ML13016A210

Safety Evaluation for Humboldt Bay, Unit 3, New EP Rule Exemption

ML13016A210
Person / Time
Site:	Humboldt Bay
Issue date:	11/05/2014
From:	NRC/FSME
To:
Hickman J
Shared Package
ML13016A197	List: ML13016A202 ML13016A210
References
Download: ML13016A210 (20)

Text

SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE RELATED TO HUMBOLT BAY POWER PLANT, UNIT 3 EXEMPTION REQUEST FOR PORTIONS OF 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX E, AND 10 CFR 50.47 DOCKET NO. 50-133

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On November 23, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Final Rule amending certain emergency planning (EP) requirements in the regulations that govern domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities (76 Federal Register (FR) 72560). The Final EP Rule was effective on December 23, 2011, with specific implementation dates for each of the rule changes.

Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3 was issued an operating license on August 28, 1962.

On July 2, 1976, HBPP Unit 3 was shut down for annual refueling and to conduct seismic modifications. In 1983, updated economic analyses indicated that restarting HBPP Unit 3 would probably not be cost-effective, and in June 1983, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E),

the HBPP licensee, announced its intention to decommission the unit. On July 16, 1985, the NRC issued Amendment No. 19 to the HBPP Unit 3 Operating License (Reference 1) to change the status to possess-but-not-operate, and the plant was placed into a SAFSTOR1 status.

On December 15, 2003, PG&E submitted a license application (Reference 2) to the NRC in accordance with Part 72 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) to construct and operate an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) on the HBPP site. This application included an ISFSI Emergency Plan. On November 17, 2005, the NRC issued a site-specific Materials License No. SNM-2514 to PG&E for an ISFSI at the HBPP site (Reference 3.)

The staff concluded that the Humboldt Bay ISFSI Emergency Plan met the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 72.32(a).

On December 14, 2007, PG&E requested NRC prior approval of a proposed Emergency Plan that consolidates the existing HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan and the existing Humboldt Bay ISFSI Emergency Plan into a single plan that will be called the Humboldt Bay Site Emergency Plan (Reference 4). This request was approved in letter dated August 27, 2008 (Reference 5).

1 SAFSTOR is a method of decommissioning in which a nuclear facility is placed and maintained in a condition that allows the facility to be safely stored and subsequently decontaminated (deferred decontamination) to levels that permit release for unrestricted use.

Enclosure

On August 14, 2012, PG&E submitted a letter, Request for Exemption from Specific 10 CFR 50 Requirements Regarding Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations (Reference 7), requesting exemption from specific emergency planning requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 for the HBPP facility.

PG&E has determined that this exemption request and its impact on the corresponding HBPP Site Emergency Plan is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12. Thus HBPP's intent in submitting this exemption request is to maintain the current regulatory structure prior to the Final EP Rule and, therefore, does not propose any changes to the HBPP Site Emergency Plan or implementing procedures other than simple regulatory reference changes that can be implemented under 10 CFR 50.54(q).

2.0 DISCUSSION The NRC upgraded its EP regulations on November 3, 1980 by publishing a Final Rule (45 FR 55402) amending the EP requirements for production and utilization facilities. By letter dated April 13, 1981 (Reference 8), PG&E stated that it believed that its existing Emergency Plan was adequate for the plant conditions at that time and if the decision was made in the future to resume operation of the unit, it would revise the Emergency Plan at that time.

By memorandum dated November 13, 1981 (Reference 9), the NRC staff responded to an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board inquiry with regard to the EP status of HBPP Unit 3 and concluded that it was unnecessary for HBPP Unit 3 to upgrade its emergency response capability as long as the plant remained in a shutdown condition.

On April 4, 1985, PG&E submitted the proposed HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan, Revision 0, SAFSTOR, (Reference 10) describing the emergency facilities, organization control of emergencies, and corrective actions that would be carried out in the event of an emergency at HBPP Unit 3 during the SAFSTOR period.

The NRC approved the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR on April 29, 1987 (Reference 11). The Safety Evaluation (SE) documenting this approval established the emergency planning requirements for HBPP Unit 3. Although PG&E did not specifically request an exemption from the emergency planning requirements when it submitted the changes to its emergency plan, the staffs approval of the emergency plan granted a de facto exemption from offsite emergency preparedness requirements.

The HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR eliminated formal offsite emergency planning requirements for HBPP Unit 3, based on the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor and the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures.

