ML12235A807

SECY-78-319: Response to Request from the California Public Utilities Commission for a Determination of Acceptability of Siting an Lng Terminal within 5 Miles of an Existing Nuclear Power Plant

ML12235A807
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Issue date:	01/01/1978
From:	NRC/SECY
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SECY-78-319
Download: ML12235A807 (84)

Text

June 16, 1978 SECY-78-319 For:

From:

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Background:

COIVIMISSIONER ACTION The Commi ssi one rs Edson G. Case, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i\\

J L

lv tv,..,~,

f" Lee V. Gossick, Executive Directoi for Operations r

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FROM THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSIOtl FOR A 11 DETERMINATION OF ACCEPTABILITY" OF SITING AN LNG TERMINAL WITHIN 5 MILES OF AN EXISTING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Approval of a letter to Robert Batinovich, President of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).

1n*1975 West-rn LNG Associates filed an application with the State of California and the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to construct a tenninal for the receipt, storage, and handling of large quantities of liquefied natural gas.

The review of that application has prompted a request by the State for input from the Commission, as discussed below.

The hazards of LNG are the subject of considerable debate.

Responsibility for evaluation and regulation of LNG-related hazards are shared amongst several Federal Agencies.

A recent i nt:eragency task force report has been prepared entitled 11Draft Report of LNG Safety and Siting", which describes the division of authority amongst various government agencies, and outlines the histories of research into, and Congressional consideration of, LNG safety. It is included herein as Enclosure B.

By California law, the California Public Utili_ty Commission (CPUC) must decide by July 31, 1978, whether or not to issue a pennit for an LNG tenninal at one of several candidate sites selected t1y the California Coastal Cammi ssion.

Unless they can find that the decision would not be in the interests of public safety and welfare, they are further required to choose a site 4 miles south of Sa~ Onofre, or another 5 miles south of Diablo Canyon.

At either of these sites, the proposed LNG traffic w,:,ul d result in frequeflt LNG tanker transits off-shore under circumstances in which a major shipping acciden could be -::apable of engulfing the nuclear power plants i flammable gas.

Discussion: Reviews of the risks of LNG-related activities close to licensed reactors have been conducted by the NRC staff in two instances:

1)

In 1973 LNG importation proposals were made which would have* led to LNG tanker traffic on the Delaware River, pass*i ng about 2 km from Hope Creek and Sal em uni ts.

Al thc,ugh one LNG proposal has been withdrawn and the other is v'irtually assured of being disallowed, the Hope Creek issue is now in its second appeal.

2)

An LNG facility (Cove Point) has been constructed approxi-mate,.ly 4 km from the operating Calvert Cliffs facility.

NatU1:ral barriers effectively protect Calvert Cliffs from acci1:1ents at the.LNG facility, but the off-shore docking tenr1fnal is 5.6 km from the nearest Calvert Cliffs safety-rel a1ted structure.

We have negotiated with the Coast Guard to prevent closer approach by tanker traffic, and to assure constant tugboat assistance.

NRR has issued a Safety Evaluation on the Calvert Cliffs LNG matter that concluded that the risk, given extensive Goast Guard tontrols, is accei:ptably 1 ow.

However, a detailed LNG contingency pl an will also be required to be developed over the next several months.

In addition to our licensing reviews of the LNG activities near Calvert Cliffs and Hope Creek/Salem, the staff has provided comments on FPC's (now FERC) environmental impact statements on various proposals to construct LNG tenninals (including the Western LNG Associates Tenninal application now being reviewed by the State of California).

As is discussed at length in Enclosure 8, the Federal responsi-bilities are not well defined, and the regulations governing LNG facilities and traffic are still in various stages of development.

The staff's contact with the State of California began several years ago (Enclosure C provides relevant corres-pondence).

Throughout this period, staff and consultants for the State of California have contacted the NRC staff to advise us of the status of their reviews and to obtain pertinent background infonnation regarding our reviews and intE!rests.

The LNG Tenninal Act of 1977 requires the California Coastal Commission to identify and evaluate remote onshore sites for an LNG terminal and submit a final site ranking to the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) by May 31, 1978.

On January 31, the Coastal Commission voted to retain five proposed sites for study and ranking out of 82 which had been initially consi derE!d.

Those five sites listed in geographical order from North to South are: (a) Rattlesnake Canyon, San Luis Obispo County; (b) Point Conception, Santa Barbara County; (c) Las Varas, Santa Barbara County; (d) Deer Canyon, Ventura County; ( e) Horno Canyon, San Di ego County. Under the Act, the Goastal Commission will base its ranking of these sites

( and set appropriate.condi ti ans, if any, to apply to each site) based on the policies of the Coastal Act.

The Coastal Commission has recently submitted its report to the PUC.

The PUC must make a decision as to whether to issue such permit for an LNG terminal by July 31, 1978.

If a permit is issued, it must be for the first-ranked site, Horno Canyon, unless the PUC*detennines that there is an immediate need for-LNG ~,hich cannot be met by timely operation of the first-ranked site or that it is inconsistent with public health, safety and welfare.

In that event, the PUC may then issue a permit for a lower-ranked site if such approval can insure timely importation, distribution, and utilization of LNG.

The PUC must also accept the conditions recommended for each site by the Coastal Commission, subject to certain listed exceptions.

The LNG Tenninal Act required the Coastal Commission to hold formal public hearings in each of the counties where a proposed site is located.

These have been conducted.

The purpose of these hearings was to receive testimony on how the Commission should rank the sites and on appropriate tenns and conditions that might be imposed to mitigate adverse impacts on coastal resources. Testimony did not address the issue of whether or not an LNG terminal is needed or specific engineering requireme!nts which should be imposed to enhance public safety, which are matters within the jurisdiction of the PUC in separate proceedings.

While this* State's staff have been wel 1 aware of our concerns regarding LNG, the Coastal Commission's recom-mendation to the Public Utilities Commission ranked two sites ahead of the applicant's preferred Pt. Conception site. The first-ranked site, Horno Canyon, is roughly 4 miles south of the San Onofre site. The second-ranked site, Rattlesnake Canyon, is about 5 miles south of Diablo Canyon.

It is to be noted that none of the alternative sites for consideration by the CPUC possesses a natural harbor or protec:ted waters, a requirement not mentioned in the California LNG Siting Act of 1977.

The FERG is contesting the constitutionality of this Act, and believes the best site to b1e Oxnard, California, which is a port.

The Hornai Canyon site is on federal land, and DOD staff have indicated that they will not agree to its proposed use (Enclosure D).

The Rattlesnake Canyon site is by far in the most exposed waters, and would require immense off-:shore construction to build the terminal.

The LNG applicant is a corporation half of which is owned by PG&E; we understand that should Rattlesnake Canyon be issued a pennit for an LNG tenninal, PG&E may withdraw from the E!nterpri se.

In testimony at the Coastal Commission, San Luis Obispo, April 10, 1978 Western LNG Tenni nal Associates stated that Rattlesnake Canyon involves the most hazardous marine operations of any of the sites.

It was stated "unlike the other sites, it is not certain that even the construction of a breakwater will reduce the risk of marine accidents to an acceptable level".

In summa~f, regardless of the outcome of either the NRC or the CPUC consideration of this matter, construction of an LNG tenninal at either of the first two sites is doubtful.

The letter from Mr. Batinovich, President of the CPUC (Enclosure C) requested:

"an NRC cleterm1 nation as to the acceptab111 ty of locating an LNG facility within 4-5 miles of an existing nuclear generating station.

In the alternative, a clear set of specific NRC.guidelines for the 11:>cation of potentially hazardous facilities in proxirrl'i ty to nuclear reactors is sought."

The proposed response (Enclosure A), basically reiterates previous staff recommendations.

Namely: (1) a preference for an LNG site which is more removed from nuclear faci-lities than either Horno Canyon or Rattlesnake Canyon (2) a s;uggestion that if either of the two sites is selectieid, that the conditions of the license be set so as to minimize the risk to nuclear facilities and (3) a recognition that a:~1 evaluation (whose outcome is unclear) of the acceptability of continued operation of the nuclear facility will be required if ei tl1er of the two sites is selected.

The staff believes that an LNG tenninal within 4-5 miles of an existing nuclear generating station is acceptable.

However, the sh"ip traffic to and from the tenninal may pose an un-acceptable risk unless suitably controlled which (as noted earlier) is the issue on Calvert Cliffs, where actions to reduce the risk are inherently more feasible because of the protected waters and traffic restrictions of the bay.

The St,1te of California has funded extensive studies of ship traffic risks and ways to reduce the risk.

The NRC staff has received two reports on such studies which ctJPpear to indicate that LNG risks can be made very low if proper attention is given to various aspects of the,:ictivity.

The CPUC is empowered to set forth any necessary conditions, and the California - sponsored risk control studies are still underway.

Recommendation:

In view of the foregoing the staff has prepared the draft letter *in the form proposed and recommends it for the Chainnan*s signature.

Coordination:

The Office of the Executive Legal Director has no legal objection to this paper.

,e.f~\\as::hi ng D~ rector Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

A. Proposed Letter, Chairman Hendrie to President Batinovich, CPUC.

B. Draft Report of the Interagency Task Force on LNG Safety and Siting.

C. Correspondence between NRC and California on LNG.

o. Testimony of Camp Pendleton Officials.

Commissioners' commEmts should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by close of business Wednesday, June 28, 1978.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Jt1ne 22, 1978, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for,analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec. Dir. for Opers.

Regional Offices ACRS AS&LBP AS&LAP Secretariat

• Enc.1 osure A Proposed Letter,Chainnan Hendrie to President Batinovich, CPUC

DRAFT Mr. Robert Batinovich President, California Public Utilities Commission Sacramento, California

Dear Mr. Batinovich:

Thank you for your telephone call and letter of June 6, 1978 advising me of the status of your review of the Western LNG Terminal Associates application.

Your letter noted that the CPUC must decide on the siting question by tlul y 31, 1978.

The NRC staff has b1:,en aware of and commented on this application over a number of years.

They have repeatedly advanced the position that, as a matter o*f preference, LNG terminals and LNG shipping routes should be located some distance away from nuclear power reactor sites.

As you pointed out, the Coastal Commission has selected two sites, which are relatively cl osE~ to nuclear reactors, as the most preferred.

Si nee they are well aware of our concerns, their ranking implies a view on their part that the Horno Canyon and Rattlesnake Canyon sites are, or can be made acceptable - notwithstanding the presence of nearby nuclear facilities.

Your letter of June 15 stated:

11The CPUC request$ an NRC determination as to the acceptability of locating an LNG facility within 4-5 miles of an existing nuclear generating station, In the alternative, a clear set of specific NRC guidelines for the location of potentially haiardous facilities in proximity to nuclear reactors is sought. 11

Mr. Robert Batinovich We have, in considering this request, reviewed Mr. Denton's responses to the California Coastal Commission staff, which were partially quoted in your letter, and find that we are in general agreement with those responses.

We bel *ieve that the determination you request must be decided upon by co11sideration of the issue raised in Mr. Denton's 1 etter of April 12" 1978:

"The nearby presE~nce of an LNG terminal, even if that terminal were so designed and situated that it did not place a direct hazard to a nuclear plant, could bring with it the increased possibility of the close approach by LNG tankers or flammable gases rel ea_sed from these tankers.

Such a possibility would have to be considered in deciding whether or not the nuclear power plant could be operated safely without undue risk to the public.

11 Our staff believes that, in principle, it is feasible to design an LNG storage and gasification facility such that a severe acci-*

dent at that facility would not jeopardize the continued safety of a nuclear generatiri9 station four or five miles away.

However, we believe that LNG ta1riker traffic to and from the facility may constitute an unacceptable risk to nearby nuclear generating stations.

We understand that the State of California has con't:racted for studies to i den ti fy measure!> to reduce risks of LNG tanker accidents during transit or docking.

We would expect that these studies would also

Mr. Robert Batinovich identify measures that could, if implemented, result in reduced risks to a nuclear power plant in the general vicinity of LNG ship traffic.

The development and implementation of measures which could be shown to reduce the risk to ctieceptab ly 1 ow 1 evel s would nevertheless result in a residual risk not present at other sites.

More importantly, our reviews of the LNG traffic associated with the Cove Point termfnal,:rnd its pote_nti al impact on the Ca 1 vert Cliffs Nuclear Power Pl ant l1ave shown that measures to 1 imi t the risk from LNG traffic, while foasible, are difficult to establish and constitute burdens to the Coast Guard, our licensees and the operators of the LNG traffic.

We would anticipate very much greater difficulties in effect-ing appropriate safety measures in the open coastal waters of California, due to the larger volume of traffic and more hazardous maritime condi-tions, than in the Chesapeake Bay.

In the event either of the two highest ranked sites is selected by your Commission, it would be necessary to conduct an evaluation, whose out-come is unclear, of the acceptability of continued operation of the nuclear facility in question.

The burden of demonstrating adequate safety of the nuclear generating station would lie with the NRC licensee, while the Coast Guard and the owners and operators of the LNG tankers could bear much of the burden of implementing the appropriate safety measures.

Mr. Robert Batinovich In summary, we beliE~ve that an LNG facility located within 4-5 miles of an existing nuclear generating station will pose an added threat to the health and sa1fety of the public which must be mitigated and that such siting should not be penni tted if there are other sites which are also favoir'able from an overall environmental, economic and safety standpoint.

Should you decide to propose either Horne Canyon or Rattlesna~:e Canyon sites, we would urge that the permit include a condition that the pennittee develop measures with appropriate Federal and State agencies and the licensee of existing nuclear stations to,assure that the risk of an LNG accident will not jeopardize the continued safe operation of the existing nuclear station.

Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman

Enclosure B Draft Report of the Interagency Task Force on LNG Safety and Siting

z LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG)

FACILITY SAFETY & SITING (Dr-a.ft Re*port by the-subgroup of the-Federal Interagency Task Force-on LNG Imports-)

April 4, 1978 JRAFT

TABLE OF CO~TENTS Introduction

~. l Ba.ck ground Conclusions..

4-Discussion s

Federal Government 5

St.ate-and L,1::ica.l Gove-rnmerits

... *... * *... 1 6 Public Concern...............

• ....... *. 16.

Congre:ssic,na.l lnte:rests: **.**..***..... 16 lndus-try A c:tivitie-s LNGRe-se-a.rc:h.**.*****.***.***...* 17 Population Cri*:e-ria. for Siting. LNG Faccilitie-s

• *

• 2.6 LNC Liability *..*.

