ML13275A145

Interim Staff Evaluation and Request for Additional Information Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Implementation of Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

ML13275A145
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	11/26/2013
From:	Nicholas Difrancesco Plant Licensing Branch III
To:	Pacilio M Exelon Business Services Co
Nicholas DiFrancesco, NRR/DORL 415-1115
References
EA-12-051, TAC MF1119, TAC MF1120
Download: ML13275A145 (28)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November 26, 2013 Mr. Michael J. Pacilio Senior Vice President Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO)

Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT:

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2- INTERIM STAFF EVALUATION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE OVERALL INTEGRATED PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ORDER EA-12-051, RELIABLE SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION (TAC NOS. MF1119 AND MF1120)

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Order EA-12-051, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12054A679), to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. This Order requires the licensee to have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel: (1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred.

By letter dated February 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13063A323), Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC or the licensee)) provided the Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, describing how it will achieve compliance with Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-051 by spring 2015. By letter dated June 7, 2013, as supplemented by email dated June 25, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML13134A093 and ML13176A332, respectively),

the NRC staff sent a request for additional information (RAI) to the licensee. The licensee provided supplemental information by letters dated July 3, 2013, and August 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML13186A004 and ML13241A238, respectively).

The NRC staff has reviewed these submittals with the understanding that the licensee will update its OIP as implementation of the Order progresses. With this in mind, the staff has included an interim staff evaluation with this letter to provide feedback on the OIP. The staff's findings in the interim staff evaluation are considered preliminary and will be revised as the OIP is updated. As such, none of the staff's conclusions are to be considered final. A final NRC staff evaluation will be issued after the licensee has provided the information requested.

M. Pacilio The interim staff evaluation also includes RAis, response to which the NRC staff needs to complete its review. The licensee should provide the information requested in the 6-month status updates, as the information becomes available. However, the staff requests that all information be provided by September 30, 2014, to ensure that any issues are resolved prior to the date by which the licensee must complete full implementation of Order EA-12-051. The licensee should adjust its schedule for providing information to ensure that all this information is provided by the requested date.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at 301-415-1115 or via e-mail at nicholas.difrancesco@nrc.gov.

Sincerely, Nicholas DiFrancesco, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 111-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-37 4

Enclosure:

Interim Staff Evaluation and Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 INTERIM STAFF EVALUATION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO THE OVERALL INTEGRATED PLAN IN RESPONSE TO ORDER EA-12-051, RELIABLE SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-373 AND 50-374

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On March 12,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Order EA-12-051, "Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool [SFP]

Instrumentation" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML12054A679), to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. This Order requires, in part, that all operating reactor sites have a reliable means of remotely monitoring wide-range SFP levels to support effective prioritization of event mitigation and recovery actions in the event of a beyond-design-basis (BOB) external event. The Order required all holders of operating licenses issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations ( 10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," to submit to the NRC an Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) by February 28, 2013.

By letter dated February 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13063A323), Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensee) provided the OIP for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, describing how it will achieve compliance with Attachment 2 of Order EA-12-51 by Spring 2015 for Units 1 and 2. By letter dated June 7, 2013, as supplemented by email dated June 25, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML13134A093 and ML13176A332, respectively) the NRC staff sent a request for additional information (RAI) to the licensee. The licensee provided supplemental information by letters dated July 3, 2013, and August 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos.

ML13186A004 and ML13241A238, respectively).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Order EA-12-051 requires all holders of operating licenses issued under 10 CFR Part 50, notwithstanding the provisions of any NRC regulation or license to the contrary, to comply with the requirements described in Attachment 2 to the Order except to the extent that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license. Licensees shall promptly start implementation of the requirements in Attachment 2 to the Order and shall complete full implementation ENCLOSURE

no later than two refueling cycles after submittal of the OIP or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Order EA-12-051 required the licensee, by February 28, 2013, to submit to the NRC an OIP, including a description of how compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 2 of the Order will be achieved. of Order EA-12-051 requires the license to have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel: (1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the SFP operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred. of Order EA-12-051, states that the SFP level instrumentation shall include the following design features:

1.1 Instruments

The instrumentation shall consist of a permanent, fixed primary instrument channel and a backup instrument channel. The backup instrument channel may be fixed or portable. Portable instruments shall have capabilities that enhance the ability of trained personnel to monitor spent fuel pool water level under conditions that restrict direct personnel access to the pool, such as partial structural damage, high radiation levels, or heat and humidity from a boiling pool.

1.2 Arrangement

The spent fuel pool level instrument channels shall be arranged in a manner that provides reasonable protection of the level indication function against missiles that may result from damage to the structure over the spent fuel pool. This protection may be provided by locating the primary instrument channel and fixed portions of the backup instrument channel, if applicable, to maintain instrument channel separation within the spent fuel pool area, and to utilize inherent shielding from missiles provided by existing recesses and corners in the spent fuel pool structure.

1.3 Mounting

Installed instrument channel equipment within the spent fuel pool shall be mounted to retain its design configuration during and following the maximum seismic ground motion considered in the design of the spent fuel pool structure.

