ML12338A463

Official Exhibit - ENT000089-00-BD01 - Declaration of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld in Support of New England Coalition'S Motion for Reconsideration

ML12338A463
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	03/28/2012
From:	Hopenfeld J New England Coalition
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
RAS 22104, 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01
Download: ML12338A463 (15)

Text

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Official Hearing Exhibit ENT000089 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

In the Matter of: Submitted: March 28, 2012 (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3)

ASLBP #: 07-858-03-LR-BD01 Docket #: 05000247 l 05000286 Exhibit #: ENT000089-00-BD01 Identified: 10/15/2012 Admitted: 10/15/2012 Withdrawn:

Rejected: Stricken:

Other:

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the matter of -

ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE, LLC Docket No. 50-271-LR and ENTERY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. ASLB No.06-849-03-LR Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application DECLARATION OF DR. JORAM HOPENFELD IN SUPPORT OF NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

1. My name is Dr. Joram Hopenfeld. New England Coalition, Inc. ("NEC") has re1a:ined me as an expert witness in proceedings concerning the application of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. ("Entergy") to renew its operating license for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ("Vermont Yankee") for twenty years beyond the current expiration date of March 2 1,2012.

2. I am a mechanical engineer and I hold a doctorate in mechanical engineering. My

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curriculum vitae was attached to my first declaration in support ofNEC's Petition to Intervene, filed May 26, 2006.

3. I submit the following comments in support of New England Coalition's Motion For Reconsideration.

4. With one exception, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel ("ASLBP, "Board" or "Panel") decided to dismiss wholesale the technical issues that were raised by the New England Coalition during lengthy proceedings regarding Entergy's application for a

. twenty-year life extension of the VY nuclear power plant.

5. In rejecting the NEC's issues the Board ignored or dismissed, by and large, the technical data that was presented by NEC without the Board providing a valid technical rationale for doing so.

6. Conversely, the Board cited and relied on Entergy's statements which were not supported by data. For example, I have provided data showing that it takes 25-40 diameters for turbulent flow to become fully developed when entering a pipe. Without providing a supporting technical argument or data the ASLB accepted Entergy's unsupported position that four diameters is sufficient to attain a fully developed flow.(PID 46-47,Rebttal Dec1"Post Tr.779 at 13, Tr. 1124-1126 (Hopenfe1d)

Dr. Hopenfeld's concern that it was inappropriate to assume that the flow at the feedwater nozzles is fully developed has not been substantiated and instead has been fairly rebutted by the evidence presented by Mr. Stevens and Mr.

Fitzpatrick. Nor is there fair indication that Dr. Hopenfeld's other concerns are warranted {iiFindings, PID 49)

The Board's position disregards well-established hydraulic principles. (Tr.1125-1128)

(PID 123-124}

7. The ASLBP allowed very little time to NEC's witnesses to speak: or explain in comparison to the time allowed to Entergy and NRC Staff witnesses at the evidentiary hearings.

8. Ironically, one explanation provided by the ASLB for favoring Entergy's testimony was that the NEC witness did not provide sufficient information to the Board; while the Board chose to ignore information that I did provide.

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In the PID, the Board points to reliance on a Table in a standard text pointedly describing it as an "excerpt from a textbook" as if that settled the weight the data should be accorded.

Dr. Hopenfeld testified that it is unlikely that the flow in the VYNPS feedwater nozzle is fully developed because the upstream pipe has a straight section only 48 inches in length and a diameter of 9.7 inches, and this, according to an excerpt from a textbook,69 Dr. Hopenfeld says, is not sufficient for fully developed flow.

Id.; Hopenfeld Rebuttal Decl. Post Tr, 779, at 13; Tr. 8.11120-21 (Hopenfeld).

69 NEC Exh. NEC-JH_29, E.R.G. ECKHERT, HEAT AND MAss TRANSFER at 212, Fig. 8-9 (2d Ed.

1959).

PID,46 9 . . The ASLB questioned witnesses for Entergy, th~ NRC Staff, and NEC in a panel format; seating the witnesses in 'the jury box together. However, the conversation was largely limited to the ASLB and Entergy and NRC Staff witnesses.