• * *.. *

• 3 5

~LIQCE'FIED NATURAL. GAS ( LNG)

FACIUTY SAFETY AND SITING Repor1~ by the-Subgroup of the-Fede-rat Interaeencv Task Force-on LNG lmoorts Th~ task of this sµbgroup was to assess dl a.&?ects. of safety relating to the-trans po rta.ti,, rr, s to rage-and handling o! LNG with the rr.aj or thruat focusing on na.fety and siting of LNG fa.cilities- &a they rela.te-to LN Gimport proje-cts.

The result.s of this effort a.rt" to b(" used in the-formulation c)! a. National LNG Import policy.

The-information cc,nta.ined in this report wa..s &as-embled by rE-pre-se-:it-a.tive-s of th~ Depa.r-tm~nt of Tra.nsporta.tion (DO Tl - Office-of thE""

Se-c ret.a.ry {OSTl, Ma.te-r-ials Transportation Bureau. {M TB), C ni ted SLate-s Cea.st Guard. (l'SCG): a.nd the-Department of Energy (DOE) -

O!!ice-or the-_ Secretary, Fede ra.l Ene-rgy Regula.to ry Commission (FERC), and the E:conomic Regula.Lory Administration (ERAl. ln

&ddit1on, the-services of two contractors-- were-used in the develop-ment o! information on LNG S.fety a.nd Siting-~ The-Arthur D. Littl~

rep-ort orr LNG Sa.(,*ty. d&ted Ja.nua.ry 1977, is included 3.S* Appendix l.

The-Ecology a.nd E:~1vironment~ Inc. (EE!) report on the-Sa.fety As*pe--cts of LNG Importation is. included as Appendix-2..

The group a;lso r-e-fe-rred to repor-ts. a.nd studies by the-Office-of Technology Assessment (OTA)., 1,eve-ral ata..tes., a.nd inforrna.tion resulting from public h"a..rings, arid meetings. with repre-senta.tive-s.. of industry and th~ public.

During-the-pa.st se-ve-ral yea.rs, "LNG Safety" has bee-r. of ma.jar concern to many governmer::t:.a.l. a.gencie-s, organizations, a.nd individuals.

The subject has been re-presented and publicized over the-full range from being technically sc)und and adequate to one-of horror and cornpletelr ina.d f' quate--.

This. revie....,_ a.ttemp*:s. to id~ntify the-bas.ic issues on the broad scope of LNG operations a.nd develop a.lte--rnati"ves to assist in the es tabli s hmen t olnot only a.. Nationill LNG Import program, but a.. uniform national a.pproa.ch to dealing with LNG safety and siting.

=

Background===

Within the-1.A&t few yea.rs, liquefied natur-a.l g<Ls--

( LNG) ha.a, become-a.n essential commodit*( impo ru.nt to the-ove-ra.11 energy needs 0£ the nation.

It ha.a:.. become indispensable in maintaining adequate supplies of na.tura.l gas: in many urban a.. rea.s. during. periods. of peak demand.

LNG technology is: ~::roven-and has a..18-yea.r history o! successful international ba.sel<~ad operations. with deliveries to countries such a.s Japan, England, France and It.a.Ly.

LNG technology in the U.S. for pea.kshaving. and satellite-operations has been successfully employed over the-la.at 12. ye;.. rs.

LNG peakshaving facilities were used extensively this past winter to help meet emergency needs..

I LNG has. a.. long history of 1afe: opera.tion with almost 2.0 yea:-s of international LNG tn.de-involving a.pproximate-ly 3,000 de-liv~rie-s since-the LNG Ta.nker "Methane-- Pioneer-" ma.de-the first trip in 1959.

There-ha.v~ been 15 LNG :ships i:-r operation since 196i logging half a million miles-without a ma.jor a.ccident or fa.ta.lity. ln the-U.S. ther-e-are nearly 100 LNG ba.s~load, pea.ksha.ving and satellite-facilities which have-more-than l million hour:;_ of sa.!e ope-ration. Several additional large-ba.seloac::

te-rmina..ls. for the-ntora.ge-and handling o( imported LNG iLre being con-structed or planned on the E;ast Coast. In a.ddition, other terminals a.r-e-being planned fort.he Gulf a.nd-West Coast.

Projecting the-growth of both pea.ks having: a.nd_ baseload !acilities, a.s..

we-11 a.s the-u.. tellii:e-- fa.c:ilities-, is-difficult in light of uncerta.in~ies in worldwide energy t~Conomics: today. However, a. continuing g l"OWth is expected over the 1,ext 10 yea.rs: with perhaps some-100 new facilitie-s being constructed. during_ this-period.

A great deal of concern exists concerning safety and location of these LNG f&cilities.

This is. particularly true with regard to LNG install-a.tions in urban a.n~a.s which have become *a. matter-of major concern to special interest g :roups, regulatory a.utho ritie s, and legislators.

LNG ca.n be a.nd i!,, being. transported,. handled, a.nd stored in a safe-manne:-.

It is ha..u.rdous m;a.te-ria.l, but treated a.~cordingly and handled in a res pons: :le-ma.nne-r, can be-s.a.!ely imported into the l". S. in large-quantities. Othe, more hazardous materials are-bein~ handled in the 1). S. on a. daily ba.si s, in aig.nificant qua.ntitie-s: in a. sa.!e-manner.

There-is currently a. la.ck 0£ uniformity in the e-xisting. criteria:. empl:oyed to a;sau.re an adequate!'" level of safety Lt the-la.crge-number o( LNC fa.cilities.~ The result is: some confusion on the-part of the-industry and regulate ry a..utho r'itiei; concerr:.ing: what safety measures &nd techniques hould be-- employed a.ta.. particula..r fa..cility a.nd consequently, the public very often tends to make unrea.sonable-demands. rega..rdin~ the-location and construction of new facilities.

At the-present ~ime-, the safety regulatory jurisdiction over LNG safety and s.iting of faciliti1~-s can involve-Federal, Stat@- and local a.ge-nci.es, depending on the pa.rticula.r location. The-approval process for a facility can ta.k~ over thre~ yea.rs. before-construction can start.

l

Conclusions The-involvement,=,£ ao ma.ny government a.gencie.s a.t a.ll level5, has; c:rea..ted a.. lengthy approval process involving 4-wide r&nge of regulatio:-:-s.

permits a.nd va.ric,us other-types ol approvals..

Specific-conclusic,ns, a.re, a.s follows:

1.

Fedei*al responsibility for safety of LNG facilities is not clearly defined. The DOE (E:RA a.nd FERC) and DOT (MTB and CG) are ea.ch exercising authority for safety.

Z..

No lcderal policy exists (or the-siting of LNG facilities:

with the-Federal position to the St.ates and local governmen:s being 1inclea. r.

3.

There* are no standard or uniform guidelines for risk a.na.lysis. in evaluating-LNG facility aite-locations.

4~

There has been no-composite eva.ba.tion of research work (done by industry, government, and individuals\\ on safety o:--

• risk a.issessment to determine-the best information a.pplicab:~

to a. na.tional policy.

Discussion-Th~ Federal, State!" a.nd local governments, the-public, Congress a.nd industry are all C<~ncer-ned a.nd h.a.ve-ea.ch taken-certain-a.ctions-in their respe-cti ve-ai:-eas.

'!he primary Fede~ra.r a.gencies,_ State-and local gover-nments and others that are-involved in th~ safety a.nd siting of LNG facilities a.re identifiec.

be-low with major,!Lctivities in each a.rea. listed.

Department of Transpot"tation Th~ Sf"'cr'"ta.ry has: the-overall safety regulatory responsibility over sue:-.

faciliti~s and has de-legated this to two operational elements, Materials Transporta.tion EhLreau., and the-United States Coast Cua.rd.

ThP* Of!ic~ of Pipe~line-Safety Operations (OPSO) of the Materials Tra.nsporta.t1on B\\lreau. is!Jued an advance Notice-- o! Proposed Ru.lemaki:-:;:

concerning safetr of LNG facilities on April 2.l, 19i7.

In o,d("'r to e-limi:~1ate-the-overlapping of, and ccn!'!icts bet\\1/een, the OPS:

re-gulations and foose-propoaed by the-Coast Guard, a.nd to assist the owners a.nd: oper2Ltor-s:. of LNG facilities which would be, subject to both Coast Guard a.nd OPSO regulation, L Memorandum of Understanding (Appf"ndix: 3) ha.s. '::>een negotiated a.nd aigned by the-two agencies.

Und~r the-Na.tura.l Ga.a, Pipeline-Sa.fety Ac.t of 1968, the Materials Trans po rta.tion E,u.reau. (M TB), through its Office of Pi pelin{,op~ra.tions.

adn~inistt-rs. safety r-egulations applicable-to pipeline facilities used in t:.:

transportation, ii,cluding storage, of LNG.

On('" exception to the-authority of MTB precludes-pre-scribing of the-location of any L.NC facility.

However-, the safety standards can be d~t~rminativei-of wher-e-an LNG facility can be located. For example, aa standa.rd requi i~ing minimum distances between a facility and private-::-

corr.mE-rcial re~i.denc~s or a standa.rd requidng location of. a. facility ~

a. s-ta.ble-land ma:1s. cou.ld e-Hectively preclude the loca~ion of a. facility i::

a.rea.s o! high po*~1ula.tion density or seismic activity. In short, the-MTE does ha.ve-the-a.u1:horHy to say where LNG facilities cannot be focated.

l't"'r!rnlin'! tfie-r,:;'re' dT d'i~ l"ec3'er"a.r Energy Regu!a.tory*Comffir'~/foh'Tnd,.

in the-c~se-of pu.rely intrastate-LNG facilities, the-appropriate* state-an.:

loca.l r~gula.tory bodie-s, to say ~ere-they can be located.

In the-case-of a.lrea.dy existing LNG !a.cilities, current a.tatutory:

~uthority allows-M *rB to pr-escribe-new operational a.nd maintena.nce-requirements, but i~ only allowed to impose-physical pla.nt modi!ica.tion requirements if !oti.:nd on a. case--by-ca.se-basis:. that~ fLcility "is-ha.za.rdous to life-or* property."

6 The-Office-of Pipeline-Safety Operations: (OPSO) in MTB has issued sa!et;*

1tandards for the-storage, handling a.nd transportation of LNG a.nd relatec

!a.c:ilities. in Part 192... 12. of 49 CFR, referencing the National. Fire Protecti:~

Association,. NFPA 59A 19iZ..

In addition, OPSO published a.n advance 1-btice-of Proposed Rulema.king, April 21, 1cn7, to prescribe new Federal sa.!ety atanda.rds for LNG

!ac:ilitie-s covering-the-design (including site *election). construction, operation a.nd ;mair1tena.nce. (Appendix 4)

The-notice-focuses on wha.t is set-n as the three-risks: &ssociat_ed with an LNG spill. Fiut, the-risk of thermal radiation.

Se-cond, the risk of a: natural gas cbuci emanating from a. apill. Third, the r-isk of a.

catastrophic spill c,( LNG which could impede-or over-whelm the containme::~

mea.sure-s.

The-- notic~ spe-ci!kally addresses the-need for (11 better im;,o*.indment a.ystems, (2.l stronger site-security, (3) diking a.round tra.nsier lines-,

(41 ae-para.tion distances between critical components, (5) pr-otection a-gainst seismic &nd other envir-onmental forces, (6) frequent plant ins-pe-ctions and m,:1nitor-ing, (7) procedures to qualify a.nd trir.in pe-rsonnel, (8) p:~ocedures to construct and operate the facility, (91 pla.nS!' Cor !ire-prevention and firefighting, a.nd (10\\ improved stora.ge-ta.nk design and t~nting.

Tht'- deadline-- for c:omments on the advance notice was December l, 1977.

The-comments re*::eived ha.ve-been det.1.iled and extensive--, a.nd we a.re now evaluating thE~* comments. DOT exp,ectS,. to issue a.. Notice of Propose:

Rulema~ing later 1:his year.

. The-U.S. Coast G,Jardu.nder the-Magnuson Act (50 USC 191) a.nd the-Ports and Waterw;a.ys Safety Act of 1972. (33 USC 12.21-7) has the responsibilit,~ for port safety. This ?'-esponsibil.ity applies to a.ny veasel.

bridge-or othe-r structures or a.ny land structure-or shore-area immediately a.dja.,: ent to these-waters.. The Coast Guard is undertaking has undertaken th*~ following actions th.at ca.n relate-to LNG:

l.

Contrc,ls. LNG ve*5sel traffic movements z..

Regulates desigrr and construction of LNG vessels

============::-

!. R:egula.te*s, unde-r-L~tter of Compliance P rogra.:n, safety of foreign J:.NG vessels. a.r-rivi.ng in U.S. ports.

4. Studying the-explosibility of la.r-ge-unconfined va.por-clouds

!or lique*fied ga.ses- (including. LNG).

5.

De-vefopi1~g standardized techniques. for-a.sses sme-nt: of hazar-ds. 1:lf cargo a pills (including LNG). This is being pe-rform,~d by Arthur D. Little, Inc. unde-r-Coa.st Cua.rd contract.

6. Studying-LNG fire-sa.!et;- (e.. g., fire-control a.nd e-xtingui!shment, structure-, a.nd ~rsonnel prote-ction1.

7.

Studying "rol1011e-r" in liquefied gas. tanks on 11e-ssels and as he, re- (including LNG).

8.

De-11e-loping safety regulations: for-terminal a.nd ?Ort facilitie-!i. !including L~Cl.

It is tht">- Coas_t Cua.d's_ position tha.t the-haza.rds a.ssociatec with each hazardous mate-rial should be-carefully evaluated and cons1s.tent regulatory*

a.c-tion tak~n -.uith d1.,;,e-- consideration to the-risks a..ssocia.ted wi:h ea.ch hazardous mat~ria.l. Coast Guard report - Views & Practices (Appendix 4'.

The-reguluing o( LNG 11essel movements, vessels and wa~er!ron~ facilities as a.n integral pa.rt c)! the-Coast Guard's ongoing. l-.a::ardous r.-:ate-ria.ls*

r~gulatory prog:-am, issues a. high level of safety of LNG :-:-,a:-ine-t:-a.ns-portation and facili*:ies,.