1.4 Qualification

The primary and backup instrument channels shall be reliable at temperature, humidity, and radiation levels consistent with the spent fuel pool water at saturation conditions for an extended period.

This reliability shall be established through use of an augmented quality assurance process (e.g., a process similar to that applied to the site fire protection program).

1.5 Independence

The primary instrument channel shall be independent of the backup instrument channel.

1.6 Power supplies: Permanently installed instrumentation channels shall each be powered by a separate power supply. Permanently installed and portable instrumentation channels shall provide for power connections from sources independent of the plant [alternating current (ac)] and [direct current (de)] power distribution systems, such as portable generators or replaceable batteries. Onsite generators used as an alternate power source and replaceable batteries used for instrument channel power shall have sufficient capacity to maintain the level indication function until offsite resource availability is reasonably assured.

1. 7 Accuracy: The instrument channels shall maintain their designed accuracy following a power interruption or change in power source without recalibration.

1.8 Testing

The instrument channel design shall provide for routine testing and calibration.

1.9 Display

Trained personnel shall be able to monitor the spent fuel pool water level from the control room, alternate shutdown panel, or other appropriate and accessible location. The display shall provide on-demand or continuous indication of spent fuel pool water level. of Order EA-12-051, states that the SFP instrumentation shall be maintained available and reliable through appropriate development and implementation of the following programs:

2.1 Training

Personnel shall be trained in the use and the provision of alternate power to the primary and backup instrument channels.

2.2 Procedures

Procedures shall be established and maintained for the testing, calibration, and use of the primary and backup spent fuel pool instrument channels.

2.3 Testing and Calibration: Processes shall be established and maintained for scheduling and implementing necessary testing and calibration of the primary and backup spent fuel pool level instrument channels to maintain the instrument channels at the design accuracy.

On August 29, 2012, the NRC issued an Interim Staff Guidance document (the ISG),

JLD-ISG-2012-03, "Compliance with Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12221A339), to describe methods acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with Order EA-12-051. The ISG endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, the methods described in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12-02, Revision 1, "Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, 'To

Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation' " dated August 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12240A307). Specifically, the ISG states:

The NRC staff considers that the methodologies and guidance in conformance with the guidelines provided in NEI 12-02, Revision 1, subject to the clarifications and exceptions in Attachment 1 to this ISG, are an acceptable means of meeting the requirements of Order EA-12-051.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Background and Schedule LaSalle, Units 1 and 2, share a common reactor building refueling floor and two interconnected SFPs. Each pool is approximately 34-feet wide by 40-feet long and 37 -feet deep. The pools are connected via a transfer canal. The pools are normally interconnected and at the same water level when the water level in either SFP is greater than nominally 1 foot above the top of the spent fuel storage racks.

The licensee submitted its OIP on February 28, 2013. The OIP states that installation of the SFP level instrumentation at LaSalle will be completed by the end of Spring 2015, based on the end of the second refueling outage for Unit 2 following submittal of its OIP.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's schedule for implementation of SFP level instrumentation. If the licensee completes implementation in accordance with this schedule, it would appear to achieve compliance with Order EA-12-051 within two refueling cycles after submittal of the OIP and before December 31,2016.

3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Water Levels of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that All licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel: (1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system [Level 1], (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck

[Level 2], and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred [Level 3].

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that Level 1 represents the HIGHER of the following two points:

• The level at which reliable suction loss occurs due to uncovering of the coolant inlet pipe, weir or vacuum breaker (depending on the design), or

• The level at which the water height, assuming saturated conditions, above the centerline of the cooling pump suction provides the required net positive suction head specified by the pump manufacturer or engineering analysis.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that for Level 1, for both units, the indicated level on either primary or backup instrument channel must be greater than elevation 842 feet (ft.) 1 inch (in.) to maintain normal operation of the Fuel Pool Cooling system. This is the elevation of the bottom of the fuel pool weirs which maintain the flowpath for re-circulation of water from the pool through the system.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The Spent Fuel Pool at LaSalle Station has skimmers and scuppers located at the 842'-1" elevation that water must flow into. From there the water is routed to the surge tanks from which the Fuel Pool Cooling (FC) Pumps draw suction. The suction trip is at an approximate 819'-6" elevation. Thus the 842'-1" elevation reflects the higher of the two points noted in NEI 12-02, Section 2.3.1.

The NRC staff notes that Level1 is adequate for normal SFP cooling system operation and it is also adequate to ensure the required fuel pool cooling pump net positive suction head. The staff also notes that this level represents the higher of the two points described in NEI 12-02 for Level1.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that Level 2 represents the range of water level where any necessary operations in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool can be completed without significant dose consequences from direct gamma radiation from the stored spent fuel. Level 2 is based on either of the following:

• 10 feet (+I- 1 foot) above the highest point of any fuel rack seated in the spent fuel pools, or

• a designated level that provides adequate radiation shielding to maintain personnel radiological dose levels within acceptable limits while performing local operations in the vicinity of the pool. This level shall be based on either plant-specific or appropriate generic shielding calculations, considering the emergency conditions that may apply at the time and the scope of necessary local operations, including installation of portable SFP instrument channel components.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that Level 2, for both units, is the indicated level on either the primary or backup instrument channel of greater than 10 ft. plus instrument channel accuracy above the top of the storage racks.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee provided a sketch showing the approximate location of the level sensor and the elevations identified as Levels 1, 2, and 3. This sketch shows Level 2 at an elevation of 830ft. 0 in., which is approximately 10ft. above the top of the fuel rack.

