Q. using up/down pushbuttons to control boric acid at the desired flowrate.

OATC Step 4.6.1.9 Monitor counters on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator 1-FQI-0110 and TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1 -FQI-01 11 and perform the following:

. WHEN counter on 1 -FQI-01 10 BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator reaches its setpoint, verify 1-FV-O11OA BORIC ACID TO BLENDER is closed.

. WHEN counter on 1-FQI-0111 TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator reaches its setpoint, verify 1-FV-O111A REACTOR MAKEUP WATER TO BLENDER is closed.

OATC Step 4.6.1.10 If desired, flush approximately 15 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water through 1 -FV-01 1 OB by performing the following:

a. Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A to ALT DIL.

b. Set TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 for 13 to 15 gals.

C. Place BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1 -HS-01 11 B in CLOSE.

d. Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START.

e. Verify flow is indicated on 1-FI-O11OB.

f. WHEN TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1 -FQI-01 11 reaches the desired setpoint, verify 1-FV-01 1 1A RX MU WTR TO BA_BLENDER_is_closed.

15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 4.6.1.11 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller 1-FIC-OllO is in AUTO and potentiometer is set for current RCS Cb.

OATC Step 4.6.1.12 Align Reactor Makeup Control system for automatic operation as follows: (Not until repaired)

COMPONENT NAME POSITION

a. 1 -HS-O1 11 B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT AUTO

b. 1-HS-O11OB BLENDER OUTLETTO CHARGING PUMPS SUCTION AUTO C. 1-HS-40001A VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT AUTO

d. 1-HS-40001B VCT MAKEUP CONTROL START OATC Step 4.6.1.13 Verify the following valves are closed:

. 1 -FV-O1 11 B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT.

. 1-FV-O11OB BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT.

OATC Step 4.6.1.14 Boric Acid Transfer Pump was placed in START at Step 4.6.1.6, return to AUTO or as directed by SS.

OATC Step 4.6.1.15 H Reactor Makeup Water Pump was placed in START at Step 4.6.1.6, return to AUTO or as directed by SS.

OATC Step 4.6.1.16 Operate the Pressurizer Back-up Heaters as necessary to equalize Cbbetween the RCS and the Pressurizer.

16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CVCS VCT Level Transmitter 1LT-112 Fails HIGH causing VCT Level Control Divert Valve (LV-1 12A) to divert to RHUT and disabling auto make-up to the VCT.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE Automatic Control Rod withdrawal function has been disabled.

The only function enabled when Control Rod handswitch is placed in AUTO is automatic insertion when Tavg is at least 1.5 degrees above Tref.

OATC Step 4.6.1.17 Monitor RCS Tavg, control bank position, or power level as applicable.

SS Return to step and procedure in effect, UOP 12004-C.

End of 13009-1, Manual Makeup End of Event # 2, Proceed to Event # 3.

17

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

The RWST will develop a leak from the sludge mixing line resulting in lowering RWST level below the Tech Spec limit. After receipt of a QMCB annunciators, the UO will find the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves have failed to automatically close. The UO will close the valves on the QPCP and the leak will be terminated.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose RWST level is actually lowering on all channels.

Symptoms / alarms:

ALBO6-E04 RWST LO LEVEL Indications:

. RWST level lowering on Ll-0990, 0991, 0992, and 0993 to less than 95%.

OATC ALBO6-E04 17006 actions PROBABLE CAUSE

1. Filling of Accumulators.

2. Adding water to the Spent Fuel Pool.

3. Safety Injection (SI) actuation.

4. System leakage.

UO AUTOMATIC ACTIONS RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves 1-HV-10957 (Train B, 1-LT-0991) an 1-HV-10958 (Train A, 1-LT-0990) close.

Note to examiner: These valves are located on the QPCP and will NOT automatically close for this event. The UO will have to manually close the valves to isolate the leak.

18

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

The RWST will develop a leak from the sludge mixing line resulting in lowering RWST level below the Tech Spec limit. After receipt of a QMCB annunciators, the UO will find the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves have failed to automatically close. The UO will close the valves on the QPCP and the leak will be terminated.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC ALBO6-E04 actions continued.

uO INTIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE UO SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. IF in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, and SI is not in progress, stop any operation that could be removing water from the RWST.

2. IF a system leak is indicated, dispatch personnel to locate and isolate the leak.

Note to examiner. The UO closing either HV-10957 or HV-1 0958 will isolate the leak for this event.

Note to SimBooth: Delete malfunction when candidate manually closes either HV-1 0957 or HV-1 0958.

SS 3. Restore RWST level to normal per 13701 -1, Boric Acid System.

4. Refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4 and TR 13.1.7.

COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

The RWST will develop a leak from the sludge mixing line resulting in lowering RWST level below the Tech Spec limit. After receipt of a QMCB annunciators, the UO will find the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves have failed to automatically close. The UO will close the valves on the QPCP and the leak will be terminated.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST).

LCO 3.5.4 The RWST shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more sludge B.1 Restore the valve(s) to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months mixing pump isolation OPERABLE status.

valves inoperable.

D. RWST inoperable for D,1 Restore RWST to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months reasons other than OPERABLE status.

Condition A or B.

E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODe 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or D AND not met.

E.2 Be in MODE 5 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

Note to examiner: Closing the RWST sludge mixing isolations HV-1 0957 and HV-1 0958 satisfies Condition B.

20

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

The RWST will develop a leak from the sludge mixing line resulting in lowering RWST level below the Tech Spec limit. After receipt of a QMCB annunciators, the UO will find the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves have failed to automatically close. The UO will close the valves on the QPCP and the leak will be terminated.

Time Position 1 Applicants Action or Behavior SS TR 13.1.7 Borated Water Sources Operating.

TR 13.1.7 The following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required by TR-13.1 .3:

a. Boric acid storage tank.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

0. RWST inoperable. 0.1 Enter applicable Conditions Immediately.

of RWST Technical Specification 3.5.4.

End of EVENT #3, Proceed to EVENT #4.

21

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event Description Containment Area Lo Range Rad Monitor RE 0002 Fails High CVI Fails to Actuate Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Alarm/Indications UO ALBO5-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM SS ALBO5-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM Safety Related Display Consol (SRDC)-RE-002, Intermediate & High Alarm PC RE-002 Step Change to High Rad UO 170054 B03 INTMD AADIATION ALARM OATC PROBABLE CAUSE An alert condition on one or more of the Radiation Monitor Channels.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check the Safety Related Display Console (QRM2), the RMS Communications Console (QRM1) and the Plant Computer to determine the monitor in alarm and Go To 17100-1, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Process And Effluent Radiation Monitor System (RMS) or 171 02-1, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Safety Related Display Control QRM2 as appropriate.

Note to examiner: The Communications Console (COMS)

QRM1 is NOT modeled in the Vogtle simulator.

22

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event Description Containment Area Lo Range Rad Monitor RE 0002 Fails High CVI Fails to Actuate Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 17005-1 C03HIGH RADIATiON ALARM OATC PROBABLE CAUSE uO A high alarm on one or more of the Radiation Monitor Channels.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS The following actions will occur if a High Level Radiation Alarm is actuated on the associated monitor:

1-RE-0002 or 1-RE-0003, Containment Low Range Area Monitor:

Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). (Will not actuate)

INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check the Safety Related Display Console (QRM2), the RMS Communications Console (QRM1) and the Plant Computer to determine the monitor in alarm and Go To 171 00-1, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Process And Effluent Radiation Monitor System (RMS) or 17102-1, Annunciator Response Procedure For The Safety Related Display Console QRM2 as appropriate Note to examiner: The Communications Console (COMS)

QRM1 is NOT modeled in the Vogtle simulator.

23

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event Description Containment Area Lo Range Rad Monitor RE 0002 Fails High CVI Fads to Actuate Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 17102-1 Safety Related Display Console RE-0002 (RED LAMP LIT)

(HIGH)

UO PROBABLE CAUSE ss NOTE During refueling operations indicates a fuel drop accident.

During power operation indicates possible loss of coolant accident.

High radiation in the Containment Building.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Initiates Containment Building Ventilation Isolation. (NO)

INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Initiate evacuation of Containment IF the alarm is due to unexpected or unexplained radiation increases, OR IF appropriate HP controls are NOT in place for the radiological conditions indicated.

2. IF the alarm is due to expected radiation increases from preplanned evolutions AND appropriate HP controls are in place, THEN request HP and Chemistry to investigate the cause of alarm. If required, initiate evacuation of Containment.

SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation.

UO will manually start the piping pen units and close all Dampers on the CVI MLBs.

2. If required, verify that Containment has been evacuated and all personnel accounted for.

3. Notify Chemistry to independently determine radiation level in the Containment.

4. IF the channel has malfunctioned:

24

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event Description Containment Area Lo Range Rad Monitor RE 0002 Fails High CVI Fails to Actuate Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

a. Comply with Technical Specifications LCO 3.3.6.

b. Unlock panel and place 1-HS-13259 on CVI BLOCK PANEL 1-1609-P5-CB1 to BLOCK (Cont. Bldg RB-70).

c. Request Chemistry to investigate and take corrective action.

d. Reset CVI per 11886-1, Recovery From ESF Actuations.

5. IE the alarm is an actuation resulting from Fuel Handling, initiate 1 8006-C, Fuel Handling Event, as appropriate.

6. IF the channel has not malfunctioned, initiate 18004-C, RCS Leakage.

COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE SS Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS: 3.3.6 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 25

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event Description Containment Area Lo Range Rad Monitor RE 0002 Fails High CVI Fads to Actuate Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS LCO 3.3.6 CVI FU 2 CONDITION B REQUIRED COMPLETION CONDITION ACTION TIME B. NOTE B.1 Enter Immediately Only applicable in applicable MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. Conditions and One or more Functions Actions of LCO with one or more manual 3.6.3, or automatic actuation Containment channels inoperable. Isolation OR Valves, for No radiation monitoring containment channels OPERABLE. purge supply OR and exhaust Required Action and isolation valves associated Completion made Time of Condition A not inoperable by met. isolation instrumentation.

ss LCO 3.6.3 Condition B REQUIRED COMPLETION C 0 N DITIO N ACTION TIME B. One or more penetration B.1 Isolate the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months flow paths with two affected containment isolation penetration flow valves inoperable except path by for purge valve leakage use of at least not within limit, one closed and de activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

End of Event #4. Go to Event #5 26

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

MFPT A High Vibration Alarm Causes Crew To Enter 18013-C, RAPID POWER REDUCTION.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / UO Responds to MFPT A HI VIB Annunciator ALB15-E01 by Referencing ARP 17015-1 Window E01 MFPT A HI VIB 17015-1 E01 NOTE Turbine and pump bearing vibration may be monitored on the following Plant Computer points, or at the Bentley Nevada cabinet next to MFP B:

Bentley Nevada 1A MFPT H.P. Bearing Vibration: X: X0219 X 1XIS-5308X Y: X0249 Y 1 XIS-5308Y 1A MFPT L.P. Bearing Vibration: X: X0220 X 1XIS-5309X Y: X0250 Y 1XIS-5309Y 1A MFP INBD Bearing Vibration: X: X0253 X 1XIS-4918X Y: X0254 Y 1XIS-4918Y 1A MFP OUTBD Bearing Vibration: X: X0255 X 1XIS-4919X Y: X0256 Y 1 XIS-491 9Y 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE

1. Bearing malfunction due to loss of oil or improper cooling.

2. Bowed shaft.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 27

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

MFPT A High Vibration Alarm Causes Crew To Enter 18013-C, RAPID POWER REDUCTION.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE A handheld vibration instrument may be used to determine vibration levels locally.