Since issuance of the approval and SE for the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR, HBPP has not requested nor received substantive exemptions from emergency planning requirements.

By letter dated December 14, 2007 (Reference 4), HBPP submitted an application to consolidate the existing HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR and the ISFSI Emergency

Plan into a single plan for Commission approval. The requested changes consolidated and revised the existing emergency plans to reflect the reduced radiological hazards that result from relocation of spent nuclear fuel assemblies and fuel fragment containers from the HBPP Unit 3 spent fuel pool to the ISFSI. These changes included elimination of emergency action levels specific to the spent nuclear fuel stored in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool, changes to the minimum emergency response organization staffing and reducing the number of annual drills from two per year to one.

By letter dated August 27, 2008 (Reference 5), the NRC staff found that the PG&E proposed changes met the applicable standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 72.32(a), and the applicable requirements in Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50, and the HBPP Site Emergency Plan, as changed, would continue to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the HBPP facility.

The NRC issued Amendment No. 43 to HBPP Unit 3 Facility Operating License No. DPR-7, on June 16, 2008 (Reference 12.) Amendment No. 43 eliminated security plan requirements from the 10 CFR Part 50 licensed site for the period after the spent nuclear fuel was transferred to the 10 CFR Part 72 licensed ISFSI. The spent fuel transfer was completed on December 11, 2008 (Reference 6). Therefore, PG&E is no longer required to comply with 10 CFR Part 73 security requirements for HBPP Unit 3. Many aspects of the Final EP Rule deal with emergency planning as a result of a security event. PG&E has completed a review of the Final EP Rule with regard to the current license basis, i.e. with no security plan, and has concluded that most of the Final EP Rule requirements are not applicable to HBPP Unit 3. The intent in submitting this exemption request is to maintain the current 10 CFR Part 50 license basis that was in place prior to promulgation of the Final EP Rule. The EP program at the HBPP site met the EP requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 that were in effect before December 23, 2011, subject to any license amendments or exemptions modifying the EP requirements for the licensee. Thus, compliance with the EP requirements in effect before the effective date of the Final EP Rule demonstrated reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures could be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

With the Final EP Rule, several requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 were modified or added, including changes in Section 50.47, Section 50.54, and Appendix E. Specific implementation dates were provided for each EP rule change, varying from the effective date of the Final EP Rule through December 31, 2015. The NRC determined that implementation of the Final EP Rule was not necessary to ensure continued adequate protection of public health and safety, and common defense and security (76 FR 72563). The final rule codified certain voluntary protective measures contained in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events, and generically applicable requirements similar to those previously imposed by Commission Orders.

In addition, the Final EP Rule amended other licensee emergency plan requirements to: (1) enhance the ability of licensees in preparing and in taking certain protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency; (2) address, in part, security issues identified after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001; (3) clarify regulations to effect consistent emergency plan implementation among licensees; and (4) modify certain EP requirements to be more effective and efficient. However, the Final EP Rule was only an enhancement to the NRCs regulations and was not necessary for adequate protection. On page 72563 of the Federal Register notice for the Final EP Rule, the Commission determined that the existing regulatory structure

ensures adequate protection of public health and safety and common defense and security.

3.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, Specific Exemptions, PG&E has requested an exemption from certain Final EP Rule requirements in Section 50.47, Section 50.54, and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, many of which concern offsite emergency preparedness. In 1995, the Commission provided its view on offsite emergency and evacuation planning for an ISFSI not at a reactor site in its Statement of Considerations for the Final Rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and monitored retrievable storage facilities (MRSs) (60 FR 32430; June 22, 1995). The Commission stated, [T]he offsite consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not warrant establishing Emergency Planning Zones (60 FR at 32435) and, The Commission does not agree that as a general matter emergency plans for an ISFSI must include evacuation planning (60 FR at 32439).

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) special circumstances are present. The staff reviewed this request to determine whether the specific exemptions should be granted.

4.1 Specific Exemptions from 10 CFR 50.47 HBPPs letter dated August 14, 2012, requested an exemption from 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) (as indicated below by strike through) for the HBPP facility. Additionally, the 2011 Final EP Rule changed the regulations in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Although, the changes were not identified by PG&E as requested exemptions, the basis for the 1987 exemption has not changed and is the same basis for PG&Es current exemption request; therefore the staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the new requirements as identified below:

(4.1.1) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3)

(3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensees Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified.