10. Entergy and NRC Staffwitnesses were permitted to interject comment, speaking out and offering "clarification" in the form of lengthy testimony on technical issues under discussion. (E.g., Tr. 986,990, 1025, 1025, 1049, 1058, 1065, 1088, 1107 - Testimony of Stevens, Fitzpatrick, and F~)

NEC witnesses were not often permitted to offer countervailing views. In one instance when a critical technical issue was under discussion, rather than to interject I raised my hand just to shoulder height. I had observed Entergy's witness raising his hand from time to time and getting a positive response from the Board. Therefore, I thought it was a polite and acceptable signal that I would like to offer testimony on the subject which might "clarify" at least one point inNEC's view. Judge Richard E.Wardwell sharply told me, "From now on if! don't have a question for you, I'd like for you not to raise your hand. We're not in school here. Okay?" Tr. 1636-1638 3

DR. HOROWITZ: A little more complicated, 23 but essentially.

, 24 JUDGE WARDWELL: I've got to call you one 25 more time. Dr. Hopenfeld. From now on, ifl don't 1637 1 have a question for you, I'd like for you not to raise 2 your hand. We're not in school here. Okay? I don't 3 have a question, but go ahead.

4 DR. HOPENFELD: Well, I just wanted to 5 make a comment on the line - I wasn't telling you 6 anything different. Dr. Hausler has information, or 7 would like to comment about the completeness of my -

8 JUDGE WARDWELL: And I understand that, 9 and if I have a question for Dr. Hausler, I will ask 10 it. The reason I say that, Dr. Horowitz, is because-11 - I meari Dr. Hopenfeld 12 DR. HOPENFELD: I understand.

13 JUDGE-WARDWELL: -- is that we have the 14 pre-filed testimony. Some of the testimony is clearer 15 to understand than others. And it's not to say that 16 the amount of questioning is any relationship to the 17 weight ofthe testimony. It's all weighted equally, 18 and then evaluated in regards to its credibility. But 19 it may be just thathis testimony is clearer, so I 20 personally don't have questions.

21 DR. HOPENFELD: I apologize.

22 JUDGE WARDWELL: Well, I'll get it to when 23 I come down. I have a list of questions in regards to 24 velocity. Rather than trying to find it, I'd rather 25 go through mine in the order of things. Itwill take 1638 1 more time for me to find it than when we eventually 2 get to it.

He did not inquire further as to NEC's evaluation of the issue.

12. When, as NEC's witness, I was trying during the oral hearings to explain and provide technical* background to the Board, I was continuously interrupted; often not being pennitted to finish a simple sentence. I was certainly not prepared for the issues to be treated in this manner.

Open skepticism, conflicting expressions of opinion and rational data-reliant argument are nutritional necessities for solid science. I had presumed that fact finding in 4

an evidentiary hearing would pursue a similar course and one that was even-handed. That was not to be and I believe that as a result the Panel left the hearing with less than a whole picture of the issues.

13. The ASLB Panel was chaired by a legal expert, who shared the duties of inquiry with two members having a scientific and/or technical background. However, the issues in this case involve very specific and not broadly understood materials, mechanics, energy, and plant operations phenomena beyond the depth of most generalists. It appears now that the ASLB Panel in this case lacked the on board expertise to competently weigh conflicting testimony on all of the topics presented.

The transcript of the evidentiary hearings that were held in Vermont this past July and the Board decision, which relies heavily on the testimony presented in those hearings, clearly demonstrate that the Board lacks a fundamental understanding of the principles of safety risk assessment, material fatigue, material corrosion and nuclear plant instrumentation The ASLB's lack of rudimentary knowledge of these subjects is illustrated by several examples.

A. Cumulative Usage Factor, CUF. The, Board concluded that my "CUFen recalculations are unsound" because, the Board explains; ' ... the recalculations predict that the regulatory requirement would have been exceeded within 4.63 years after VYNPScommenced operations, and iUs obvious that this did not occur. Tr. At 1129-30" (Initial Decision, pages 56 and 57) Actually, a reading of the transcript finds that the discussion the Board refers to spans pages 1128 -1136. In the finding the Board says that it obvious that the regulatory requirement was not exceeded. But in the transcript it is 5

clear that Dr. Reed is of the opinion that a calculated CUF that is larger than unity is an indication that the component must fail and what is obvious to him is that there have been no failures.