There-a.re-many h.a.::a.rdc,us ma.tena.ls, such as gasoline--, carried on ou..r-na.tion's waterways in much greater qua.:1tities than L:-:C and there* a.re-many h.a.:a.r-doua materials, such a.s anhydrous.

amonia., ethylen~ oxide, a.nd chlorine, which a.re-mo r-e dar:ge :-ous than LNG and yet a.re-being ca.r.ried eve-ry day on vessels-in the L':1ited States.

In fact, a. ca.se-coulci be-ma.de that liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), which is, carried in far gr1~a.ter quantities than LNG, is. more dangerous t:.a.n L~C.

lt is the-Coast Guard's-position th.a.t the haz.ards associated. with the carria.p*

of any hazardous ma.. t_e-riaL should be-car-efully evaluated and cons is-tent regula.tory actiG>n ta.ken in consideration of specifi.c and rela.ti11e r-isks.

a.s sociate-d ;a.:i th each hazardous material.

As. LNG imports in::rea.se, the Coast Guard has. been adjusti:1g and will continue-realigning: its. resources. to respond ir. a.n appropria~e manner to the-safety, se-curity a.nd envi ronmenta.l protection concerns.

• Since-1q7z: the-Coast Cua.rd has-been supervising. the importation o{ LNG through Boston Harbor to. t.'ie-Distrigas facility in Everett.. Massachusetts.

Currently, the-CoaH Guard is. preparing for the imminent a.tart of ope-ra.~::~s-a.t major-LNG facilities a.t Cove-Point, Maryland, orr Chesapeake Bay an-:-

on E:lba.. Island in Sa.va.nnah, Georgia.

Future-LNG facilities:. are plannec

!or the-Gulf a.nd Pac:i!ic Coasts.

With re-s.pect to the* mo.ve-ment of vessels., it is. Coa.s.t Guard policy that epeci!ic direction a~nd control should be exercised by local Coast Guard o!!icia.ls.- acting in.~cc:orda.nce, with general guidelines issue-d by the-Commanda.nt. lt i:s: belit-ved that local Coast Cua.rd 9Hicials, having det.1..ile-d knowledgt-of local port a.nd waterway configurations, hazards,.

vessel tra..f!ic cha:-,Lcteri s tics, cargo patterns, marine-practices a.nd customs, and environmental and economic matters. a.rea in the best position to dt-termi.ne what specific vessel traffic management actions a r~ a. pp ro p ria le--.

Coa.s t Guard District Commanders and Captains of the-Po rt regulate-L~;:

ve-sse-1 move-mt"nls a.nd oth~r tra.f!ic: unde-r the-authority of the Ports a.nc Wal"'r1,1,;ays Sa.fe-ty Act of l<?i?. (33 t:SC 1121-7;.

Unde-r 33 CFR Pa.rt 160, the-st!" local Coast Gua:r-d oHicials hav!" been de-legated authority to dire-c:

ve-sse-1 movements, to pr"'vent damage-and to control vessel tra.!fic in a..:-~.. s-de-tf"'rmine-d to be- *!,spe-cially ha.z.ardous, or-under conditions of reduced vi ai bili ty, adveru* wea. the-r, vessel congestion. or othe-r-hazardous c:ircums ta nee s.

Using: this, authority, Co1.st Gu.a.rd District Commanders a.nd Captains **

the-Port have-isa1J,ed 1.nd a.re-continuing-to issue orders and directions regulating: the movement of ves-sels carrying-LNG, LPG and other haz:a:-:ous m.ate-ria.ls:.

When these o rderS"" a.nd directions a.re, is sued on a continui:-:; *:,a.sie tht!'y a..r~ issued orily a.fter the-re-has been consultation with *state a.nd lc;.d governments and the-rep res enta tives of marine industry, po rt and ha:-:::-

a.utho ritie-s. envi *r*onmenta.l groups a.nd othe-r interested or a.!fected pa.:-:: ~s.

Among the possible* actions which local Coast Guard oHicia.ls might. ta,;._~

is the-e-s-tablish.m,ent of water or wa.ter!ront safety or-security %One-* -.;-:*.:.nd or nea.r the--vess~~l or !a.cility. This authority has been delegated to C:Ht.

Ciua.rd District. Cc>mma.nde-rs a.nd. Ca.pt.a.ins-of the Port under 33 CFR Farts. loS and lZi".

Other steps. which the-se-Coast Guard o££ic:ia.ls ma..y take to enhance-th!

aafety 0£ LNC or-LPG ve-s sel movements could include-, among others.

requiring the-ve-iue-1 to be* escorted; speci!yi.ng tug &ssistance-; restric::~g transits to periods* o( good 11isibility'; a.nd restricting other traffic dur::-:~.

the-movement of LNG vessels..

In addition to regul.a.ting the-vesae-1 tra!fic &.ssociiLted with the-movement of LNG, the-Coast Gua.rd regulate-s. the-LNG vesse-ls. themselve-s.

Acting-unde-r its Tanker Act authority (46 USC 39la.l and its D-.ngerous Cargo Act authority (46 USC 170) the-Coast Guard has. e-sta.blished a. Letter of Compliance- (LOC) program regulations governing-the-design, constructior:,

inspection and ope-n.. tion o{ LNG carriers.

The-LOC program ( 46 CFR Part 154\\ requires. thal the 0Y.:ne-r oC any foreign flag vessel transporting cert.a.in haz.ardous materials in bulk.

including_ LNG and LPG, into or out o{ United.Sta.tes ports must obta.irr a.uthoriz.ation Crom the-Coast Guard prior to issuing the-Lette-r of Compliar::~.

th~ Coast Guard reiviews the vessel plans by using criteria equivalent to thou** used in the ri!vieY.: of a. similar design for U.S. registry.

I Plan review is-con:side-red complete after plans, specifications, and inspection and test reports have-been found satisfactory and e-vi_dence-has bet"n r~C"'eiv!'d that the-ve-ssel has bee-n constructed in accordance with approv"d plans and mee--ts all other international standards.

Following plan revie-w, the-1/!*Ssel owner is notified that the-plan review has bee-n compl~t"d aryd that the-vessel,.a.-ill be-examined at its first U.S. port of ca.l:.

t.:pon arr-iva.l a.t th~~- first port o( ca.U in the-Cnited States, repre-senc.a.tives of tht"- Captain of the-- Port a.nd Officer in Charge-, Marine lnspe-ction will boarci the-ve ss e--1.

The boarding party examines the* vessel's arrangement and cargo systerr., including tanks, piping, machinery, and ala?"ms.

In addition, the-boarding: p.a.rty obs~rve~ the material condition of the* vessel.

vessel operation, cargo handling ope-rations, firefighting capability,.and peo-r-sonnel perforrr,;11..nce-_

Following sa.ti s!acto ry exa.mina tions, L Letter of Compliance will be-ia sue::.

For subsequent ve!isel a.n-iva.ls, the-COTP, in conjunction with the* OCMI, will make such rei~xamination a.she-considers necessary to insure-th.at th,-. vessel has. been maintained as initially examined.

This will be-in addition to the-regular biennial reexamination required for LOC renewal.

The-basic Coast Guard regulatory requirements for the-- design, constructi.:::

and testing of liqui!!ied gas-ships a.re-contained in Subchapter D, Rules and Regulations for Tank Vessels (spes;i!ica.lly 46 CFR Part 38 for lique-fied flarr.mab:;e gases\\ and the various other Subchapters under 46 C FR add res sing-marine safety.

These-regulations cover certification o( t:. S. ve-ssels ca.rrying li_:iuefied gases a.nd are-the ba.sis for review of foreign nag vessels prior to issuing Letters. of Compliance.

By utilizing the-same-set of requirements. for U.S. fia.g and_*foreign nag vessels for th~

cargo containment and transfer systems and related sa..Cety features, a consistent level o! safety is achieved.

The-Coast Guard ha~.. a.ssured a.nd wHl continue-to a.ssu.re the safest possible operation c1( LNG-ca.rrying vessels in U.. S.. wa.ters-.

To date-there-h.a..ve-been aev~~ral hundred ahipmenU of LNG. from Kena.i, Ala.ska.

to Japan a.nd several. from Lake-Charles-, Louisiana. to Britain; there-ba.ve-be-en many deEverie-s-to Boston a.nd Ne\\1,: York,. pluis L few bargl!!"-

trips: from Boston t1:1 New York. All were-ca.r:ried out successfully_

During calendar yea,r 19i6 Coast Guard COTP's reported l, 723 ma.rine-tra.ns!er operations involving 2., 388,000 tons of LPG and 46 ma.rine--

transf!'r operations involving 1, 335,000 tons of LNG without incident.

Department of Energy The-Federal Ene*rgy Regula.to ry Commission ( FERC), fo rme-rl y the-10 F"ede ra.l Power Commission (FPC), ha..s the* responsibility under the Na..t~:-~l Gas Act to approve,lpplica.tion.s for interstate Natural Gas facilities including LNG, and the-issuance o! a certific.te of public c:onvenience ~=-==-

nece-s si ty (economic:). Under the National Environmental Policy A ct the

.Frn.C is also r-es ponsi ble-for t.he-pre para tion of a.n environmental s taterr:e-:-::

!or each ne~ 'interstate-fa.cili ty proposed.

With the-pa.ssa.ge-- of th~ Department of E"nergy (DOE) Organization Act.::

1977, the-Federal Power Commission (FPC) had jurisdiction over the-s: :~

selection of LNG import facilities.

Under va.r-ious sections of the-Na.tu:-1.~

Gas Act (Sections 3 and 7) the FPC evaluated the proposed import fac:::::es-to a.ace-rtain whethe:r they met the general standard of being in the publi:

interest. The-FPC adopted as. a. minimum the various Department of Transportation (DO'!') regulations. associated with the design constructi::-:

and. operation o! the~se facilities, including the-ahipping, a.nd where it deemed appropriate~. imposed additional aa!ety requirements. t:nder t::!

National Environmeintal Policy Act (NEPA) 11n Environmental Impact Statement. 1EIS) is 1~equired for-o.ny major-federal action which could 1igni!icantly affect the-- environment. Since the approval of these projec:=

we-re-- deemed to be,l major federal action, ea.ch project has ha.d an ElS prepared. These :E:IS's include an assessment of the safety cha.racteris:::s.

The-DO£ organization Act transferred the-decision-ma.king authority Cc:

&ll impor~s &nq exports of natural gas-to the-Secretary of En.ergy.

The Se-cretary had delegated* this authority to the-Administrator of the* Eco:-::-'.":"'.ic Regulatory Administration (ERA).

This entire-approach to site-selec:i.::-: has been criticiz:ed since it was perceived to limit the sa!ety and aiting: re 1,:tw to only those loca.ti1::>ns-considered by the project sponsors, and their

• ~lection of potenti;a.l site-s. were-influenced primarily by economic-considerations-.

11

SUMMARY

OF FERC AND ERA DECISIONS ON SAFETY There-have been :four LNG import cases: decided by the FERC and ERA.

These cases, include Oistrigas. Corporation, Trunkline LNG Company, Pacific Indonesia LNG Company, and El Paso Algeria Com~any (El Paso I)

The following information summarizes the s,:,.f ety decisions for each of these,cases.

The safety decisions set down by.the DOE !or-Oistrigas Corporation are as follows:

l.

A system of low tem;,era ture detectors will be installed in appropriate ~ocation~ along the cryogenic transfer line to supplement existing transfer line surveillance.

2.

The pr~gram to study LNG storage tank vibra~ion will be continued.

As a result of this study, a co~~re-hensive report on the status, extent of the tests, a~d analysis of the remedies will be submitted to the Federal Energy Regu-lato:y Com.mission staff together: with f:;l:.01,,- 1..l?

reports..

l.

Any significant changes in the designr construction, or*operation procedures at the Everett Ter~inal will be submitted to the: Commission on a timely basis.

4.

The applicant will provide sufficient notitication t:o the-Com,i,issic rr concerning the nearing-to comp le~ion o.:

facility modific,a.~ions.

Moreover, before the new facility begins oper-atior,, the Commission staff will (l) have a final site-inspection conducted by the National Bureau of Sta!"tdards and (21 hold a technical conferenc~ with representat~ves of the applicant.

The Trunkline LNG decision enumerated.a series of safeg~a=ds that would be im?lemented in the design, construction, and opera.t.ion of the facility.

These cond.itions include:

I...

Trun,kli.iie shall increase the proposed deliverability of the five water ferry systems in order that both the fire hydrant loops system and the individual tank ~eluge sys~e~

would be* ab le to operate at maximur:i capacity in the event of arr emergency.

z.

Trunkline will provide a means of fire-fighting a potential LNG fi:::-e at the s-torage tank, dikes, a.nd dumps.

1.

Output of the emergency generator ~ill. be increased

• ~ that all. electric-powered detector devices, alarms, and fire fighting equipment at. the terminal should remain operative* in the e.vent of a power failure.

4~

Applicant will outline-procedures to b~ used to evacuate nearby are:as and suspend local highway and shipping:

traffic necessitiated by a major accident.

These procedures

'iii ill include ir:-....... ed i a tely notifying nearly inhabitants of any potentially danqerc1u.s situation that can arise-and mobilizing*

emergency personnel such as Civil Service, hospitals, police, and fire departmen t:s.

S.

Use of an interlocking safety system, similar to the one ~reposed for Consolidated Aluminum Corporation, will be provided for all other industries which may locate in the vicinity of the LNG plant and marine. terminal.

6.

Provide means to contain an LNG spill at the unloading dock t~ insure that a ruoture of an unloading arm on line ~ill not spill into the water.

Detailed dra~in;s of the LNG spill _cont~in~cnt systcrn will u~e known technolo~y nnd will b~ provided to the Commissio~ prior to the operation of. the terminal.

T.

After appn,val for operation, it w'as recor..rnended that the Co~ission require semiannual operational reports within 45 days. af te:r-each period ending December J l anc June 30 describing facility operations for the period covered particularly noting any abnorm~l operating expe~ience or behavior.

AbnorTnalities include rollover, geysering, cold spots on the b~nk, fires, equipment and piping failure, "nonscheaulcd mainte~ance or repair, rapid vaporizations, lZ vapor liquid releases, negative pressures within the storage tank, and higher th,~n predicted boil-off rates.

The technical information supplied by the applicant 5hould provide sufficient detail to a~low a complete unders~andi~g of these events. In the event that an abnorma.lity endangers the facility, the operating-personnel, or nearly residences or. industries, the Commission should bia* notified immediately.

8.

The capacity of the dike iu~rounding the proposed spoil disposal area for the dredging of the ~erthing area should be adequate to contain all spoils that aie deposited.