1. Dispatch an operator to MFPT A to investigate.

2. On the Plant Computer, perform the following:

a. Select the ATSI CRT Trend Display and print out a trend of the desired current Turbine parameters to determine the alarm condition.

NOTES

Elevated or fluctuating bearing drain temperatures may be an indication of bearing loading and can indicate a bearing is failing.

Engineering and Maintenance should be promptly notified if any bearing drain temperatures are elevated.

Bearing oil temperatures should be maintained between 110°F and 125°F.

b. Monitor lube oil and bearing oil temperatures of pump and turbine.

3. IF MFP TURBINE bearing vibration rises to 5 mils or greater, immediately reduce power and trip MFPT A per the following:

18013-C Rapid Power Reduction.

18016-C, Condensate And Feedwater Malfunction Note to examiner: MFP Turbine Vibrations will be approximately 6-8 mils.

SS Initiates 1801 3-C RAPID Update)

Note to examiner: Rapid power reduction steps begin on Page 29.

28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

MFPT A turbine vibration will rise to > 5 mils requiring entry into 18013-C Rapid Power Reduction and trip of MFPT A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 18013-C, RAPID POWER REDUCTION actions.

Entry Condition Target Approx. Time @ 3-5% mm 1701 5-D05 MFPT High Vibrations <70% RTP 6 10 minutes 1701 5-E01

1. Perform SHUTDOWN BRIEFING.

SHUTDOWN BRIEFING ss METHOD

Auto rod control should be used.

Reduce Turbine Load at approximately 3% RTP per minute (approx 36 MWe) up to 5% RTP (approx 60 MWe).

Borate considering the calculations from the reactivity briefing sheet and BEACON.

Maintain AFD within the doghouse.

SS (or SRO designee) Maintain supervisory oversight.

All rod withdrawals will be approved by the SS.

Approval for each reactivity is not necessary as long as manipulations are made within the boundaries established in this briefing (i.e. turbine load adjustment up to 60 MWe, etc.

A crew update should be performed at approximately every 100 MWe power change.

If manpower is available, peer checks should be used for all reactivity changes.

OPERATIONAL LIMITS

Maintain Tavg within +/- 6°F of Tref. IF TAVG/TREF mismatch >6°F and not trending toward a matched condition or if Tavg <551°F, then trip the reactor.

If load reduction due to a loss of vacuum, every effort should be made to maintain the steam dumps closed. (Permissive C-9 >24.92 Hg).

INDUSTRY OE

Shift supervision must maintain effective oversight and exercise conservative decision making.

Correction of significant RCS Tavg deviations should only be via secondary plant control manipulations and not primary plant control manipulations (i.e., do not withdraw control rods or dilute).

29

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

MFPT A turbine vibration will rise to > 5 mils requiring entry into 18013-C Rapid Power Reduction and trip of MFPT A.

Time

{ Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 2. Verify rods in AUTO.

UO 3. Reduce Turbine Load at the desired rate up to 5% mm. (60 MWe/min).

OATC 4. Borate as necessary by initiating 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

Note to examiner: Steps from 13009-C for boration are at the end of this event starting on page # 34 OATC 5. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC 6. Check desired ramp rate LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MIN.

RNO If conditions warrant a turbine load rate greater than 5%/mm, THEN perform the following:

a. Trip the reactor.

b. Go to 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 30

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

MFPT A turbine vibration will rise to > 5 mils requiring entry into 18013-C Rapid Power Reduction and trip of MFPT A.

Time Position

{ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 7. Maintain Tavg within 6oF of Tref:

a. Monitor Tavg/Tref deviation (UT-0495).

b. Verify rods inserting as required.

RNO 7b. Manual rod control should be used with insertions of up to 5 steps at a time.

c. Energize Pressurizer back-up heaters as necessary.

OATC 8. Maintain reactor power and turbine power MATCHED.

a. Balance reactor power with secondary power reduction using boration and control rods.

b. Check rate of power reduction ADEQUATE FOR PLANT CONDITIONS.

c. Check RCS Tavg GREATER THAN 551°F (TS 3.4.2).

d. Check RCS Tavg WITHIN 6oF OF TREE.

RNO for all of the above:

a. Trip the reactor.

b. Go to 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC 9. Maintain PRZR Pressure AT 2235 PSIG.

OATC 10. Maintain PRZR Level at PROGRAM.

31

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

MFPT A turbine vibration will rise to > 5 mils requiring entry into 18013-C Rapid Power Reduction and trip of MFPT A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 1 1. Maintain SG Level BETWEEN 60% AND 70%.

OATC 12. Notify the System Operator that a load reduction is in progress.

ss 13. Notify SM to make the following notifications as appropriate:

Plant Management Notifications using 1 0000-C, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.

NMP-EP-1 10, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

00152, FEDERAL AND STATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

Technical Specification sampling for load reductions greater than 15% using 351 10-C, CHEMISTRY CONTROL OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

QC to perform a NOPT inspection using 84008, RPV ALLOY 600 MATERIAL INSPECTIONS AND REPORTS for reactor shutdowns.

NOTE UO Attempts should be made to keep steam dumps closed if power reduction is required for Condenser problem.

UO 14. Check Steam DumpsCLOSED.

UO 15. Check Turb/Gen to remain online. (YES) 32

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

MFPT A turbine vibration will rise to> 5 mils requiring entry into 18013-C Rapid Power Reduction and trip of MFPT A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 16. Check desired plant conditions achieved.

Adequate load reduction.

-OR-Plant conditions no longer required shutdown.

RNO

16. WHEN desired plant conditions are achieved, THEN Go to Step 17.

UO 17. Perform the following:

a. Stabilize power level.

b. Place rods in MANUAL and match Tavg with Tref.

c. Maintain stable plant conditions.

d. Go to 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1) Section 4.2 and perform actions from the starting power level to ending power level.

If not ended previously, End of EVENT #5, Proceed to EVENT #6.

33

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System OATC 4.2 BORATION 4.2.1 Determine the existing RCS boron concentration from Boron Meter 1 -Al-401 34 OR by sample analysis.

4.2.2 To determine the number of gallons of boric acid required to borate the RCS, perform the following.

IF borating to required boron for a xenon free cool down, obtain the maximum boron concentration for the cool down range from the PTDB Tab 1.3.4-Ti and T2.

OR IF borating to a desired boron concentration, determine the desired change in boron concentration by subtracting the existing concentration from the desired concentration.

THEN Determine the amount of boric acid necessary to accomplish the desired change in boron concentration using PTDB Tab 2.3 and correct the obtained value using PTDB Tab 2.1.

Note to examiner: The OATC may also use a Beacon Book calculation to obtain a boron addition target for the Rapid Power Reduction. For a power reduction to 70%, this will be a boron addition of 230 gallons at 30 gpm.

OATC 4.2.3 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

OATC 4.2.4 Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in BOR.

34

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE If necessary, boric acid flow may be adjusted using 1 -FIC-01 10 with SS concurrence. Changes to pot setting should be logged in the Control Room Log and restored at completion of activity.

OATC 4.2.5 Adjust potentiometer on Boric Acid Blender Flow Controller 1-FIC-OllO as desired and verify in AUTO.

CAUTION Digital counter setting on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1 -FQI-01 10 reads in tenth-gallon increments.

OATC 4.2.6 Set BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1-FQI-0110 to the desired amount of Boric Acid.

35

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.7 Verify the following:

. BA TO BLENDER 1 -HS-01 1 OA is in AUTO.

. BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT 1 -HS-01 1 OB is in AUTO.

One Boric Acid Transfer Pump in AUTO or START.

. RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER 1 -FV-O1 11 A is closed with 1HS-O111A in AUTO.

. BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1 -FV-01 11 B is closed with 1HS-O111B in AUTO.

NOTES

Boration can be manually stopped at any time by placing 1-HS-400018 in STOP.

. VCT pressure, 1 -P1-115 should be maintained between 20 and 45 psig.

OATC 4.2.8 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START and pertorm the following:

. Verify Boric Acid Transfer Pump is running.

. Verify 1 -FV-01 1 OB is open.

. Verify 1 -FV01 1 OA throttles open to provide desired flow on 1-Fl-O11OA.

. Monitor BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1-FQI-01 10.

36

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.9 WHEN 1-FQI-011O BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator reaches its setpoint, verify boration stops and the following valves close.

. 1 -FV-O1 1 OA, BA TO BLENDER

. 1-FV-O11OB, BLENDER OUTLETTO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT OATC 4.2.10 Flush approximately 15 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water through 1 -FV-01 1 OB by performing the flowing:

a. Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A to ALT DIL.

b. Set TOTAL MAKEUP integrator 1-FQI-01 11 for 13 to 15 gallons.

c. Place BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1 -HS-01 11 B in CLOSE.

d. Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START.

e. Verify flow is indicated on 1 -Fl-01 1 OB.

f. WHEN TOTAL MAKEUP integrator 1 -FQI reaches the desired setpoint, verify the following valves close:

. 1-FV-O111A, RX MU WTRTO BA BLENDER

. 1 -FV-01 1 OB, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT 37

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

]

OATC 4.211 Verify 1-FtC-Ui 10 potentiometer is set to setting recorded prior to boration (or as directed by SS).

OATC 4.2.12 Align Reactor Makeup Control system for automatic operation as follows:

COMPONENT POSITION

a. 1 -HS-1 108 BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT AUTO

b. 1HS-40001A VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT AUTO

c. 1 -HS-40001 B VCT MAKEUP CONTROL START OATC 4.2.13 IF BA TRANSFER PUMP was placed in START at Step 4.2.7, return to AUTO or as directed by SS.

OATC 4.2.14 Monitor P05 Tavg, source range count rate, and Reactor Power as applicable.

OATC 4.2.15 Operate the Pressurizer Back-up Heaters as necessary to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and the Pressurizer.

38

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Rapid Power Reduction boration steps.

Event

Description:

Rapid Power Reduction boration steps from 13009.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.16 Verify desired boration through sample analysis or from Boron Concentration Meter 1-1 208-T6-006. (1 -Al-401 34).

End of 13009-1, Boration steps 39

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior uo Diagnoses loss of B MFP Alarms:

. ALB16-D01 MFPT B TRIPPED Indications:

. Lowering MFP B Speed

. Rising MFP B Deviation Note to examiner: the crew may reference the ARP for the annunciator or may go directly to AOP 18016-C, Condensate And Feedwater Malfunction.