JUDGE REED: Given that the plant has not 8 failed, that none of these nozzles has failed, how can 9 youjustify proposing that the CUFen numbers could 10 possibly be as large as what you propose?

11 DR HOPENFELD: How can I justify? All 12 this says, all these numbers say, and I think that's 13 what the ASME code, to the best of my understanding, 14 and what the guidance are, to say if you have -- and 15 I believe that Mr. Stevens talked about that too -- it 16 doesn't mean everything falls apart once that number 17 is about one. All it says, when you reach about one 18 you have got to do something. I cannot buy your 19 supposition --

20 JUDGE REED: Even if! accept your point, 21 that it doesn't fall apart, just major cracking 22 occurs, we have not seen major cracking in any of 23 these components in 30-something years of operation..

24 And yet your CUFens predict that they fail in periods 25 of time that would be substantially shorter than that.

1 Hence I have to infer that your 2 calculations are extremely excessively conservative.

Tr.l130-31 Based on the'above apparent misunderstanding of how the CUF is determined and what exceeding unity means, the Board concluded on page 56 of the PID, that:

"As was elicited in testimony during the hearing, Dr.Hopenfeld's recalculations predict that the regulatory requirement (i.e., unity) would have been exceeded within 4.63 years after the VYNPS commenced operations, and it is obvious to the Board that this did not occur. Tr. at 1129-30. "

In my opinion the Board erred in deciding that my'calculations lead to the conclusion that the regulatory requirements would have been exceeded within 4.63 years of the time in which VY commenced operations. No such number as 4.63 was elicited from me or any other expert witness. The numbers that I provided do not lend themselves to the Board's conclusion.

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The ASME code requires that calculated CUFs not exceed one. The two sets of CUF numbers I have provided were obtained by two different methods indicating only that the CUF would exceed some time during the 20 year life extension. In one method I have used the exact same CUF values provided by Entergy and corrected them only by using more appropriate oxygen concentrations.

Dr. Reed erroneously concluded that the NEC calculations are not valid because none of the NEC components with CUF larger than unity has failed. In fact the CUF is a convenient design criterion that incorporates safety factors because it is based on a formation of small crack (known as an engineering crack) and it is not based on running tests to failure. In fact, the license has reported the presence of such cracks in the lining of the nozzles in question. Both I and Mr. Stevens are in agreement that the fact that the calculated CUF exceed one does not mean that the components would fail. It only means that that it could potentially fail, Dr. Reed apparently does not agree with this concept.

The Board chose to ignore experts on both sides to come to its finding. From Dr. Reed's assertions regarding CUF as an indicator of failure, Dr. Ward's off-point questions during

, the hearings, and the findings in the Board decision it is apparent that the Board misunderstood what the CUP means and how it was defined.

I have explained to the Board that I do not know how to relate my CUP predictions (Pages 1128-1129) to the 4.63 years calculated by the Board. Since the ASLB dismissed my calcUlations on that basis it is necessary to establish the technical validity of how relating my results to the 4.63 years calculated by the Board. The Board should be required to provide a technical explanation how the above decision was reached given the 7

defInition of the CUF, the experimental data used to detennine the CUF and how one measures whether the regulatory requirements have been exceeded. (The Board did not specify what those requirements were, yet at the hearing Dr. Reed was referring to component failures) . .

In summary, the Board replaced my expert opinion on this subject, and that of the licensee's witness, Mr. Stevens, with their own assumptions, calculations, and conclusions which I believe are grossly in error reflecting almost a complete lack of understanding of fatigue technology.

It would greatly improve public confidence in NRC if the Board would provide a detailed technical rationale for substituting the own view of technical issues for that of technical experts, and to avoid couching their fmdings in technical vagaries.

