ML13214A271
| ML13214A271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| Download: ML13214A271 (115) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:sri 020r9-siini f Acw ES-201 Ecamination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: P-OWNS FER.T Date of Examination: çJtM( 3-7, Developed by: Written - Facility NRC II Operating - Facility NRC D Target Chief Date* Task Description (Reference) Examiners Initials
-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (Cia; C.2.a and b)
-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e)
-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c)
-120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d)
[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1 .e; C.3.c; Attachment 3)] {-75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-ls, ES-401-1/2, ES-4O-3, and ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d)
/4/13
{-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)} //t {-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6, and any Form ES-201-3 updates), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)
-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NR,C Form 398s) due (C.1.l; C.2.g; ES-202) /(
3
/
1 c
-14 10. Final license applications due and Form S-201-4 prepared (C.1.l; C.2.i; ES-202)
-14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervis rforfacility licensee review ,i (C.2.h; C.3.U -
-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2. anh; C.
-7 13. Written examinations and o erating te ts ap roved by NRC su ervisor (C.2.i; C.3.h) t
)i-;tTv /z4/ Of
-7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1 or2 (if>10) applications audited to confirm qualifications / eligibility; and examination approval an waivr letters sent (C.2.i; Attachment 5; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)
-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines revLewed with facility licensee (C.3.k)
-7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and ,que,stions distributed to NRC examiners (C.3.i)
Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by case basis in coordination with the facility licensee. [Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.
ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility. jy pp Item Task Description 1 a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401. w R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled.
- c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
- d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate.
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S and major transients.
M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsecu 0 c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative R and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form
/ (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form - T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s) - (4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.
- b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
N c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 25.
- d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.
A e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
- f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO).
,Pri ted N e/ atre tej
- a. Author (i(I.14(L. .
j5J ,
/
f/ 3
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) 7:i44
/
CPcgrL_L1LO /3/13
- d. NRC Supervisor Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines f.1 -I, 7)i ri-s,i ES -Z) -l jot Of45 (j/i e c&dC / j;-4.t ES 21)1-2. -
,s- -/z.
ES-201, Page 26 of 28 .7 11
ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: is Date of Examination: . 1_ 4 JjA.F j 3 Initials Item Task Description 1 a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401. 4 R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with 44t iiI,/ I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled. A T TT T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. -Ii Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate. A.) d.
- a. Using Form ES-301 -5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S nd major transients.
M b. Asses hether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number .- u and mix o licants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation s ule L without compro ing exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested ing A at least one new or ificantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are dupli d T from the applicants au st(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated o ubsequent days.
- c. To the extent possible, assess her the outline(s) conform(s)W qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on m ES-301-4 and ded in Appendix D.
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline ts th riteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required numb control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions specifie n the form I (2) task repetition from the last two N xaminations is w the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from applicants audit test(s) (4) the number of new or m tasks meets or exceeds the minimu cified on the form (5) the number of alter path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tas eet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verify thatth dministrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the sks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) least one task is new or significantly modified no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. LJ
- b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
- c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. E? t R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.
L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. :z7
- f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). )!-
, Peaature a Author
- b. Facility Reviewer (*) A/ A
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) BRU,4D *8ALLE42 Z12.
- d. NRC Supervisor M4J- AQAJ1/ k 71 Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines S -201- a
ILT 1306 ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201 -3
- 1. Pre-Examination L
I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 6I3-i1I2O1 3 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 6/3-72O1 3. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE I RESPONSIBILITY DAT NOTE
- 1. MiMj,i &ic) PA * -{A
- 2. 1
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- 3. M J49L/ 7A4
- 4. 1 C - IY/tAt
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- 11. c.. . -
- 12. C *. c :- 7
- 13. O/%2 /5 P/6v.cdIf_wr JA411 7/, /i5
- 14. I I 15 I NOTES:
fl: ES-201 e 27 of 28
0 L\ 0 ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) ofh-J!3 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner, I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (eg., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowedge, did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administratio instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these n, I did not licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC, PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATURE (1) DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE 1.
- 2. 7;.
cC 5
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- 3. ! J.-3
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- 2-2S 7-i-; 3 l3.e-1 L/ 5v 2 7L3Z 2 7-(3 14, 1 u 3
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NOTES iL43 --7\ 3 n ES-201, F 27 of 28
LT 3c ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) Oti19f as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g. acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations andlor an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Pot-Examinatiop zS To the best of my knowjedge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s)of6L1:)7o/J. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provi performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE (RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATURE (1) DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE
- i. IEct o
- 2. A-1. Li,v jIr
- 3. 43f3/5 Af/14P1 -75 o,*C 3f3 i1%,o(1,.r. -
44/ z13
- 6. lL$-c 4y,vç ZI/3 PACL
- 7. P. (PyJ Y ,jitit... L I I -i 3
- 8. J4r, L cjiik .-q Tt 4zkL5 cL4 7/01/13 lb / / //
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- 12. -
L Jur#m ci ES-201F 27of28 n Im
ILT 1306 ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201 -3
- 1. Pre-Examination acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 6/34412013 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g.,
acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been corn promised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge,) did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 6I344I01 3. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DAT DATE NOTE
- 1. /7::/ I
- 2. t3 71
- 3. Sq 7 Lir s -i us(.i / .J-2h 3/8/13
- 5. M(C4L i//i 3.
- 6. P.? 11 J 1
, 1
- 7. rytY. LSy,i /,i /3 7 /
- 8. ./<
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- 9. ThI1 t2ccr
- 10. t t
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- 11. QWJW. r)t 0 f-1t ,!/
- 12. I
- LL.
- 13. tc) -
- 14. ,.
I-15 _ P t/-c2 ::1 I NOTES: ES-201. e27of28
ILT 1306 ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201 -3
- 1. Pre-Examination z
I acknowledge that have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 6/3-61>4713 as of the date of my signature. agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 6/3-6.Ii1 3. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide°perforrnance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATURE (1) DATE NOTE
- 1. !-- )) /
- 2. 0. TTic
- 3. 1 / rd
- 4. (kak t4*% 7c3
- 5. yh 7: L?c+ &
- 6. (.9 fsrA
- 7. kaii 4Lci 1J1Jj)
- 8. 1/15-1(3 L_
- 9. Lç
- 10. t!Mft1e% zij;Li4
- 11. h.4CC sA!c)L SI( T1&r//Ui ,L}L. A iL7 ,// 3
- 12. 2 r 1
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- 13. \ .i-.I 775/i3
- 14. 2L-L3 15 -(ews HL:
NOTES: ES-201 e27of28
ILT 1306 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201 -3 ES-201
- 1. Pre-Examination scheduled for the week(s) of 6/3-j472013 as of the date I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to those applicants scheduled to be administered these chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g.,
licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the security may have been examiner any indications or suggestions that examination I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered To the best of my knowledge, Jdid not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information this security agreement until the completion of examination administration I did not during the week(s) of 6/3-1412013. From the date that I entered into those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to below and authorized by the NRC.
SIGNATURE (1) DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE I RESPONSIB!L!TY 7J/i3
- 1. çc . \L /3 11413
- 2. E.i SR.D-r 3.
- 4. Ll:( ? ..-i3
ç P t5!J 4 o 5.
- 6. 4 1 tt- - ( _c_ ---4cJD
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- 7. 1--t c; \ ct L 1 If
- 8. ..
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- 9. c 7
l r
- 10. ( e c - 4 NOTES:
4 ES-20 je 27 of 28
lIT 1306 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201 -3 ES-201
- 1. Pro-ExaminatIon I acknowledge that! have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 6I34r2O1 3 as of the date about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC of my signature. I agree that! will not knowingly divulge any information or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, of examination administratio n, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g.,
licensing examinations from this date until completion indirect feedback). provide direct or acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or and understand that procedures) Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility Iicense&s the facility licensee. action against me or violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement security may have been I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination compromised. -
- 2. Post-ExamInation licensing examinations administered To the best of my knowledge, l$lld not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC examination administration, I did not I entered into this security agreement until the completion of during the week(s) of 6I3-i4IO13. From the date that , except as specifically noted instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations below and authorized by the NRC.
SIC TU E(1 DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE PRINTED NAME JOB Trfl.E I RESPONSlBlLTY
- 1. IktL44AL. (iSoii E(A 1Ai, (ftfiz X
- 2. (yjy ..v td/YIV,V
- 3. L21( io(I. VV\6 / 7/li
- 4. S y
1 . 4 i ,L e-Jyi N 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
- 10. \
11. 12. 13. 14. 15 NOTES: ES-201.Page 27 of 28
ILT 1306 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201 3 ES-201
- 1. Pre-Examinatiori for the week(s) of 6/3.i3 as uf the date I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled any infoimaton about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC of my signatue agree thall will not knowingly divulge appiicants scheauled to be administered these chief exarmner I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide perfonnence feedback to those noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g..
licensing examinations from ttiis date until complebon of examination administration, except as specifically does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understarirl that Furthermore, am aware of the physical security measures an enforcement action against me or the fac;ility licensee violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinahons and/u suggestions that examination security may have been I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any inrcations or compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination the NRC licensing examinations administered To the best of my knowledge, did not divulge to any unauthonzed persons any information concerning agreement until the completion of examination administration. I did not during the week(s) of 6/3- b13 From the date that I entered into this security feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations , except as specifically noted instruct, evaluate, or provide performance below and authorized by the NRC SIGNATURE (1 DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY
- 1. ic-. 4L 9-
- 2. SPZY 3.
- 4. s 51W
- 5. 2/lG kL.
- 6. Advt),
7, f\rt 8. 9. SYAc .. 10.
- 11. ----
12. 13. t4. 15 NOTES: ES-20 1. 27 of 28
lIT 1306 Form ES-201 -3 ES.201 EpmInat1on Security Areemejit
- 1. £i,Examlnatbn the data licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 613-14201 as of acknowledge that I have acqukd speclallzed knowledge about the NRC these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC ation about of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any inform er. I unders tand that I am not to instruc t evalua te, or provid e performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these chief examin (e.g.,
istration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC licensing examinations from this data until completion of examination admin ual does not select the trainin g conten t or provid e direct or indirec t feedba ck). acting as a simulator booth operar or communicator is acceptable if the Individ ures) and unders tand that ments (as documented in the facility licensees proced Furthemiore, I am aware of the physical security measures and require licensee. result In cancel lation of the exarnfriations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility violation of the conditions of this agreement may ions or sugges tions that examin ation securit y may have been er any Indicat I will Immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examin compr omised . Z Post-Examination Information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administerednot IL To the best of my knowledge, Id not divulge to any unauthorized persons any y n, I did this securit agreement until the completion of examination administratio during the week(s) of 613-14)2013. From the date that I entered Into who were admrristered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted Instruct, evaluate, or pmvlde performance feedback to those applicants below and authorized by the NRC. SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE PRNTB) NAME JOB Tfl1E I RESPONSIBILIV( SIGb(TUBE (1)
- 1. k&4A. E(Aw 1EA4
- 2. Cw .J x-* rc4w
/ /1_
- 3. -il( Jof/-L- Ia- it
- 4. r... ( .5. N14 5.
6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15 NOtES: ES-201 .Page 27 of 26
LT Th ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre.Examination i acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC Iicensi rg examinations scheduled for the week(s) ot413J4e13 as of of my signature. I agree that twill not knowingly divulge any information about the date those examinations to any persons who have not been authorized NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide perform by the ance feedback to those applicants scheduted to be admiislered these licensing examinations from this ilate until completion of examination admin istration except as specifically noted below and authorized by the (e g acting as a s4mulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual NRC does not select the training content or pn,vde direct or indirect feedback) Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and require ments (as documented in the facility licensee a procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in canceflation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief or examiner any indications or suggestions that examination securit may have been compromised. y
- 2. Post-Examlnatin 1Y To the best oL my knowedg, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any infcrm ationconceming the NRC licensing examinations administered during the wek(s) of flfi. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I. did not instruct, evaluate, or pit vh performance feedback to those applicants who were admin istered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE I RESPONSl81L1TY SIGNATURE (1) DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE
- 1. Erc u .e.r+Oc Qpr,t-of
- 2. t fhr aJ(
fsI/L)J
- 3. J,i 41 t z.7J 5 -.
2--13
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- C ILT 1306 Examination Security Acireement Form ES-201 -3.
ES-201
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of G/ -1A1201 3 as of the date 3
to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about These examinations to be administered these feedback to those applicants scheduled chief examiner. I understand that am not to instruct evaluate, or provide performance authorized by the NRC (e.g., licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administratio n, except as specifically noted below and select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the indMdual does not procedures) and understand that in the facility licensees Furthemiore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented action against me or the facility licensee. of and/or an enforcement violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation the examinations or hat examination security may have been I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any Indications suggestions.t compromised.
- 2. Post-ExamInation concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthonzed persons any information during the week(s) of 6J3-2O1 3. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, .1 did not these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered below and authorized by the NRC.
SIGThE ( DATE SIGNAE ) NOTE PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE I RESPONSIBILiTY
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ES-201, Page 27 of 28
LT 3% E201 Examination SecurfiyAqreement Forra
- 1. Pre-wm1naflon Lao redgethnt Ilwve ecq peciellzed kno4edge about tti NRC ttcenslnq exam a6orstheduIed 1c the wee),o1kA4Y_ae o m date otniy elgnature I agree that iwfH not tvu)ge any hibmatlon about these examinations b anypsons tIio havenot beet authorized by the NRC dilef examfret. I understand that I emnoti iretruct ev&ua. or provtde Øeiformanee feedbeck to thoec eppi sschedtdod to be adtninlste,act these Gcensfhg exambelons fromihis date untWcompietkm of oxsrnlnWdon knlstbon exceptse specifically naiad behw and authorized by the NRC
*a.g., acas a &mulatorbrzh cperpo nornmuriitothaxieptae if the kitfividueldoes nat select the ingountant orprovide d1rior bidirect feedbadc. Fueni , Ian reafthh .irltymeaaiTesand rnts(eecwnented ceneWs procedures) and ufldarsf7d That violation othe COnCHOns of this agreement may result In cnceUatkri ofthe examinatkis en&or an enfrxcementac6on agaInst me or the isciUty licensee. twill frnniemfislely report to thciRy management orihe NfC chief a dnerany1rtdItaons or estiurme that examinatIon sewrfty may have been compnmlsed
- 2. PostxamtnaLlon To th stot:uioiowicio [dkI not d1vu to any wwu horlzedpersens anylnf&maboc, ancening the NRC licanding eatiomdmthistarod dlrthe From thedate that I entered Into this securifragreement wWlthe unot exam nadminietretlon. I did not instruct eva1te, Or prormanoeleddc to those ptlcrmIs wbomm adnirdstered these Ik,enslng examinations, except as spedfkally noted below ndauthOdedbyüie NRC.
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ILT 1306 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Date of Examination: 6/3/20 13 Examination Level: RO/SRO Operating Test Number: 1306 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed Code Conduct of Operations M 2.1.5 Evaluate Work Schedule against guidelines of NPG-SPP 3.21 Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits SRO/RO Ala Conduct of Operations RO Aib N 2.1.18: 2/3-SR-2 Operator Logs MODE 5 Table 4.1 through 4.7 part 2 2.1.7 2-SR-3 .4.2.1 Jet Pump Mismatch and Operability SROA1b M Equipment Control N 2.2.41: Determine isolation boundary to repair a failed Lube Oil Cooler on Condensate Booster Pump 2B or 3B RO SRO A2 N 2.2.23: LCO Tracking Log entry for RWCU PCIS Valves failed Radiation Control SRO/RO A3 M 2.3.11: Calculate Airborne Effluent Release Rate lAW 0-SI-4.8.b. l.a. 1 Emergency Plan N 2.4.44: Follow up Notification and PAR Change SRO A4 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol Room (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; <4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (P)revious 2 exams ( I; randomly selected) (S)imulator
ILT 1306 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Reactor Operator
- 1. NPG-SPP-03 .21 Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits
- Modified from Bank
- NPG-SPP-03.21
- Evaluate a work hour schedules and determine that one of them exceeded work hour limits for time worked.
- 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. Importance RO 2.9
- 2. ICS Logs
- New
- 2-SR-2 or 3-SR-2
- Perform Operator logs in accordance with 2-SR-2 Instrument Checks and Observations for log tables 4.1 through 4.7. Verify acceptance criteria are satisfied in accordance with notes.
- 2.1 .18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports.
RO 3.6
- 3. Determination of Isolation Boundary Condensate Booster Pump 2B or 3B for work on lube oil cooler.
