ML13247A234

CW-2013-08 Final Op Test

ML13247A234
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	08/27/2013
From:	Kelly Clayton Operations Branch IV
To:	Union Electric Co
laura hurley
References
50-483/13-008
Download: ML13247A234 (203)

Text

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: __Callaway_______________________ Date of Examination: _8/27/13______

Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 2013 Re-Exam Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

RSA-1 R Review ECP Calculation Conduct of Operations 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or N limitations associated with reactivity management. (4.6)

RSA-2 R Determine the volume and RMCS control settings for raising RWST level Conduct of Operations D 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (4.2)

RSA-3 R Review CCP Surveillance for Operability Equipment Control 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (4.1)

N RSA-4 R Determine Maximum Allowable Stay Time Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under M normal or emergency conditions. (3.7)

RSA-5 R Classify Emergency Events Requiring Emergency Plan Implementation Emergency Procedures/Plan D 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (4.6)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

Administrative Topic Outline Task Summary RSA-1: Review ECP Calculation The Applicant will review an ECP calculation performed in accordance with OSP-SF-00005 Estimated Critical Position Calculation. The critical steps include identifying the errors of using the wrong temperature used, wrong boron worth, and identifying wrong maximum rod height.

This is a new JPM.

RSA-2: Determine the volume and RMCS control settings for raising RWST level The Applicant will determine the potentiometer settings for Boric Acid and Blended flow using RWST level/volume curves and OTN-BG-002, Reactor Makeup Control and Boron Thermal Regeneration System. The critical steps include determining the volume to be added to the RWST, interpolating curves to determine Boric Acid and Makeup Water flows, and determining the potentiometer settings for Boric Acid and Blended flow.

This JPM is from the bank and was used on the 2005 ILT SRO Exam.

RSA-3: Review CCP Surveillance for Operability The Applicant will review Attachment 2 of OSP-BG-P005B Centrifugal Charging Pump B Inservice Test - Group and identify the pump D/P was calculated incorrectly. The critical steps include identifying the calculation error, declaring the pump inoperable and entering the correct Technical Specification.

This is a new JPM.

RSA-4: Determine Maximum Allowable Stay Time The Applicant will determine the allowable stay time using a RWP and Survey Map. The critical steps include determining the correct RWP, dosimeter setting, dose rate from survey map, and calculate stay time.

This JPM is modified from a bank JPM that was used on the 2005 ILT SRO Exam RSA-5: Classify Emergency Events Requiring Emergency Plan Implementation The Applicant will be given a set of plant conditions and will implement the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) to classify the event within 15 minutes (Time Critical)

This JPM is from the bank and has not been used on an ILT exam since 2004.

CALLAWAY ENERGY CENTER JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: RSA-1 rev2 KSA No: GEN 2.1.37 Revision: August 2013 KSA Rating: 4.6 Job

Title:

SRO Task

Title:

Review ECP Calculation.

Validation Time: 20 minutes Learning Objective: T61.003A 6, LP A-12, Obj D, Given the procedure and actual plant data, Calculate an Estimated Critical Position.

The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be:

[ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

Task Performer:

Location of Performance:

Control Room Simulator/Lab Plant Classroom X Method of Performance: Simulated Performed X Alternate Path: ___ ___ Time Critical: ___ ___

Student Handouts: OSP-SF-00005 Estimated Critical Position Calculation Curve Book Table 1-8 WINPCNDR Handouts Calculator

References:

OSP-SF-00005 Estimated Critical Position Calculation Plant Curve Book

JPM NO: RSA-1, Rev 1 Initial Conditions: The plant was shutdown for R19 on 4/8/13 at 0322. The refueling outage is complete. The Start-up is scheduled for 5/26/13 at 1200.

• Reactor Engineering department has reported that the ECP program is not available and that the ECP will be calculated using Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005.

• XEPRED EFPD=0 DATA from various computer programs XEPRED EFPD 0 PCNDR, section 7 BOL critical boron 1421 ppm concentration to control at HZP, ARO, (k=1.0)

Anticipated RCS Tavg at 557°F startup

• The Nuclear engineers have determined that the amount of negative reactivity to be -242.2 pcm for Step 6.9.3.

• It is desired to calculate boron concentration for the ECP.

Initiating Cues: The Shift Manager has directed you to review and approve the completed Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005 Estimated Critical Position Calculation using the printouts and information provided by the Reactor engineer. Inform the Shift Manager of any issues with the calculation.

Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the Applicant will have identified the errors Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005 Estimated Critical Position Calculation.

START TIME:

STOP TIME:

PAGE 1 of 2

JPM NO: RSA1, Rev 1 JPM TASK PERFORMANCE STEP ELEMENT STANDARD SCORE Provide the candidate with a copy of OSP-SF-00005 Estimated Critical Position Calculation and the print outs from WinPCNDR S U

• 1. Candidate reviews Applicant identifies the errors and Attachment 1 of OSP-SF- informs the Shift Manager. See KEY Comments:

00005 Estimated Critical for correct data.

Position Calculation Critical steps of the Attachment are marked on the KEY.

Error 1 wrong temperature in step 6.8.1 Wrong differential boron worth in step 6.12.2 Wrong Max rod height in step 6.14.4 S U

2. The JPM is complete Record stop time on Page 1 Comments:

Denotes Critical Step PAGE 2 of 2

Initial Conditions: The plant was shutdown for R19 on 4/8/13 at 0322. The refueling outage is complete. The Start-up is scheduled for 5/26/13 at 1200.

• Reactor Engineering department has reported that the ECP program is not available and that the ECP will be calculated using Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005.

• XEPRED EFPD=0 DATA from various computer programs XEPRED EFPD 0 PCNDR, section 7 BOL critical boron 1421 ppm concentration to control at HZP, ARO, (k=1.0)

Anticipated RCS Tavg at 557°F startup

• The Nuclear engineers have determined that the amount of negative reactivity to be -242.2 pcm for Step 6.9.3.

• It is desired to calculate boron concentration for the ECP.

Initiating Cues: The Shift Manager has directed you to review and approve the completed Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005 Estimated Critical Position Calculation using the printouts and information provided by the Reactor engineer. Inform the Shift Manager of any issues with the calculation.

OSP-SF-00005 ESTIMATED CRITICAL POSITION CALCULATION MINOR Revision 019 Page 1 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 ESTIMATED CRITICAL POSITION CALCULATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 PURPOSE ...................................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 ACCEPTANCE/FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA .............................................................................. 3 4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ....................................................................................... 3 5.0 PREREQUISITES ......................................................................................................................... 5 6.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS ................................................................................................. 6 6.1. Critical Condition Prior To Last Shutdown .......................................................................... 6 6.2. Pre-Shutdown Reactivity From Rods ................................................................................... 7 6.3. Critical Boron Concentrations .............................................................................................. 7 6.4. Power Defect ....................................................................................................................... 8 6.5. Fission Products At Shutdown ............................................................................................. 9 6.6. Total Reactivity At Time Of Shutdown ................................................................................ 9 6.7. Fission Products At Startup ................................................................................................ 10 6.8. Temperature At Startup ...................................................................................................... 10 6.9. Desired Critical Rod Height ............................................................................................... 11 6.10. Desired Critical Boron Concentration................................................................................. 12 6.11. Total Reactivity ................................................................................................................. 12 6.12. Critical Boron Concentration ............................................................................................. 13 6.13. Critical Rod Height ............................................................................................................ 14 6.14. Rod Limits ......................................................................................................................... 15 7.0 RESTORATION ......................................................................................................................... 17

8.0 REFERENCES

............................................................................................................................ 17 8.1. Implementing ..................................................................................................................... 17 8.2. Developmental ................................................................................................................... 17 9.0 RECORDS ................................................................................................................................... 17 10.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES ....................................................................................................... 18 ATTACHMENT 1, Estimated Critical Position Calculation .................................................................... 19 ATTACHMENT 2, Input Guidelines For Estimated Critical Position Calculation ................................... 22 Page 2 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 ESTIMATED CRITICAL POSITION CALCULATION 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1. To determine critical rod height.

1.2. To determine critical boron concentration.

2.0 SCOPE Used for reactor startup calculations.

3.0 ACCEPTANCE/FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to achieving reactor criticality; verify that the predicted critical control bank position is within the limits of T/S LCO 3.1.6 per the requirements of T/S SR 3.1.6.1.

4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4.1. The average moderator temperature for criticality shall be greater than or equal to 551°F.

4.2. When the reactor has been shutdown for less than 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />, the Estimated Critical Position/Boron Concentration shall be recalculated whenever the estimated number of hours from actual criticality to predicted criticality differ by more than one hour.

4.3. Curve Book Figures referenced in this procedure are controlled per ETP-ZZ-00015, Preparation, Review, Approval and Control of the Curve Book.

4.4. Data may be obtained as applicable from the following approved software programs for the current cycle:

• ECP

• PC Nuclear Design Report (PCNDR)

• WinPCNDR

• XENON_PREDICTION

• XEPRED

• Applicable Plant Computer Points 4.5. Design end of life may be obtained from plant computer point REK1531, or Curve Book Table 12-1CC.

Page 3 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 4.6. In some cases, the pre-shutdown reference reactivity data may be more accurate if the data is obtained at equilibrium conditions rather than at conditions just prior to the shutdown. For example, if a rapid downpower is commenced prior to the reactor shutdown, then more accurate reference reactivity data may be obtained from equilibrium conditions just prior to the downpower rather than from transient conditions just prior to the reactor shutdown.

4.6.1. Based on the discussion in Step 4.6, the pre-shutdown reference reactivity data may be obtained from equilibrium conditions at some time prior to the shutdown rather than from conditions immediately prior to the time of shutdown. Guidance for selecting reference reactivity data may be found in Attachment 2.

4.6.2. Caution should be taken to ensure that all pre-shutdown reference reactivity data is selected for a consistent reference time (i.e., data for bank height, boron concentration, power level, xenon reactivity, and samarium reactivity should be selected for the same reference time.)

-END OF SECTION-Page 4 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 5.0 PREREQUISITES 5.1. CHECK the plant is in MODE 3 or 4.

5.2. DETERMINE the desired time for criticality.

-END OF SECTION-Page 5 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS NOTE The ECP software should be used to determine the ECP and ECB. Section 6.0 should be used for guidance in obtaining the necessary input for the ECP software. The computer printout should be filed as a record of the ECP.

The approved program should be located in folder I:\NUCENG\SYSTEMS\REACTOR\SOFTWARE\APPROVED\ECP. If the ECP program in this folder is not available, Reactor Engineering should be contacted for the approved software.

If the software program is NOT being used, data in the following steps will be recorded on Attachment 1.

6.1. Critical Condition Prior To Last Shutdown 6.1.1. RECORD the shutdown date and time, referring to Attachment 2 for additional guidance.

6.1.2. RECORD the predicted startup date and time.

6.1.3. RECORD the burnup in EFPD using one of the following:

• REU1523, BURN UP

• XEPRED

-END OF SECTION-Page 6 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.2. Pre-Shutdown Reactivity From Rods 6.2.1. OBTAIN the pre-shutdown controlling bank information as follows:

a. IF at the beginning of a cycle AND power has not yet exceeded 5%, RECORD the following information for pre-shutdown conditions:

• Bank D

• 228 steps

b. IF power in the current cycle has exceeded 5%, RECORD the following information from pre-shutdown conditions, referring to Attachment 2 for additional guidance:

• The controlling control rod bank.

• The step counters readings for the controlling control rod bank height.

NOTE Other sources of rod worth data may be used during physics testing as determined by Reactor Engineering.

6.2.2. Using the rod information from Step 6.2.1, DETERMINE and RECORD the amount of pre-shutdown negative reactivity using one of the following:

• WinPCNDR

• PCNDR, Section 5

-END OF SECTION-6.3. Critical Boron Concentrations 6.3.1. OBTAIN the critical boron concentration as follows:

a. IF at the beginning of a cycle AND power has not yet exceeded 5%, RECORD the critical boron concentration from the BOL critical boron concentration to control at HZP, ARO, (k=1.0) from PCNDR, Section 7.

b. IF power in the current cycle has exceeded 5%, RECORD the most recent sample under stable RCS conditions, referring to Attachment 2 for additional guidance.

6.3.2. CHECK which source was used to obtain critical boron.

-END OF SECTION-Page 7 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.4. Power Defect 6.4.1. OBTAIN the power level before shutdown as follows:

a. IF at the beginning of a cycle AND power has not yet exceeded 5%, RECORD zero for power level before shutdown.

b. IF power in the current cycle has exceeded 5%, RECORD the highest indicated power level the last time Keff was equal to one using one of the following and referring to Attachment 2 for additional guidance:

• Power range meters N41A, N42A, N43A, or N44A

• SE NR-45 Recorder after a Rx trip

• REU1150, 1 MIN AVG NIS POWER

• REU1117, RX THERMAL POWER

• REU0485M, 1 MIN AVG OF RCL AVG DT 6.4.2. OBTAIN the total power defect as follows:

a. IF power level was less than 0% the last time Keff was equal to one, RECORD zero for the total power defect.

b. RECORD the total power defect for the power level recorded in Step 6.4.1 using one of the following:

• WinPCNDR

• PCNDR, Section 5

-END OF SECTION-Page 8 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.5. Fission Products At Shutdown 6.5.1. OBTAIN the negative reactivity from xenon at shutdown as follows:

a. IF at the beginning of a cycle AND power has not yet exceeded 5%, RECORD zero.

b. IF power in the current cycle has exceeded 5%, RECORD xenon reactivity prior to the time of shutdown using one of the following and referring to Attachment 2 for additional guidance:

• REU1504, XE WORTH (PCM)

• XENON_PREDICTION

• XEPRED 6.5.2. OBTAIN the negative reactivity from samarium at shutdown as follows:

a. IF at the beginning of a cycle AND power has not yet exceeded 5%, RECORD zero.

b. IF power in the current cycle has exceeded 5%, RECORD samarium reactivity prior to the time of shutdown using one of the following and referring to Attachment 2 for additional guidance:

• REU1505, SM WORTH (PCM)

• XENON_PREDICTION

• XEPRED

-END OF SECTION-6.6. Total Reactivity At Time Of Shutdown NOTE This is the total negative reactivity due to rods, power defect, xenon, and samarium at the time of the last shutdown.

6.6.1. RECORD the algebraic sum the reactivities from Steps 6.2.2, 6.4.2, 6.5.1, and 6.5.2.

-END OF SECTION-Page 9 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.7. Fission Products At Startup 6.7.1. OBTAIN the negative reactivity from xenon at startup using one of the following:

a. IF at the beginning of a cycle AND power has not yet exceeded 5%, RECORD zero.

b. IF power in the current cycle has exceeded 5%, RECORD xenon reactivity at time of startup using one of the following:

• XENON_PREDICTION

• XEPRED 6.7.2. OBTAIN the negative reactivity from samarium at startup using one of the following:

a. IF at the beginning of a cycle AND power has not yet exceeded 5%, RECORD zero.

b. IF power in the current cycle has exceeded 5%, RECORD samarium reactivity at time of startup using one of the following:

• XENON_PREDICTION

• XEPRED

-END OF SECTION-6.8. Temperature At Startup NOTE The lowest loop RCS Tavg shall be greater than 551°F. [Ref: 8.1.4]

6.8.1. RECORD the anticipated average RCS Tavg at startup.

6.8.2. RECORD the temperature difference between the anticipated temperature at startup and the no-load programmed average temperature of 557 °F.

6.8.3. CALCULATE the isothermal temperature coefficient for the anticipated average temperature and boron concentration at startup using one of the following:

• WinPCNDR

• PCNDR, Section 5 Page 10 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.8.4. CALCULATE the reactivity associated with a temperature other than that of the no-load value by multiplying the temperature difference in Step 6.8.2 by the isothermal temperature coefficient Step 6.8.3.

-END OF SECTION-6.9. Desired Critical Rod Height CAUTION The Rod Insertion Limits of Curve Book Figure 13-1 and the Rod Withdrawal Limits of Curve Book Figure 2-13 shall be observed at all times.

6.9.1. IF it is desired to specify critical boron concentration and calculate rod height, PERFORM Section 6.10 and MARK Section 6.9 N/A.

6.9.2. DETERMINE Integral Rod Worth with D Control Bank at 170 steps using one of the following: [Ref: 8.2.7]

• WinPCNDR

• PCNDR, Section 5 6.9.3. ADD 200 pcm or more of negative reactivity to IRW at 170 steps to determine the IRW for a desired rod height at least 200 pcm below Control Bank D at 170 steps.

6.9.4. Using one of the following, DETERMINE the desired critical rod height for the IRW determined in step 6.9.3: [Ref: 8.2.7, 8.2.8]

• WinPCNDR

• PCNDR, Section 5

-END OF SECTION-Page 11 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.10. Desired Critical Boron Concentration NOTE After RCS boron adjustments and sampling are complete, it may be necessary to recalculate the ECP by entering the actual RCS boron concentration in Step 6.10.2.

6.10.1. IF it is desired to specify rod height and calculate critical boron concentration, PERFORM Section 6.9 and MARK Section 6.10 N/A.

6.10.2. RECORD the desired boron concentration for the startup.

6.10.3. CALCULATE the change in boron concentration by subtracting the last critical boron concentration in Step 6.3.1 from the desired boron concentration in Step 6.10.2.

6.10.4. RECORD the differential boron worth using one of the following:

• WinPCNDR

• PCNCR, Section 6 6.10.5. CALCULATE the change in reactivity due to boron by multiplying the change in boron concentration in Step 6.10.3 by the differential boron worth in Step 6.10.4.

-END OF SECTION-6.11. Total Reactivity NOTE The correction factor accounts for a bias observed in other startups.

6.11.1. RECORD the ECP Correction Factor from the Curve Book: Table 1-8.

Page 12 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.11.2. ALGEBRAICALLY SUM the reactivities for the following to obtain the reactivity that will be present in the core at startup relative to the last time Keff was equal to one:

• Xenon from Step 6.7.1

• Samarium from Step 6.7.2

• Temperature from Step 6.8.4

• ECP correction factor from Step 6.11.1

• One of the following:

• Rods from Step 6.9.3

• Boron from Step 6.10.5 6.11.3. ALGEBRAICALLY SUBTRACT Step 6.11.2 from Step 6.6.1 on the ECP calculation.

-END OF SECTION-6.12. Critical Boron Concentration 6.12.1. IF rod height is being calculated, MARK Section 6.12 N/A and PERFORM Section 6.13.

6.12.2. RECORD the differential boron worth for the estimated boron concentration at the predicted temperature at startup using one of the following:

• WinPCNDR

• PCNDR, Section 6 6.12.3. CALCULATE the required boron change by dividing the reactivity difference in Step 6.11.3 by the differential boron worth in Step 6.12.2.

6.12.4. CALCULATE the required boron concentration for startup by algebraically adding the required boron concentration change in Step 6.12.3 to the last critical boron concentration in Section 6.3.

-END OF SECTION-Page 13 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.13. Critical Rod Height 6.13.1. IF critical boron concentration is being calculated, MARK Section 6.13 N/A and PERFORM Section 6.12.

CAUTION The Rod Insertion Limits of Curve Book Figure 13-1 and the Rod Limits of Curve Book Figure 2-13 shall be observed at all times.

6.13.2. Using the reactivity difference in Step 6.11.3, DETERMINE the rod height from one of the following:

• WinPCNDR

• PCNDR, Section 5

-END OF SECTION-Page 14 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 6.14. Rod Limits 6.14.1. RECORD the remaining control bank reactivity worth from Step 6.9.3 IF calculating critical boron worth or 6.11.3 IF calculating critical rod height.

NOTE If the calculated Minimum Rod Height is lower than the RIL, the RIL will be used as the Minimum Rod Height. [Ref: 8.2.7]

6.14.2. DETERMINE Minimum Rod Height for ECP as follows:

a. Subtract 500 pcm from the value in Step 6.14.1.

b. Using one of the following, DETERMINE the rod position of the IRW calculated in Step 6.14.2.a:

• WinPCNDR

• PCNDR, Section 5

c. IF the position calculated in Step 6.14.2.b is higher than the RIL, ENTER the position.

NOTE Establishing the minimum rod height as the RIL satisfies the Acceptance Criteria of Section 3.0.

d. IF the position calculated in Step 6.14.2.b is lower than the RIL, ENTER the RIL.

Page 15 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 NOTE If the maximum position reactivity is zero or positive, or the calculated Maximum Rod Height is higher than Control Bank D at 170 steps, Control Bank D at 170 steps will be used as the Maximum Rod Height.

If the calculated Maximum Rod Height is higher than the control rod withdrawal limit at 0% power from Curve Book Figure 2-13, the withdrawal limit will be used as the Maximum Rod Height.

6.14.3. DETERMINE Maximum Rod Height for ECP as follows:

a. ADD 500 pcm to the value in Step 6.14.1.

b. IF the result of Step 6.14.3.a is zero or positive, ENTER 170 steps on Bank D.

c. IF the result of Step 6.14.3.a is negative, PERFORM the following:

1. Using one of the following, DETERMINE the rod position for the IRW calculated in Step 6.14.3.a:

• WinPCNDR

• PCNDR, Section 5

2. ENTER the lower of the two following positions: [Ref: 8.2.7]

• Position calculated in Step 6.14.3.c.1

• 170 steps on Control Bank D 6.14.4. IF the position determined in Step 6.14.3 is higher than the control rod withdrawal limit at 0% power from Curve Book Figure 2-13, ENTER the withdrawal limit from Figure 2-13 as the Max Rod Height instead of the position determined in Step 6.14.3.

-END OF SECTION-Page 16 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 7.0 RESTORATION None

8.0 REFERENCES

8.1. Implementing 8.1.1. ODP-ZZ-00016, Reactor Operator Watchstation Practices And Logs 8.1.2. T/S LCO 3.1.6 8.1.3. T/S SR 3.1.6.1 8.1.4. T/S LCO 3.4.2 8.2. Developmental 8.2.1. Curve Book: Table 1-8, Figure 2-13, Figure 13-1 8.2.2. ETP-ZZ-00015, Preparation, Review, Approval and Control of the Curve Book 8.2.3. ETP-ZZ-00012, Inverse Count Rate Ratio 8.2.4. Nuclear Design Report 8.2.5. CAR 200303622 8.2.6. CAR 200303929 8.2.7. CAR 200207983 8.2.8. CAR 200509793 9.0 RECORDS Records generated by this procedure are filed with the appropriate work authorizing document.

9.1. Attachment 1, Estimated Critical Position Calculation Page 17 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 10.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES Section or Step Page(s) Description Number 4, 6, 7, 8, 4.6, 6.1.1, Added steps to explain Attachment 2 usage. Per CARS 201200291 9 6.2.1.b, 6.3.1.b, and 201204504 6.4.1.b, 6.5.1.b, 6.5.2.b 17 8.1.1 Added Reference 22 Attachment 2 Added attachment. Per CARS 201200291 and 201204504 Page 18 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 Attachment 1 Estimated Critical Position Calculation Sheet 1 of 3 Person Completing Initials/PIN Date & Time STEP 6.1.1 Shutdown Date _______ Time _______

6.1.2 Startup Date _______ Time _______

6.1.3 Burnup EFPD _______

NOTE Recalculate the ECP if the reactor has been shutdown less than 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />, and the estimated time of criticality will differ from the actual time of criticality by greater than one hour.

6.2 Pre-Shutdown Reactivity From Rods 6.2.1 Controlling Bank _______

6.2.1 Step Counter _______

6.2.2 Controlling Bank Rod Reactivity (-) ______pcm 6.3 Critical Boron Concentrations 6.3.1 Critical Boron Concentration ______ppm 6.3.2 ______PCNDR Section 7

______Boron sample 6.4 Power Defect 6.4.1 Power level before shutdown _______%

6.4.2 Total Power Defect (-) ______pcm 6.5 Fission Products At Shutdown 6.5.1 Xenon reactivity (-) ______pcm 6.5.2 Samarium reactivity (-) ______pcm 6.6 Total Reactivity At Time Of Shutdown __________________

6.6.1 Algebraic sum of Steps: 6.2.2, 6.4.2, 6.5.1, and 6.5.2 (-) ______pcm Page 19 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 Attachment 1 (Cont'd.)

Sheet 2 of 3 6.7 Fission Products At Startup 6.7.1 Xenon reactivity (-) ______pcm 6.7.2 Samarium reactivity (-) ______pcm 6.8 Temperature At Startup 6.8.1 Anticipated RCS avg temp at startup ______°F 6.8.2 Temp difference from 557°F ( ) ______°F 6.8.3 Isothermal Temp Coefficient ( ) ______pcm/°F 6.8.4 Temperature reactivity (Step 6.8.2 X 6.8.3) ( ) ______pcm 6.9 Desired Critical Rod Height 6.9.2 IRW with bank D at 170 steps (-) ______pcm 6.9.3 Step 6.9.2 + (-)200 pcm or more (IRW at desired Rod height) (-) ______pcm 6.9.4 Critical rod height ______steps 6.10 Desired Critical Boron Concentration 6.10.2 Desired startup boron concentration ______ppm 6.10.3 Boron change from last critical (Step 6.10.2 - 6.3.1) ( ) ______ppm 6.10.4 Differential Boron Worth (-) ______pcm/ppm 6.10.5 Reactivity change due to boron (Step 6.10.3 X 6.10.4) ( ) ______pcm 6.11 Total Reactivity 6.11.1 ECP correction factor from Table 1-8 ( ) ______pcm 6.11.2 Reactivity at startup (6.7.1 + 6.7.2 + 6.8.4 + 6.11.1

+ 6.9.3 or 6.10.5) ( ) ______pcm 6.11.3 Reactivity difference (6.6.1 - 6.11.2) ( ) ______pcm 6.12 Critical Boron Concentration 6.12.2 Differential boron worth (-) ______pcm/ppm 6.12.3 Boron change (6.11.3 / 6.12.2) ( ) ______ppm 6.12.4 Required critical boron concentration (6.12.3 + 6.3.1) ______ppm Page 20 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 Attachment 1 (Cont'd.)

Sheet 3 of 3 6.13 Critical Rod Height 6.13.2 Control bank _______ at _______ Steps Minimum Rod Height 6.14.1 Remaining control bank reactivity from 6.9.3 or 6.11.3 ( ) ______pcm

- 500 pcm 6.14.2.a Step 6.14.1 - 500 pcm ( ) ______pcm 6.14.2.c/d Minimum Rod Height Control Bank _______ at _______ Steps Maximum Rod Height 6.14.3 Remaining control bank reactivity from 6.9.3 or 6.11.3 ( ) ______pcm

+ 500 pcm 6.14.3.a Step 6.14.1 + 500 pcm ( ) ______pcm 6.14.3.b/6.14.3.c.2/6.14.4 Maximum Rod Height Control bank _______ at _______ Steps Remarks: ______________________________________________________________________________________

Performed by IV Performed By Approved By (Reactor Engineer) (Reactor Engineer) (Senior Reactor Operator)

Page 21 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-SF-00005 Rev. 019 Attachment 2 Input Guidelines For Estimated Critical Position Calculation Sheet 1 of 1 DATA POINT TYPE OF REACTOR SHUTDOWN Controlled Shutdown Reactor Trip/Rapid Shutdown

-8 Time when 10 data was Time of trip or commencement of Time of Shutdown taken. Note 1 shutdown.