An exemption from offsite EP requirements was previously granted for the HBPP Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR on April 29, 1987. The 2011 Final EP Rule changed the regulation by removing the term near site from 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). The fact that an Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) need not be near the site does not change the licensees current exemption from the underlying requirement to have an EOF because the basis for the exemption has not changed. Therefore, the staff concludes that PG&E continues to be exempt from the requirement that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensees Emergency Operations Facility have been made, of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).

(4.1.2) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4)

(4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

The NRC previously granted the licensees request for an exemption from the requirement: and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) with the approval of the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR on April 29, 1987. Therefore, the staff concludes that PG&E continues to be exempt from the requirement that and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

(4.1.3) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)

(10) A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. [1987 exemption]

Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed. [1987 exemption]

HBPP Unit 3 was shutdown prior to the upgrade in the 1980 Final EP Rule and was not required to implement these upgraded regulations; therefore HBPP Unit 3 did not have formal offsite emergency planning. In 1987, the NRC approved the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR which eliminated the 1980 Final EP Rules offsite emergency planning requirements.

This approval exempted PG&E from 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) in its entirety and concluded that the licensees proposal to discontinue offsite emergency planning activities and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning was acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences associated with the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor.

The staff determined that no credible events would result in doses to the public beyond the owner controlled area boundary that would exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Therefore, Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) beyond the owner controlled area and the associated protective actions developed from evacuation time estimates (ETE) were no longer required. Additionally, the staff concluded that the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR provided for an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at the HBPP facility in its shutdown and defueled condition, and also provided reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the HBPP facility.

The 2011 Final EP Rule changed the regulation by adding the requirements, Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis, to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). These requirements to

develop and update an ETE are offsite activities and the NRC granted PG&E an exemption from offsite emergency planning activities in 1987. Because the basis for the 1987 exemption has not changed and is the same basis for PG&Es current exemption request, the staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the new requirements, Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis, of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and continues to be exempt from the remainder of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).

4.2 Specific Exemptions for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV PG&Es letter dated August 14, 2012 requested an exemption from certain sections of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E (as indicated by strike through) for the HBPP Site.

(4.2.1) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1

1. The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e.,

organization for coping with radiological emergencies, assessment actions, activation of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, recovery, and onsite protective actions during hostile action. In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license under this part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) or combined license under 10 CFR Part 52, shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in

§ 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards.

The HBPP ISFSI Physical Security Plan maintains compliance with Security Orders and 10 CFR 73.55 requirements as applicable. The HBPP Unit 3 site was granted exemptions from 10 CFR 50.54(p) and from 10 CFR Part 73 on June 16, 2008.

In the Final EP Rule to amend certain emergency planning requirements for 10 CFR Part 50, the Commission also added the definition of "hostile action" as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel. This definition is based on the definition of "hostile action" provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02. The NRC excluded non-power reactors from the definition of "hostile action" at that time because non-power reactors are not nuclear power plants, and a regulatory basis had not been developed to support the inclusion of non-power reactors in that definition. Further analysis and stakeholder interactions would be needed prior to including non-power reactors in the definition of "hostile action.

Likewise, an ISFSI is not a nuclear power plant. The staff also considered the similarity between the HBPP site and a non-power reactor to determine whether the HBPP site should be included within the definition of hostile action. Non-power reactors pose lower radiological risks to the public from accidents than do power reactors because: (1) the core radionuclide inventories are lower as a result of their lower power levels and often shorter operating cycle lengths; and (2) non-power reactors have lower decay heat associated with a lower risk of core melt and fission product release in a loss-of-coolant accident. The HBPP site also has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. This fact formed part of the basis for PG&E 1987 exemptions from offsite EP

requirements. Additionally, NRC Bulletin 2005-02 was not applicable to nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that all fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel. Therefore, the staff concludes that the HBPP site is also excluded from the definition of hostile action.

Because the HBPP site does fall within the definition of hostile action in Appendix E of Part 50, the NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement: and onsite protective actions during hostile action of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, section IV.1 for the HBPP site, based on the analysis provided in this section. The remaining requirements applicable to a 10 CFR Part 50 licensee apply to PG&E.

(4.2.2) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2

2. This nuclear power reactor license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the NRC.

The NRC previously approved the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR, which eliminated offsite emergency planning for HBPP Unit 3, based on the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor and the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. The requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2 involves ETEs, an element of offsite emergency planning. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2 for the HBPP site, based on the analysis in this section and the justification provided in Section 4.1.3 above.