- New
- Drawings 2/3-45E721, O-45E763-3, 2/3-47E804-1, 2/3-45E753-3 and 2/3-47E844-1
- Determine the components that shall be identified to repair the lube oil cooler for Condensate Booster Pump 2B or 3B
- 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures. Importance RO 4.1
- 4. Calculate Airborne Effluent Release Rate in accordance with O-SI-4.8.b. l.a. 1
- Modified
- O-SI-4.8.B.l.a.1
- Calculate Building Ventilation Release Fraction and determine acceptance criteria met.
Calculate Stack Release Fraction and determine that acceptance criteria NOT met. Calculate Total Site Release Fraction and determine acceptance criteria met.
- 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases RO 3.8
ILT 1306 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Senior Reactor Operator
- 1. NPG-SPP-03.21 Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits
- Modified from Bank
- NPG-SPP-03.21
- Evaluate a work hour schedules and determine that one of them has exceeded work hour limits for time worked and determine actions required for NFR violation.
- 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. Importance SRO 3.9
- 2. 1-SR-3.4.2.1 Jet Pump Mismatch and Operability
- Modified from Bank
- 3-SR-3.4.2.l
- Complete a surveillance requirement on Reactor Recirculation System Jet Pump Mismatch and Operability, determines that an Engineering review is required and determines that the Acceptance Criteria is NOT met.
- 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. Importance SRO 4.7
- 3. LCO Tracking Log entry for failed PCIS Valve
- New
- OPDP-8
- Complete an LCO Tracking Log Entry from the results of 1/2/3-SR-3.6.1.3.5(RWCU) RWCU Primary Containment Isolation Valve Operability
- 2.2.23 Ability to track Technical Specifications limiting conditions for Operations.
- Importance SRO 4.6
- 4. Calculate Airborne Effluent Release Rate iaw O-SI-4.8.b.1.a.1
- Modified
- O-SI-4.8.B.1.a.1
- Calculate Building Ventilation Release Fraction and determine acceptance criteria met.
Calculate Stack Release Fraction and determine that acceptance criteria NOT met. Calculate Total Site Release Fraction and determine acceptance criteria met. Determine ODCM entry is required for NOT met acceptance criteria
- 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. Importance SRO 4.3
ILT 1306 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1
- 5. Protective Action Recommendation Evaluation
- New
- EPIP-1 and 5 Emergency Classification Procedure and General Emergency
- Completed Notification Handouts Appendix F General Emergency Follow-Up Information Form and J Upgrade Protective Action Recommendation
- 2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. Importance SRO 4.4
ES-301 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Date of Examination: 6/3/2013 Exam Level: RO/SROIJSROU Operating Test No.: 1306 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-l); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including I ESF) Safety System I JPM Title Type Code* Function
- a. Recirc Pump Shutdown Plant in Mode 2, 2/3-01-68 A, N, 5, L 1
- b. Alternate RPV Injection Fire Systems, 2-EOI Appendix-7K D, S 2
- c. Alternate RPV Pressure Control RFPT, 2/3-EOI Appendix-i iF D, S 3
- d. Restore Shutdown Cooling, 2/3-AOI-74-i M, 5, L 4(RO Only)
- e. TIP Isolation Failure, 2-A0I-64-2E N, A, S, EN 5
- f. RWM Functional Test for Startup 2/3-SR-3.3.2.1.2 P, L, S 7
- g. Containment Venting, High Pressure 2/3-EOI Appendix-12 M, 5, A 9
- h. USST lB Transformer Tap Changer Auto Checks (Unit 2 only) A, P, S 6 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-l); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. Shutdown Unit 1/2 D DG at Diesel Engine Control Cabinet M, A 6
- j. Manual Operation of 3-FCV-85-11B, using 3-PCV-85-11 N, R, E 1
- k. SLC Alternate Injection, 3-E0I Appendix-7B D, R, E 2 All RO and SRO-l control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-l I SRO-U (A)Iternate path 4-6/2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9/<8/<4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/> 1I?1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - I1 (control room system) (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odifled from bank including 1 (A) > 2!> 2/>1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3I 2 (randomly selected) (R)CA :1I1I?:1 (S)imulator ti
ILT 1306 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems JPM Narrative Control Room Systems:
- a. Recirc Pump Shutdown with plant in Mode 2 (Unit 2 or 3)
Alternate path / New / Simulator / Low power
.2/3-01-68 Reactor Recirculation System
- 202001 Recirculation System A2.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: System valves IMPORTANCE: RO 3.5 SRO 3.4
- Operator directed to shutdown Recirculation Pump B and maintain temperature in the idle loop in MODE 2 in accordance with 2/3-01-68 section 7.1, when the operator opens the discharge valve to maintain temperature the idle Reactor Recirculation pump will rotate requiring the operator to close the discharge valve.
- b. Alternate RPV Injection Fire System (Unit 2 Only)
- Direct from Bank / Simulator
- 2/3-E0I Appendix-7K Alternate RPV Injection System Lineup Fire System
- 29503 iReactor Low Water Level EA1.08 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Reactor Low Water Level: Alternate Injection systems: Plant-specific IMPORTANCE: RO 3.8 SRO 3.9
- Inject with Fire Systems JAW 2/3-E0I Appendix-7K to restore RPV Level.
- c. Alternate RPV Pressure Control RFPT (Unit 2 or 3)
- Direct from Bank / Simulator
- 2/3-E0I Appendix-i iF Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems RFPT On Minimum Flow
- 295007 High Reactor Pressure AA2.01 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to High Reactor Pressure: Reactor Pressure IMPORTANCE: RO 4.1 SRO 4.1
- Places RFPT A and B in pressure control in accordance with 2/3-EOI Appendix-i iF
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ILT 1306 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems JPM Narrative
- d. Restore Shutdown Cooling (Unit 2 or 3)
- Modified from Bank / Low Power / Simulator
- 2/3-AOI-74-1 Loss of Shutdown Cooling
- 295021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling AA1 .02 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of Shutdown Cooling: RHRlshutdown cooling IMPORTANCE: R03.5 SRO3.5
- Operator is directed to restore shutdown cooling following an inadvertent RPS actuation, will restore shutdown cooling with RHR Pump B and establish a cooldowri JAW with the AOl for loss of Shutdown Cooling.
- e. TIP Isolation Failure (Unit 2 only)
- New / Alternate Path / ENgineered Safety Feature / Simulator
- 2-AOI-64-2E Traversing Incore Probe Isolation
- 223002 PCJS/NSSS A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on PCIS/NSSS; and (b) based on those predications, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: System Logic Failures IMPORTANCE: RO 3.0 SRO 3.3
- The TIPs are manually driven in and the ball valve auto closes, for those TIPS that do not retract in manual the TIP shear valve is activated.
- f. RWM Functional Test for Startup (Unit 2 or 3)
- Direct from Bank / Low Power-Shutdown / Simulator
- 2/3-SR-3.3.2.1.2 RWM functional test for startup
- 201006 Rod Worth Minimizer System (RWM) A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SYSTEM (RWM) (PLANT SPECIFIC);
and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Out of sequence rod movement; P-Spec(Not-BWR6) IMPORTANCE: RU 3.1 SRO 3.5
- Operator will perform 2/3-SR-3.3.2.1.2, RWM Functional Test for Startup, which requires operator to select and withdraw a control rod out of sequence to test the functionality of the Select Error, Withdraw Error and Withdraw Block
ILT 1306 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems JPM Narrative
- g. Containment Venting High (Unit 2 and 3)
- Modified / Simulator I Alternate Path
- 2/3-EOI Appendix-12 Primary Containment Venting
- 261000 Standby Gas Treatment System A2.14 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Standby Gas Treatment System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: High System Pressure IMPORTANCE: RU 3.0 SRO 3.2
- Vent Primary Containment JAW 2/3-EOI Appendix-12, due to high system pressure vent valve will cycle open and close rapidly causing the valve to fail closed. The operator will secure the vent path lAW Appendix 12 and align the other vent path. Once again the vent valve will cycle open and close the operator adjusts flow on the flow controller to lower the system pressure and to stop the rapid cycling of the event valve.
- h. USST lB Transformer Tap Changer Auto Checks (Unit 2 only)
- Alternate Path / Previous / Simulator
- 0-GOI-300-4, Switchyard Manual
- 262001 AC Electrical Distribution A4.05 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Voltage, current, power, and frequency on AC buses. IMPORTANCE: RU 3.3 SRO3.3
- Operator is directed to perform USST lB Transformer Tap Changer Auto Checks. The Tap changer will fail the initial auto check and a second will have to be performed to verify proper operation of USST lB Tap Changer.
In-Plant Systems:
- i. Shutdown Unit 1/2 D DG from Diesel Engine Control Cabinet
- Modified / Alternate Path
- 0-01-82, Standby Diesel Generator System
- 264000 Emergency Generators K4.07 Knowledge of Emergency Generators design features and/or interlocks for the following: Local operation and control IMPORTANCE:
R03.3 SRO3.4
- Simulates performing an Emergency Shutdown of D DG.
ILT 1306 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems JPM Narrative
- j. Manual Operation of 3-FCV-85-11B, using 3-PCV-85-11
- New / RCA / Emergency in Plant
- 3-01-85, Control Rod Drive System
- 201001 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Power supply failures IMPORTANCE: RO 3.0 SRO 3.1
- Perform field actions to manually operate 3-FCV-85-1 lB using 3-PCV-85-1 1 due to a loss of Unit Preferred 120VAC.
- k. Alternate RPV Injection Standby Liquid Control System
- Direct from Bank / Emergency in Plant / RCA
- 3-E0I Appendix-7B Alternate RPV Injection System Lineup SLC System
- 29503 iReactor Low Water Level EA1 .08 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Reactor Low Water Level: Alternate Injection systems: Plant-specific IMPORTANCE: RO 3.8 SRO 3.9
- Perform field actions to Line Up for Injection with SLC lAW 3-E0I Appendix-7B.
ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facility: Browns Ferry Date of Examination: June 2013 Operating Test Number: ILTI 306
- 1. General Criteria Initials a b*
- a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution).
- b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination.
- c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D.1 a.)
- d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.
- e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level. =
- 2. Walk-Through Criteria
- a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:
- initial conditions initiating cues -
- references and tools, including associated procedures.
reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee operationally important specific performance criteria that include:
- detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature . I
- system response and other examiner cues
- statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant \
- criteria for successful completion of the task
- identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards
- restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable
- b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301 -1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance pJ5 /11 4 criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified U on those forms and Form ES-201-2.
- 3. Simulator Criteria The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with (
J\ Form ES-301 -4 and a copy is attached. Printed Name I Sigratu Date
- a. Author $i... O. CA&SIYJ / f Z
1 L// 3
- b. Facility Reviewed (*) Lfr5 (, /4?41tJL /j)44lid c9-/
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) 3fWNO C.
- d. NRC Supervisor /LA4<XFA T. Wz NOTE:
- The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.
# Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
ES-301 .Page 24 of 27
ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Fomi ES-301 -4 Facility: Browns Ferry Date of Exam: 6/3/2013 Scenario Numbers: 1/2/3/4/5 Operating test No.: June 1306 Initials QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES a b c#
- 1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.
fft 41 7.
- 2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events. IL
- 3. Each event description consists of the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point (if applicable)
- 4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
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- 5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. jf 4( :.c:_
- 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
- 7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. Cues are given.
- 8. The simulator modeling is not altered.
- 9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.
- 10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301. P 41 $
- 11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).
- 12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).
Al
- 13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.
Actual Attributes jj Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) 8/10/9/9/10
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 3/3/3/2/4
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4/4/4/414
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 1/1/2/2/1 f A 1
j,
- 4. Major transients (1 -2) 3/1/2/2/2
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1/0/0/212
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 3/3/3/5/4
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) j.
ES -301, Page 25 of 27
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-8 vacility: Beowes Ferry NPP Date of Exam: June 3- 14, 2013 Operating Test No.: ILT 1306 T CREW CnEw CREW CREW CREW 0 POSITION pcc S ITID N P0513105 POSITION POSITION T N S A 8 S A 0 S A 6 S A 0 S A 8 A R T 0 0 3 0 R T 0 8 T 0 R T 0 L M 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P U R I U ° RX NOR 1 1 WvI ._ i I/C 3.4.5.6 4 2 -axv-vL........ or MAJ 7 1 TS 4,6 2 2 RX 2 2 I 3 1 NOR I 2 2 001 ..__ CI IIC 3,4 3.4,5,7 3.4 5.6 10 4 0T?xHJ6J____ 1053 1____L_ NOR 1 1 1 00-I . I/C 0,6 3.7 4 4 -nov MAJ 7 8 2 2 TS aa 10 RX 1 1 1 NOR I 1 1 1 530-I I &54.R 4 4 -mo-u MAJ 0 71 3 2 ( izz::z Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers tor each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATCr and balanue-ot-planf (BOP) positions; Instant SRO5 must serve in both the SRO and the ATC posihons. including at least two instrurrrent or component (IIC) rnalfunchono and one major transient, in the ATC position. Il an Instant SRO addlflolrully serves in the BOP position, one I/C roallunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position. Reactivity manipulations maybe conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) bot must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix 0. () Reactivity and normal evolutions maybe rnplaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-Icr-i basic. Whenever practical, both instrument and component maltonctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight lv the applicants competence count tuward Ihe minimum requirements specified for the applicants ficense level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301, Rev. 9 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Browns Ferry Date of Examination: June 2013 Operating Test No.: 1306 APPLICANTS RO SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARK 123451234512345 Interpret/Diagnose Events 3,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5 ,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5 ,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5 6, 7 6,7,9 6,7,8 6,7 6, 7 6,7,9 6,7,8 6,7 6, 7 6,7,9 6,7,8 6,7 and Conditions Comply VVith and 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, ,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, ,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 4,5,6 4,5,7, 5,6,7, 5,6,7, 4,5,6 4,5,6 4,5,7, 5,6,7, 5,6,7, 4,5,6 4,5,6 4,5,7, 5,6,7, 5,6,7, 4,5,6 Use Procedures (1) 8 9 8 8 9 8 8 9 8 Operate Control 1,2,3 1,2,3, 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3, 1,2,3 1,2,3, 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3, 1,2,3 1,2,3, 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3, 4,5,6 4,5,7, 4,5,6 4,5,6 4,5,6 4,5,6 4,5,7, 4,5,6 4,5,6 4,5,6 4,5,6 4,5,7, 4,5,6 4,5,6 4,5,6 Boards (2) 7,8 7 7 7,9 7 8 7,9 7,8 7 7 8 7,9 8 7,8 7 Communicate 7 5,8,9 7,9 6,7,8 4,6,7 7 5,8,9 7,9 6,7,8 4,6,7 7 5,8,9 7,9 6,7,8 4,6,7 8 8 8 and Interact Demonstrate Supervisory 4,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,5,6, 3,4,6, ,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,4,5, 3,5,6, 3,4,6, 6,7 7,8,9 6,7,9 7,8 7,8 6,7 7,8,9 6,7,9 7,8 7,8
\bility (3)
Comply With and 4,6 1,6 2,3 1,3 3,4,6 4,6 1,6 2,3 1,3 3,4,6 Use Tech. Specs. (3) Notes: (1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO. (2) Optional for an SRO-U. (3) Only applicable to SROs. Instructions: Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate even, applicable competency for every applicant.
ES-40t, Rev. 9 BWR Eon Oue Form E8-401-i Facility Browns Feny Dat.ofExam: 2012 RO IdA Category Palate SRO-OnIy Points Tier Group - KKKKKKAAAAG A2 G* Totsi 1 2 = 8 4 5 0 1 2 3 4
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2 111 21 17 2 1 Aicnsd im WA 3 WA Edcns TlerTs 4 6 4 4 6 4
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1 23333232212 26 3 2 5
- 2. 111121111111202 Plant 2 ..
1 3 YShefl 3 TlerTo tste 4445343323 38 5 S 8
- = = = = = = = =
- 3. Generic KnoWledge and AbIlities 1 2 CategorIes 3 4 10 1 2 sJ 4 7 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2
- 1. Erisiwe thatat heat twoftØcs fesm eve yappllochle K AcolegorymesamIedwlth In eadi tier ofthe RO and SRO.only eumies (L.., exceptftr one cagoiy In ller3ofthe SRO.on)y outline, the Thr Totals hi each KIAcateystWl not be less than two).
- 2. The polnttotel for each groin and tier In the proposed outline must match that spedifed In the tdile.
The (hal pah4tctalfor aech group and tier may dewlate by *1 Worn that specified In tile le based on NRC revWons. The (hal RO noun mustl 75 pablls and the SROonly exam nsisttotd 26 poInts.
- 3. S mslsvde one Wlthln each group are kientilled on the associated outilne systems or evolidlons that do notapply attite facIlity should be d dad hsportant,aIIa.epecmc systems that are notbidudedvntiieouthne should beadded. Referte 1,AUadun.nt2, for geddano. ,.dk.g the a netloncfkiappiu,..Ia KIA statements.
