ML14057A620
| ML14057A620 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/2014 |
| From: | Robinson K Calvert Cliffs, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, EDF Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| References | |
| Download: ML14057A620 (9) | |
Text
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 CENG a joint venture of Constellation
'eDF Energy'O CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT February 20, 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
SUBJECT:
Document Control Desk Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; Docket No. 72-8 Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments - 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2), a report of changes, tests and experiments is provided as Attachment (1). The attachment contains brief descriptions of changes, tests, and experiments approved under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2013.
This letter does not contain any regulatory commitments.
Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Douglas E. Lauver at (410) 495-5219.
Very truly yours,
,en F. Robinson
- Engineering Services KFR/PSF/bjd Attachments:
(1)
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)]
cc:
N. Morgan, NRC W. M. Dean, NRC Resident Inspector, NRC S. Gray, DNR C. Haney, NMSS W~SLv7
ATTACHMENT (1)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)]
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC February 20, 2014
ATTACHMENT (1)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)]
Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00512 50.59 Approved 0001 1/2/2013 Subject Unit 1 Cycle 21 U1C21 Core Reload Summary Proposed Activity:
The proposed activity is the Unit 1 Cycle 21 (U1C21) core reload. Revision 0 authorized the Unit 1 Cycle 21 core design for operation in all plant modes; however it did not authorize end-of-cycle coastdown operation. Revision 1 authorized end-of-cycle coastdown operation.
It also addressed Condition Report CR-2012-006339, which identified that a few statements in Revision 0, meant to provide background information, were either outdated or not entirely accurate. These inaccuracies did not represent any safety or operation concerns, or invalidate any conclusions in the 50.59 Safety Evaluation, and were corrected in Revision 1.
==
Conclusions:==
Unit 1 Cycle 21 is authorized for operation in all plant modes. The proposed activity has been evaluated against the eight criteria of 10 CFR 50.59. It is concluded that no additional License Amendment is required prior to implementation since all items requiring prior NRC review and approval were included in the NRC Tech Spec changes and SER received on 2/18/11.
Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00516 50.59 Approved 0000 1/9/2013 Subject Alternate Release Path for Liquid Radwaste System Summary Proposed Activity:
This activity routes a temporary liquid waste discharge path to bypass the degraded section of underground pipe, 1-LC3-1001. This will involve removing the internals of OCKVMWS-530, and running a hard pipe, to a temporary check valve (0-MWS-101). The temporary check valve will prevent flow from going back towards OCKVMWS-530. The other side of the temporary check valve will have a flexible hose connected, which will run through the aux building to a temporary isolation valve in the Unit 2 CCW Pump room, bolted to a penetration through the K-line into the turbine building at the 12' level. From the penetration in the turbine building, a hard pipe will carry the liquid waste into 10"HB27-201 1, which opens into the 22 Circ Water discharge conduit. This is near the existing discharge point, but now the connection is above ground as opposed to buried and is further upstream of the original discharge point
==
Conclusions:==
This activity is for routing a temporary liquid waste discharge path to bypass the degraded section of underground pipe, 1-LC3-1001. This will involve removing the internals of OCKVMWS-530, and running a hard pipe, to a temporary check valve (0-MWS-101).
The temporary check valve will prevent flow from going back towards OCKVMWS-530. The other side of the temporary check valve will have a flexible hose connected, which will run through the aux building to a temporary isolation valve in the Unit 2 CCW Pump room, bolted to a penetration through the K-line into the turbine building at the 12' level. From the penetration in the turbine building, a hard pipe will carry the liquid waste into 10"HB27-201 1, which opens into the 22 Circ Water discharge conduit. This is near the existing discharge point, but now the connection is above ground as opposed to buried and is further upstream of the original discharge point.
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ATTACHMENT (1)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)1 Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00518 50.59 Approved 0000 11/15/2013 Subject Replace Fischer & Porter models analog controllers with Yokogawa series digital controllers Summary Proposed Activity:
Replace Fischer & Porter models 53EG4331ADAA (1 (2)PIC5154, 1(2)PIC5157) and 53ED31 1 IBB I (I (2)HIC5206, 1(2)HIC5208) analog controllers with Yokogawa YS 1700 series digital controllers.
==
Conclusions:==
This activity does not require prior NRC approval because this activity is essentially a like for like replacement of loop controllers. There are only two significant differences between the existing controller and the controller being used to replace it. The first difference is a single CPU failure. The new controllers have dual CPU's. If one CPU fails, the remaining CPU assumes control of the controller. The controller can only be operated in Manual mode upon single CPU failure. This is different than the old controller in that the controller will switch from AUTO to MANUAL if the controller is in AUTO at the time of a single CPU failure. This is actually an enhancement over the existing controller in that the new controller is more fault tolerant than the old controller. The switch to MANUAL has no immediate or short term adverse effects. An alarm has been added to the system to alert operators if this situation should arise. The second difference is that the old controllers are analog and the new controllers are digital. Therefore, the new controllers use software to perform their control function whereas the old controllers use electronic circuitry. The use of software introduces the remote possibility of a common mode software failure which is a new failure mode for the controller. Although this failure mode is new, the plant design basis and failure analysis remain valid. The new controllers that have been used in industry prior to this modification have proven to be robust from both a hardware and a software standpoint. The configurations have been tested and in the unlikely event of a controller malfunction, this evaluation has shown that the existing plant design basis and failure analysis for the system is fully able to safely cope with any controller failure.