(4.2.3) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.3

3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall use NRC approved evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the formulation of protective action recommendations and shall provide the ETEs and ETE updates to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.3 for the HBPP site, based on the justification provided in Section 4.2.2.

(4.2.4) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4

4. Within 365 days of the later of the date of the availability of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau or December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall develop an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it under

§ 50.4 to the NRC. These licensees shall submit this ETE analysis to the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4 for the HBPP site, based on the justification provided in Section 4.2.2.

(4.2.5) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.5

5. During the years between decennial censuses, nuclear power reactor licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and State/local government population data, if available. These licensees shall maintain these estimates so that they are available for NRC inspection during the period between decennial censuses and shall submit these estimates to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.5 for the HBPP site, based on the justification provided in Section 4.2.2.

(4.2.6) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.6

6. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the nuclear power reactor licensee's currently NRC approved or updated ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the NRC under § 50.4 no later than 365 days after the licensee's determination that the criteria for updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.6 for the HBPP site, based on the justification provided in Section 4.2.2.

(4.2.7) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7

7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, and a description of the assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, including hostile action at the site. For purposes of this appendix, hostile action is defined as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that include the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force.

The staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to amend its emergency plan by June 23, 2014, to: (1) include a description of the assistance expected from appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, beyond the information already contained in BRPs emergency plan to meet the requirement of Appendix E,Section IV.A.7 as of December 22,

2011; and (2) identify and describe the assistance expected from appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with hostile action at the site, as hostile action is defined in Appendix E,Section IV.A.7. The NRC grants the first exemption because requiring PG&E to provide a description of the assistance expected from appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, in light of the low risk of an emergency necessitating offsite assistance and the information already provided by HBPP in its emergency plan, is an unnecessary burden on the licensee. The NRC grants the second exemption because, as explained in Section 4.2.1 above, PG&E is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to a hostile action.

(4.2.8) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9

9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not assigned responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of their assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan?

In the proposed rule to amend certain emergency planning requirements for 10 CFR Part 50 (74 FR 23254; May 18, 2009), the NRC asked for public comment on whether the NRC should add a requirement for non-power reactor licensees to perform a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel can perform all assigned emergency plan implementation functions in a timely manner without having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from performing their emergency plan functions. The NRC received several comments that opposed a regulation imposing this requirement. The NRC agreed that this requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees. Staffing at non-power reactors is generally small, which is commensurate with the need to operate the facility in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. Therefore, the NRC did not include this requirement in the Final EP Rule.

The staff considered the similarity between the staffing levels at ISFSIs like the HBPP site and staffing levels at non-power reactors. The design of the ISFSI provides radiation shielding and contains internal airflow paths that allow decay heat from the spent fuel contents to be removed by natural air circulation around the canister wall. This passive design requires monitoring by minimal staff, which is commensurate with operating the ISFSI in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. In the Final EP Rule, the NRC agreed that the staffing analysis requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees due to the small staffing levels required to operate the facility. For the same reason, the staff concludes that the HBPP site is also excluded from performing the staffing analysis.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9 for the HBPP site, based on the analysis provided in this section.

(4.2.9) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.1

1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other

Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or licensee and State and local governmental authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis.

The NRC previously approved the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR, which eliminated offsite emergency planning for HBPP Unit 3, based on the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor and the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. The requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.1 for protective measures outside the site boundary and for offsite monitoring involve elements of offsite emergency planning. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that PG&E continues to be exempt from the requirements: and outside and and offsite of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.1 for the HBPP site, based on the analysis in this section and the justification provided in Section 4.1.3 above.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement: By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant. of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.1 for the HBPP site based on the justification provided in Sections 4.2.1.

(4.2.10) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.2

2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees shall establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. Licensees shall not construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt to restore plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an emergency action level that has been exceeded. Licensees shall not construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.

Because ISFSIs have a low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures, and based on the NRC staffs reviews of previous versions of the Humboldt Bay Emergency Plan, the staff concludes that the Humboldt Bay Site Emergency Plan, as of August 27, 2008, provided: (1) an adequate basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness: and (2) in conjunction with arrangements made with offsite response agencies, provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Humboldt Bay facility. Thus,

granting the requested exemption from the requirement in Appendix E,Section IV.C.2, to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes and promptly declare an emergency condition, which was not a requirement as of December 22, 2011, would not change these conclusions.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is only exempt from the requirements: By June 20, 2012, within 15 minutes and to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.C.2, because the HBPP Site Emergency Plan that was approved by the NRC provided that the licensee was committed to notifying the appropriate offsite response organizations within one hour after the licensee declares an emergency at the HBPP site. The remaining requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.2 are applicable to the HBPP site.