Critical Boron Conc. From most recent RO turnover entry

-8 Critical Rod Height From 10 data. Note 1 or midnight entry, whichever is most Controlling Bank recent.

Power Level Prior to Enter power at time of trip or Use 0%. Note 1 Shutdown commencement of shutdown.

Use poison concentrations Use poison concentrations from Xenon at Time of Shutdown midnight ODP-ZZ-00016 Control Iodine from XEPRED run or Room Computer Log printout if Samarium from curve book. Will power was constant from midnight Promethium need to account for power until trip. Otherwise do XEPRED descension causing xenon run.

and samarium buildup.

Note 1: If available, reference reactivity data should be taken from equilibrium conditions prior to 10-8 data. In this case, input data will be from the equilibrium conditions.

Page 22 of 22 CONTINUOUS USE

CALLAWAY ENERGY CENTER JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: RSA-2 KSA No: GEN 2.1.25 Revision: July 2013 KSA Rating: 4.2 Job

Title:

SRO Task

Title:

Determine the volume and RMCS control settings for raising RWST level Validation Time: 16 minutes Learning Objective: T61.0110.6, LP 11, Obj P, IDENTIFY the BTRS MCB controls, alarms and indications and DESCRIBE how each is used to predict, monitor or control changes in the BTRS System.

The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be:

[ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

Task Performer:

Location of Performance:

Control Room Simulator/Lab Plant Classroom X Method of Performance: Simulated Performed X Alternate Path: __ ____ Time Critical: ___ ___

Student Handouts: OTN-BG-0002 RWST Level/Volume Curve Tank Book Curve Book Straight Edge Calculator

References:

OTN-BG-00002, Reactor Makeup Control and Boron Thermal Regeneration System

JPM NO: RSA-2, Rev 1 Initial Conditions: The unit is coming out of a refueling outage.

A significant leak occurred during the refuel pool draindown process.

RWST level is 92%.

RWST Boron Concentration is 2375 PPM.

BAST concentration is 7000 ppm Initiating Cues: You have been directed to determine the volume addition required to establish the RWST level to 98% and the Reactor Makeup Control System settings to maintain RWST boron concentration at its current value with a makeup flow rate of 90 GPM Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the Applicant will have determined the Volume addition and controls settings within the specified range.

START TIME:

STOP TIME:

PAGE 1 of 3

JPM NO: RSA-2, Rev 1 JPM TASK PERFORMANCE STEP ELEMENT STANDARD SCORE S U

1. Obtain a verified working Applicant obtained working copy of copy of OTN-BG-00002 and OTN-BG-00002 Comments:

determines that Section 5.5 -

MANUAL MODE OF RMCS OPERATION applies.

Refers to RWST Level/Volume S U

2. *Determine the volume to be Curve and determines 23,500 added. Comments:

gallons but 25,500 must be added.

Refers to Figure 7-2 and S U

3. *Determines RMCS settings determines:

based upon required blended Comments:

flow rates

• Boric Acid flow BG-FK-111 potentiometer setting 5.63 +/-.1

• Blended flow BG-FK-110 potentiometer setting 7.63 +/-.1 S U

4. The JPM is complete Record stop time on Page 1 Comments:

Denotes Critical Step PAGE 2 of 3

Initial Conditions: The unit is coming out of a refueling outage.

A significant leak occurred during the refuel pool draindown process.

RWST level is 92%.

RWST Boron Concentration is 2375 PPM.

BAST concentration is 7000 ppm Initiating Cues: You have been directed to determine the volume addition required to establish the RWST level to 98% and the Reactor Makeup Control System settings to maintain RWST boron concentration at its current value with a makeup flow rate of 90 GPM Provide to Examiner when complete:

Volume to be added ___________

Reactor Makeup Control System settings: ___________________________

OTN-BG-00002 REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL AND BORON THERMAL REGENERATION SYSTEM MINOR Revision 041 Page 1 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL AND BORON THERMAL REGENERATION SYSTEM TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 PURPOSE ...................................................................................................................................... 4 2.0 SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................... 4 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ....................................................................................... 4 3.1. Precautions .......................................................................................................................... 4 3.2. Limitations........................................................................................................................... 5 3.3. General Notes ...................................................................................................................... 5 4.0 PREREQUISITES ......................................................................................................................... 7 5.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS ................................................................................................. 8 5.1. Automatic Mode Of RMCS Operation ................................................................................. 8 5.2. Dilute Mode Of RMCS Operation ........................................................................................ 9 5.3. Alternate Dilute Mode Of RMCS Operation ...................................................................... 11 5.4. Borate Mode Of RMCS Operation ..................................................................................... 13 5.5. Manual Mode Of RMCS Operation To CCP Suction (VCT) .............................................. 15 5.6. Manual Mode Of RMCS Operation (RWST-RHUT-BTRS) ............................................... 17 5.7. BTRS Operation - Boration ................................................................................................ 20 5.8. BTRS Operation - Dilution ................................................................................................ 24 5.9. BTRS Operation - Borate To Dilute Mode Change ............................................................ 28 5.10. BTRS Operation - Dilute To Borate Mode Change ............................................................ 31 5.11. Flushing BTRS Demineralizers Using RCS Letdown Flow ................................................ 34 5.12. Flushing BTRS Demineralizers Using Reactor Makeup Water ........................................... 36 5.13. Pressure Testing BTRS With Reactor Makeup Water ......................................................... 41 5.14. Immediate Boration To Support Plant Shutdown................................................................ 44 5.15. Restoration Of The SW Side Of CVCS Chiller Unit From Dry Layup Condition ............... 46 5.16. Placing The SW Side Of CVCS Chiller Unit In Dry Layup Condition................................ 48 5.17. Restoration Of Chilled Water Side Of CVCS Chiller Unit From Dry Layup Condition ...... 50 5.18. Placing The Chilled Water Side Of CVCS Chiller Unit In Dry Layup Condition ................ 53 5.19. Removing BTRS From Service For Maintenance ............................................................... 55 5.20. Filling And Venting BTRS Following Maintenance Using Letdown Or Rx M/U Water ..... 56

6.0 REFERENCES

............................................................................................................................ 61 6.1. Implementing ..................................................................................................................... 61 6.2. Developmental ................................................................................................................... 61 Page 2 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL AND BORON THERMAL REGENERATION SYSTEM TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 7.0 RECORDS ................................................................................................................................... 62 7.1. QA Records ....................................................................................................................... 62 7.2. Commercial Records .......................................................................................................... 62 8.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES ....................................................................................................... 63 ATTACHMENT 1, BTRS Performance Data/Status Log......................................................................... 64 ATTACHMENT 2, RCS Letdown Flow - BTRS Demineralizer Flushing Data ....................................... 65 ATTACHMENT 3, Reactor Makeup Water - BTRS Demineralizer Flushing Data .................................. 66 ATTACHMENT 4, Volume Control Tank Level Control System ............................................................ 67 ATTACHMENT 5, BTRS Controls For BG HIS-27 Indication ............................................................... 68 ATTACHMENT 6, Dilute Mode Of RMCS Operation ............................................................................ 69 ATTACHMENT 7, Alternate Dilute Mode Of RMCS Operation ............................................................. 70 ATTACHMENT 8, Borate Mode Of RMCS Operation ........................................................................... 71 Checklist 1, Removing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers from Dry Lay-up Checklist 2, Placing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers in Dry Lay-up Checklist 3, Locked Valve Restoration Checklist 4, Restoration From Dry Layup Of BTRS Chiller Chill Water Side Page 3 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL AND BORON THERMAL REGENERATION SYSTEM 1.0 PURPOSE To provide instructions for the operation of the Reactor Makeup Control System (RMCS) and the Boron Thermal Regeneration System (BTRS).

2.0 SCOPE This procedure addresses all modes of RCS boration and dilution and also includes:

• Flushing BTRS Demineralizers

• Pressure testing BTRS Demineralizers

• Immediate Boration

• Establishing & Securing From Dry Layup in the CVCS Chiller Unit

• Removing BTRS from Service for Maintenance

• Restoring BTRS to Service 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1. Precautions 3.1.1. The boric acid storage tank level should not be reduced below the minimum required by FSAR 16.1.2.6, if in MODES 1 through 4 or FSAR 16.1.2.5, if in MODES 5 and 6.

Plant Contained  % Level in MODE Volume (gal) One Tank 1, 2, 3, or 4 17,658 70 5 or 6 2,968 10 3.1.2. Whenever a difference of 50 ppm exists, the pressurizer spray should be operated by placing the backup heaters on to equalize the boron concentration in the RCS and pressurizer.

3.1.3. Prior to make up being added to the refueling canal, RCS or Spent Fuel Pool, with all four RCPs secured, recirculation flow should be checked through the RCS (RHR flow greater than or equal to 1000 gpm) or the concentration of the make up should be greater than or equal to 2000 ppm.

3.1.4. At all times when boration/dilution via BTRS is initiated or in progress, the Reactor Coolant Filter must be in service with BGV8421, CVCS RX CLNT FLTR BYP ISO, CLOSED, to prevent possible resin leakage from entering the RCS.

Page 4 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 3.1.5. When placing a BTRS bed into service after an extended period of time or when the bed boron concentration is suspect, letdown flow should be diverted to the RHUT until the desired trend in boron concentration is observed by the Boron Concentration Monitoring System, (BCMS), or chemistry sample.

3.1.6. The recirculation return line to the RWST is non-seismic. To ensure the RWST remains OPERABLE in MODES 1 through 4, no other systems, with the exception of the SI pumps in standby, are aligned to the RWST return header when performing Section 5.6 aligned to the RWST. [Ref: 6.2.13]

3.1.7. Prior to establishing M/U flow for flushing a BTRS Demineralizer bed, BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA COUNTER, must be reset and the counter set to the maximum amount of water that Radwaste can receive. It is important to stop letdown flow through the letdown reheat heat exchanger prior to stopping M/U flow. This will allow cooling of the letdown reheat heat exchanger.

3.1.8. During Reactor Makeup Control System operation, it is permissible to place one of the Boric Acid Transfer Pumps in Pull To Lock. This will allow for maintenance of level in one of the Boric Acid Storage Tanks to prevent Annunciator 37B, BA TKS LEV LO.

3.1.9. When setting BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA COUNTER, and BG FY-110B, BA COUNTER, allowances should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. For instance, the accuracy of both the boric acid integrator BG FY-110B and the total makeup flow integrator BG FY-111B is +/- one count. This equates to +/- 0.1 gal for BG FY-110B and +/- 1.0 gal for BG FY-111B. Differences in setpoint and total flow delivered are also dependent on the amount of time it takes for valves to close and isolate flow once the integrator setpoint has been reached.

3.2. Limitations Under normal conditions, the RMCS should operate in the AUTOMATIC mode. When used in modes other than AUTOMATIC, the system should be returned to AUTOMATIC upon completion of the evolution.

3.3. General Notes 3.3.1. BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, should be adjusted to maintain a constant flow through the BTRS Demineralizer beds. This will allow more accurate results to be obtained for operator aid development.

3.3.2. Demineralizer flushing may be stopped or interrupted as required by plant conditions. However, to minimize the frequency of flushing operations, the Demineralizer should be flushed for the duration determined by the BG System Engineer.

Page 5 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 3.3.3. A new BTRS Demineralizer bed should be flushed in accordance with OTN-BG-00001 ADD05, Operation of the BTRS Demineralizer System, prior to placing the bed into service for the first time.

3.3.4. The BTRS Chiller Unit and Pumps are normally NOT in service.

a. The Service Water Inlet and Outlet Headers are in a dry lay-up condition until the Chiller Unit is required for service. This requires a fill and vent of service water headers prior to the Chiller Unit being placed in service. A dry lay-up condition requires the inlet and outlet service water isolation valves to be LOCKED CLOSED with various vents and drains OPENED.

b. The Chill Water side of the BTRS Chiller is also placed in dry lay-up condition until the Chiller Unit is required for service. Power is removed from the pumps and chiller unit. Some drains and vents are left OPEN with FME screens installed.

3.3.5. During Startup testing of the BTRS system, the following noted items were documented:

a. Operation of BTRS in the Borate mode following an extended period of time in the Dilute mode can initially produce BTRS effluent of approximately 200 ppm greater than the RCS boron concentration.

b. If the Demineralizers are saturated when boration begins, or if the Demineralizers have been recently flushed before starting a dilution, the maximum anticipated change in RCS boron concentration via BTRS is approximately 100 ppm. Under either condition, the maximum change will require 8-10 hours for the Demineralizers to become saturated.

c. Demineralizer inlet temperature as indicated on BG TI-381, LTDN RH HX TUBE SIDE OUTLET TEMP CTRL TEMP IND, should go to between 40°F to 60°F within approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after BTRS has been placed in the Dilute mode, when BTRS is originally at ambient conditions (80°F). This is due to the time required to cool down the associated heat exchangers and piping.

d. Demineralizer inlet temperature, as indicated on BG TI-381, should go to between 135°F and 145°F within approximately 15 minutes after BTRS has been placed in the Borate mode, when BTRS is originally at ambient conditions (80°F).

e. When BTRS is in the Borate mode for more than 30 minutes at a time, Demineralizer inlet temperature, as indicated on BG TI-381, may begin to oscillate +8 to -10°F from the setpoint value.

Page 6 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Step 3.3.5 Cont'd

f. During Borate mode of operation, to prevent the Demineralizer inlet temperature from reaching the BTRS TEMP HI DIVERT alarm setpoint of 156°F or the BTRS TEMP HI alarm setpoint of 150°F, it may be necessary to lower the setpoint on BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, to prevent the oscillations.

3.3.6. Attachment 4, Volume Control Tank Level Control System, provides information on the setpoints and controls of the VCT level.

3.3.7. Attachments 6 through 8 are provided to assist in normal shiftly dilutions/borations of the RCS. It is the intent that the cover page of this procedure and applicable Attachments 6, 7, or 8 be copied for the intended shiftly dilutions/borations discussed at the beginning of shift brief. Copies should be made of the quantity discussed for the incremental dilutions/borations during the shift.

4.0 PREREQUISITES 4.1. WHEN required, ENSURE the following:

• Reactor Makeup Water System is available to supply the RMCS.

• Sufficient boric acid of proper concentration is available to supply the RMCS.

• The Service Water System is available to supply the CVCS Chiller Unit during BTRS operation.

• The CVCS Chiller Surge Tank is within the normal operating range.

4.2. Prior to make up being added to the refueling canal, RCS or Spent Fuel Pool, with all four RCPs secured, MAKE a URO Log entry documenting that either recirculation flow through the RCS (RHR flow) is greater than or equal to 1000 gpm, or that the boron concentration of the make up is greater than or equal to 2000 ppm.

4.3. IF making up to the RWST per Section 5.6 in MODES 1 through 4, ENSURE no other systems, with the exception of the SI pumps in standby, are aligned to the RWST return header.

-END OF SECTION-Page 7 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS NOTE All control switches are on Panel RL001 or RL002 unless otherwise noted.

BG FK-111, REACTOR M/U WTR FLOW CTRL, defaults to 120 gpm when the Reactor Mode Selector Switch is in AUTO.

BGHCV0387, BTRS DEMINS BYP HV, is interlocked such that BGHCV0387 can NOT be taken out of the bypass position unless one of the BTRS Demineralizer Inlet valves is open. This section is sequenced such that this interlock is NOT challenged.

5.1. Automatic Mode Of RMCS Operation NOTE Automatic mode of RMCS controls VCT level between 30% and 50%

5.1.1. DETERMINE the desired boric acid flow rate for blended flow required using Curve Book, Figure 7-2, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Blended Flow for 120 gpm AUTO Makeup and Manual Reduced Flow Rates, or equivalent.

5.1.2. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.1.3. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in AUTO.

5.1.4. SET BG FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, at the desired flow rate and PLACE the controller in AUTO.

5.1.5. PLACE BG FK-111, REACTOR M/U WTR FLOW CTRL, in AUTO.

5.1.6. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

-END OF SECTION-Page 8 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.2. Dilute Mode Of RMCS Operation NOTE A "Nominal 120 gpm Dilution" should be performed per Attachment 6 instead of this section.

5.2.1. DETERMINE the desired dilution volume and flow rate using the following (as applicable):

• Curve Book, Figure 7-5, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Dilution

• Curve Book, Figure 7-6, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Dilution Rate

• Curve Book, Figure 7-8, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Dilution and Boron Addition

• The shiftly Reactivity brief

• Using OpsReactivityCalc software 5.2.2. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.2.3. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in DIL.

5.2.4. SET BG FK-111, REACTOR M/U WTR FLOW CTRL, at the desired dilution flow rate and PLACE the controller in AUTO.

NOTE When setting BG FY-111B, allowance should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. (Step 3.1.9 contains more information, if required.)

5.2.5. SET BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW COUNTER, to deliver the desired amount of makeup water.

5.2.6. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

5.2.7. IF desired, using BG FK-111, ADJUST the flow rate as required by plant conditions.

5.2.8. IF desired to stop the dilution flow before BG FY-111B automatically stops it, PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

Page 9 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.2.9. WHEN dilution is complete, RESTORE from the Dilute Mode as follows:

a. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

b. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in AUTO.

c. ENSURE BG FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, is set to the desired concentration for the current RCS boron concentration.

d. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

-END OF SECTION-Page 10 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.3. Alternate Dilute Mode Of RMCS Operation NOTE A "Nominal 120 gpm Alternate Dilution" should be performed per Attachment 7 instead of this section.

5.3.1. DETERMINE the desired dilution volume and flow rate using the following (as applicable):

• Curve Book, Figure 7-5, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Dilution

• Curve Book, Figure 7-6, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Dilution Rate

• Curve Book, Figure 7-8, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Dilution and Boron Addition

• The shiftly Reactivity brief

• Using OpsReactivityCalc software 5.3.2. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.3.3. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in ALT DIL.

5.3.4. SET BG FK-111, REACTOR M/U WTR FLOW CTRL, at the desired dilution flow rate and PLACE the controller in AUTO.

NOTE When setting BG FY-111B, allowance should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. (Step 3.1.9 contains more information if required.)

5.3.5. SET BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW COUNTER, to deliver the desired amount of makeup water.

Page 11 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 NOTE In the Alternate Dilute Mode, a portion of the dilution flow goes directly to the charging pump suction; therefore, the effects on reactivity will be seen sooner and occur more rapidly.

5.3.6. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

5.3.7. IF desired, using BG FK-111, ADJUST the flow rate as required by plant conditions.

5.3.8. IF desired to stop the dilution flow before BG FY-111B automatically stops it, PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.3.9. WHEN dilution is complete, RESTORE from the Alternate Dilute Mode as follows:

a. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

b. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in AUTO.

c. ENSURE BG FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, is set to the desired concentration for the current RCS boron concentration.

d. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

-END OF SECTION-Page 12 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.4. Borate Mode Of RMCS Operation NOTE A "Normal Frequently Performed Boration" should be performed per Attachment 8 instead of this section.

5.4.1. DETERMINE the desired dilution volume and flow rate using the following (as applicable):

• Curve Book, Figure 7-2, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Blended Flow for 120 gpm AUTO Makeup and Manual Reduced Flow Rates

• Curve Book, Figure 7-3, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Addition

• Curve Book, Figure 7-4, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Addition Rate

• Curve Book, Figure 7-6, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Dilution Rate

• Curve Book, Figure 7-8, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Boron Dilution and Boron Addition

• The shiftly Reactivity brief

• Using OpsReactivityCalc software 5.4.2. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.4.3. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in BOR.

5.4.4. SET BG FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, at the desired boron flow rate and PLACE the controller in AUTO.

NOTE When setting BG FY-110B, allowance should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. (Step 3.1.9 contains more information if required.)

5.4.5. SET BG FY-110B, BA FLOW COUNTER, to deliver the desired amount of boron.

5.4.6. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

Page 13 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.4.7. IF desired, using BG FK-110, ADJUST the flow rate as required by plant conditions.

5.4.8. IF desired to stop the boration flow before BG FY-110B automatically stops it, PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.4.9. WHEN boration is complete, RESTORE from the Boration Mode as follows:

a. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

b. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in AUTO.

c. ENSURE BG FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, is set to the desired concentration for the current RCS boron concentration.

d. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

-END OF SECTION-Page 14 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.5. Manual Mode Of RMCS Operation To CCP Suction (VCT) 5.5.1. DETERMINE the desired boric acid and makeup water flow rates for blended flow using Curve Book, Figure 7-2, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Blended Flow for 120 gpm AUTO Makeup and Manual Reduced Flow Rates.

5.5.2. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.5.3. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in MAN.

5.5.4. SET BG FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, at the desired boron flow rate and PLACE the controller in AUTO.

5.5.5. SET BG FK-111, REACTOR M/U WTR FLOW CTRL, at the desired flow rate and PLACE the controller in AUTO.

NOTE When setting BG FY-111B, allowance should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. (Step 3.1.9 contains more information if required.)

5.5.6. SET BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA COUNTER, to deliver the desired amount of makeup water.

5.5.7. SET BG FY-110B, BA COUNTER, sufficiently high to ensure boric acid flow continues throughout manual makeup.

5.5.8. PLACE BG HIS-111B, MAKEUP TO VCT INLET, in CLOSE.

5.5.9. OPEN BG HIS-110B, MAKEUP TO VCT OUTLET.

Page 15 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 CAUTION BG FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, is normally in AUTO in the Full Open position. During manual makeup to the VCT with low RCS boron concentrations, boric acid will inject at 40 gpm until BG FK-110 throttles back flow, resulting in adding more boron than required.

5.5.10. IF operating near end of cycle with low RCS boron concentration, PERFORM the following

a. PLACE BG FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, in MANUAL

b. REDUCE output to the approximate boric acid addition rate in gpm. (Late in the core cycle this may be close to zero demand.)

NOTE Steps 5.5.10.c and 5.5.11 should be performed concurrently.

c. PLACE BG-FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, in AUTO.

5.5.11. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

5.5.12. WHEN the makeup addition is complete, PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.5.13. PLACE the following in AUTO:

• BG HIS-110B, MAKEUP TO VCT OUTLET

• BG HIS-111B, MAKEUP TO VCT INLET 5.5.14. RESTORE the RMCS to AUTO per Section 5.1.

-END OF SECTION-Page 16 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.6. Manual Mode Of RMCS Operation (RWST-RHUT-BTRS) 5.6.1. ENSURE VCT level is sufficient for expected plant operating conditions for the duration of the makeup.

5.6.2. IF makeup is required to the Spent Fuel Pool, Refer To OTN-EC-00001, Fuel Pool Cooling And Cleanup System.

5.6.3. DETERMINE the desired boric acid and makeup water flow rates for blended flow using Curve Book, Figure 7-2, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs -

Blended Flow for 120 gpm AUTO Makeup and Manual Reduced Flow Rates.

5.6.4. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.6.5. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in MAN.

5.6.6. SET BG FK-110, BA FLOW CTRL, at the desired boron flow rate and PLACE the controller in AUTO.

5.6.7. SET BG FK-111, REACTOR M/U WTR FLOW CTRL, at the desired flow rate and PLACE the controller in AUTO.

NOTE When setting BG FY-111B, allowance should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. (Step 3.1.9 contains more information if required.)

5.6.8. SET BG FY-111B, COMBINED M.U & BA COUNTER, to deliver the desired amount of makeup water.

5.6.9. SET BG-FY-110B, BA COUNTER, sufficiently high to ensure boric acid flow continues throughout manual makeup.

5.6.10. PLACE the following in CLOSE:

• BG HIS-110B, MAKEUP TO VCT OUTLET

• BG HIS-111B, MAKEUP TO VCT INLET Page 17 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.6.11. OPEN the appropriate valve(s) below to align the Boric Acid Blender Outlet to the desired location:

NOTE BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO, and BGV0034, RX M/U WTR TO BTRS ISO, should be entered in the Locked Component Deviation List if performance of this procedure is terminated or postponed prior to restoration of these valves to the LOCKED CLOSED position.

• Makeup to RWST

• BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO (AB-2000 Rm 1318)

• BGV0195, M/U TO RWST HDR ISO (AB-2000 Rm 1318)

• Makeup to RHUT

• BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO (AB-2000 Rm 1318)

• HEV0027, BA BLEND TEE TO RECYC EVAP FEED DEMIN IN (AB-2000 Rm1318)

• Makeup to BTRS

• BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO (AB-2000 Rm 1318)

• BGV0034, RX M/U WTR TO BTRS ISO (AB-1974 Rm 1105) 5.6.12. IF adding water to the RWST, NOTIFY Chemistry that sampling is required.

5.6.13. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

Page 18 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.6.14. WHEN the makeup addition is complete:

a. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

b. RESTORE any components that were manipulated in Step 5.6.11 as follows:

• CLOSE and LOCK BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO.

• CLOSE BGV0195, M/U TO RWST HDR ISO.

• CLOSE HEV0027, BA BLEND TEE TO RECYC EVAP FEED DEMIN IN.

• CLOSE and LOCK BGV0034, RX M/U WTR TO BTRS ISO.

c. RESTORE the RMCS to AUTO per Section 5.1.

d. PLACE the following in AUTO:

• BG HIS-110B, MAKEUP TO VCT OUTLET

• BG HIS-111B, MAKEUP TO VCT INLET

e. PERFORM Checklist 3, Locked Valve Restoration.

f. IF makeup was added to the RWST, PERFORM the following:

NOTE RWST recirc time requirements are determined by Chemistry per CSP-ZZ-07620, Borated Water Sources (BAST-A, BAST-B and RWST).

1. IF makeup was added to the RWST, NOTIFY Chemistry to sample within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the recirc time being met.

2. PLACE the RWST in a recirculation lineup in accordance with OTN-EC-00001, Fuel Pool Cooling And Cleanup System.

-END OF SECTION-Page 19 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.7. BTRS Operation - Boration 5.7.1. IF the BTRS bed to be placed into service is a new resin bed, ENSURE it has been flushed per OTS-BG-00006, Flushing BTRS Demineralizers.

CAUTION Normal alignment for Chiller Unit is service water inlet and outlet headers and chill water side in dry lay-up condition with various vents and drains open.

5.7.2. IF the Chiller Unit is in dry lay-up condition, PERFORM the following:

• Section 5.15 (to fill and vent the Chiller Unit service water headers)

• Section 5.17 (to fill and vent the Chiller Unit chilled water side) 5.7.3. ENSURE Service Water is available to the Chiller unit.

5.7.4. Using the Plant Curve Book as needed, DETERMINE the required increase in boron concentration.

NOTE It is preferred to use Step 5.7.6 for startup of BTRS, since it allows startup of the Chiller and establishes the desired Chilled Water Loop temperatures prior to aligning the BTRS valves and sending CVCS flow through the BTRS piping.