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ATTACHMENT (1)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)I Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00521 50.59 Approved 0000 2/1/2013 Subject Alternate Release Path For Liquid Radwaste System (Temporary Change to Discharge Liquid Radwaste to Unit 1 Circulating Water Conduit)
Summary Proposed Activity:
This activity routes a temporary liquid waste discharge path to bypass the degraded section of underground pipe, 1 -LC3-1001. This will involve removing the internals of 0CKVMWS-530, and running a hard pipe to a temporary check valve (0-MWS-101). The temporary check valve will prevent flow from going back towards OCKVMWS-530. The other side of the temporary check valve will have a flexible hose connected, which will run through the aux building to a temporary isolation valve in the Unit 1 CCW Pump room, bolted to a penetration through the K-line into the turbine building at the 12' level. From the penetration in the turbine building, a combination of hard pipe and flexible hose will carry the liquid waste to valve 1HVCD-240 to allow flow into 10"HB27-1011, which opens into the 11 and 12 Circ Water discharge conduits.
==
Conclusions:==
This activity is for routing a temporary liquid waste discharge path to bypass the degraded section of underground pipe, 1-LC3-1001. This will involve removing the internals of OCKVMWS-530, and running a hard pipe, to a temporary check valve (0-MWS-101).
The temporary check valve will prevent flow from going back towards OCKVMWS-530. The other side of the temporary check valve will have a flexible hose connected, which will run through the aux building to a temporary isolation valve in the Unit 2 CCW Pump room, bolted to a penetration through the K-line into the turbine building at the 12' level. From the penetration in the turbine building, a hard pipe will carry the liquid waste into 10"HB27-201 1, which opens into the 22 Circ Water discharge conduit. This is near the existing discharge point, but now the connection is above ground as opposed to buried and is further upstream of the original discharge point.
Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00522 50.59 Approved 0001 3/1/2013 Subject Unit 2 Cycle 20 Core Reload Modification Summary Proposed Activity:
The proposed activity is the Unit 2 Cycle 20 (U2C20) core reload. Revision 0 authorized the Unit 2 Cycle 20 core design for operation in all plant modes (it should be noted that there was a Mode 2 restriction in the associated engineering change package ECP-11-000715 for issuance of CA06165 Revision 0001). Revision 1 documents completion of CA06165 Revision 0001 to incorporate the EQ source term multiplies for 2 batches of AREVA fuel and issuance of engineering change notices for corresponding revisions to EQ files (Mode 2 restriction in associated engineering change package satisfied).
==
Conclusions:==
Unit 2 Cycle 20 is authorized for operation in all plant modes. All safety analyses required to justify Unit 2 Cycle 20 operation in all plant modes have been completed/evaluated and the currently reported UFSAR accident doses remain bounding for operation of Unit 2 Cycle 20.
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ATTACHMENT (1)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS 110 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)]
Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00524 50.59 Approved 0000 1/25/2013 Subject 24 Containment Air Cooler Containment Response Summary Proposed Activity:
Unit 2, No. 24 Containment Air Cooler fan motor became grounded and was declared inoperable at 0349 on Saturday, January 19, 2013.
Technical Specification 3.6.6 required Action C to be entered with a completion time of 7 days to restore the fan to operable status. This activity performs safety analyses to demonstrate that containment peak pressure and temperature design limits are met during a LOCA or MSLB with only one operable Containment Air Cooler in the "B" train provided lower limits on Containment normal pressure and temperature, RWT temperature, and Salt Water inlet temperature are maintained. These limits and the above definition of operability for the "B" Containment Air Cooler train would only be applicable for the period January 26, 2013 through February 17, 2013. Calvert Cliffs proposed a license condition be added to Appendix C of Renewed Operating License DPR-69 for Unit 2 to restrict the operating conditions under which the Unit 2 containment cooling trains would be considered operable.
==
Conclusions:==
The NRC approved this proposed change. The following License Condition was proposed:
For the period from January 26, 2013 to February 17, 2013, an OPERABLE "A" train of the Containment Cooling system consists of two operable containment cooling fans and coolers and the associated instruments and controls. An OPERABLE "B" train of the Containment Cooling system consists of one operable containment cooling fan and cooler and the associated instruments and controls.