(4.2.11) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3

3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first reactor at the site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public with the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

The design objective of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and notification capability will range from immediate alerting and notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and notification system. The alerting and notification capability shall additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15 minute design objective for the primary prompt public alert and notification system. When there is a decision to activate the alert and notification system, the appropriate governmental authorities will determine whether to activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public alert and notification system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities.

The NRC previously approved the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR, which eliminated formal offsite emergency planning requirements for HBPP, based on the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor and the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. There were no credible events that would result in doses to the public beyond the owner controlled area boundary that

would exceed the EPA PAGs. Therefore, EPZs beyond the owner controlled area and the associated protective actions are no longer required. The staff concluded that the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR provided for an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at the HBPP facility in its shutdown and defueled condition, and also provided reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the HBPP facility. Additionally, the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR that was approved by the NRC, provided that the licensee was committed to notifying the appropriate offsite response organizations within one hour after the licensee declares an emergency at the HBPP site. As noted above, the NRC previously granted the licensees request for an exemption from offsite planning requirements with the approval of the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR on April 29, 1987 Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the HBPP site is exempt from the requirement: within 15 minutes and continues to be exempt from the requirement: The licensee shall demonstrate that the appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first reactor at the site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public with the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and notification capability will range from immediate alerting and notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and notification system. The alerting and notification capability shall additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15 minute design objective for the primary prompt public alert and notification system. When there is a decision to activate the alert and notification system, the appropriate governmental authorities will determine whether to activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public alert and notification system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. The remaining requirements are applicable.

(4.2.12) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i)

8. a. (i) a licensee onsite technical support center and an emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be exercised during an emergency; The NRC previously approved the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR, which eliminated formal offsite emergency planning requirements for the HBPP site. This approval exempted PG&E from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, onsite technical support center and a licensee near-site emergency operations facility for the reasons

provided in section 4.1.1 above. The NRC staff concludes that the HBPP site continues to be exempt only from the requirement: onsite technical support center and an emergency operation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.E.8.a.(i). The remaining requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.E.8.a.(i) are applicable to the HBPP site.

(4.2.13) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(ii)

(ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite operational support center; The 2011 Final EP Rule changed the provision by adding the requirement, For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite operational support center, to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.

NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, (Reference 14) provides that the operational support center (OSC) is an onsite area separate from the control room and the Technical Support Center (TSC) where licensee operations support personnel will assemble in an emergency. The OSC should provide a location where plant logistic support can be coordinated during an emergency and restrict control room access to those support personnel specifically requested by the shift supervisor.

With the current decommissioning status of the HBPP site and the storage of the spent nuclear fuel in the ISFSI, an OSC is no longer required to meet its original purpose of an assembly area for plant logistical support during an emergency. Therefore, the NRC concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.E.8.a.(ii).

(4.2.14) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.b.

b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, either a facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s). An emergency operations facility may serve more than one nuclear power reactor site. A licensee desiring to locate an emergency operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site shall request prior Commission approval by submitting an application for an amendment to its license.

For an emergency operations facility located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and offsite responders can interact face-to-face with emergency response personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site. Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the emergency operations facility must include the following:

(1) Space for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State, and local responders; (2) Additional space for conducting briefings with emergency response personnel; (3) Communication with other licensee and offsite emergency response facilities;

(4) Access to plant data and radiological information; and (5) Access to copying equipment and office supplies; The NRC previously approved the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR, which eliminated offsite emergency planning for the HBPP site. This approval exempted PG&E from the requirement to have a licensee EOF for the reasons provided in section 4.1.1 above.

Therefore the NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.b. to have an EOF (4.2.15) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.c.

c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, a facility having the following capabilities:

(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves; (2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves; and (3) The capability to support response to events occurring simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the emergency operations facility serves more than one site; and The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.c. because, as explained in 4.1.1 above, PG&E is exempt from the requirement to have an EOF.

(4.2.16) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.d.

d. For nuclear power reactor licensees, an alternative facility (or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively having the following characteristics: the capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action. The requirements in this paragraph 8.d must be implemented no later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the capability for staging emergency response organization personnel at the alternative facility (or facilities) and the capability for communications with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security, which must be implemented no later than June 20, 2012.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.d, because as explained in Section 4.2.1. above, PG&E is exempt from the requirements in Appendix E related to hostile action.