The NRC notes that the licensee designated Level 2 using the first of the two options described in NEI12-02 for Level2.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that Level 3 corresponds nominally (i.e., +/- 1 foot) to the highest point of any fuel rack seated in the spent fuel pool. Level 3 is defined in this manner to provide the maximum range of information to operators, decision makers and emergency response personnel.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that for both units, Level 3 is the indicated level on either the primary or backup instrument channel of greater than 0 ft. (elevation 820ft.) plus instrument channel accuracy above the top of the storage racks.

The NRC staff notes that the elevation for Level 3 is the highest point of any spent fuel storage rack seated in the SFP.

The licensee's proposed plan, with respect to identification of Levels 1, 2, and 3, appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

3.3 Design Features: Instruments of Order EA-12-051, states, in part, that The instrumentation shall consist of a permanent, fixed primary instrument channel and a backup instrument channel. The backup instrument channel may be fixed or portable. Portable instruments shall have capabilities that enhance the ability of trained personnel to monitor spent fuel pool water level under conditions that restrict direct personnel access to the pool, such as partial structural damage, high radiation levels, or heat and humidity from a boiling pool.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that A spent fuel pool level instrument channel is considered reliable when the instrument channel satisfies the design elements listed in Section 3

[Instrumentation Design Features] of this guidance and the plant operator has fully implemented the programmatic features listed in Section 4 [Program Features].

In its OIP, the licensee stated that both the primary and backup Instrument Channels will utilize permanently-installed instruments. The primary instrument channel level sensing components will be located in the Unit 1 SFP and the backup instrument channel level sensing components will be located in the Unit 2 SFP. Each instrument channel will be capable of monitoring SFP

water level over a continuous range from the high pool level elevation of 842ft. 7% in. to the top of the spent fuel racks at elevation 820 ft. The licensee also mentioned that the same level sensing technology will be used for both instrument channels.

The NRC staff notes that the range specified for the licensee's instrumentation will cover Levels 1, 2, and 3 as described in Section 3.2 above. The licensee's proposed plan, with respect to the number of channels and the range of the instrumentation for both of its SFPs, appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

3.4 Design Features: Arrangement of Order EA-12-051, states, in part, that The spent fuel pool level instrument channels shall be arranged in a manner that provides reasonable protection of the level indication function against missiles that may result from damage to the structure over the spent fuel pool. This protection may be provided by locating the primary instrument channel and the fixed portions of the backup instrument channel, if applicable, to maintain instrument channel separation within the spent fuel pool area, and to utilize inherent shielding from missiles provided by existing recesses and corners in the spent fuel pool structure.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that The intent of the arrangement requirement is to specify reasonable separation and missile protection requirements for permanently installed instrumentation used to meet this Order. Although additional missile barriers are not required to be installed, separation and shielding can help minimize the probability that damage due to an explosion or extreme natural phenomena (e.g., falling or wind-driven missiles) will render fixed channels of SFP instrumentation unavailable.

Installation of the SFP instrument channels shall be consistent with the plant-specific SFP design requirements and should not impair normal SFP function.

Channel separation should be maintained by locating the installed sensors in different places in the SFP area.

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that The plan is to install SFP level sensors in the southeast corner of the Unit 1 SFP and in the northeast corner of the Unit 2 SFP; separated by a distance of approximately 103 feet. The sensors themselves will be mounted, to the extent practical, near the pool walls and below the pool curb to minimize their exposure to damaging debris and not interfere with SFP activities. Instrument channel electronics and power supplies will be located in seismic and missile protected areas either below the SFP operating floor or in buildings other than the [reactor building]. The areas to be selected will provide suitable radiation shielding and environmental conditions for the equipment consistent with instrument

manufacturer's recommendations. Equipment and cabling for power supplies and indication for each channel will be separated equivalent to that provided for redundant safety related services.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee clarified that the location of the SFP level instruments changed since the submittal of the OIP. The sketch provided in this letter shows that the SFP sensors will now be installed in the northwest corner of the Unit 1 SFP and in the southwest corner of the Unit 2 SFP and be separated by a distance of approximately 35ft. 9 in.

The licensee's proposed location of the primary and backup SFP level instruments appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG. However, the NRC staff has concerns with the licensee's lack of information with regard to the routing of these two channels in accordance with the guidance on channel separation as described in NEI 12-02. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI #1 Please provide additional information describing how the final arrangement of the SFP instrumentation and routing of the cabling between the level instruments, the electronics and the displays, meets the Order requirement to arrange the SFP level instrument channels in a manner that provides reasonable protection of the level indication function against missiles that may result from damage to the structure over the SFP.