9-.

Steps should be taken to avoid the spilling of fuels, lubricants, pipe coating agents, and the harmful substances during construction and operation of the facility.

10*..

Any significant changes in f~l".:.lity design, construction, or c:perating philosophy sho1..:: d be repor~ed. to*

the FERC on a tim*~~ly basis..

11..

Trunkline should coordinate with the* U.S. Coast Guard prior to the operation of the terrni~al to investigate and establish further vessel traffic sa.fety procedures to be implemented during LNG tanker transit.

The Pac Indonesia cas~ had the following safety stipulations assigned. to it:

l~

An inspcc:tion and review system should be establishc:

modelled after the~ California Public Utility Comr.:ission proposal.

This system mandates that 90 days after approval of an application, the applicants must present detailed procedures and schedules for a "Final Safety Analysis Report." The inte!:r*:cnors wi.:11 be given 45 days to cor:-.:ncnt on this submission and can file their own safety proposal contemporaneously with the applicant's filing.

2-The inscection and review system wilL also provide for an ongoing ~evie~ of the design of the facility as well a& its cons~~uctidn*by an inspector and should include extensive quality control efforts.

The functions of an inspector could be perfor~ed by a governmental or private organization with the costs borne. by the applicants.

This syster.: would also include a means whereby interested parties=

can brinq the risk of potential hazards to the attention

.of an inspector.

Conflict between an inspector and the applicants 'will l:e. resolved by the Department of Energy.

3~

A further requirement of this decision included the use of underground storage tanks unles~ the applicant could make a showing that the original tank design was more advantageous.

4-~

Regardir:1g undersea piping facilities, the applican~E must show that the placement of these pipes will not be more beneficial than the design for which approval was requested.

5.

The safety system must include fire control water tcr all water,spr:L.ys* and high expansion foam units for a continuous 24-hour period after a maximum credible earthqua~:.

6.

Storage tanks must be lighted and well marked for air traffic.

13

In the El Paso East:ern Company decision the FERC set down the following conditions:

l.

El Paso should file all significant changes irr facilit..y designs, c,::mstruction, operations, or operating philosophy 'with thet Commission.

When final design plans are near completion anc: before hardware construction begins for the plant and terminal facilities, the Commission will be given* sufficient advance notice so that a technical conference may be held.

Z.

El Paso will file semiannual operational reports within 45 days ~fte(r December 31 and June 30 for each y~ar with the Co:r,:-:-iission.

These reports will describe facility operations noting any abnor~al operating experiences or beh~vior.

Ab~oc~~litics will includa rollover, cold spo~s, equiprn~nt failures, non-scheduled maintenance, rapid va?or-ization and ttceysering,~ vapor or liquid releases, negative pressures within the tanks, and higher-than-predict~d bcil-off rates.

!n the event that any abnormality is of su::icier.t magnitude to indicate*the possibility of damage to ~he facility or injury to operating personnel, the Com.~ission would be* notified irr.r:iediately.

3.

El Paso ~ill establish procedures to be utilized in the event of.an accident.. with the Coast Gua~d, Civil Defense, hospitals, rolice and fire departments.

These procedures will include im.":'ediate notification of* nearby inhabitants of any potentially da:,gerous-situation, the mobilization of local emerge~cy personnel, the evacuation of nearby areas, and the suspension of local highway and shipping traffic.

• Moreover, routes tc be used by emergency personnel to reach the LNG terminal, and evacuation routes, should be pla~ned and test driven.

All these procedures will be filed with the Commission, and El ?aso should tra\\n appropriate operating personnel t*o carry out these procedures.

l4

Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)

The-CEQ has. resp,:1nsibility under the-National Environmental Policy Act to review for adequacy the-- environmental impact sta.teme-nts prepa.r-ed by other Fede.rat agencies. (FPC in the-case- 0£ LNG projects)

In the LNG safety area., CEQ is primarily concerned with the lack- 0£ sound criteria..

15

!or siting LNG facilities. CEQ issued guidelines for the-development a.nd issuance-of environmental impact statement. It has &lso proposed an interagenc:y study c)f LNG safety with the-objectives of defining and a.ssessin; the risks-a.!!ociat,~:d with the LNG import program. This study would also provide a. basis for* sound decision-ma.king regarding terminal site-selecti:,::

and other question:; relating to ter-minals a.swell as LNG ~hip and barge-operations. Th~ CEQ proposed that those-agencies with a.n inter-est in L~G p.rovide funds,!or this study, however, most a.gencie s including OPSO anc.

USCG declined.

A special request was then ma.de by CEQ to OST ir. a letter-dated Ma.rel, 19, 1975. This request wa.s also declin!'d for la.ck of funds.

The-propo!;a.l for the study wa.s eventually dropped.

Jyta.ritime-Administration (MA RAD\\

MA RAD administers pr-ograms to a.id in the development, promotion, and ope-ration of the U.S. merchant ma.r-ine, including conducting resea:-d:

and development,Lctivities to improve the efficiency and eco:1omy of the merchant mari:1e-.

The MARAD cont:~a.cted with the National Burea.1.1 of Standa.rcs (?\\BS) for-

. a. study of LNG ini;u.lating materials.

E:nvironmental Protection Agency (E'P.A.)

EPA endeavors tc> a.bate and control pollution aystematica.lly, by integration of res,earch, monitoring, standard setting, a~d enforcement activities. EPA ha.:s completed a. study o! r-isk a.ssessr.1ent of s:orage and transportation of LNG and liquid petroleum gases.

General Accounting Office (GAO)

The GAO is lookii:i.g into the LNG safety question to -determine-if the safety issue has been adequately addressed.

GAO feels. that LNG will be the-- subject of Congressional hearings and legislation this year and wants to be in a position to provide information and assistance to Congress in these* efforts..

In December 1976, a study was initiated to cover LNG baselc)ad, peakshaving and satellite facilities as well as

t Liquid Petroleum-Gas, (LPG), &nd na.ptha~ lt is understood that the-primary emphasis will be-in the area. o! sa.gota.ge-.a.nd n&tur:a.l disa.ste-rs.

The-study is. completed and the draft report is currenUy under review.

State-a.nd Local Gc,vernment State-and municipc1,l governments have dra.wn up th~ir own safety codes a.nd ordinances, imposing a.dditional safety £ea.tu.res: for-spe-ci£ic facilities under their jurisdictions.

To da.te~ Massach.. Lsetts,, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island have a.dopted state safety standards for LNG facilities.

Rhode Island has a.ls:

adopted standards for siting. ln New York City, LNG facilities also require-the-approvals. of several agencies including the Boa.rd of Standa.:-:;

and Appeals, the-Department of Ports and Terminals, a.nd the New Yor~

16 Fi re Department. Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Califo :-nia. have pr=~: sed atanda.?"da for sititig.

Califor-nia has also proposed t1tanda.rds for safety.

Public Conc'er-n A great deal o( public concern with LNG safety has-been expressed th:-:*.;.{,

the-actions of both ele-cted and appoil'\\ted public o!!icials.

By pa.rticipa::::-:

in officially 1ponsc,red meetings of their own, public interest groups, o::.-.

local and national, have* influenced the news media.

To date, public concern for LNG facilities-has been expressed il.lmost exclusively by o:-

on behalf o! local <:,pposition groups whose members live* close-- to propcs~i LNG sites-. Major a.reas of concern &re-overall LNG safety, LNG safe-::

as,~ political iaau*e-, the credibility of the LNG industry, and the impo::-:...::ce-of safety relevant ta other issues. a.uch a.s pr-cpe.rty values and insuranc~

ra.te s.

Cong res siona.l Int~~rests

- The-Congress has shown a str-ong. interest in the safety and siting of L~~:

!a.cilitie-s. In,Novembe-r 1976 the Senate Committee on Commerce pre~.;.:-ed

~ "at.a.ff working F~ilper" on legislation for the siting_ and operation of L>:

facilities and for LNG accident liability. The purpose of this working pa.per was to deve:lop leg.islation to be-considered by* the 95th Congress.

To date-, no legisl.a.tion ha.s been introduced in the Senate.

Senators. Ma.gnusc,n and Hollings of th~ Senate Commerce Committee-b..a.,*e requested the Office-of Technology As se-s sment (OTA) to do a "state c: ::le science" study of LNG safety~

Senator Stevens has: of!ered a.n amendment to S. 682. (Tanker-Safety Act o! 1977) to indude-LNG ships. in the-provisions governing oil tanker aaf ety at.a.nda.rd s..

17 On J\\!ay 3, 19ii, Congressman Dingell introduced in th~ House-H. R. 6844,.

"Liquefied Natural Gas Facility Sa.!ety A ct", a. bill to regulate-the-siting, design, constructi.on, a.nd operation of facilities to be used fo i-the trans-portation, storage~. and conversion of lique-tied natural gas.

He-h.a..s also introduced t"i4'.0 additional bills on the-same subject (H. R. 11586 dated March 15, 1978, and H. R. 1162?. dated March 15, 1978).

Industry Activities The-- gas indus\\ry has recognized the apecial cha.ra.cteristics of LNG by making use of the-substantial *cryogenic. technology developed a.s pa.rt of thE" l'. S. space prc:ig nm and employing the-knowledge o( experienced a.nd qualified engineer:> and contractors. The industr1/2 through the 'American Gas Association (A.G. A.), h.a.s funded 1.nd sponsored LNG safety res ea re::

sine~ 1963 and cu1~rently, through the Gas Research Institute-. Since tha.t yt>ar almost_ 40 prc,grams involving se-vera.l million dollars ha.ve-been sponsored by the-industry.

In addition, other industry 11.ssociations ha.ve-sponsore-d substantial amounts-o! resea..rch into the potential hazards of LNG and required :;;..!e-ty features a.s. well as the development o! codes and standards th::-ough code-making organizations.

The-National Fire-Protection Associ.,uion (NFPAl h.a.s emerged as the* leader in the develop-ment of standards for LNG safety.

As :stated earlier in this r-eport, the, F~deral Governm~int (DOT) h.a.s adopted t.l-1e* N.FPA standa..rds in t..,.e Federa~

Regulations a.s an interim standard until a. review of LNG safety ca.n* be--

ma.de- &.nd comprehensive-standards c:n be developed.

The-- safety of LNG transportation and ato*rage-has: recently r-eceived a. lot of public' &ttentiori. Within the-last two months Congressional hearings ha.*.-~

been held, the CE1S television program "60 Minutes" has looked at the

• issut>s, and a.. number of provocative-a..rticles have appeared in national publications., Ac::idents-such a.s the L~C spill in Waverly, Tennessee a.nc tht> break-up oft.he oil tanker Amoco Cadiz. off the-coa.st of France have*

ra..ise-d further que*stions a.bout the-safety of transpor:tation o! large-quanti~:~s of da.nge-rous mate~riills such a.a_ LNG.

In spit~ of the* !act that the !irst (and only) ma.jor LNC spill occurred thirty yea.rs a.go, very little, is. known with certainty a.bout the-h.az.ards ?OHC

--~--------------,-

by the substance-. ln the decades since-, there-- ha.s. been-much spe-cula.ti:::

and a.. good dea.l of research-, but the-behavior o! a.. la.rge unconfined relea.!e is. still not well u.ride-ratood.

There-a.re-two primary rea.sons for the-lack of a.. conclusive-da.ta. ba.se-.

First, research has been unde-rtaken-for different purposes by the-gas industry, the-Fecleral Government, and academia.

No common set of assumptions or p1~edetermined baseline-- h.a.s-been used in most cases.

Consequently, a. 1,umber or mathematical models exist, each providing differing: predictic>ns a.bout wha..t will happen in the-case-of a spilt. Sec::::,

almol!tt a.11 of t}:le-work to date has been theoretical. The instrumenta..ti:::

and specialized t,~*sting: facilities needed !or scale e!fects experiments have-bee.n limited. While there-is abundant speculation about what mig.*.:

happen in the cas,~ of a spill, a.lmoat no ha.rd evidence exists to substa.:-.:-

ia.te a.ny of the th,e:ories.

As a. result, 11ubstantia.l uncertainty remains about:

(1)

LNG £i. res a.nd the-rma.t radiation.

( Z) va.po r cloud develop:-:- ~~t.

propagation, and ignition, llnd (3) detonation potential.

Today. th~ U.S. i~ in the process of ma.king a. considerable com mi tme-:

18 to the-importation of LNG. Many of the-most significant decisions. ha.*.~

already be-en made-or will be-made-in the-next couple of y~a.rs as the :-ajar import terminals &re-approved a.nd constn.icted. Thus. as. the-Cong re-s; ::inal Q((ice-o( T~chnol,::igy" Asse-ssment recently pointed out, "... it is-unl:*~ly that the-United St.. ues can afford the ti:ne and money to conduct enoug:-.

res"arch to resolve-the-differences {a.bout the conflicting predictions ::

LNG dynamicsl 1.nd come-to firm decisions. about the-safety a.nd beha..-::: :-

of LNG." Yet, it is vital that adeqUAtesta.ndards of :safety be determ:.:::: a.n=

adopted. This r,~quires the-immediate at.art of a. coordinated and well focused research effort.

The-objective-should be-to provide-useful information to s1..:Lpport current decision ma.king.

This means thAt a.ns*.:.~rs

& re-needed in terms. o! months rather-than years.

The-highest prio r-ity of the-research program should be to identify potentially da.nge:~ous-elements in the-overa.ll system and to describe ope-rational a.nd !ltructural 1pecifications that will minimize and mitip.:e the-h.a.~ard.

Thia: ca.n be done now despite the limited understanding c:

LNG.

As, a matt*~* of fact, over-a year ago in a study of LNG safety, :.::e Arthur D. Little Company (Appendix 1), found,

"... none of these-uncertainties is-e,ufficient to prevent a. reasonable-and adequa.te aasess:-::ent of the-safety,of LNG facilities-a.nd operations from presently being rr.1.:~."

At a minimum, c:onsideration should be given to: (l)* water and land transportation systems a.nd ope-rations, (2) major t~rmina.Land sma.::~.

• to rage !acilitieis design a.nd operation, (3) possibUities for human e-:-ror, (4) the-ability of natural phenomena such as storms, floods, or seis~:~

events to disrupt: transportation. unloading, and storage, and (5) tr.e ability oC fa.ciliti :s to withstand ext~rnally<aused events such as pro_-~.:tiles

&ircra.!t era.shes-, a.net a.djacent. explosion or £ires *. Mitigation meLsures tha.t would prevent.~ limit, a.nd control possible-a.ccidents should be-examined.

Once-the-prelimina. ry intensive e!!o rt to design-safe sy=tems ha.s been concluded, a. aecc>nd stage-o! resea..rch focusing more on the-behavior of LNG ma.y be-d~~sirable.

The-type-o( research to be conducted should be-determined by the decisions. that h.a.ve-already been ma.de about safety

&nd 5iting. For <<~xample, large sea.le-experimentation ma.y or may not be-necessary_ depeinding-on how much LNG activity is occurring in or near population* centeru. Whatever the scope-of further resea..rch, the prime d*eterminant should be the prospects £or genera.ting a.dditiona.l in!orma.tion that can a.nd will be used by LNG regulators a.nd operators.

Specific organizations-- tha.t ha.ve been involved in or developed plans £or re-sea. rch a re:

Department of Tr*a.nsporta.tion - The-Burea.u.'a. OPSO has aponsored three studies 0£ LNG t,~:chnology.

A 1gi4 study provided at.ate-of-the-a.rt information relating to design, location, conet:-uction, operation, and maintenance-of LNG facilities.

It a.lso provided a.. review of codes and practices a.iong. with *an evaluation of trends in LNG aa.!ety co:isidera.tions.

A separate auppl!ment ga.ve information on major research work. Topics cove-red include: Va.poriza.tion and Cloud Dispe-rsion; Spills on \\Va.ter:

Superheat Explo:sions, Stratification and Rollover; Thermal Radiation; Detonation a.nd D,~nagration; and Fire Control.

OPSO has 1.lso p;a.rtici pated with the-Coast Guard, the-Energy Re sea. rch and Development Administration, 1.nd the A me rica.n Gas Association in funding experime:nts a.t China. L.a.ke to ex~mine-the-characteristics of burning LNG on the-au.r!a.ce-of water and o! an igni led LNG cloud.

OPSO aees a. ne,~d !or la.rge-scale-testing to validate* predictive modeling.

The-re is, need for mo re-work to advance the-s t.a.te-of-the-a.rt for measures and procedures (e-. g., diking: impoundment insulation, di!usion*techniq*~1es, plant personnel protection) to control or mitigate known risks.

R*~ search currently in pr-ogress Co r earthquakes de sign should ce-rta.inly be-continued and possibly expanded.

In addition, the Coast Guard has beerr *deeply engaged in LNG resea..r-ch for many years:..

Recogni.:ing the novel nature of LNG, the Coast Cua.rd initiated a.n acti"e-research program to describe th~ potential hazards which could result from a..n a..ccidenta.l release. The first effort was beg..:~

in 1968 to evalu.a.t~ th~ eHects of spilling LNG.onto water.

This prograrr:

has. progressed from laboratory siz.e-tests: up to 1500 gallon spills.

19

The-current program is b~ing conducted a.t Na.-..*al \\l\\*eapons-Center, China. Lake-, California. to study pool ~preading phenomen&; name-a.iz.e-; thermal ra.diati,:,n: a.nd Came-speed through va.por clouds. Tests have been run which show that ignition of a.. vapor cloud !ormed from the-accidental relea!,e-of LNG will bu.rn, but it will not detonate*.

The-China Lake eHort is currently being jointly sponsored by the Coa.st Ciua.rd,. the Depa.rtmetnt of Energy, the-Ame-ric:an Gas Association, and the-Materials. Transportation Bureau.

ln addition to the sttLdies of spill phenomena, the-Coast Guard ha.s 1ponsored three major reseiLrch projects directly relating to LNG aaf~ty, including cargo tank desjgn criteria, fire protection system requirements, and personnel qualification requirements. Approximately twenty other brca.de::- rese;irch projects a.re-directly &t:;>licable to LNG.

A d~tailed listing of the Coast Guard.'s. LNG research efforts is shown on pa.g~s 21 - 2.4 of this-report.

2.C

U.f'<',rr TITIZ OIi

,.. rurq orsc111r-r1°'4

• 11uardt of IMC 5pHla9, In l'tarlne Tran*rortatlot1*

l"Tl~-AO-lO~Ol~I-

.*ll*J*rdf o, lpU**~

or l.HG lt1to.,*teJ" Ct!TJS-~0-1~it'l8)

Vfrc>f Cloud J~plo!tl>fl Study fhue l

-~*ploalon H*s*r~,

"lih Spltl, of Lary*

Quantltl*t of ll*urdou~ l'taterl*i11"

. INTIS-1\\0-,.0011421 r*b. f9l0 ht OrffJ

,.,. ** ro,.

J'tll nrr: or

,U:Sf.AIIClf l

rT.OfllAI.,,,..,011<<. or S"ff.ll ll[Sfl\\flCll fO"TAACT C06T I OO~l..AAS I 1s,ooo

~.G.*661,000

'N),I\\ )O(l,000 01'50 so.ooo

,-CA lS,ooo lflct. tn rtiu* '

(:oat, Inc ** '"

l'tMIIN J Cvallf 100,000

,'CA

]00,000 tlASA S0,000 c.c. ps,ooo 50,eoo C'OtlTRACTOll

!)uroau of

~ln*t 11-~- N*Y*l

.,...,poo*

C*flt*r at CM~ Lakfl, C.alHornla S1111.'Ulllf rrovl,1r,I

• t,.,r k *1nJrr111,1nct\\111 ri( I.Ht. tlrti-wf<<.f Ot'I ¥JI or, Im* lu11in1,..,q of I r**lt.*I', *l'I U :o11*rr***\\ f*l\\1'11 *fl*f 'f'll'°f

.,,,.,..., **Ion.

t:Q jcf" ror..,.*, nnd ll>f' fllf'l'I' lt>put Jo,.....

cloud"*" dra.,n all'IOat c:-*clu:1hcly r,.,,. th!> 'l**/*lr

.,i*lnq.

Oc1u1c clnU<l t*Y**dnq r-*r:111'1"4 uotl\\ t>.Jo., Ht Jowcr fla...,..able ~l"'~f.-

Contlnuod aboV4l worll ln ***lll'Clf!ell f'llrloefon, fn4 **ro.-

c louc1 l:>urnln<J.

Coocc-n11111t lh*t 1tie e*1*loaton rhf'll°"'"llOfl 4* hydrocart><*n cooecntr.)t Ion Hn*ltlvo fPc1 illai U~

v*por cloud Lurnln1 cvlJt>ncc* f fl~*hbacll tG :1ou~cr.

fhue, - ~~'1!~,e,.tl!~t!.~i!'"t.. ~~~i.,.~

~;~-~~..!t~*~!::::*c::!l':-t~:"'-,~-~,;c.i,*~~"

0 ~ o. \\~*~ '!'G"6p,U. 4'1r'\\t. ~"";"~~-HL ttl, o(ft4~

f'-f<:,!Cjo..flo.,, t-\\..,~u'\\_l...._..,, ce'Y'\\*fr;..,,4 v* f::l'" t/t&A-4'- of f?*p,-J-....

~t ~

f O.:*J U.... trpwwuJ:f fib.. ~y,L {..;I.Ut.\\_ ~ii~

fha** U - 11,*.,.l*I'" tf'11p1 of V!lflouo 9-,s,*f! *"HII cnn-t.louc.-d.

l*Pl"nlv,. t..-.oor.-r uaNt In.olt*"'Pl lo '1t>ton11,,

Jroo.-cthA11c.

tto c1rtoo11tlon1t oburrv**d.

'f\\1t-lnvr11r l'f"-

tlona aho conductr,J to ~,.tcr*lnt> ruo-ur 11nt*oq,,. t'l dcfooatlon.

fhac;,o I q - Pt*tcr"'lne thq Jlr* t,uud* "' *n lqnJlc'1 apro*dlnq pool nf ute,on wator *n4 Jroni lhq lqnltlor) Pf th,. w.apor* ot ian *h***4r.. prc114 <>Ill vopor cfoud.

lllfn loclvdad '"Cl"C n*l<1hln11al,-nl,.'\\110 an<l...,,tti11nr/rrop*nt detoo,.tlon t*~t.**

rto.. a n - tight 1pU h of '~<lO fi4lllfflfl of UQ I'll~",-itr wue -J* i11 /1*1*1ur.t, 1977.

four trill* hAc1 f!>'llltdl.1t11 l*111hio11 ~hh V.U)in*J flPHl,.t,,, -~ four,rtn, MIJ del*Y~d l9nltlon wlth v1ryl11~ *pllJ,,t,~.

rtin** V - rO\\lr ta11k1 C*t Oevelo,,....nt of ~*pl~ reapontJYt

-th11nt1 **n*or lbl oru J'lll1riat Ion of tolld **rlo1 ht t,oo*t*r n*ce cary to c*u** * *tcady atato drtonotlnn In unconUn:,d.,.tl**n* (c) Deunaln.1tlo11 of therl'\\al r*dlft,on trou th*.,.ul111.:,11 pool Ure poulblt at INC,1cillt)'* Jfl4 Id) Ver u lcat lon of.. lnd-tunn* l ttchnlrrau ~, con<1ucthl1 yapor dl*perelon apllJ t**tfl, N

4 hAlfc,,,, of is,;,,

>t,ud., l.r al J..AJ f- ~

,1,--yi,-'<<~*,__,...,,,.,.,.(..l,Jl cl.. (((,(. S<>-i,,,"( i'rr(;;.,.~*~-4.r.

/<,.fr) -..,,.,,Q-t.... o *rt..,,.,,.~,u19,'f~ ~

I, r4 (

REPORT TITLE OR

. ~PORT PATK fROJ£CT OESCRifTIO~

!STATUS)

• Prediction of Litetbi~

l"&rcta 1971 Extreme Accelerationa tor Dee19n of LNG Car90 Tanke" (NTlS-'-0-7796)5)

• "Tanker structural P10, l975 Analysie for Minor Colllsloo11" (flT I S-,.O-A0.)1031)

"Recon,...~ndqtiona tor

~pfll }97~

Quallflcatlone of LNG C:air90 l'f'ir&onnel" Three

,,-.(. l\\,.1L1:-.:'1 Vol~es (N1'lS-I\\O-l\\026108f I ifl *'f'... p*,* *

"Chemical uaurd Re-

"'4rch :J.~16 11r,onse InConnatlo11 Syat-*

ICIIRlS) and "llazud Sept. l97~

IIP6e&&ment Computer Sf&tem" (ttACS) !Hne Vollf*

, fire Safety,-board J&fl, 197(!

• V~ssels" (lrr1s-110-A0l06 l 9) ond "Small Scala Teata Ofl Hay 1~76 Control Methods for Some LtlG llaz,uds" (tlTlS-AO-F\\0.)3 52 2)

"A Survey of the f'larcti l97fl ftfectivene~s of Control

~ethods for Flree fll S0111e ll,t,aJdoua Chemical Cargoes" (t1TIS-AO-A026l00)

~vulnerability Model -

Pn Goin1 A Simulation Sy6tem tor l\\&i.es11ln9 Oamaga

~~aultln9 from Harino Spill1" (l-tr1S-AO-A0l52i5) and "VulnenbiUty tle>del V**r',i Guide"

'fl'\\>J; Of l\\£SEARCII Applied t.ppUed f,ppl1e4 Hu,ar4 AnAlysi11 Hazard AnAly111&

TOTAL CONTRACT J"UNDING

~ONTAACT COST (DOl,1.t\\~I 260;000

J.8~,00Q 39,000

'995,000 CONTIU\\CTOR ffaval Ship Research an4 Pcve l orimeni; Ceoter

"* lloeenblatt

!lnd 5011, Inc.

Operationa

' 1leaec11:ch, Jrc.

r,.o. Uttle

lnc, Universitr

£n9ineers, lnc.

Untveraitr En9ineers, Inc.

Enviro Control, Inc.

Slit\\MAIW Oevrlopmc11t of

• JnOdol to predict tt10,11tp*P10 fCCflel't..

• tlons needed for tho dcdgl) of tho cargo t.:,nk, in lJIG ve:.:.c ls.

Prc<ticted extreme& "1ere ccr.p.1rc'1 to tt,e Chcnliql Tram:port Iodustry Advisory Commi~te9 (CTJllq propa::ie<l rote&.

f.vAluatcd H*: phenomena t-hat contrlbuto to thf '1>U~ty of a lon9itu,Unally frAPled-ohip, panicularly, tarik*f, to withstand a 1dnor colliaion jc*J"'IO t,nkf fC'IIIAiO intact),

llecommeoded st.andard11 for the toinlng and other qudJO-catlono of pcrsonnei ot LtlG shlp11 ond tlargcit, rrovJdes information essential for timely decielon ~4kJn9 during emer9cncles involving the water tron::port of haz,1rdouu ch,-111ic.1ls.

Co111;eq11cnt damoge to r~ople !ln4 property were not assessed, l\\nalyticol examination of car90 spill and fiJ' ha~ar4 potential a~:;ociated with the marine handlln9 of WG,

(£P1ph.isie on h,,rulling operations.)

Tlui ma~lmu:J\\

controllable fire was defined.

T1!&ted the cffoctiveneso of \\later apray on vapof dl11p,ir-alon and pool Ciro radiation ond of tlry che111lca~4 Ofl

• pooi fires ond ol>11tructed pool tire*.

Aese6Gment of fire &afety of marine bul~ ch~~lcal carrlci-s wa5 hxupereJ hy lack of 1tat4 1rn4 th! inal>q~tf to confldcn,1y ficale-up small ec4le te&tl ot firf extlngui&hmcnt.

S.1Jnulat1on model to pr~dict reault9 ~t IIUlrln* *pill!

i.e., toxic cloud or thermal radiation fr0111 * ~ur11ln~

pool, ond estimates injuries, death* and pro?crty lo****

for a specific location.

Based on CURIS 11114 !tACS.-.od,~f,

Project Title or Project Description Evaluation of Liq~id Dynamic Loads in Slack Cargo Tunks Ship SJ:ructurea Committee ThennoeleeJ:ic Hodel Studies of Cryo-genic Tanker Structures (NTIS AD-771217)

A Study to Obtaiq Verification of Liquefied Natural Gae (J..NG) Tan~ Loading Cr! terttt (trns AD-

~025716)

!leport Pate Type of Research Ongoing 1973 April 19]6 Applied Contractor Southwest Research Institute Sanders Associates, lnc.