5.7.5. PLACE the BTRS in the Borate Lineup in accordance with either Step 5.7.6 or 5.7.7 below.

5.7.6. IF desired, STARTUP the Chilled Water Loop and PREPARE BTRS for operation in the Borate Mode by performing the following:

a. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

b. ENSURE either of the following CVCS Chiller Pump control switches is in RUN, and the other pump control switch is in STOP:

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B

c. WHEN BG FI-375, CVCS CHILLER SYS FLOW, has stabilized, PLACE BG HIS-21, CVCS CHILLER UNIT, in AUTO.

Page 20 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Step 5.7.6 Cont'd

d. WHEN BG TI-379, CVCS CHILLER SURGE TANK TEMP is between 40°F and 50°F:

1. Refer To Night Orders or the current BTRS Performance Data/Status Log (Attachment 1) for guidance and DETERMINE which Demineralizer(s) to use for the Borate Mode.

2. OPEN the inlet valve for the selected BTRS Demineralizer(s) and CLOSE the inlet valves for the other Demineralizers:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV

e. PLACE BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, in MANUAL and SET to zero.

5.7.7. IF Step 5.7.6 was NOT performed, PREPARE the BTRS for operation in the Borate Mode as follows:

a. ENSURE demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, is set at 100%

(to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

b. ENSURE one of the following CVCS Chiller Pump control switches is in AUTO, and the other is in STOP:

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B

c. ENSURE BG HIS-21, CVCS CHILLER UNIT, is in AUTO.

d. Refer To Night Orders or the current BTRS Performance Data/Status Log (Attachment 1) for guidance and DETERMINE which Demineralizer(s) to use for the Borate Mode.

e. OPEN the inlet valve for the selected BTRS Demineralizer(s) and CLOSE the inlet valves for the other Demineralizers:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV

f. PLACE BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, in MANUAL and SET to zero.

Page 21 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.7.8. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, ENSURE BGHV8245 is OPEN.

5.7.9. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in BORATE.

NOTE , BG HIS-27 BTRS Controls, shows the input into the lights for the DILUTE, OFF and BORATE switch positions. [Ref: 6.2.9]

5.7.10. CHECK the white BORATE light on BG HIS-27 ON.

5.7.11. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, CLOSE BGHV8245.

5.7.12. PLACE BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, in AUTO, and ENSURE it is set below 7.0.

5.7.13. IF the boron concentration of the BTRS bed or piping is known (or suspected) to be different from the current RCS boron concentration:

a. PLACE BG HIS-112A, LTDN DIVERT TO VCT & RHR, in HUT.

b. WHEN the desired trend in boron concentration is observed by BCMS or chemistry sample, PLACE BG HIS-112A, LTDN DIVERT TO VCT & RHR, in VCT.

5.7.14. WHEN BG TI-381, BTRS DEMIN INLET TEMP, stabilizes between 135°F and 145°F:

a. WITHIN 5 minutes before the start of boration, RECORD the data required in Block 1 of Attachment 1.

b. ADJUST BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, to obtain the desired boration rate.

c. RECORD the data required in Block 1A of Attachment 1.

5.7.15. WHEN the desired boron concentration has been established:

a. RECORD the data required in Block 2 of Attachment 1 (required within 5 minutes before completion of the boration).

b. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

c. RECORD the data required in Block 2A of Attachment 1.

Page 22 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 NOTE should be retained at the Reactor Operators desk until the data sheet is filled. When filled, the original copy should be forwarded to the BG System Engineer and a copy retained for reference for the next boration/dilution.

The normal alignment of BTRS is with flow through BGHCV0387.

5.7.16. IF the BTRS mode is to be changed from Borate to Dilute, Go To Section 5.9.

5.7.17. IF normal alignment with flow through BGHCV0387 is desired, N/A Step 5.7.18.

5.7.18. WHEN no additional boration is desired, as determined by the SM/CRS:

a. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, OPEN BGHV8245.

b. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in OFF.

c. ADJUST the RMCS as required by plant conditions.

d. IF desired to place the Chiller Unit in a Dry Lay-up condition, PERFORM the following:

• Section 5.16 (to drain the Chiller Unit service water headers)

• Section 5.18 (to drain the Chiller Unit chilled water side)

-END OF SECTION-Page 23 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.8. BTRS Operation - Dilution 5.8.1. IF the BTRS bed to be placed into service is a new resin bed, ENSURE it has been flushed per OTS-BG-00006, Flushing BTRS Demineralizers.

CAUTION Normal alignment for Chiller Unit is service water inlet and outlet headers and chill water side in dry lay-up condition with various vents and drains open.

5.8.2. IF the Chiller Unit is in dry lay-up condition, PERFORM the following:

• Section 5.15 (to fill and vent the Chiller Unit service water headers)

• Section 5.17 (to fill and vent the Chiller Unit chilled water side) 5.8.3. ENSURE Service Water is available to the Chiller Unit.

5.8.4. Using the Plant Curve Book as needed, DETERMINE the required increase in boron concentration.

NOTE If the BTRS Demineralizers have been flushed or have had new resin installed, the initial RCS dilution rate will be more rapid than normally observed.

Step 5.8.6 is the preferred method to use for startup of BTRS, since it allows startup of the Chiller and establishes desired Chilled Water Loop temperatures prior to aligning the BTRS valves and sending CVCS flow through the BTRS piping.

5.8.5. PLACE the BTRS in the Dilute lineup in accordance with either Step 5.8.6 or 5.8.7 below.

5.8.6. IF desired, STARTUP the Chilled Water Loop and PREPARE the BTRS for operation in the Dilute Mode by performing the following:

a. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

b. ENSURE either of the following CVCS Chiller Pump control switches is in RUN, and the other pump control switch is in STOP:

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B Page 24 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Step 5.8.6 Cont'd

c. WHEN BG FI-375, CVCS CHILLER SYS FLOW, has stabilized, PLACE BG HIS-21, CVCS CHILLER UNIT, in RUN.

d. WHEN BG TI-379, CVCS CHILLER SURGE TANK TEMP is between 40°F and 50°F:

1. Refer To Night Orders or the current BTRS Performance Data/Status Log (Attachment 1) for guidance and DETERMINE which Demineralizer(s) to use for the Borate Mode.

2. OPEN the inlet valve for the selected BTRS Demineralizer(s) and CLOSE the inlet valves for the other Demineralizers:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV 5.8.7. IF Step 5.8.6 was NOT performed, PREPARE the BTRS for operation in the Dilute Mode as follows:

a. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

b. ENSURE ONE of the following CVCS Chiller Pump control switches is in AUTO, and the other pump control switch is in STOP:

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B

c. ENSURE BG HIS-21, CVCS CHILLER UNIT, is in AUTO.

d. Refer To Night Orders or the current BTRS Performance Data/Status Log (Attachment 1) for guidance and DETERMINE which Demineralizer(s) to use for the Dilute Mode.

e. OPEN the inlet valve for the selected BTRS Demineralizer(s) and CLOSE the inlet valves for the other Demineralizers:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV 5.8.8. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, ENSURE BGHV8245 is OPEN.

Page 25 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.8.9. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in DILUTE.

NOTE , BG HIS-27 BTRS Controls, shows the input into the light for the DILUTE, OFF, and BORATE switch positions. [Ref: 6.2.9]

5.8.10. CHECK the white DILUTE light on BG HIS-27 ON.

5.8.11. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, CLOSE BGHV8245.

5.8.12. IF the boron concentration of the BTRS bed or piping is known (or suspected) to be different from the current RCS boron concentration:

a. PLACE BG HIS-112A, LTDN DIVERT TO VCT & RHR, in HUT.

b. WHEN the desired trend in boron concentration is observed by BCMS or chemistry sample, PLACE BG HIS-112A, LTDN DIVERT TO VCT & RHR, in VCT.

5.8.13. WHEN BG TI-381, BTRS DEMIN INLET TEMP, stabilizes between 40°F and 60°F:

a. WITHIN 5 minutes before the start of dilution, RECORD the data required in Block 1 of Attachment 1.

b. ADJUST BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, to obtain the desired dilution rate.

c. RECORD the data required in Block 1A of Attachment 1.

5.8.14. WHEN the desired boron concentration has been established:

a. RECORD the data required in Block 2 of Attachment 1 (required within 5 minutes before completion of the dilution).

b. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

c. RECORD the data required in Block 2A of Attachment 1.

Page 26 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 NOTE should be retained at the Reactor Operators desk until the data sheet is filled. When filled, the original copy should be forwarded to the BG System Engineer and a copy retained for reference for the next boration/dilution.

The normal alignment of BTRS is with flow through BGHCV0387.

5.8.15. IF the BTRS Mode is to be changed from Dilute to Borate, Go To Section 5.10.

5.8.16. IF normal alignment with flow through BGHCV0387 is desired, N/A Step 5.7.18.

5.8.17. WHEN no additional dilution is desired, as determined by the SM/CRS:

a. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, OPEN BGHV8245.

b. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in OFF.

c. ADJUST the RMCS as required by plant conditions.

d. IF desired to place the Chiller Unit in a Dry Lay-up condition, PERFORM the following:

• Section 5.16 (to drain the Chiller Unit service water headers)

• Section 5.18 (to drain the Chiller Unit chilled water side)

-END OF SECTION-Page 27 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.9. BTRS Operation - Borate To Dilute Mode Change NOTE This section should be performed whenever BTRS is used for load follow operations due to Maintenance or ambient conditions.

5.9.1. ENSURE the BTRS is aligned per Section 5.7 5.9.2. IF the BTRS bed to be placed into service is a new resin bed, ENSURE it has been flushed per OTS-BG-00006, Flushing BTRS Demineralizers.

5.9.3. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

5.9.4. ENSURE either of the following CVCS Chiller Pump control switches is in RUN, and the other pump control switch is in STOP:

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B 5.9.5. ENSURE BG HIS-21, CVCS CHILLER UNIT, is in RUN.

5.9.6. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, ENSURE BGHV8245 is OPEN.

5.9.7. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in DILUTE.

5.9.8. CHECK the white DILUTE light on BG HIS-27 ON.

NOTE , BG HIS-27 BTRS Controls, shows the input into the lights for the DILUTE, OFF and BORATE switch positions. [Ref: 6.2.9]

5.9.9. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, CLOSE BGHV8245.

5.9.10. Refer To Night Orders or the current BTRS Performance Data/Status Log (Attachment 1) for guidance and DETERMINE which Demineralizer(s) to use for the Dilute Mode.

Page 28 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.9.11. OPEN the inlet valve for the selected BTRS Demineralizer(s) and CLOSE the inlet valves for the other Demineralizers:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV 5.9.12. WHEN BG TI-381, BTRS DEMIN INLET TEMP, stabilizes between 40°F and 60°F:

a. WITHIN 5 minutes before beginning the dilution, RECORD the data required in Block 1 of Attachment 1.

b. ADJUST BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, to obtain the desired dilution rate.

c. RECORD the data required in Block 1A of Attachment 1.

5.9.13. WHEN the desired boron concentration has been established:

a. RECORD the data required in Block 2 of Attachment 1 (required within 5 minutes before completion of the dilution).

b. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

c. RECORD the data required in Block 2A of Attachment 1.

NOTE should be retained at the Reactor Operators desk until the data sheet is filled. When filled, the original copy should be forwarded to the BG System Engineer and a copy retained for reference for the next boration/dilution.

The normal alignment of BTRS is with flow through BGHCV0387.

5.9.14. IF normal alignment with flow through BGHCV0387 is desired, N/A Step 5.9.15.

Page 29 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.9.15. WHEN no additional boration is desired, as determined by the SM/CRS:

a. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, OPEN BGHV8245.

b. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in OFF.

c. ADJUST the RMCS as required by plant conditions.

d. IF desired to place the Chiller Unit in a Dry Lay-up condition, PERFORM the following:

• Section 5.16 (to drain the Chiller Unit service water headers)

• Section 5.18 (to drain the Chiller Unit chilled water side)

-END OF SECTION-Page 30 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.10. BTRS Operation - Dilute To Borate Mode Change NOTE This section should be performed whenever BTRS is used for load-follow operations due to Maintenance or ambient conditions.

5.10.1. ENSURE the BTRS is aligned per Section 5.8.

5.10.2. IF the BTRS bed to be placed into service is a new resin bed, ENSURE it has been flushed per OTS-BG-00006, Flushing BTRS Demineralizers.

5.10.3. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

5.10.4. ENSURE ONE of the following CVCS Chiller Pump control switches is in RUN, and the other pump control switch is in STOP:

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B 5.10.5. ENSURE BG HIS-21, CVCS CHILLER UNIT, is in RUN.

5.10.6. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, ENSURE BGHV8245 is OPEN.

5.10.7. PLACE BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, in MANUAL and SET to zero.

5.10.8. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in BORATE.

NOTE Attachment #5, BG HIS-27 BTRS Controls, shows the input into the light for the DILUTE, OFF and BORATE switch positions. [Ref: 6.2.9]

5.10.9. CHECK the white BORATE light on BG HIS-27 ON.

5.10.10. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, CLOSE BGHV8245.

5.10.11. Refer To Night Orders or the current BTRS Performance Data/Status Log (Attachment 1) for guidance and DETERMINE which Demineralizer(s) to use for the Borate Mode.

Page 31 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.10.12. OPEN the inlet valve for the selected BTRS Demineralizer(s) and CLOSE the inlet valves for the other Demineralizers:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV 5.10.13. PLACE BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, in AUTO, and ENSURE it is set below 7.0.

5.10.14. WHEN BG TI-381, BTRS DEMIN INLET TEMP, stabilizes between 135°F and 145°F:

a. WITHIN 5 minutes before beginning a boration, RECORD the data required in Block 1 of Attachment 1.

b. ADJUST BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, to obtain the desired boration rate.

c. RECORD the data required in Block 1A of Attachment 1.

5.10.15. WHEN the desired boron concentration has been established:

a. RECORD the data required in Block 2 of Attachment 1 (required within 5 minutes before completion of the boration).

b. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

c. RECORD the data required in Block 2A of Attachment 1.

NOTE should be retained at the Reactor Operators desk until the data sheet is filled. When filled, the original copy should be forwarded to the BG System Engineer and a copy retained for reference for the next boration/dilution.

The normal alignment of BTRS is with flow through BGHCV0387.

5.10.16. IF normal alignment with flow through BGHCV0387 is desired, N/A Step 5.10.17.

Page 32 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.10.17. WHEN no additional boration is desired, as determined by the SM/CRS:

a. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, OPEN BGHV8245.

b. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in OFF.

c. ADJUST the RMCS as required by plant conditions.

d. IF desired to place the Chiller Unit in a Dry Lay-up condition, PERFORM the following:

• Section 5.16 (to drain the Chiller Unit service water headers)

• Section 5.18 (to drain the Chiller Unit chilled water side)

-END OF SECTION-Page 33 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.11. Flushing BTRS Demineralizers Using RCS Letdown Flow NOTE When it has been determined that the BTRS Demineralizers are saturated and continued dilution of the RCS is desired, the Demineralizer may be flushed to the Boron Recycle System.

5.11.1. CONTACT Chemistry to ensure that BTRS effluent samples will be taken on intervals of 30 to 60 minutes during Demineralizer flushing.

5.11.2. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

CAUTION VCT level should be monitored closely during BTRS flushing.

5.11.3. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, ENSURE BGHV8245 is OPEN.

5.11.4. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in BORATE.

NOTE Attachment #5, BG HIS-27 BTRS Controls, shows the input into the light for the DILUTE, OFF and BORATE switch positions. [Ref: 6.2.9]

5.11.5. CHECK the white BORATE light on BG HIS-27 ON.

NOTE It is desirable to flush one Demineralizer Bed at a time. The other Demineralizers should be isolated by closing their respective inlet Isolation valve.

5.11.6. Refer To Night Orders or the current BTRS Performance Data/Status Log (Attachment 1) for guidance and DETERMINE which Demineralizer(s) to use for the Borate Mode.

Page 34 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.11.7. OPEN the inlet valve for the selected BTRS Demineralizer(s) and CLOSE the inlet valves for the other Demineralizers:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV 5.11.8. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, CLOSE BGHV8245.

5.11.9. WHEN BG TI-381, BTRS DEMIN INLET TEMP, stabilizes between 135°F and 145°F:

a. SET BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 0% (to close BGHCV387 and divert total letdown flow to the BTRS Demineralizers).

b. PLACE BG HIS-112A, LTDN DIVERT TO VCT & RHR, in HUT.

c. INFORM Chemistry that BTRS flushing has begun.

d. RECORD the data required on Attachment 2, BTRS Flushing Data, now and at 30 to 60 minute intervals during the flush.

e. WHEN the Demineralizers appear to be flushed as indicated by the data recorded on Attachment 2, (with reference to General Note 3.3.2), FORWARD the completed copy of Attachment #2 to the BG System Engineer.

f. WHEN the Demineralizers have been rinsed, as indicated by the Boron Concentration Measurement System or effluent samples, PERFORM the following:

1. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to fully open BGHCV0387).

2. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, OPEN BGHV8245.

3. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in OFF.

4. ADJUST the RMCS as required by plant conditions.

5. PLACE BG HIS-112A, LTDN DIVERT TO VCT & RHR, in AUTO.

-END OF SECTION-Page 35 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.12. Flushing BTRS Demineralizers Using Reactor Makeup Water NOTE When it has been determined that the BTRS Demineralizers are saturated, the BTRS System may be isolated to allow flushing boron from the Demineralizers to the Boron Recycle System.

Since Reactor Makeup Water from the Boric Acid Blending Tee is being used to flush the Demineralizers, no boration via the BA Blending Tee should be performed during Steps 5.12.18 through 5.12.27.

5.12.1. INFORM Chemistry that BTRS effluent samples will be taken on intervals of 30 to 60 minutes during Demineralizer flushing.

5.12.2. ENSURE BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, is in OPEN.

5.12.3. ENSURE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, is in OFF.

5.12.4. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.12.5. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in DIL.

5.12.6. PLACE the following in CLOSE:

• BG HIS-110A, BA TO BA BLENDING TEE

• BG HIS-110B, MAKEUP TO VCT OUTLET

• BG HIS-111B, MAKEUP TO VCT INLET 5.12.7. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

5.12.8. ENSURE the following are in STOP:

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B

• BG HIS-21, CVCS CHILLER UNIT Page 36 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.12.9. CLOSE the applicable valves for the Demineralizers which will NOT be flushed and OPEN the applicable valve for the Demineralizer to be flushed.

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV NOTE The following step prevents BGHV7054 from opening when BG HIS-0027 is placed in BORATE.

CAUTION Performance of Steps 5.12.10 and 5.12.12 isolates BTRS from the CVCS. No RCS boration/dilution is possible due to BTRS operation in this lineup.

5.12.10. Using BG HIS-7054, BTRS INLET VLV, CLOSE BGHV7054.

NOTE If performance of this procedure is terminated or postponed prior to restoration of the following valves to the LOCKED CLOSED position, they should be entered in the Locked Component Deviation List:

• BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO

• BGV0034, RX M/U WTR TO BTRS ISO 5.12.11. UNLOCK and OPEN BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO (in VCT Valve Room).

5.12.12. CLOSE BG7053, CVCS MOD HX HDR ISO TO RX CLNT FLTR (SE corner Rm 1105).

5.12.13. ADJUST BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, to 7.0 (corresponds to 140°F).

5.12.14. NOTIFY Chemistry to ensure BTRS effluent samples are taken during performance of Steps 5.12.24 through 5.12.27.c to determine when no additional flushing is required.

Page 37 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.12.15. NOTIFY Radwaste that BTRS Demineralizer Flushing is starting.

5.12.16. UNLOCK and OPEN BGV0034, RX M/U WTR TO BTRS ISO (Rm 1105).

5.12.17. OPEN BGV0060, BTRS TO RECYC EVAP FEED DEMIN IN HDR ISO.

NOTE Since Reactor Makeup Water from the Boric Acid Blending Tee is being used to flush the Demineralizers, no boration via the BA Blending Tee should be performed during Steps 5.12.18 through 5.12.27.

5.12.18. PLACE BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, in MANUAL and SET to zero.

5.12.19. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in BORATE.

NOTE The Borate white light will not energize due to BGHV7054 being CLOSED. Valve position per is required.

5.12.20. ENSURE position of all valves listed on Attachment 5 (except BGHV7054) in the Borate position.

5.12.21. ADJUST BG FK-111, REACTOR M/U WTR FLOW CTRL, to 5.0 (corresponds to 80 gpm).

CAUTION Step 5.12.22 implements P&L Step 3.1.7.

5.12.22. RESET BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA COUNTER, and SET it to the maximum amount of water that Radwaste can receive.

NOTE The following step will commence M/U flow.

5.12.23. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

Page 38 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.12.24. Slowly RAISE the output of BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, to raise the letdown reheat heat exchanger outlet temperature at BG TI-381, BTRS DEMIN INLET TEMP, to between 135°F and 145°F.

5.12.25. WHEN the temperature at BG TI-381 is at the desired value and stable:

a. PLACE BG TK-381A in AUTO.

b. RECORD the BG FY-111B totalizer reading on Attachment #3.

c. Using BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, slowly CLOSE BGHCV0387 to commence flushing the Demineralizer.

d. INFORM Chemistry that BTRS flushing has begun and to obtain the data required on Attachment 3 at 30 to 60 minute intervals during the flush.

NOTE In this lineup, automatic high temperature protection is not available for the Demineralizers.

If BG TI-381 temperature exceeds 156°F, letdown may divert to the VCT.

e. MONITOR BG TI-381, BTRS DEMIN INLET TEMP, periodically to ensure the reactor makeup flushing water temperature does not exceed 145°F.

5.12.26. WHEN the Demineralizers appear to be flushed as indicated by the data recorded on Attachment 3 and referencing step 3.3, FORWARD the completed copy of Attachment 3 to the BG System Engineer.

5.12.27. WHEN the Demineralizer flushing is complete PERFORM the following:

a. PLACE BG TK-381A in MANUAL.

NOTE The following step will stop LTDN Flow to the LTDN Reheat Hx.

b. Using BG TK-381A, slowly CLOSE BG TCV-381B while monitoring temperature drop on BG TI-381.

c. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to fully open BG HCV-387).

d. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in OFF.

Page 39 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Step 5.12.27 Cont'd

e. CLOSE BGV0060, BTRS TO RECYC EVAP FEED DEMIN IN HDR ISO.

f. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

g. ADJUST BG FK-111, REACTOR M/U WTR FLOW CTRL, to 7.5 (corresponds to 120 gpm).

h. CLOSE and LOCK BGV0034, RX M/U WTR TO BTRS ISO.

i. OPEN BG7053, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL.

j. CLOSE and LOCK BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO.

k. RESTORE the BTRS Demineralizers to the normal lineup by ensuring the following valves are open, or in the desired lineup for BTRS operation:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV

l. PLACE BG HIS-7054, BTRS INLET VLV, in AUTO.

m. ADJUST the RMCS as required by plant conditions.

n. PLACE the following valves handswitches in AUTO:

• BG HIS-111B, MAKEUP TO VCT INLET

• BG HIS-110A, BA TO BA BLENDING TEE

• BG HIS-110B, MAKEUP TO VCT OUTLET

o. PERFORM Checklist 3, Locked Valve Restoration.

-END OF SECTION-Page 40 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.13. Pressure Testing BTRS With Reactor Makeup Water NOTE This section of the procedure should follow major maintenance on BTRS System.

Since Reactor Makeup Water from the Boric Acid Blending Tee is being used to pressurize the system, no boration via the BA Blending Tee should be performed during performance of this section.

5.13.1. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, ENSURE BGHV8245 is OPEN.

5.13.2. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in OFF.

5.13.3. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

5.13.4. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in MAN.

5.13.5. PLACE the following in CLOSE:

• BG HIS-110A, BA TO BA BLENDING TEE

• BG HIS-110B, MAKEUP TO VCT OUTLET

• BG HIS-111B, MAKEUP TO VCT INLET 5.13.6. SET demand on BG HC-387, BTRS DEMIN BYPASS CTRL, at 100% (to ensure BG HCV-387 is fully open).

5.13.7. ENSURE the following are in STOP:

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B

• BG HIS-21, CVCS CHILLER UNIT 5.13.8. IF desired, CLOSE the BTRS Demineralizer Isolation valves using the following:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV Page 41 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 CAUTION Performance of Steps 5.13.9 and 5.13.11isolates BTRS from the CVCS.

5.13.9. Using BG HIS-7054, BTRS INLET VLV, CLOSE BGHV7054.

NOTE If performance of this procedure is terminated or postponed prior to restoration of the following valves to their LOCKED CLOSED position, they should be entered in the Locked Component Deviation List:

• BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO

• BGV0034, RX M/U WTR TO BTRS ISO 5.13.10. UNLOCK and OPEN BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO (in VCT Valve Room).

5.13.11. CLOSE BG7053, CVCS MOD HX HDR ISO TO RX CLNT FLTR (SE corner Rm 1105).

NOTE Step 5.13.12 will prevent letdown flow through the letdown reheat heat exchanger. This MUST be done to prevent boiling of the pressure test fluid.

5.13.12. ADJUST BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, to 0.

5.13.13. UNLOCK and OPEN BGV0034, RX M/U WTR TO BTRS ISO, (Rm 1105).

5.13.14. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in BORATE.

5.13.15. IF the BG HIS-27 Borate light is not ON, ENSURE position of valves by other indications in accordance with Attachment 5.

5.13.16. Using BG HIS-111A, REACTOR M/U WTR TO BA BLENDING TEE, manually OPEN BGFCV0111A and ESTABLISH flow to the BTRS System.

5.13.17. MONITOR BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW COUNTER, to determine the amount of Reactor Makeup Water added to the system.

Page 42 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.13.18. WHEN an inspection has been made of the BTRS Valve Room (Aux. Bldg, 1974, Room 1105), PERFORM the following:

a. Using BG HIS-111A, REACTOR M/U WTR TO BA BLENDING TEE, CLOSE BGFCV0111A.

b. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in OFF.

c. PLACE the following in AUTO:

• BG HIS-7054, BTRS INLET VLV

• BG HIS-110A, BA TO BA BLENDING TEE

• BG HIS-110B, MAKEUP TO VCT OUTLET

• BG HIS-111B, MAKEUP TO VCT INLET

d. ADJUST the RMCS as required by plant conditions.

e. ENSURE the following valves are OPEN or in the desired lineup for BTRS Operation:

• BG HIS-7010A, BTRS DEMIN A INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010B, CATION DEMIN INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010D, BTRS DEMIN D INLET VLV

• BG HIS-7010E, BTRS DEMIN E INLET VLV

f. ADJUST BG TK-381A, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, to 6.5 and ENSURE it is in AUTO.

g. CLOSE and LOCK BGV0034, RX M/U WTR TO BTRS ISO, (Rm 1105).

h. OPEN BG7053, LTDN DIVERT FLOW CTRL, (Rm 1105).

i. CLOSE and LOCK BGV0192, M/U TO BA BLENDING TEES HDR ISO (Rm 1318).

j. PERFORM Checklist 2, Placing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers in Dry Lay-up.