3.5 Design Features: Mounting of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that Installed instrument channel equipment within the spent fuel pool shall be mounted to retain its design configuration during and following the maximum seismic ground motion considered in the design of the spent fuel pool structure.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that The mounting shall be designed to be consistent with the highest seismic or safety classification of the SFP. An evaluation of other hardware stored in the SFP shall be conducted to ensure it will not create adverse interaction with the fixed instrument location(s).

The basis for the seismic design for mountings in the SFP shall be the plant seismic design basis at the time of submittal of the Integrated Plan for implementing NRC Order EA-12-051.

In its OIP, the license stated that the design of the mounting of the sensors in the SFP will be consistent with the seismic Class I criteria. The licensee stated that installed equipment will be verified to be seismically adequate for the seismic motions associated with the maximum seismic ground motion considered in the design of the plant area in which it is installed.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The current plan for the SFPI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013 with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014. The requested information will be provided in the February 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

In its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee stated that the mounting device total loading and attachments are not available at this time and that this information will be developed during the detailed design process. The licensee restated that this information will be provided to the staff in the February 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

The NRC staff notes that in its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Started" and that the information will be provided to the staff during the February 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified these requests as:

RAI#2 Please provide the following:

a) The design criteria that will be used to estimate the total loading on the mounting device(s), including static weight loads and dynamic loads. Describe the methodology that will be used to estimate the total loading, inclusive of design basis maximum seismic loads and the hydrodynamic loads that could result from pool sloshing or other effects that could accompany such seismic forces.

b) A description of the manner in which the level sensor (and stilling well, if appropriate) will be attached to the refueling floor and/or other support structures for each planned point of attachment of the probe assembly. Indicate in a schematic the portions of the level sensor that will serve as points of attachment for mechanical/mounting or electrical connections.

c) A description of the manner by which the mechanical connections will attach the level instrument to permanent SFP structures so as to support the level sensor assembly.

(This information was previously requested as RAI-3 in NRC letter dated June 7, 2013)

In addition, the staff plans to verify the results of the licensee's seismic testing and analysis when it is completed based on the licensee's response to the following RAI.

RAI#3 For RAI 2(a) above, please provide the analyses used to verify the design criteria and methodology for seismic testing of the SFP instrumentation and the electronics units,

including design-basis maximum seismic loads and hydrodynamic loads that could result from pool sloshing or other effects that could accompany such seismic forces.

RAI#4 For each of the mounting attachments required to attach SFP level equipment to plant structures, please describe the design inputs, and the methodology that was used to qualify the structural integrity of the affected structures/equipment.

3.6 Design Features: Qualification of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that The primary and backup instrument channels shall be reliable at temperature, humidity, and radiation levels consistent with the spent fuel pool water at saturation conditions for an extended period. This reliability shall be established through use of an augmented quality assurance process (e.g. a process similar to that applied to the site fire protection program).

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that The instrument channel reliability shall be demonstrated via an appropriate combination of design, analyses, operating experience, and/or testing of channel components for the following sets of parameters, as described in the paragraphs below:

• conditions in the area of instrument channel component use for all instrument components,

• effects of shock and vibration on instrument channel components used during any applicable event for only installed components, and

• seismic effects on instrument channel components used during and following a potential seismic event for only installed components ...

The NRC staff assessment of the instrument qualification is discussed in the following subsections: (3.6.1) Augmented Quality Process and (3.6.2) Qualification and Reliability.

3. 6. 1 Augmented Quality Process Appendix A-1 of the guidance in NEI 12-02 describes a quality assurance process for non-safety systems and equipment that is not already covered by existing quality assurance requirements. Within the ISG, the NRC staff found the use of this quality assurance process to be an acceptable means of meeting the augmented quality requirements of Order EA-12-051.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that the reliability of the instrumentation would be established through the use of an augmented quality assurance process (e.g., a process similar to that applied to the site fire protection program).

The licensee's proposed augmented quality assurance process appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

3. 6. 2 Qualification and Reliability NEI 12-02 states, in part, that The temperature, humidity and radiation levels consistent with conditions in the vicinity of the [SFP] and the area of use considering normal operational, event and post-event conditions for no fewer than seven days post-event or until off-site resources can be deployed by the mitigating strategies resulting from Order EA-12-049 should be considered. Examples of post-event (beyond-design-basis) conditions to be considered are:

• radiological conditions for a normal refueling quantity of freshly discharged

( 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />) fuel with the SFP water level 3 as described in this Order,

• temperatures of 212 degrees F and 100% relative humidity environment,

• boiling water and/or steam environment

• a concentrated borated water environment ...

In its OIP, the licensee stated, consistent with NEI 12-02, in part, that Temperature, humidity and radiation levels consistent with the conditions in the vicinity of the SFP and the area of use considering normal operation, event and post-event conditions for no fewer than seven days post-event or until off-site resources can be deployed by the mitigating strategies resulting from Order EA-12-049 will be addressed in the detailed design engineering phase of the project.