C. CUFen and Metal Fatigue - The fatigue analysis of ilUc1ear power plant components is discussed in Comments on Proposed NRC Generic Communication Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2008-XX "Fatigue analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Components" May I, 2008, (attaChed as NEC Exhibit, Motion for

. Reconsideration JH_2).1 The document is authored by Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. and incorporates, with their own comments, the comments of four nuclear utilities.

Comment 3 states their understanding of the relative importance of one aspect which is associated with the application of Green's Function, i.e. the use of one stress component vs. the use of six stress components, in the context of ASME requirements:

1 This document was provided by Entergy in Disclosures on July 1, 2008; too late for inclusion in NEC's Prefiled Direct Testimony 8

ASME Code, Subsection NB, Sub article NB-3200 methodology is not prescriptive. As a result aU analyses performed using this methodology rely on the judgment of the analyst, including judgment on items such stress components, transient definitions, heat transfer coefficients, material properties, and other input parameters to ensure that the analysis results are appropriate and bounding for the intended application. In fact, the confirmatory analysis performed for one boiling water reactor feedwater nozzle referenced in the RIS uses many of the same judgments - judgments that have routinely been applied in CLB analyses for Classl. components throughout the industry.

Given the lack of specific requirements related to environmental fatigue assessment, any methodology may be non conservative if not correctly applied. Why is the single-stress analysis method singled out in the RIS. Has NRC reviewed all approaches used' to assess environmental effects and determined that aU other methods are always conservative?

I share Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.' s concern: why did the NRC ignore the uncertainties in the heat transfer, material and other inputs and focused attention only on the uncertainties in the stress analysis? Based on my observations during the two years prior to, and during the hearing the answer became apparent to me: the NRC reviewers were experts in stress analysis but did not have the required knowledge in other but equally important areas. Unlike NEC, neither the NRC Staff nor the Licensee presented any witnesses with credentials or experience qualifying them to give expert testimony on electrochemistry, mass transfer, heat transfer, and hydraulics. The NRC did not present experts in these areas for the ACRS review of the Vermont Yankee License Renewal Safety Evaluation Report, as well.

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From the testimonies provided at the hearing it is clear that the uncertainty in using one stress component vs. six component pales in importance in comparison to the uncertainties in heat transfer and oxygen inputs. In my opinion the uncertainty in oxygen input is at least 10 times more important than the number of components used in the Green's function as opposed to the number of component used in the conventional ASME analysis.

The Board chose, following on NRC Staff's example to focus only on one aspect which is associated with the application of Green's Function, i.e. the use of one stress component vs. the use of six stress components. Even though NEC provided data on heat transfer and oxygen which contradicted Entergy's and NRC mere unsupported statements the Boardchose to believe the NRC and Entergy as discussed below.

It appears that the ASLB copied and reinforced NRC's request for essentially disallowing the use of the Green's function without weighing the uncertainties of other parameters.

Since the issue whether Green's function should or should not be used was hardly debated at the hearing the Board has done disservice to both the Industry for imposing perhaps unnecessary financial burden and to the public for completely ignoring the essential and real technical issues associated with metal fatigue.

c. Heat Transfer. Entergy assumed that the heat transfer input to certain nozzles is uniform because the flow at the entrance to the nozzle is fully developed. This is a major non conservative oversimplification of the problem 10

It is a fundamental engineering fact, known for at least for 100 years, that it takes about 25-40 diameters for the flow at the entrance to a pipe to become fully developed. NEC provided data showing how the heat transfer would vary in the feedwater nozzle.

Entergy stated that it takes only 4 diameters to establish a fully developed flow without any supporting data. Yet, the ASLB accepted Entergy's position on the basis that their explanation, without providing any supporting data, was more "credible' than NEC's presentation. The Board did not provide a technical rational to support their decision.

.. D.Oxygen Effe~t .The equations for calculating fatigue factors were formulated in a laboratory under conditions where the parameters effecting fatigue were known. In the reactor environment during transients these conditionS, oxygen levels for example, are not known. This fact is commonly accepted by those researches that developed the fatigue equations. Only by using available data and known laws of physics one can asses .

the effects of these parameters. Entergy ignored the specifications provided by the developer of the fatigue equations, and consequently calculated low CUF values.