- 4. Se acttqilcs from as many systems and evol onepG-4e; sample every system orevohdlon hi the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Abseeta phe specific pdorfty, ardy those KI havIng an inortance rathig OR) of 2.5 or higher shall be ie4ected. Use the ROand SROrsthig.forth. RD and SRO.onty respechve)y.
6, SeleotSROt os for Tiers I and 2from the shaded systems and KIA categories.
- 7. The genetic (0) KIAs luTh,, I and 2 shall be selected from Secuon 2efthe KVe Catalog, butWo topics must be rdeventtc thea p11 evolutIon or system.
- 8. On the followIng pages, ecterthe KIA manbers,a bdefd ptlcno(ebtcplc,thetoplcs ratings (IRs) for the I11Gshb liCense level, and the pciettohas fcr.acb system and category. Enter the group and tiertolais for each category lntheIechove Iffuel handling equlpmantls saupled In other Sian Catago.yA2 or G on the 800.only exam, eater it on the IdLed. ciColumn A2fcrThr 2, Group 2 (Note
#1 doesnotm,ply). UseduplicatepagesforRO and SRO.only exams.
- 8. For Tier 3, select topics from Sectlon2cf the kIAcatwo6. and enterifie KIA nimibars, descriptions, IRs, and polntIs (I) on Form ES.4014. LhiuILSRO selectIons leKiAs that are United tolO CFR 55.43.
ES4OI 2 Form ES-401-I ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (ROl
= = =-= = SRO)
= -
EIAPE #1 Name! Safety Function K 1< K A A K/A Topic(s) G lR # 1_._ 1 295001 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced R - Core Flow Circulation Il & 4 295003 Partial or Complete Loss of AC 16 5 AA o- ) A, . O
)AAI.Ot 295004 Paitial or Total Loss of DC Pwr! 6 f 295005 Main Turbine Generator - ()AM.OI Trip! 3 295006 SCRAM/i a.-
?)AI(.O2 295016 Control Room Abandonment /7 g :R)c2.l.32 R()AALO-295018 Partial or Total Loss of CCW /8 295Ol9PartialorTotalLossoflnst.AirI8 R (.)cZ.2.39 (S)AALo 295021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling (4 R (R) AA?..07
- g S (P AI.O4- (G 1 z .2.4) fZ.$
295023 Refueling Acc/ 8 295024 HIgh Drywell Pressure /5 ft)(24S c1G2.+.21 296025 High Reactor Pressure /3 A.o1 295026 Suppression Pool High Water f (i)At.OI Ternpi5 295027 High Containment Temperature /5 295028 High Drywell Temperature IS
)EK3.o4 295030 Low Suppression Pool Wtr Lvi 15 P..
P)l.o1 295031 Reactor Low Water Level /2 I 295037 SCRAM Condition Present - - - 03 C5) 2. .4. 3 o and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown I 1 295038 High Off-site Release Rate /9 el.O2. 600000 Plant Fire On SIte I 8 - 5
)AbC2. (5) AAZ.3 700000 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 5 R
( f)AkI.O ) ( 4 ()A L 5 rA Disturbances/S
= = =
+/- 13
=
K/A Category Totals: 13 n Group Point Total: 20/7 43
ES-401 3 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 8WR Examination Outkne Form ES-401-1 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO I SRO) EIAPE # / Name! Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR # 1 2312 295002 Loss of Main Condenser VacI 3 295007 High Reactor Pressure /3 295008 High Reactor Water Level #2 A 1. o 295009 Low Reactor Water Level/2 2g50i0High0rywellPressure/5 295011 High Containment Temp /5 295012 High Drywall Temperature / 5 295013 High Suppression Pool Temp. /5 -295014 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition/i ) R 03 295015 Incomplete SCRAM/i AV3. oI 295Ol7HighOff-siteReleaseRatel9 C5) AA2,O 295020 Inadvertent Cont. Isolation /5 & 7 ( 295022 Loss of CR0 Pumps/i 295029 High Suppression Pool Wtr Lvi /5 S 5) EA2. 03 295032 High Secondary Containment f) (P.) K2.oZ Area Temperature/S 295033 High Secondary Containment Area Radiation Levels /9 295034 Secondary Containment Ventilation High Radiation! 9 295035 Secondary Containment High Differential Pressure/S 295036 Secondary Containment High Sump/Area Water Level/5 500000 High CTMT Hydrogen Conc. IS - - - 5 c. 2.2. 44
= = = = = = = =
K/A Category Point Totals: L L IL o L[L Group Point Total: 7/3
ES-401 4 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outilne Form ES-401-1 Systems - TLer 2/Group I (RO I SRO) System #1 Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR # 1234561234 203000 RHR/LPCI: Injection 11. AZ Mode 205000 Shutdown Cooling A4D7 206000 HPC1 2.3S 207000 Isolation (Emergency) Condenser A A 209001 LPCS - - - r C1) A.o3 c) . . 3I 209002 HPCS It I 2II000SLC 212000 RPS (J) )44.Oj 2150031RM - -
- S P) A3.D c)A.M 215004 Source Range Monitor 215005 APRM!LPRM j I4Zo..
217000RCIC 218000A0S 5R)K4.oi (S)A2.OS 223002 PClSINucIear Steam R P) Supply Shutoff j..) i.4. 04 239002 SRVs A R) CS) - 2. Lii 259002 Reactor Water Level ) 1(6.03 Control 261000 SGTS (g) Ai .o7 262001 AC Electrical R (2 Distribution 262002 UPS (AC/DC) (R) k . i7 263000 DC Electrical ([i.) Al 01 Distribution R) I4.0i 264000 EDGs () 14303 300000lnstrumentAir I. i)c4.3 400000 Component Cooling (P) ILl. 01 Water K/A Category Point Totals 2.3 I 5I IIa Group Point Total 26/5 3
ES-401 5 Form ES-401-1 ES.401 SWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-l Plant Systems Tier 2/Group (RO / SRO)
= = = =
=
System 4/Name K K K K K K A A A A G KIATOpIC(s) IR 4 123458 12 34 201001 CR0 Hydraulic 201002 RMCS ) <4.D4 201003 Contrel Rod and Drive (5) 4. 8 Mechenlam PJ4tk.6 201004 RSCS 201005 RCIS 201006 RWM - - - - -
- d.) A2.05 202001 Reorculation 202002 Reclrculalion Flow Control 204000 RWCU 214000 RPIS CR) I4&.o(
21 5001 Traverarng tn.re Probe 21 5002 RBM 216000 Nudear Boiler Inst f ) A4 op.. 219000 RHR!LPCI: Torus/Pool Cooling Mode 223001 Primary CTMT and Aux 226001 RHRILPCI: CTMT Spray Mode 230000 RHRILPCI: Torus/Pool Spray R (P) M ID Mode 233000 Fuel Pod Coolicg/Cleanup 234000 Fuel Handilng Equzment ((k) I5.O?. 239001 Main and Reheat Steam S (5) A 2. I I 239003 MSIV Leakage Control 241 000 Reactor/TurbIne Pressure Regulator 245000 Main Turbine Gen. / Aux. 256000 Reactor Condensate 259001 Reactor Feedwater R (R) . .4. p 268000 RadwaSte - - - - ce) A .0 I 27l0000ffgas (PJJ6.il 272000 Radiation Monitoring (P..) I4 .03 286000 Fire Protection 288000 Plant Ventilation (P.) 143.05 290001 Secondary C1W
=
290003 Control Room HVAC - R $) A3,oL j4 290002 Reactor Vessel Internals P. (.14. K/A Category Point Totals: L .!=i I I I I I I I I Group Point Total: 12/3
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ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTUNE FORM ES-Wi-i KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR 1(1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 AS A4 6 TOPIC: RO SRO 295001AK1.03 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced 3.6 4.1 Core Flow Circulation I 1 & 4 296OOA2.O2 Partial or Complete Loss of AC / 6 424.3 UO[1IL][1[] Reactor powet!pressurei and level 296004AA1.O1 Partial or Total Loss of DC PwrI 6 3.33.4 DE]OL1 D.C. electrical distributlon systems 295005AA1.01 Main TUJbUie Generator TrIp /3 3.1 3.3 []E]DHJL]DD[] Recirculation system: Plant-Specific 295006AK1.02 SCRAM/i UUUU[1L][]OD Shutdown margin 29501662.1.32 Control Room Abandonment / 7 3.8 4.0 flflflflQQflQQQ Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions. 295018AA1.02 PaxliaI or Total Loss of CCW /8 3.3 DD1DIThJUEJDD System loads 295019622.39 Partial or Total Loss of inst. Air/B 3.9 4.5 Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems. Te&53.8.3 ,4ovd) 295021AA2.07 Loss of Shutdown Cooling I 4 2.9 3.1 [JQQ[]QQQ Reactor recirculation flow 2953AIc3.o4 Refueling Ace Cooling Mode/B 3.0 3.5 QflQJJQU Non-coincident SCRAM function 296024G2A.8 High Diywell Pressure /5 3.8 4.5 ODD DH Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction wIth EOPs. Page 1 of 2 8/2/2012 10:25 AM
I I I I I 0 L.. C LI C C C C El LI El C C C C C El LI C 2 C C C C C C El C C EJ LI LI C 1] LI C C C C C C C LI C LI C P C C C C LI C C C C C C C C LI C C LI C C C C LI C C C C El C C C C C C C C C C C C C LI LI C] El C LI LI
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ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1K2K3K4K51(6AIA2A3A4G TOPIC: RO Sf0 5OO8AK1.O2 High Reactor Water Level 12 2.8 2.8 [][]flDDDUflflD Component erosion/damage 295014AA2.03 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition/i 4.0 4.3 DJDDDEL1JflDU Cause of reactivity addition 205015AK3.O1 Incomplete SCRAM /1 3.4 3.7 []QQ[][J[J[J[J Bypassing rod insertion blocks 295020G2.4.4 Inadvertent Cont. Isolation 15 & 7 DODDDDDUUD Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. 295032E1(208 High Secondary containment Area 3.8 3.9 ULJUDDDUDUD Systems required for safe shut-down Temperature IS 2g5O33EA1.05 High Secondary Containment Area 3.9 4.0 QQQ DflE1E1U Affected systems so as to Isolate damaged portions.... Radiation Levels / 9 295035EA1.O1 Secondary Containment High 3.6 3.6 QQQQQJJJ Secondary containment ventilation system Differential Pressurel5 Page 1 of 1 812/2012 10:25 AM
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ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 SWR EXAMINATION OUTUNE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Kl K2 1(3 K4 KS 1(6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 2630001(601 DC Electrical Distribution DDDDODDUI3D A.C. electrical distribution 2640001(3.03 EDGe 4.1 4.2 DDDDLJJDDO Major loads powered from electrical buses fed by the emergency generator(s) 300000G2.4.3 Instrument Air Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation. UUUUUUDDDD 4000001(1.01 Component Cooling Water 3.2 3.3 JE1E1E1EJE1fl Service water 8ystem Page 3 of 3 8I220l2 10:25AM
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ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki 1(2 K3 1(4 K5 K6 Al .42 A3 A4 G TOPIC: no sno 29OOO3A3O2 Control Room HVAC 3.0 3.4 []Q Q [][] [][] ] j [] Q lnitiatiorVlallure of fire protection system Page2of2 80l2 10:25AM
ES-401, REV 9 T3 BWR EXAMINATION OUTUNE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR KIK2K3K4K5K6AIA2A3A4G TOPIC: RO SRO 02.127 Conductofoperatlons E]UUUDUDUDU Knowledge of system purpose and or function. 02.1.31 Conductofoperatlons 4.6 4.3 Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup. G2.136 Oonductotoperatlons 3.0 4.1 C] C] C] [3 C] U U U C U Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved In core alterations 022.15 EqulpmentControl 3.9 4.3 C) U U U U U U Li C] U Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentaion 022.25 EquIpment Control 32 42 [] [] C) U U U LI U U Knowledge of the bases In Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. 022.39 Equipment Control 3.9 4.5 C] [] LI U U U U U C] U Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems. 023.13 RadlatlonControl 3.4 3.8 C] C] []U[]C]L]UUU Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertainIng to licensed operator duties 02.3.14 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 C) C) [] C) U U U C] [3 U Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities 02.4.1 ErnergencyProcedures!Plans 4.6 4.8 C] U U U [3 U C] [3 U U IJ Knowledge of EOP ent,y conditions and immediate action steps. 024.9 ergency Procedures/Plans 3.8 42 C) C) C] U U U LI U U Knowledge of low power! shutdown lmpilcatlons In accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies. Page 1 of 1 8/212012 1025 AM
ES-401, REV 9 ()T1G1 SWR EXAMINATION OUTUNE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: 1R Xl K2 1(31(41(51(6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 295003M2.05 PartJaJ or Complete Loss of AC 16 3.942 DODD ]DJDO Whether a partial or complete loss of A.C. por has occurred 295019AA2.02 Partial or Total Loss of Inst. Air 18 3.6 3.7 flJJJJ Status of safety-related Instrument air system loads (see AK2.l AK2.19) 295023G2.2.40 Refueling Acc Cooling Mode 18 3.4 4*7 DOODCDDDDEJ AbWty to apply technical specifications for a system. 296O24Ga4.21 High Drywall Pressure /5 4.0 4.6 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions 296037G2.4.30 SCRAM Condition Present and Power 2.7 4.1 ooonoonoua Knowledge of events related to system operatiorislstatus Above APRM Downscale or Unknown that must be reported to internal orginizatlons or outside
/1 agencies.
600000AA2.13 PlantFlreOnSlte/8 32 3.8 DJDOIDDD Need for emergency plant Shutdown 700000AA2.O5 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 323.8 1OOL1DDDODD Operational status of offslte circuit Distrurbancecs Page 1 of 1 81212012 10:26 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTUNE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME! SAFETY FUNCTION: IR 1<1 1<2 1<3 K4 1<5 1<6 Al *2 A3 A4 0 TOPIC: RO SRO 295017AA2.O1 High Off-site Release Rate /9 2.9 42 ODDDDUDL]DD Off-site release rate: Plant-Specific 2950295*2.03 High Suppression Pool Wtr Lvi /5 * [][]flE1DD[][]DD Diywelllcontalnment water level 500000022.44 HIgh CIMT Hydrogen Conc. /5 4.2 4.4 DDDLJL]DDC][]LJ Ability to Interpret control room Indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Page 1 of 1 6/2/2012 10:26AM
ES-401, REV 9 BWR EXAMINATION OUTUNE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1K2K3K4K5K6AIA2A3A4G TOPIC: RO SRO 209001G2.1.31 LPCS 4.6 4.3 QflJJQ Ability to locate control room switches, controls and Indications and to determme that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup. 211000A2.05 SIC 3.1 3.4 ODD ]DOO1DDD Loss of SBLC tank heaters 215003A2.01 IRM 2.8 3.2 Power supply degraded 2180OO2.05 ADS 343.6 DJOJOOD Loss 01 A.C. or D.C. power to ADS valves 239002Gaa12 SRVs 3.7 4.1 OOJLJDOEJ Knowledge of surveillance procedures. Page 1 of 1 82O12 10:26AM
ES-401, REV 9 32G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTUNE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME! SAFETY FUNCTION: IR 1<1 1<2 1<3 K4 KS KS Al *2 A3 A4 (3 TOPIC: Rb SRO 20100302.4.18 Control Rod and Drive MechanIsm 3.3 4.0 C] C] C] C] C] C] [] C] [] [J Knowledge of the speclflc bases for EOPs. 230001A2.11 Main and Reheat Steam 4.1 4.3 C] [] C] C] [] C] LI C] C] C] Steam line break 268000*2.01 Radwaste 2.9 rupture [} [] C] U C] C] C] J [] [] C] System Pageloti 612/2012 1026AM
ES-401 Record of Rejected KIAs Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A Rejected due to lack of post-accident instrumentation related to instrument air system at Browns Ferry. Replaced with 300000 RO 2/1 300000 G2.4.3 G2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. Rejected due to no Control Room HVAC fire protection system at Browns Ferry. Replaced with 290003 A3.0 lAbility to monitor RO 2/2 290003 A3.02 automatic operations of the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: Initiation/reconfiguration 4 During Atlanta written exam review, changed KA from 295023 SRO 1/1 295023 G2.2A G2.2.40 to 295023 G2.2.44 -7g) Is Unable to write an SRO level question. Changed KA from SRO 2/2 201003 G2.4.7f 201003 G2.4.18 to 201003 G2.4.1 1. ( wi) N 6/22/2013 7:47:22 AM Page 1 U i
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ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6 Facility: Browns Ferry Date of Exam: June 2&, 2013 Exam Level: RO X SRO X Item Description Initial a b* c Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility. {j( 1.
- 2. a. NRC K/As are referenced for all questions.
**f
- b. Facility learning objectives are referenced as available. q[ t.