-END OF SECTION-Page 43 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.14. Immediate Boration To Support Plant Shutdown 5.14.1. ENSURE the water plan or Chemistry is referenced to determine the source of boric acid for boration of the RCS.

5.14.2. ENSURE one of the Charging Pumps is in operation in accordance with OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

5.14.3. IF it is desired to borate from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks, PERFORM the following:

a. START at least one Boric Acid Transfer Pump using the following handswitch:

• BG HIS-5A, BA TRANSFER PUMP A

• BG HIS-6A, BA TRANSFER PUMP B

b. Using BG HIS-8104, EMERG BORATE TO CHG PUMP SUCT, OPEN BGHV8104.

c. ENSURE greater than 30 gpm flow is indicated on BG FI-183A, EMERG BORATE FLOW.

d. WHEN boration from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks is complete:

1. STOP any operating Boric Acid Transfer Pump using:

• BG HIS-5A, BA TRANSFER PUMP A

• BG HIS-6A, BA TRANSFER PUMP B

2. Using BG HIS-8104, EMERG BORATE TO CHG PUMP SUCT, CLOSE BGHV8104.

3. EQUALIZE charging pump suction header and RCS boron concentrations as follows: [Ref: 6.2.11]

a) ALLOW the running charging pump to continue flowing to the RCS for at least 30 minutes.

b) IF plant conditions allow, FLUSH the suction header of the non running charging pumps per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

c) IF a charging pump can NOT be flushed at this time, ENSURE a Caution Tag is placed on the affected charging pump hand switch warning of high boron concentrations and the need to flush the charging pump suction header per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

Page 44 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.14.4. IF it is desired to borate from the RWST, PERFORM the following:

a. IF CCP A is in operation, using BN HIS-112D, CCP A SUCT FROM RWST, OPEN BNLCV112D.

b. IF CCP B is in operation, using BN HIS-112E, CCP B SUCT FROM RWST, OPEN BNLCV112E.

c. ENSURE the applicable valve indicates OPEN using:

• BN HIS-112D, CCP A SUCT FROM RWST

• BN HIS-112E, CCP B SUCT FROM RWST

d. Using BG HIS-112B, VCT OUTLET VLV, CLOSE BGLCV112B.

e. Using BG HIS-112C, VCT OUTLET VLV, CLOSE BGLCV112C.

f. WHEN Boration from the RWST is complete:

1. Using BG HIS-112C, VCT OUTLET VLV, OPEN BGLCV112C.

2. Using BG HIS-112B, VCT OUTLET VLV, OPEN BGLCV112B.

3. ENSURE both VCT outlet valves are OPEN using:

• BG HIS-112C, VCT OUTLET VLV

• BG HIS-112B, VCT OUTLET VLV

4. CLOSE both RWST suction valves using:

• BN HIS-112D, CCP A SUCT FROM RWST

• BN HIS-112E, CCP B SUCT FROM RWST

5. EQUALIZE charging suction header and RCS boron concentrations as follows: [Ref: 6.2.11]

a) ALLOW the running charging pump to continue flowing to the RCS for at least 30 minutes.

b) IF plant conditions allow, FLUSH the suction header of the non running charging pumps per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

c) IF a charging pump can NOT be flushed at this time, ENSURE a Caution Tag is placed on the affected charging pump hand switch warning of high boron concentrations and the need to flush the charging pump suction header per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

-END OF SECTION-Page 45 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.15. Restoration Of The SW Side Of CVCS Chiller Unit From Dry Layup Condition 5.15.1. CLOSE the following vents and drains on Checklist 1, Removing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers from Dry Lay-up.

• EAV0083, CVCS CHL SERV WTR IN VENT

• EAV0169, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR SPLY HDR DRN

• EAV0084, CVCS CHL SERV WTR OUT VENT

• EAV0171, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN HDR DRN

• BGV0411, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN VENT

• BGV0412, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN DRN

• BGV0304, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR SPLY TEST CONN

• BGV0413, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR SPLY DRN

• BGV0305, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN TEST CONN NOTE With the Chiller Unit shutdown, BGFC5010, CVCS CHILLER UNIT COND SERV WTR OUT FLOW CTRL could be opened or closed. Filling and venting the service water inlet and outlet headers will be performed as though this valve were CLOSED.

5.15.2. UNLOCK and SLOWLY OPEN the EAV0168, CVCS CHL SERV WTR IN ISO and ALLOW the inlet header to fill up to BGFC5010, CVCS CHILLER UNIT COND SERV WTR OUT FLOW CTRL.

5.15.3. VENT the header from EAV0083, CVCS CHL SERV WTR IN VENT.

5.15.4. UNLOCK and SLOWLY OPEN EAV0170, CVCS CHL SERV WTR OUT ISO and ALLOW the inlet header to fill up to BGFC5010, CVCS CHILLER UNIT COND SERV WTR OUT FLOW CTRL.

Page 46 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 NOTE If performance of this procedure is terminated or postponed prior to restoration of the following valves to the LOCKED CLOSED position they should be entered in the Locked Component Deviation List:

• EAV0168, CVCS CHL SERV WTR IN ISO

• EAV0170, CVCS CHL SERV WTR OUT ISO 5.15.5. VENT the header from the following valves:

• EAV0084, CVCS CHL SERV WTR OUT VENT

• BGV0411, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN VENT 5.15.6. COMPLETE Checklist 1, Removing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers from Dry Lay-up.

-END OF SECTION-Page 47 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.16. Placing The SW Side Of CVCS Chiller Unit In Dry Layup Condition 5.16.1. CLOSE and LOCK the following valves, (CB-1974 Rm-3101 N Center Of Room, 7' Up):

• EAV0168, CVCS CHL SERV WTR IN ISO

• EAV0170, CVCS CHL SERV WTR OUT ISO 5.16.2. PLACE drain rigs on the following drain valves:

• BGV0412, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN DRN, (AB-1974 Rm-1102, NW of Chl Unit next to N wall)

• BGV0413, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR SPLY DRN, (AB-1974 Rm-1102, East of Chil Unit)

• EAV0169, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR SPLY HDR DRN, (CB-1974, Rm-3101)

• EAV0171, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN HDR DRN, (CB-1974, Rm-3101) 5.16.3. OPEN the following drain valves:

• BGV0412, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN DRN, (AB-1974 Rm-1102 NW of Chl Unit next to N wall)

• BGV0413, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR SPLY DRN, (AB-1974 Rm-1102 East of Chil Unit)

• EAV0169, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR SPLY HDR DRN, (CB-1974 Rm-3101)

• EAV0171, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN HDR DRN, (CB-1974 Rm-3101) 5.16.4. OPEN the following vent valves:

• EAV0083, CVCS CHL SERV WTR IN VENT, (AB-1974 Rm-1102 West Of BTRS Chiller 15ft Up Over Walk Zone)

• EAV0084, CVCS CHL SERV WTR OUT VENT, (AB-1974 Rm 1102 West Of BTRS Chiller 15 Ft Up Over Walk Zone)

• BGV0411, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN VENT, (AB-1974 Rm-1102 NW Of Chl Unit Near Wall 9' High)

Page 48 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.16.5. WHEN draining is complete, REMOVE the drain rigs from the following valves:

• BGV0412, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN DRN, (AB-1974 Rm-1102 NW of Chl Unit next to N wall)

• BGV0413, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR SPLY DRN, (AB-1974 Rm-1102 East of Chil Unit)

• EAV0169, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR SPLY HDR DRN, (CB-1974 Rm-3101)

• EAV0171, CVCS CHL UNIT SERV WTR RTN HDR DRN, (CB-1974 Rm-3101) 5.16.6. COMPLETE Checklist 2, Placing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers in Dry Lay-up.

-END OF SECTION-Page 49 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.17. Restoration Of Chilled Water Side Of CVCS Chiller Unit From Dry Layup Condition 5.17.1. REMOVE tags.

5.17.2. REMOVE the FME screens and CLOSE the following valves:

• BGV0409, CVCS CHL SRG TK OUT DRN

• BGV0414, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN HDR DRN

• BGV0417, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT DRN 5.17.3. REMOVE the FME screens and INSTALL venting hoses for the following vents:

• BGV0419, CVCS CHL SRG TK IN VENT

• BGV0410, CVCS CHL UNIT IN VENT 5.17.4. Slowly THROTTLE BGV0070, DI WTR TO CVCS CHL SRG TK ISO, to begin filling the system.

NOTE When CVCS Chiller Surge Tank level instrumentation has been vented and placed in service by I&C, vent line monitoring may be replaced by monitoring computer points BGL0380H, BTRS CHL SRG TK, and BGL0380L, BTRS CHL SRG TK.

5.17.5. Continuously MONITOR the CVCS Chiller Surge Tank vent line 368-HBD-2 and CLOSE BGV0070, DI WTR TO CVCS CHL SRG TK ISO, if any water is observed.

5.17.6. Continuously MONITOR BGLI0380, CVCS CHILL SURGE TK LEVEL - - LEVEL IND.,

and maintain level between 55 to 75 % using BGV0070, DI WTR TO CVCS CHL SRG TK ISO.

5.17.7. REQUEST I&C vent BGLT0380, CVCS CHL SURGE TK LVL XMTR.

5.17.8. MONITOR BGV0410, CVCS CHL UNIT IN VENT, and CLOSE the valve when a solid stream of water has been observed for at least two (2) minutes.

5.17.9. INSTALL venting hoses for the following vents:

• BGV0418, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT VENT

• BGV0415, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN VENT Page 50 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.17.10. WHEN surge tank level has been established, VENT at the following locations until a solid stream of water has been observed for at least two (2) minutes:

• BGV0418, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT VENT

• BGV0415, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN VENT 5.17.11. ENSURE the following valves are closed:

• BGV0418, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT VENT

• BGV0415, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN VENT

• BGV0410, CVCS CHL UNIT IN VENT

• BGV0419, CVCS CHL SRG TK IN VENT 5.17.12. RAISE surge tank level on BGLI0380, CVCS CHILL SURGE TK LEVEL - - LEVEL IND., to 80 to 82 % using BGV0070, DI WTR TO CVCS CHL SRG TK ISO.

5.17.13. ENSURE BGV0070, DI WTR TO CVCS CHL SRG TK ISO, is closed.

5.17.14. CLOSE the following breakers:

• PG19NBF5, FDR BKR TO PBG01A CVCS CHILLER PMP A

• PG20NCF4, FDR BKR TO PBG01B CVCS CHILLER PMP B

• PG2003, FDR BKR TO SBG02 CVCS CHILLER UNIT 5.17.15. Using one of the following, START a chiller pump and run for up to one (1) minute:

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B 5.17.16. WHEN the chiller pump has been stopped, VENT at the following locations until a solid stream of water has been observed for at least two (2) minutes:

• BGV0410, CVCS CHL UNIT IN VENT

• BGV0418, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT VENT

• BGV0415, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN VENT 5.17.17. ENSURE surge tank level on BGLI0380, CVCS CHILL SURGE TK LEVEL - - LEVEL IND., is 80 to 82 % using BGV0070, DI WTR TO CVCS CHL SRG TK ISO.

Page 51 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.17.18. Using one of the following, START the chiller pump NOT started in Step 5.17.15 and run for up to one (1) minute:

• BG HIS-24, CVCS CHILLER PUMP B

• BG HIS-23, CVCS CHILLER PUMP A 5.17.19. WHEN the second chiller pump has been stopped, VENT at the following locations until a solid stream of water has been observed for at least two (2) minutes:

• BGV0410, CVCS CHL UNIT IN VENT

• BGV0418, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT VENT

• BGV0415, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN VENT 5.17.20. WHEN BGLI0380, CVCS CHILL SURGE TK LEVEL - - LEVEL IND., is between 55 to 82 %, CLOSE BGV0070, DI WTR TO CVCS CHL SRG TK ISO.

5.17.21. REMOVE venting hoses and INSTALL caps on the following vents:

• BGV0418, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT VENT

• BGV0415, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN VENT

• BGV0410, CVCS CHL UNIT IN VENT

• BGV0419, CVCS CHL SRG TK IN VENT 5.17.22. PERFORM Checklist 4, Restoration From Dry Layup Of BTRS Chiller Chill Water Side.

-END OF SECTION-Page 52 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.18. Placing The Chilled Water Side Of CVCS Chiller Unit In Dry Layup Condition

[Ref: 6.2.10]

NOTE Chilled Water should NOT be drained to the DRW sumps. Drains should be routed to the SLW sump in the north east corner of the Aux Building. This will require approximately 300 feet of hose.

5.18.1. CONTACT Chemistry to determine if any special requirements are needed for dry layup.

5.18.2. ENSURE the following breakers are OPEN:

• PG19NBF5, FDR BKR TO PBG01A CVCS CHILLER PMP A

• PG20NCF4, FDR BKR TO PBG01B CVCS CHILLER PMP B

• PG2003, FDR BKR TO SBG02 CVCS CHILLER UNIT 5.18.3. ENSURE BGV0070, DI WTR TO CVCS CHL SRG TK ISO, is closed.

5.18.4. ROUTE a drain hose "header" from the Chiller Pumps to the SLW sump.

5.18.5. CONNECT drain hoses from the following drains to the "drain header":

• BGV0409, CVCS CHL SRG TK OUT DRN

• BGV0500, CVCS CHL PMP A DISCH DRN

• BGV0501, CVCS CHL PMP B DISCH DRN

• BGV0414, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN HDR DRN

• BGV0417, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT DRN 5.18.6. OPEN BGV0409, CVCS CHL SRG TK OUT DRN.

5.18.7. AFTER the CVCS Chiller Surge Tank has mostly drained, OPEN the following drains:

• BGV0500, CVCS CHL PMP A DISCH DRN

• BGV0501, CVCS CHL PMP B DISCH DRN

• BGV0414, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN HDR DRN

• BGV0417, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT DRN Page 53 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.18.8. Slowly OPEN the following vents to ensure the system is drained:

• BGV0419, CVCS CHL SRG TK IN VENT

• BGV0410, CVCS CHL UNIT IN VENT 5.18.9. Using a container, DRAIN the residual water from the impellers of the Chiller Pumps by opening the following:

• BGV0302, CVCS CHL PMP A DRN

• BGV0303, CVCS CHL PMP B DRN 5.18.10. CONNECT an air line for Service Air to vent BGV0410, CVCS CHL UNIT IN VENT.

5.18.11. ENSURE the drain hose going into the SLW Sump is secured to NOT move.

5.18.12. Slowly THROTTLE the air line to no more than two (2) turns open.

5.18.13. ALLOW air to blow through the piping for approximately one (1) hour.

5.18.14. CLOSE the air line and REMOVE the air hose.

5.18.15. ENSURE the following are closed:

• BGV0302, CVCS CHL PMP A DRN

• BGV0303, CVCS CHL PMP B DRN 5.18.16. CLOSE the following valves and REMOVE their drain hoses:

• BGV0500, CVCS CHL PMP A DISCH DRN

• BGV0501, CVCS CHL PMP B DISCH DRN 5.18.17. REMOVE the drain hoses and INSTALL FME screens for the following valves:

• BGV0409, CVCS CHL SRG TK OUT DRN

• BGV0414, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR IN HDR DRN

• BGV0417, CVCS LTDN CHL HX CHILLED WTR OUT DRN 5.18.18. INSTALL FME screens for the following vents:

• BGV0419, CVCS CHL SRG TK IN VENT

• BGV0410, CVCS CHL UNIT IN VENT 5.18.19. HANG Tags

-END OF SECTION-Page 54 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.19. Removing BTRS From Service For Maintenance 5.19.1. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, ENSURE BGHV8245 is open.

5.19.2. ENSURE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, is in OFF.

5.19.3. Using BG HIS-7054, BTRS INLET VLV, CLOSE BGHV7054.

5.19.4. CLOSE BG7053, CVCS MOD HX HDR ISO TO RX CLNT FLTR (AB-1975 Rm 1105, SE corner).

5.19.5. CLOSE BG7001, CVCS MOD HX TO LTDN CHL HX HDR UPSTRM ISO (AB-1975 Rm-1105, NW Corner Of Rm Against West Wall) 5.19.6. VENT and DRAIN as required to perform maintenance.

-END OF SECTION-Page 55 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.20. Filling And Venting BTRS Following Maintenance Using Letdown Or Rx M/U Water NOTE It takes approximately 400 to 500 gallons to fill the BTRS system. If BTRS demin Beds are drained that would add to the total gallons. (A BTRS Bed is approximately 200 gals if it is filled with resin.)

5.20.1. IF using letdown, ENSURE VCT level is sufficient to support refilling the portion of BTRS that was drained.

5.20.2. Using BG HIS-8245, CVCS DEMIN OUTLET VLV, ENSURE BGHV8245 is OPEN.

5.20.3. Using BG HIS-7054, BTRS INLET VLV, PLACE BGHV7054 in CLOSE.

5.20.4. ENSURE BG7053, CVCS MOD HX HDR ISO TO RX CLNT FLTR, is CLOSED (SE corner AB 1974 Rm 1105).

5.20.5. OPEN BG7001, CVCS MOD HX TO LTDN CHL HX HDR UPSTRM ISO (AB-1975 Rm-1105, NW Corner Of Rm Against West Wall).

NOTE BGV0056, CVCS BTRS DEMINS TO NUC SAMP SYS HDR ISO, remains closed during fill and vent to prevent water hammer of the sample system.

5.20.6. ENSURE BGV0056, CVCS BTRS DEMINS TO NUC SAMP SYS HDR ISO, is CLOSED.

5.20.7. PLACE BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL, in DILUTE.

NOTE The white DILUTE light will not be lit due to BGHV7054 being closed. Computer points should be used to verify valves positions. BGUV7022 will have to be verified locally.

5.20.8. CHECK the white DILUTE light on BG HIS-27 is off.

Page 56 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.20.9. CONFIRM valve positions using the following computer points:

• Using BGZ7002A, CHECK BGUV7002A, CVCS MOD HX TO LTDN CHL HX HDR CTRL VLV, OPEN.

• Using BGZ7002B, CHECK BGUV7002B, LTDN CHL HX TO LTDN REHEAT HX HDR CTRL VLV, OPEN.

• Using BGZ7040, CHECK BGUV7040, CVCS LTDN CHL HX TO RX CLNT FLTR HDR CTRL VLV, CLOSED.

• Using BGZ7041, CHECK BGUV7041, CVCS LTDN CHL HX BYP HDR CTRL VLV, CLOSED.

• Using BGZ7045, CHECK BGUV7045, CVCS BTRS DEMINS OUT CTRL VLV, NOT CLOSED.

• Using BGZ7046, CHECK BGUV7046, CVCS BTRS DEMINS IN BYP CTRL VLV, NOT OPEN.

• Using BGZ7056, CHECK BGUV7056, CVCS BTRS DEMINS HDR CTRL VLV, OPEN.

• Using BGZ7057, CHECK BGUV7057, CVCS BTRS DEMINS OUT BYP CTRL VLV, CLOSED.

• Using BGZ7054, CHECK BGHV7054, CVCS MOD HX BTRS IN ISO HV, CLOSED.

• Using BGZ0381A, CHECK BGTCV0381A, CVCS LTDN DIVERT FLOW TCV A, NOT OPEN.

• Using BGZ0381B, CHECK BGTCV0381B, LTDN DIVERT BYP TCV B, NOT CLOSED.

5.20.10. Locally CONFIRM BGUV7022, CVCS MOD HX TO RX CLNT FLTR CTRL VLV, OPEN.

NOTE Failing open BGUV7057 provides a flowpath to refill the BTRS Demin inlet header while in the DILUTE mode.

5.20.11. CLOSE BGUV7057V1, AIR SPLY ISO FOR BG-UV-7057, and BLEED air to fail open BGUV7057.

Page 57 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.20.12. IF using Letdown to refill the BTRS:

a. Slowly THROTTLE OPEN BG7053, CVCS MOD HX HDR ISO TO RX CLNT FLTR, (SE corner AB 1974 Rm 1105), until flow is heard.

b. During the BTRS refill, IF the VCT requires filling, PERFORM the following:

1. CLOSE BG7053, CVCS MOD HX HDR ISO TO RX CLNT FLTR.

2. Manually FILL the VCT using applicable parts of this procedure.

3. Slowly THROTTLE OPEN BG7053, CVCS MOD HX HDR ISO TO RX CLNT FLTR, (SE corner AB 1974 Rm 1105), until flow is heard.

NOTE Step 5.20.13 can be performed in parallel with Steps 5.20.14 and 5.20.15 to complete the BTRS Fill and Vent.

5.20.13. IF using Rx M/U water to refill the BTRS, MAKEUP to BTRS using Section 5.6, Manual Mode of RMCS Operation (RWST-RHUT-BTRS).

NOTE In the following step, venting is only required for the portion of the BTRS that was drained.

Suggested vents to use are the first six in the list.

5.20.14. Thoroughly VENT the system using the appropriate valves below:

• BGV0552, CVCS BTRS DEMINS OUT BGUV7045 UPSTRM VENT

• BGV0295, CVCS BTRS DEMIN E PRI SLUICE WTR RTN DRN

• BGV0499, CVCS BTRS DEMINS BYP VENT

• BGV0383, MB DEMINS TO MOD HX VENT

• BGV0425, CVCS LTDN CHL HX BYP HDR VENT

• BGV0395, BTRS DEMINS OUT HDR BGUV7045 DNSTRM VENT

• BGV0294, CVCS BTRS DEMIN D PRI SLUICE WTR RTN DRN

• BGV0292, CVCS BTRS DEMIN B PRI SLUICE WTR RTN DRN

• BGV0393, CVCS BTRS DEMINS BYP HDR VENT Page 58 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Step 5.20.14 Cont'd

• BGV0386, CVCS MOD HX TO LTDN CHL HX HDR VENT

• BGV0401, CVCS LTDN CHL HX TO RX CLNT FLTR HDR VENT

• BGV0389, LTDN CHL HX TO LTDN REHEAT HX HDR VENT

• BGV0391, CVCS LTDN REHEAT HX OUT TO BTRS DEMINS HDR VENT

• BGV0291, CVCS BTRS DEMIN A PRI SLUICE WTR RTN DRN

• BGV0397, CVCS MOD HX TO RX CLNT FLTR OUT VENT 5.20.15. WHEN venting is complete, ENSURE any of the following that were used for venting are CLOSED and CAPPED:

• BGV0552, CVCS BTRS DEMINS OUT BGUV7045 UPSTRM VENT

• BGV0295, CVCS BTRS DEMIN E PRI SLUICE WTR RTN DRN

• BGV0499, CVCS BTRS DEMINS BYP VENT

• BGV0383, MB DEMINS TO MOD HX VENT

• BGV0425, CVCS LTDN CHL HX BYP HDR VENT

• BGV0395, BTRS DEMINS OUT HDR BGUV7045 DNSTRM VENT

• BGV0294, CVCS BTRS DEMIN D PRI SLUICE WTR RTN DRN

• BGV0292, CVCS BTRS DEMIN B PRI SLUICE WTR RTN DRN

• BGV0393, CVCS BTRS DEMINS BYP HDR VENT

• BGV0386, CVCS MOD HX TO LTDN CHL HX HDR VENT

• BGV0401, CVCS LTDN CHL HX TO RX CLNT FLTR HDR VENT

• BGV0389, LTDN CHL HX TO LTDN REHEAT HX HDR VENT

• BGV0391, CVCS LTDN REHEAT HX OUT TO BTRS DEMINS HDR VENT

• BGV0291, CVCS BTRS DEMIN A PRI SLUICE WTR RTN DRN

• BGV0397, CVCS MOD HX TO RX CLNT FLTR OUT VENT NOTE WHEN opening BG7053, CVCS MOD HX HDR ISO TO RX CLNT FLTR, there maybe a small VCT level drop due to pressurizing the system.

5.20.16. FULLY OPEN BG7053, CVCS MOD HX HDR ISO TO RX CLNT FLTR.

5.20.17. OPEN BGUV7057V1, AIR SPLY ISO FOR BG-UV-7057, and ENSURE BGUV7057, CVCS BTRS DEMINS OUT BYP CTRL VLV, is closed.

Page 59 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 5.20.18. OPEN BGV0056, CVCS BTRS DEMINS TO NUC SAMP SYS HDR ISO.

5.20.19. PLACE BG HIS-7054, BTRS INLET VLV, in AUTO.

5.20.20. IF Reactor Makeup Water was used to fill the system, ENSURE a proper flush is performed.

5.20.21. WHEN desired, PLACE the BTRS system in service using OTN-BG-00001 ADD05, Operation of the BTRS Demineralizer System.

-END OF SECTION-Page 60 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1. Implementing 6.1.1. CSP-ZZ-07620, Borated Water Sources (BAST-A, BAST-B and RWST) 6.1.2. OTN-EC-00001, Fuel Pool Cooling And Cleanup System 6.1.3. OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System 6.1.4. OTN-BG-00001 ADD05, Operation of the BTRS Demineralizer System 6.1.5. OTS-BG-00006, Flushing BTRS Demineralizers 6.1.6. ODP-ZZ-00004, Locked Component Control 6.1.7. Curve Book, Figure 7-2, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Blended Flow for 120 gpm AUTO Makeup and Manual Reduced Flow Rates 6.1.8. Curve Book, Figure 7-3, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Boron Addition 6.1.9. Curve Book, Figure 7-4, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Boron Addition Rate 6.1.10. Curve Book, Figure 7-5, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Boron Dilution 6.1.11. Curve Book, Figure 7-6, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Boron Dilution Rate 6.1.12. Curve Book, Figure 7-8, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Boron Dilution and Boron Addition 6.1.13. Checklist 1, Removing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers from Dry Lay-up 6.1.14. Checklist 2, Placing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers in Dry Lay-up 6.1.15. Checklist 3, Locked Valve Restoration 6.1.16. Checklist 4, Restoration From Dry Layup Of BTRS Chiller Chill Water Side 6.2. Developmental 6.2.1. M-22BG01 6.2.2. M-22BG02 Page 61 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 6.2.3. M-22BG03 6.2.4. M-22BG04 6.2.5. M-22HE01 6.2.6. M-23BG12 6.2.7. FSAR 16.1.2.2 6.2.8. FSAR 16.1.2.5 6.2.9. CAR 199803251, During Performance Of A Retest On BGTCV0381B, An Unexpected Leak Occurred 6.2.10. CARS 199901416 6.2.11. CARS 200308549, Reactivity Management Near Miss while starting 'B' CCP 6.2.12. CARS 200606374 6.2.13. CARS 201010145 6.2.14. 8809D57 S041 7.0 RECORDS 7.1. QA Records 7.1.1. Curve Book, Figure 7-5, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Boron Dilution 7.1.2. Curve Book, Figure 7-6, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Boron Dilution Rate 7.1.3. Curve Book, Figure 7-8, Reactor Makeup Control System Nomographs - Boron Dilution and Boron Addition 7.1.4. Checklist 1, Removing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers from Dry Lay-up 7.1.5. Checklist 2, Placing the Chiller Unit Service Water Headers in Dry Lay-up 7.1.6. Checklist 3, Locked Valve Restoration 7.1.7. Checklist 4, Restoration From Dry Layup Of BTRS Chiller Chill Water Side 7.2. Commercial Records 7.2.1. Data acquired in Attachment 1, 2 or 3 will be filed in the system files as a commercial record.