In addition, the following limitations must be met for each containment cooling train to be considered OPERABLE:
(1) The Unit 2 RWT water temperature shall not exceed 80°F, (2) The Unit 2 containment average air temperature shall not exceed 95°F, (3) The Unit 2 initial containment pressure shall not exceed 1.0 psig, and (4) The Salt Water average inlet temperature shall not exceed 80'F.
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ATTACHMENT (1)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)]
Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00531 50.59 Approved 0000 9/19/2013 Subject Containment Response LAR Summary Proposed Activity:
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would revise the calculated peak containment internal pressure for the design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) described in Technical Specification 5.5.16 and the initial internal containment pressure limit in Technical Specification 3.6.4. The calculated peak containment internal pressure, Pa, is increased from 49.4 psig to 49.7 psig. This increase in Pa is due to an increase in the calculated mass and energy released into Containment during the blowdown phase of the design basis LOCA. In addition, a change to the containment pressure Technical Specification is needed to limit the upper bound initial pressure to less than or equal to 1.0 psig, from its current limit of less than or equal to 1.8 psig. This change is needed to support the calculation of peak containment internal pressure while maintaining the calculated peak containment internal pressure below the design limit of 50 psig.
==
Conclusions:==
This change was submitted to and approved by the NRC. This is the ECP implementing License Amendment No. 303 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 and Amendment No. 281 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2.
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ATTACHMENT (1)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS 110 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)]
Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00532 50.59 Approved 0000 12/23/2013 Subject 1A Diesel Generator Building Summary Proposed Activity:
This modification installs external ducts that enclose the Southeast and Northeast third floor openings of the IA Diesel Generator Building in order to direct Diesel Generator Radiator fan exhaust to the roof of the building, preventing sustained "design winds", up to 100 mph, from interfering with radiator fan performance.
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Conclusions:==
External ducts that enclose the Southeast and Northeast third floor openings of the IA Diesel Generator Building are being installed to direct IA Diesel Generator Radiator fan exhaust to the roof of the building, thereby preventing sustained "design winds", up to 100 mph, from interfering with radiator fan performance.
The ducts will reside on the exterior of the building, and not internal to the Category I building structure. An analysis to determine if there is a credible diesel engine / generator set missile that could strike the safety related external ductwork on the lA Diesel Generator Building was performed. The conclusion of this analysis is that the OC diesel generator does not represent a credible source of missiles that could impact the 1A Diesel Generator Building external ductwork, and therefore the missile load does not need to be considered in the design of the ductwork. Missiles emanating from the 1B, 2B or 2A will not impact IA duct because those EDGs are contained in Category I structures.
Based on this Evaluation, this activity does not require a change to the CCNPP Technical Specifications or License Conditions or meet any of the above 10 CFR 50.59 criteria for requiring prior NRC approval.
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ATTACHMENT (1)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)1 Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00528 72.48 Approved 0000 12/18/2013 Subject ECP to justify Storing 32P DSC's inside new HSM-HB modules Summary Proposed Activity:
The proposed activity is to make three design changes that will support continued use of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP). These changes are:
- 1) Allow the storage of the approved NUHOMS-32P DSCs inside of a modified Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) design used for ISFSI Phase IV. The HSM is modified to allow modular construction and to improve heat rejection and shielding capabilities, and is based on the Transnuclear HSM-H design approved for use by the NRC for the General License NUHOMS CoC 1004 and 1030. This modified HSM is referred to hereafter as "HSM-HB" to distinguish it from the original HSM design used for ISFSI Phases I - III.
- 2) The NUHOMS-32P DSC design will also be modified to an expanded range of fabrication options for the boron aluminum neutron absorber plates. The first 24 NUHOMS-32P DSCs (CEG-1049 to CEG-1072) used neutron absorber plates fabricated from a borated aluminum which is ingots fabricated via boron compound mixed with molten aluminum. The next 6 NUHOMS 32P DSCs to be loaded use neutron absorber fabricated from an aluminum boron carbide Metal Matrix Composite (MMC; ingots fabricated via blending of powdered aluminum and boron carbide, followed by hot vacuum pressing) rather than aluminum boron alloy.
- 3) Finally, Value Added Pellet (VAP) fuel will be introduced to the ISFSI for the first time (only batches 1NT, IT, 2S, IV, 1W, and 2T, excluding 2TF and 2TW Lead Fuel Assemblies). The differences between Standard and VAP fuel include larger diameter pellets, thinner cladding, higher assembly MTU, use of Zirlo cladding and TURBO spacer grids.
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Conclusion:==
New analyses were performed to verify that confinement, shielding, DSC internal pressure, structural stresses, criticality safety and cladding temperature are acceptable for: storage of the NUHOMS-32P DSC in the HSM-HB modules, storage of indicated batches on CE 14x 14 VAP fuel, and use of boron aluminum MMC neutron absorber. The results demonstrate that all of the design criteria continue to be met, and these changes do not impact the safe storage of the spent fuel assemblies under normal, off-normal and postulated accidents conditions.
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