- 3. SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401 f
4
- 4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions jJ were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office). 7iL
- 5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as
,7 incicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:
the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or examinations were developed independently; or 15f Vthe licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain)
- 6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest Bank Modified New new or modified); enter the actual RO I SRO-only question distribution(s) at right.
22/5 15/4 38/16
- 7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RD exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; Memory C/A the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly , , /
42 selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter ./ / the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right. 37 I 6 38 I 1 9 References/handouts provided do not give away 8. answers or aid in the elimination of distractors. ç1 f 1
, 4_
- 9. Question content conforms with specific K/A statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are justified.
- 10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.
jç
- 11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; . J 1L the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet. JAJ f
Printed Name / Signat r J LL._ Date
- a. Author
(*)
/4i! 3 / /Zo/i
- b. Facility Reviewer . iZ/_
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) R.U?4D Ck6AL.Lfl, , -p4-li
- d. NRC Regional Supervisor ,144,f.tf4IP(Jé.- c --/3 Note:
The facility reviewers initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations.
# Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
ES-401 .Page 29 of 33
ES-401 Browns Ferry 2013 Draft Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES4O19
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F1H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only Gen The SRO portion of the exam was PRELIMINARILY determined to NOT meet the acceptability standards of NUREG-1 021. tn SRO Questions (40%) were rated as unacceptable:
. Cred Dist: Q# 78, 83, 86, 88, 93, 98
. SRO-only: 77, 97, 100
. Q-KIA:90 Gen Fifteen RD Questions (20%) were rated as unacceptable:
. Cred Dist: Q# 9, 12, 27, 41, 46, 48, 49, 59, 61, 64, 66, 68, 73
- QKIA: Q# 10, 75 Den RD Exam:
. 33New
. 25 Bank
. l7Mod
. 36 Higher Cog
. 39 Lower Cog Gen SRO Exam:
. l3New
. 5Bank
. 7Mod
. 20 Higher Cog
. 5 Lower Cog Den Preliminarily, there are five BFN 2010 NRC Exam Repeats: Q#40, 45, 47, 64, 93; which is allowed by the NUREG.
Gen In order to verify significantly modified, need the original question (from which the modified version was created) for the following: Q#7, 15, 16, 29, and 43
Instructions [Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 5 (easy difficult) rating scale (questions in the 24 range are acceptable).
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
information).
- The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless
- The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
- The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
The distractors are not credible single implausible distractors should be repaired more than one is unacceptable
- One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
- The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).
memory).
- The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from
- The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
- The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
mismatches are unacceptable).
- 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level
- 6. Enter question source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Check that (M)odified questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.
, ?
- 7. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement or (S)atisfactory
- 8. At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
ES-401 2 Form ES-4O19
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO[- (F/H) (1-5) Stem Icues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/E/S Explanation Dist. Link units ward K/A Only F 2 x x x B E Tier 1 Group 1: 295001 AK1 .03 [Brunswick 2010, Q# 37] Partial: An applicant can successfully argue there is no correct answer to the 2 part of the question when less than 25% power. Specify power level (impacts whether APLHGR and MCPR limits must be adjusted, that is when 25% power).
- 2. Cred Dist: Borderline plausibility for the 2 part of Choices C and D (thermal limits are not required to be adjusted).
Suggest re-wording the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement to test which power distribution limit (MCPR or LHGR) is required to be adjusted in accordance with TS 3.4.1.
- 3. Stem Focus: The first portion of the question is testing generic fundamentals knowledge. Since this is the plant specific written exam, revise the first portion of the question to test the applicants knowledge of how the Maximum Fractional Limiting Critical Power Ratio (MFLCPR) value is affected instead of how critical power ratio is affected because this is the Powerplex parameter indication that is available to the operators. (plant specific information) Alternatively, test how the Tech Spec 3.2.2 plant specific parameter (MCPR) is affected. These would be more appropriate for the plant specific written exam.
Note: MFLCPR: Ratio of the Operating Limit CPR, modified by either a power or flow dependent penalty, to the critical power ratio for a bundle. 4 41 (3 Q: 5g,;(-,
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q SRO Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A 2 H 2 x Tier 1 Group 1: 295003 AA2.02
- 1. Q=K/A: The proposed question is only testing the SRV/RCIC capacities, which arent necessarily dependent on a partial/complete loss of AC. [If you cover up the first sentence in the stem (LOOP), how is the answer any different?] These capacities are always true, even when AC power is available.
Suggest testing 2-AOI-57-4 (Unit Preferred) or 2-AOl-57-5NB (l&C A/B) aspects that impact the operators ability to determine and/or interpret reactor power, pressure, or level indications/values.
- 2. Stem Focus: Stem does not specify whether RCIC is operating in pressure control mode or injection mode.
- 3. Partial: The l fill-in-the-blank implies that an ATWS exists
/ because of the phrase reactor power is above/below 5%. [Is this referring to neutron power, i.e., APRM downscale indications? decay heat power?]
3 F 2 x x Tier 1 Group 1: 295004 AA1 .01
- 1. Partial: Choice C (can operate MOVs once the board back on normal supply) is also correct.
- 2. Stem Focus: Choice A should clarify Tech Spec surveillance testing (instead of just testing).
- 3. Stem Focus: Choice B should be re-worded as until the Tech Spec load restrictions on the plant controlled drawings are met.
Note to NRC reviewers: The intent of the K/A is being tested because monitoring the DC distribution system involves knowing the requirements for MOV operation. of,4 cok-i 42cI3
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 4 H 2 x x M E Tier 1 Group 1: 295005 AA1.01 [2010 Hope Creek, Q# 50] 1 Stem Focus: The recirc pumps initial speed is missing from the A stem. (Is it 28%? If so, then Choice C can also be correct.) 2 2 Provide recirc initial speeds in stem. Ci ky1J31 vti4 f3i. 2. Job-Link: Is there a pressure indicator on the control board for main turbine l stage pressure? If so, include this pressure [Th Al &. instrument UNID in the stem, If not, then provide the status of 9-SB, W16 in the stem (dark or lit) instead of the l stage pressure value since this is what the operators will see in the actual plant. th 4
- 3. Stem Focus: The bullet should clarify the position of the EOC/RPT switches (instead of saying inservice).
- 4. Stem Focus: The stem question can be streamlined as WOOTF predicts the effect (if any) on the reactor recirc pumps if an automatic main turbine trip subsequently occurs?
Note to NRC reviewers: The A RPS Bus loss makes Choice B plausible.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Q= B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus K/A 5 F 5 Tier 1 Group 1: 295006 AK1 .02
- 1. LOD = 5 on RO test. Testing the basis for SDM is beyond the scope for an RO.
- 2. Q=KIA: This is a Tier 1 Group 1 (emergency abnormal) K/A statement, which should somehow test an operational implication of adequate/inadequate shutdown margin. The proposed question doesnt test an implication of shutdown margin not being met/or being met following a scram.
Suggest testing EOI-1, Note 1, including the implication of this note when met or not met, given a set of plant conditions. NOTES (\
- Y A TAAATA. ATTSA AT 3 AtAAA OTJATTT
- TiArcAfTR,.T
- 3. Ensure no oiw/SiQ#
6 H 2 x Tier 1, Group 1: 295016 G2.1.32 Cred Dist: Choice C (MSIV will reclose again since high steam flow will occur) is not plausible because all rods inserted and nothing related to a PCIS status light/alarm is listed in the stem that could be (incorrectly) construed as an active PCIS signal. Is it even possible to have 135% steam flow after all rods are inserted if theres a break in the piping?
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice A (PCIS isolation is still present) is borderline plausible because the stem does not include any PCIS status indication(s) would could be construed as an existing isolation signl.
- 3. Stem Focus: For the transfer switch 2-XS-1-14, also provide the noun name of this switch (A Inboard MSIV Transfer Switch) in the stem question.
Suggest adding a bullet to the stem that states the PCIS isolation signal has not been reset and re-working Choice C. rj
...4 ,..f AJSt 44g-
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only Ni S Tierl, Group 1: 295018 AA1.02 Please provide the original bank question. 8 H 2 x Tier 1, Group 1: 295019 G2.2.39 Job-Link: Operability determinations are typically SRO decisions. However, ROs are responsible for 1 hr tech spec action statements. (which in this case is declaring the DG inoperable).
- 2. Partial: An applicant could argue that since both banks have an issue, there is a prudent action to conservatively declare the DG inoperable. (In a situation where one banks air compressor is tripped and the other bank has an air leak, there is too fine of a line on operability.)
Suggest the following: Re-work the question to pose a situation where the 9-23B, W2 annunciator is received (Diesel Gen B Trouble) and after dispatching an operator, one banks air compressor breaker is 7 I. tripped with its air receiver pressure at 0 psig, while at the same time the other air receiver pressure is stable at 160 psig, with the compressor NOT running. Then test the applicants knowledge with the following statements: of the DGs starting air systems are rQquired for operability. (Both/Only One) Given the conditions listed above, a tech spec required action statement entered. Is required to be! is NOT required to be) 9 H 2 x N U 295021 AA2.07 Cred: Choice D (verify the pump in service to remove decay heat) is not plausible because pump operation always ADDs heat to a fluid system with no heat exchanger.
- 2. Cred: Choice B (raise level to remove decay heat) is not plausible because Choice A has a similar reason. In other words, since promoting vessel circulation will indeed remove decay heat, these two choices cant both be the answer. This is basically a sub-set issue.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/E Cred. Partial Explanation Focus Dist. 10 F 2 x Tier 1, Group 1: 295023 AK3.04 Q=KIA: The proposed question is not testing the REASON for removing the shorting links.
- 2. Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice C is also correct because the SRM Rod Block will mitigate.
- 3. Job-Link: 0-GOI-1 00-3C, Attachment 7, Step 1.0 [5] (page 108 of 130) states that the neutron monitoring system can remain in the coincident mode during the subcriticality check. Does BEN ever remove shorting links? If not, then this K/A statement may not be valid at BEN.
Suggest re-working to test the REASON.. .perhaps as: Unit 2 is in Refueling and O-GOl-100-3C, Fuel Movement Operations During Refueling, Attachment 7, Subcriticality Check, is being performed. A control rod, surrounded by fuel, is being withdrawn. WOOTF identifies 1) some other knowledge and 2) the reason why shorting links are required to be removed during this evolution? A. First item; Because the SRMs are quadrant specific B. First item; Because a spiral reload is in progress C. First item; Because the SRM5 are quadrant specific D. First item; Because a spiral reload is in progress 11 H 2 x Tier 1, Group 1: 295024 G2.4.8 Stem Focus: Add information to the stem that clarifies that the immediate operator actions in 1-AOl-100-1 have been completed.
- 2. Stem Focus: Modify Choices A and B to also include 1-AOl-100-1.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Minutia Back B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. ward 12 F 2 x x Tier 1, Group 1: 295025 EA2.01
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices A and D (will first exceed TS safety limit) are not plausible because the TS safety limit is listed as the first event to occur as pressure rises, which is contrary to the Defense in Depth philosophy/concept.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice B (exceed TS safety limit thirdly) is not plausible because the TS safety limit is always the LAST thing to be exceeded in accordance with Defense in Depth philosophy/concept
- 3. Stem Focus: The title of TS 3.4.10 is missing.
To meet the intent of Tier 1, Group 1 (Emergency/Abnormal), suggest testing the applicants knowledge of actions in ARP 9-5A, W 1 (Reactor Press High) or AOl-47-2, or an EHC pressure controller malfunction. 13 H 2 x x Tier 1, Group 1: 295026 EA1.01 [2010 River Bend, Q#13]
- 1. Stem Focus: The first 3 bullets are not necessary to elicit the correct response. (delete)
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem is missing torus pressure, which is required for the RHR NPSH Curve usage.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice B (lower ioop 2 RHR pump flows due to NPSH) is not plausible because torus temperature is less than the lowest value on the y-axis of Curve 2.
- 4. Stem Focus: The phrase suppression pool cooling is not needed in bullets 7 and 10, because the first sentence already says that both loops of RHR are in suppression pool cooling L/
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 14 H 3 x x N E Tier 1, Group 1: 295028 EK3.04 1 1. Cred Dist: To enhance plausibility of Choice D (ED because th 7 ( torus level is too low), change torus level in the stem bullet) to-il inches). 11 tAJ 2. Stem Focus: The l sentence can be streamlined with the last portion of the sentence to say caused an automatic scram.
- 3. Stem Focus: The words the reactor in Choices C & D can be deleted. The words emergency depressurize do not need to be capitalized.
15 F 2 x x M E Tierl,Groupl: 295030 EK2.01 4i 1. Please provide original bank question that this questi)
...rnodified from.
VtA (J
- 2. Partial: Choice B is a subset of Choice A; that is, Choice B can also be argued as correct.
FU/l. 1 3. Stem Focus: None of the information above the stem question LQ ._ YA CA is necessary to complete the fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 4. Stem Focus: The phrase lock out HPCI may be slang or not defined; the actions in each choice should be further defined.
Q [ Suggest re-wording the fill-in-the-blank statement (to be more
- 1) precise and eliminate possibility of two correct answers) as:
In accordance with 1-EOl-2, Primary Containment Control, Step SP/L-4, IF suppression pool level cannot be maintained above a minimum level of______ , THEN A. 11.5 ft; Isolate HPCI by closing the steam supply valves. B. 11.5 ft; Place the aux oil pump in the P-T-L position C. 12.75ft;
/ D 1275ft 1: .
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UJEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 16 F 2 x M E Tier 1, Group 1, 295031 EK3.03 [2007 Duane Arnold, Q# 55]
- 1. Stem Focus: The stem of the question needs to be focused specifically to a situation where a LOCA occurred and Primary Containment Flooding is required in accordance with 3-EOl-C-1,
/ Step C1-24. Then ask the applicant to complete the fill-in-the 1.5 S / blank statements. This helps to provide context from where the fill-in-the-blank statements are derived.
- 2. Stem Focus: Replace the l part of each choice with actual levels (-180 vs. -215)
- 3. Please provide original bank question.
Note to NRC reviewers: The reason for spray cooling is being tested (indirectly) in this question because the reason for the - minimum level and core spray pattern is adequate core cooling, i.e., preclude core damage and SAMG entry.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Minutia B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. 17 H 2 x x x 295037 EK1.03 (Sample Question Received 1-3-12)
- 1. Partial: There is no one correct answer to the first part of the question (whether the reactor is/is NOT subcritical) because there is a misalignment between asking the applicants to determine if the reactor is critical asking the applicants what tank level indicates hot shutdown boron weight. As written, there is not enough information provided in the stem to determine if the reactor is critical. For example, was level lowered? If so, then the boron is in the lower plenum and has not yet been mixed into the core. Upon injection of a predetermined amount of poison, the operator is to restore the water level to its normal operating range, thereby mixing poison throughout the core and bringing the reactor subcritical. IF level was not lowered, then what are SRM, IRM, SRM Period, and APRM indications? It seems the proposed question is trying to test the latter.
- 2. Cred Dist: The 2 d part of Choice 0 (the reactor will become subcritical during the cool down) is not plausible because cooling down always inserts positive reactivity.
- 3. Cue: The only choice that contains the word may is also the w part of Choice C says that the 2
correct answer, that is, the reactor may return to criticality during the reactor cool down.
- 4. Stem Focus: These type of fill-in-the-blank statements should be split up into two statements. This helps the exam writer and the applicants be clear as to exactly what is being tested.
- 5. LOK (F/H): Comment #1 also affects whether the question is lower/higher cog. IF the question intends to test the applicants ability to assess criticality based on the information provided in the stem, THEN this is higher cog. On the other hand, IF the question intends to test the applicants knowledge of the numerical value of hot shutdown boron weight tank level, THEN this is lower cog.
- 6. 3-15-13: Comments incorporated. Still need to include SRM Period Meter indication in the stem to assure the reactor is subcritical.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN UIE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 18 H 2 S Tierl,Groupl: 295038 EK2.02 [2011 BEN 1102,Q#18J F 1. The question is incorrectly listed as Tier 3.
\Af ff 4
. 2. To add plausibility to Choices A, B, & C, and to be slightly different from the 2011 NRC Exam item, add annunciator 9-4C, rd 3
W34 (hi hi) as the bullet in the stem. [This will not change the correct answer.] 19 H 2 x x x B E Tier 1, Group 1: 600000 AK2.O1
- i. iZ (/Vc-cv I
- . . 1. Cred Dist/Partial: IF Choice A was true, THEN Choice D would V ij iLMJl also be true. Since there cant be two correct answers on an
( CLt.&. NRC exam question, these choices can be eliminated and are 4 7 not plausible. [subset issue] 1 i - 2. Stem Focus: The stem does not include any fire header pressures; fire pump status is normally dependent on this parameter, which would add plausibility to Choice C. 1 and 2 bullets are not necessary. e
- 3. Stem Focus: The rd 3
- 4. Stem Focus: The bullet is vague; was the LOOP somehow caused by the Transformer 1A fault or was it unrelated?