Page 62 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 8.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES Section or Page(s) Description Step Number Deleted precaution on RWST recirc time. Recirc time is controlled by 5 Old step 3.1.7 CSP-ZZ-07620.

Reworded note to state that recirc time requirements are determined by 19 5.6.14.f.1 note Chemistry per CSP-ZZ-07620.

6.1.1 and old 61 and Added CSP-ZZ-07620 as a reference. Deleted RFR 017192A and steps 6.2.7 and 62 UOTCR 96-152 as references.

6.2.8 Page 63 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Attachment 1 BTRS Performance Data/Status Log Sheet 1 of 1 Desired Temp Range PARAMETER Instrument Dilute / Borate DATA DATE Block 1 - Data recorded, in the given order, prior to Dilution/Boration via BTRS BTRS Demin Inlet Temp BG TI-381 50 +/- 10°F / 140 +/- 5°F BTRS Demin Outlet Temp BG TI-389 (Note 1)

BTRS Outlet Temp BG TI-386 95 +/- 5 °F / 95 +/- 5°F Block 1A - Desired flow established through BTRS Demineralizer Time flow established through BTRS Demineralizer BTRS Demin flow BG FI-385 As desired Block 2 - Data recorded, in the given order, prior to completion of Dilution/Boration BTRS Demin Inlet Temp BG TI-381 50 +/- 10°F / 140 +/- 5°F BTRS Demin Outlet Temp BG TI-389 (Note 1)

BTRS Outlet Temp BG TI-386 95 +/- 5 °F / 95 +/- 5°F Block 2A - Flow secured through BTRS Demineralizers Time BTRS demin bypassed Latest RCS CB Demineralizer in Service Circle letter A D E A D E A D E A D E A D E REMARKS:

NOTE 1: Optimum performance should exist when the outlet temperature reaches 50 +/- 10°F for the Dilute mode, or 140 +/- 5 °F for the Borate mode. These conditions will NOT be reached unless continuous flow to the Demineralizer has existed for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. However, as long as the outlet temperature raises for dilution and lowers for boration, the system is functioning properly.

Page 64 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Attachment 2 RCS Letdown Flow - BTRS Demineralizer Flushing Data Sheet 1 of 1 DATE: ____________________________ Demineralizer being flushed ____________

Performed by: ____________________________________________________________

Time of data acquisition Effluent boron concentration Elapsed time Time of data acquisition Effluent boron concentration Elapsed time BG FI-132, LTDN HX OUTLET FLOW ______________ gpm Page 65 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Attachment 3 Reactor Makeup Water - BTRS Demineralizer Flushing Data Sheet 1 of 1 DATE: ____________________________ Demineralizer being flushed ____________

Performed by: ____________________________________________________________

Time of data acquisition Effluent boron concentration Elapsed time Time of data acquisition Effluent boron concentration Elapsed time Final Totalizer reading: __________________

Initial Totalizer reading: __________________ Total water used: ______________________

Page 66 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Attachment 4 Volume Control Tank Level Control System Sheet 1 of 1 LCV 112C/E OPEN LCV 112E SHUT LCV 112C Page 67 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Attachment 5 BTRS Controls For BG HIS-27 Indication Sheet 1 of 1 Equipment status required to energize the COMPONENT BG HIS-27 white light with the switch in the indicated position:

BG HIS-27, BTRS CTRL DILUTE OFF BORATE BGUV7002A, CVCS MOD HX TO LTDN CHL HX OPEN CLOSED CLOSED HDR CTRL VLV BGUV7002B, LTDN CHL HX TO LTDN REHEAT OPEN CLOSED CLOSED HX HDR CTRL VLV

• BGUV7022, CVCS MOD HX TO RX CLNT FLTR OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CTRL VLV BGUV7040, CVCS LTDN CHL HX TO RX CLNT CLOSED OPEN OPEN FLTR HDR CTRL VLV BGUV7041, CVCS LTDN CHL HX BYP HDR CTRL CLOSED OPEN OPEN VLV BGUV7045, CVCS BTRS DEMINS OUT CTRL VLV OPEN OPEN CLOSED BGUV7046, CVCS BTRS DEMINS IN BYP CTRL CLOSED CLOSED OPEN VLV BGUV7056, CVCS BTRS DEMINS HDR CTRL VLV OPEN CLOSED CLOSED BGUV7057, CVCS BTRS DEMINS OUT BYP CTRL CLOSED OPEN OPEN VLV BGHV7054, CVCS MOD HX BTRS IN ISO HV OPEN CLOSED OPEN BGTCV0381A, CVCS LTDN DIVERT FLOW TCV A CLOSED CLOSED Not Required BGTCV0381B, LTDN DIVERT BYP TCV B OPEN OPEN Not Required

• Valve position for BGUV7022 does NOT input into the plant computer. Local position verification is required.

Page 68 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Attachment 6 Dilute Mode Of RMCS Operation Sheet 1 of 1 NOTE This attachment provides direction for frequently performed, nominal 120 gpm dilutions.

1. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

2. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in DIL.

3. RESET BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW TOTALIZER, to 000.

NOTE When setting BG FY-111B, allowance should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. (Step 3.1.9 contains more information if required.)

4. ENSURE BG FY-111B is set to deliver the desired amount of makeup water.

5. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

6. WHEN the desired amount of water has been added, PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

7. IF required, PERFORM the following:

a. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in AUTO.

b. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

Page 69 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Attachment 7 Alternate Dilute Mode Of RMCS Operation Sheet 1 of 1 NOTE This attachment provides direction for frequently performed, nominal 120 gpm alternate dilutions.

1. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

2. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in ALT DIL.

3. RESET BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW TOTALIZER, to 000.

NOTE When setting BG FY-111B, allowance should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. (Step 3.1.9 contains more information if required.)

4. ENSURE BG FY-111B is set to deliver the desired amount of makeup water.

5. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

6. WHEN the desired amount of water has been added, PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

7. IF required, PERFORM the following:

a. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in AUTO.

b. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

Page 70 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

OTN-BG-00002 Rev. 041 Attachment 8 Borate Mode Of RMCS Operation Sheet 1 of 1 NOTE This attachment provides direction for frequently performed, nominal borations.

1. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

2. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in BOR.

3. RESET BG FY-110B, BA COUNTER, to 000.

NOTE When setting BG FY-110B, allowance should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. (Step 3.1.9 contains more information if required.)

4. ENSURE BG FY-110B is set to deliver the desired amount of boron.

5. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

6. WHEN the desired amount of borated water has been added, PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

7. IF required, PERFORM the following:

a. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in AUTO.

b. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

Page 71 of 71 CONTINUOUS USE

CALLAWAY PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: RSA-3 KSA NO: GEN2.2.12 Revision: KSA RATING: KSA Rating: 4.1 Job

Title:

SRO Task

Title:

Review CCP Surveillance for Operability Validation Time: 20 minutes Learning Objective: T61.003A-6, LP A22, Obj A.2.a, PERFORM the following as they pertain to APA-ZZ-00340, Surveillance Program Administration: DESCRIBE: SM responsibilities regarding the Surveillance Program The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be:

[ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

Task Performer:

Location of Performance:

Control Room Simulator/Lab Plant Classroom X Method of Performance: Simulated Performed X Alternate Path: __ ____ Time Critical: ___ ___

Student Handouts: Copy of OSP-BG-P005B Completed copy of Attachment 2, System Performance Data Sheet, from OSP-BG-P005B.

References:

OSP-BG-P005B Centrifugal Charging Pump B Inservice Test - Group B TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.5.2

JPM NO: RSA-3 Rev 1 Initial Conditions: Callaway is at 100% Power. The Reactor Operator has just completed the Group B operational readiness of CCP B from OSP-BG-P005B Centrifugal Charging Pump B Inservice Test - Group B.

Initiating Cues: You are an extra SRO on shift. The Shift Manager (SM) has given you Attachment 2 of OSP-BG-P005B Centrifugal Charging Pump B Inservice Test -

Group B to review. Inform the SM when your review is complete and include any actions required that need to be taken.

Write down required actions, if any, on your cue sheet and return to the Examiner.

Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the Operator will have determined that CCP B is INOPERABLE and that it must be restored to OPERABLE STATUS within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

START TIME:

STOP TIME:

Page 1 of 3

JPM NO: RSA-3 Rev 1 TASK NUMBER - ELEMENT STANDARD SCORE S U

1. Obtain a verified working Applicant obtained working copy of OSP-BG-P005B copy of OSP-BG-P005B Comments:

S U

2. Review completed copy of Applicant reviewed Attachment 2 of OSP-BG- completed copy of Comments:

P005B. Attachment 2 of OSP-BG-P005B.

S U

3. *Identifies the data in step Applicant identified that the 6.1.27 (Pump Differential number for Pump Differential Comments:

Pressure) was calculated Pressure should be 2396 incorrectly psid instead of 2416 psid S U

4. *Identifies the data in step Applicant identified that the 6.1.27 (Pump Differential Pump Differential Pressure is Comments:

Pressure) is less than the less than the Tech Spec limit Tech Spec Limit of 2400 psid of 2400 psid Page 2 of 3

JPM NO: RSA-3 Rev 1 TASK NUMBER - ELEMENT STANDARD SCORE S U

5. *Informs Shift Manager that Applicant informed SM that that CCP B is INOPERABLE CCP B is INOPERABLE and Comments:

and that it must be restored that it must be restored to to OPERABLE STATUS OPERABLE STATUS within within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

accordance with T/S LCO Review APA-ZZ-00340 3.5.2 Surveillance Program Administration CUE: If the applicant does not state the T/S ask them:

What T/S needs to be entered and what actions that need to be taken?

S U

6. The JPM is complete Record stop time on Page 1 Comments:

Denotes Critical Step Page 3 of 3

Initial Conditions: Callaway is at 100% Power. The Reactor Operator has just completed the Group B operational readiness of CCP B from OSP-BG-P005B Centrifugal Charging Pump B Inservice Test - Group B.

Initiating Cues: You are an extra SRO on shift. The Shift Manager (SM) has given you Attachment 2 of OSP-BG-P005B Centrifugal Charging Pump B Inservice Test -

Group B to review. Inform the SM when your review is complete and include any actions required that need to be taken.

Write down required actions, if any, on your cue sheet and return to the Examiner.

OSP-BG-P005B CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP B INSERVICE TEST - GROUP B MINOR Revision 048 Page 1 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP B INSERVICE TEST - GROUP B TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 PURPOSE ...................................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ......................................................................................................... 4 3.1. Pump Test Data.................................................................................................................... 4 3.2. Check Valve Tests ............................................................................................................... 4 4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ....................................................................................... 5 5.0 PREREQUISITES ......................................................................................................................... 6 5.1. Initial Conditions ................................................................................................................. 6 5.2. Test Equipment .................................................................................................................... 7 6.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS ................................................................................................. 8 6.1. CCP B Inservice Test Pump Run.......................................................................................... 8 6.2. BGV0605 Open Test And BGV0091 Closure Test ............................................................. 14 6.3. BGV0589 Check Valve Open Test ..................................................................................... 15 7.0 RESTORATION ......................................................................................................................... 18

8.0 REFERENCES

............................................................................................................................ 19 8.1. Implementing ..................................................................................................................... 19 8.2. Developmental ................................................................................................................... 20 9.0 RECORDS ................................................................................................................................... 20 10.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES ....................................................................................................... 21 ATTACHMENT 1, CCP PBG05B Test Flow Path .................................................................................. 22 ATTACHMENT 2, System Performance Data Sheet ............................................................................... 23 ATTACHMENT 3, CCP B Suction Pressure Calculations ....................................................................... 24 ATTACHMENT 4, Maintenance Rule Functionality Brief ...................................................................... 25 Checklist 1, CCP PBG05B Restoration Page 2 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP B INSERVICE TEST - GROUP B 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1. This procedure demonstrates the Group B operational readiness of Centrifugal Charging Pump B (CCP B) per APA-ZZ-00356, Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Program.

1.2. This procedure performs the open testing of BGV0095, BGV0589, BGV0605 and the close testing of BGV0091.

1.3. This procedure obtains pump spin up time for use in ITP-ZZ-00004, Response Time Testing Program, on a 36 month cycle.

2.0 SCOPE 2.1. The Group B operational readiness of CCP B is proved by development of a differential pressure between 2400 and 2899 psid on a frequency described in APA-ZZ-00356, Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Program.

2.2. The following check valve tests are performed:

• BGV0095, CCP B DISCH TO SEAL WTR HX CHECK - open safety test

• BGV0589, CCP B DISCH TO SEAL WTR INJ FLTRS HDR CHECK - open safety test

• BGV0605, CCP B DISCH BGFCV0121 UPSTEAM CHECK - open non-safety test

• BGV0091,CCP A DISCH TO SEAL WTR HX CHECK - closed non-safety test 2.3. Pump spin up time is the elapsed time from initiation of the start signal to obtaining a discharge pressure greater than 2405 psig. This response time test is normally performed once per 36 months.

2.4. The Centrifugal Charging Pump B room cooler is checked and documented for an automatic start when the Centrifugal Charging Pump B is started.

Page 3 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 3.1. Pump Test Data 3.1.1. Differential pressure is within the Normal Range as specified on Attachment 2, System Performance Data Sheet, per T/S SR 3.5.2.4, T/S SR 3.5.3.1, FSAR 16.1.2.3.1, and FSAR 16.1.2.4.1.

3.1.2. The Centrifugal Charging Pump B Room Cooler automatically starts when the Centrifugal Charging Pump B is started within the requirements of ODP-ZZ-00002, Equipment Status Control.

3.1.3. If pump spin up time is measured, the pump obtains the required discharge pressure from initiation of start signal as specified on Attachment 2. This partially satisfies T/S SR 3.3.2 1.C#10, T/S SR 3.3.2 1.D#10, T/S SR 3.3.2 1.E#10, FSAR 16.3.2.1.1, and FSAR 16.3-2, Table items 2a, 3a and 4a.

3.2. Check Valve Tests 3.2.1. BGV0095, CCP B DISCH TO SEAL WTR HX CHECK, is demonstrated open by pump differential pressure being in the Normal Range as specified on Attachment 2.

3.2.2. BGHV8111, B CCP DISCH MINIFLOW TO SEAL WTR HX ISO, pipe temperature is in the Normal Range as specified on Attachment 2.

3.2.3. BGV0605, CCP B DISCH BGFCV0121 UPSTREAM CHECK, is demonstrated open by initiating flow through the normal charging header as specified on Attachment 2.

3.2.4. BGV0589, CCP B DISCH TO SEAL WTR INJ FLTRS HDR CHECK, is demonstrated open by passing the required seal injection flow as specified on Attachment 2.

3.2.5. BGV0091, CCP A DISCH TO SEAL WTR HX CHECK, is demonstrated closed by meeting back leakage criteria specified on Attachment 2.

Page 4 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4.1. If performing in MODE 1, 2, or 3, T/S LCO 3.5.2 and FSAR 16.1.2.4 are applicable.

4.2. If performing in MODE 4, 5 or 6, FSAR 16.1.2.3 is applicable.

4.3. If performing in MODE 4, T/S LCO 3.5.3 is applicable.

4.4. A pretest brief should be held to familiarize the appropriate personnel with the required testing this procedure dictates and with the Maintenance Rule Functionality requirements in Attachment 4.

4.5. IF the data falls in the Required Action Range:

4.5.1. The SM/CRS declares the component INOPERABLE and takes the required actions in accordance with Technical Specifications and APA-ZZ-00340, Surveillance Program Administration.

4.5.2. The SM/CRS checks the validity of the data (i.e., by immediately rerunning the test, evaluating test instruments and conditions, conferring with test personnel, or other methods).

4.6. When measured pump test parameters that fall outside the Normal Range have resulted from an identified systematic error such as improper system lineup or inaccurate instrumentation, the test shall be rerun after correcting the error.

4.7. If testing is terminated or temporarily postponed at some point prior to the locked valve being returned to its normal locked position, the altered valve shall be logged in the Locked Component Deviation List per ODP-ZZ-00004, Locked Component Control.

4.8. PBG05B, CCP B, should NOT be run at less than 60 gpm.

4.9. PBG05B, CCP B, should NOT be run at less than 130 gpm for more than 30 minutes.

4.10. RCP Seal injection flow must be maintained between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP.

4.11. Prior to starting a CCP, the associated Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump should be started per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System, to ensure proper CCP sleeve bearing lubrication is present before pump loading occurs. [Ref: 8.2.7]

4.12. After a CCP is secured, the associated Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump should be stopped per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System. [Ref: 8.2.7]

4.13. If testing is required during Cold Shutdown, the reactor vessel should be open to atmosphere.

Page 5 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 4.14. If testing is required with the vessel head installed during Cold Shutdown, the discharge of the charging pump must NOT be opened unless transferring charging pumps for normal charging alignment. FSAR 5.2.2.10.4 [Ref: 8.1.13]

4.15. If CCP B has been made incapable of injection per T/S LCO 3.4.12, then CCP B should be aligned per OSP-BG-00002, Verify One Centrifugal Charging Pump Incapable Of Injection Into RCS.

4.16. If charging is required, then CCP A or the NCP should be in service supplying normal Charging/Seal Injection per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

4.17. An FPIP (based on Master FPIP MFP-00826) should be implemented any time a CCP is run.

This requires a Fire Watch to implement compensatory measures due to impact on capability of post fire safe shutdown.

4.18. After pump testing conditions are stable, the pump must be run for at least two (2) minutes prior to taking pump performance data.

5.0 PREREQUISITES 5.1. Initial Conditions 5.1.1. ENSURE SM/CRS has reviewed Technical Specifications for any LCO Action Statements that may be entered should any component tested be declared INOPERABLE.

5.1.2. ENSURE SM/CRS has reviewed the applicable activities and plant conditions which must exist prior to procedure performance.

5.1.3. ENSURE a job brief has been held and the actions in Attachment 4 were discussed with the Maintenance Rule Dedicated Operator.

5.1.4. ENSURE CCP B suction is lined up to the Volume Control Tank or the RWST.

5.1.5. ENSURE the method for communications between Control Room and local operator in pump room has been established.

5.1.6. WHEN plant is in MODE 4 with any RCS cold leg temperature less than or equal to 275°F, MODE 5 or MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on, ENSURE Cold Over Pressure Mitigation System (COMS) is in effect per T/S LCO 3.4.12.

5.1.7. INFORM RP CCP B will be placed into operation.

Page 6 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 NOTE This pump is run on recirc during performance of this procedure, the recirc returns to the suction of all the charging pumps so if boron concentration in this pump differs from RCS then core reactivity will be changed. [Ref: 8.2.1 and 8.2.2]

5.1.8. ENSURE the difference in boron concentrations between the RCS and CCP B is managed per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

5.1.9. ENSURE a flowmeter, supplied by Engineering, is installed on piping upstream of BGV0091, CCP A DISCH TO SEAL WTR HX CHECK, to record back leakage in Section 6.2.

5.1.10. ENSURE a FPIP for PBG05B, CCP B, is in effect.

5.2. Test Equipment 5.2.1. ENSURE the following is available:

• Pyrometer

• Stopwatch, required only if pump spin up time is to be measured

• 25 feet of 3/8" tubing to be used for venting

• Poly vent bottle 5.2.2. ENSURE all M&TE is within their calibration due date and RECORD ID number and calibration due date on Attachment 2.

-END OF SECTION-Page 7 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 6.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS NOTE When pump spin up time measurement is required, a separate PM0903516 specifying measurement of pump spin up time will be issued, normally once per 36 months.

Steps pertaining to measurement of pump spin up time may be marked N/A at all other times.

6.1. CCP B Inservice Test Pump Run CAUTION If COMS is in effect, only one CCP is allowed to be capable of injection to the RCS.

6.1.1. IF COMS is in effect, ENSURE CCP B is aligned in accordance with the applicable section of OSP-BG-00002, Verify One Centrifugal Charging Pump Incapable Of Injection Into RCS.

6.1.2. ENSURE Train B of CCW is in service per OTN-EG-00001, Component Cooling Water System.

6.1.3. RECORD tank to be used on Attachment 2:

• TBG05, CVCS VOL CTRL TK

• TBN01, REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK Page 8 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 6.1.4. RECORD initial level for tank being used from applicable indicator listed below on Attachment 2.

a. TBG05, CVCS VOL CTRL TK

• BG LI-185, VCT LVL

• BG LI-112, VCT LEV

b. TBN01, REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

• BN LI-930, RWST PROT A LEV IND

• BN LI-931, RWST PROT B LEV IND

• BN LI-932, RWST PROT A LEV IND

• BN LI-933, RWST PROT B LEV IND 6.1.5. IF using the VCT, RECORD pressure indicated on BG PI-115, VCT PRESS, from TBG05, CVCS VOL CTRL TK, on Attachment 2.

NOTE The Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump should be allowed to run for at least five (5) minutes prior to starting associated CCP.

6.1.6. PLACE BG HIS-2AX, CCP B AUX L-0 PUMP, in AUTO to START PBG03B.

6.1.7. CHECK BG HIS-2AX, CCP B AUX L-0 PUMP, RUN light is on.

6.1.8. Using the appropriate handswitch, ENSURE valves listed below are in their designated position:

• BG HIS-8111, CCP B RECIRC VLV, OPEN

• BG HIS-8357B, CCP B TO RCP SEALS, CLOSED

• EM HIS-8803B, BORON INJ HDR CVCS INLET VLV, CLOSED 6.1.9. Using one of the following, CHECK SGL12B, AUX BLD CCP B RM CLR, status:

• Computer point GLQ0026, CCP RM CLR 12B FAN

• GLHS0192, START/STOP PUSHBUTTON FOR SGL12B 6.1.10. IF SGL12B is running, using GLHS0192, START/STOP PUSHBUTTON FOR SGL12B, STOP SGL12B, AUX BLD CCP B RM CLR.

Page 9 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 6.1.11. IF COMS is in effect, Go To Step 6.1.13.

6.1.12. IF CCP A is supplying charging, PERFORM the following:

a. STATION a Maintenance Rule Dedicated Operator in communication with the Control Room to OPEN BG8483C, CCP B DISCH BGFCV0121 UPSTRM ISO, to restore system to functional should a valid signal occur.

b. ENSURE BG8483C, CCP B DISCH BGFCV0121 UPSTRM ISO, is unlocked and closed. [Ref: 8.1.13]

6.1.13. IF NCP is supplying normal charging, PLACE BG FK-121, CCP DISCH FLOW CTRL, in MANUAL and CLOSE BGFCV0121, CVCS CCP A&B DISCH TO REGEN HX FCV.

CAUTION Pipe temperature just upstream of BGHV8111, B CCP DISCH MINIFLOW TO SEAL WTR HX ISO, should be continuously monitored for the first five (5) minutes of pump operation. If pipe remains cool after 1 to 2 minutes, it is an indication of no recirculation flow and the pump should be shut off immediately to prevent damage to pump.

6.1.14. Using pyrometer, MEASURE pipe temperature just upstream of BGHV8111, B CCP DISCH MINIFLOW TO SEAL WTR HX ISO, and RECORD on Attachment 2.

NOTE Fire Watch is required when CCP is running.

6.1.15. STATION Step 5.1.10 FPIP Fire Watch.

Page 10 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 NOTE Steps 6.1.16 and 6.1.17 may be performed concurrently.

The Control Room Operator should count down (i.e. 3, 2, 1, mark) to the pump start initiation for the local operator to begin timing.

CAUTION Starting the CCP could affect core reactivity due to the recirc flow path going back to the suction of all the pumps.

6.1.16. IF pump spin up time is to be measured using PM0903516, MEASURE the elapsed time from pump start initiation to greater than or equal to 2405 psig indicated on BGPI0119, CVCS CCP B DISCH PRESS IND.

6.1.17. PERFORM one of the following to start the pump:

a. IF OSP-SA-0017B, Train B SIS-CSAS Slave Relay Test, (PM0903412) is being performed concurrently, START CCP B per the instructions in that procedure.

b. Using BG HIS-2A, CCP B, START CCP B.

6.1.18. IF performed, RECORD pump spin-up time on PM0903516 and Attachment 2.

6.1.19. PERFORM the following:

• IF SGL12B, AUX BLD CCP B RM CLR, is running CIRCLE Yes on Attachment 2.

• IF SGL12B, AUX BLD CCP B RM CLR, is NOT running, CIRCLE No on Attachment 2 and NOTIFY the SM/CRS to evaluate using ODP-ZZ-00002, Equipment Status Control.

6.1.20. ENSURE BG HIS-2AX, CCP B AUX L-0 PUMP, RUN light is off and the STOP light is on after a reasonable time following start of the CCP. [Ref: 8.2.7]

6.1.21. IF the Aux Lube Oil Pmp remained in service, NOTIFY system engineer.

6.1.22. RECORD BGPI0020, CCP MTR 5B FLTR DISCH L/O PRESS IND, on Attachment 2.

6.1.23. CONTINUE with data collection steps while pipe temperature monitoring is recorded in the next step.

Page 11 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 NOTE Normally, the pipe temperature should rise to between 100 and 130°F and stabilize. If CCW temperature is below usual temperature due to cold weather, the pipe temperature may be as much as five (5) degrees below this normal range and is acceptable. [Ref: 8.2.6]

CAUTION If pipe remains cool, it is an indication of no recirculation flow and the pump should be stopped immediately. If pipe gets over 160°F, it is an indication of not enough recirculation flow, the pump should be stopped and the recirculation flow path investigated.

6.1.24. At approximately five (5) minute intervals for the first 15 minutes of pump operation, MEASURE pipe temperature just upstream of BGHV8111, CCP B DISCH MINIFLOW ISO VLV, and RECORD on Attachment 2.

NOTE Pressure indication may be subject to rapid fluctuations. If this occurs, BGV0093, CCP B SUCT BGPI0188 ROOT, should be slowly closed until readings stabilize prior to recording pressure.

6.1.25. OBTAIN suction pressure from BGPI0188, CCP PMP B SUCTION PRESS IND, and RECORD on Attachment 2.

6.1.26. OBTAIN discharge pressure from BGPI0119, CVCS CCP B DISCH PRESS IND, and RECORD on Attachment 2.

6.1.27. CALCULATE the pump differential pressure by subtracting suction pressure from the discharge pressure and RECORD on Attachment 2.

6.1.28. IF COMS is in effect, PERFORM the following:

• Using BG HIS-2A, CCP B, STOP CCP B.

• RELEASE the Step 5.1.10 FPIP Fire Watch.

