ML12261A317
| ML12261A317 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/2012 |
| From: | Nicole Coleman, Nick Hilton NRC/OE |
| To: | |
| Coleman N | |
| References | |
| EA-12-152 EN-12-039 | |
| Download: ML12261A317 (2) | |
Text
September 17, 2012 EN 12-039 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation EA-12-152 Burlington, KS 66839 Docket Nos.: 50-482
Subject:
ISSUANCE OF FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION This is to inform the Commission that a Notice of Violation will be issued on or about September 21, 2012, to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (licensee) for a violation associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding identified during an inspection. This Yellow finding, an issue of substantial safety significance, involves the failure of the licensee to correctly implement maintenance that affected safety-related equipment in accordance with written procedures, between April 16 and 27, 2011.
The Notice of Violation is based on the licensees failure to meet Technical Specification 5.4.1(a), Procedures, which requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Appendix A, Section 9.a, specifies, in part, maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures. Although required by the work order, the licensee failed to install insulating sleeves on two splices associated with startup transformer B phase protective relay circuit, between April 16 and 27, 2011. On January 13, 2012, the startup transformer experienced a trip and lockout during a plant trip because the two uninsulated wires touched and provided a false high phase differential signal to the protective relaying circuit. The protective lockout caused prolonged loss of offsite power to all Train B equipment and all non-safety related buses.
The licensee was provided a choice letter on August 6, 2012; however, in a telephone conversation with Region IV, the licensee accepted the characterization of the risk significance of this finding, and declined the opportunity to discuss this issue in a Regulatory Conference and provide a written response.
It should be noted that the licensee has not been specifically informed of the enforcement action. The schedule of issuance and notification is:
Mailing of Final Significance Determination September 21, 2012 Telephone Notification of Licensee September 21, 2012 The State of Kansas will be notified.
CONTACTS: Nicole Coleman, OE, (301) 415-1048 Nick Hilton, OE, (301) 415-3055
Distribution: EN-12-039, September 17, 2012 OWFN OWFN TWFN EBB Regional Offices Chairman Mcfarlane EDO OCFO NMSS RI RII Comm. Svinicki DEDR OP CENTER RIII RIV Comm. Apostolakis DEDMRS FSME Comm. Magwood OE RES MAIL Comm. Ostendorff OGC ACRS ADAMS SECY NRR OIS OE staff OCA OI NSIR OPA OIG NRO OIP Electronic DISTRIBUTION:
R. Zimmerman, OE N. Hilton, OE N.Coleman, OE OE r/f EN binder X PUBLIC X NON-SENSITIVE ADAMS ML12261A317 OFFICE OE:ES OE:BC NAME N. Coleman G. Gulla DATE 9/13/2012 9/14/2012 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY