ML13163A327

From Andrea Russell to Samson Lee: Action Request for Review of G20120172

ML13163A327
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	05/22/2012
From:	Andrea Russell Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:	Brice Bickett, Doerflein L, Samson Lee NRC/NRR/DRA, NRC Region 1, NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
References
FOIA/PA-2013-0010, G20120172
Download: ML13163A327 (17)

Text

K Doerflein, Lawrence From:

Sent:

To:

Cc:

Subject:

Attachments:

Follow Up Flag:

Flag Status:

Good morning, Russell, Andrea Tuesday, May 22, 2012 9:04 AM Lee, Samson; Bickett, Brice; Doerflein, Lawrence-Jennerich, Matthew; Dennig, Robert; Ulses, Anthony; MorganButler, Kimyata; Fretz, Robert; ul, Ryan; Safford, Carrie; Monninger, John; McIntyre, David; Collins, TimoThy; Scott, Cather-Te; Albert, Michelle; Cook, William; McCarver, Sammy Vaidya, Bhalchandra; Thadani, Mohan Action: Request for Review of G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206)- PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendation 2nd meeting (TAC ME8189)

ME8189 (G20120172) PRB Notes (2nd Mtg) 5-29-12-version track changes shown 5.22.12.docx Follow up Flagged On behalf of Bhalchandra, I am providing you with the revised PRB internal meeting notes on the initial recommendation, for your review. These meeting notes have been updated based on the conversation at the PRB meeting on May 17t', The changes are shown in tracked format.

We will consider revising the notes again based on our discussion at the next meeting, which is scheduled for May 29 th. We will discuss the revised notes and the e-mails from Bhalchandra, John Monninger, and Mohan concerning what issues, relative to the petitioners' requests for FitzPatrick, are addressed in GL 89-16 (e.g.,

prevention and mitigation of severe accidents).

Please provide your comments to myself and Bhalchandra by COB Friday May 2 5tb.

Thank you for your time, Andrea 2.206 Coordinator Andrea Russell Project Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR/DPR/PGCB Ph: 301-415-8553 c/,;q

10 CFR 2.206 PRB Closed Meeting Notes - 05117112

SUBJECT:

PETITIONER:

DATE:

GUNTER ET AL. 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK PLANT (G20120172) (TAC ME8189)

Paul Gunter, et al Mayjarch 9, 2012, the supplements dated March 13. and March 20,

2012, and Petitioners' Presentations to the PRB in the Public Meeting on April 17, 2012.

PRB MEMBERS & ADVISORS Samson Lee Bhalchandra Vaidya Anthony Ulses Robert Dennig Robert Fretz John Monninger Andrea Russell Kim MorganButler Brice Bickett Mathew Jennerich Lawrence Doerflein Carrie Safford Ryan Eul Catherine Scott (PRB Chair - Deputy Director, NRR, Division of Risk Assessment)

(Petition Manager - NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)

(Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Reactor Systems Branch)

(Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Containment and Ventilation Branch)

(Senior Project Manager - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, Projects Management Branch)

(Associate Director - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate)

(Agency 2.206 Coordinator - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking)

(Branch Chief(A) - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Generic Communications Branch)

(Senior Project Manager - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)

(Project Engineer - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)

(Branch Chief - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety)

(Deputy Assistant General Counsel Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)

(Enforcement Specialist - Office of Enforcement)

(Assistant General Counsel - Materials Litigation and Enforcement -

Office of General Counsel)

SUMMARY

OF REQUEST:

On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter, et. al..

submitted a joint petition to the NRC, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.206, regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick).

The joint petitioners request that the FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system. The joint petitioners state that the risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.

The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Dalichi.

The joint petitioners request that the NRC take action to suspend the FitzPatrick operating license immediately until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed, reviewed, and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis:

1) Entergy Nuclear Operations' FitzPatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise known as "the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:

a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and; b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.

In the March 20, 2012, supplement to the petition, the joint petitioners state that the Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the enclosure as an "apparent beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability" involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.

To summarize the supplement, the joint petitioners state that:

The Commission's March 12, 2012, Order states that "Current regulatory requirement and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the US. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensed activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety." The Order further states, "While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exist with regard to the reliability of the vents."

The NRC inspection report identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" which is further identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existing 2

• 1 plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."

The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened vent OF&

does not address in a timely way the unique condition of FitzPatrick.

FitzPatrick uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result. FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program." Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident. The additional identified "vulnerability" and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.

BASIS FOR THE REQUEST:

As a basis for the request, the joint petitioners' state that in light of the multiple failures of the GE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in the days following the March 11, 2011, station black out event, the joint petitions seek the prompt and immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick operations because:

" The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression containment system is identified as inherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.

" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe accident mitigation is not a fully "hardened vent" system.

• The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon non-conservative and faulty assumptions.

" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground level.

The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses.

" The continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety.

" The identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of "no likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and are not reasonably justified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident.

IS THERE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: (If Yes, describe)

NO.

3

In its internal meeting on March 20, 2012, the PRB found that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public and therefore, denied the request for emergency enforcement action based on the following considerations:

1. The Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear event, concludes in its report dated July 12, 2011, that continued nuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense because of the low likelihood of an event beyond the design basis at a U.S. nuclear power plant and the current mitigation capabilities at those facilities; and,

2. On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050), This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. The order stated that:

Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dal-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR Mark It containments although as discussed above, Mark I1 containments are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments are needed to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.

The NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented in its Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered this information in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark I1 containments were safe to operate following the events at Fukushima. In addition, the NRC staff was cognizant of and reviewed the results of inspections performed under TI 183 at FitzPatrick (Report dated May 13, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. MLI 11330456) following the events at Fukushima. The regional staff has communicated with NTTF regarding the Vent system configuration at FiitzPatrick, including the differences from GL 89-16 recommendations (Larry Doerflein e-mail). The petition for emergency enforcement action provided no new additional information relating to the existing containment venting capability of the Fitzpatrick plant.

DOES IT MEET CRITERIA FOR REVIEW?

Criteria for Reviewing Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:

1.

The petition contains a request for enforcement-related action such as issuing an order modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, issuing a notice of violation, with or without a proposed civil penalty.

YES.

2.

The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified. The petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare essentials. The supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry, 4

I XqT ý-ý.

Formatted: Forit color: Red 5

3.

There is no NRC proceeding available in which the petitioner is or could be party and through which the petitioner's concerns could be addressed.

Y68,----tSf4-PaJIl. -hGoe

S aR NRC proseOcdig available. GR MaF 1 12, 2012, 1hc ISC oree Iie6e ef-Wd ia~frk~ Wit Marktainrncnts io have feliablaF dwerctios ppvided by the S*aff ReG.u.Fe.....,M ooran.duR,4 (. RM) to SECY 12 002-5-.

detallirg the r0l12b!G harcnd coRntmiscndert ioni. Tins prceedic g would fo1l2w, the-10 CFR 50.90 process, which Would pro-'ide.ppu*,,ity,' for p'blc.omm.n.s and theroforo, publi. prt ipatiop.

YES.

Criteria for Reiecting Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:

1. The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related action or fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or existence of safety concerns.

YES, in part.

2. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.

YES, in part.

On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark If containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012.

It cannot be stated with certainty that the NTTF, as well as, the JLD, while developing the Commission Order, performed a detailed review of the FitzPatrick's unique situation with respect to its refusal to perform the modifications recommended by GL 89-16.

3.

The request is to deny a license application or amendment.

NO.

4.

The request addresses deficiencies within existing NRC rules, NO.

IS THERE A NEED FOR OE. 01, 01G, or OGC INVOLVEMENT:

The petition does not contain any allegations of licensee or NRC staff wrongdoing. However, the PRB includes representatives from OE and OGC.

RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND SCHEDULE (Next Steps):

I Rjeot if the NRC staff dc'.*e'.octlno staff Av RIua;ticn0 to addfo&&-aA4fevl4a~iae

!R6 concIUS19nS 6

EanTonnt Vent

,Yct6 or not ac#..Pt if we find that the petitioner raics, issues that are.

ur.-ently being addressed in anothera,:coding, the Cemmnisien Order E"A 12 060. The Oder q~

d *ed Ge~n t ainpin

• t.tm e ini-o- D &A w -. 4 -204-6 i-o r w-th8 roAablfo haRdc-d-YGnt. Refer to the attachod table fqFe;46, Accept in part (see Table for explaination).

The next steps would be to:

Ensure management agrees with the PRB initial recommendation.

Inform the petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation.

Provide the second opportunity for the petitioners to address the PRB, and make the arrangements for an acceptable date and time.

7

I Table (This table summarizes each issue for the followin Specific rssue Raised hDoes thes c

Recommendation meet criteria for review under Z206 1 process?

FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended,e...

T-'- A eL in tn e "4"

ras the result of the undue risk to the public health and concluded that there is no immediate safely concern to safety presented by the operator's reliance on non-FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public, and conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the therefore, the request for immediate action should be analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing rejected. The Petitioners have not provided adequate ductwork containment vent system. The risks and basis for the their argument regarding the operator's uncertainty presented by FilzPatrick's assumptions and reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as that went into the analysis of the capability of associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health system and safety.