ARP 17016-1, WINDOW D01 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE

a. Manual trip using 1-HS-3170 on QMCB

b. Low oil pressure to MFPT Bearings

c. Low oil pressure to Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) Bearings

d. Low suction pressure to MFP

e. Low vacuum in condenser

f. MFPT Steam Exhaust Valve has closed

g. MFPT Thrust Bearing wear

h. Steam Generator Hi-Hi level or safety injection actuation

i. Manual operation of local trip lever

j. Turbine overspeed 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE s 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Initiate 1801 6-C, Condensate And Feedwater MaIfunction 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 40

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

L Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 5.0 COMPENSATORY ACTIONS NONE SS Initiates AOP 18016-C, Condensate And Feedwater Malfunction AOP 18016-C, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION. SECTION A LOSS OF MAIN FEED PUMP IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS OATC Al. Check reactor power LESS THAN Q EQUAL TO 70%.

RNO Al. Perform the following:

a. Trip the reactor

b. Go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION SS E-O190O0c REACTOR TRIP ORSAFETY INJEcTION IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS OATC 1. Check Reactor Trip. (NO)

. Rod Bottom Lights LIT (NO)

Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN. (NO)

Neutron Flux LOWERING. (NO)

RNO

1. Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches.

IF Reactor NOT tripped, THEN goto 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION / ATWT.

SS Transitions to 19211-C, FR-Si RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION I ATWT.

41

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE This Functional Restoration Procedure should NOT be implemented if both 4160V AC emergency buses are de-energized, 19100-C should be entered.

CAUTION RCPs should not be tripped with Reactor power greater than 5%.

IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS (Steps 1 & 2)

OATC 1. Verify Reactor trip:

. Rod Bottom Lights LIT. (NO)

. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN. (NO)

. Neutron Flux LOWERING. (NO)

RNO

1. Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches.

IF Reactor NOT tripped, Critical THEN insert Control Rods.

Note to examiner: Control rods will begin inserting at 72 step per minute when the UO trips the Main Turbine, however, after 1 minute, auto rod motion will fail and the OATC will have to insert rods manually at 48 steps per minute. Manual insertion of Control rods is CRITICAL.

UO 2. Verify Turbine trip: (NO)

a. All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED.

RNO Critical 2. Trip Turbine Note to examiner: Without a reactor trip the Turbine will not automatically trip.

42

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 3. Check AFW Pumps RUNNING: (NO)

. MDAFW pumps (NO)

. TDAFW Pump, if required. (NO)

Note to examiner: The TDAFW pump is required to be started if at least 2 SG levels are be < 10% NR.

43

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4. Emergency borate the RCS:

UO

a. Start at least one Boric Acid Transfer Pump. (may already be running)

b. Verify a Charging Pump is running.

c. Open EMERGENCY BORATE valve HV-81 04. (NO)

RNO

c. IF HV-8104 will NOT open, THEN open the following:

FV-1 1 OA, BA TO BLENDER

FV-1 1 OB, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT.

Note to examiner

1) Either the OATC or UO may be asked to perform this step

2) HV-8104 will fail to open (pre-loaded malfunction)

3) FV-1 1 ONB may already be partially open from LT-1 12 failure however this step requires them to be fully open which will necessitate deliberate action on the part of thecrew

d. Verify charging flow GREATER THAN 42 GPM. (may not)

e. Verify boric acid flow GREATER THAN 30 GPM.

Note to examiner: Due to high RCS pressure during the ATWT, it may be necessary to take control of FIC-0121 to raise charging flow to > 42 gpm.

f. Check RCS pressure LESS THAN 2335 PS 1G. (YES)

RNO (just in case)

f. Check PRZR PORVs and Block Valves open.

IF valves NOT open, THEN reduce RCS pressure to less than 2135 psig by performing the following:

1) Arm COPS.

2) Open PRZR PORVs and Block Valves as necessary.

44

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 5. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

a. Dampers and Valves CLOSED.

. CVI MLB indication. (may be)

UO RNO (just in case)

a. Perform the following:

1) Close Dampers and Valves.

2) Start Piping Pen Units.

Note to examiner: If SI has occurred, the RNO will be unnecessary, if SI has NOT occurred, the UO will perform the RNO steps at the HVAC panel. CVI dampers I valves are listed on page # 50 & 51.

OATC 6. Initiate the following:

UO

Continuous Action Page.

. NMP-EP-11O, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

OATC 7. Check for SI:

a. SI signal EXISTS OR ACTUATED. (Maybe, depends on timing)

b. Initiate ATTACHMENT A. (If, YES)

Note to examiner ATTACHMENT A starts on page 52 45

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 8. Check the following trips have occurred:

a. Reactor trip. (NO)

RNO

a. Locally trip the Reactor trip and Bypass breakers.

IF the trip breakers will NOT open, THEN tn the Control Rod Drive MG Set output breakers at the Reactor Trip Switchgear.

Note to examiner: The crew is expected to call someone to perform this action:

The Simbooth Operator will open the trip breakers two minutes after receiving the request.

a. Turbine Trip. (YES)

OATC 9. Check Reactor power:

a. LESS THAN 5%. (YES)

b. lR SUR LESS THAN 0 DPM. (YES)

c. Go to Step 24.

Note to examiner: This step is a continuous action, when the trip breakers open, the crew should go to step 24 to exit this procedure.

UO 10. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN. (YES) 46

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 1 1. Check SG levels:

a. NR level- AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10%. (32% ADVERSE)

RNO

a. Verify total feed flow greater than 1260 gpm. (NO)

IF NOT, THEN start pumps and align valves as necessary.

IF all SG(s) NR levels less than 10% (32% ADVERSE)

THEN maintain total feed flow greater than 1260 gpm.

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% (32% ADVERSE) and 65%.

Note to examiner: At this point they should have the LOHS with no feedwater available.

UO 12. Check CST level GREATER THAN 15%. (YES) 47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 13. Verify all dilution paths ISOLATED.

RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER, FV-1 1 1A CLOSED.

. Dispatch operator to verify CVCS RX MU WTR TO CCP A ISO, 1 208-U4-183 LOCKED CLOSED.

UNIT 1 (AB-A47)

UNIT 2 (AB-A82)

RNO

13. Dispatch operator to close:

CVCS RX M/U WTR SUPPLY TO CVCS ISO, 1208-U4-177.

UNIT 1 (AB-A47)

UNIT 2 (AB-A82)

Note to examiner The Simbooth Operator will open the trip breakers as requested after 2 minutes or after step 13, whichever comes first This is to ensure scenario progresses as expected

14. Check for reactivity insertion from uncontrolled cooldown:

RCS Temperature - LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

-OR-Any SG pressure LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLED MANNER (NO)

RNO

14. Stop any controlled cooldown:

Operate Steam Dumps or ARVs as necessary

Lower total feed flow

HZ all SG NR level less than 10% [32% ADVERSE], THEN maintain total feed flow greater than 570 gpm

GotoStep22 48

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 22. Check Core Exit TCs LESS THAN 1200°F (YES)

NOTE The Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) value is located in the PTDB, TAB 16.0.

OATC 23. Check Reactor power:

a. LESS THAN 5%. (YES)

b. IR SUR LESS THAN 0 DPM. (YES)

OATC 24. Maintain emergency boration to provide adequate shutdown margin for subsequent conditions.

SS 25. Initiate Critical Safety Function Status Tress per 19200-C, F-O CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

Crew should recognize red path on heat sink and transition to 19231 -C (Page # 56)

SS 26. Return to procedure and step in effect.

49

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

CVI Dampers and Valves VALVE # DESCRIPTION LOCATION HV-12975 CNMT AIR RAD MON SPLY ISO PC QPCP HV-i 2976 CNMT AIR PAD MON SPLY ISO ORC QPCP HV-1 2977 CNMT AIR RAD MON RTN ISO ORC QPCP HV-12978 CNMT AIR RAD MON RTN ISO IRC QPCP HV-2626A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV- MAIN QHVC (C31)

(Normally de-energized shut)

HV-2626B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV-MINI QHVC ((C32)

HV-2627A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY CRC ISO VLV- MAIN QHVC (D31)

(Normally de-energized shut)

HV-2627B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORG ISO VLV-MINI QHVC (D32)

HV-2628A CTB NORM PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV- MAIN QHVC (A33)

(Normally de-energized shut)

HV-2628B CTB NORM PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV-MINI QHVC ((A34)

HV-2629A CTB NORM PURGE EXH CRC ISO VLV- MAIN QHVC (B33)

(Normally de-energized shut)

HV-2629B CTB MINI PURGE EXH CRC ISO VLV-MINI QHVC (B34)

HV-2624A CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV QHVC (A35)

HV-2624B CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV QHVC (B35) 50

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

HV-12604 PIPING PEN PM OUTLET ISO DMPR QHVC (C22)

HV-12605 PIPING PEN PM INLET ISO DMPT QHVC (822)

HV-12606 PIPING PEN PM INLET ISO DMPR QHVC (B23)

HV-12607 PIPING PEN PM OUTLET ISO DMPR QHVC (C23)

HV-12596 RECYCLE HOLD-UP TK-1 ISO VENT VLV QHVC (E22)

HV-1 2597 RECYCLE HOLD-UP TK-1 ISO VENT VLV QHVC (E23)

HS-2548 PIPING PEN PM FLTP & EXH FAN 1 QHVC (A22)

HV-2549 PIPING PEN PM FLTR & EXH FAN 2 QHVC (A23) 51

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

Attachment A, Safety Injection Verification

1. Verify FW isolation valves closed:

. MFIVs

BFIVs

. MFRVs e BFRVs

2. Check both trains of ECCS equipment ALIGNING

- 2. Actuate SI.

FOR INJECTION PHASE:

MLB indication

3. Check Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED:

- 3. Actuate CIA.

CIA MLB indication H valves do NOT close, THEN close valves.

4. Check AFW Pumps - RUNNING:

MDAFW Pumps . Start Pumps.

. TDAFW Pump, if required Open Steam Supply valve:

HV-5106

5. Verify SG Blowdown isolated:

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, C, and D in the CLOSE position.

52

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

. SG Sample Isolation Valves CLOSED.

6. Check ECCS Pumps and NCP status:

_a. CCPs - RUNNING. a. Perform the following for available CCP(s):

1) Place alternate miniflow valve handswitch in ENABLE PTL:

HS-8508A HS-8508B

2) Start CCP(s):

_b. SI Pumps - RUNNING. b. Start Pumps.

_c. RHR Pumps - RUNNING. _c. Start Pumps.

_d. NCP TRIPPED.

- _d. Stop the NCP.

_7. Verify CCW Pumps ONLY TWO RUNNING EACH TRAIN.

8. Verify proper NSCW system operation:

_a. NSCW Pumps ONLY TWO RUNNING EACH TRAIN

b. NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN handswitches IN AUTO:

. HS-1668A HS-1669A 53

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

9. Verify Containment Cooling Units:

a. ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED:

. MLB indication

b. NSCW Cooler isolation valves OPEN:

. MLB indication 1 0. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

a. Dampers and Valves CLOSED:

- a. Perform the following:

. CVI MLB indication 1) Close Dampers and Valves.

2) Start Piping Pen Units.

11. Check if main steamlines should be isolated:

a. Check one or more of the following conditions: a. Go to Step 12.

Any steamline pressure LESS THAN Q EQUAL TO 585 PS 1G.

Containment pressure by recording -

GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG.

Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI - BLOCKED ANQ High Steam Pressure Rate ON -

TWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLI NE.

_b. Verify main steamline isolation and bypass valves CLOSED.

54

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

ATWT due to loss of B MFP with failure of auto rod motion.

_12. Check Containment pressure - REMAINED LESS 12. Verify the following:

THAN 21.5 PSIG.

a. Containment Spray actuated.

b. Containment Spray Pump discharge valves open.

c. Containment Spray Pumps running.

_13. Verify Diesel Generators RUNNING.

END OF ATTACHMENT A 55

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to examiner: It is expected the crew will transition to 19231-C, FR-H.1 Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink about this time if they have not already transitioned.

SS Transitions to 19231-C, FR-Hi, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK CAUTION: Feed flow should NOT be re-established to any faulted SG if a non-faulted SG is available.

UO 1. Check total feed flow capability to SG(s):

Greater than 570 gpm available. (NO)

-AND

. Less than 570 gpm due to Operator action. (NO)

RNO

1. GotoStep3.

3. Initiate the following:

OATC

Continuous Actions Page For Prior to Establishing Bleed and Feed (Next UO Page SS

NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

56

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test Nob: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PRIOR TO ESTABLISHING BLEED AND FEED ERROR! Monitor CCP status AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE.

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

ERROR! Monitor for RCS bleed and feed requirements:

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

WR level in any 3 SGs LESS THAN 29% [44% ADVERSE]

-OR-

RCS pressure GREATER THAN 2335 PSIG DUE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ERROR! Monitor CST level less than 15% for swap to alternate CST.

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

ERROR! Try to establish MDAFW feed flow.

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

ERROR! Try to establish TDAFW feed flow.

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

57

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

LTime Position ERROR!

Applicants Action or Behavior Monitor for SI actuation/reset requirement:

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

PRZR level - CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 9%

[37% ADVERSEI

-OR RCS subcooling - CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 24°F

[38°F ADVERSE]

ERROR! Try to establish main feedwater flow.

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

ERROR! Maintain PRZR pressure less than 2000 psig (P-i i).

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

ERROR! Monitor 41 60V AC Emergency Busses to restart ESF equipment.

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

ERROR! Try to establish feed flow from condensate system.

REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND.

58

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4. Check if secondary heat sink is required:

a. RCS pressure GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE.

(YES)

b. RCS WR temperature GREATER THAN 350°F. (YES)

OATC 5. Check CCP status AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE. (YES)

SS 6. Check if RCS bleed and feed is required:

a. Check the following:

UO WR level in any 3 SGs LESS THAN 29% [44% ADVERSE] (YES)

-OR OATC RCS pressure GREATER THAN 2335 PSIG DUE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK (Possibly)

OATC b. Trip all RCPs SS c. Go to Step 35 and perform bleed and feed actions 59

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8,9,10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position] Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 35. Verify SI actuated.

OATC 36. Verify RCS feed path:

a. Verify ECCS Pump status:

CCPs AT LEAST ONE RUNNING. (YES)

-OR SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING. (YES)

b. Verify ECCS valve alignment PROPER LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs.

CAUTION: During bleed and feed operation the PRT may rupture.

OATC 37. Establish RCS bleed path:

a. Place all PRZR Heaters in OFF/PTL.

b. Check power to PRZR PORV Block Valves AVAILABLE.

(Yes)

Critical c. Arm COPS and check PRZR PORV Block Valves BOTH OPEN.

d. Open both PRZR PORVs. (B Train PORV will not open) 60

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 38. Verify adequate RCS bleed path:

COPS-ARMED e PRZR PORV Block Valves BOTH OPEN

PRZR PORVs BOTH OPEN (NO)

RNO Critical 38. Perform the following:

a. Open Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves:

. HV-8095A RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV

HV-8095B RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV

. HV-8096A RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV

. HV-80968 RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV

HV-0442A REACTOR HEAD VEN TO PRT

. HV-0442B REACTOR HEAD VENT TO PRT

b. Align an available low pressure water source to at least one intact SG by initiating ATTACHMENT C.

Note to examiner: Once an adequate bleed path has been established by opening one PORV with the Rx Vessel Head Vents, the TDAFW overspeed trip will be reset allowing them to feed SGs.

SS 39. Initiate ATTACHMENT D while continuing with this procedure.

61

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW 40. Initiate CONTINUOUS ACTIONS AFTER ESTABLISHING BLEED AND FEED The following steps are the continuous actions AFTER feed and bleecL 41 Maintain ECCS flow and PORVs open (Head Vents if used).

42 Monitor 4160V AC Emergency Busses to restart ESF equipment.

46 Monitor for CNMT pressure rise greater than 21.5 psig to actuate CNMT Spray.

47 Monitor CNMT conditions to secure CNMT Spray.

48 Monitor RWST level less than 29% to establish Cold Leg Recirculation.

49 Try to establish MDAFW flow.

53 Try to establish TDAFW flow.

CREW 41. Maintain RCS heat removal:

ECCS flow (YES)

. PRZRPORVsBOTHOPEN (NO)

RNO

. Maintain Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves open.

CAUTIONS

. If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:

. RHR Pumps

. SI Pumps

. Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units

. Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on UV signal).

. ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CR1 is reset).

OATC 42. Reset SI.

62

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION Repositioning Phase A Isolation Valves may cause radiation problems throughout the plant.

OATC 43. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A.

UO 44. Establish Instrument Air to Containment:

a. Instrument Air Pressure GREATER THAN 100 PSIG. (YES)

b. Open INSTR AIR CNMT ISO VLV HV-9378.

c. Verify PRZR Spray Valves operating as required.

UO 45. Place Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service by initiating 13120, POST-ACCIDENT HYDROGEN CONTROL OATC 46. Check Containment Pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21.5 PSIG BY UO PRESSURE RECORDING (YES)

Go to Step 48.

OATC 48. Check RWST level GREATER THAN 29%. (YES)

UO 63

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION Feed flow rates should be controlled to prevent excessive RCS cooldown.

49. Try to establish MDAFW flow to at least one SG:

a. Check MDAFW Pump - AVAILABLE

. Power available (YES)

Suction pressure (NO)

. Discharge pressure (NO)

Note to examiner: No MDAFW Pumps will be available.

RNO

a. Perform the following:

. Initiate actions to restore an MDAFW Pump:

a) Reference 13610, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM b) Verify MDAFW Pump discharge throttle valves are closed.

. WHEN MDAFW Pump is started, THEN go to Step 49.b.

Go to Step 53 64

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION Feed flow rates should be controlled to prevent excessive RCS cooldown.

53. Try to establish TDAFW flow to at least one SG:

a. Check TDAFW Pump AVAILABLE

. Steam admission valve HV-5106 OPEN (YES)

. Trip & Throttle valve PV-1 5129 OPEN (NO)

(HS1 5111)

. Governor valve SV-1 5133 OPERATING PROPERLY (YES)

(PDIC-51 80A).

RNO

a. Perform the following:

. Initiate 13610, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM to operate TDAFW Pump as necessary. (Page 66)

. WHEN TDAFW Pump is started, THEN go to Step 53.b.

. Go to Step 57

b. Select SG(s) to feed:

1) All SG WR levels LESS THAN 9% [31% ADVERSE] (NO)

RNO

b. GotoStep54.

65

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

54. Verify TDAFW pump throttle valves open for selected SG(s):

HV-5122 TDAFW Pump to SG 1 HV-5125 TDAFW Pump to SG 2 HV-5127 TDAFW Pump to SG 3 HV-5120 TDAFW Pump to SG 4

55. Verify adequate feed flow to raise SG levels. (YES)

56. Go to Step 70.

70. Check for adequate secondary heat sink:

a. NR level in at least one SG GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE]

RNO

a. IF feed flow to at least one SG verified, THEN do NOT continue until NR level is restored to greater than 10% [32% ADVERSE].

71. Check RCS temperatures:

. Core exit TCs LOWERING

RCS WR hot leg temperatures LOWERING 66

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

72. Verify Reactor Head Vent Valves CLOSED:

HV-8095A - RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV

HV-8095B - RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV

HV-8096A - RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV

HV-8096B - RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV

. HV-0442A - REACTOR HEAD VEN TO PRT

. HV-0442B - REACTOR HEAD VENT TO PRT

73. Check SG pressures GREATER THAN 585 PS 1G.

NOTE After closing a PRZR PORV, it may be necessary to wait for RCS pressure to rise before determining if ECCS flow can be terminated.

74. Check if ECCS flow can be terminated:

a. RCS Subcooling GREATER THAN 24°F.

b. Check RVLIS full range indication GREATER THAN 63%.

c. Go to Step 76.

END OF THE SCENARIO FREEZE THE SIMULATOR WITH NRC CHIEF EXAMINER CONCURRENCE.

67

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

[ Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

57. Try to establish main FW flow to at least on SG:

a. Check condensate system IN SERVICE. (NO)

RNO

a. Place condensate system in service by initiating 13615, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS.

WHEN Condensate system in service, THEN go to Step 58.

Return to Step 49. (Page 61)

Note to examiner: Condensate system will not be available as neither MFP is available.

65

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time j Position Applicants Action or Behavior Note to examiner: it is expected that the SS will call C&T asking for the Outside Operator and a representative from Mechanical Maintenance to investigate the cause, and reset as applicable, the overspeed trip for the TDAFW pump.

These are the steps from the AFW System procedure for resetting the overspeed trip.

SOP 13610, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 4.4.7 CAUTION If this reset of the Trip & Throttle valve is following an actual overspeed trip and the potential exists to initiate AFW flow to a hot dry SIG, closing of the TDAFW discharge valves should be considered prior to reset of the Trip & Throttle valve.

4.4.7.1 4.4.7.7 Performed in the TDAFW Pump House 4.4.7.8 Place the TDAFW Pump Steam Admission Valve 1 -HV-51 06 handswitch 1HS-5106A (QMCB) in CLOSE.

NOTE Holding 1HS-5106A in the CLOSE position allows the speed controller startup logic to reset when the T&T valve is electrically opened 4.4.7.9 AFW Actuation signal is present, hold 1HS-5106A in the CLOSE position until completion of Step 4.4.7.10.

NOTE When Handswitch 1 HS-1 5111 is placed in OPEN, the Trip & Throttle Valve latches and then opens.

4.4.7.10 Place Handswitch 1HS-1 5111 (QMCB) in OPEN, THEN release.

66

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

LOHS after ATWT from overspeed of the TDAFW pump, MDAFW pump B coupling failure, and trip of A MFPT. Additionally, failure of B Train PORV will require the use of Rx Vessel head vents during LOHS feed and bleed.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTIONS

Steam Admission Valve 1-HV-5106 will open when 1HS-5106A is released if an open signal is present.

. If pump speed cannot be controlled or overspeed condition occurs again, when 1 HS-51 06 is released in the next step, do not attempt to reset again until the speed control problem has been corrected.

4.4.7.11 Performed in the TDAFW Pump House 4.4.7.12 WHEN the Trip and Throttle Valve is fully open as indicated at MLB13-4 OR 1 HS-1 5111 (QMCB), release 1 HS-51 06A IF applicable.

At this point the TDAFW pump should be started, this will return the crew to Step 53.b of 19231-C. (Page 63).

67

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vocitle Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, MOL, steady state operations.

(Base IC # 14, snapped to IC # 177 for HL18 NRC Exam)

Eciuiment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B)

Turnover: AMSAC Trouble annunciator is ON due to instrument malfunction. Engineering &

Maintenance are investigating.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ES11 Train B MSL Auto Isolation Failure ES2OAIB Block CIA Actuation Tm A/B 9001A FAIL = TRUE 9001 B FAIL = TRUE CCLR ALO FAIL =TRUE C CLR B LO FAIL = TRUE IAO9b Instrument Air Compressor # 2 auto start failure.

lAO9d Instrument Air Compressor # 4 auto start failure.

RHO4B Failure of RHR pump B to auto start Overrides HS3007B Train B SLI Handswitch Failure NORMAL HS13006A Train A SG#1 BSIV Fail to Close on SLI or Manually OPEN Event No. j 1 MaIf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description Ti RC1OA l-OATC NR Tc Loop # 1 fails high.

@100% I-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.1-1, Function 6,7 Condition E, LCO 3.3.2, FU5b, Condition I T2 TUO7 C-UO Inadvertent Main Turbine Runback.

C-SS Decreasing reactor power from the turbine runback T3 CVO7 C-OATC Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips.

C-SS TS-SS INFO LCOs TA 13.1.5 Condition A and LCO TR 13.1.3 Condition A 4 N-OATC Restore normal charging & letdown N-SS 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No. j 1 MaIf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description T5 RCO9C TS-SS Wide range Tc on ioop 3 fails low.

@0%

LCO 3.3.3, PAMS, Condition A, FU 3, Condition D LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown, Condition A, EU 3, Condition D 6 AC 3 C-UO Air compressor # 3 trips with failure of AC # 2 and AC # 4 to TRIP C-SS automatically start.

= TRUE T7 ESO7 M-All Spurious AMSAC Actuation due to technician error while investigating spurious AMSAC TROUBLE annunciator. This will result in a reactor -

turbine trip.

T8 RCO3C M-All DBA LOCA on RCS Loop #3 9 ES1 1 C-UO Train B MSL Auto Isolation Failure.

Pre- C-SS Train B SLI Hand switch Fails to operate loaded HS3007B Train A Bypass Steam Line Isolation Valve fail to close on SLI or HS13006A from QMCB 10 RHO4B C-OATC RHR pump Train B fails to automatically start on an SI signal.

Pre- C-SS loaded Critical 11 Cnmt C-OATC Both Containment Spray discharge valves fail to open automatically Pre- Spray C-SS on CS signal.

loaded Discharge Critical valves auto open failures 12 Cnmt C-UO All Containment Coolers fail to automatically start on LOW speed on Pre- Coolers C-SS an SI signal.

loaded fail to auto Critical start on LOW speed (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

Loop # 1 NA Tcold fails high.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Perform IOA of AOP 18001-C and places control rods in manual.

Defeats the failed channel using the Tave and Delta T defeat switches.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1-1, Function 6, Condition E LCO 3.3.1-1, Function 7, Condition E LCO 3.3.1-1, Function 5b, Condition I Event 2:

Inadvertent Main Turbine Runback occurs.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Check turbine runback required per IOA of AOP 18012-C.

UO Stabilize turbine load per IOA of AOP 18012-C.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 3. 4:

The Normal Charging Pump will trip. CVCS Charging and Letdown will be returned to service.

(NOTE: The Chief Examiner may decide to go to the next event after a charging pump is started and prior to placing Letdown in service).

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually closes the Letdown Orifices and the Letdown Isolation valves to stop flashing in the Letdown system.

OATC I UO Trends the RCP operating parameters on the IPC computer.

OATC Adjusts HC-182 Seal Flow Controller to maximum seal flow and adjusts Charging Flow Controller FC-121 to minimum.

OATC Starts a charging pump. (CCP)

OATC Adjusts HC-182 to obtain 8 -13 gpm seal injection and adjusts Charging Flow Controller FC-121 to obtain desired charging flow.

NOTE: The next malfunction may be entered at this point with NRC Chief Examiner discretion.

The following steps may not be completed in its entirety prior to subsequent events and completion of scenario.

OATC Places Letdown Pressure Controller PIC-131 to 50 75% demand.

3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 OATC Places Letdown Temperature Controller TIC-130 in manual and adjusts to the recorded control room rounds position.

OATC Opens letdown isolations and letdown orifices.

OATC Adjusts P IC-i 31 and places in AUTO and places TIC-i 30 in AUTO.

OATC Adjusts FIC-i 21, HC-i 82 to maintain PRZR level and seal injection.

Technical Specifications:

LCO TR 13.1.5 Charging Pumps Operating LCO TR 13.1.3 Boration Flow Paths Operating Event 5:

The WR Tcold for loop # 3 will fail low. This will require a Tech Spec entry by the SS but no operator actions are required.

Verifiable Actions:

None Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.3, PAMS, Condition A, FU 3, Condition D LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown, Condition A, FU 3, Condition D Event 6:

Air compressor # 3 trips with failure of Air compressors # 2 and # 4 to automatically start.

Verifiable actions:

UO Manually starts Air compressor # 2 or # 4.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 7:

Spurious AMSAC Actuation due to technician error while investigating spurious AMSAC TROUBLE annunciator. Reactor trips on Turbine Trip.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Performs lOAs of E-0.

UO Performs IOAs of E-0.

SS-Performs IOAs of E-0, transitions to ES-0.i and directs crew in actions to stabilize the plant.

Technical Specifications:

None 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 8.10,11, 12:

RCS DBA LOCA.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually starts RHR pump B which fails to automatically start.

OATC Manually opens Containment Spray discharge isolation valves which fail to automatically open.

UO Manually starts Containment Coolers in LOW speed which fail to automatically start LOW speed.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 9:

Train B MSL Auto Isolation Failure.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Recognizes Train B SLI auto actuation failure.

UO Manually actuates SLI.

Technical Specifications:

None The scenario may be stopped during the performance of 19010-C, E-l Response to Reactor or Secondary Coolant Leakage CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Manually starts RHR pump B to provide ECCS injection flow to prevent an inadequate core cooling event. RHR pump B is required to be started by the end of the OATC Initial Operator Actions.

2) Manually opens either Containment Spray discharge isolation valve (HV-9001A or B) to cooldown and depressurize Containment to prevent a challenge to the Containment barrier which could result in an uncontrolled release to the environment per Foldout Page or 19000-C (E-0) or step 8 of the OATC Operator Initial Actions (if CNMT is> 21.5 psig).

OR Manually starts at least 4 Containment Coolers in LOW speed to cooldown and depressurize Containment to prevent a challenge to the Containment barrier which could result in an uncontrolled release to the environment by completion of Operator Initial Actions of 19000-C (E-0).

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UNIT 1 REACTIVITY BRIEFING SHEET Shift: Day Date: 4/9/13 Burnup: 11168.03 MWD/MTU Asof 4/9/13 7:23 MINIMUM SHIFT REACTIVITY INFORMATION TO BE BRIEFED Power: 100 Rod Motion: AUTO Current Temperature Control Strategy: Dl LUTION Currently Making Up: 50.0 gal Every: 1 to 2 hrs The desired Tavg operating band is 585.5 +1- 0.05 degrees F CVCS makeup system boric acid flow per 100 gal makeup: 13.0 gallons/100 CVCS makeup system pot setting(FIC-0110): 3.24 BTRS Strategy: none AFD Strategy: Maintain on target plus/minus 1 AFD units Reactivity System Components Degraded/OOS:

I None Activities expected that may affect core reactivity (Reactivity Focus Items):

I None CURRENT CORE REACTIVIITY PARAMETERS Boron Worth: 8.5 pcm/ppm PCM per 1% pwr change: 17.9 Current MTC value: HFP: -17.9 pcm/F HZP: -3.9 pcm/F Current BAST Cb: 7000 ppm Current RCS Cb: 907 ppm Boration required per: degree F: 21.3 gallons 1% pwr change: 21.3 gallons 10% pwr change: 212.8 gallons 30% pwr change: 638.5 gallons Dilutions required per: degree F: 143.1 gallons 1% pwr change: 143.1 gallons Boration required for stuck rods: 3182.2 gallons for 2 stuck rods 4837.3 gallons for 3 stuck rods

lf more than 3 rods are stuck begin boration and calculate for actual number of stuck rods*

Human Performance tools:

Peer check Three-way communication Placekeeping Procedure Use STAR Time-Out Situational Awareness Valid for PTDB Cycle 18 Tab 1.0 rev 29 approved 9/29/12 and Tab 16.0 rev 19 approved 1 0/5/12 S:54/ORKGROUPSISNC SOUTHERN NUCLEARPL4NTVOGTLEIOPERAT1ONSPLA YERSTURNEROVERUHU1 REACTIV!TYSHEET.XLS

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Loop 1 Tcold fails high.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnoses NR Temperature Instrument Failure.

(Loop 1 Tcold TE-41 1A fails high)

Symptoms I alarms:

. ALB12-A03 RC LOOP txT/AUCT liT HI-LO DEV

. ALB12-A04 RC LOOP TAVE/AUCT TAVE Hl-LO DEV

. ALB12-A05 TAVG/TREF DEVIATION

. ALB12-A06 OVERTEMP liT ALERT

. ALB12-BO4AUCTTAVG HIGH

. ALB12-B06 OVERPOWER liT ALERT

. ALB1O-E03 OVERTEMP liT ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK ALERT

. ALB1O-C03 OVERPOWER liT ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK ALERT Indications:

. Control rods rapidly inserting.

. Loop 1 Tavg / Delta T indications deviating from other loops.

. 1 FIC-Ol 21 Charging Flow Controller rises to maximum demand.

AQPI8001-C,SéctionB,SYSTEMSIN$TRUMENTATION MALFuNCTIoN OATC IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION B1. Verify ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in MAN position.

SS Enters AOP 18001-C, Section B.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Loop 1 Tcold fails high.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B2. Restore TAVG to program band.

Note to examiner: It is expected the OATC will pull rods out to the original rod height in 3 step increments with SS concurrence.

OATC B3. Check NR Temp failed LOW. (NO)

RNO B3. IF NR Temp has failed HIGH, THEN

a. Place FIC-121 in MANUAL.

b. Control charging flow to maintain Pressurizer Level at Program Level.

OATC B4. Select affected loop on TS-412T TAVG DEFEAT SEL.

Defeat 412 OATC B5. Select affected loop on TS-41 1 F DELTA T DEFEAT SEL.

Defeat 411 UO B6. Check FIC-121 in AUTO (NO)

RNO B6. Restore FIC-121 to AUTO as follows:

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario Non: 5 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Loop 1 Tcold fails high.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

a. AFTER Pressurizer level has been stable within 1% of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place FIC-1 21 in AUTO.

Cue to Simbooth: IF asked, the Shift Manager has given permission to place the charging flow controller in auto.

OATC B7. Place ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in AUTO position if desired.

SS B8. Notify I & C to initiate repairs.

Calls C & T to perform the following:

. Notify Operations Duty of AOP entry.

. Write a Condition Report.

. Notify Maintenance of the failure.

SS B9. Bypass the affected instrument channel using 1 3509-C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

NOTE: Expect the SS will NOT bypass the channel.

SS BlO. Trip the affected channel bistables and place the associated MASTER TEST switches in TEST position per TABLE B1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

NOTE: The SS is expected to leave bistables untripped during the allowed out of service time to facilitate I & C trouble shooting of the failed channel.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Loop 1 Tcold fails high.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Bi 1. Initiate the applicable actions of:

. TS3.3.1

. TS3.3.2 SS LCO 3.3.1 Function 6, 7 Condition E OT AT, OP AT CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME SS A. One or more A .1 Enter the Condtion referenced in Immediately Functions with Table 3.3.1-1 for the channel(s).

one or more required channels inoperable.

E. One channel E.1 Place channel in trip 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Inoperable.

OR E.2 Be in MODE 3 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months SS LCO 3.3.2 Function 5b Condition I FWI CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME SS A. One or more A .1 Enter the Condtion referenced in Immediately Functions with Table 3.3.2-1 for the channel(s) or one or more Train(s).

required channels inoperable.

I. One channel 1.1 Place channel in trip 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Inoperable.

OR 1.2 Be in MODE 3 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months SS Bi 2. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Loop 1 Tcold fails high.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Bi 3. Check repairs and surveillances complete. (NO)

RNO B13. Perform the following:

a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step B14.

b. Return to procedure and step in effect.

End of EVENT # 1, Proceed to EVENT #2 once control rods have been placed in AUTO Control rods in auto is required for the next event.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Runback Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses Main Turbine Runback is in progress.

Alarms:

ALBi2-A05TAVE /TREF DEVIATION Indications:

Generator MWe lowering

. Tavg rising

. Main Turbine control valves throttling closed.

. Insertion of main control rods in auto.

AOP1 8012-C. TURBINE RUNBAcK IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Checks Turbine Runback REQUIRED (NO)

OATC 2 of 4 CT DELTA-T runback bistable status lights lit.

-OR-2 of 4 OP DELTA-T runback bistable status lights lit.

RNO

1. Perform the following:

UO

a. Stabilize Turbine load:

1) Approximately match CV SIGNAL using STANDBY LOAD SET potentiometer.

2) Simultaneously depress ON and BYPASS pushbuttons on STANDBY SIGNAL MATCH.

b. Go to Step 16.

6

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Runback Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Enters AOP 18012-C, Turbine Runback and verifies completion of Immediate Operator Actions.

UO 16. Check Turbine load STABLE.

SS 17. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO 18. Control Turbine load using the STANDBY LOAD SET potentiometer.

NOTES

. Control Rods should not be withdrawn during a transient.

. Turbine load reduction or dilution should be used if needed to raise Tavg.

OATC 19. Check Tavg TRENDING TO TREE.

RNO

19. Match Tavg and Tref and control delta I to +/- 3% of target by performing the following as necessary:

. Adjust turbine load.

. Borate by initiating 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

Use Rods.

UO 20. Check Steam Dump System

a. ARMED

b. RESPONDING TO TAVGJTREF DEVIATION 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Runback Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 21. Control PRZR level - IN PROGRAM BAND.

22. Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 TO 13 GPM.

23. Check PRZR Pressure TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

UO 24. Check SG NR level - TRENDING TO 65%.

UO 25. Check Steam Dumps:

a. Check all Steam Dump valves CLOSED.

RNO

a. WHEN all Steam Dump valves are closed, THEN reset C-7, if present, by momentarily placing STM DUMP CONTROL MODE SELECT HS-500C in RESET.

AER

b. Reset C-7, if present, by momentarily placing STM DUMP CONTROL MODE SELECT HS-500C in RESET.

UO 26. Test the Backup and Mechanical Overspeed Trips by initiating 14286, TURBINE TRIP DEVICE OPERABILITY TEST.

NOTE: The SS may call C & T to dispatch personnel to perform this surveillance test.

OATC 27. Check reactor power change LESS THAN 15%.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Runback Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 28. Check cause of runback CORRECTED. (NO)

RNO

28. Perform the following:

a. Restore turbine control to normal using 13800, MAIN TURBINE OPERATION when the cause is corrected.

b. Return to procedure and step in effect.

Calls C & T to perform the following:

. Notify Operations Duty of AOP entry.

. Write a Condition Report.

. Notify Maintenance of the failure.

. Crew may perform a Brief at this time.

End of EVENT #2, Proceed to EVENT #3.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips, Loss of Charging flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging OATC Diagnose Normal Charging Pump (NCP) has tripped:

Symptoms I alarms:

ALBO7-A05 REGEN HX LTDN HI TEMP ALBO7-B06 CHARGING LINE HI/LO FLOW ALB07-C06 CHARGING PUMP OVERLOAD TRIP ALBO8-F06 RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW ALB33-A05 41 60V SWGR 1 NAO5 TROUBLE Indications:

. NCP hand switch green and amber light lit.

Charging flow indicates 0 gpm on 1 FI-0121A or 1 FI-0121C.

. Letdown flashing on 1 Fl-i 32C.

SS Enters 1 8007-C, section B Loss of Charging.

AoPlBoo7-c,cvcs MALFUNTION SECTIONB LOSS OF CHARGING IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS OATC Bi. Isolate letdown:

a. Close letdown orifice isolation valves:

. HV-81 49A

. HV-8149B

. HV-8149C b: Close letdown orifice isolation valves:

. HV-0459

. HV-0460 10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips, Loss of Charging flow.

Time

[ Position J Applicants Action or Behavior 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Enters AOP 18007-C, Section B, LOSS OF CHARGING FLOW.

OATC B2. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO OATC B3. Trend RCP Seal Parameters listed in ATTACHMENT A.

OATC ATTACHMENT A - RCP SEAL PARAMETER INDICATION uO NOTE: The following points are accessible under IPC Group 62.

PARAMETER IPC POINT RCP Seal Injection Flow RCP 1 F0131 RCP2 F0129 RCP3 F0127 RCP4 F0125 RCP Seal Injection Temperature T0140 (Measured at VCT Outlet)

Number 1 Seal Leakoff High Flow RCP 1 F0161 RCP2 F0160 RCP3 F0159 RCP4 F0158 Number 1 Seal Inlet Temperature RCP1 T0181/T0417 RCP2 T0182/T0437 RCP3 T0183/T0457 RCP4 T0184/T0477 11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips, Loss of Charging flow.

Time Position] Applicants Action or Behavior 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging OATC B4. Check charging pumps(s) OPERATING NORMALLY:

. Discharge flow trend STABLE.

. Discharge pressure trend STABLE.

. VCT level IN NORMAL BAND.

. Bus current STABLE.

. Suction pressure STABLE.

Crew is expected to dispatch an SO to the NCP and its breaker.

the SO will report back as follows:

NCP pump bearings hot and over current relays tripped for breaker 1 NAO5-08.

OATC B5. Locate and isolate any charging system leakage. (N/A)

OATC B6. Check ACCW system - IN SERVICE. (YES) uO OATC B7. Check normal charging valves OPEN: (YES)

. HV-8105

. HV-8106

. HV-8146 or HV-8147

. HV-8485A and B

. FV-121

. HV-0182 12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips, Loss of Charging flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging OATC B8. Check normal charging flow ESTABLISHED. (NO)

RNO B8. Perform the following:

a. WHEN normal charging flowpath can be established, THEN place normal charging and letdown in service by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

NOTE to examiner: Step BlO will be performed AFTER the OATC places Normal Charging and Letdown in service per EVENT 4.

Once Event 4 is complete, return to this page for completion of the AOP for Loss of Charging actions continuing with BlO Steps for normal charging and letdown are on page # 15.

b. GotoStepBlO.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips, Loss of Charging flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1 8007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging OATC B15. Return to procedure and step in effect.

Calls C & T to perform the following:

. Notify Operations Duty of AOP entry.

. Write a Condition Report.

. Notify Maintenance of the failure.

End of EVENTS # 3 and # 4, Proceed to EVENT # 5.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System OATC NOTE to Examiner: Student may go to Section 4.4.2 first, but it will direct him to the following section with no Charging Pump running.

13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.13, Restart of CCP or NCP following Loss of a Charging Pump CAUTIONS At BOL, while borating to maintain Tavg, the calculated delta boron concentration between the RCS and the last time the CCP/NCP was placed in service may be incorrect. Experience has shown that high concentrations of borated water tend to collect in the suction piping of the idle pumps, resulting in a higher boron concentration in the CCP/NCP than the RCS. This may cause and unexpected boration and temperature reduction, when the pump is placed in service or tested.

Restart of a charging pump should not be delayed in order to flush the pump prior to start.

OATC 4.4.13.1 PRIOR to starting the pump and based on the conditions described in the first caution above, a slight boration should be anticipated and a briefing on compensatory actions to offset the boration should be conducted.

CREW CAUTION: A determination should be made that loss of the Charging Pump was not due to air/gas binding before starting the same or another pump.

OATC 4.4.13.2 Dispatch an Operator to pertorm pump pre-start checks.

Note to examiner: Simbooth cue operators a CCP is ready to start.

15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System OATC 4.4.13.3 Verify VCT LEVEL 1 LI-i 85 indicates between 30 and 80%.

OATC 4.4.13.4 Verify OPEN VCT OUTLET ISOLATION Valves:

. 1-LV-0112B

1LV-01i 2C OATC 4.4.13.5 Verify OPEN COP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-81 10.

OATC 4.4.13.6 IF starting a COP per[orm the following:

IF starting COP-A:

a. Open COP-B SUCTION 1-HV-8471A.

b. Open COP-B MINIFLOW 1-HV-81 1 iA.

c. Verify OPEN COP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-81 10

d. Close COP-B SAFETY GRADE CHG 1-HV-0190A.

e. Open COP-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION 1-HV-8485A.

16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time Position 1 Applicants Action or Behavior 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System OATC IF starting COP-B:

a. Open COP-B SUCTION 1 -HV-8471 B.

b. Open CCP-B MINIFLOW 1 -HV-81 11 B.

c. Verify OPEN COP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-8110

d. Close COP-B SAFETY GRADE CHG 1-HV-0190B.

e. Open COP-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION 1-HV-8485B.

f. Open COP DISCHARGE HEADER OROSSOONNECT 1 -HV-8438 NOTE and step 4.4.13.7 are N/A.

OATC 44 13 8 Set 1HC-182 for Maximum Seal Flow (0% demand)

DATO 44 13 9 Verify Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 in MAN and set to minimum.

NOTE Normal and Alternate charging paths should be alternated over plant life to equalize thermal stress. The transfer should be performed at cold shutdown conditions to avoid thermal transients. Normal charging should be in service during even-numbered fuel cycles.

Alternate charging should be in service during odd-numbered fuel cycles. Swapping nozzles at NOPT should be avoided.

17

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time

[ Position

} Applicants Action or Behavior 13OO61, Chemical and Volume Control System OATC 4.4.13.10 Verify OPEN one of the following:

NORMAL CHARGING TO LOOP 1 14-IV-8 146

-OR-ALTERNATE CHARGING TO LOOP 4 1-HV-8147 OATC 4.4.13.11 Verify OPEN CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION Valves:

. 1-HV-8105

. 1-HV-8106 OATC 4.4.13.12 Verify the ALOP of the CCP to be started is running as indicated by the QMCB red indicating lamp lit.

OATC 4.4.13.13 Start the desired CCP or NCP.

CCP-A 1 HS-273A OR CCP-B 1 HS-274A 18

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System OATC 4.4.13.14 IF a COP was started, verify the selected CCP ALOP red indicating lamp goes off (on QMCB) shortly after the pump is started.

4.4.13.15 is N/A.

OATC 4.4.13.16 Simultaneously perform the following:

. Adjust Seal Flow Control 1 HC-1 82 to obtain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP.

. Adjust Charging Flow Control I FIC-12f to obtain the desired charging flow.

OATC 4.4.13.17 Return to Section 4.4.2 to establish Normal Letdown and Charging.

OATC 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2 Returning Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.

OATC 4.4.2.1 IF a Charging Pump is NOT in service, Go To Section 4.4.13 to start the NCP OR an available Centrifugal Charging Pump, THEN Return To this section.

19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Section 4.4.2, Returning Normal Charging and Letdown to Service OATC NOTES: This section also applies to returning normal charging and letdown to service following termination of safety injection.

In the event letdown was isolated from the shutdown panel, a walk down of letdown components and piping shall be performed prior to restoring normal letdown to service.

Letdown is to be established as soon as possible after initiating flow through a Charging Nozzle.

OATC 4.4.2.2 This step is N/A.

OATC 4.4.2.3 Perform the following:

a. Close LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valves:

1-HV-B149

l-HY-8149 H4

b. Close LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves:

.. i-LV-460

. 1 -LV-459 c Close PZR AUX SPRAY VALVE 1-HV-8145

d. Open CVCS LETDOWN PIPE BREAK PROT ISOLATION 1-HVi5214 20

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time

[ Position 1 Applicants Action or Behavior 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System OATC 4.4.2.3 Continued

e. Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV IRC i-HV-8160.

f Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV ORG 1-HV-8152 g Place Letdown Pressure Controller 1PIC-13t in MAN and adjust output to between 50% and 75%.

h. Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in MAN and adjust output to the most current position as recorded on the Control Room Rounds Sheets.

i. Verify PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1 LR-459 greater than 17%.

NOTE: If Normal Charging and Letdown are being returned to service as directed from Section 4.4.15, one of the valves in Substep j. and both valves in Step 4.4.2.4 will already be open.

j. Verify one of the following are OPEN:

NORMAL CHARGING TO LOOP 1 1-HV-8146 (even-numbered fuel cycle)

-OR ALTERNATE CHARGING TO LOOP 4 1-HV- 8147 (odd-numbered fuel cycle) 21

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior 13006-1, Chemtcal and Volume Control System OATC 4.42.4 Verify CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION Valves are OPEN:

e 1-HV-8106

. 1-HV-8105 OATC 4.4.2.5 Simultaneously perform the following:

. Adjust 1 HC-1 82 output to maintain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP.

. Adjust 1 FIC-121 to raise CHG FLOW 1 FI-121A to between 80 and 90 gpm.

OATC 4.4.2.6 Open LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves by holding their handswitches in OPEN UNTIL the valves are fully open:

. 1-LV-460 1HS-460

1-LV-459 1HS-459 22

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13006-1, chemical and Volume control System OATC 4.4.2.7 Establish Letdown flow:

a. Simultaneously open a Letdown Orifice and maintain pressure by performing the following:

Open one LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valve by holding its handswitch in the OPEN position until fully open:

1 HS-81 49B (75 gpm odd fuel cycles)

OR 1 HS-81 49C (75 gpm even fuel cycles)

OR 1HS-8149A (45 gpm)

Adjust 1PIC-l3lAto maintain LETDOWN PRESS 1 P1-131 A between 360 and 380 psig.

b. Record the letdown orifice that was placed in service in the Unit Control Log.

OATC 4.4.2.8 WHEN LETDOWN 1P1-131A stabilizes between 360 psig, place :1 p1 431 in AUTO.

OATC 442 9 Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in AUTO and verify it maintains temperature less than or equal to 1 15°F.

23

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

[ Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System OATC 4.4.2.10 Verify LETDOWN REGEN HX OUT 1TI-127 indicates less than 380°F.

OATC 4.4.2.1 1 Monitor 1 LR-459 Pressurizer Level and Pressurizer Level Setpoint.

OATC 4.4.2.12 Maintain Pressurizer Level within 1% of Level Setpoint using 1FIC-121.

OATC 4.4.2.13 Place Pressurizer Level Control in automatic UNLESS it is to remain in Manual under Tagout or Caution tag:

a. Verify PRZR Level Controller 1 LIC-459 in AUTO.

b. AFTER level has been stable within 1% of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place 1 FIC-1 21 in AUTO.

OATC 4.4.2.14 This step is N/A.

18007-C, Section A, Loss of ChargIng OATC B1 0. Establish Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 GPM.

Bi 1. Check RCP seal injection flow ESTABLISHED. (YES)

OATC B12. Control PRZR level IN PROGRAM BAND.

24

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Return Normal Charging and Letdown to service after Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trip.

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging SS Bi 3. Initiate the following Technical Specifications and/or Technical Requirements as necessary:

LCO 3.5.2 LCO 3.5.3 LCO 3.5.5 TR 13.1.2 TR 13.1.3 (NCP tripped, ILCO)

TR 13.1.4 TR 13.1.5 (NCP tripped, ILCO)

OATC B14. Check normal charging flow ESTABLISHED.

OATC Bi 5. Return to procedure and step in effect.

Calls C & T to perform the following:

. Notify Operations Duty of AOP entry.

. Write a Condition Report.

. Notify Maintenance of the failure.

End of EVENTS #3 and #4, Proceed to EVENT #5.

25

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Wide Range Tcold on Loop # 3 fails low.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnoses WR Tcold Loop # 3 fails low.

Alarms:

ALB12-C05 B COLD OP LOW AUCT RCS TEMP

ALB12-D05 B RCS PRESS APPROACHES COLD OP LIMIT Indications:

Loop # 3 WR Tcold fails low.

ARP17Oi2$q:WINDOWCO5 PROBABLE CAUSE Plant Cooldown in progress.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Temperatures less than 220°F.

2. Verify Cold Overpressure Protection System is in service per 12006-C, Unit Cooldown To Cold Shutdown.

3. Refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.4.12 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 26

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Wide Range Tcold on Loop #3 fails low.

Time

[ Position Applicants Action or Behavior ARP 17012-1, WINDOW D05 PROBABLE CAUSE OATC Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure rise due to:

a. Loss of Letdown,

b. Pressurizer Sprays not sufficient,

c. Excessive Pressurizer Heaters in service.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. IF RCS is water solid, check RCS temperatures stable or lowering.

2. Control RCS temperatures to maintain them stable.

SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION With Residual Heat Removal in service, RCS pressure must be maintained below 425 psig.

1. Check Pressurizer Sprays and Heaters and adjust as necessary to reduce RCS pressure.

2. Check letdown and if isolated, reduce charging flow and re establish letdown.

3. IF Pressurizer Sprays are NOT available, reduce RCS pressure using 1-PIC-0131 on the QMCB.

27

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Wide Range Tcold on Loop # 3 fails low.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE SS Refers to Technical Specifications LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Condition A, Enters applicable condition listed in Table 3.3.3-1 FU 3, RCS Tcold (wide range), Condition D LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation EU 3, RCS Cold Leg Temperature, Condition A ILCO 3.4.12, Cold Overpressure Protection Systems (COPS)

N/A Applicable in Mode 4, 5, or 6 End of Event # 5, proceed to Event # 6.

28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Air compressor # 3 trips with failure of air compressors #2 or

4 to automatically start.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose Air Compressor # 3 has tripped:

Symptoms / alarms:

ALB32-F03 480V SWGR 1NB19 TROUBLE ALBO1-B05 SERVICE AIR CMPSR TROUBLE ALBO1 -006 SERVICE AIR HDR LO PRESS (delayed)

Indications:

. Green and amber light lit on AC # 3 handswitch.

Nate to examiners It is possible the candidate may directly enter AOP-1 8028-C, Loss of Instrument Air UO Response to ALBO1-B05 Dispatches an operator to Panel PMEC to implement the appropriate alarm response procedure per 1721 0-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB on PMEC Air Compressors Control Panel.

UO Response to ALB32-F03

1. Attempt to determine cause of alarm:

a. Check system indications on QEAB.

b. Check for associated alarms.

Note to examiner: It is obvious AC # 3 has tripped, the UO may dispatch an electrician or maintenance to troubleshoot the breaker.

29

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Air compressor # 3 trips with failure of air compressors # 2 or

4 to automatically start.

Time Position

[ Applicants Action or Behavior Note to Simbooth Operator: Report back that window D03 is illuminated on the PMEC panel for 1.2401 .C4503 NO. 3.

COMPRESSOR LO OIL PRESS and per the ARP the compressor motor trips at 12 psig oil pressure and there is lots of oil on the compressor skid from an apparent oil leak.

UO A crew member will call up air pressure trend on IPC computer.

OATC Note to examiner: The standby compressors should start at 100 psig prior to receipt of the ALBO1 -C06 alarm. It is possible the crew may start a standby compressor once instrument air pressure drops under 100 psig and ALBO1-C06 will never alarm.

UO Response to ALBO1-C06 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS

1. Service Air Dryer Inlet Isolation Valve 1 -PV-9375 closes at a service air pressure of 80 psig.

2. Any standby compressor with its hand switch in AUTO-PTL position will auto start at a discharge pressure of 100 psig decreasing.

30

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Air compressor # 3 trips with failure of air compressors # 2 or

4 to automatically start.

Time

{ Position Applicants Action or Behavior Response to ALBO1-C06 continued.

SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check QMCB indications AND start a standby Air Compressor if necessary to maintain service air header pressure above 100 psig.