South"{est Research InstH.ute Cost

$50,000

$30,000

$50,000 Summar:y A continuation of th~ pr~vio~

etudy. Topics include~ ~e~i~

of current tank eloshing ~ode followed hy experiments to provide more sloshing d~ta ~n to establish the reepone~ of LNG tan~ membr~ne structure~

under such forces.

New model will then he prepared.

Prepared~ ~ethod for calcula ting the temperature and stresses of the hull ~e~~l after failure of en LNG tank.

Calculations showed fair agreement with scale ~odel tests.

Investigated the forces exerted by LNG in c~rgo taokE apecifically whether those forces experienced due tot~

loading were compatible with the requirements imposed by some eight public and prtvat regulat9ry or~~niz~tioos.

froject Title r Project Description Review and Analysla of Liquefied Natural Gas Research frogram Continuation of Ar!

Assessment of rre-dictability of LNG Vapor Dispersion fro~

Catastrophic Spills.

on Water".

Phase VJ Report Date

.,fuly 1978 fUTURE R&O PROJECTS Type of Research AppUed Baste Contractor National Academy of Science Dr. Havena Univ. of ~rkansaij Cost Summary

$97,000 Subcommittee of ~he NAS Maritime Hazardous Materials Committee phall:

$19,089 l, Analyze the s~fe~y issues associated ~1th iNG transport~tion handling and stowage which need to be addressed through research.

2. -Analyze the LNG safet) research which has been com-pleted, projected or plannec 3,

Determine if LNG research is auffictent tQ adequately provide answers to questionij relat!ng to itt<

safety.

4.

Petermine w~at qu~s-tions, if any, concern!ng LNG safety need to b~

addressed, po a detail analysis of Science ApplicatJons Joe.

vapor dispersion model.

U, S, N~val Weapons $100,900*

Center at China l, Contfnu~ to study d~tonatlon potential ot

~mconHne4 methane, 1-tt~

~o detonate using plan, wave generated from e~plo~

tn pipe.

iakc, Caltfornln 2,

Study fonna~foq fr0111 large spill. Jee co4l4 low vapor rate.

Department of Energy - The DOE has developed a comprehensive five*-year plan (Publication DOE/EV-0002) as the result of an assessment of LNG safety and environmental issues.

Industry - The nahual gas industry, through the American Gas Association and the Gas Research Institute, has done and is planning to do extens:ive research into the safety of LNG. Many individual companies: have also done research in this area.

However, to date, LNG re search efforts have been largely uncoordinated.

The Use.of Pooulation Criteria for §iting LNG Facilities

"'() "?T-# f/,.~

Increased useage of LNG poses sorr.e.;,a e::. s:.i.::,* safety problems.

A large spill could result in a major fire with lethal thermal radiation. in~ detonation causing a destructive blast wave.

or in a vapor plume that drifts some distance before igniting 26 or exploding.

There is a general agreement that the probability of an acci1ent is low.

Yet there is also little dispute that the consequences could be disasterous.

One option for ~inimizing the risk of unacceptable damage to hu."':!an life and perscmal property is to isolate as much as possible the transpc~rtation and storage of LNG from signiticant population centers.

This would not necessarily lower tne chance of a mishap. but would help to ensure that any adverse impact is mitigated.

Determination.of what population exclusion or density crite:ia should be used in L~G sitinq decisions is a difficult task, The behavioral properties of a large. unconfined LNG spill are not well understood.

For example. a preliminary proposal by DOT's Office of Pipeline Safety-Operation would establish a thermal radiation protection exclusion distance fro:n ar. LNG terminal equal to. in the case of parks and playgrouncs. 3.6 timds the square root of the area contain~d by the diking system.

This would amount to exclusion distances up to a couple of thousand feet. and would. according to the analysis.

provide sufficient time-for exposed hu:nans to seek shelter.

~.n analysi~ by the consulting-firm Ecology and Environment.

rnc. sugges*ts a lai:*ger thermal radiation pr:otection zone may be desirable.

The State of California has found that skin burn radiation damage can occur up to a distance of four miles.

Similar un,::ertainty exists with respect to how far an LNG vapor plume might travel.

Estimate~ range from a few hundred yards up to 50 miles for a 25.000 M3 spill.

Furthcr-moce. nobody has been able to demonstrate that a vapor cloud can ba-detonated oI:- determine the circurnst<J.nce in which such n reaction is 1ikely or possible.

The lack of thcit danger confic~ncc.

c.!:"iteria is a solici technical base about LNG dynamics means zones around an accident cannot be ~redicted with Conse:ruently. the estcblisr~'ilent of population highly subjective and fundamentally political.

California is the first and only jurisdiction to make such a judgment~

A law has been passed which limits population density to less than 10 people 9er sq~are mile within one mile of the facility. and less than 50 pe9ple per square mile within four miles.

This precludes any significant population center-from being ~,i thin what the Sta ta has determinec. to be the thermal radiaticm damage zone of a large LNG fire.

2.7 l'Li#.";,l~J:-

,,,.. 0/1.:;i:r_ cc,,_,,h,,,sh,I ~~'[.ti£. />~.J.ti. 9£7"-'.ti.tf.,,,,.

.~N~,,,...,,.~,,y1,*C1.I'~,.,-..,;,,1,.*..'*s, A somi:what dl.fferent way to imiting. popu1.at1.on exposure to a potential hazard is used by the ~uclear Regulatory COm."!!ission.

Three :;afety zones are established around each nuclear power plant.

The size of each zone is determined on a casE~-by-case basis takinq into consideration plant engineeridq design and local geography and la~d utili-zation.

The first zone. generally six to eight hundred yards wide, is an exclusion area.

Residence in this band is no!T.'lally prohibited and most other activities are severely restricted.

A low population zone. usually at least two miles in width.

surrounds the ~xclu.siorr area.

The people allowed in this band must be of such a total ntlr.lber and density that there is a reasonable probability that appropriate protective measures could be taken in their behalf in the event of a serious accident.

'!'he final zone. the outer boundary of which must be at least one and one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low population zone. excludes population centers of more than about 25.000.

Both the Califorr.ia and NRC standards result in approximatelT a four mile buffer,1.round the facility.

The NRC apprcach provides somewhat rnc,re flexibility because the controlling factor in the low population zone is capable to take pro-tective actions. not: rigid density standards.

This permits some tradeoffs to be made between plant design and population i.e.. the more safe<;;ruards at the facility the greater the adjacent population can probably be.

If tj,e new Californi.a standards had been applied to facilities now in operation or under construction. these terminals could not have been built.

Of locations now being seriously con-siderE?d. only Point Conception. California and Matagorda Bay.

Taxas (if the transient tourist population is. excluded) meet

• the density requirements.

FERC has had conducted preliminary alternative site inv~stigations for the Northeast Coast. the Gul.f Coast. and the West Coast.

These studies identified preferable l~cations for terminals based on an extensive list of criteria including oceanographic. navigational, economic, land use. and ~afcty considerations.

The purpose of the effor~ was not to select specific sites tha~ would be mandated.

by the Federal Govi~:rnment. rather to get so1:ie idea of how many f~asible locations there are-The criteria used pre-cluded location near major urban areas.

The sites that

.were identified ~s being ~ost desirable fro~ an overall standpoint generally had population densities (around either the terminal site or the transportation corridor leading to it) in excess of the California standards.

Options l)

Establish specific population density standards that all pending and future projects must meet.

This would be a hiqhly volatile and essentially politi-::al issue.

If it is the desired option Congress should be asked to set standards.

In* fact. this is a.lready unce:-

consideration by t'.:1e House Subcormnittee on Energy ar,d Power.

Subsequent to recent hearings on HR 6844 to establish a~

LNG siting and project design policy. amendnents are bei~g considered that owuld establish spedific population de~sity limits.

One of the proble~s with setting riqid standards is what to do as population increases.

It is possible that as this occurs our understanc.ing of LNG safety and control will impiove sufficiently to alleviate cancer~.

Otherwise st=ict control either through zoning or through so~e type emine~t domain authority would have to be legislated and impleme~ted.

2}. Establish a tc,tal exclusion area up to some distar:ce.

from the facility surrounded by a low population zone (no speclfic dens~ty standard).

Under this alternative the operator would have to maintain an unused area ar,:,und the facility of. for example. t*... *o thousand feet.

This total exclusion area would be su=-

rounded by a low ~opuiation zone wide enough to preclude some level of thermal radiation exposure. for example.

0.2 cal/cm2sec.

~he operation would be obligated to ensure that either the population in this zone does not increase (e.g.. by buying the property) or for ensuring an adequate level of protection (e.g.. better enginee~ir.g safeguards or adequate evacuation plans).

This option provides more flexibility for the operator_over the life-time of the project without increasing the corisequenccs of an accident.

The distances for the exclusion area and low population zone will have to be set.

This could be a controversial process.

2.8

3)

Establish a Federal Siting Corn."':'littce that would ide:-:tify the s:Ltes to be used for L:-rc terminals.

This option need not be adopted to ensure population density limitations.

As t~is can be accomplished through option l or 2.

The advantages of this alternative are that it would allow for wiser land use planning for the nations's coastal areas and it would help minimize the time required to decide on the suitability of a site fo: each new L~G import appli-cation since appro:;>riate sites would be predetermined.

The disadvantages ~re that it could conflict with other Agencies regulatory authority (e.g.. Dept. of Co!T'.."nerce Coastal Zone Manage~ent Oversight). and could be viewed as unwarranted Fed~ral interference in State and local land use decision-makinq.

4)

Continue current case-by-case review of terroinal siting.

Although few additton.al major LNG import terminals are anticipated. the cc,sts and ti!!le involved in each siting decision have been and ~ilL probably continue to be pro~

hibitive.

Establishing basic groundrules. such as population de~sity. for locatinq a facility ~ould make the job easier for both applic~nt and reviewer.

Population !nformatiorr Tables The information presented in the following tables is in very rough form,and useful only to provide*a general idea of populations adjacent to possible terminal sites.

In many cases the estimates are based on 1970 census data and may be significantly out of date.

The sources of the fig~res

• were pri:narily impact statements and site e:naa112 '..on sti..:dies prepared by consultants for FERC.

The information is.,.mfor-tunately. often in terms t~at makes. comparison difficult.

30

l'oLJUli.t llu11 ol /\\t:eJ!.i ~Ut:.r:ouudl 11~ Luc.;

Terminal and Transportation Corridors Facilities Under Construction Cove PL, MD 1::iba Island, Gl\\

Lake charies, LA I

Potehtial Sites Gulf Coast Port. Isabel, TX Harbor 1s1and, TX Pascagotiia Bay, tA

\\-Ji thin 1000 fl:

1 mile 3 miles 5 miles t-Hthin 1000 ft 1 mile 3 miles 5 tniles Within 1000 ft 1 mile 3 miles 5 miles N11mhcr. of People*

/\\djJ<.:enl l:o Tr*1*111inal Mon1~

None 2,500

/\\dj<.1cc!nt lo Trnn~por.tation Corridor few hundred few thousand (up to 60,000 seasonal (tourists 3,600 permanent c..,..-,.-,,-, __, _____ -------*

VV I V\\.IV

.::,,uuuuc.a..

.:,c:oouJ1a..1.

50 workers undetermined 50 workers 1,300 11300 1,300 1,300 1,300.

480 workers 480 workers Not avaiiabie 161000 21,000 Matagorda ~*Y, TX The city of Port o*connet i3 jtnt cvet 4 ~iles from the site~ It has a permanent population of 840 and a peak daytime summer population of 4,eso.

Potchtia1 sites t*:es t Coast:

Oxnard 1 cA Pt:. Conception, CA Sah Onofre,*CA Within 1 tnile j

Not available

~opul<<tion Density

( persons/mi1)

\\'iithin 4 miles

~60 Approximately 400

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Summary

. DRAFT 35 Kay McKeough 4/3/78 LNG: r.iabili ty (Subsection of Safety and Siting}

0- The adequacy c:1f insurance-to cover the injuries and

.damages that,::ould be expected from a major LNG accident is an integral part of the assessment of safety and siting issues.

Despite all precautions, an LNG accident could occur and LNG tankers and liauefaction or terminal f :LCilities destroyed.

Serious accidents could caus1e l,:,ss of life and damages to nearby communities.

Estimates* of potential damage and, in turn, requisit:e insurance coverage vary widely dependinq on conclusions as to the safety of LNG.

~ The law goverr1ing-liability is extremely complex and far from-clear.

Federal maritime law is often incon-sistent or incomplete, causing uncertainties as to legal remedies available in the event of a LNG accident~

Confusion can result in instances where both maritime and non-maritimes laws come into olav.

In addition, uncertainties. are raised whether n~me~ous state laws apply either separately or concurrently wi.th Federal :Law...

0 Some industry sources maintain that existing insurance arrangements are adequate to provide coverage in the event of a major LNG accident.

They point out that LNG is-an excE?llent risk in the insurance market and that insurancE: in excess of the value of the vessel

~-

could be easily obtained..

They argue that terminals carry adequate:!. insurance -- generally $ 50-$200 million -- and point to the_strong financial. position

• of LNG operatc:>rs.

0 A number of studies conclude that a LNG accident could leave injuried parties with little or inadequate compensation.

They point to t~e limited liability under existing corporate str~ctures whereby LNG operators are capitalized separately, placing the assets of the parent company out of ieach;

Likewise, each LNG tanker is a separate corporate entity in

order to take,:1.dvantage of statutory limitations on liability. Fu:~thermore, accidents caused by force majeure or a third party with littl.e insurance could result in av,oidance of liabil.ity.

0 New mechanisms to assure adequate compensation in the event of a maji:lr LNG accident could ~merge.

These could be patterned after similar mechanisms desig~ed to cover other hazardous materials, such as.nu~lear power plants and major maritime accidents with potential for considerable damage and loss of life.

These mechanis:r:~s could involve comprehe.nsive ins*~=ance funds funded by all LNG operators, strict liabilicy standards ~nd minimum levels of protection, or a combination of private financial protection and govern-ment indemnity to fully cover claims arising f=or.-. an accident.

0 The Federal Gclvernment should give top priority* to LNG liability issues.

Concerned.agencies should begin a thorough study of the*adequacy of existing insurance arrangements and possible alternatives to provide adequate com;,m1.sation in the event of a major ac=ident:.

These should be analyzed from the standpoint of costs

• versus benefits, impact on the com.'nercial insu:-a:-:ce market, and experience with insurance arrangemen~s for other hazardous materials.