The petitioner's concerns regarding this issue do not require immediate shutdown of FitzPatrick based on the conclusions reached by NTTF and the Commission Order regarding Reliable Hardened Vent for the US GE Mark I BWRs.

U. S. plants have implemented 'beyond-design-basis" requirements such as ATWS, SBO, combustible gas control, aircraft impact assessment, mitigation of major fires or explosions, and extensive damage mitigation

\\

guidelines, thereby reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. A sequence of events like those occurring in the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur at US GE Mark I BWRs.

The NRC NTTF report on July 12, 2011, based on review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, made a recommendation to the Commission to include a reliable hardened vent system.

8

/

peSndecificl ssue Raised caenDoes thts Recommendation i

ed o

meet criteria adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the outside the scope of the 2.206 process and therefore, Fukushima Daiichi nulear accident, this request should be reiected, pursuant to Crtefon 1 u e for reecin a etition under 10 CFR 2.206.

The sountpensioner of ntse e opera qetin thlic Tiieresy be sineen efec suppor h eItionn pnigfinaltr esko lurtiors of apbicnst all enge ie t "ou then general. This is not an enforcement related action and is tadequacy a*

n at pre-existin g

contatinmet if cityde othe sod pe of the 2o206 process and therefore, vent which is not a fully hardened ventlineasThicharsolto has beno acivdteisushv remndstraed by NaCe n

euer 89-16. as tuch, this request should be resectedi pursuanp t to Criterion I theFitigate theseereor uniquely didents matukesh foraeiecting a petioon under 1.0 C.FR.2.206.

cin me noint pei tions d d not seek oinr r

estall that No.

Ths is merielyaion st oemn tha sort tha e pertdit nth rtighse kown ashe hardenued vperai nofte Masreqese by Orrd subnc hrof cnRstafreiewant evaluato (eite n50 that NRCGeeri ad e ftuacy andabityo as pexinstalle ontaneveryilty other s

ie inmo ccibcr 3acilitiesfor incagntc a sli s, the Get which os no w instart th ened ent US;eraol.o hird noa beenfaoirem ed nt the cstes d

ated Systemr ecommended by N

ne GLetter89.16.

as itisuoutsidehen reso ped o

the reomme nded b

s aGL 1 therefore, demostrtedto aveexpriened ultplefaiure tothis issues should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2 Io mitigatehesevernuclearaccidentat___________fo reiectin g a Petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

FitzPatrick shall p ublicy doc ngswt h fori n

lepnddnt Noe Thibe not in for., mtier raises i

at hactie anready been h

e reiew iont e pontiFue o ationm ranalysesnor the r eI

,ability t ecp of th.. s0f review and evalratn eoit, on th a

denv isa t

nom a "ule hardened ventlier as which b assoN TT reommendation*t 5, 1 ad 6.

h. as been a the. i ha:e NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other a

^f"""

' n,,,..,.,,

3,*,01,, fo i,,, s,,,

l-in,. !he-GE Mark I in the US; r~eliable hardened Go,"t.ainment Yeon!..

The SE dated Syt/ember 28, 1992.shows that FitzPatrick m.et he

.W.RO.G criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be relected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for re'ectin# a *etition under 10CFR 2.206.

FitzPatrick shall publicly document for independent N oYes.

, T

.,i-,

is no! an eR em n,. ate,.,

ac;-....

Os

,.,, i and capability of the FitzPatrick pre..xisting containment to

,.4,e,,e,

,,,,,,,1.,.... *,,,,;.,,.

vent system as previously identified as 'an acceptable he=,.,*

...,... °., ~

n

• n 6 deviatiofl"from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which*

basis ofNTF Recommendation 5.1 and 6....

t=oread: Wt Coor:

Red

-ecommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent

-- /

9

Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation meet criteria for review under2.206 System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September28,1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment ventng anr specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:

a) the FitzPatrick cost-beneft analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and; b) 'unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.

.,,,,eu~hr inquify and th~eref ore, !his reguect Ahu not be acceptod 4o rcview, ourouant to Criterin 2 ýfo n the,arch 20, 1,

to.............

,h......t....

the NeYes.

'.Th...jThe Temporary Instruction 25151183 provides the NRC inspection results in the

'Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the inspection report as an "apparent beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability"involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the OTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.

Fmn atted: Font colorRe br~OY44 eig basis.7cdn s e~snt a Gonsideratio 4u"f I

-Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and 6.

itP404c's Containment VWn System Wasrc6cv'ý I!The NRC inspection report foer TI-25 15/1 831 identifies T eVeI 10

Specific Issue Raised that FitzPatrick's 'existing plant capabilities' and 'current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting' which is further identified as a "current licensin basis vulnerabilit" The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's 'existing plant capabilities' as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that 'FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program.'

The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, N

2016, for installing the hardened vent Order does not address, in a timely way, the unique condition of the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant.

oes this 1 Recmmendation meet criIteri~a for review under 2 206 process?

aw-M

,.i,.,,a*rt~~f t t he tq im" of the issun respense to the GL 89 16 was also rceviewed and appmveid by !he NRC in September 1092, instoding the staf rvio ofthelicnse's roesse6 and Procedurs and ii.,spe,.ions. The NRC saf hvG uln

6t4ted, ewhil and icosh'g bsisv~inorbduyfr e d design bais/

acidc*nf"*ws not a consideration dukqn GL 891!6 Th eitigoner raises issues tht have already been the 3ibjes of 49C ta.f-frview and evalation* eiher n that; aciy otheF Similar ilitie of on agene*

i c Sbsis, fo^

-4 fký -oAI;;

facPility in qusioeln, pndi*Ang reL alidain~~l~'

of thel concusins f NTF ad te CmmisiP Ordcr. The Orde; on hardened containmen VePts (EA 12-050) phas a timeline of Qecomber: 31, 2015, fl)r 01instllq h Felile4hardened containment veRt. Therefore ti rciectifN apeiticn der 10 GFR 2.206.Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and 6.

Thisis mr*,ely a slt aFteent to supp The petitioner raises issues that have already beeg the pi geerll. TI-- -s nta frment r~elated aetiesubiect of NRC staff review, and is-oGtsideevalualion either on that facility, other similar 0.

formiatted: No underhoe L

Fma rdNn color.,

Red Formatted: Font colar:

Red

Specific Issue Raised Specific Issue Raised The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with 'a beyond design and licensin bases vulnerability, in that FitzPathck's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."

Does this IRecommendation meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?

cilities, or on a generic basis. for which a resolution has been achieved, the.-

e,*,q 4

6 F-m-at: Font color:

R*

]

p, eessissues have been resolved, and t he.he.

ormtt: Font color:

Red resolulion is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated Splember 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16,. Therefor Formatted; Fort color:

Red this reý issue should be rejected, pursuant to

7.

o

-or_

Criterion 42 for re'ectin a etition under 10 CFR 2.206,-

Foma

.. Fon color:

R r s e

t a d tpFormatted:

Font color:

Red SNo.

"r,,.

y a s..÷,.. 'talm o suoeTe petitioner gcnr~l Th~iznoton nfocomnt zl~cdFormatted: Font colo: Red raises issues that have already b~eeathe pe* P...

.,.=

____ ____an nopPPA Jtd iomttd ontcolor,_Re

,isubiect of NRC staff review.n

. Formatted:

Font color:

Red -

euleevaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis. for which a resolution been achieved, the.

pe,,,h,2....

.k?.2Formatted:

Fout colo: Red p.eeeissues have been resolved, and t e.e.h

, Font colo: R J

resolulion is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated Spiember 2B 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore..

Fo tt: Fon colo r Re d 7

this reWeissue should be reiected, pursuant to Formate Fot rolor:

Red No. Cleron 1Z for rejecting a ketition under 10 CFR 2.206.-

Rd No, Fitzpatrick's containment vent system was reviewed and firmt

"*-"r-c-o:

e approved by the NRC at the time of the issuance of the Facility Operating License in 1974. FitzPatic.k's response to the GL 89.16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving its positions with regards to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system meets the design bases and the design intent. Temporary Instruction Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of theli n

basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident.

Specific Issue Raised Doe this Recommendation meet criteria for review under 2.206 Proc 2515/183. "beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability [for beyond design basis accidents]"was not a consideration during GL 89-16 inspections, It is not mandatory on the Licensees to implement the Generic Letters.

The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in questionrPnding e validakR of the-Rc SNclzi gf P.UIF nd tMe Car isszies Ordcr. The n.ORd n hardenod Genteipment venis (EA 12 050) be

1. g t min --

f eeme 31, 2016, fer instlaling the relieble erdenc f

entinct vent.. The SE dated Sptember 28, 1992 shows lhat FitzPatrick met the B.WROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16., Therefore, this issue should be rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for r~eectin a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

The additional identified "vulnerability" and the N ý I

mwns.

we petitio in......,

remote and uncertain mitigation strateQy places the public

-1....

T. i net

,o,re ltced

.in end is.

health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the

• • t'ide the co of th

,20 p...... n

erefore, continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations

,,,.,OOQ, a 01i In (C*,

In during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.

Teptireshavo Rot previ;ded adequate basiG tor

-Ipe~i ola~e, a/

,raw.

dFoWcotor Text I

/

-xx

Specific Issue Raised L L A44-. &c pWR MARK i planis have iTTF mpRe d many 5a Iq as

,ontrol, airra mpact assessment, damage miiation guidelines, !herebyredcin th li!ctioc ofcor dmag a d r

-;adilgia rolases. A sequenec of evenis like thse oceurring iihe-Fukushimfa accident is 6nhikely !o occUr a44USGE Ma4 MWRS.Fhe, tha NFa nd The Commision Orer have conctdod that thefe is no immediatesfet coner toFiz~arik, r o te ealh ndsafetyof the p~bkie-_Acce t on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 15.1 and 6.

1 14

SUMMARY

(1)

The petition and the supplements do not include any new or additional information or facts that were not known to the NRC staff with respect to FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System.

(2)

Fitzpatrick's Containment Vent System was reviewed and approved by the NRC at the time of the issuance of the Facility Operating License in 1974. FitzPatrick response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections.

The NRC staff evaluation had stated while approving its positions with regards to GL 16, that FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System meets the design intent. It is not mandatory on the Licensees to implement Generic Letters.

(3)

After the issuance of the Facility Operating License, the NRC has conducted its regular and necessary inspections and assessments of the licensee's performance, The Commission has not found it necessary to issue any generic communications, based on the industry operating experience, or the plant specific communications, based on the licensee's performance, to require any changes to the design and operating requirements of the Containment Vent System. The plant continues to meet all the requirements with respect to the regulations and the licensing bases, including those with respect to the design basis accidents and natural phenomena. Fukushima events have been characterized as "Beyond Design Basis Accidents." The design and operating requirements for "Beyond Design Basis Accidents" for Containment Vent System are being addressed through the Commission-Issued Order.

(4---

r, "

Obes w

" yta e--oaff sp9cGfl'aly GOR-6,....

and d(oelborately avaluated the FitzPatrick sp1ifif-he disigtu Vent System and the licensee's peSitien with respect to GL 89

• 1*,

hen NTTF and the CommGissrion Odrer for the Reliable Vont System, conc-n-ded thAt "Current ragulatop' requirem.nts and cxisting plan cEapabilities allow !the NRC tococnlude that a sequence of-events such as the Vukushtmp aai is

..ide-s tu-n e-S-Therefore, cntinued operatio n

d licensing acti,;Itiec doanet-pece-an imm nnt threa i heath and safety." Therefore, the NRC staff needs to deve!op the taff evaluatian to address. and revalidal' the

...c.usEn..

t t4gmF-e

!4he Ceammiccien Order for Fitpatrick plant specific, situation With respect to 'Ie ontainment VOnW rystem.

Peitioners'concernth Daema rF 2016fr implem entalIn o

Af the C "Mmissa Orde r i tea far in the fu'ture. l beu4 ~

j theGO IR stf dvlee testf evalu ation to address and reveli date the Gond~usionep"at "_ FP and-the Co0-MmisAo Or-der fo FPtzparick plant specififc sit'uaion wit-h-respet to its contaimt vent system. For

.. ampl;* Thle petitinrer raises issues that have already been to suject Of NRC Staff-review and evaluation either enR that facility, ether simZilar facilities, Or (An a genric bsis1 for whichi a resolution has boon achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the FGGeluli0n is applicable to the fasil4y &R queetinRpendigre Levfiidet'en ef the9 conclusiens of NT.TF and the Cn.mission Order. Ther.fore. this issue should be reieGt6d, pu-6UcaP-to Cr..itrion 2..r rei..tine a petitio under 2-01 CF 2.2 6.H.......,...

n be net aEG"t~id fW dcde tM0 petitiGone raisesissues theat are currently being9 addressed in another praoeeding. The OrdeFr O hardened containment v-nts (E-A Q00i hrc a timolinp of Decemher 31. 2016. for installina the reolabl; hardeRAd-

_,ont a iimervent-Theretre,...this-issue-should-not-be-.aosepted p

-review;--pnusuant--

,The petitioner' bases and jurtitioa! ns for m*any the statements and claims in the petition and it nupplOmOntS, aro not sloa; However, they are not euftisiont to warrant further inquiry, or arc not-on enforAA cme.nt rotoF-9 oion and are outside the seope of the-16