Examples of post-event (beyond-design-basis) conditions to be considered are:

• radiological conditions for a normal refueling quantity of freshly discharged (1 00 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />) fuel with the SFP water level 3 as described in Order EA-12-051,

• temperatures of 212 degrees F and 100% relative humidity environment,

• boiling water and/or steam environment, and ...

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated in part, that The current plan for the SFPI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013

with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014. The requested information will be provided in the February 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

The NRC staff notes that in its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Started" and that the information will be provided to the staff during the February 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified these requests as:

RAI#S Please provide the following:

a) A description of the specific method or combination of methods you intend to apply to demonstrate the reliability of the permanently installed equipment under BOB ambient temperature, humidity, shock, vibration, and radiation conditions.

b) A description of the testing and/or analyses that will be conducted to provide assurance that the equipment will perform reliably under the worst-case credible design basis loading at the location where the equipment will be mounted. Include a discussion of this seismic reliability demonstration as it applies to a) the level sensor mounted in the SFP area, and b) any control boxes, electronics, or read-out and re-transmitting devices that will be employed to convey the level information from the level sensor to the plant operators or emergency responders.

c) A description of the specific method or combination of methods that will be used to confirm the reliability of the permanently installed equipment such that following a seismic event the instrument will maintain its required accuracy.

(This information was previously requested as RA/-4 in NRC letter dated June 7, 2013)

In addition, the NRC staff plans to verify the results of the licensee's testing and analysis used to demonstrate the qualification and reliability of the installed equipment when it is completed.

The staff has identified this request as:

RAI#6 For RAI #5 above, please provide the results for the selected methods, tests and analyses used to demonstrate the qualification and reliability of the installed equipment in accordance with the Order requirements.

3. 6. 3 Qualification Evaluation Summary Upon acceptable resolution of the RAis in Section 3.6, the NRC staff will be able to make a conclusion regarding the instrument qualification.

3. 7 Design Features: Independence of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that The primary instrument channel shall be independent of the backup instrument channel.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that Independence of permanently installed instrumentation, and primary and backup channels, is obtained by physical and power separation commensurate with the hazard and electrical isolation needs. If plant AC or DC power sources are used then the power sources shall be from different buses and preferably different divisions/channels depending on available sources of power.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that the primary instrument channel will be independent of the backup instrument channel and that independence will be achieved through physical and electrical separation of each channels' components commensurate with hazard and electrical isolation needs.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The current plan for the SFPI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013 with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014. The requested information will be provided in the February 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

The NRC staff notes that in its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Started" and that the information will be provided to the staff during the February 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI#7 Please provide the following:

a) A description of how the two channels of the proposed level measurement system meet this requirement so that the potential for a common cause event to adversely affect both channels is minimized to the extent practicable.

b) Further information on how each level measurement system, consisting of level sensor electronics, cabling, and readout devices will be designed and installed to address independence through the application and selection of independent power sources, the use of physical and spatial separation, independence of signals sent to the location(s) of the readout devices, and the independence of the displays.

(This information was previously requested as RAI-5 in NRC letter dated June 7, 2013)

3.8 Design Features: Power Supplies of Order EA-12-051, states in part, that Permanently installed instrumentation channels shall each be powered by a separate power supply. Permanently installed and portable instrumentation channels shall provide for power connections from sources independent of the plant ac and de power distribution systems, such as portable generators or replaceable batteries. Onsite generators used as an alternate power source and replaceable batteries used for instrument channel power shall have sufficient capacity to maintain the level indication function until offsite resource availability is reasonably assured.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that The normal electrical power supply for each channel shall be provided by different sources such that the loss of one of the channels primary power supply will not result in a loss of power supply function to both channels of SFP level instrumentation.

All channels of SFP level instrumentation shall provide the capability of connecting the channel to a source of power (e.g., portable generators or replaceable batteries) independent of the normal plant AC and DC power systems. For fixed channels this alternate capability shall include the ability to isolate the installed channel from its normal power supply or supplies. The portable power sources for the portable and installed channels shall be stored at separate locations, consistent with the reasonable protection requirements associated with NEI 12-06 (Order EA-12-049). The portable generator or replaceable batteries should be accessible and have sufficient capacity to support reliable instrument channel operation until off-site resources can be deployed by the mitigating strategies resulting from Order EA-12-049.

If adequate power supply for either an installed or portable level instrument credits intermittent operation, then the provisions shall be made for quickly and reliably taking the channel out of service and restoring it to service. For example, a switch on the power supply to the channel is adequate provided the power can be periodically interrupted without significantly affecting the accuracy and reliability of the instrument reading. Continuous indication of SFP level is acceptable only if the power for such indication is demonstrably adequate for the time duration specified in section 3.1 [.]

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that Each channel will be normally powered from a different 120VAC [120 volts-alternating current] bus. Upon loss of normal ac power, individual channel installed batteries will automatically maintain continuous channel operation. The batteries will be replaceable and be sized to maintain channel operation until off-

site resources can be deployed by the mitigating strategies resulting from Order EA-12-049. Additionally, each channel will have provisions for connection to another suitable power source.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The current plan for the SFPI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013 with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014. The requested information will be provided in the February 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

In its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee stated that the equipment total power supply configuration and characteristics are not available at this time. However, in this same letter, as part of the description of the SFP instruments, the licensee stated, in part, that The sensor electronics provide an instrument standard analog signal to a remote enclosure that will be installed in an accessible location. This enclosure contains the Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS), backup battery, and water level display. The enclosure also includes the capability to connect an emergency or temporary external power source as part of the FLEX mitigating strategies.