- 5. Stem Focus: Was the automatic sprinkler actuation at the transformer or in another plant building?
20 F 2 x x M E Tier 1, Group 1: 700000 AKI .01 [2009 Perry, Q# 30]
- 1. #/units: The step in 0-AOl-57-1 E states:
4 i9 [Ii 1.11 LOWER reactive power to system voltage returns to A2.O-I 530KV. OR UNTIL Generator Reactive power leaches -150 MVAR. It appears that this procedure step has a typo; the first word to should be until. Verify w/ Operations which control board switch the operator is required to manipulate to complete this step.
- 2. Stem Focus: In an effort to ensure plant specific knowledge is being tested (beyond the allowable BEN system voltage limits),
change the l portion of each choice to a specific control switch, including the UNID#, that the operator is required to lower.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE C red. Partial Job- Minutia B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link 21 F 2 x Tier 1, Group 2: 295008 AKI .02 Stem Focus: The question is disjointed. On one hand, the applicants are being asked what the AOl-3-1 says. On the other hand, the applicants are required to re-interpret what AOl 3-1 says in light of the fact that the crew closed the MSIVs before level reached the main steam lines. This is confusing and can lead to multiple correct answers. Suggest solely testing the content of the AOI-3-1 caution, that is, do not include the crews actions to close the MSIVs in the stem. This will be much cleaner and still hits the K/A. For example, In accordance with A 01-3-1, WOOTF identifies a malfunction that could occur if reactor water level is left unattended to the point that it enters the main steam lines? A. SRVs could fail to open B. SRVs could fail to close C. Damage to RCIC/(-Nct D. Damageztwkt. 22 H 2 x Tier 1, Group 2: 295014 AA2.03 [2007 Duane Arnold, Q#61] Partial: Choice B can also be correct, especially if the pressure rate-of-rise is small. Review SPP-10.4 Significance Levels 1,2, or 3 for other options.
- 2. Stem Focus: For Choices B, C, and 0, include the BFN UNID#.
of the specific components/transmitters that are malfunctioning. For Choice A, identify the location, that is, centrally located CRD number.
-h &i4
-Q tp 4-z- L/Lt, -,,
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 23 H 2 x x x N E/U Tier 1, Group 2: 295015 AK3.01 ILVE
../J 1. Cred Dist: The power level is too high for the first part of Choices A & Bto be plausible. Pick a power level inside the
) RWM transition zone.
- 2. Cue: The 1st phrase of the fill-in-the-blank statement (For these
- 41. . ,.. ,, , plant conditions...) is redundant to the nd 2
part of Choice C (at
,5V ,_ L/.
this time); this is the only choice like this and is also the correct jJ answer.
/ ) L4 3. Stem Focus: Split the fill-in-the-blank statement into two Z -
I L separate sentences, revising the 2 portion as necessary. As nd 2 proposed, the part of the fill-in-the-blank statement is weak. 24 H 2 x x N E Tier 1, Group 2 295020 G2.4.4
- 1. Q=KJA: In order to directly hit the K/A (Inadvertent Containment Isolation), change the RCIC room temperature in the stem and make the correct answerQeA (Group 5 was spurious).
ót t} . - 2. Stem Focus: The 1 part of the choices can be streamlined as The Group 5 isolation should NOT have occurred. Or The Group 5 isolation is correct.
/I)1
- 3. Stern, Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement needs to be split I into two statements because these are two completely separate thoughts.
_1 - / 1 l,) (J42 . ft 4. tem Focus: The word complete in the 1 sentence is not
\. necessary.
- 5. Stem Focus: Even though the annunciator engraving includes the identifier 1-TA-71-41, is this necessary to have in the stem? Our request for the actual annunciator wording was to have the annunciator location (9-3D, W10). The 1-TA-71-41 th 4
identifier is already listed in the bullet. Note to NRC reviewer: Another common way of hitting this K/A (Inadvertent Containment Isolation) is a RPS MG set trip.
- 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
Explanation Tier 1 Group 2, 295032 EK2.08 [2002 Perry NRC Exam, Q#371 1 Partial: Choice A (access to permit operating the plant) is STILL correct even though the word OPERATION is included, because you need to operate the plant in order to safely shut it down.
- 2. Partial: Choice D (room coolers exceeded their design) is also correct, based on MSOT.
- 3. Cred Dis: Choice C (spurious fire indications may be received) is not plausible because nothing in the stem indicates any SSIs have been entered.
Suggest writing a question involving EOl-3, SCIT-4. Tier 1, Group 2,295033 [2010 Brunswick NRC Exam, Q#58]
- 1. Stem Focus: The Is! part of the fill-in-the-blank statement is not nd 2
being tested because each of the parts is unique.-
- 2. Stem Focus: Need to include other parameters in the stem near the RWCU system (normal values), similar to other parameters included in the stem in Brunswicks Q#58:
- 3. QKIA: In order to hit the K/A statement (operate system to isolate affected portions), change the 2 portion of each choice to include switch names, UNID#s, etc. that the operator would manipulate to isolate SDV V&D and RWCU.
,vLgc Sv:qq IcJ 2 d pie!
- 4/7 k. V -fi (/cA)a k1a, V44? csu £ OA$ LY) -ue DV V b A V -
+ j>AJQ, Z2 Jt
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link 27 H 2 x x Tier 1, Group 2, 295036 EA1.01 [2010 Nine Mile Point, Q#621 Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices A/C (stop 2B CS pump) is th 4 not plausible because of the bullet in the stem that says nothing else is available. Uncovering the core always makes turning the pump off wrong. Partial: Choice B (manually start sump pumps/continue to use leaking CS loop to fill RPV) is also correct because of the meaning of the word VERIFY (if not so, make it so). Suggest re-working the question to test how EOl-3, Steps SC/L 3 (sump at 66) and/or SC/L-1 1 (room level at 20) are performed, that is, test the applicants knowledge of HOW the crew determines these levels while executing EOl-3 in the control room. (requires local observation of a mounted dipstick vs. can be deduced by annunciator setpoints from the control room). 28 H 2 x Tier 2, Group 1: 203000 A2.16 Stem Focus: Provide the current status of the LPCI initiation lights (lit or not lit), located at Panel 9-3, in the stem. This lends credibility to the 2/3 core height choices and is something the operators will see in the control room.
- 2. Stem Focus: Put the noun name of 74-52 in the stem and delete it from all four choices to minimize reading burden. Do the same for 3-HS-74-155A and 3-XS-74-122.
- 3. Stem Focus: Add another bullet to the stem to indicate that RHR Loop II is in torus cooling.
- 4. We will need to see how many scenarios include throttling the LPCI outboard injection valves. This question may overlap too much with scenarios.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Explanation Focus Dist. 29 H 2 x Tier 2, Group 1: 205000 A4.07 [2007 Duane Arnold, Q#2]
- 1. Job-Link: 2-SR-3.4.9. 1(1), Section 1.1 states that this procedure is only used when the reactor is critical. The sentence in the stem says that the reactor has been scrammed.
Is this the right procedure? If not, then re-work question to include the name/number of the correct procedures. If this is the right procedure, then...
- 2. Stem Focus: add 2-SR-3.4.9.1 (1) (noun name), Attachment 2 (noun name) to the stem and say that this step is being performed.
- 3. Based on Table 2 (of 2-SR-3.4.9.1(1)), the difference between 640 psig and 450 psig is 36°F. Is B the correct answer? Need to understand why D is listed as the correct answer.
- 4. The step being performed in 2-SR-3.4.9.1 (1) only is to verify the cooldown rate is 100°F/hr. What procedure is used to document the cooldown rate? The stem question seems disjointed from what 2-SR-3.4.9.1(1) documents.
- 5. Please provide Duane Arnold original test item.
30 F 5 Tier 2, Group 1: 206000 G2.2.38 nd 2
- 1. LOD=5: The part of the question tests the TS Bases, which is beyond the scope of RD knowledge on the plant specific d
2 written exam. The part is not plausible because LCD applicability is based on core safety, not equipment protection. Suggest keeping the 1° part of the question as is, but changing 0d the 2 part of the question to test the applicants knowledge of whether HPCI is operable when aligned to the suppression pool, since this is more closer aligned to the RO job responsibilities for board walkdowns, etc. 4 L :.,
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U!E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 31 H 2 x x B E Tier 2, Group 1: 209001 A3.03 [2009 Quad Cities Q# 311
- 17.,
1 nd 2 half of Choice A (continues to discharge to the
- 1. Cue: The
. / pool) is a cue of the 1-SR-3.5.1.6 flowpath. The applicants should know the flowpath.
- 2. Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choice D (no flowpath available) is not plausible because the stem does not include any potential reasons why the mm flow valve wouldnt operate. (1-SR-3.5.1.6 doesnt open the mm flow valve breaker, no 480 V RMOV Bds listed, etc.)
- 3. This question is listed as modified even though it is identical to the Quad Cities question (doesnt meet the definition of significantly modified in NUREG 1021). Change to B (Bank)
Suggest changing the 1 part of the choices to Remain the
,d 2
I same vs. Rise. Add a part to the question to test whether Core Spray is/is not injecting. Tier 2, Group 1: 211000 K1.01 [2010 Brunswick Exam, Q#9] Tier 2, Group 1: 211000 K3.01 2010 Oyster Creek, Q#23] 1 Cred Dist: Choice 0 (pump failed to start) is not plausible because the discharge pressure is listed as 1100 psig. rd 3
- 2. Cue: The bullet is a cue to the applicants; this bullet should list the control board indications and let the applicants deduce that only one of the SLC system 1 squib firing circuits has actuated. Also list any applicable annunciators that normally/abnormally occur when the operator placed the pump control switch to the START position, e.g., 9-5B, W20 and/or W14, if applicable.
- 3. This question was listed as lower cog question; however, seems to be higher cog. Disuss.
Suggest re-working the question to test SLC is / is NOT injecting and reactor shutdown will! will NOT take longer than designed.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Focus I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia Dist. Link Back-ward Explanation 34 F x x x 212000 K4.01 (Sample Question Received 1-3-12) LOD1: Nothing in the stem is necessary to answer the fill-in-the-blank statement. (Cover up the stuff about the fuse with your hand; you can still answer the question). This question will not provide any discriminatory value on the exam because it is LOD=1.
- 2. Cred Dist: The grammar of the 1 fill-in-the-blank makes the first portion of Choice C and D not plausible, that is, There is one RPS instruments monitoring. (the word instrument is plural).
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice D (one pressure instrument in the RPS A trip system and its loss will not cause a half scram) is not plausible because if an applicant only thought there was one pressure instrument monitoring pressure, they would assume that the loss of the only instrument would at least cause a half scram.
Suggest developing a question to test the applicants knowledge of how RPS is configured and responds during the surveillance testing, for example, 3-SR-3.3.1.1.14, Section 3.4.D.1 and Step 7.4.2 [2] associated with turbine stop valves limit switches and/or whether the annunciator REACTOR CHANNEL A(B) AUTO SCRAM will alarm when one valve is tested. 3 3-11-13: Suggestion incorporated. See additional comments below
- 5. Stem Focus: The phrase simulated closed is confusing and will generate questions during the exam administration.
- 6. Cred Dist: The 1 St part of Choices A and 0 (will NOT cause half scram) is borderline plausible because.., IF the surveillance procedure has simulated the closure of MSV-2, the expressed purpose is to verify a half scram occurs when MSV-1 is actually closed. Does the surveillance include steps to close other MSVs while MSV-2 is simulated closed? If so, then this may be acceptable.
- 7. Stem Focus: The 2 fill-in-the-blank statement uses slang, that is, considers. Try to re-word to be more precise.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO BIMIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 35 H 2 x B E Tier 2, Group 1: 215003 A3.03 [2010 Oyster Creek, Q# 17] 4 1( 42 1. Cred Dist: Choice A(half scram only) is not plausible because
,j) - 1J all IRM half scrams result in a rod block.
q Suggest making a two part question to test the applicants ability
/ .
.. to predict the new readings on Range 5 AND whether a half scram exists.
Tier 2, Group 1: 215004 K2.01 [2009 Vermont Yankee, Q#3] I &. z/ f 36 F 2 x E
- 1. Stem Focus: Change the I part of Choices A and D (RPS) to 120 VAC, to be consistent with the 1t part of Choices B and C.
- 2. Stem Focus: In order to be precise, add the Panel # (Panel 9-12?) where the SRM A drawer is located to the 1 sentence in the stem.
1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 37 F 2 x x x N E 215005 K2.02 (Sample Question leceived 1-3-12) A r , 1. The plausibility analysis for Choices C and D is missing. 1 ( 2. Cred Dist: Choice C (half scram will occur even though APRM 15 is still energized) is not plausible.
- 3. Stem Focus: The word completely in the first sentence is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 4. Stem Focus: The word properly in the stem question is not necessary to elicit the correct response. (words like properly, correct, etc. are not needed in stem questions because these concepts are always implied and only add reading burden).
- 5. #/units: There is no such thing as APRM A, that is, the APRMs at BFN are APRM 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Suggest the following: WOOTF completes both statements for the Unit 2 APRM power supply arrangement? Each APRM is at Panel 2-9-14. Within a QLVPS, LVPS 1 and 2 are powered from A. only powered from the QLVPS located in its associated bay; RPSB B. only powered from the QL VPS located in its associated bay; RPS A C. powered from two QLVPS; RPS B D. powered from two QLVPS; RPS A 3-11-13: Comment partially incorporated. See additional comment below
- 7. Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices A/C (the individual LVPS are powered from the QLVPS) is not plausible because this implies that the LVPS are self powered; that is, one low voltage power supply cant be powered from itself.
Modify the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement as listed above.
- 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Link units ward K/A Only Tier 2, Group 1: 217000 A1.02
- 1. Verify the RCIC response on the simulator to ensure a correct answer. Provide results.
39 H 2 x x Tier 2, Group 1: 217000 K5.06 [2008 Fitzpatrick, Q#37J
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice 0 (auto isolation logic pb required to be depressed) is not plausible because the stem does not include any parameters that could be misconstrued as a potential RCIC isolations.
- 2. Cue: The word spurious in the 1 sentence is a cue that a mechanical overspeed event occurred, which is the correct answer.
- 3. Stem Focus: the word Wan before UO (in the 2 sentence) may not be grammatically correct. Can also streamline this sentence by eliminating the Unit Supervisor.
Suggest changing the spurious trip to a RCIC Hi Water Level Trip Light is LIT. Then, keep the first part of the question related to the simultaneous existence of a mechanical overspeed trip (Choices are RCIC is still tripped / RCIC is reset), but add a second part to test the applicants knowledge of whether the Hi Water Level trip p.b. is required to be depressed before RCIC will operate. 40 H 2 B S Tier 2, Group 1: 218000 K4.01 [2010 BFN 1006, Q#40j 4 I- .. Try changing up the electrical boards/pump availabilities to make the question a bit different. Also change the placement of the correct answer. (b)
- 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Link units ward K/A Only 41 H 2 x x Tier 2, Group 1: 223002 A2.06 [2008 BFN NRC Exam, Q#13] jSt
- 1. Cred Dist: The part of Choices CID (tripping the ATU) is not plausible because neither 01-64 nor 01-99 lists this method for placing ANY instrument channel in a tripped condition. All actions listed in 01-64 and 01-99 are to pull fuses.
- 2. Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices BID (PCIS Groups 2, 3, & 6 isolate) is not plausible because 1) plant design allows maintenance and testing of a channel without affecting the operation of the unit and 2) there are no other parameters listed in the stem that could be misconstrued as a reason why Groups 2, 3, & 6 would isolate.
- 3. Partial: Choice C is also correct because pulling a fuse is virtually the same thing as placing a trip into the ATU.
- 4. Stem Focus: Add the phase lAW 01-64 & 01-99 somewhere in the stem, which is the procedure portion of the K/A statement and provides context for the controlling document being implemented to the applicants.
4 May have to provide a reference to the applicants to remedy this question. 4- 3O- 3
/j r 1 4/
2
- //;t ,) Zc S-/
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 42 F 2 x x N E Tier 2, Group 1: 223002 K4.04 Cue: the word stabilize in the 1 sentence is a cue that the 1. Ic / MSlVs are still open. Lv
- 2. Partial: Choice D (isolation is bypassed at 852 psig) can also be argued as correct.