The ASLB, disrriissing all experimental data and the fact that oxygen solubility increases as the temperature decreases, agreed with Entergy, claiming without any proof that the oxygen during the transients is known at the surface of a given components. The ASLB apparently mistakenly believed, (PID page 37) .that the fact that VT performed daily measurements of oxygen for 13 years during steady state operations represents oxygen levels at the components surface during the transients where the temperature varies.

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Even though the specifications for calculating the FEN requires that the oxygen be used at OAPPM the Board accepted Mr. Fairs testimony (Page 37) that this was meant to be a default value. While this is a crucially important point, the Board did not question Mr.

Fair as to where It is specified as a default value in the relevant NUREGS 6909 and 6587 reports or from where Mr. Fair obtained his information. Nor did the Board inquire how one decides when default values should or should*not be used. Nor did the Board ask Mr.

'Fair to relate the steady oxygen measurements to the values that exceed them during the transients~ The fact that the recommendation to use 0.4 PPM is couched in permissive language (can) rather than prescriptive language (must) is not cause to dismiss. Since the guidance is not regulation, but rather a guide toward meeting regulation a more proper interpretation of "can" is that if industry uses 0.04 PPM, they need provide reviewers with no further justification than to invoke the guidance. If they pick some other concentration, then they must show analysis to support that choice will not result in a non-conservative outcome. The Board overrode the written prescription ofNUREGS 6909 and 6587 on how to calculate oxygen bya mere unsupported verbal statement of an NRC witness, Mr. Fair; The Board conclusion is fundamentally incorrect when it finds that "Entergy used actual DO data and otherwise demonstrated that its approach to this phenomenon is sound. "(PID 39)

As already stated above and in my testimony, plants do not perform actual DO measurements during the transients at the location of the component in question. There is no practical method of performing such measurements.

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E. CDF NEC claimed that the safety consequences of pipe failure from corrosion or

. formation of loose parts plant from the dryer must be studied in terms of Core Damage Frequency, CDF. Even though the concept of CDF is commonly used in all NRC safety studies and Commission papers, the ASLB members displayed no apparent familiarity with this concept. (Tr.1613-1621). This point is important because Entergy's witness

• repeatedly referred to how safe certain components are without quantifying their statements. When the decision makers are not aware that safety can be to some degree described in terms of the CDF it raises into question the technical quality of the entire hearing process.

F. Effect of Velocity on Corrosion. NEC provided experimentally derived data showing the sensitivity of flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) to velocity. The ASLB dismissed the data without providing rationale for doing so. By statiilg (Initial Decision, Page 146) that Bench marking is not required the Board accepted Entergy's witness testimony that FACis not very sensitive to flow velocity. The Board did not discuss why

.the data that was provided by NEC, showing a marked effect of velocity on FAC of steel

. in water was rejected. Nor did the Board discuss why, instead they relied on data of corrosion of copper in an acid which was cited by Entergy's witness. Apparently the ASLB has the mistaken impression that local velocities in a plant are known parameters.

G. In General- Were the assumptions of Entergy and the ALSB resulting Findings of Fact to be reviewed by a competent technical panel, it is in my profession opinion that they would not survive, without censure, a first reading:

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It is my opinion that if the ASLBP, and the NRC want to retain credibility in the field of nuclear review, the ASLBP should now re-open the record; contract independent expert consultants and with their assistance review the submissions and testimony on the record for completeness, credibility,and veracity within the acceptance criteria of the various relevant scientific and technical disciplines.

Advice It is my advice that, in order to recover scientific and technical integrity in these proceedings, NEC should, at the least, request that the ASLB or the Commission appoint an independent panel of competent technical experts to review the Board's technical rationale for rejecting the NEC contentions.

I, Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing DECLARATION OF DR. JORAM HOPENFELD IN SUPPORT OF NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is true and correct.

Signed in the original, Joram Hopenfeld Dr Joram Hopenfeld Executed this day of , 2008 at Rockville, Maryland.

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I, Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing DECLARATION OF DR. JORAMHOPENFELD IN SUPPORT OF NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is true and correct.

Dr, Joram Hopenfeld

. Executed this fifteenth day of December, 2008 at Rockville, Maryland.