Page 12 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 6.1.29. IF CCP A is supplying normal charging, PERFORM the following:

a. PLACE BG FK-121, CCP DISCH FLOW CTRL, in MANUAL.

b. CONTROL charging flow.

c. OPEN and LOCK BG8483C, CCP B DISCH BGFCV0121 UPSTRM ISO.

d. RELEASE the Maintenance Rule Dedicated Operator.

6.1.30. IF Section 6.2 and 6.3 will NOT be performed, PERFORM the following:

a. Using BG HIS-2A, CCP B, STOP CCP B.

b. PLACE BG HIS-2AX, CCP B AUX L-0 PUMP, to the STOP position.

c. IF appropriate, TERMINATE the FPIP of Step 5.1.10.

d. Go To Section 7.0 RESTORATION.

-END OF SECTION-Page 13 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 6.2. BGV0605 Open Test And BGV0091 Closure Test 6.2.1. IF COMS is in effect, ENSURE the appropriate section of OSP-BG-00002, Verify One Centrifugal Charging Pump Incapable Of Injection Into RCS, has been completed to swap charging pump capable of injection to the RCS PRIOR to continuation of this procedure.

6.2.2. INITIATE shifting charging supply from pump currently supplying normal charging to charging supply from CCP B per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

6.2.3. WHEN the shift to CCP B is complete, RECORD flow through BGV0605, CCP B DISCH BGFCV0121 UPSTEAM CHECK, as shown on BG FI-121A, CHG HDR FLOW, on Attachment 2.

6.2.4. RECORD the back leakage through BGV0091, CCP A DISCH TO SEAL WTR HX CHECK, as shown on the flow meter upstream of BGV0091, on Attachment 2.

6.2.5. IF NOT performing Section 6.3, RESTORE charging supply alignment as directed by the SM/CRS per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

-END OF SECTION-Page 14 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 6.3. BGV0589 Check Valve Open Test 6.3.1. ENSURE CCP B is supplying normal charging/seal injection per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

CAUTION

• IF BGV0100 is allowed to remain closed for more than two (2) minutes, unless Step 6.3.3.a is performed, the reduced charging flow may cause a decrease in pressurizer level that can reduce RCS pressure to less than the LCO 3.4.1.a DNB limit.

• Energizing Pressurizer Heaters will cause an outsurge from the Pressurizer that may result in a reactivity change.

6.3.2. IF a VT2 inspection of BGV0100, CVCS SEAL WTR INJ FLTRS IN ISO, will be performed while it is closed, ENERGIZE a BU Heater group per OTN-BB-00005, Pressurizer and Pressurizer Pressure Control.

Page 15 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 NOTE When closing BGV0100, the greatest decrease in RCP seal flow will occur near the end of valve travel.

While closing BGV0100, if higher flow letdown orifice is in service and BG HC-182 is throttled closed to maintain seal flow greater than 32 gpm, Pressurizer level may be observed to lower with BGFCV0121 full open.

While closing BGV0100 and opening BG HIS-8357B, it will be necessary to monitor and maintain the following parameters using BG HC-182 and BG FK-121 to keep Pressurizer and VCT levels relatively stable:

• Seal flow between 32 and 52 gpm on BG FI-215A or BG FI-215B

• Combined flow on BG FI-121A and BG FI-215A or BG FI-215B maintained greater than 70 gpm to meet CCP minimum flow requirements. When BGV0100 is closed BG FI-121A will indicate charging flow only, and BG FI-215A or BG FI-215B, will indicate RCP seal flow only.

• Pressurizer level within 5 % of program

• Pressurizer pressure 2225 to 2250 psig

• Letdown Regen HX outlet temperature less than 385 ºF on BG TI-127 6.3.3. PERFORM the following steps to provide RCP seal flow through the alternate seal injection line:

a. MONITOR and MAINTAIN parameters listed in the above note.

b. Slowly OPEN BG HIS-8357B, CCP B TO RCP SEALS.

c. UNLOCK and CLOSE BGV0100, CVCS SEAL WTR INJ FLTRS IN ISO.

d. WHEN BGV0100, CVCS SEAL WTR INJ FLTRS IN ISO, is fully closed, RECORD RCP seal flow using BG FI 215A, CHG PUMP TO RCP SEAL FLOW, or BG FI 215B, CHG PUMP TO RCP SEAL FLOW, on Attachment 2.

e. Slowly OPEN BGV0100, CVCS SEAL WTR INJ FLTRS IN ISO.

f. Slowly CLOSE BG HIS-8357B, CCP B TO RCP SEALS.

g. WHEN Pressurizer level is restored to program, ADJUST BG HC-182, CHG HDR BACK PRESS CTRL, to attain 32 gpm RCP seal flow or as desired on BG FI-215A, CHG PUMP TO RCP SEAL FLOW, or BG FI-215B, CHG PUMP TO RCP SEAL FLOW.

Page 16 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 6.3.4. IF energized per Step 6.3.2, DE-ENERGIZE BU Heaters per OTN-BB-00005, Pressurizer and Pressurizer Pressure Control.

6.3.5. IF ISF-SB-0A33A, SSPS Train B Slave Relay K624, K626, K604, K711, & K743 Test, is to be performed, REQUEST I&C perform the procedure at this time.

6.3.6. ENSURE all pump related test data has been recorded on Attachment 2 AND REVIEWED by the Reactor Operator.

6.3.7. RESTORE charging/seal injection alignment as directed by the SM/CRS per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System.

6.3.8. IF CCP B is secured, ENSURE the following are performed:

• PLACE BG HIS-2AX, CCP B AUX L-0 PUMP, to the STOP position.

[Ref: 8.2.7]

• IF appropriate, TERMINATE the FPIP of Step 5.1.10.

-END OF SECTION-Page 17 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 7.0 RESTORATION 7.1. INITIATE restoration of equipment per Checklist 1, CCP PBG05B Restoration.

7.2. INITIATE performance of independent verification of equipment status per Checklist 1, CCP PBG05B Restoration.

NOTE Steps 7.3 through 7.8 may be performed in any order.

7.3. At NG02ADR1, FDR BKR TO SGL12B B CCP RM COOLER, using GLHS0192, START/STOP PUSHBUTTON FOR SGL12B, STOP SGL12B.

7.4. IF CCW pumps were started, as directed by the CRS/SM, STOP any CCW pumps that were started to support pump run.

7.5. ENSURE the Actual Value condition is evaluated against the acceptance/functional criteria and that the SM/CRS is immediately notified if the Actual Value condition is out of tolerance.

7.6. IF NCP is supplying normal charging, ENSURE BG FK-121, CCP DISCH FLOW CTRL, is set at 25 % and in AUTO.

7.7. IF both CCPs are secured, ENSURE the CCPs suction is vented per OTN-BG-00001 ADD02, Shifting from one of the CCPs to the NCP.

7.8. UPDATE Status Board for current boron concentration of the CCP.

-END OF SECTION-Page 18 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048

8.0 REFERENCES

8.1. Implementing 8.1.1. APA-ZZ-00340, Surveillance Program Administration 8.1.2. APA-ZZ-00356, Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Program 8.1.3. ISF-SB-0A33A, SSPS Train B Slave Relay K624, K626, K604, K711, & K743 Test 8.1.4. ITP-ZZ-00004, Response Time Testing Program 8.1.5. ODP-ZZ-00002, Equipment Status Control 8.1.6. ODP-ZZ-00004, Locked Component Control 8.1.7. OSP-BG-00002, Verify One Centrifugal Charging Pump Incapable Of Injection Into RCS 8.1.8. OSP-SA-0017B, Train B SIS-CSAS Slave Relay Test 8.1.9. OTN-BB-00005, Pressurizer and Pressurizer Pressure Control 8.1.10. OTN-BG-00001 ADD02, Shifting from one of the CCPs to the NCP 8.1.11. OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System 8.1.12. OTN-EG-00001, Component Cooling Water System 8.1.13. COMN 1401 8.1.14. FSAR 5.2.2.10.4 8.1.15. FSAR 16.1.2.3 8.1.16. FSAR 16.1.2.3.1 8.1.17. FSAR 16.1.2.4 8.1.18. FSAR 16.1.2.4.1 8.1.19. FSAR 16.3.2.1.1 8.1.20. FSAR 16.3-2, Table items 2a, 3a and 4a 8.1.21. T/S LCO 3.4.12 Page 19 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 8.1.22. T/S LCO 3.5.2 8.1.23. T/S LCO 3.5.3 8.1.24. T/S SR 3.3.2 1.C#10 8.1.25. T/S SR 3.3.2 1.D#10 8.1.26. T/S SR 3.3.2 1.E#10 8.1.27. T/S SR 3.5.2.4 8.1.28. T/S SR 3.5.3.1 8.1.29. Checklist 1, CCP PBG05B Restoration 8.2. Developmental 8.2.1. CARS 199901812 8.2.2. CARS 199903408 8.2.3. CARS 199903524 8.2.4. CARS 200306153 8.2.5. CARS 200402614 8.2.6. CARS 200704247 8.2.7. RFR 016691B 8.2.8. PM0901017 8.2.9. PM0901003 8.2.10. PM0903412 8.2.11. PM0903516 9.0 RECORDS 9.1. Attachment 2, System Performance Data Sheet (Filed with the appropriate Work Authorizing Document.)

9.2. Checklist 1, CCP PBG05B Restoration Page 20 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 10.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES Section or Page(s) Description Step Number Combined old Steps 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 to give clear direction should data 5 4.5 fall in the Required Action Range. Per CARS 201206883 Added step about running stable for two minutes before taking pump 6 4.18 performance data. Per CARS 201206883 Page 21 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 Attachment 1 CCP PBG05B Test Flow Path Sheet 1 of 1 Page 22 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 Attachment 2 System Performance Data Sheet Sheet 1 of 1 Person Performing (Print) Initials/PIN Date Started:

Date Completed:

Steps 6.1.14 and 6.1.24 Step 6.1.18 Tank TBG05 TBN01 (normal temp range is 100 to 130°F) Calculated Pump Spin-up Time: ______ ( 5 sec)

Time Pipe Temp °F Step 6.1.3 - Tank to be used (3) T=00 _______ _________ Step 6.1.19 - CCP B Room Cooling Fan started as Step 6.1.4 - Initial Level T+05 _______ _________ required:YES / NO (circle one)

Step 6.1.5 - Initial Press T+10 _______ _________ Step 6.1.22 T+15 _______ _________ Lube Oil Inlet Pressure: BGPI0020 ______ ( 15 psig)

Suction pressure (psig) Discharge pressure (psig) Pump Differential Pressure (psid)

(Step 6.1.25) (Step 6.1.26) (Step 6.1.27)

Required Action Range (High) > 2899 Actual Value Normal Range 14.4 to 82.4 2400 to 2899 Required Action Range (Low) < 2400 Tech Spec Limit 2400 Baseline 44.5 2680 2635.5 Valve Verification Flowrate Step 6.2.3 BGV0605 BGFI0121A Step 6.2.4 BGV0091 Flow meter upstream of BGV0091 < 12 gpm Step 6.3.3.d BGV0589 BGFI0215A or BGFI0215B 32 gpm M&TE Data ID Numbers Cal Due Dates Page 23 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 Attachment 3 CCP B Suction Pressure Calculations Sheet 1 of 1 Per J-24BG40 and J-07P16, BG PI-188 is at 1976' 7 1/2". Instruction manual M-721-0093 gives Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) required equals 16 feet. M-23BG02 gives pump suction nozzle elevation at 1979' 7". Pump can take suction from the RWST or the VCT. The VCT has the limiting suction pressure characteristics. J-U8000 gives the following setpoints:

VCT Hi Pressure Alarm (BG-PAHL-115) = 65 psig VCT Lo Pressure Alarm (BG-PAHL-115) = 5 psig VCT Hi Level Alarm (BG-LAHL-149) = 97%

VCT Lo Level Alarm (BG-LAHL-149) = 22%

Westinghouse Precautions, Limitations, and Setpoints document (PLS) gives BG- 8120, VCT relief valve, setpoint at 75 psig. M-23BG04 gives VCT full at 2013' 8 3/8". The PLS also states that BG LT-149 is calibrated to a 75" span extending from the lower tap to a point 75" above the lower tap. Per J-24BG12, the lower instrument tap is at 2003' 9 1/2". From this, 97% is calculated to be at 2009' 10 1/4" and 22% to be at 2005' 2". 0-150 psig +/- 2% FS pressure gauges give +/- 3 psig accuracy. Add or subtract this as appropriate.

Using the above information:

Low Action Range From NPSH required 1979' 7" + 16' - 1976' 7 1/2" = 8.21 psig

-3.0 psig 5.21 psig

<5.2 psig Low Alert Range From VCT low alarm for pressure and level 2005' 2" - 1976' 7 1/2" = 27' 2 1/2" =11.78 psig + 5 psig = 17.35 psig

-3.0 psig 14.35 psig 5.2 -14.4 psig High Action Range From maximum VCT level and pressure 2013' 8 3/8" - 1976' 7 1/2' = 35' 8 7/8" = 15.47 psig + 75 psig = 91.00 psig

+ 3.0 psig 94.00 psig

>94.00 psig High Alert Range From VCT high alarm for pressure and level 2009' 10 1/4" - 1976' 7 1/2' = 31' 10 3/4" = 13.8 psig + 65 psig = 79.4 psig

+ 3.0 psig 82.4 psig 82.4 -94.0 psig Normal Range From Low Alert Range and High Alert Range 14.4-82.4 psi Page 24 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

OSP-BG-P005B Rev. 048 Attachment 4 Maintenance Rule Functionality Brief Sheet 1 of 1 While Safety Systems are thought of as those systems designed to mitigate design basis accidents, not all mitigating systems have the same risk importance. Those systems that have a higher risk importance are monitored for unavailability time, which is when the system is not functional as related to Maintenance Rule unavailability indicator.

Actions taken to maintain system functionality such as taking credit for actions by the Reactor Operator in the Control Room or a stationed Maintenance Rule Dedicated Operator do NOT make the system operable.

Crediting these actions only maintains Maintenance Rule Functionality so the system does not accrue Unavailability hours.

Actions may be credited if they are simple and may be performed in a short time frame. If actions are being credited, and if required to be relieved or leave the area, the operator involved must perform a turnover of the listed functionality actions in event of a valid demand of the system or secure from the test and restore system functionality.

Functionality Actions for OSP-BG-P005B:

Use of a Maintenance Rule Dedicated Operator:

When BG8483C, CCP B DISCH BGFCV0121 UPSTRM ISO, is closed, CCP B is NOT functional unless a Maintenance Rule Dedicated Operator is stationed in the vicinity of BG8483C to restore system to functional should a valid signal occur.

During restoration, the Maintenance Rule Dedicated Operator is released when BG8483C is opened and locked open.

Page 25 of 25 CONTINUOUS USE

CALLAWAY ENERGY CENTER JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: RSA-4 rev 1 KSA No: GEN 2.3.4 Revision: July 2013 KSA Rating: 3.7 Job

Title:

SRO Task

Title:

Determine Maximum Allowable Stay Time.

Validation Time: 12 minutes Learning Objective: T61.01106.C.2, DESCRIBE the management policy regarding radiation exposure as defined in APA-ZZ-01000, Callaway Plant Radiation Protection Program The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be:

[ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

Task Performer:

Location of Performance:

Control Room Simulator/Lab Plant Classroom X Method of Performance: Simulated Performed X Alternate Path: ___ ___ Time Critical: ___ ___

Student Handouts: RWP 300501 Routine Survey CA-M-20130702-3 1111 RHR Pump Room

Title:

A & Pump Platform.

References:

RWP 300501 Routine Survey CA-M-20130702-3 1111 RHR Pump Room

Title:

A & Pump Platform.

APA-ZZ-01000 CALLAWAY ENERGY CENTER RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM

JPM NO: RSA-4, Rev 1 Initial Conditions: A leak has developed in the RHR Pump A room cooler that requires isolating the room cooler.

You have been directed to close RHR Pump A room cooler isolation valves EFV0037 and EFV0038.

Initiating Cues: Determine maximum allowable stay time to close the two valves and isolate the leak before a dosimeter limit is exceeded.

Task Standard: Stay time identified as 2.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> based upon exceeding maximum dose START TIME:

STOP TIME:

Page 1 of 2

JPM NO: RSA-4, Rev 1 JPM TASK PERFORMANCE STEP ELEMENT STANDARD SCORE S U

1. Reviews RWP and survey Provide the applicant with a copy of maps required for task RWP 300501 Routine, and Survey Comments:

CA-M-20130702-3 1111 RHR Pump Room

Title:

A & Pump Platform.

S U

2. *Identifies the dose limit per Applicant identified the dose limit per the RWP RWP 300501 Routine is 11 mrem Comments:

S U

3. *Identifies the dose rate near Applicant identified that the dose the valves to be operated. rate near isolation valves EFV0037 Comments:

and EFV0038 is 4 mrem/hr S U

4. *Identifies the maximum stay Applicant identified the maximum time stay time is 2.75 hr or 165 minutes Comments:

11 mrem / (4 mrem/hr) = 2.75hr

.73333 hr x (60 min/ hr) = 165 minutes S U

5. The JPM is complete Record stop time on Page 1 Comments:

Critical Step Page 2 of 2

Initial Conditions: Initial Conditions: A leak has developed in the RHR Pump A room cooler that requires isolating the room cooler.

You have been directed to close RHR Pump A room cooler isolation valves EFV0037 and EFV0038.

Initiating Cues: Determine maximum allowable stay time to close the two valves and isolate the leak before a dosimeter limit is exceeded.

07/29/2013 07:39 Radiation Work Permit 300501ROUTINE Rev 04 Operations and Radwaste Routine Activities Including WPA, Technician Rounds, and Shipping Activities.

Includes All Activities Previously Assigned to RWP Numbers 200501OSPPROC and 300501OSPPROC.

NO ACCESS TO SATELLITE RCA'S ON THIS RWP.

FOR ACCESS TO SATELLITE RCA'S, USE 300501MISCL.

System Component: VARIOUS Job Location: RCA Status: Active Begin Date: 03/22/2013 00:00 Expire Date:

General Requirements RP Coverage Type: Intermittent RWP Type: General Dose Projection (mrem): 775 Level 2 Brief Required: No Authorization Required: No Single Use: No Electronic Dosimeter Alarm Settings: Dose: 11 mrem Rate: 100 mrem/hr Radiological Conditions Radiological Condition Comments Radiological Impact Rating Dose Rates (mrem/hr) Radiological conditions vary by Contact  : Room/Area.

General Area: See Surveys Airborne radioactivity is not anticipated.

Travel Path : Areas will be posted as required.

Contamination (DPM/100cm2)

Internal  :

Review current survey data and area postings prior to entry. 3 External  :

General Area: See Surveys Page 1 of 3

07/29/2013 07:39 Radiation Work Permit 300501ROUTINE Rev 04 Special Instructions for Workers Dosimetry:

• OSLD and Electronic Dosimeter.

Protective Clothing/Equipment:

• Full set of Protective Clothing in Contaminated Areas.

• Partial PC's allowed for tours, inspections, and work allowed by RP.

...No climbing, crawling, or kneeling in Partial PCs.

• Lab Coat and Gloves in contaminated Fume Hoods, Sinks, Cabinets, and when handling radioactive samples except discharge system samples.

Contact RP Prior to:

• Breach, drain, or vent of a contaminated system. (Discuss Noble Gas Release Potential)

• Entry into an area not normally surveyed or accessed.

• Accessing areas greater than 8 ft above floor / work platform.

• Work requiring a change to radiological postings or boundaries.

• Evolutions that will/could change radiological conditions.

• Handling contaminated hoses or vent rigs.

• Opening drums, containers, or other packages of RAM to assess the need for additional Protective Clothing.

Work Practices:

• Check Electronic Dosimeter every 15 minutes, or more often as needed, to prevent receiving a Dose Alarm.

• Contain or clean up all liquid leakage.

• Handle drain covers/strainers as contaminated materials.

• Bag or seal contaminated hose ends as soon a practical to prevent contamination spread.

• To access satellite RCA's use RWP 300501MISCL.

Limitations:

• No entry to Locked High RadiationAreas or High Contamination Areas.

• No entry to Airborne Radioactivity Areas except as follows:

• Entry to posted Airborne Radioactivity Areas is permitted if:

...Area is posted due to Noble Gas.

...Total DAC (per CA0387) is < 0.3 DAC Total.

• Contact RP to determine DAC information.

• No Handling items >5000 mRem/hr.

• No access to Satellite RCA'S on this RWP.

• Use RWP 391120EMERGENCY for access to RCA during emergencies.

Special Instructions for RP Technician With failed fuel, large amounts of noble gas can be released while venting primary systems.

...Discuss compensatory actions such as running hoses to ventilation, slower vent rates, etc.

(CAR200706674)

Page 2 of 3

07/29/2013 07:39 Radiation Work Permit 300501ROUTINE Rev 04 Special Memos Level 1 ALARA brief required (pre-work discussion of RWP requirements with RP):

• Shiftly prior to accessing a High Radiation Area.

Access to East RW Yard from RW NE door to perform work requires RP Supervision approval.

Follow requirements of HTP-ZZ-01203 Section 6.3.3 when accessing Radwaste Yard via RW Northeast door.

Stop, place work in safe condition and Notify RP if:

• Work area dose rates or contamination levels exceed ranges listed in the RWP (or in referenced survey maps),

exceed ranges discussed in RCA entry briefs, or dose rates exceed 800 mRem/hour.

• Abnormal conditions become evident.

• Scope of work changes.

• Accumulated Dose Alarm is received.

• Unanticipated Dose Rate Alarm or Continuous Dose Rate Alarm is received.

Revision 04: Changed Rate Alarm set point back to 100 mRem/hr.

Page 3 of 3

H210.0001 VSDS Standard Map Survey Survey CA-M-20130702-3 General Information

Title:

1111 RHR Pump Room A & Pump Platform Survey Date/Time: 07/02/2013 16:00 Lead Surveyor: Lindstrom, Jonathan Survey Type: Quarterly Work Order/Task #:

Counted By: Rx % Pwr: 100%

RWP #: 300101ROUTINE PIN: 100390 Status: Approved by: Hurla, Gerald W, 07/03/2013 PIN: 2883 Ready for Review by: Lindstrom, Jonathan, 07/02/2013 PIN: 100390 Dose Rate (DR) Object Prefixes/Suffixes Dose Rates with Prefixes: Dose Rates with No Prefixes: Default Prefixes: Default Suffixes:

• = Contact Gen Area HS = Hot Spot "n" = Neutron

+ = 30cm Gen. Area "b" = Beta "c" = Corrected Postings Legend CA=Contaminated Area RA=Radiation Area Map Locations

1. File Name Image Description Location Code Bldg/Area Name Location Description 1 V1111 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP ROOM AB 1974 A 1111 AB 2 V1111A RHR PUMP A PLATFORM AB 1974 1111A AB Instruments Used Instrument Instrument Inst

1. Model Serial # Type 1 RO-2 ION-4108-HP D 2 Model 177 CRM-4150-HP C Survey #: CA-M-20130702 PDF Generated On: 07/03/2013 15:51 Page 1 of 5

H210.0001 VSDS Standard Map Survey Map: 1 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP ROOM A Survey #: CA-M-20130702-3 Date/Time: 07/02/2013 16:00 Comments: DRR changed from 0-70 mRem/hr to 0-30 mRem/hr due to the Summary of Highest Readings current dose rates. (All available values may not be listed)

Smears Air Samples & Wipes

4) 6000 dpm/100 cm2 b/g Wipe 3) 4000 cpm/Wipe b/g Type: Quarterly Symbol Legend (for example only) RWP #: 300101ROUTINE Reactor Power = 100%

Unless otherwise noted, dose rates in mrem/hr.

Lead Surveyor: Lindstrom, Jonathan Status: Approved by: Hurla, Gerald W, 07/03/2013 Location Code: AB 1974 Bldg/Area Name: 1111 Location

Description:

AB Image File: V1111 Survey #: CA-M-20130702 PDF Generated On: 07/03/2013 15:51 Page 2 of 5

H210.0001 VSDS Standard Map Survey Data Point Details Survey #: CA-M-20130702-3 Map: 1 - RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP ROOM A

1. Type Inst. Value Units Position Notes 1 DR g N/A 2 mrem/hr South side 2 DR g N/A 2.0 mrem/hr EJV0065 3 DR g N/A 2 mrem/hr GLV0010 4 DR g N/A 5 mrem/hr 5 DR g N/A 15 mrem/hr EJV8724A 6 DR g N/A 7 mrem/hr DNHV8812A 7 DR g N/A 5 mrem/hr EJFCV0610 8 DR g N/A 4 mrem/hr GLV0134 9 DR g N/A 4 mrem/hr EFV0037 / EFV0038 10 DR g N/A 3 mrem/hr 11 DR g N/A

• 14 mrem/hr N/A + 10 mrem/hr 12 DR g N/A 2 mrem/hr 13 DR g N/A 5 mrem/hr EJV064 14 DR g N/A 4 mrem/hr EJV0185 15 DR g N/A 5 mrem/hr GLV0010 16 DR g N/A 18 mrem/hr GLV0087 17 DR g N/A 10 mrem/hr 18 DR g N/A 4 mrem/hr 1 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 2 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 3 Smear N/A b/g 3000 dpm/100 cm2 4 Smear N/A b/g 6000 dpm/100 cm2 5 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 6 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 7 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 8 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 9 Smear N/A b/g 1000 dpm/100 cm2 10 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 11 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 12 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 1 Wipe b/g 300 cpm/Wipe 2 Wipe b/g 200 cpm/Wipe 3 Wipe b/g 4000 cpm/Wipe 4 Wipe b/g 2000 cpm/Wipe Text DRR 0-30 mRem/hr Note HS 1111-1 Text 60/12 Posting RA CA Image File: V1111 Survey #: CA-M-20130702 PDF Generated On: 07/03/2013 15:51 Page 3 of 5

H210.0001 VSDS Standard Map Survey Map: 2 RHR PUMP A PLATFORM Survey #: CA-M-20130702-3 Date/Time: 07/02/2013 16:00 Comments: Summary of Highest Readings (All available values may not be listed)

Smears Air Samples & Wipes

3) <1000 dpm/100 cm2 b/g Wipe 1) <100 cpm/Wipe b/g Type: Quarterly Symbol Legend (for example only) RWP #: 300101ROUTINE Reactor Power = 100%

Unless otherwise noted, dose rates in mrem/hr.

Lead Surveyor: Lindstrom, Jonathan Status: Approved by: Hurla, Gerald W, 07/03/2013 Location Code: AB 1974 Bldg/Area Name: 1111A Location

Description:

AB Image File: V1111A Survey #: CA-M-20130702 PDF Generated On: 07/03/2013 15:51 Page 4 of 5

H210.0001 VSDS Standard Map Survey Data Point Details Survey #: CA-M-20130702-3 Map: 2 - RHR PUMP A PLATFORM

1. Type Inst. Value Units Position Notes 1 DR g N/A 5 mrem/hr 2 DR g N/A 5 mrem/hr 1 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 2 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 3 Smear N/A b/g <1000 dpm/100 cm2 1 Wipe b/g <100 cpm/Wipe Image File: V1111A Survey #: CA-M-20130702 PDF Generated On: 07/03/2013 15:51 Page 5 of 5

CALLAWAY ENERGY CENTER JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM No: RSA5 KSA No: GEN 2.4.41 Revision: July 2013 KSA Rating: 4.6 Job

Title:

SRO Task

Title:

Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications:

Initiate RERP implementation to include event classification and initial offsite notification.