43D Suggest the following: Reactor pressure is lowering. WOOTF completes the statement in accordance with 1-01-1, Section 3.2.2.B? Whenever reactor pressure FIRST reaches and the reactor mode switch is in the position, the MSIV5 will auto-close. A. 725 psig; RUN B. 725 psig; START/HOT STBY C. 852 psig; RUN D. 852 psig; START/HOT STBY
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q SRO Explanation Dist. Link units ward K/A 43 F 2 x Tier 2, Group 1: 239002 K6.02 [2007 Clinton, Q# 6]
- 1. Stem Focus: Need to ensure that the stem is clear that the DWCA system has no residual pressure, that is, pressure is not continuing to decay, it is zero.
- 2. Cred Dist: Discuss the plausibility of the non-ADS valves in the d
2 portion of Choices A/C (can still be operated once?) Is this based on residual pressure in the DWCA system?
- 3. Please provide original Clinton question.
Suggest the following: WOOTF completes the following statement? 5i2 .a equipped with accumulators, whieh-ate-sized-to contain sufficient pneumatic pressure for a miisimum of A. /4ld-M&RV5; 5 valve operations B. AdL.-M&RVs; 5 hours C. ONL-V--the-ADS14SRVs; 5 valve operations D. GNl4ke-ADS-M&RVs; 5 hours 44 H 2 x E Tier 2, Group 1: 259002 K5.03 2004 BFN NRC Exam, Q#30]
- 1. Cue: The 2 w sentence in the stem is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 2. Cue: The phrase in parenthesis is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 45 F 2 x x B E Tier 2, Group 1: 261000 Al .07 [2010 BFN NRC Exam, Q#46] Partial: Choice C is also correct. (subset issue)
,31fiju //IJ
- 2. Partial: There may be no absolutely correct answer because the fill-in-the-blank statement specifies plenum temperature as the controlling parameter whereas 01-65, specifies charcoal 2
Y(i ( ( bed temperature.
- 3. Stem Focus: In order to mirror precaution & limitation 3.0, Item G, the fill-in-the-blank statement needs to have a phrase added at the end, that is, once the SGT has been shutdown.
Vfr Suggest the following: 3o - I In the event that the SGT charcoal filter temperature rises to (due to iodine adsorption following a LOCA, the decay heat removal dampers once the train has 1 I V . been shutdown.
-. A. 125F; will automatically open B. 140 F; will automatically open C. 125F; must be manually opened D. 140 F; must be manually opened
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F #/ SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus units Only 46 F 2 Tier 2, Group 1: 262001 K2.01 Cred 01st: Choices CID (first to a unit board then back up to a start bus) are not plauéible because the Unit Boards are listed FIRST, then the Start Busses. Each of the choices should present a flowpath, sequenced to start at the switchyard and end at a shutdown board. Reversing the components such that the unit board comes before the start bus doesnt make sense and both of these choices are not the correct answer.
- 2. Cred 01st: Choice A (USST 1A feeds Unit Board 2B) is not plausible because this path physically doesnt exist.
- 3. Job-Link: Verify with 1 ).Ops management and 2) an RO learning objective that ROs are required to know the qualified circuits.
Suggest providing 4 choices of paths that physically exist, and which are sequenced correctly. For example: WOOTF identifies a qualified circuit from the offsite transmission network to the 4 KV Shutdown Board for Units I and 2? A. From the 500 kV switchyard, through unit station service transformer (USST) IA to a 4.16 kV unit board. That unit board feeds 4.16kV shutdown bus I or 2, which then feeds two of the Unit I and 2 4.16 kV shutdown boards (A and B or C andD) (INCORRECT) B. From the 500 kV switchyard, through unit station service transformer (USST) lB to a 4.16 kV unit board. That unit board feeds 4.16 kV shutdown bus I or 2, which then feeds two of the Unit I and24.l6kV shutdown boards (A and B or C and D) (CORRECT) C. From the 500 kVswitchyard, through USST2A to a 4.16 kV unit board. That unit board feeds 4.16 kV shutdown bus I or 2, which then feeds two of the Unit I and 2 4.16 kV shutdown boards (A and B or C and D) (CORRECT)
- 0. Need another incorrect choice here (INCORRECT
- 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 4- -l Tier 2, Groupi: 262001 K5.02 12010 BFN NRC Exam, Q#47J Stem Focus: Provide UNID#s for the 2 and rd 3 bullets, that is, the breaker numbers and noun names.
- 2. Use a Unit 3 bus and change the placement of the correct answer, to be different from 2010 BFN NRC Exam Q#47.
F 2 x x Tier 2, Group 1: 262002 K3.17 Cred Dist: The reasons included in Choices A, B, and 0 make these choices not plausible because For Choice A, IF the AP compressor was running continuously, then monitoring D W-to-Torus LP wouldnt be necessary because more AP is a good thing, that is, TS requires 1.1 psid. For Choice B, IF the ECCS and RCIC bus logic power monitors were unavailable, NOTHING would auto-start, because these systems are energize-to-actuate. Therefore, there is no reason to monitor 2-9-3 indications. For Choice D IF 64-20 and -21 (The Rx-BIdg-to-Torus A Vacuum Breaker ISOLATION VALVES) were to fail open, then the in-series check valve discs operation would be unimpeded; therefore, there is no reason to mnitor .P The K/A statement does not require testing the applicants knowledge of the reason.
- 2. Q=KIA: What process monitoring is lost during a loss of Panel 9-9, Cabinet 6? May want.to re-work question for another 12OVAC system (since uninterruptible power supply K/A can also apply to there 12OVAC systems with redundant backup power schemes) that affects the monitoring of some process.
Does Panel 9-9, Cabinet 6 affect the Panel 2-9-21 Steam Leak Detection? (Item n in AOI-57-4) If so then this could match the K/A. As written, it seems that the question is testing CRD temperatures, which isnt a normal process monitoring load on Panel 9-9, Cabinet 6. Discuss.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 2 sentence is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
Explanation Tier 2, Group 1: 263000 Al .01
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices ClD (voltage wis) are not jausible because BB2 Panel 1 amps is 34Qd chaier cur isStJ.
- 2. Cue: Shouldnt the applicants know the charger capacity without providing this information?
3r
- 3. Cue: The word discharge in the bullet may be a cue if the BB Panel 1 ammeter does not have this label.
- 4. Stem Focus: The phrase Battery Board 2 Panel 1 in the 2 and 3 bullets is redundant to the first sentence, reading burden.
- 5. Please provide the original bank question from which this question was modified.
Tier 2, Group 1: 263000 K6.01 [2009 Vermont Yankee, Q# 11]
- 1. Stem Focus: The 1 sentence implies that offsite power was lost to all 3 units, which is the intent of the question; however, may want to be more clear in this sentence as All three units were initially operating at 100% power when offsite power was lost to the entire plant site.
nd 2
- 2. Cue: The sentence is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice A is not plausible because 1.) it lists one charger and the 2 fill-in4he-blank statement begins with the words The chargers.. (plural) and 2) the 2 ?orton of this Choice is different from the others. For the 1 part of Choice A, modify to say Chargers 1, 2A, 2B, and 4. For the 2fl part of Choice A, modify to match the other three choices.
- 4. Stem Focus: The stem question can be streamlined to eliminate repeating the phrase 250V DC battery chargers in the l part of Choices B, C, and 0. WOOTF predicts the impact on the 250VDC Battery Chargers?
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 51 H 2 x N E Tier 2, Group 1: 264000 K3.03 ( 1. Stem Focus: The 1 sentence implies that offsite power was lost to all 3 units, which is the intent of the question; however, may want to be more clear in this sentence as All three units were initially operating at 100% power when offsite power was ( > lost to the entire plant site. k t 2. Stem Focus: The first two sentences should be written in past tense. i_- d
, ... 3. Stem Focus: The first word in the 2 sentence should be
/,. changed from A to The. 7 I
Stem Focus: In the stem question, the acronym LOCA should
.-. be changed to accident signal was received
?/ / . ..
This question was marked as lower cog however it appears to be a higher cog question. Discuss. N S Tier 2, Group 1: 300000 G2.4.45 52 H 2 x (3 .... i) Stem Focus For the 1 fill in the blank statement change the 4 h first word from A to The I / 53 H 2 M E Tier 2, Group 1: 400000 K1.01 [2007 Nine Mile 1, Q#36]
-(3 1. Partial: Since there are no pressures provided in the stem, there may be no correct answer.
i2
- 2. Why is the word AUTOMATIC necessary? Discuss.
- 3. This question was listed as lower cog; however, it appears to be higher cog. Maybe Ok. Discuss.
t. t (j1 ;t 6ffr)4/J&2 A / C. .
-b /( 3 1 7/*
- 1 I, 12it .
I w J{.((j)
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Dist. I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back-Link units ward 0= K/A SRO B/M/N UIEIS Only Explanation Focus 54 F 2 Tier 2, Group 2: 201002 K4.04 This knowledge will be tested a lot on the operating exam; suggest keeping the 2r part of the question (whether the switch can be used to insert rods) and replacing the 1 part with another item to test the applicants knowledge of the Rod Out Permit light, or some other RMCS logic feature associated with the settle function. aifi
- 2. #/units: The picture has unit 2 designation whereas the question includes a unit 3 designation.
- 3. This question was listed as higher cog; however, it appears to be lower cog.
55 H 2 x Tier 2, Group 2: 201006 A2.05 Cred Dist: Choice D (rod isnt mispositioned even though it was continuously withdrawn beyond one notch) is not plausible. Plausibility analysis provided was based on the one rod test mode; however, this is not performed during a plant startup at 5% power. Suggest modifying the 2 portion of the question to test the applicants knowledge of whether an action statement is required/is not required in accordance with TS 3.1.6. (TS can be a procedure for the purpose of satisfying the K/A
/0 Li statement). This is above-the-line information, which is testable to RO and will solve the plausibility issue with Choice D.
[1 i . , c )., N i QtLiL 5
/3; I
,>e/t(/ VASI Q 1 fli*2 Wi4.. 51*,.4 4 4
2)9
) 1
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LCD 1 (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cuesl T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q SRO B/MIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 56 F 2 x x E Tier 2, Group 2: 214000 K6.01
- 1. #/units: Include the electrical cabinet and/or panel number 4-I beside each of the choices.
c nf t srios inclu de a loss of un it preferred/
- 3. Stem Focus: The picture is sort of blurry, might be just as good to tell them that full core display rod position values are all blank. The l sentence says when a loss of power occurred.
Might be better to say when all rod position indications on the full core display were lost as shown. Alternatively, get a picture with less glare.
- 4. Stem Focus: The first choice is the only one with the word power.
S Tier 2, Group 2: 216000 (Nuc Boiler lnst) A4.02 58 H 2 Tier 2, Group 2: 230000 A1.10
- 1. Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices A/B çorus spray valves auto-isolated) is not plausible because the 6 bullet in the stem says that DW sprays are in service. (If DW sprays havent auto-isolated, then neither have torus sprays.)
- 2. Partial/Cred Dist: The correct answer appears to be Choice D because EQ 1-2 is still in process The decision of when to exit EOl-2 is an SRO judgement and is not indicated in the stem.
to standby Suggest modifying the question to eliminate the 6 bullet (applicants can deduce DW sprays are in service based on the drywell pressure trend) and re-word the l fill-in-the-blank statement to test whether or not an auto-isolation signal currently exists for 74-57/74-58:
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7 8, Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) B/M/N Explanation Tier 2, Group 2: 234000 K5.02
- 1. Cred Dist: Choices C/D are not plausible because there is no way refueling the reactor could ever occur. Theres nothing in the stem that can be misconstrued as a reason why the bridge would stop before it reached the core.
Suggest testing the applicants knowledge of whether a rod out block will I will not occur and some other piece of knowledge. Alternatively, include something in the stem that could be misconstrued as a reason why the bridge would stop all of a sudden when it reached the core. Tier 2, Group 2: 259001 G2.4.6
- 1. Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice C is also correct. Also, in C-5, under the steps that say Stop and Prevent, the flowchart uses the words stop lowering level, which could make Choice B also correct. Too subtle of differences between the correct answer and ChoicesC/D.
- 2. Stem Focus: In Choices BID, the phrase maintain level in a 50 inch band is not specific.
- 3. #/units: At BFN, the C-5 flowchart never uses the phrase Terminate and Prevent; should be Stop and Prevent.
- 4. Stem Focus: The stem question should include in accordance with C-5.
- 5. Ensure no overlap w/ SRO Q#77 Suggest re-working the question to test 1) whether injection is I is NOT required to be Stopped and Prevented and 2) the reason. (knowledge of mitigation strategies).
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/E Cred. Partial Job- Minutia Back B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link ward 61 F 2 x Tier 2, Group 2: 271000 K5.11
- 1. Cred: Choices A/C are not plausible.
- 2. Job-Link: Lesson plan says charcoal will heat up with more water. However, OPL1 71.030, Appendix C does not describe this phenomenon. Need to understand the conditions under Ip / which this can occur.
4) Rework the question to include an alarm [9-53, W27 d4.... 4, (CHARCOAL BED GAS REHTR OUTL DEW PT TEMP HIGH] LA) and the required actions (operational implication) when MT-066-110 (dewpoint)is abnormal and/or the possible malfunctioning 07 / component (provided temperature and dewpoint values). 4& vi/i1i) There appears to be conflicting BEN guidance for dewpoint: Y\M Lesson OPL171.030 says:
/ e. Moisture element 66-1 0 measures tfle (4, dewpoini ii dewpoint is >42 F charcoal beds should be bypassed But ARP 9-53 says:
tJ E IF dewpoint cannot be restored to below 42F, THEN INATE WO to troubleshoot and CONTACT system engineer for evaluation. 62 F 2 x Tier 2, Group 2: 272000 K2.03 (Awec SAf JiL b& Note to NRC reviewers: The Wide Range eous Effluent Monitor (WRGERMS 0-RM-90-306), located at nel 9-10) receives signals WI frotwo in-eries detecibrs -RM-90-147 and -148 The L-.-i WRGEMs moditor at PanetQ1 is powered from 120VACUI?,S Cf I whereaNfle detecirs are powred from attery BoaIui2, PaneL 13. Loss of detetor powe?causes annrnciator 9-34, W20, SThCK GAS C); /1) RADIATION MONITOR DNSC/INOP.
-h (1
2 k 1. Cred: Choices C/D are not plausible because all scintillation radiation detectors are powered from DC sources. 6 Suggest testing which units battery board powers the WRGERM5 detectors (BB1 or BB2) and the power supply to the O WRGERM5 monitor located at Panel 9-10 (I&C or Unit Preferred).
- 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
Explanation Tier 2, Group 2: 288000 K3.05 Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choice B (supply fan trips, exhaust fan doesnt trip, and building pressure rises) is not plausible because the exhaust fan is still running, which sucks on the building causing pressure inside the building to always lower. Suggest testing the applicants knowledge of 1) how a failure of PdIC 64-2 will affect building pressure, that is, PdIC 64-2 output signal fails either upscale or downscale, and 2) the setpoint for annunciator 9-3D, W32 (EOl-3 entry condition). Tier 2, Group 2: 290003 A3.01 [2010 BFN NRC Exam, Q#34] Cred Dist: Choice A (neither CREV units auto-start) is not st 1 plausible because the bullet says that high radiation has been detected in the U3 CR air inlet. The purpose of CREV is to protect the CR operators from high rad by auto-starting. Nothing in the stem indicates a condition which can be misconstrued to imply CREV unavailability.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice B (CREV5 suck off of outside air) is not plausible because the 1 bullet says that high radiation has been detected in the U3 CR air inlet. The purpose of CREV is to protect the CR operators from high rad by isolating the outside air.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice C (Control Bay normal ventilation is restarted) is not plausible because the 1 bullet says that high radiation has been detected in the outside air; therefore, no one would align normal ventilation back in service.
This only leaves Choice D. Which is the correct answer.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 65 F 2 x B E 290002 K1.14 (Sample Question Received 1-3-12) 1 QK/A: In order to more directly link the question to the RPV INTERNALS, change the term feedwater line(s) in each of the ( four choices to feedwater sparger(s).
- 2. Stem Focus: The word correct in the stem question Es not
= necessary to elicit the correct response. (words like properly, correct, etc. are not needed in stem questions because these concepts are always implied and only add reading burden).
- 3. Stem Focus: Steam line the stem question as:
WOOTF describes the piping configuration for the RWCU system return flow back to the reactor? A. Units 2 and 3 can return via the A or Bfeedwater spargers. B. ONLY Unit 3 can return via the A or B feedwater spargers. C. Units 1 and 2 can return via the A or B feedwater spargers. D. ONLY Unit I can return via the A or B feedwater spargers.
- 4. 3-11-13: Comments incorporated.
