ML13184A232
| ML13184A232 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/2013 |
| From: | Shear G Division of Reactor Safety III |
| To: | Pacilio M Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| 3-2012-020, EA-13-068 | |
| Download: ML13184A232 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000237/2013407
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Region III
2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210
Lisle IL 60532-4352
July 3, 2013
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3; REPORT
NOS. 05000237/2013407; 05000249/2013407(DRS) AND RESULTS OF
INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 3-2012-020
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
This letter refers to the investigation conducted from June 6, 2012, to March 29, 2013, at the
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Dresden Station). The purpose of the
investigation was to determine if a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), an Equipment Operator
(EO), and/or any other personnel at the Dresden Station knew that a former SRO planned to
commit a violent crime and willfully failed to report that SRO for aberrant behavior. A factual
summary of the NRC investigation is enclosed.
Based on the results of the NRC investigation, an apparent violation with several
examples was identified, although only one example was deemed willful. This apparent
violation is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC
Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.
The NRCs requirements for reactor licensee access authorizations programs are contained in
Section 73.56 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). The NRC requirements
applicable to this issue include the following:
10 CFR 73.56(a)(2) requires that a licensee establish, implement and maintain its
access authorization program in accordance with the requirements of this section.
10 CFR 73.56(f)(1) requires that licensee and applicant access authorization programs
must include a behavioral observation program that is designed to detect behaviors or
activities that may constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public
and common defense and security, including a potential threat to commit radiological
sabotage. Licensees, applicants and contractors or vendors must ensure that the
individuals specified in paragraph (b)(1) and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this section are
subject to behavioral observation.
M. Pacilio -2-
10 CFR 73.56(f)(3) states, in part, that individuals who are subject to an access
authorization program under this section shall at a minimum, report any concerns arising
from behavioral observation, including, but not limited to, concerns related to any
questionable behavior patterns or activities of others to the reviewing official, his or her
supervisor, or other management personnel designated in their site procedures and that
the recipient of the report shall, if other than the reviewing official, promptly convey the
report to the reviewing official, who shall reassess the reported individuals unescorted
access or unescorted access authorization status.
The apparent violation examples involve:
1. A former EO, who had unescorted access to the Dresden Station, willfully failed to report
to a supervisor observed concerns arising from observed behavior indicating a change
of behavior in two other former individuals who had unescorted access to the
Dresden Station as required by 10 CFR 73.56(a)(2), 73.56(f)(1), and 73.56(f)(3), when
the other individuals attempted to recruit him in their plans to commit a violent crime.
2. A former SRO, who had unescorted access to the Dresden Station, failed to report to a
supervisor observed concerns arising from observed behavior indicating a change of
behavior in another former individual who had unescorted access to the Dresden Station
as required by 10 CFR 73.56(a)(2), 73.56(f)(1), and 73.56(f)(3), when the other
individual attempted to recruit him in his plans to commit a violent crime.
3. A former SRO, who had unescorted access to the Dresden Station, failed to report to a
supervisor observed concerns arising from observed behavior indicating a change of
behavior in another former individual who had unescorted access to the Dresden Station
as required by 10 CFR 73.56(a)(2), 73.56(f)(1), and 73.56(f)(3), when the other
individual went along with his plans to commit a violent crime.
4. An SRO, with unescorted access to the Dresden Station, failed to promptly
contact a reviewing official upon learning of questionable behavior as required by
10 CFR 73.56(a)(2), 73.56(f)(1), and 73.56(f)(3), when the SRO was informed by two
reactor operators about the questionable behavior of an EO.
Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being
issued for this apparent violation at this time. The circumstances surrounding the apparent
violation, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and effective corrective action
were discussed with Mr. David Czufin and other members of your staff during an exit meeting
on June 4, 2013.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either:
(1) respond to the apparent violation addressed in this letter within 30 days of the date of this
letter; (2) request a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC); or (3) request Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR). Please contact Mr. Joseph Maynen at 630-829-9835 within ten days
of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response.
M. Pacilio -3-
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as Response to the
Apparent Violation in Report No. 05000237/2013407; 05000249/2013407(DRS) EA-13-068, and
should include, for the apparent violation: (1) the reason for the apparent violation, or, if
contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been
taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further
violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate response is
not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC,
the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision.
If you request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your perspective
on the apparent violation and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into
consideration before making an enforcement decision. We encourage you to submit supporting
documentation as to the corrective actions you have taken at least one week prior to the
conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. The topics
discussed during the conference may include the following: (1) information to determine
whether violations occurred; (2) information to determine the significance of the violations;
(3) information related to the identification of the violations; and (4) information related to any
corrective actions taken or planned to be taken. In presenting your corrective actions, you
should be aware that the promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions, as well as your
prior enforcement history, will be considered in assessing any civil penalty for the apparent
violation. If a PEC is held, the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of
the conference; however, it will be closed to public observation because the apparent violation
is based on an NRC OI Report that has not been publicly disclosed and pertains to whether an
individual committed wrongdoing.
In lieu of a PEC, you may also request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue.
The term ADR is used to generally encompass various techniques for resolving conflicts using
a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation.
Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the mediator) works with
both parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a
mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make
decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up
misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the
issues. Additional information concerning the NRC's program can be obtained at
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict
Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral
third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within ten days of the date of this letter if you
are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violation
described above may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by
separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the NRCs Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),
M. Pacilio -4-
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent
possible, any response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so
that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Maynen of my staff at
630-829-9835.
Sincerely,
/RA by Patrick L. Louden for
Gary L. Shear, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249
Enclosure:
Factual Summary
of NRC Investigation
FACTUAL SUMMARY OF NRC INVESTIGATION
On June 6, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Investigations (OI),
Region III Field Office, initiated an investigation to determine if a Senior Reactor Operator
(SRO), an Equipment Operator (EO), and/or any other personnel at the Dresden Nuclear Power
Station (Dresden Station) knew that a former SRO planned to commit a crime and willfully failed
to report that SRO for aberrant behavior. The investigation was completed on March 29, 2013,
and was documented in OI Report No. 3-2012-020.
During the investigation, it was determined that an EO knew that two former SROs planned to
commit a crime and deliberately failed to report that information for approximately a year to a
year and half, contrary to site procedures. Following the May 9, 2012 arrest of one of the former
SROs, the EO related to numerous individuals onsite, to the police, to the licensees
investigators, and to the NRC investigator, a generally consistent story about being approached
to participate in committing a violent crime by two former SROs at the Dresden Station. The EO
related having between two to three conversations with the two former SROs that included
discussions of the planned criminal activities, including preliminary planning and actions.
Although the EO expressed that he was disinterested in the plan and did not think that the
former SROs were serious, the EO was aware that one of the former SROs had taken several
steps towards enacting his plan, including plans to map out armored car routes, plans to obtain
a getaway vehicle, and obtaining body armor. Further, the EOs reported responses to the
SROs provided evidence that he thought that the SROs were potentially serious about
committing the planned crimes.
The EO acknowledged that he did not report what he knew to anyone during the time period
that preceded the arrest of one of the former SROs. The EO further acknowledged receiving
training on reporting creditable threats to the plant or the health and safety of the public.
ENCLOSURE
M. Pacilio -4-
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent
possible, any response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so
that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Maynen of my staff at
630-829-9835.
Sincerely,
/RA by Patrick L. Louden for/
Gary L. Shear, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249
Enclosure:
Factual Summary
of NRC Investigation
DISTRIBUTION:
See next page
- See previous concurrence
FILE NAME: G:\ORAIII\EICS\ENFORCEMENT\Cases\Enforcement Cases 2013\EA-13-068 Dresden
Carjacking\EA-13-068 Dresden Choice Letter (Rev 2).docx
OFFICE RIII RIII RIII D:OI
NAME Lougheed Maynen Rubic Goetz
Non-concur
DATE 06/12/13 06/17/13 06/14/13 06/17/13
OFFICE D:OE D:OGC RIII RIII
1 2
NAME Zimmerman Scott Orth Shear
Wray for Hair for
DATE 06/26/13 06/27/13 07/02/13 07/03/13
OFFICIAL FILE COPY
1 OE concurrence received via email from J. Wray on June 26, 2013.
2 OGC No Legal Objection received via email from C. Hair on June 27, 2013.
Letter to Michael J. Pacilio from Gary L. Shear dated July 3, 2013
SUBJECT: DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3; REPORT
NOS. 05000237/2013407; 05000249/2013407(DRS) AND RESULTS OF
INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 3-2012-020
DISTRIBUTION:
Vivian Campbell
RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2 Resource
RidsNrrPMDresden
RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource
Chuck Casto
Cynthia Pederson
DRPIII
DRSIII
Patricia Buckley
OEMAIL Resource
Robert Goetz
Scott Kryk
Nancy Hane
Patricia Lougheed
Magda Gryglak
ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov
Gerry Gulla
Mandy Halter
Christopher Hair