Validation Time: No greater than 30 minutes (Time Critical)

Learning Objective: T61.0110, LP-76, Obj C, Identify initial classifications and potential escalations when plant conditions change and Obj D, For a given Emergency Declaration, demonstrate the use of Sentry computer to make the required notifications The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be:

[ ] SATISFACTORY [ ] UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

Task Performer:

Location of Performance:

Control Room Simulator/Lab X Plant Classroom Method of Performance: Simulated Performed X Alternate Path: ___ ___ Time Critical: ___ X___

Student Handouts: EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions, Rev 48

References:

EIP-ZZ-00101, Classification of Emergencies, Rev 47 EIP-ZZ-00101, ADD 1, EAL Classification Matrix, Rev 3 EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions, Rev 48

JPM NO: RSA-5, Rev 1 Initial Conditions: Given the following plant conditions:

The Plant has been at 100% for 3 days following a Refueling Outage Annunciator 76D, SFP LEVEL HILO, alarms EC LI-39A, SFP LEV, is lowering Annunciator 62D, AREA RAD HIHI, alarms SD-RE-37, Fuel Pool Bridge Crane Rad, indicates 660 mr/hr and rising SD-RE-38, Spent Fuel Pool Area Rad, indicates 630 mr/hr and rising GG-RE-27 and 28, Fuel/Aux BLDG Normal Exhaust and Emergency Exhaust System, have risen to their HI HI setpoint and actuated a Fuel Building Ventilation Isolation Signal (FBVIS).

GT-RE-21B, Unit Vent Air Exh Radiation, indicates radiation level has risen to 6.3 E+7 µCi/sec, and is stable.

Non-essential personnel are evacuated from the Fuel Building Initiating Cue: You have been provided the combined EAL attachments and directed to determine the Emergency Event Classification, complete the Sentry Notification Form and then perform the notification of off-site agencies within the required time limits.

This JPM is Time Critical.

(THIS IS A DRILL)

Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the operator will have determined the event classification to be a Site Area Emergency based on EAL RS 1.1, Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release. The operator will then complete the Sentry Notification Form and send it within 15 minutes of the event classification time. Total time shall not exceed 30 minutes but the second 15 minute clock started at the EAL classification time on Attachment 1.

START TIME: STOP TIME:

PAGE 1 of 3

JPM NO: RSA-5, Rev 1 JPM TASK PERFORMANCE STEP ELEMENT STANDARD SCORE S U

1. Obtain a verified working Applicant obtained working copies of copy of EIP-ZZ-00101, procedures Comments:

Classification of Emergencies, ADD1 Wall Chart, and combined EAL attachments S U

• 2. Using the given conditions Applicant declared a Site Area and Addendum 1, determine Emergency, RS 1.1, Offsite dose Comments:

the appropriate emergency resulting from an actual or imminent classification: Site Area release of gaseous radioactivity Time of Declaration Emergency exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE for the actual or (Start of new 15 min projected duration of the release., clock) within 15 minutes of start S U

• 3. Notify Facility Personnel Applicant notified facility personnel Announce the Emergency Comments:

Classification, the Declaration Time and the Cause EIP-ZZ-00102, ATT 5, EC Flowchart S U

• 4. Notify Onsite Personnel Applicant notified onsite personnel Complete Attachment 1 - Comments:

Sound the Emergency Alarm EIP-ZZ-00102, ATT 5, EC Flowchart PAGE 2 of 3

JPM NO: RSA-5, Rev 1 JPM TASK PERFORMANCE STEP ELEMENT STANDARD SCORE S U

• 5. Is Emergency an Alert or Applicant determined emergency Higher? was an Site Area emergency Comments:

EIP-ZZ-00102, ATT 5, EC Flowchart S U

• 6. Have SAS activate callout Applicant had SAS activate callout per KOA-ZZ-00200 using the per KOA-ZZ-00200. Comments:

appropriate message, if not already activated at a lower Examiner Cue:

classification SAS has been notified to activate EIP-ZZ-00102, ATT 5, EC callout Flowchart S U

• 7. Is Emergency a General Applicant determined emergency Emergency was not a General Emergency Comments:

EIP-ZZ-00102, ATT 5, EC Flowchart S U

• 8. Notify offsite agencies by Applicant filled out the Sentry completing and sending the notification form and sent it to the Comments:

Sentry notification form offsite agencies within 15 minutes of completing the EAL classification Time Notification Sent IAW the key (Completion time of 2nd EIP-ZZ-00102, ATT 5, EC Examiner CUE Flowchart 15 min clock)

If asked:

A release evaluation is in progress S U

9. The JPM is complete Record stop time on Page 1 Comments:

Critical Step PAGE 3 of 3

(THIS IS A DRILL)

Initial Conditions: Given the following plant conditions:

The Plant has been at 100% for 3 days following a Refueling Outage Annunciator 76D, SFP LEVEL HILO, alarms EC LI-39A, SFP LEV, is lowering Annunciator 62D, AREA RAD HIHI, alarms SD-RE-37, Fuel Pool Bridge Crane Rad, indicates 660 mr/hr and rising SD-RE-38, Spent Fuel Pool Area Rad, indicates 630 mr/hr and rising GG-RE-27 and 28, Fuel/Aux BLDG Normal Exhaust and Emergency Exhaust System, have risen to their HI HI setpoint and actuated a Fuel Building Ventilation Isolation Signal (FBVIS).

GT-RE-21B, Unit Vent Air Exh Radiation, indicates radiation level has risen to 6.3 E+7 µCi/sec, and is stable.

Non-essential personnel are evacuated from the Fuel Building Initiating Cue: You have been provided the combined EAL attachments and directed to determine the Emergency Event Classification, complete the Sentry Notification Form and then perform the notification of off-site agencies within the required time limits.

This JPM is Time Critical.

(THIS IS A DRILL)

EIP-ZZ-00101 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ADMINISTRATIVE CORRECTION Revision: 048 Page 1 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 PURPOSE ...................................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................................................................................... 3 4.0 PREREQUISITES ......................................................................................................................... 3 5.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS ................................................................................................. 4

6.0 REFERENCES

.............................................................................................................................. 8 6.1. Implementing ....................................................................................................................... 8 6.2. Developmental ..................................................................................................................... 8 7.0 RECORDS ................................................................................................................................... 10 8.0 DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................ 10 9.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES ....................................................................................................... 11 ATTACHMENT 1, Emergency Action Level Category / Sub-Category Overview .................................. 12 EIP-ZZ-00101 Addendum 1, Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix EIP-ZZ-00101 Addendum 2, Emergency Action Levels Technical Bases Document Page 2 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides guidelines for classification of emergencies at the Callaway Plant.

2.0 SCOPE 2.1. Establishes indications for determining conditions at which specific emergency classifications are to be declared.

2.2. This procedure is initiated when:

• Alarms, abnormal instrument readings, or reports of conditions that indicate an emergency situation (either real or potential) have occurred.

• A subsequent action step in a plant operating off-normal, or Emergency Procedure which refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant conditions.

3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1. Shift Manager Upon classification of an emergency, assumes the position of Emergency Coordinator and initiates emergency actions including making Protective Action Recommendations to authorities responsible for implementing off-site emergency measures. Assigns on-shift personnel to emergency duties as deemed necessary, and notifies the EDO of the emergency.

Continues as Acting Emergency Coordinator until relieved by the EDO. When relieved, the Shift Manager will resume normal duties in directing Plant Operations activities from the Control room. [Ref: 6.2.18, 6.2.8]

3.2. Emergency Coordinator Responsible for directing overall emergency response on-site. Initially, the Shift Manager assumes the responsibilities of Emergency Coordinator. At the ALERT (or higher) emergency classification levels, the EDO will relieve the Shift Manager and assume the Emergency Coordinator duties. The Emergency Coordinator directs the Emergency Response Organization from the TSC after relieving the Shift Manager. [Ref: 6.2.23, 6.2.8]

3.3. Plant Personnel Responsible for immediately reporting any abnormal condition or event to the Shift Manager.

4.0 PREREQUISITES None

-END OF SECTION-Page 3 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 5.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS NOTE Initial classification should take place as soon as possible but NOT greater then 15 minutes after recognition of initiating conditions.

The primary tool for determining the emergency classification level is Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix wall chart (EIP-ZZ-00101 Addendum 1, Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix) located at key locations.

The user of the Matrix may (but is not required to) consult EIP-ZZ-00101 Addendum 2, Emergency Action Levels Technical Bases Document in order to obtain additional/clarifying information concerning the EALs under classification consideration.

5.1. Shift Manager - WHEN abnormal or emergency conditions (real or potential) occur, PERFORM the following to ensure that appropriate actions are taken for the safe and proper operation of the plant. [Ref: 6.2.25]

• Use Emergency Procedures.

• Reference EIP-ZZ-SK001, Response to Security Events.

• Update Security.

• Dispatch the Fire Brigade, other personnel.

• Take other actions, as needed.

NOTE Instrumentation listed in the Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix wall chart, are the primary means of determining conditions; if these are inoperative, others indications may be substituted.

5.2. Shift Manager - Using indications available (alarms, readings, reports, etc.) and the Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix wall chart, DETERMINE the appropriate emergency classification: [Ref: 6.2.23]

Page 4 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 NOTE Emergency Classification can also be based upon projected conditions/indications to ensure adequate measures are taken to mitigate any consequences of the emergency. [Ref: 6.2.22]

The majority of the EALs provide very specific thresholds and the Emergency Coordinator must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the EAL threshold is imminent. If, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, an imminent situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the thresholds have been exceeded. While this is particularly prudent at the higher emergency classes (as the early classification may provide for more effective implementation of protective measures), it is nonetheless applicable to all emergency classes.

Explicit EALs specifying use of Emergency Coordinator judgment are given in the Hazards and Fission Product Barrier Degradation categories.

The plant operating MODE that exists at the time that the event occurs (prior to any protective system or operator action is initiated in response to the condition) should be compared to the MODE applicability of the EALs. If a lower or higher plant-operating MODE is reached before the emergency classification is made, the declaration shall be based on the MODE that existed at the time the event occurred. If additional events occur, the declaration shall be based on the MODE that existed at the time the new event occurred. This logic is applied to determine the plant-operating MODE, EAL categories (C, F, S) and EAL Classification Matrix (Hot/Cold) applicability.

5.2.1. SELECT the applicable EAL Classification Matrix wall chart (Hot for MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4; Cold for MODES 5, 6 or De-fueled).

NOTE The left side of the EAL Classification Matrix is identical on both pages of the wall chart, and lists EALs that are applicable under any plant-operating MODE.

The right side of the Hot EAL Classification Matrix, lists EALs that are applicable under MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The right side of the Cold EAL Classification Matrix lists EALs that are applicable only under MODES 5, 6 and De-fueled. shows an overview of EAL Classifications and Sub-Classifications.

5.2.2. SCAN the left column of the EAL Classification Matrix and LOCATE the EAL category and subcategory that are most applicable to available indications.

5.2.3. From left-to-right, READ across the category/subcategory row.

5.2.4. FIND the corresponding EAL with the most severe classification level that is appropriate to the actual indication(s). There may be more than one.

5.2.5. REPEAT Steps 5.2.1 through 5.2.4 as necessary to ensure all classifiable EALs are identified.

Page 5 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 5.3. IF extra personnel are desired when NO conditions exist that in his opinion warrant an emergency declaration, the Shift Manager may have the SAS operator ACTIVATE the Emergency Callout System per KOA-ZZ-00200, Activation of the Callaway Plant Emergency Callout System using one of the following messages:

• Message #2 for duty Rapid Responders.

• Message #10 for all available Rapid Responders, ERO Coordinators, and engineers.

5.4. WHEN conditions exist that in their opinion warrants the declaration, the Emergency Coordinator has the option to DECLARE an UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY using the Judgment EALs (EAL HU6.1 through HG6.1 or the Table F-1, Fission Product Barrier, Judgment Loss/Potential Loss thresholds.)

NOTE Occasionally, a licensee discovers that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a postevent review. Frequently, in cases of this nature, which were discovered after the fact, licensees have declared the emergency class, immediately terminated the emergency class and then made the appropriate notifications.

However, the NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the event was previously reported but mis-classified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or mis-classified) event provides an acceptable alternative.

5.5. DECLARE the most severe emergency classification that corresponds to the condition derived from review of the EAL Classification Matrix.

NOTE Initial notifications to State and Local Agencies are required to be initiated and acknowledged within 15-minutes after declaration of the emergency classification.

5.6. Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator - PERFORM the necessary emergency implementing actions as outlined in EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions to ensure the proper response is taken to implement the Callaway Plant Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

5.7. IF necessary, CONTACT the EDO to discuss emergency actions.

5.8. Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator - RECLASSIFY the emergency as conditions dictate in accordance with this procedure.

Page 6 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 5.9. This procedure may be exited when Event Closeout or Plant Recovery has been declared in accordance with EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Plant Recovery.

-END OF SECTION-Page 7 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1. Implementing 6.1.1. APA-ZZ-01003, Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual 6.1.2. CDP-ZZ-01100, Atmospheric Hazard Control 6.1.3. CDP-ZZ-08100, Post Accident Sampling Guidelines 6.1.4. EIP-ZZ-00101 Addendum 1, Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix 6.1.5. EIP-ZZ-00101 Addendum 2, Emergency Action Levels Technical Bases Document 6.1.6. EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions 6.1.7. EIP-ZZ-00260, Event Closeout/Plant Recovery 6.1.8. EIP-ZZ-01211, Management Action Guides for Nuclear Emergencies (MAGNEM) 6.1.9. EIP-ZZ-SK001, Response to Security Events 6.1.10. Emergency operations Procedure E-0 6.1.11. FRC.2, Core Cooling 6.1.12. FRH.1, Heat Sink 6.1.13. HTP-ZZ-07010, Alternate Method to Obtain CHARMS Reading.

6.1.14. KOA-ZZ-00200, Activation of the Callaway Plant Emergency Callout System 6.1.15. ODP-ZZ-00025, Emergency Operating Procedure Usage 6.1.16. OTO-RK-00001, Loss of Control Room Alarms 6.1.17. OTO-SG-00001, Seismic Event 6.1.18. OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility 6.1.19. OTO-SK-00001, Plant Security Event - Hostile Intrusion 6.1.20. OTO-SK-00002, Plant Security Event - Aircraft Threat 6.2. Developmental 6.2.1. 10CFR50 Appendix E Page 8 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 6.2.2. 10CFR50.34 6.2.3. 10CFR50.54 6.2.4. APA-ZZ-00703, Fire Protection Operability Criteria and Surveillance Requirements 6.2.5. BB-162 Rev. 000 6.2.6. BB-179 Rev. 000 6.2.7. Callaway Plant Final Safety Analysis Report 6.2.8. Callaway Plant Radiological Emergency Response Plan 6.2.9. Callaway Plant Technical Specifications 6.2.10. Comm. 20606, UNLRC 867 NRC Inspection Report 84010-A8 6.2.11. Comm. 41525, UE letter to NRC - Alert for S/G tube rupture 6.2.12. Comm. 43073, ULNRC 2998 6.2.13. Comm. 50110, EP response actions for security based events 6.2.14. Emergency Action Level (EAL) Descriptions 6.2.15. EPCI-98-01, EAL Bases Calculation 6.2.16. FSAR CN 00-065, GTRE59/60 Alert and High Alarm Computer Setpoints 6.2.17. NEI 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.2.18. NUREG 0654 Rev 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Support of Nuclear Power Plants 6.2.19. NUREG 1022 Rev. 2, Event Reporting Guidelines 6.2.20. NUREG 0818, Emergency Action Levels for Light Water Reactors 6.2.21. Reg. Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors 6.2.22. RERP Section 4 6.2.23. RERP Section 5.1.1 6.2.24. RERP Section 5.2.1 6.2.25. RERP Section 6.2 Page 9 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 6.2.26. ULNRC 05189 6.2.27. EAL Technical Bases Document 6.2.28. NEI 99-01 Revision 4, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, January 2003 6.2.29. NUMARC/NESP-007 Rev. 2, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, Questions and Answers 6.2.30. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2003-18, Supplement 2, Use of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels Revision 4, Dated January 2003 (December 12, 2005) 6.2.31. NRC Bulletin 2005-02 Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events 7.0 RECORDS None 8.0 DEFINITIONS Emergency Classifications

• UNUSUAL EVENT - Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

[Ref: 6.2.8, 6.2.26, 6.2.13]

• ALERT - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of Hostile Action. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. [Ref: 6.2.8, 6.2.26, 6.2.13]

• SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or Hostile Actions that result in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or: (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. [Ref: 6.2.8, 6.2.26, 6.2.13]

• GENERAL EMERGENCY - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or Hostile Action that result in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. [Ref: 6.2.8, 6.2.26, 6.2.13]

Page 10 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 9.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES Section or Page(s) Description Step Number 6 Note Added acknowledgement to notification.

Page 11 of 12 INFORMATION USE

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev. 048 Attachment 1 Emergency Action Level Category / Sub-Category Overview Sheet 1 of 1 EAL Category EAL Subcategory Any Operating MODE:

R - Abnormal Rad Release / Rad Effluent 1 - Offsite Rad Conditions 2 - Onsite Rad Conditions H - Hazards 1 - Natural & Destructive Phenomena 2 - Fire or Explosion 3 - Toxic, Corrosive, Asphxiant &

Flammable Gas 4 - Security 5 - Control Room Evacuation 6 - Judgment Hot Conditions:

S - System Malfunction 1 - Loss of Power 2 - RTS Failure 3 - Inability to Reach or Maintain Shutdown Conditions 4 - Instrumentation / Communications 5 - Fuel Clad Degradation 6 - RCS Leakage 7 - Inadvertent Criticality F - Fission Product Barrier Degradation None Cold Conditions:

C - Cold Shutdown / Refuel System 1 - Loss of Power Malfunction 2 - RCS Level 3 - RCS Temperature 4 - Communications 5 - RCS Leakage 6 - Inadvertent Criticality 7 - Fuel Clad Degradation Page 12 of 12 INFORMATION USE

RG1 Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of RS1 Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of RA1 Any unplanned release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the RU1 Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment SA1 AC power capability to emergency buses reduced to a single SU1 Loss of all offsite power to emergency buses for 15 minutes.

SG1 Prolonged loss of all offsite power and prolonged loss of all SS1a Loss of all offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power to gaseous radioactivity exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE or gaseous radioactivity exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem environment that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent that exceeds two times the radiological effluent Offsite Dose power source for 15 minutes such that any additional single onsite AC power to emergency buses. emergency buses.

5000 mRem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) limits for 15 minutes Calculation Manual (ODCM) limits for 60 minutes or longer. failure would result in station blackout.

the release using actual meteorology. or longer.

Note 3: If dose assessment results are available at the time of declaration, the Note 2: If dose assessment results are available at the time of declaration, the SG1.1 1 2 3 4 SS1.1 1 2 3 4 SA1.1 1 2 3 4 SU1.1 1 2 3 4 classification should be based on dose assessment instead of radiation Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has monitor readings. While necessary declarations should not be delayed classification should be based on dose assessment instead of radiation monitor Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power to emergency Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power to emergency AC power capability to emergency buses NB01 and Loss of all offsite AC power to emergency buses NB01 readings. While necessary declarations should not be delayed awaiting results, exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of data to the contrary, assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing awaiting results, the dose assessment should be initiated / completed in order the dose assessment should be initiated / completed in order to determine if the release is detected and the release start time is unknown. buses NB01 and NB02. buses NB01 and NB02 for 15 min. NB02 reduced to a single power source for 15 min. and NB02 for 15 min.

to determine if the classification is warranted. See EAL RG 1.2. classification should be subsequently escalated. See EAL RS1.2. AND EITHER:

RG1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RS1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RA1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RU1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Loss of Restoration of at least one emergency bus within Power 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely. SS1b Loss of all vital DC power.

Valid reading on any monitors that exceeds or is expected Valid reading on any radiation monitors that exceeds or Valid reading on any Gaseous monitors > Table R-1 Valid reading on any Gaseous monitors > Table R-1 is expected to exceed Table R-1 column SAE for column UE for 60 min. (Note 1) OR to exceed Table R-1 column GE for 15 min. (Note 1 & 3) column Alert for 15 min. (Note 1) SS1.2 1 2 3 4 15 min. (Note 1 & 2) CSFST Core Cooling - RED or ORANGE path.

RA1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RU1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Loss of all Division 1 and 2 vital DC power based on RG1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RS1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF < 107.0 VDC bus indications for 15 min.

Offsite Valid reading on the Liquid Radwaste Discharge monitor Valid reading on the Liquid Radwaste Discharge monitor Rad Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates (HB-RE-18) > 200 X Hi-Hi alarm (with effluent discharge (HB-RE-18) > 2 X Hi-Hi alarm (with effluent discharge Conditions doses > 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid CDE doses > 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE at SG2 Failure of the Reactor Trip System to complete an automatic SS2 Failure of Reactor Trip System instrumentation to complete or SA2 Failure of Reactor Trip System instrumentation to complete or not isolated) for 15 min. (Note 1) not isolated) for 60 min. (Note 1) trip and manual trip was not successful and there is indication initiate an automatic reactor trip once a Reactor Trip System initiate an automatic reactor trip once a Reactor Trip System at or beyond the site boundary. or beyond the site boundary.

of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core. setpoint has been exceeded and manual trip was not successful. setpoint has been exceeded and manual trip was successful.

RS1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RA1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RU1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RG1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Field survey indicates closed window dose rate Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates SG2.1 1 2 SS2.1 1 2 SA2.1 1 2

> 100 mRem/hr that is expected to continue for > 1 hr at or releases indicate concentrations or release rates releases indicate concentrations or release rates

> 1,000 mRem/hr expected to continue for > 1 hr at or

> 200 x ODCM limits for 15 min. (Note 1) > 2 x ODCM limits for 60 min. (Note 1) Automatic and all manual trips failed to generate a Automatic and all manual trips (using SB-HS-1 or Indication of all of the following:

beyond the site boundary. beyond the site boundary.

negative SUR and prompt lowering in reactor power to SB-HS-42) failed to generate a negative SUR and prompt Any RTS setpoint was exceeded.

OR OR RTS < 5% after any RTS setpoint is exceeded. lowering in reactor power to < 5% after any RTS setpoint is Automatic trip did not occur.

Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE of Field survey sample analysis indicates thyroid CDE of Failure AND EITHER: exceeded. Successful manual trip occurred (using SB-HS-1 5,000 mRem for 1 hr of inhalation at or beyond the site 500 mRem for 1 hr of inhalation at or beyond the site CSFST Core Cooling - RED. or SB-HS-42).

boundary. boundary.

OR RA2 Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has or will RU2 Unexpected rise in plant radiation.

CSFST Heat Sink - RED.

result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the Reactor Vessel.

Abnormal Rad SU3 Inability to reach required shutdown within Technical RA2.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RU2.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Specification limits.

Release

/ Table Table R-1 R-1 Effluent Effluent Monitor Monitor Classification Classification Thresholds Thresholds Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has Valid low water level or alarm indicating uncontrolled water Rad or will result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside level drop in the refueling pool, spent fuel pool or fuel Inability to SU3.1 1 2 3 4 Effluent ReleasePoint Release Point Monitor Monitor GE GE SAE Alert UE the Reactor Vessel resulting in raised readings on any of transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining Reach or Plant is not brought to required operating mode within 200 X Hi-Hi the following radiation monitors: covered by water.

Plant Vent GT-RE-21B GT-RE-21B 5.82E+8 5.82E+8 µCi/sec5.82E+7

µCi/sec 5.82 E+7 µCi/sec 200 X Hi-Hi alarm 2 X Hi-Hi alarm

µCi/sec alarm Maintain Technical Specifications LCO action statement time.

Hi-Hi Alarm on Fuel Building exhaust monitors AND Shutdown Atmospheric Steam Dump (ASD) AB-RE-111/112 AB-RE-111 /112 Gaseous 3.58mr/hr 3.58E+2 E+2 mr/hr 35.935.9 mr/hr mr/hr (GG-RE-27 or 28). Unplanned valid area radiation monitor reading rises in Conditions 113/114113 /114 Monitors (STM LINE A, B, C, D Mon.)

Gaseous Manipulator crane radiation monitor Containment Building or Fuel Building.

TD TDAFW AFWSteam SteamDischarge Discharge FC-RE-385 FC-RE-3852.08E+3 2.08 mr/hr E+3 mr/hr 2.09 E+2 mr/hr (SD-RE-41) >100 mR/hr. SS4 Inability to monitor a significant transient in progress. SA4 Unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciation or SU4a Unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciation or Fuel Building East or West Wall area radiation indication in Control Room with either (1) a significant transient indication in the control room for 15 minutes.

Radwaste Bldg Vent GH-RE-10B 200 X Hi-Hi alarm 2 X Hi-Hi alarm monitor (SD-RE-37 or 38) > 30 mR/hr. in progress, or (2) compensatory non-alarming indicators are unavailable.

RA2.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RU2.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Unplanned valid area radiation monitor reading rises by a SS4.1 1 2 3 4 SA4.1 1 2 3 4 SU4.1 1 2 3 4 A water level drop in the reactor refueling cavity, spent Onsite factor of 1000 over normal* levels. Loss of annunciators and indicators based on any of the Unplanned loss of annunciators or indicators for 15 min. Unplanned loss of annunciators or indicators for 15 min.

fuel pool or fuel transfer canal that will result in irradiated Rad following: based on any of the following: based on any of the following:

fuel becoming uncovered.

• Normal levels can be considered as the highest reading in the System Conditions past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> excluding the current peak value. 3 of 4 field power supplies indicate < 105 VDC. 3 of 4 field power supplies indicate < 105 VDC. 3 of 4 field power supplies indicate < 105 VDC.

Malfunct. Field Power Supply Bus voltage is < 105 VDC. Field Power Supply Bus voltage is < 105 VDC. Field Power Supply Bus voltage is < 105 VDC.

RA3 Release of radioactive material or rises in radiation levels within > 9 logic power supplies have failed. > 9 logic power supplies have failed. > 9 logic power supplies have failed.

the facility that impedes operation of systems required to > 4 Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have failed. > 4 Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have failed. > 4 Multiplexer Adapter Rack Fuses have failed.

maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown OR BOTH of the following: OR BOTH of the following: OR BOTH of the following:

Any failure of a combination of power supplies Any failure of a combination of power supplies Any failure of a combination of power supplies RA3.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF (including Optical Isolators) or Multiplexer (including Optical Isolators) or Multiplexer (including Optical Isolators) or Multiplexer Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in areas requiring continuous Inst. / Adapter Rack Fuses. Adapter Rack Fuses. Adapter Rack Fuses.

occupancy to maintain plant safety functions: Comm. AND AND AND Any minimum compensatory actions Any minimum compensatory actions Any minimum compensatory actions Control Room (SD-RE-33).