The NRC staff notes that in its August 28, 2013, letter, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Started" and that further information will be provided to the staff during the February 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI#S Please provide the following:

a) A description of the electrical ac power sources and capacities for the primary and backup channels. (Previously requested in NRC letter dated June 25, 2013 (ADAMS No. ML 13176A33)).

b) Please provide the results of the calculation depicting the battery backup duty cycle requirements demonstrating that its capacity is sufficient to maintain the water level indication function until offsite resource availability is reasonably assured.

(This information was previously requested as RAI-6 in NRC letter dated June 7, 2013)

3.9 Design Features: Accuracy of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that The instrument channels shall maintain their designed accuracy following a power interruption or change in power source without recalibration.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that Accuracy should consider operations while under SFP conditions, e.g., saturated water, steam environment, or concentrated borated water. Additionally, instrument accuracy should be sufficient to allow trained personnel to determine when the actual level exceeds the specified lower level of each indicating range (levels 1, 2 and 3) without conflicting or ambiguous indication.

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that The instrument channels will be designed to maintain their design accuracy following a power interruption or change in power source without recalibration.

Instrument channel accuracy, to be determined during detailed design, will consider Spent Fuel Pool conditions (e.g., saturated water, steam environment),

as well as, other applicable radiological and environmental conditions and include display accuracy. Instrument channel accuracy will be sufficient to allow trained personnel to determine when the actual level exceeds the specified lower level of each indicating range (levels 1, 2, or 3) without conflicting or ambiguous indications.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The current plan for the SFPI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013 with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014. The requested information will be provided in the February 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

The NRC staff notes that in its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Started" and that the information will be provided to the staff during the February 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI#9 Please provide the following:

a) An estimate of the expected instrument channel accuracy performance (e.g., in percent of span) under both (a) normal SFP level conditions (approximately Level1 or higher) and (b) at the BOB conditions (i.e., radiation, temperature,

humidity, post-seismic and post-shock conditions} that would be present if the SFP water level were at the Level 2 and Level 3 datum points.

b) A description of the methodology that will be used for determining the maximum allowed deviation from the instrument channel design accuracy that will be employed under normal operating conditions as an acceptance criterion for a calibration procedure to flag to operators and to technicians that the channel requires adjustment to within the normal condition design accuracy.

(This information was previously requested as RAI-7 in NRC letter dated June 7, 2013) 3.10 Design Features: Testing of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that The instrument channel design shall provide for routine testing and calibration.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that Static or non-active installed (fixed) sensors can be used and should be designed such that testing and/or calibration can be performed in-situ. For microprocessor based channels the instrument channel design shall be capable of testing while mounted in the pool.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that instrument channel design will provide for routine testing and calibration consistent with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 and NEI 12-02 and that details will be determined during detailed design engineering.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The current plan for the SFPI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013 with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014.

Following the issue of the design, procedures will start being developed with a projected July 2014 completion date. The requested information will be provided in the August 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

The NRC staff notes that in its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Not Started" and that the information will be provided to the staff during the August 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI #10 Please provide the following:

a) A description of the capability and provisions the proposed water level sensing equipment will have to enable periodic testing and calibration, including how this capability enables the equipment to be tested in-situ.

b) A description of how such testing and calibration will enable the conduct of regular channel checks of each independent channel against the other, and against any other permanently-installed SFP level instrumentation.

c) A description of how functional checks will be performed, and the frequency at which they will be conducted. Describe how calibration tests will be performed, and the frequency at which they will be conducted. Provide a discussion as to how these surveillances will be incorporated into the plant surveillance program.

d) A description of what preventive maintenance tasks are required to be performed during normal operation, and the planned maximum surveillance interval that is necessary to ensure that the channels are fully conditioned to accurately and reliably perform their functions when needed.

(This information was previously requested as RAI-8 in NRC letter dated June 7, 2013) 3.11 Design Features: Display of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that Trained personnel shall be able to monitor the spent fuel pool water level from the control room, alternate shutdown panel, or other appropriate and accessible location. The display shall provide on-demand or continuous indication of spent fuel pool water level.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that The intent of this guidance is to ensure that information on SFP level is reasonably available to the plant staff and decision makers. Ideally there will be an indication from at least one channel of instrumentation in the control room.

While it is generally recognized (as demonstrated by the events at Fukushima Daiichi) that SFP level will not change rapidly during a loss of spent fuel pool cooling scenario more rapid SFP drain down cannot be entirely discounted.

Therefore, the fact that plant personnel are able to determine the SFP level will satisfy this requirement, provided the personnel are available and trained in the use of the SFP level instrumentation (see Section 4.1) and that they can accomplish the task when required without unreasonable delay.