(4.2.17) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.e.

e. A licensee shall not be subject to the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this section for an existing emergency operations facility approved as of December 23, 2011; The NRC staff concludes that the HBPP site is exempt from the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.e, because, as explained in 4.1.1 above, PG&E is exempt from the requirement to have an EOF.

(4.2.18) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.

a. A full participation exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in a full participation exercise required by this paragraph 2.a.

The 2011 Final EP Rule revised Section IV.F.2.a to require nuclear power reactor licensees to submit scenarios for their onsite biennial exercises under 10 CFR 50.4. This requirement was revised to enable the NRC to verify that licensees would implement in their exercise scenarios the requirements of Appendix E, Sections IV.F.2.i and IV.F.2.j, including hostile action and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of responders.

In 1987, the NRC approved the HBPP Unit 3 Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR, which eliminated formal offsite emergency planning requirements. This approval exempted PG&E from the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a to conduct full participation exercises. PG&E continues to be exempt from A full participation exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located, in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. In granting this exemption, the NRC relied on the factors and conclusions discussed in section 4.2.1 above.

Because PG&E does not have to conduct full participation exercises, it does not need to comply with the requirement that the exercise scenarios for those full participation exercises need to be submitted to the NRC. Based on these reasons and the analysis in section 4.2.1, the staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement, Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in a full participation exercise required by this paragraph 2.a, in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.

(4.2.19) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.b.

b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a subsequent exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this paragraph 2.b. The exercise may be included in the full participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of this section. In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary to ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained during the interval between biennial exercises by conducting drills, including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency response include activities such as management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, event classification, notification of offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite and offsite impact of radiological releases, protective action recommendation development, protective action decision making, plant system repair and mitigative action implementation. During these drills, activation of all of the licensee's emergency response facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) would not be necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the onsite exercise training objectives.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement: Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this paragraph 2.b. An exemption from offsite EP requirements was previously granted for the HBPP Emergency Plan for SAFSTOR on April 29, 1987. Therefore, PG&E continues to be exempt from the requirements: and offsite and (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F.2.b. Further information is provided in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.18 above.

(4.2.20) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.i.

i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios for nuclear power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile action. Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate must emphasize coordination among onsite and offsite response organizations.

In the Statement of Considerations for the Final EP Rule (76 FR 72589), the NRC discussed the addition of a new Section IV.F.2.i to Appendix E to require all nuclear power reactor licensees to include hostile action in biennial evaluated exercises. The final rule also ensures that scenarios will be sufficiently varied by requiring the use of a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events to properly train responders to respond to events more realistic than those currently used in training, and to avoid preconditioning the responders to success with inappropriate anticipatory responses.

In the Final EP Rule, the NRC identified this requirement as specific for power reactor licensees.

The staff considered the similarity between the HBPP site and a non-power reactor for the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. Unlike nuclear power plants, ISFSIs have a low risk of a radiological release or a wide spectrum of events.

As explained in sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.1, the NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to offsite emergency planning activities and a hostile action, respectively. Therefore, the staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement, Such scenarios for nuclear power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile action, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.i.

(4.2.21) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section F.2.j.

j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by nuclear power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to implement the principal functional areas of emergency response identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each exercise must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific to emergency response duties in the control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint information center. Additionally, in each eight calendar year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees shall vary the content of scenarios during exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to the following scenario elements: hostile action directed at the plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public protective actions, an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, implementation of strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under § 50.54(hh)(2), and integration of offsite resources with onsite response. The licensee shall maintain a record of exercises conducted during each eight year exercise cycle that documents the content of scenarios used to comply with the requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee shall conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no later than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a site will begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile action exercise is conducted. For a site licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the initial exercise required by Section IV.F.2.a.

In the Statement of Considerations for the Final EP Rule (76 FR 72589), the NRC discussed the addition of a new Section IV.F.2.j to Appendix E to require all nuclear power reactor licensees to provide an opportunity for the emergency response organization (ERO) to demonstrate proficiency in response to a wide spectrum of scenarios, including a hostile action and a loss of large areas of the plant due to fire or explosion. It further provides that the ERO must demonstrate key skills specific to emergency response duties in the control room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), EOF and joint information center.