- 5. Stem Focus: In Choice 8, the first word (Units) should be plural.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units K/A Only 66 F 2 x x Tier 3: G2.1.27
- - C 1. Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices A/B (delays releasing 02/H2) is not plausible because the earths environment contains these LA(A elements.
tjiU. 2. Partial: Choice D could also be correct since the recombination of hydrogen and oxygen could involve radioactive hydrogen and radioactive oxygen. p Lv - q 2f-t Suggest testing the applicants knowledge of how the OG system 1) minimizes the potential for explosions (recombination of 02/H2 vs. cooling the effluent steam via Glyccil Coolers) and AA 2) reduces the volume of offgas (recombination of 02/H2 vs, Charcoal filtration). 67 H 2 x x Tier 3: G2.1.31 [2011 BFN NRC Exam, Q#15]
- 1. Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement includes two
..I.... separate thoughts. Split this statement into two fill-in-the-blank statements.
lAJ h 2. #/units: Use only the noun name (and UNID#) on the control board labels to describe the pressure indicators. Alternatively, a?re4, test the applicants to predict the narrow range indications for
-8f/&; (5\4 this situation.
.9 3. Partial: choice C (pressure stable) is also correct. Provide pressure ranges for the 2 part of each choice to ensure only OV)(L one correct answer, that is, one pressure range is 800 to 1000 psig (which would indicate that only a reactor scram had been
- I inserted) and the other pressure range whatever it is after an ED
.I)\tJ has been performed.
.2
*.&1/2:
i I b
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
LOK LOD - (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia Explanation Focus Dist. Link 68 F 1 x Tier 3: G2.1.36
- 1. Cred Dist: Choice A (cold pool) is not plausible because the spent fuel pool is never this cold. To test the applicants knowledge of the minimum allowed SFP temperature, use a fill-1 2.
n-the-blank statement with two plausible numbers. Cred Dist: Choice C (defective storage rack) is not plausible because the storage rack is defective, which could result in criticality during fuel sipping.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice B (2 way movement when loaded) is ou borderline plausible, given Choice 0 (make sure pneumatic system working).
- 4. LODl: This question will provide no discriminatory value.
nT
- 5. Please provide bank question from which this question was modified.
69 F 2 x x her 3 GZ2.15 [2009 Hatch NRC Exam ,Q#68]
- 1. #/units: The noun name of 2-HS-66-1 5 (Panel 2-9-8) is missing
(
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem question is vague because of the phrase the valve and actuator; noun names should be provided.
- 3. Cue: The 2 sentence in the stem is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 4. Stem Focus: Suggest the following changes:
Solenoid FSV 66-15 is shown The SJAE 2B Inlet Valve, FCV-66-15, fails A. Energized; closed B. Energized; open C. De-energized; closed D. De-energized; open (;.. -/A.1 o *
/ )
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A 70 F 2 x x E Tier 3: G2.2.25 [2009 Hatch NRC Exam Q#70] Cue: The only choice that has the word NOT capitalized is also the correct answer.
- 2. Partial: Choice 0 is also correct.
AQ Suggest the following for fix both comments and to create a significantly modified version from the original Hatch exam item: WOOTF completes the following statement in accordance with the bases for Tech Spec 2.1.1, Reactor Core Safety Limits? The ensures that during normal operation
\and during abnormal operational transients,______
)4. APLHGR safety limit; at least 99.9% of the fuel rods in the
/ core do not experience transition boiling B. APLHGR safety limit; .cladding oxidation does not exceed 0.1 7percent of the total,j1ladding thickness C. MCPR safety limi Vat least 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core do not experince transition boiling
/ D. MCPR safety limit; 7percent of the t cladding oxidation does not exceed al cladding thickness 7
I /
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 71 F 2 x x ,, N E Tier 3: G2.2.39 1)I 1. Cred Dist: Borderline plausibility for Choice D (waiting an hour 7 before verifying having to verify separation criteria) because this
..)
-lX is an action that can be performed quickly in the control room.
. lii.n(s UCondition
/ 2. Stem Focus: The stem question should include A as r shown below:
frY Suggest the following to remedy both omments: WOOTF completes the statement below in accordance with Tech Spec 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability, Condition A, One withdrawn control rod stuck? In accordance with Tech Spec 3.1.3, Condition A, if one withdrawn control rod is stuck, then A. Immediately verify separation criteria are met B. Disarm the adjacent control rods within 1 hour C. Declare the control rod slow within 1 hour D. Immediately declare the control rod inoperable 72 F 2 x x N E Tier3: G2.3.13 A q 1. Partial: The wording of the stem question and the fill-in-the r ,\/fL./) Jr blank statement needs to exactly mirror the words in GOl-200-2 k / to preclude potential appeals by an the applicants. JUU 5f7 2. Verify with Ops Mgmt that this question is not testing minutia. WOOTF completes the following statement in accordance with 2-GOl-200-2, Primary Containment Initial Entry and Closeout? Entering the drywell to perform a leak inspection, when the primary system is at or near rated operating temperature and pressure, requires the s permission.
8. Job- Explanation Link Tier 3: G2.3.14 Cred Dist: Choices B/C are not plausible. For example, if one had no idea what the normal Unit 3 injection rate was, one would look at Choices A/B and say to themself..since 16 is higher than 12. ..and the 2 part of each choice is the same, .then even IF B is correct, A is always correct. Therefore B is not plausible. The same deductive reasoning applies for Choices C/D in the opposite direction. This allows the applicant to get rid of Choices B/C using only deductive reasoning. 74 F 2 x x x G2.4.1 (Sample Question Received 1-3-12) [River Bend 2008 #741 Cred Dist: Choice D (No EOl entry conditions) is not plausible because the stem contains containment parameters increasing increasing in severity and an ATWS (power 3%). Cue: Providing hydrogen and oxygen readings, drywell pressure/temperature, and torus temperature is not required to elicit the correct response. Q=KJA: The proposed question not fully test the applicants knowledge of immediate action steps, for example, immediate operator actions in 2-AOl-i 00-1. See if it is also possible to test an IOA as part of this question, in addition to the EOl entry conditions.
- 4. Stem Focus: The first sentence should say that the reactor automatically scrammed.
- 5. 3-11-13: Comments incorporated. See additional enhancement to the fill-in-the-blank statements below:
WOOTF completes both statements for the current conditions? The Unit Supeivisor_______ required to enter C-b. (is/is NOT) The OA TC required to trip the Recirc Pumps. (is/is NOT)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
Q# LOK LOD - (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Explanation Focus Dist. 75 F 2 Tier 3: G2.4.9 Q=K/A: The accident being tested is a control rod drop event; however, the mitigation strategy for this event is the same whether the reactor is at high power or low power (the mitigative strategy is to drive the rod full in). Since the mitigation strategy is the same, then the question is not meeting the K/A. The intent of the K/A is to test the applicants knowledge of the implication of being at a low power when an accident/event occurs. The examples listed in the K/A statement (LOCA or Loss of RHR) have big differences in the procedures/methods used to mitigate these events during low power as compared to when the reactor is at 100% power. Likewise, we should test an accident/event where the mitigative strategy is different or does not apply when the reactor is operating at 100% power.
- 2. Verify no overlap with any scenario events.
Suggest testing the appjiants knowledge of mitigative strategies listed in l-74-iuring a RCS leak, since these strategies dont appliwhen the reactor is at 100% power.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link 76 H 3 x Tier 1, Group 1: 295003 AA2.05 (Sample Question Received 1-3-12)
- 1. SRO-only: SRO-only knowledge should not be credited for questions that can be answered solely using knowledge of an AOP entry condition. Plant conditions which require entering AOP5 are required RO knowledge items. Station Blackout (SBO) is defined as a loss of 161 and 500kV systems and a failure of the two diesel generators which supply normal power to the two 480V Shutdown Boards on a unit. This is RO knowledge. Likewise, a loss of the 500 KV system requires entry to 0-AOl-57-1 B. This is also RO knowledge.
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem question is not clear. It appears that the procedures listed in the stem are missing some sort of number in front of the procedure number because the choices dont seem to match the stem question.
Suggest writing a question to test the SRO applicants ability to perform Step 4.2 [13] in 0-AOl-57-1B, given a specific switchyard, transformer, diesel configuration.
- 3. 3-11-13: Received new replacement question. Graded as 4: enhancement, see below.
- 4. Cue: The words two QUALIFIED in the 10:00 sentence are not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Job Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Link units ward K/A Only 77 H 2 U Tier 1, Group 1: 295019 AA2.02 [2009 Hope Creek, Q#78] SRO-only: The 1 part of the question can be answered using RO systems knowledge that SDV V&D valves preclude another manual scram (Title of App 1 F is Manual Scram) The 2 nd part of the question presumably is the SRO piece; however, this part of the question does not hit the K/A statement (interpret status of safety related pneumatic loads) because the level band doesnt necessarily depend on the loss of instrument air this is always the required level band when power is below 5%. In other words, if you take instrument air problem out of the question, and only provide the other information in the stem, the correct answer (+2 to +51) is still the same. The K/A statement is required to be hit at the SRO level. In this question, only the RO portion hits the K/A statement.
- 2. Ensure no overlap with RO Q#60 Two suggestions to remedy these comments:
One alternative is to use the wording of the K/A statement (interpret the status of safety related instrument air loads) to test the SRO applicants ability to make the right E-plan call based on the status of the control rods (which can be called and/or status of the unit. Another alternative is to pose a situation where a portion (or all) of the reactor building pneumatic system has depressurized and and test the applicants ability to determine which safety related components are inoperable (RO knowledge), including the required TS action statements (SRO knowledge). (cant be direct lookup when provided the TS reference). 5 hAdL cejv oc t c
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. 78 H 2 x x Tier 1, Group 1: 295023 G2.2.40 Cred Dist: Choices NC (continue moving fuel) are not plausible because the fuel pooi level is noticeably lowering.
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem conditions do not provide the status of Loop I RHR. Is Loop I RHR in the SDCg mode of operation?
Choice B mentions securing shutdown cooling even though the stem doesnt say shutdown cooling was in operation. This is disjointed and may not allow any of the choices to be correct.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 2 nd sentence can be modified so that the C2 RHRSW Pump can become the (new) 3 bullet.
Suggest the following to remedy comment 1: Replace the 5 sentence in the stem (A report from the refuel floor indicates that the fuel pool level is noticeably lowering) with The current fuel pool level indication is xxx inches and stable. (This will be a level just under the fuel pool abnormal alarm setpoint that corresponds to below 22ff.) This situation will suffice as a refueling accident. Then test the SRO applicants ability to 1) determine which LCO applicability applies (TS 3.9.7 or 3.9.8) AND 2) interpret how to implement alternate decay heat removal in accordance with the bases paragraph that states: Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the units Operating Procedures. For example, this may include the use of the Reactor Water Cleanup System. The method used to remove the decay heat should be the most prudent choice based on unit tA conditions. - If a discriminating question at the SRO level cannot be writter. for this K/A, then contact the Chief Examiner for a replacement t I
\, K/A statement in the Refueling Accident topic.
DfIJ - o_ :p (/27 Qv
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cuesi T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 79 H x x x x x M E/U 295024 G2.4.21 (Sample Question Received 1-3-12) st 1
- 1. Cred Dist: The part of Choices A and B (previous HPCI testing causing OW pressure to lower and torus pressure to rise) is not plausible because the HPCI testing occurred 7 Hours ago.
- 2. Q=K/A: The proposed question does not test a high drywell pressure condition.
- 3. Job-Link: The premise of the first part of the question may not be operationally valid. According to the distracter analysis, the premise of the question is that a diywell to containment leak bypassing the containment pressure suppression function is causing DW pressure to lower, Torus pressure to rise, and a lowering torus level. One possible situation that represents this premise is a stuck open Torus-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker; however, the torus level would not be dropping. The change in torus level, due to changing torus pressure, is relatively small.
The applicants may think that this means the torus is leaking, and argue that there is no absolutely correct answer.
- 4. LOD=1: The SRO portion of this question is a direct lookup.
- 5. Stem Focus: The last two bullets (Venting torus just been secured and HPCI testing completed at 05:00) should be included in the first few sentences instead of at the end of the list of bulleted items because the bulleted list occurred subsequent to these two bullets.
- 6. Stem Focus: The portion of the annunciator UNID#(1-pda 137) is not necessary. Even though this may be part of the engraving, the intent is to provide the exact wording of the annunciator (without paraphrasing). The portion of annuniciator UNID# inside the parenthesis is appropriate (9-3B, W26).
- 7. 3-11-13: Received replacement question; see the next row below for continuation...
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia Back- 0= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link ward K/A Only 79 H 2 (continued from previous row) Tier 1, Group 1: 295024 [2010 BFN, Q#81]
- 8. QK/A: The SRO portion of the question (can / cannot change modes) has a very weak link to the high DW pressure K/A statement. The SRO portion of the proposed question tests whether the unit can enter Mode 2 from Mode 4 even though a PCIV is inoperable:
The intent of the K/A statement is to test the SROs knowledge (during a high drywell pressure condition) of a parameter or EOP logic system thats used to protect/assess the status of a j.ey safety function like the containment. 1 For example: Given the following excerpt from EOl-2, PC/P....
- N VL..
WOOTF completes the following statement? The number 13 beside each step refers to the preceding before step, which deals with pressure reaching 55 psig, in order to preclude________ A. torus; the loss of a fission product barrier B. torus;.MGentty) C. drywell; the los6f a fission product barrier D. drywell; SAMG entry
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 80 H 3 x x Tier 1, Group 1: 295037 G2.4.30 1 Stem Focus: The stem does not provide the clock time for the bulleted conditions.
- 2. The fill-in-the-blank statement should be re-worded as:
At XX:XX (time), the highest required classification is and the State of Alabama was/is required to be notified no later than 3 r d
- 3. Cue: The level band in the bullet is a cue for other questions on the exam.
81 H 2 x x Tier 1, Group 1: 600000 AA2.13
- 1. QK/A: Because each of the choices includes an SSI, the applicants can already assume that the decision to enter the SSls has been made. Therefore, the word determine in the K/A statement is not being tested, that is, the applicants ability to determine the need for an emergency plant shutdown.
- 2. Stem Focus: The stem question asks for a two items: 1) a SM decision and 2) a governing procedure. All four choices indicate a decision to manually scram, which means this can be moved to the stem question.
- 3. Stem Focus: The phrase governed by is subjective; re-work the stem question to test what procedure is required to be implemented in order to perform a manual scram on each unit and delete the reference to a manual scram in all of the four choices (since the stem question will contain this).
- 4. Cred Dist: Choice 0 (U3 scram in accordance with 3-GOl-100-12A) is not plausible because a normal unit shutdown from 100% power to cold shutdown takes a long time, given the urgency of an SSI scram event on all three units.
4O/3: / f j [ 2o / -
--- 1/i id .,ç. (fl &1Ais S4 I, .iedi.
V-fi 1.13 l?cc I&
- 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
Explanation Tier 1 Group 1: 700000 AA2.05
- 1. Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choice B (all 161 circuits mop but all 500 circuits still operable) is not plausible because the stem says thatl6l voltage is 161 and that the 161 status is yellow and 500 status is red.
- 2. Stem Focus: Boil down the first part of all choices to either 1)
Raise reactive load or 2) Raise turbine load.
- 3. Stem Focus: Add TRO-TO-SOP-30.128 (name/number) to the stem question as in accordance with Tier 1, Group 2: 295017 AA2.01 [2009 Hatch, Q#86]
- 1. Cred Dist: The 1s part of Choices C/D (ED not required) is not plausible when the dose rate at the site boundary is 1 RJhr, reactor still pressurized, and an unisolable steam break exists.
- 2. Stem Focus: The first sentence says reactor building temps/rad was rising due to a steam line break in the turbine building.
Suggest testing the SRO applicants knowledge of a parameter (not the value) or rule-of-usage for the Tables associated with EPIP-1 Gaseous effluent release limit thresholds. For example, test the knowledge that 1) one of the EPIP-1
\ Gaseous effluent release limit threshold parameters for a general emergency is Iodine 131 dose at the site boundary (vs.
J the site boundary not gamma reading-incorrect) and 2) whether 7 WRGERM5 is/is allowed to be used to base the general emergency declaration. (EPIP-1 says that actual field
)measurements orprojected dose assessments are to be used to
/ make the declaration unless neither of these assessments can
/ be conducted within 15 minutes.)
- 3. Ensure no overlap wl SRO Q#99
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 84 H 3 M E Tier 1, Group 2: 295029 EA2.03 [2010 Vermont Yankee, Q#83] Partial: Choice A (Perform Appendix 18) is also correct. See Step SPIL-2. ii 2. Stem Focus: Only list procedures in each of the choices; title and number only. Come up with another plausible procedure to 4 replace one of the Appendix 13 (Choices CID); this new choice could potentially be SAMG entry is required if the Core Spray flow value is also included in the F A. Appendix?? B. EOI-C-2 C. Appendix 13 D. SAMG entry is required
1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 85 H 2 x N E 500000 G2.2.44 (Sample Question Received 1-3-12)
)J_ /-
I 1. Stem Focus: The 2 portion of each choice is unique; therefore, the l portion of the question is not being tested. Additionally, only the 2 portion of Choices B and C include a reason, which makes the choices disjointed. Suggest 4 3O L3 changing the 2 portion of two distracters to 1 -EOl-Appendix 14B, CAD Operation.
- 2. Partial: An applicant could successfully argue that by venting per Appendix 12, the hydrogen/oxygen concentrations may actually lower. Choice B can also be correct even though Appendix 12 is only directed in the PC/P leg of EOl-2.
- 3. Stem Focus: The first two bullets are not necessary to elicit the correct response. Suggest the following remedies for all comments listed above:
A LOCA has occurred on Unit I and the following conditions currently exist:
- Suppression Pool level is l6ft
- H2JO2 Concentrations are indicated below:
[PICTURE HERE: 02 @ 4.5% & H2 @ 9%] WOOTF completes both statements? In accordance with 1-EOl-Appendix 19, H202 Analyzer Operation, readings from 1-XR-76-110 H2/02 Concentration Recorder (Panel 1-9-54) or from 1-MON-76-1 10, H2/02 Analyzer (Panel 1-9-55) may only be obtained after________ Based on the current H2/02 readings and in accordance with 1-EOl-2, PC/H leg, the crew is required to enter________ A. 5 minutes; 1-EOl-Appendix 14 A B. 5 minutes; 1-EOl-Appendix 14B C. 10 minutes; 1-EOl-Appendix 14A D. 10 minutes; 1-EOl-Appendix 14B
- 4. 3-11-13: Comments incorporated; except...
d 2 E Cue: The bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response. The last phrase in the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement to purge the containment with.. should be replaced with enter.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
1 Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= S 1RO B/M/N UIE/S Explanation Link units ward K/A Only Tier 2, Group 1: 209001 G2.1.31 d 2 Cred Dist: The part of the question (which is the only part of the question that is SRO-only) is not plausible because the EOls are in effect during a LOCA. This is also RO knowledge. Suggest writing a question that deals with Tech Specs. 87 H 2 x Tier 2, Group 1: 211000 A2.05 [2010 Nine Mile Point, Q#861 Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 2 part of Choices A/B (SLC needed in Mode 3 for an KflNS) is borderline because all rods are inserted and it is impossible for an ATWS to occur.
- 2. Stem Focus: The times in each of the choices are vague because the stem doesnt include a timeline of events. Add times to the stem events.
Suggest keeping the 1 part of the question, provided a timeline of events is included in the stem, and substitute the following knowledge for the 2 part: cm accordance with Tech Spec Bases 3.1.7, the bases for
/ requiring SLC to remain operable in Mode 3 is to ensure that the
/ suppression pool pH remains above 7.0 under worst case
(,conditions for days following a LOCA.
C
- 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Link units ward K/A Only 88 H 2 x x U Tier 2, Group 1: 215003 A2.01 [2007 Brunswick, Q#88j od 2 rd 3 1 Cue: The and bullets point to Choice C as the correct answer.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice A (bypass SRM D and keep going) is not plausible because there is nothing in the stem that could be misconstrued to imply that SRM D was malfunctioning.
- 3. Cred Dist: Choice D (bypass SRM D and perform calibration) is not plausible because it is the same thing as Choice B. The applicants know there can only be one correct answer; therefore, since Choices BID are virtually the same, the
/
applicants can eliminate these choices solely based on F psychosymetrics.
/
Suggest re-working the question to tell the SRO applicants that two IRM5 have degraded power supply such that h.yJailed.o meet SRMIlRMjá criteria dunngastartupXhen test the! S 1 ill ti1ifTFan action statement in Tech Specs and the TJje uhedto be entered. (no refeo.ca provided) ci some other administrative restriction regarding managemeJ J Alternatively, if a discriminating question cannot be written at the SRO level, Chief Examiner will provide replacement KIA at your request. Note to NRC reviewers: SRMIIRM overlap criteria is RO knowledge. See the following OPL1 71.020 Learning objective:
- 10. Descibe the range toi JRM/APR1l cveriap. ISOER 90-Reconmendelon I]
ROs are required to monitor neutron monitors, for any abnormality, during a startup.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 89 H 3 x N E 218000 A2.05 (Sample Question Received 1-3-12)
/ 1 Note: Ensure that the applicants are not being provided li- L4J 3A Attachment 1 of 3-Aol-i-i; only Tech Spec 3.5.1 (no bases) is being provided as a reference.
- 2. Suggest the following enhancements:
Unit 3 is operating at 100% power and a loss of 250V RMOV Board 3B occurs. WOOTF identifies the required action(s), if any, in accordance with Tech Spec 3.5.1? A. No action statement in LCD 3.5.1 is required to be entered. B. ONLY action statement E. I is required to be entered. C. Action statements G. I and G.2 are required to be entered. D. Action statement H. I is required to be entered.
- 3. 3-11-13: Comments incorporated ...except for
- 4. Cue: the only choice that has a phrase after the word entered is also the correct choice. Delete the phrase for the supported systems.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 90 F 2 N U Tier 2, Group 1: 239002 G2.2.12 4 ( ( ( 1. Q=K/A: The proposed question only tests generic surveillance attributes (partial performance of a surveillance test okay as a
/ Jj1 J PMT and protocols for conduct of testing) even though the K/A statement is linked to Relief/Safety Valves. The proposed question is more suited to a Tier 3 RO K/A statement and does
- 4. not meet the intent of the Tier 2, Group 1 topic.
Suggest the following: WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with 2-SR-3.4.3.2, Main Steam Relief Valves Manual Cycle Test, acceptance criteria? Each relief valve shall be manually opened and OPEN position indicated exhibited by acoustic monitors downstream of the valve indicate steam is flowing from the valve _ANDIOR thermocouples downstream of each relief valve detect steam flow from an open relief valve as indicated by rising tailpipe temperature. The green valve indicating light shall indicate a CLOSED valve as evidenced by no acoustic monitor response _AND/OR thermocouples downstream of each relief valve indicates no steam flow by lowering tailpipe temperature. Meets SRO-only based on the OPERABILITY determination incorporated with acceptance criteria.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LCD I (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focusj Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 91 H 2 x x N E/U Tier2, Group 2: 201003 G2.4.18 4 3 1. Cred Dist: Choice C (exit C5 when reactor not subcritical) is not plausible because C-5 is always entered when the reactor is not J f subcritical.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice D (stay in C5 when the reactor IS subcritical)
/ is borderline plausible because C-5 only applies when the reactor isnt subcritical.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 1 part of each choice can be streamlined to Exit C-5 or Remain in C-5. None of the other information in I
the l part of each choice is required to elicit the correct ( response. 3 - 7OJ L.
. 4. Cue: Ensure no overlap w/ RO Q#60 (level band required to be maintained in l bullet)
- 5. Ensure no overlap wI RO Q#5 1 AF) A Suggest the following:
1L i5 -cAX A scram occurred and during the implementation of EOI-1, the US CO . 5 reaches the following retainment override step: rj WHILE EXECUTING THE
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J O 0 3CZ z i) In accordance with EOl Program Manual Basis document xxxxxlVVllllAAA, noun name, WOOTF identifies the basis for the 1ttu word subcritical and the procedure required for level control for this situation? First part of the question test the term subcritical means that reactor power is below the heating range (range 7). OPLI (versus some other wrong condition) l. 7 f 20 Second part test RC/L vs C-5
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (EIH) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. I Partial B/MIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. 92 H 2 x Tier 2, Group 2: 239001 A2.11 I! f Direct Lookup: Since the proposed reference to be provided to
-so the applicants is TS 3.6.1.3, the l part of the question is a 1/- (iu. L -
)
direct lookup. Suggest still providing the reference to the applicants, but frk TS change the st 1 part of the question to test the TS basis for WHY there is a 4 hour difference for the completion time regarding a MSIV. (because an additional 4 hours allows time to restore Wi..
- r A
%1C the MSIV to operable before having to reduce power or shutdown the unit VS. and additional 4 hours allows time to implement administrative controls for the operable in series valve when the probability of misalignment is low)
- 2. Cred Dist: The plausibility of a Site Area emergency existing when the steam line is isolated and all temperatures are slowly nd 2
( lowering is borderline. part of Choices BID). Suggest changing the 2 part of the question to test the 7 applicants knowledge of whether or not an emergency classification is required! not required. 93 H 2 x Tier 2, Group 2: 268000 A2.01 [2010 BEN, Q# 91] Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices NC (use EPIP-1 to determine what is leaking and the isotopes) is not plausible because EPIP-1 is the emergency plan classification procedure and does not provide guidance to determine the source of underground water leaks on site.
- 2. Partial: Choice B is also correct.
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- 3. Partial: The 2 sentence in the stem may-not necessarily mean that the waste sample tank discharge pipe is leaking. This is a cryptic way to provide the information to the applicants that the waste sample tank discharge piping is leaking inside the protected area. Consequentially, an applicant could argue that there is no correct answer.
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- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F j Cred. Partial Job- Minutia B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Link 94 F 2 x G2.1.35 (Sample Question Received 1-3-1 2) [Fitzpatrick 2010 #94]
- 1. SRO-only: The gjy knowledge required to identify the correct answer (Choice A) is found in 1-01-78, Precaution and Limitation 3.A.1, that is, spent fuel temperatures below 68°F exceed the temperature reactivity in the criticality analysis. This is a system cooling limitation (not an administrative limitation) and it is RO knowledge.
1h 6
- 2. Cue: The bullet does not provide the actual fuel pool level.
Instead, it only states that the required level above the fuel is met.
- 3. Stem Focus: Choice B does not state whether to suspend or continue with fuel movement, which is unlike the other three choices.
- 4. Stem Focus: The stem question does not elicit a reason for the action even though each of the choices includes a reason.
Suggest testing the SRO applicants knowledge of 0-GOl-100-3C, Step 5.1 [2.1], which deals with requirements for the FATE.
- 5. 3-11-13: Comment for replacement test item incorporated, except....
- 6. Stem Focus: the word copy in the stem question may be misleading. Suggest enhancing as: UIAW WOOTF identifieswhere the OFFICIAL Fuel Assembly Transfer Form (FATF) is required tO be located during refueling7
- 7. Stem Focus: In order to be parallel with Choice A: revise Choice D to say In the control room on the Unit Supervisors desk.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD I Explanation (F/H) (1-5) Stem cuesi T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 95 H 5 x x M E Tier3: G2.1.43 [2010 Vermont Yankee, Q#941
- 1. LOD = 5: Requiring the applicants to know the SPP-3.5 A reporting criteria from memory (without a reference) is too difficult. Suggest providing a copy of SPP-3.5 to the applicants for this question.
I
- 2. Partial: There is no correct answer to this question because the stem does not specify how high reactor power was, including the duration. Modify the stem to say that the core thermal power exceeded 3458 MWth for an 8 hour period (8 hr average). This is a clearer violation of the BFN operating license.
- 3. Stem Focus: Modify the stem question to include reference to 1-AOI-6-1A and SPP-3.5.
St 1
- 4. Stem Focus: Modify the sentence to include the reason why the extraction steam was lost, that is, an inadvertent closure of Heater 1A1 Extraction Isolation Valve, 1-FCV-005-0005.
- 5. Verify on the simulator by closing 1-FCV-005-005 to ensure all other automatic valve operations do not result in a reactor trip or feedwater event.
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- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Explanation Focus Dist. 96 F 2 x x Tier 3: G2.2.18 Cred Dist: Choice C (only can enjoy TS 30.4(b) when RHR Pump 2A becomes a higher risk) is not plausible because it is backwards to defense in depth.
- 2. Stem Focus: The term MODE Restraint Assessment is subjective and can be misleading. The assessment is always performed; however, the Tech Spec privilege of 3.0.4(b) may or may not be invoked.
- 3. Stem Focus: The first part of the stem can be simplified.
Unit 2 is in Mode 4 and is preparing to enter Mode 2; however, an inoperable Tech Spec component exists. WOOTF completes both statements? Tech Spec LCO 3.0.4fallows entry into a mode with the LCO not met ONLY if_______ In accordance with NPG-SPP-09. 11.2, Risk Assessment Methods for Tech Specs, the Tech Spec 3.0.4(b) provision should only be used when A. a risk assessment is performed; there is reasonable likelihood that the inoperable equipment will be made operable within the applicable completion time once the mode is entered. B. the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in the higher mode for an unlimited period of time; some plausible distracter. C. similar D. similar
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIM/N UIEIS Explanation Focus j Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 97 F 2 / / x ,N U Tier 3: G2.2.3
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- 1. SRO-only: The proposed question only tests the minimum zero
( ;( /[f t t2 .j.4-i - 7 Z .4-injection reactor water level value. This is RO knowledge
, ,, if totc& -i.-1I ,
j /, pertaining to the definition of adequate core cooling. Reference
// lesson plan OPL1 71 .201, Learning objective:
,k I\Io- k 4 - jt 4(? 10. Identity the rneangs of the fotowing terms asthey relate to the EOIs:
fl 12° t- . , Additionally, this question is not linked to any of the 7 topics in 1 CP 3, ta )e. .f IOCFR55.43(b). 98 F 2 x x x B U Tier 3: G2.3.4
- 1. Cred Dist: The l part of Choices CID (person already received 25 REM and can get more emergency dose) is not plausible.
4 2. Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statements seem unrelated. This is confusing.
- 3. Partial: The stem does not include in accordance with...,
which could make the answer subjective. Suggest the following: (WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with EPIP
\15, Emergency Exposures?
/The shall provide authorization for all emergency 7 radiation doses that may exceed 10 CFR 20.1201 entitled S, Occupational Dose Limits for Adults Potassium Iodide (KI) should be issued if a projected dose to
\. the thyroid is expected to exceed______ during emergency conciitions. /
/O/
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Explanation Focus Dist. 99 H 2 x Tier 3: G2.4.18 Job-Link: Will one fuel bundle being damaged cause the general emergency threshold for offsite radioactive release to be met if the reactor building is intact? Suggest re-working the stem of the question to say that major damage to the reactor building roof and spent fuel pool has occurred. nd 2
- 2. Partial: the fill-in-the-blank statement is vague, that is, the phrase the basis for this ction does not match the fuel pool conditions: For only the case of proceeding to Cold Shutdown per EOl-3, when 2 areas are above max safe and no primary system discharging, y; however, this question has to do with a huge fuel pool problem. The basis for going to Cold Shutdown is totally unrelated to the situation at hand. Therefore, an applicant can argue that there is no completely correct answer.
- 3. Cue: The l bullet should be modified to ensure no overlap with other test items. Suggest re-wording as The offsite radioactive release threshold for a general emergency has been met.
Suggest testing ONLY a situation where a missile has caused extensive damage to the fuel pool with the reactor continuing to operate in Mode 1. Then test the applicants knowledge of whether ED is/is NOT required and the basis for EOI-4, Step RR-5.
- 4. Ensure no overlap w/ SRO Q#83
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD - (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KJA Only 100 F 2 x N U Tier 3: G2.4.19 SRO-only: The proposed question solely tests knowledge of EOP layout, symbols, and icons, at the RO level. Knowledge of 4- EOP layout, symbols, and icons is RO knowledge; refer to OPL171.201, RO learning objectives #1 and #3. Additionally, the question must have some relation (be linked) to one of the 7 topics in 10CFR55.43(b). I, y9( B Enabling Objacricas I Describe or denNy tine intent and condoons for use of tie tollcvang 201 Dow clrao oyrobolo
- a. Entry Arrow Floe, Path dentlier Rot Arrow o Ececute Concurrently Step o Retainment Override I COri:ingnnit ActOr Ste Act on Stop Decision Step Before Decision Step I Srgnel Slap Operator Note I Table 3 Descnbe or dentin the means by wInch an operator keeps back 01 the progression through an E0I fOwchart.
Suggest the following: The Unit Supeivisor reaches the following step CI-35: ( WOOTF identifies I) the generic name this shaped EOl symbol and 2) the point in C-I at which the exit arrow C symbol originated? A. Action Step Symbol; in the Pçirnaney Containment Flooding portion of C-I B. Signal Step Symbol; in the Primary Containment Flooding portion of C-I C. Action Step Symbol; in the Steam Cooling portion of C-I
\D. Signal Step Symbol; in the Steam Cooling portion of C-I
ES-403 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility: oWti P1S--R( Date of Exam: Exam Level: RO SRO Initials Item Description a b c
- 1. Clean answer sheets copied before grading 7 7it_ ?1(-.
- 2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented L 9
- 3. Applicants scores checked for addition errors (reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations)
- 4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail /
- 5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are justified 4, 7A
- 6. Performance on missed questions checked for training i
deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity jr of_questions_missed_by_half_or_more_of the_applicants Printed Name/Signature Date
- a. Grader
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) 4 A
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) (4O 7-q,3
- d. NRC Supervisor (*) F3eN k If 5JS < /(c,4
(*) The facility reviewers signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.}}