In cooperation with effor~s underway in the Congress, the Administration sho:.ild work toward legislation to eliminate both Federa~

and State lega.L uncertainties, simplify claims procedures, and establish strict liability.

A.lternatively, study would be made whether LNG, najor-oil spills, nuclear facilities, noxious gases and other hazardous materials should be regulated as a class, with m,:~jor reform of the insurance struct'..ire initiated.

36

Maritime Law The Limitations of Liability Act of 1951 is one of the most important sta.tutes in mar.itirne liability law.

The Act limits the li,!.bility of the owner of the vessel for accidents occurring without his knowledg~ or privity to the value of the owner's interest in the vessel and "her freight then pending._"

An exception is made for loss of life or bodily i°nj ury in which case-liability is limited to S60 per ton of the vessel.

If a* vessel is totally destroyed and its cargo discharged, the claimant can receive nothing unless a Federal statute supersedes the term of the Ac:t.

I With respect to LNG, an imp~rtant legal question is raisec in the evept a ma:ior accident originates onboard a:: UJG ship and spreads to the terminal and nearby areas.

Legislation and a>urtrulings somewhat clarify that the vessel is totally liable for all damages, but its limits c=

liability are circumscribed by the 1851 Act and patterns c=

vessel ownershi?.

The concurrence of State-Federal maritime jurisdiction and attendant legal problems can confuse the liability issue.

Certain states have promulgated statutes calling for strict State liability limits for oil tankers.

To date, no state has enacted liability standards alt~ough a New York L.~G bill could be interrupted as providing for strict liability for LNG owners for any accident occurring in port.

Injured parties ma.y be unable to recover damages if the accident were due to an act of God, an act of war, or negligence since: these cases are excluded u.nder liability laws.

The law is incomplete if fault rests with another vessel or third party carrying little insurance.ti'# compe::nsation is likely.

In the event the accident occurs at the terminal site, State law is applicable, althou. 1;-h it is unclear whether a showing of negligence would l:::1e required or if there is strict liabili ey.

.! I

---

~----------

No international law governing !NG liability provisions exists.

The International Maritime Consultative Organi-zation (IMCO) issued a code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Cases in Bulk, but the organization has not addressed L.'iG liability provision:,.

The IMCO has been heavily involved with mixed results in liability and corr~ensation damages from oil pollution by tankers.

The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution was issued. in 1969 but it was soon rendered obsolete by tanker sizes.

As a result, a Convention on the Establish..-nent of an International F-.ind for Compensation for Oil Pollution damages was proposed to raise the lim~ts of liability coverage and provide for full and adequate compensation.

For the International Fund to become effective, inter alia, eigh": nations must have agreed to be bound by the International Fund Convention and in each signatory nation a total quantity of at least 750 million tons of oil must have been received by cargo owners liable for contribution to the Fu~d.

The Convention has not come into force and the U.S. has signed but not ratified it..-

Although the IMCO i~ perhaps the international organization with the most expeirtise to address LNG L:.. ability, it is unlikely to undertake the issue in the nea.= future due to its experience with oil pollution compensation and liability.

The U.S. could pus~ for IMCO involvement, but is would be unsupported by oth1:r maritime nations with UIG fleets.

In the meantime domestic law, which could serve as a precedent for other nations, will have to filL gaps and eliminate ambivalency in liability provisions.

33

Other Problems Affectina Comoensa tion Intricate corporate ownership patterns-of LNG vessels and terminals result in a complicated financial.

situati6n* leaving the corporate assests unreachable for compensation purposes. It is characteristic in the shipping industry that each vessel is set up as a separate corporation in order to isolate the assets of the parent cc,rpora tion.

Thus liability laws beco:ne theoretical since in practice there is no recourse to the assets of t~e party at fault when a ship and its cargo are destroyed.

Similarly, the !NG ter~inal is a wholly-owned, se?a=ately capitalized subsidiary of larger natural gas co:n?anies.

The natu,ral gas irnporte:-/terminal operator purc:-1.ases insurance that presumably could cover loss of terrni~al facilities, -stimated at some S200-S300 million a~d second and third party damages.

However, this insurance, %~a~~

as protection and indemenity, (p and il in many ins:an=es would do little more than compensate for the loss o!

terminal f acili t~.es, assuming they *would have to be reconstruc~ed at a*higher cost due to inflation.

~- so~e instances, the vo~ssel owner waives the right to sue the terminal O?era tot~ if fault rests with t!"le latter.

The net effect is a reduced amou;;t of coverage ca=~ied by the ter:.1inal.

As part of its LNG re?ort,. GAO si.;.=ve:::*ec.

the liability insurance coverage per incidant of L~G terminals and fo1~:nd a."'!loun ts such as "to the fullest ex-:en t possible,II S 50-lC0 million for third part:.ies in excess of liability coverage; $140 million with no provisi~~s for third parties, etc.

However, some private sources estimate da.*n-age c:ould reach S-500 million based on damages resultinq from incidents involving other ha:ar~ot:s materials.

Under existing pz:actices, no federal agency assu.":les responsibility for assuring compensation of victi~s.

Claimants face a tL~e consuming and expensive process in order to receJ.ve com?ensation.

Fault must be es~abl.ished, t-he extent of damages assessed, and the parent comp.:.ny' s liability litj.gated..

Possible Solutio~s to L~G tiabilitv Problems 39 There is a growing concern for the need to shift the economic burden of LNG risks from nearby residents and property owners to the shi *:,owners and terminal opera tors.

Assu:~ing costs are passed 'through the end-use consumer will bear any added insurani:::e costs.

• solutions include setting of minimum limits of coverage, provisions for strict liability regardless of fault, and expedited litigation procedures.

LNG could be viewed in the context of other hazardous. substances, such as noxious.gases, major oil. spills, or nuclear facilities and comprehensive insurance schemes enacted to cover all hazardous materials as a class. This approach calls for a combination of private insurance financing and government ind1:imni ty.

Funding-could be based on risk and damage poti:tntial.

Alternatively, a mandatory LNC.

insurance compensation fund, financed by an excess tax on imported quantities of LNG could be imposed.

There is some precedent for this type of* fund.

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authority Act (PL 93-153) modifies the Limits of Liability Act under certain con-ditions~ and establishes-a $100 million Trans-Alaska Liability Fund, funded by a 5-cent-per barrel fee levied upon the oil owner.

The Act establishes strict liability withc>ut regard to fault.

The shipow:1e:::-

and operator are liable for the first $14 million o:

claims and the Liability Fund covers the balance U? to the established limit of. $100 million.

40 The Deepwater Port Act of 197~ also incorporates t~e fu~d concept and establishes a $100 million Deepwater Port L~abil~~-

F_und.

Each barrel of oil loaded or unleaded at a c.ee?'**:a. ter port is assessed 2 cents which is contributed to t::e :'u:-:d.

The Fund sets legislative orecedent by inter alia :er~i':ti~c the United Stati:s Governrne;t to initiate a cl~a=-:ior:.

~

suit on behalf of damaged citizens in order to lessen

. an injured party's costs of litigation and strea.."rtl~ne remedy procedures.

Legislation is i~ending in several congressional co~~ittes that establishe~fti.NG Damages or Compensation :-..md, fu:-.c:ed by a fee (cents/mcf) on natural gas received at the ter~inal.

The Fun~ is to be used to pay fqr claims which exceed t~e liability limit set forth in the bills.

In the case o=

vessels, this amount is $75 million or $1,000 ;,er ton, whichever is less, and in the case of terminals, t:-.e

-upper limit,ts; s:100 million..

The bills <3'enerally ?rovi=e for strict liability and expedited ligitation procedu=es

• MEMORANDUM OF' UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ANO THE MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION BUREAU FOR REGULATION OF WATERFRONT LIQUEFIED NATURA!. GAS FACILITIES I.

INTRODUCTION APPENDIX ;

43

• Within the Depi~rtment of Transportation (DOT), the United States Coas*t Guard (USCG) and the Materials Trans-portation Bureau (M"rB) exercise separate and overlapping safety regulatory a1Jthori ty af fee ting t!'le siting, design, construction, maintenance, and operation of waterfront liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities adjoining the navig-able waters of the United States.

The USCG derives its authority over such facilities from the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (Pub. L.92-340, 33 U.S.C. 1221-1227) and the Magnuson Act (50 U.S.C. 191).

The regulatory auth-ority of the MTB ov,er these sa.'T\\e facilities (as well as non-waterfront LNG facilities) is derived from the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety A~t of 1968 (Pub. L.90-481, 49 U.S.C.

1671 et sea.) and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (Pub:7:.93-632,, 49 U.S.C. 1801 et sea.).

rn recognition of each of the parties' respective regulatory responsibilities, the USCG and the MTB agree that a memorandum cf understanding is needed to avoid dup-lication of regulatory efforts regarding waterfront LNG facilities and to maximize the exchange of relevant informa-tion.

rr..

~:S?ONSIBILITIES. OF THE PARTIES For the foregoing reasons, the USCG and the MTB agree to the following d~vision of regulatoty resp6nsibilities with respect to waterfront LNG facilities and cooperation in carrying out those responsibilities:

USCG RESPONSIBILITIES The USCG is rE!Sponsible for establishing regulatory requirements. for--

(1)

Facility site selection as it relates to manage-ment of vessel traffic in and around a facility;

(2)

(3)

( 4)

-2.-

'Fire prevention and fire protection equipment, systems, and methods for use at a facility; Security of a facility; and All other matters pertaininq to the facility between the vessel and the last manifold (or valve) inLimediately before the receiving tank ( s)

• MTB RESPONSIBILITIES The MTB is re~ponsible for establishing regulatory requirements for--

(1)

Facility site selection except as provided by paragraph (1) of the "USCG Resoonsibilities" set forth in t:his Memor*andu."Tl; and *

(2)

All other matters pertaining to the facility beyond (and including) the last manifold (or valve) immediately before the receiving tank(s) except as provided by parag:aphs (2) and (3) of the "USCG Resp(?nsib:~li.ties" set forth in this Hemorandu.11.

,JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES (L)

The USCG and the MTB will cooperate and assist each other in carrying out their respective water-front LNG :Eacility regulatory enforcement activi-,..

ties; and (2)

The USCG and the MTB, in an effort to avoid incon-sistent re~1ulation of similar safety matters (including as between w~terfront and non-waterfront LNG. facilities), will consult with each other before issuing each Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Notice of ?reposed Rulemaking, and final regulation affecting waterfront LNG facilities.

For the United States Coast Guard For the Materials Trans-

• ~

ADM Owen W. Siler Commandant Date 1 FtB 1978 Date- _____________

FEB I

~. -*-

- -*~...

r Enclosure C Correspondence between NRC and California on LNG

C O P Y PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION State of California June 6, 1978 Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie 1717 H. Street, N.W.

U. S. Nuclear Regul,:ttory Commission Washington, DC, 20555

Dear Chairman Hendr*ie:

San Francisco, California File No. 004-3 On September 16, 1977, California's Governor Brown signed Senate Bill 1081, the Li9u~~fied Natural Gas Terminal Act of 1977.

(LNG Terminal Act)

This act grants the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) e>cclusive power to issue a permit for the con-struction ancf operation of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in California.

On October 14, 1977, Western LNG Terminal Associates filed an application with the CPUC for a permit to construct and operate an LNG terminal at Point Conception, California.

The LNG Terminal Act requires the CPUC to issue a decision on the application no later than July 31, 1978.

Further, the act provides that not later than May 31, 1978, the California Coastal Commission must submit to the CPUC the Coastal Commission's final 1r*eport evaluating and ranking the sites which qualify for an LNG terminal.

The Coastal Commission's report is deemed a recommendation to the CPUC, and the CPUC is required to issue a permit for construction and operation at the site designated as the highest-ranke!d site by the Coastal Commission.

However, the CPUC may select a lower-ranked site if it determines with respect to each higher-ranked site that location of an LNG terminal at such site is not consistent with interests of public health, safety and welfare,,::,r if it determines that it is not feasible to complete construc:tion and commence operation of the terminal at such higher-rankeid site in sufficient time to prevent significant curtailment of High-priority requirements for natural gas and also finds that approval 1::,f the lower-ranked site will significantly reduce such curtailment.

On May 31, 1978, the Coastal Commission issued its final report evaluating and ranking suitable sites for an LNG terminal as follows:

C O P Y Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie June 6, 1978 Page 2 (1)

Camp Pendl1~ton-Horno Canyon (San Diego County)

(2)

Rattl esnakt! Canyon ( San Luis Obi spa County)

( 3)

Point Conc1~ption ( Santa Barbara County)

(4)

Deer Canyon (Ventura County)

Camp Pendleton, the highest-ranked site, is located five miles south of Southern California Edison's San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station while the second rE!commendation, Rattlesnake Canyon, is situated 3.6 miles south of the Pacific Gas and Electric Diablo Canyon Nuclear Generating Station.

In evaluating the pending appl i*cation to construct and operate an LNG terminal at Point Conception, the CPUC must determine, on or before July 31, 1978, whether the highest-ranked sites, Camp Pendleton and Rattlesnake Canyon, a re acceptable in terms of both public safety and timely delivery of gas supplies.

To facilitate the resolution of this difficult question, the CPUC seeks guidance from the NRC with respect to its poliicy for locating nuclear generating facilities in the area of a* potenti a1ly hazardous LNG facility or vice versa.

By letter dated April 12, 1978, Harold Denton, Director of the Division of Site Sci1fety and Environmental Analysis at the NRC, informed Pat Wei nstiei n of the Coastal Cammi ssion staff that:

"Part 100 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations permits two or more nuclear power reactors to be in close proximity if, and only if, they are so designed that an accident at one does not endanger the safety of any of the others..

Our design requirements against other industrial ctnd transportation facilities nearby are consistent with this requirement, namely that the safety of the nuclear power plant must not be dependent upon events at th,c,se facilities."

Mr. Denton further sitated that:

• "[A]t this time w*~ are not prepared to offer specific suggestions for provisions in the construction and operation of an LNG terminal at Rattlesnake Canyon or Horno Canyon nt!cessary to clearly demonstrate the compatibility of !iuch a facility with the existing nearby nuclear power reactors.

While a variety of meansures might bE! taken to isolate the possible interaction betweEm the two types of activities, the need for and value, of any specific measure would require further st1udy. 11

Honorable Joseph H. Hendrie June 6, 1978 Page 3 C O P Y In light of the Coastal Commission's recommendations of May 31, 1978 and in view of the statutorily-mandated decision date of July 31, 1978 precll udi ng further study, the CPUC requests an NRC detennination as to the acceptability of locating an LNG facility within 4-5 miles of an existing nuclear generating station.