In the Final EP Rule, the NRC identified this requirement as specific for nuclear power reactor licensees. As explained above, the NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to a wide spectrum of events, offsite emergency planning activities and a hostile action. Additionally, with the current conditions of the site, where only the

ISFSI and its related support systems, structures, and components remain, there are no other facilities in which ERO personnel could demonstrate proficiency. Based on these reasons, the staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.j.

(4.2.22) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.I.

By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a range of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile action must be developed to ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform the functions of the licensees emergency plan.

The NRC staff concludes that PG&E is exempt from the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.I because, as explained in 4.2.1 above, the HBPP site is exempt from requirements in Appendix E related to hostile action.

4.3 Exemption Conclusions The NRC has found that PG&E meets the criteria for an exemption in § 50.12. The NRC has determined that granting the exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commissions regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.

As noted in Section 2.0, Discussion, above, PG&Es compliance with the EP requirements in effect before the effective date of the Final EP Rule demonstrated reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense and security. In this SE, the NRC staff explains that PG&Es implementation of the HBPP Site Emergency Plan, with the exemptions, will continue to provide this reasonable assurance of adequate protection.

Thus, granting the exemptions will not present an undue risk to public health or safety and is not inconsistent with the common defense and security.

For the Commission to grant an exemption, special circumstances must exist. Under

§ 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present when [a]pplication of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. These special circumstances exist here. The NRC has determined that PG&Es compliance with the regulations described in this SE is not necessary for the licensee to demonstrate that, under its emergency plan, there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Consequently, special circumstances are present because requiring PG&E to comply with the regulations that the staff describes in this SE is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the EP regulations.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC concludes that the licensees request for an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to10 CFR Part 50 as specified in the SE are acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences associated with the current plant status as permanently shut down and spent nuclear fuel is stored in an ISFSI.

The HBPP site exemption request has been reviewed against the acceptance criteria included in 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR 72.32 and Interim Staff Guidance -

16. The review considered the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor, and the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. These evaluations were supported by the previously documented licensee and staff accident analyses. The staff concludes that the current HBPP Site Emergency Plan provides: (1) an adequate basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness, and (2) in conjunction with arrangements made with offsite response agencies, reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the HBPP facility.

The NRC has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the exemptions described in the SE are authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest, and special circumstances are present.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Amendment of License No. DPR-7 to Possess-But-Operate Status, dated July 16, 1985 (ADAMS Legacy No. 8507260040).

2. Letter from Pacific Gas and Electric Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, License Application for Humboldt Bay Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, dated December 15, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML033640441).

3. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Issuance of Materials License No. SNM-2514 for the Humboldt Bay Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (TAC No. L23683), dated November 17, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML053220310).

4. Letter from Pacific Gas and Electric Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Proposed Emergency Plan Revision Requiring Prior NRC Approval, dated December 14, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073540069).

5. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Humbolt Bay Power Plant Unit 3 - Proposed Changes to the Emergency Plan (TAC No.

J00340), dated August 27, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082110367).

6. Letter from Pacific Gas and Electric Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Request for Rescission of NRC Orders EA-02-077 and EA-03-099, dated December 11, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML083657367).

7. Letter from Pacific Gas and Electric Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Request for Exemption from Specific 10 CFR 50 Requirements Regarding Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, dated August 14, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12236A327).

8. Letter from Pacific Gas and Electric Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Docket No. 50-133 License No. DPR-7, dated April 13, 1981 (ADAMS Legacy No.

8104210394).

9. Memorandum from B. Grimes to T. Novak, Emergency Preparedness Reuirements for Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3, dated November 13, 1981 (ADAMS Legacy No.

8112100610).

10. Letter from Pacific Gas and Electric Company to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Emergency Plan to Support Decommissioning and SAFSTOR, dated April 4, 1985 (ADAMS Legacy No. 8504190169).

11. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit No. 3 Decommissioning, Safety Evaluation Report, dated April 29, 1987 (ADAMS Legacy No. 8705060214).

12. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Humboldt Bay Unit 3 - Issuance of Amendment and Exemption from Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 73 Security Requirements (TAC No. J00337), dated June 16, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081060313).

13. Spent Fuel Project Office Interim Staff Guidance - 16, Emergency Planning, dated June 14, 2000. (ADAMS Accession No. ML003724570).

14. NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, dated February 1981(ADAMS Accession No. ML051390358).

Principal Contributors: Michael Norris Michael E. Rodriguez