2. Dispatch an operator to check for system leaks OR excessive air usage.

3. IF pressure continues to fall AND CANNOT be restored, refer to 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air.

4. Refer to 13710-1, Service Air System and verify Air Compressors are operating properly.

5. IF equipment failure is indicated, initiate maintenance as required.

CAUTION: Procedure 1371 0-1 Service Air System should be referenced prior to performing the following step if service air has isolated due to low pressure.

6. WHEN service air pressure is greater than 97 psig as read on 1-PI-19380 on panel PMEC, reset 1-PSL-9375. Switch is located on instrument rack 15 (1 -1624-P5-R1 5) on Turbine Building level 1 near Powdex vessels.

Note to SimBooth: Remote Function (RE) IAO1.

Note to examiner: ALBO1 -C06 will clear when step 6 is performed.

31

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Air compressor # 3 trips with failure of air compressors #2 or

4 to automatically start.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Monitors air pressure returns to normal.

End of EVENT #6, Proceed to EVENT #7.

32

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 1 9000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (NOTE: lOAs are steps 1 through 4)

SS Makes a page announcement of Reactor Trip (and SI if appropriate)..

OATC 1. Check Reactor Trip: (YES)

. Rod Bottom Lights LIT

. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers OPEN

. Neutron Flux LOWERING Note to Simbooth Operator: Insert T8 for OBA LOCA at this time.,

UO 2. Check Turbine Trip: (YES)

. All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED UO 3. Check Power to AC Emergency Buses. (YES)

a. AC Emergency Busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

. 4l6OAClEBusses

b. AC Emergency Busses ALL ENERGIZED.

. 4l6OVAClEBusses

480V AC 1 E Busses OATC 4. Check if SI is actuated. (YES)

. Any SI annunciators LIT

. SI ACTUATED BPLP window LIT SS Go to Step 6.

33

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9, 10, 11, 12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL # 3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 6. Initiate the Foldout Page.

CREW SS 7. Perform the following:

OATC

OATC Initial Actions Page UO

UO Initial Actions Page NOTE: SS initiates step 8 after OATC/UO Initial Actions completed.

34

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 EventNo.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior FOLDOUT ss CREW 1. RCPTRIPCRITERIA Trip all RCPs if BOTH conditions listed below occur.

a. COPs or SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

RCP Trip Parameter RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN 1375 PSIG.

2. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA Switch to alternate CST by initiating 13610, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM when CST level lowers to less than 15%.

3. CNMT SPRAY ACTUATION CRITERION Verify the following when CNMT pressure is greater than or equal to 21.5 psig.

a. CNMT Spray actuated.

b. CNMT Spray discharge valves open.

c. CNMT Spray Pumps running.

4. Monitor SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING conditions:

Verify annunciators 17005-A6, SPENT FUEL PIT HI TEMP and 17005-E2, SPENT FUEL PIT LOW LEVEL are both clear.

H alarms are NOT CLEAR, THEN initiate 18030-C, LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL OR COOLING.

IF SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL OR COOLING ALARMS are not available, THEN dispatch operator to start 2 HR interval local checking that level>

217 ft and temperature < 130°F.

IF either parameter is exceeded, THEN initiate 18030-C, LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL OR COOLING

if applicable, Using PRDT TAB 26, determine time to restore SFP LEVEL OR COOLING <time to reach 200°F in Spent Fuel Pool.

IF NOT initiate 18030-C, LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL OR COOLING 35

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9, 10, 11, 12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL # 3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

1. Check both trains of ECCS equipment ALIGNING FOR INJECTION PHASE: (YES)

MLB indication OATC 2. Check Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED. (NO)

CIA MLB indication RNO

2. Actuate CIA IF valves do NOT close, THEN close valves.

CIA valves list which are required closed on the OMCB:

HV-9378 Instr. Air to Containment (QMCB panel 1A1)

HV-7699 RCDT pump discharge isolation (QMCB panel 1A2)

HV-71 26 RCDT Vent isol valve to WGAS (QMCB panel 1 A2)

HV-7136 RCDT pump discharge isolation (QMCB panel 1A2)

HV-71 50 RCDT vent isol valve to WGAS (QMCB panel 1 A2)

HV-8100 RCP seal leakoff ORC isolation (QMCB panel 1A2)

HV-8112 RCP seal leakoff IRC isolation (QMCB panel 1A2)

HV-8152 RCS letdown line isol valve ORG (QMCB panel 1A2)

HV-8160 RCS letdown line isol vavle IRC (QMCB panel 1A2)

HV-8028 PRT fill isol valve (QMCB panel 1A2)

CIA valves list which are required to be closed on the QPCP.

HV-0780 Rx Cavity and CNMT sump discharge (QPCP)

HV-0781 Rx Cavity and CNMT sump discharge (QPCP)

HV-3548 RCS Hot Leg 1 & 3 sample isol (QPCP) 36

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL # 3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC 3. Check ECCS Pumps and NCP status:

a. CCPs RUNNING. (YES)

b. SI Pumps RUNNING. (YES)

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. (NO)

RNO Critical c. Start Pumps.

d. NCP TRIPPED. (YES)

OATC 4. Verify CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING TRAIN B. (YES) 37

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 EventNo.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL # 3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIV5 will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS

5. Verify proper NSCW system operation: (YES)

a. NSCW Pumps ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

b. NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN hand switches IN AUTO:

. HS-1669A

. HS-1668A OATC 6. Verify Containment Cooling Units:

Critical a. ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED. (NO)

. MLB indication NOTE: The UO will have to start the Containment Coolers in LOW speed at the QHVC panel by operating the following handswitches.

Train A:

Fan 1, 1-HS-12582A (A24)

Fan 2, 1 -HS-2582A (A25)

Fan 5, 1-HS-12584A (C24)

Fan 6, 1-HS-2584A (C25)

Train B:

Fan 3, 1-HS-12583A (A26)

Fan 4, 1-HS-2583A (A27)

Fan 7, 1-HS-12585A (C26)

Fan 8, 1 -HS-2585A (C27)

b. NSCW Cooler isolation valves OPEN. (YES)

. MLB indication 38

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC 7. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation.

a. Dampers and Valves CLOSED. (YES)

CVI MLB indication OATC 8. Check Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21 PSIG.

(NO)

RNO

8. Verify the following:

a. Containment Spray actuated

b. Containment Spray Pump discharge valves open. (NO)

Critical c. Containment Spray Pumps running.

NOTE: The OATC will be required to manually open at least one Containment Spray Pump discharge isolation valve.

OATC 9. Check ECCS flows:

a. BIT flow (YES)

b. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1625 PSIG. (YES)

c. SI Pump flow. (YES)

d. RCS pressure LESS THAN 300 PS 1G. (YES) 39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC 10. Check ECCS Valve alignment PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs. (YES)

OATC 11. Check ACCW pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING. (YES)

OATC 12. Adjust Seal Injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 GPM.

OATC 13. Dispatch Operator to ensure one train of SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING in service per 13719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM.

END OF OATC INITIAL ACTIONS RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OF 19000-C CONTINUING AT STEP 8.

40

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9, 10, 11, 12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS

1. Check AFW Pumps RUNNING. (YES)

. MDAFW Pumps

. TDAFW Pump, if required.

UO 2. Check NR level in at least one SG GREATER THAN 10%.

(32% ADVERSE). (YES)

UO 3. Check if main steamlines should be isolated: (YES)

a. Check for one of more of the following conditions:

Any steam line pressure LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 585 PSIG.

Containment pressure GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG. (YES)

. Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate ON TWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLI NE.

b. Verify Main Steam line Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED.

NOTE: Train B MSIVs and Bypasses will fail to automatically close and the Train A MSIV Bypass for Loop 4 will fail to close. The UO will be required to actuate SLI from the Train A SLI handswitch only to prevent a steam release to the secondary plant. This step is NOT critical.

41

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 EventNo.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS

4. Verify FW Isolation Valves closed: (YES)

. MFIVs

. BFIVs

MFRVs

. BFRV5 UO 5. Verify SG Blowdown isolated: (YES)

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, C, and D in the CLOSE position.

SG Sample Isolation Valves CLOSED.

UO 6. Verify Diesel Generators RUNNING. (YES)

UO 7. Throttle total AFW flow as necessary to maintain SG NR levels between 10% (32% ADVERSE) and 65%.

UO 8. Verify both MFPs TRIPPED. (YES) 42

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 EventNo.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO 9. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN. (YES)

OATC BACK TO 19000-C PROCEDURE MAIN BODY, step #8.

uO 43

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW 8. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC 9. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F.

-OR-Without RCP(s) running RCS WR COLD LEG TEMPERATURES.

RNO (IF needed)

9. IF temperature is less than 557°F and lowering, THEN perform the following as necessary:

a. Stop dumping steam.

b. Perform the following as appropriate:

IF at least one SG NR level greater than 10%

(32% ADVERSE), THEN lower total feed flow.

-OR IF all SG NR levels less than 10% (32% ADVERSE), THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 gpm.

c. If cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

d. If temperature greater than 557°F and rising, THEN dump steam.

44

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario Now: 5 Event No.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AM SAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL # 3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTION: A PRZR PORV Block Valve which was closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV should not be opened unless used to prevent challenging the PRZR Safeties.

10. Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:

a. PRZR PORVsCLOSED AND IN AUTO. (YES)

b. Normal PRZR Spray Valves CLOSED. (YES)

c. Power to at least one Block Valve AVAILABLE. (YES)

d. PRZR PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (NO)

RNO

d. Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.

OATC 11. Check if RCPs should be stopped:

a. ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING: (YES)

CCPorSlPump

b. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1375 PSIG. (YES)

c. Stop all RCPs.

Note to examiner: RCS pressure will be < 1375 psig at this time.

45

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 EventNo.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 12. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. SG Pressures:

Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner. (NO)

-OR Any completely depressurized. (NO)

RNO

a. GotoStepl3.

b. Go to 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

46

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 13. Check SG Tubes intact:

a. Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b. Secondary Radiation NORMAL. (YES)

MAIN STEAM LINE MONITORS

RE-13120(SG1)

RE-13121 (SG2)

RE-13122 (SG3)

RE-13119(SG4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839

RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation.

RNO

b. Go to 1 9030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

c. Check SG levels ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

RNO

c. Goto Step 14.

47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7,8,9,10,11,12 Event

Description:

The main turbine will trip on a spurious AMSAC Actuation followed by a DBA LOCA on RCS CL #3. During the event, RHR pump B will fail to auto start, the CS discharge valves will fail to auto open, all CNMT Coolers will fail to shift or start in LOW speed. The Train B MSIVs will fail to auto close with other complications requiring the UO to manually isolate the MSIV and Bypasses.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW 14. Check if RCS is intact inside Containment:

. Containment radiation NORMAL. (NO)

Containment pressure NORMAL. (NO)

. Containment Emergency Recirculation Sump levels NORMAL.

(NO)

RNO

14. Go to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

NOTE: The NRC Chief Examiner may stop the scenario at this point if desired.

48

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