(OTO-RK-00001) cannot be maintained. (OTO-RK-00001) cannot be maintained. (OTO-RK-00001) cannot be maintained.

OR Table S-1 Significant Transients Central Alarm Station (CAS) (by survey). AND AND EITHER:

SU4b Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communications

- Electrical load rejection > 25% Any significant transient is in progress, Table S-1. Any significant transient is in progress, Table S-1. capabilities.

full electrical load

- Reactor Trip AND OR SU4.2 1 2 3 4 HA1 Natural and destructive phenomena affecting the plant Vital Area. HU1 Natural and destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area. - Runback > 25% thermal power Compensatory plant parameters monitored via the Compensatory plant parameters monitored via the Loss of all Table S-2 onsite (internal) communications

- ECCS injection plant computer (OTO-RK-00001) are not valid or plant computer (OTO-RK-00001) are not valid or capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

HA1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF OR

- Thermal power oscillations > 10% cannot be obtained. cannot be obtained.

Operating Basis Earthquake exceeded per OTO-SG-00001, Seismic event identified by any two of the following: Loss of all Table S-2 offsite (external) communications Seismic Activity, Annunciator 98D. Annunciator 98E (verified per OTO-SG-00001, capability.

AND Seismic Activity) indicates felt earthquake.

Earthquake confirmed by any of the following: Earthquake felt in plant.

Earthquake felt in plant. National Earthquake Information Center. SU5 Fuel clad degradation.

National Earthquake Information Center.

Control Room indication of degraded performance of Table H-1 Vital Areas systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant. SU5.1 1 2 3 4 Coolant activity > any of the following:

- Area 5 HA1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Table S-2 Communications Systems 1.0 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131 for > 48 hr

- Control Building Tornado or high winds 74 mph within Protected Area Report by plant personnel of tornado or high winds Fuel Clad continuous period.

- Containment boundary and resulting in visible damage to any Table H-1 74 mph striking within Protected Area boundary. Degradation Onsite Offsite System 60 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131.

- Aux Feed Pump Rooms plant structures / equipment or Control Room indication of (internal) (external)

- Aux Building degraded performance of those systems. 225 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xe-133.

- Gaitronics System X

- Diesel Generator Building Natural & - UHS Cooling Tower HA1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF - Plant Radios X SU6 RCS leakage.

Destructive - ESW Pumphouse Non-hostile vehicle crash within Protected Area boundary - Plant Emergency Dedicated Phones X Phenomena - RWST and resulting in visible damage to any Table H-1 plant - Plant Telephone System X X Note 4: See Table F-1, Fission Product Barrier SU6.1 1 2 3 4

- Fuel Building structures or equipment or Control Room indication of Matrix, for possible escalation above Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm.

degraded performance of those safety systems. RCS - ENS (Red Phone) Line X the Unusual Event due to RCS Leakage.

OR Leakage - Back-Up Radio System (BURS) X HA1.4 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Identified leakage > 25 gpm. (Note 4)

- Sentry Notification System X Turbine failure-generated missiles result in any visible Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration damage to or penetration of any Table H-1 area. or damage to turbine or generator seals. SU7 Inadvertent criticality.

HU1.4 SU7.1 3 4 HA1.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Flooding in the Control Building, Battery Room or ESF Flooding in the Control Building, Battery Room or ESF Inadvertent Any unplanned sustained positive startup rate observed Switchgear Room that results in degraded safety system Switchgear Room that has the potential to affect Criticality on nuclear instrumentation.

Table H-2 Fire Areas performance as indicated in the Control Room or that safety-related equipment needed for the current creates industrial safety hazards (e.g., electric shock) operating mode. FG1.1 1 2 3 4 FS1.1 1 2 3 4 FA1.1 1 2 3 4 FU1.1 1 2 3 4

- Area 5 that precludes access necessary to operate or monitor

- Control Building safety equipment. Loss of any two barriers. Loss or potential loss of any two barriers (Table F-1). Any loss or any potential loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS Any loss or any potential loss of Containment (Table F-1).

- Containment AND (Notes 1, 2, 3) (Table F-1). (Notes 1, 2, 3) (Notes 1, 2, 3)

- Aux Feed Pump Rooms Fission Product HA2 Fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety systems HU2 Fire or explosion within Protected Area boundary. Loss or potential loss of third barrier (Table F-1).

- Aux Building Barriers required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (Notes 1, 2, 3)

- Diesel Generator Building

- UHS Cooling Tower HA2.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU2.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF

- ESW Pumphouse Non-hostile initiated fire or explosion resulting in visible Non-hostile initiated fire not extinguished within 15 min. of

- RWST Control Room notification or valid Control Room fire alarm damage to any Table H-2 area structure containing safety

- Fuel Building in any Table H-2 area.

systems or components or Control Room indication of

- Communication Corridor Containment Barrier Fire

- Aux Boiler Room degraded performance of those safety systems. Fuel Cladding Barrier Reactor Coolant System Barrier or Explosion - Radwaste Tunnel HU2.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF

- XNB01 and XNB02 Non-hostile explosion within the Protected Area. Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Enclosure

- South 50 ft. Turbine A. Critical Safety 1. CSFST Core Cooling - RED. 1. CSFST Core Cooling - 1. CSFST RCS Integrity - RED 1. CSFST Containment - RED.

Building Function Status ORANGE OR OR CSFST Heat Sink - RED HA3 Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases HU3 Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases CSFST Heat Sink - RED and heat sink required.

within or immediately adjacent to a Vital Area which jeopardizes deemed detrimental to normal operation of the plant. and heat sink required.

operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or establish or maintain safe shutdown. B. Core Exit TCs 2. Core exit TCs > 1,200ºF. 2. Core exit TCs > 706ºF. 2. Core exit TCs > 1,200°F Hazards AND HA3.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU3.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min.

Access to any Table H-1 area is prohibited due to Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases in amounts Toxic, release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable that have or could adversely affect normal plant operations. 3. All of the following:

Corrosive, gases which jeopardizes operation of systems required Core exit TCs > 706°F.

Asphyxiant to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the Reactor Vessel water level < Table F-2 thresholds.

& reactor. Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min.

Flammable HU3.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 3. Containment radiation 1. Containment radiation 4. Containment radiation > 8.06 E+04 R/hr GT-RE-59 C. Radiation Gas Recommendation by local, county or state officials to >2.8E+03 R/hr > 6.4 E+00 R/hr GT-RE-59 (591) or GT-RE-60 (601).

evacuate or shelter site personnel based on offsite event. GT-RE-59 (591) or (591) or GT-RE-60 (601).

GT-RE-60 (601). 5. Unexplained rise in radiation levels in areas adjacent to Containment.

4. CVCS letdown radiation

> 2.5E+01 µCi/ml HG4 Hostile action resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. HS4 Hostile action within the Protected Area. HA4 Hostile action within the owner controlled area or airborne attack HU4 Confirmed security condition or threat which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

SJ-RE-01 (016).

threat.

D. Inventory 3. Reactor Vessel water 2. RCS leak rate > available 2. RCS leak exceeding the 1. Rapid unexplained Containment pressure drop 6. Containment pressure 48 psig and rising.

HG4.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HS4.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA4.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU4.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF level < Table F-2 makeup capacity as capacity of one charging following initial rise.

7. Containment hydrogen concentration 4%.

A hostile force has taken control of plant equipment such that A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the A security condition that does not involve a hostile action thresholds. indicated by a loss of RCS pump (120 gpm) in the 2. Following LOCA, Containment pressure or sump plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to Protected Area as reported by the Security Shift Owner Controlled Area as reported by the Security Shift as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor or designee. subcooling ( 30°F [50ºF] ). normal charging mode with level response not consistent with LOCA conditions. 8. Containment pressure > 27 psig with < one full train maintain safety functions (i.e., reactivity control, RCS letdown isolated. of depressurization equipment operating.

inventory or secondary heat removal). Supervisor or designee. Supervisor or designee. OR 3. SGTR that results in an 3. Ruptured SG is also faulted outside of Containment.

OR A credible site-specific security threat notification. Note: One Containment Spray System train and one Security OR ECCS (SI) actuation. Containment Cooling System train comprise one full train A valid notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat OR 4. Primary-to-secondary leakrate > 10 gpm with A hostile action has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling non-isolable steam release from affected SG to the of depressurization equipment.

< 30 min. away. A valid notification from NRC providing information of an Systems and imminent fuel damage is likely for a freshly off- aircraft threat. environment.

loaded reactor core in pool.

E. Other 5. Coolant activity > 300 µCi/cc 5. Containment isolation valve(s) not closed after HS5 Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant control HA5 Control Room evacuation has been initiated. dose equivalent I-131. Containment isolation cannot be established. AND Downstream pathway to the environment exists.

HS5.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA5.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Control Control Room evacuation has been initiated. Entry into OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility, F. Judgment 6. Any condition in the 4. Any condition in the 4. Any condition in the 3. Any condition in the opinion 6. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency 9. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Room AND for Control Room evacuation. opinion of the opinion of the Emergency opinion of the Emergency of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates loss of the Containment Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Evacuation Control of the plant cannot be established per Emergency Coordinator Coordinator that indicates Coordinator that indicates Coordinator that indicates barrier. Containment barrier.

OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility, within 15 min. that indicates loss of the potential loss of the Fuel loss of the RCS barrier. potential loss of the RCS Fuel Clad barrier. Clad barrier barrier. barrier.

HG6 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency HS6 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency HA6 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency HU6 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of General Emergency. Coordinator warrant declaration of Site Area Emergency. Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert. Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE. Note 1: Note 2:

Table F-2 Reactor Vessel Water Level Thresholds Fission Product Barrier EALs must be capable of addressing event dynamics. Imminent (i.e.,

HG6.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HS6.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU6.1 The logic used for these initiating conditions reflects the following considerations:

HA6.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF The Fuel Clad barrier and the RCS barrier are weighted more heavily than the Containment barrier. UE within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) Loss or Potential Loss should result in a classification as if the affected threshold(s)

Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Emergency Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Fuel Clad and RVLIS No. EALs associated with RCS and Fuel Clad barriers are addressed under System Malfunction EALs. are already exceeded, particularly for the higher emergency classes.

Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress Containment Indication RCPs At the Site Area Emergency level, there must be some ability to dynamically assess how far present occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core or have occurred which involve actual or likely major or have occurred which involve an actual or potential or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of Potential Loss degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public conditions are from the threshold for a General Emergency. For example, if Fuel Clad and RCS barrier Note 3:

substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to None Emergency integrity or hostile action that results in an actual loss of or hostile action that results in intentional damage or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk Pumps Off 42% loss EALs existed, that, in addition to offsite dose assessments, would require continual assessments of Determine which combination of the three barriers are lost or have a potential loss and use FU1.1, facility protection has been initiated. No releases of (All pumps off) radioactive inventory and containment integrity. Alternatively, if both Fuel Clad and RCS barrier Potential FA1.1, FS1.1 and FG1.1 to classify the event. Also an event or multiple events could occur which Coordinator physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective radioactive material requiring off-site response or 1 14% result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss thresholds is imminent (i.e., within Judgment expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline hostile action. Any releases are expected to be limited to Loss EALs existed, the Emergency Coordinator would have more assurance that there was no immediate exposure levels beyond the site boundary (1 Rem TEDE and access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline monitoring are expected unless further degradation of need to escalate to a General Emergency. 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />). In this imminent loss situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are safety systems occurs. 2 21%

5 Rem thyroid CDE). Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels exposure levels beyond the site boundary (1 Rem TEDE Pumps On The ability to escalate to higher emergency classes as an event deteriorates must be maintained. For exceeded.

which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure and 5 Rem thyroid CDE). 3 31% example, RCS leakage steadily rising would represent an escalating risk to public health and safety.

levels beyond the site boundary (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem 4 45%

thyroid CDE).

EIP-ZZ-00101 Addendum 1 Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix Revision 003 Power Operations Startup Hot Standby Hot Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refueling Defueled Information Use

RG1 Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of RS1 Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of RA1 Any unplanned release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the RU1 Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment CA1 Loss of all offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power to CU1a AC power capability to emergency buses reduced to a single gaseous radioactivity exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE or gaseous radioactivity exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem environment that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent that exceeds two times the radiological effluent Offsite Dose emergency buses. power source for 15 minutes such that any additional single 5000 mRem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) limits for 15 minutes Calculation Manual (ODCM) limits for 60 minutes or longer. failure would result in station blackout.

the release using actual meteorology. or longer.

CA1.1 5 6 DEF CU1.1 5 6 Note 3: If dose assessment results are available at the time of declaration, the classification should be based on dose assessment instead of radiation Note 2: If dose assessment results are available at the time of declaration, the Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power to emergency buses AC power capability to emergency buses NB01 and NB02 classification should be based on dose assessment instead of radiation monitor monitor readings. While necessary declarations should not be delayed readings. While necessary declarations should not be delayed awaiting results, Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has NB01 and NB02 for 15 min. reduced to a single power source for 15 min.

exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of data to the contrary, assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing awaiting results, the dose assessment should be initiated / completed in order the dose assessment should be initiated / completed in order to determine if the release is detected and the release start time is unknown.

to determine if the classification is warranted. See EAL RG 1.2. classification should be subsequently escalated. See EAL RS1.2.

CU1b Unplanned loss of required DC power for > 15 minutes.

RG1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RS1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RA1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RU1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Loss Valid reading on any monitors that exceeds or is expected Valid reading on any radiation monitors that exceeds or Valid reading on any Gaseous monitors > Table R-1 Valid reading on any Gaseous monitors > Table R-1 of CU1.2 5 6 to exceed Table R-1 column GE for 15 min. (Note 1 & 3) is expected to exceed Table R-1 column SAE for column Alert for 15 min. (Note 1) column UE for 60 min. (Note 1) Power Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required Division 1 and 15 min. (Note 1 & 2) 2 DC buses based on < 107.0 VDC bus voltage indications.

RA1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RU1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF AND Offsite RG1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RS1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates Valid reading on the Liquid Radwaste Discharge monitor Valid reading on the Liquid Radwaste Discharge monitor Failure to restore power to at least one required DC division Rad Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates within 15 min. from the time of loss.

doses > 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE at (HB-RE-18) > 200 X Hi-Hi alarm (with effluent discharge (HB-RE-18) > 2 X Hi-Hi alarm (with effluent discharge Conditions doses > 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid CDE or beyond the site boundary. not isolated) for 15 min. (Note 1) not isolated) for 60 min. (Note 1) at or beyond the site boundary.

CG2 Loss of Reactor Vessel inventory affecting fuel clad integrity CS2a Loss of Reactor Vessel inventory affecting core decay heat CA2 Loss of Reactor Vessel inventory with irradiated fuel in the CU2 Unplanned loss of RCS inventory with irradiated fuel in the RG1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RS1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RA1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RU1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF with Containment challenged. removal capability. Reactor Vessel. Reactor Vessel.

Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates Field survey indicates closed window dose rate Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid

> 1,000 mRem/hr expected to continue for > 1 hr at or > 100 mRem/hr that is expected to continue for > 1 hr at or releases indicate concentrations or release rates releases indicate concentrations or release rates beyond the site boundary. beyond the site boundary. > 200 x ODCM limits for 15 min. (Note 1) > 2 x ODCM limits for 60 min. (Note 1) CG2.1 5 6 CS2.1 5 6 CA2.1 5 6 CU2.1 6 OR OR RVLIS Pumps Off < 65% (Top of Fuel) for > 30 min. Unplanned RCS level dropping below the Reactor Vessel With Containment closure not established, RVLIS Loss of inventory as indicated by EITHER:

Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE of Field survey sample analysis indicates thyroid CDE of flange (BBLI-53 A/B @100.1 inches) for 15 min.

AND Pumps Off < 72% (BBLI-53 A/B < 0 inches). Reactor Vessel level < bottom of RCS hot leg ID (RVLIS 5,000 mRem for 1 hr of inhalation at or beyond the site 500 mRem for 1 hr of inhalation at or beyond the site Pumps Off < 73% - BBLI-53 A/B @ 0 inches).

boundary. boundary. Any Containment Challenge indication, Table C-5.

CS2.2 OR CU2.2 6 5 6 Reactor Vessel level cannot be monitored for 15 min.

RA2 Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has or will RU2 Unexpected rise in plant radiation. With Containment closure established, RVLIS Pumps Off Reactor Vessel water level cannot be monitored 5 6 with unexplained rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank level.

result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the Reactor CG2.2 < 65% (Top of Fuel). AND Vessel. Reactor Vessel level cannot be monitored with core Loss of inventory as indicated by unexplained rise in any Abnormal uncovery indicated by any of the following for 30 min.: Note: RVLIS is not operable in MODE 6.

Table C-1 sump / tank level.

Rad Table Table R-1 R-1 Effluent Effluent Monitor Monitor Classification Classification Thresholds Thresholds CS2.3 5 6 RA2.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RU2.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Manipulator crane radiation monitor SD-RE-41 Release > 10 R/hr. Reactor Vessel level cannot be monitored for 30 min.

ReleasePoint Release Point Monitor Monitor GE GE SAE Alert UE Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has Valid low water level or alarm indicating uncontrolled water with a loss of Reactor Vessel inventory indicated by any

/ Erratic source range monitor indication.

200 X Hi-Hi level drop in the refueling pool, spent fuel pool or fuel of the following:

Rad Plant Vent GT-RE-21B GT-RE-21B 5.82E+8 5.82E+8 µCi/sec5.82E+7

µCi/sec 5.82 E+7 µCi/sec

µCi/sec 200 X Hi-Hi alarm 2 X Hi-Hi alarm or will result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside alarm Unexplained rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank Table C-1 Sumps/Tanks Effluent Atmospheric Steam Dump (ASD) the Reactor Vessel resulting in raised readings on any of transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining Manipulator crane radiation monitor SD-RE-41 AB-RE-111/112 AB-RE-111 /112 level.

Gaseous 3.58mr/hr 3.58E+2 E+2 mr/hr 35.935.9 mr/hr mr/hr the following radiation monitors: covered by water. > 10 R/hr.

113/114113 /114 Monitors (STM LINE A, B, C, D Mon.)

Gaseous Hi-Hi Alarm on Fuel Building exhaust monitors AND AND Erratic source range monitor indication. - Containment Sump TD TDAFW AFWSteam SteamDischarge Discharge FC-RE-385 FC-RE-3852.08E+3 2.08 mr/hr E+3 mr/hr 2.09 E+2 mr/hr (GG-RE-27 or 28). Unplanned valid area radiation monitor reading rises in Any Containment Challenge indication, Table C-5. - Containment Normal Sump Unexplained level rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank Manipulator crane radiation monitor Containment Building or Fuel Building. level. - Containment Instrument Sump Radwaste Bldg Vent GH-RE-10B 200 X Hi-Hi alarm 2 X Hi-Hi alarm (SD-RE-41) >100 mR/hr. - PRT Fuel Building East or West Wall area radiation - RCDT monitor (SD-RE-37 or 38) > 30 mR/hr. RCS - Auxiliary Building Sump RA2.2 RU2.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Level 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF

` A water level drop in the reactor refueling cavity, spent Unplanned valid area radiation monitor reading rises by a Table C-5 Containment Challenge Onsite factor of 1000 over normal* levels.

fuel pool or fuel transfer canal that will result in irradiated Indications Rad fuel becoming uncovered.

• Normal levels can be considered as the highest reading in the Conditions past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> excluding the current peak value. - Containment closure not established

- Containment hydrogen RA3 Release of radioactive material or rises in radiation levels within concentration 4%

the facility that impedes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold

- Unplanned rise in containment shutdown. pressure RA3.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Dose rates > 15 mR/hr in areas requiring continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions:

CA3 Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown with irradiated fuel in CU3 Unplanned loss of decay heat removal capability with irradiated Control Room (SD-RE-33). the Reactor Vessel. fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

Table C-3 RCS Reheat Duration Thresholds OR Central Alarm Station (CAS) (by survey). CA3.1 5 6 CU3.1 5 6 RCS Containment Closure Duration Any unplanned event results in RCS temperature > 200°F Any unplanned event results in RCS temperature > 200°F Note: Begin monitoring hot condition EALs concurrently.

Intact (but not RCS for > Table C-3 duration.

N/A 60 min.*

HA1 Natural and destructive phenomena affecting the plant Vital Area. HU1 Natural and destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area. Reduced Inventory) OR RCS pressure rise > 10 psig due to a loss of RCS cooling. CU3.2 5 6 HA1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU1.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RCS Established 20 min.* Note: Begin monitoring hot condition EALs concurrently. Loss of all RCS temperature and Reactor Vessel level Operating Basis Earthquake exceeded per OTO-SG-00001, Seismic event identified by any two of the following: Temp. Not intact or RCS indication for 15 min.

Seismic Activity, Annunciator 98D. Annunciator 98E (verified per OTO-SG-00001, Reduced Inventory AND Seismic Activity) indicates felt earthquake. Not Established 0 min.

Earthquake confirmed by any of the following: Earthquake felt in plant.

Earthquake felt in plant. National Earthquake Information Center.

• If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame National Earthquake Information Center. and RCS temperature is being reduced the EAL is not applicable Control Room indication of degraded performance of Table H-1 Vital Areas systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant. Cold SD/

Refuel

- Area 5 System CU4 Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communications HA1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU1.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF

- Control Building Malfunct. capabilities.

Tornado or high winds 74 mph within Protected Area Report by plant personnel of tornado or high winds Table C-2 Communications Systems

- Containment boundary and resulting in visible damage to any Table H-1 74 mph striking within Protected Area boundary. CU4.1 5 6

- Aux Feed Pump Rooms plant structures / equipment or Control Room indication of Onsite Offsite Loss of all Table C-2 onsite (internal) communications

- Aux Building degraded performance of those systems. System (internal) (external) capability affecting the ability to perform routine

- Diesel Generator Building Natural & - UHS Cooling Tower HA1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF - Gaitronics System X operations.

Destructive - ESW Pumphouse OR Non-hostile vehicle crash within Protected Area boundary - Plant Radios X Phenomena - RWST Loss of all Table C-2 offsite (external) communications and resulting in visible damage to any Table H-1 plant - Plant Emergency Dedicated Phones X

- Fuel Building structures or equipment or Control Room indication of capability.

Comm. - Plant Telephone System X X degraded performance of those safety systems.

- ENS (Red Phone) Line X HA1.4 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU1.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF

- Back-Up Radio System (BURS) X Turbine failure-generated missiles result in any visible Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration damage to or penetration of any Table H-1 area. or damage to turbine or generator seals. - Sentry Notification System X HA1.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU1.4 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Flooding in the Control Building, Battery Room or ESF Flooding in the Control Building, Battery Room or ESF Table H-2 Fire Areas Switchgear Room that results in degraded safety system Switchgear Room that has the potential to affect CU5 RCS Leakage.

performance as indicated in the Control Room or that safety-related equipment needed for the current

- Area 5 creates industrial safety hazards (e.g., electric shock) operating mode.

CU5.1 5

- Control Building that precludes access necessary to operate or monitor safety equipment. Unable to establish or maintain pressurizer

- Containment RCS Leakage level > 17% for 15 min.

- Aux Feed Pump Rooms HA2 Fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety systems HU2 Fire or explosion within Protected Area boundary.

- Aux Building required to establish or maintain safe shutdown.

- Diesel Generator Building CU6 Inadvertent Criticality.

- UHS Cooling Tower HU2.1 HA2.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF

- ESW Pumphouse CU6.1 5 6 Non-hostile initiated fire or explosion resulting in visible Non-hostile initiated fire not extinguished within 15 min. of

- RWST damage to any Table H-2 area structure containing safety Control Room notification or valid Control Room fire alarm Any unplanned sustained positive startup rate observed

- Fuel Building in any Table H-2 area. Inadvertent systems or components or Control Room indication of on nuclear instrumentation.

- Communication Corridor Criticality Fire degraded performance of those safety systems.

- Aux Boiler Room or

- Radwaste Tunnel Explosion

- XNB01 and XNB02 HU2.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Enclosure Non-hostile explosion within the Protected Area.

- South 50 ft. Turbine Building Fuel Clad HA3 Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases HU3 Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases within or immediately adjacent to a Vital Area which jeopardizes deemed detrimental to normal operation of the plant.

operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or establish or maintain safe shutdown.

Hazards HA3.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU3.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Access to any Table H-1 area is prohibited due to Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases in amounts Toxic, release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable that have or could adversely affect normal plant operations.

Corrosive, gases which jeopardizes operation of systems required Asphyxiant to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the

& reactor.

Flammable HU3.2 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Gas Recommendation by local, county or state officials to evacuate or shelter site personnel based on offsite event.

HG4 Hostile action resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. HS4 Hostile action within the Protected Area. HA4 Hostile action within the owner controlled area or airborne attack HU4 Confirmed security condition or threat which indicates a potential threat. degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

HG4.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HS4.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA4.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU4.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF A hostile force has taken control of plant equipment such that A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the A security condition that does not involve a hostile action plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to Protected Area as reported by the Security Shift Owner Controlled Area as reported by the Security Shift as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor or designee.

maintain safety functions (i.e., reactivity control, RCS Supervisor or designee. Supervisor or designee. OR inventory or secondary heat removal).

OR A credible site-specific security threat notification.

Security OR OR A valid notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat A hostile action has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling < 30 min. away. A valid notification from NRC providing information of an Systems and imminent fuel damage is likely for a freshly off- aircraft threat.

loaded reactor core in pool.

HS5 Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant control HA5 Control Room evacuation has been initiated.

cannot be established.

HS5.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA5.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Control Control Room evacuation has been initiated. Entry into OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility, Room AND for Control Room evacuation.

Evacuation Control of the plant cannot be established per OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility, within 15 min.

HG6 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency HS6 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency HA6 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency HU6 Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of General Emergency. Coordinator warrant declaration of Site Area Emergency. Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert. Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE.

HG6.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HS6.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA6.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HU6.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Emergency Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core or have occurred which involve actual or likely major or have occurred which involve an actual or potential or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to Emergency integrity or hostile action that results in an actual loss of or hostile action that results in intentional damage or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk facility protection has been initiated. No releases of Coordinator physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of radioactive material requiring off-site response or Judgment expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective hostile action. Any releases are expected to be limited to exposure levels beyond the site boundary (1 Rem TEDE and access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline monitoring are expected unless further degradation of 5 Rem thyroid CDE). Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels exposure levels beyond the site boundary (1 Rem TEDE safety systems occurs.

which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure and 5 Rem thyroid CDE).

levels beyond the site boundary (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid CDE).

EIP-ZZ-00101 Addendum 1 Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix Revision 003 Power Operations Startup Hot Standby Hot Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refueling Defueled Information Use