SFP level indication from the installed channel shall be displayed in the control room, at the alternate shutdown panel, or another appropriate and accessible location (reference NEI 12-06). An appropriate and accessible location shall have the following characteristics:

• occupied or promptly accessible to the appropriate plant staff giving appropriate consideration to various drain down scenarios,

• outside of the area surrounding the SFP floor, e.g., an appropriate distance from the radiological sources resulting from an event impacting the SFP,

• inside a structure providing protection against adverse weather, and

• outside of any very high radiation areas or LOCKED HIGH RAD AREA during normal operation.

If multiple display locations beyond the required "appropriate and accessible location" are desired, then the instrument channel shall be designed with the capability to drive the multiple display locations without impacting the primary "appropriate and accessible" display.

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that the primary and backup instrument displays would be located at the control room, alternate shutdown panel, or other appropriate and accessible location. The specific location would be determined during detailed design.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The current plan for the SFPI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013 with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014. The requested information will be provided in the February 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

The NRC staff notes that in its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Started" and that the information will be provided to the staff during the February 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI #11 Please provide the following:

a) The specific location for each of the primary and backup instrument channel displays.

b) Please describe the evaluation used to validate that the display location can be accessed without unreasonable delay following a BOB event. Include an estimate of the time available for personnel to access the display as well as the actual time it will take for personnel to access the display. Additionally, please include a description of the radiological and environmental conditions on the paths personnel might take. Describe whether the display location remains habitable for radiological, heat and humidity, and other environmental conditions following a BOB event. Describe whether personnel would continuously monitor the display or access the display location on demand.

c) If a display will be located somewhere other than the control room or alternate shutdown panel, please describe the evaluation used to validate that the display location can be accessed without unreasonable delay following a BOB event.

Include the time available for personnel to access the display as credited in the evaluation, as well as the actual time (e.g., based on walk-throughs) that it will take for personnel to access the display. Additionally, please include a description of the radiological and environmental conditions on the paths personnel might take. Describe whether the display location remains habitable for radiological, heat and humidity, and other environmental conditions following a BOB event. Describe whether personnel are continuously stationed at the display or monitor the display periodically.

3.12 Programmatic Controls: Training of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that Personnel shall be trained in the use and the provision of alternate power to the primary and backup instrument channels.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that The personnel performing functions associated with these SFP level instrumentation channels shall be trained to perform the job specific functions necessary for their assigned tasks (maintenance, calibration, surveillance, etc.).

SFP instrumentation should be installed via the normal modification processes.

In some cases, utilities may choose to utilize portable instrumentation as a portion of their SFP instrumentation response. In either case utilities should use the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) to identify the population to be trained. The SAT process should also determine both the initial and continuing elements of the required training.

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part, that Personnel performing functions associated with these SFP level instrumentation channels will be trained to perform the job specific functions necessary for their assigned tasks (maintenance, calibration, surveillance, etc.) This training will be

consistent with equipment vendor guidelines, instructions and recommendations.

This training will be consistent with equipment vendor guidelines, instructions and recommendations. The Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) will be used to identify the population to be trained and to determine the initial and continuing elements of the required training. Training will be completed prior to placing the instrumentation in service.

The licensee's proposed plan to train personnel in the use and the provision of alternate power to the primary and backup instrument channels, including the approach to identify the population to be trained, appears to be consistent with NEI 12-02, as endorsed by the ISG.

3.13 Programmatic Controls: Procedures of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that Procedures shall be established and maintained for the testing, calibration, and use of the primary and backup spent fuel pool instrument channels.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that Procedures will be developed using guidelines and vendor instructions to address the maintenance, operation and abnormal response issues associated with the new SFP instrumentation.

In its OIP, the licensee stated that procedures would be developed using guidelines and vendor instructions to address the maintenance, operation and abnormal response issues associated with the primary and backup channels of SFP instrumentation.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The current plan for the SFPI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013 with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014.

Following the issue of the design, procedures will start being developed with a projected July 2014 completion date. The requested information will be provided in the August 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

The NRC staff notes that in its letter dated August 28, 2013, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Not Started" and that the information will be provided during the August 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI #12 Please provide a list of the procedures addressing operation (both normal and abnormal response), calibration, test, maintenance, and inspection procedures that will be developed for use of the spent SFP instrumentation. Please provide a brief description of the specific technical objectives to be achieved within each procedure.

3.14 Programmatic Controls: Testing and Calibration of Order EA-12-051 states, in part, that Processes shall be established and maintained for scheduling and .implementing necessary testing and calibration of the primary and backup spent fuel pool level instrument channels to maintain the instrument channels at the design accuracy.

NEI 12-02 states, in part, that Processes shall be established and maintained for scheduling and implementing necessary testing and calibration of the primary and backup SFP level instrument channels to maintain the instrument channels at the design accuracy. The testing and calibration of the instrumentation shall be consistent with vendor recommendations or other documented basis.

In its OIP, the licensee stated, in part that Processes shall be established and maintained for scheduling and implementing necessary testing and calibration of the primary and backup SFP level instrument channels to maintain the instrument channels at the design accuracy. The testing and calibration of the instrumentation shall be consistent with vendor recommendations or other documented basis. Calibration shall be specific to the mounted instrument and the monitor.

Surveillances or testing to validate functionality of an installed instrument channel shall be performed within 60 days of a planned refueling outage considering normal testing scheduling allowances (e.g., 25%). This is not required to be performed more than once per 12 months.

The primary or back-up instrument channel can be out of service for testing, maintenance and/or calibration for up to 90 days provided the other channel is functional. Additionally, compensatory actions must be taken if the instrumentation channel is not expected to be restored or is not restored within 90 days. If both channels become non-functioning then initiate actions within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore one of the channels of instrumentation and implement compensatory actions (e.g., use of alternate suitable equipment or supplemental personnel) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

If a single SFP for the purposes of this order is divided by the closure of a normally open gate(s) such that a portion of the SFP containing fuel used for power production within the last five years is no longer able to be monitored by a required SFP instrumentation channel, then the actions described above must be taken for the impacted instrumentation channel.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The current plan for the SF PI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013 with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014.

Following the issue of the design, procedures will start being developed with a projected July 2014 completion date. The requested information will be provided in the August 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

The NRC staff notes that in its August 28, 2013, letter, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Not Started" and that the information will be provided during the August 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAI #13 Please provide the following:

a) Further information describing the maintenance and testing program the licensee will establish and implement to ensure that regular testing and calibration is performed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements. Include a description of your plans for ensuring that necessary channel checks, functional tests, periodic calibration, and maintenance will be conducted for the level measurement system and its supporting equipment.

b) A description of how the guidance in NEI12-02, Section 4.3 regarding compensatory actions for one or both non-functioning channels will be addressed.

c) A description of what compensatory actions are planned in the event that one of the instrument channels cannot be restored to functional status within 90 days.

(This information was previously requested as RA/-11 in the NRC Jetter dated June 7, 2013) 3.15 Instrument Reliability NEI 12-02 states, in part, that A spent fuel pool level instrument channel is considered reliable when the instrument channel satisfies the design elements listed in Section 3 [Instrument Design Features] of this guidance and the plant operator has fully implemented the programmatic features listed in Section 4 [Program Features].

In its OIP, the licensee stated that the reliability of the primary and backup instrument channels will be assured by conformance with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 and NEI 12-02. Upon acceptable resolution of the RAis noted above, the NRC staff will be able to make a conclusion regarding the reliability of the SFP instrumentation.

In its letter dated July 3, 2013, the licensee stated, in part, that The current plan for the SFPI design of the system based on the current Exelon Nuclear program schedule for LaSalle started the design phase in June of 2013 with design completion and 100% acceptance of the design in January 2014.

Following the issue of the design, procedures will start being developed with a projected July 2014 completion date. The requested information will be provided in the August 2014, 6-month Integrated Plan Update.

The NRC staff notes that in its August 28, 2013, letter, the licensee identified the status of this activity as "Not Started" and that the information will be provided during the August 2014, 6-month integrated plan update. The staff has identified this request as:

RAJ #13 Please provide the following:

a} Further information describing the maintenance and testing program the licensee will establish and implement to ensure that regular testing and calibration is performed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements. Include a description of your plans for ensuring that necessary channel checks, functional tests, periodic calibration, and maintenance will be conducted for the level measurement system and its supporting equipment.

b) A description of how the guidance in NEI12-02, Section 4.3 regarding compensatory actions for one or both non-functioning channels will be addressed.

c) A description of what compensatory actions are planned in the event that one of the instrument channels cannot be restored to functional status within 90 days.

(This information was previously requested as RAI-11 in the NRC letter dated June 7, 2013) 3.15 Instrument Reliability NEI 12-02 states, in part, that A spent fuel pool level instrument channel is considered reliable when the instrument channel satisfies the design elements listed in Section 3 [Instrument Design Features] of this guidance and the plant operator has fully implemented the programmatic features listed in Section 4 [Program Features].

In its OIP, the licensee stated that the reliability of the primary and backup instrument channels will be assured by conformance with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 and NEI 12-02. Upon acceptable resolution of the RAis noted above, the NRC staff will be able to make a conclusion regarding the reliability of the SFP instrumentation.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff is unable to complete its evaluation regarding the acceptability of the licensee's plans for implementing the requirements of Order EA-12-051 due to the need for additional information as described above. The staff will issue an evaluation with its conclusion after the licensee has provided the requested information.

• ML13275A145 *via email OFFICE NRR/DORLILPL3-2/PM NRRJDORL/LPL3-2/LA NRR/DSS/SBPB/BC NAME NDiFrancesco SRohrer GCasto DATE 10/1/13 10/2/13 9/25/13 OFFICE NRR/DE/EICB/BC OGC (NLO)

NAME JThorp BKiuka DATE 9/24/2013 10/21/13 OFFICE NRR/DORLILPL3-2/BC NRRJDORLILPL3-2/PM NAME TTate NDiFrancesco DATE 11/19/2013 11/26/2013