In the alternative, a clear set of specific NRC guidelines for the location of potentially hazardous facilities in proximity to nuclear reactors is sought.

In view of obvious constraints-imposed by the July 31 decision date, a timely response is requested.

Your consideration and cooperation in this matter of great importance is much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

/SI Robert Bat,novich, President

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 Mr. Pat Weinstein Onshore LNG Project Manager California Coastal Commission 631 Howard Street, 4th Floor April 12, 1978 San Francisco, California 94105

Dear Mr. Weinstein:

COPY Thank you for the iinfonnation concerning your investigations of coastal sites.

We appreci cite your request for NRC comment before any final decision is made on the preferred site for the proposed western LNG tenninal.

As you noted in yottr letter of March 13, there are two nuclear power reactor sites where potential accidents involving LNG traffic has been reviewed (Calvert C'liffs and Hope Creek/Salem).

Our general criteria are that nuclear power reactors should not be located near hazardous industrial developmimts unless one of two circumstances are satisfied:

(1) that the risks of an accident at a nearby hazardous industrial facility affecting the safety of the nuclear reactor be acceptably low or (2) that the design of the nuclear reactors be such that they can safely with stand an accident from other nearby facilities.

Part 100 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regul ati ans penni ts two or more nuclear poweir reactors to be in close proximity if, and only if, they are so designed that an accident at one does not endanger the safety of any of the others.

Our design requirements against other industrial andl transportation facilities nearby are consistent with this requirement, namely that the safety of the nuclear power pl ant must not be di~pendent upon events at those *other facilities.

Certain hazards, however, are considered sufficiently unlikely at many sites that it *f s unnecessary to design against them specifically.

At present, for example, it is physically possible that one of the LNG tankers now sailing the Pacific Ocean could be wrecked upon the California coast.

The probability that this might actually occur near San Onofre or Cliablo Canyon is, however, extremely remote, and this hazard has not been considered in the design of those plants.

The nearby presence,of an LNG tenni nal, even if that terini nal were so designed and situate:1~ that it did not place a direct hazard to a nuclear power plant, could bring with it the increased possibility-of the close approac 1, by LNG tankers or fl ammab 1 e gases rel eased from these tankers.

Such a possibility woul &-.hav&-=tit be consf dered in deciding whether or,,ot the nuclear power pl ant could be operated safely witho~t undue risk to the public.

Mr. Pat Weinstein Apri 1 12, 1978 Although no LNG facilities are likely to be built on the Delaware River, other hazardous ship cargos do appear in traffic on that river, and an Atomic Safety and L'icensing Board is presently deliberating upon the Hope Creek license applic:ation on those grounds.

Also, LNG tankers are expected to approach to with*in about 6km of the Calvert Cliffs site. This situation is currently under review by the NRC.

In the material you provided, it was noted that the adequacy of a four mile "buffer zone" between Rattlesnake Canyon and the Diablo Canyon sites "to ensure containme!nt of an emergency at one plant without involving the other requires further study".

We would agree with that conclusion.

The hazards of LNG tanker spills have been estimated by some authorities to persist to distances of up to 20 km under particularly adverse conditions.

For 1 esser di stances, it would be necessary to restrict the LNG traffic during those periods when such adverse conditions prevail.

Where adv1:*rse winds are common and the separation distance is much smaller tha11 20 kms, such restriction may prove a significant burden to the LNG traffic.

Our safety requirem1~nts. for nuclear power plants are intended to protect the public from rad*iation injury, and not to protect an applicant's investments.

If LNG and nuclear facilities are sited in close proximity, similar populations are at rhk from accidents at either, and measures that go to prevention of the initiating LNG accident would be more

,desirable than measures tomitigate the effects of such accidents in power reactor facilities.

Careful study is required to assure that specific proposed meiasures to protect one element of society does not, in effect, increase the risk to others.

At this time we are 1not prepared to offer specific suggestions for provi sf ons in the cc,11struction and operation of an LNG tenni nal at Rattlesnake Canyon oir Horno Canyon necessary to cl early demonstrate the compatibility of such a facility with the existing nearby nuclear power reactors.

Whiile a variety of measures might be taken to isolate the possible interaction between the two types of activities, the need for and value of any specific measure would require further study.

We recommend, si nee this option still exists, that the problem be avoided, by selection of a site for an LNG terminal that is more removed from the existing nuclear power reactors.

Mr. Pat Weinstein April 12, 1978 Finally, we do not believe that a seawater exchange system between a nuclear power plant and an LNG tenninal would be economically feasible, nor of significant net enviro1111ental benefit, because of the length of the pipelines.

For your infonnatfon, we are enclosing the results of staff work on LNG hazards from other licensing actions (Hope Creek, Salem, Calvert Cliffs).

In addition, we are including a report, !ITRI J6405, which indicates that certain staff assumptions may be nonconservative.

We have not yet compl E!ted a technical review of this work.

It may be helpful to discuss this matter further, and particularly to clarify the substance of the re*sul ts of our prior reviews ( as noted, this material is attached). If you desire a meeting please do not hesitate to call mE! (301) 492-7207.

Enclosure:

AS stated Sincerely,

{.~R. Denton, Director Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

,.. S'!'~TE o~*,CALIF°:ff'l!A

'1_**:_* _____________

Q_=== ____

eo_M_u_N_o_a_.==BR_o_WN_J_R===** _ao_.,

CA*LIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION 631 HOWARD STREET, 4th FLOOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94105 March 13, 1978 *0

. i:-.*:

Harold Denton Director of Site S,1fety and Environmental Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20014

Dear Mr. Denton:

Analysis The_ California Coastal Commission is required to evaluate and rank potential

-*c*-:~*r**c:~ _liquefied natural 9as (.LNG) terminal sites on the California coast and, by

. **- < :...... _Ja.v 31, 1!:178, *forw,3.rd such ranking to the California Public Utilities Com-mission for a July 31 permit decision by that agency, We have retained 5 sites (out of 82 initially considered) for detailed study and final ranking, (see the prelimina:ry and final staff reports adopted by the Corrmission on January 30, 1978).

(

Two. of the five sites being considered are within 5 miles of existing nuclear )

power plants.

The Rattlesnake Canvon site is anr,roximatel.v 4 niles south of

• • _* - ~r,__.c"J_Dj_a,b 1 ~tCaiiy9)1_h*n1acnt bupt di s1* ~e.;~.S:f.-a f~d __..:~r.rii i ~- bv *ruq.si~d. tte1rra ! n*:-:1 The norno an*1on s, e on t e amp en eton :*ar~ne...:-rlse 1s armroxma e v ::, m es

• -. \\ _ south of the Scti"i:h~~;~*--t~ 1 i &oriij__~_f.~fsc;~nL.:~.~~-- Die~o !'.:as an(f '::1 ectri c CO!nl}any' s

___ ?ar:i_Q_nofr.e. plan~ (see the attached toooorarhic maps).

Both sites have many

. I.

,.. favorable charac~eristics for an u,sr, facility based upon land use, environ-mental, and feasib'.ility considerations. It is conceivable that either site could be ranked first by the Coastal Co1T111ission.

_,..We would aooreciate! the vie1,*!S :ri: t"1e '-luclear P.e("Tulatory Comr.iission concerninq

. the feasibility o_f l_~c~in?-]n_~-~n_facil_ity carable* of storinn a leoal maximum of 1.65 million barrels of Ul".,, eventually serviced by ar)Droximatelv 19() annual tanler tri OS, at either o& these ~ ites.

'i

• We are concerned about the safety,:,uestions raised bv the proximity of the facilities and would like your comments to address probable safety requirements at each site.

In this reoard. we wouldbene:itcireatTv frori a discussion *of

-f" the Nuclear Reciu1at.i,rv Commission's ex,,eriences 1*.tith the Calvert Cliffs and r{ope Creek generating. plants, which. are locate*d **in close proximity to LNG

... fa_cil ities and LNG tanker routes.

Suoc:,ested conditions for tlle safe construc-t tion and oneration ()f an L'.*!~ terrninarat both focati ems* 1*!0Ul <l a 1 so be* *extremely

"'* help.f!Jl.

Ariyimprfc:ations the location of a* nearby UIS facility rni,,ht have on

' the operating licensing process for the nuclear plants and the time and expense

--_ involved would be re!levant to our analysis.

Fina'lly_, anv coni":ents on the

Mr. Harold Denton March 13, 1978 Page 2 feasibility of a s1:*a water exchange system between LNG and nuclear facili-t, es at eac b s jte 1~nau1 0E Mfl enme.

Thank you for your cooperation. If more detailed information is required, do not hesitate to request it from us.

V~Jt.::u;;: rj'u~s,

~

~~£~

PAT,1 WEINSTEIN...

-Onshore LNG Project Manager

Ms. Suzanne Reed Senior Energy Advi soi**

Office of Plannfng and Research 1400 Tenth Street Sacramento, Californiia 95814

Dear Ms. Reed:

AUG 8 1977 DISTRIBUTION:

Central File NRR Reading DSE Reading

~EP Reading

/

HDenton DMuller VMoore RMinogue, SD NEisenberg, SD JRead, DSE Thank you for your JL1Jy 25, 1977 letter to Dr. Norman Eisenberg concerning the licensing and reg:1'.&lation of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) faci11t1es.

Although the Uuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is not responsible for licensing and regulat:lng LNG facilities, as part of our responsibilities under the Atomic Ener!JY Act of 1954, as amended, and the National Environ-mental Policy Act (NEPA),. we review all Environmental Impact Statements

{EISs) prepared 'by thE~ Federal Power Corm;iission (FPC) pursuant to their responsibilities under the r;atural Gas Act and the HEPA.

In general, our revie!MS are limited to those areas for which HRC has special expertise or jurisdiction by law.

Specifically our reviews are directed to impacts of the proposed action relative to the radiological health and safety of the public a)7d possible.impacts on facilities licensed by or subject to licensing by t~Rc~*

I understand that Ben Harless discussed f n somewhat greater di~ta f 1 our procedures for revi ewf ng EISs prepared by other Federal agencies during his telephone conversation with you on.

August 3. 1977.

As Mr. Harless mentioned, we also received a letter from Ms. Nancy J. Aurich of the Ca 11 forni a Off1,ce of Pl ann1 ng and Research ( COPR) requesting NRC to furnish certain technical assistance and review participation in the prepa-ration of an Environrue:iiltal Impact Report for a LNG terminal to be sited in Santa Barbara County. California. A copy of our response to that letter is enclosed.

We would of course be pleased to review any Environmental Impact Reports prepared by COPR for UfG facilities and provide coim1ents to the State

Ms. Suzanne Reed AUG 8 1977 wf thin the scope of our reviews of EISs prepared for the FPC on similar facilities.

Enclosure:

As stated Sincerely, Harold R. Denton, Director Division of Site Safety and Environmental AnalySi$

• Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

(

Ms. Nancy J. Aurich UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D, C. 20555 AUG 3 1977 Project Administration Assistant Office of Planning and Research 1400 Tenth Street Sacramento, Ca 95814

Dear Ms. Aurich:

Your letter of June 13, 1977 requests the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to furnish certain technical assistance and review participation in the prep-aration of an Environmental Impact Report for an LNG terminal to be sited in Santa Barbara County, California.

We would be pleased to exchange scientific and technical information to assist in the review of the proposed Point Conception LNG terminal. This exchange of scientific and technical information sho1.:1ld prove.to be of specific benefit to both our regulatory programs.

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director, Division of Site Safety and Environ1:1ental Analysis, will serve as the NRC contact on this matter.

Members of his Division are familar with technical matters related to LNG projects. Mr. Denton's telephone number is (301) 492-7207.

For your information there are other coordinated activities between representatives of th*~ State of California and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Specifically, Mr. Robert Ryan, Director, Office of State Programs is working w*i th the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission toward an agreement on matters of concurrent responsibility and jurisdiction for the siting of nuclear plants.

In addition, Mr. Harold Denton is working with Mr. Frank Hahn, Administrative Director of the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comission on similar matters, but related speci-fically to the San Die!go Gas and Electric Company's Sundesert Nuclear Project.

Sincerely,

~~

~~{:Gossi ck Executive Director for Operations

'*stiat~ of California

(

Memorandum To State and Federal LNG Task Force Contacts Date July 25, 1977 (916) 322-4245 From Governor's Office Suzanne Reed~nergy Advisor Office of Planning and Rer

Subject:

OFFSHORE LIQUEFIED NtlTURAL GAS FACILITY SITING l

/

The Office of Planning and Research is examining the procedures that would be involved in issuing a permit for an offshore Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility.

To facilitate this study, I would like to know what role under exist-ing law your agency would perform if a permit for such a facility was sought and what new authority might be required to enable full licensing and regulation of such a facility.

An offshore LNG receiving facility could fall into one of the following categories:

1.

An LNG rece"iving storage and regasification facility constructed in state-controlled waters adjacent to a natural island with a pipeline across federal waters, then state waters to the shore.

2.

An LNG recei'ving storage and regasification facility built in federally-controlled waters, with a pipeline crossing state waters to the shore.

3.

An LNG receiving, storage, and regasification facility located on a natural island with a trestle extending into state waters and a pipe-line crossing federal waters, then state waters to shore.

The offshore facilities referenced above might be either fixed to the ocean bottom with sub-sea storage, floating with floating storage, or fixed with sur-face storage.

I would appreciate receiving your analysis of what pennits, comments, or approvals must be secured from your agency under these offshore facility siting situations at your.earliest possible convenience.

In your reply, please include:

1.

an estimate of how long approval will take;.

2.

a list of any reports the applicant must file with your agency;

3. a brief description of the decision-making process; and

4.

references to the statutes authorizing your agency's action.

I would also appreciate any other pertinent information you would care to supply.

Thank you for your attention to this request.

,::;ICE OF PLANNING AND RESEA. ~

1400 TENTH STREET ND G. BROWN JR.

G0YIEIINOII General Lee V. Goss;ick Executive Director SACRAMENTO 9!5814 June 13, 1977 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5650 Nickelson Lane:

Rockville, MD 20852

Dear General Gossick:

In August, 1976, th.ia County of Santa Barbara Office of Environmental Quality (OEQ) reque:;ted California State agency participation in an Environmental Impact Report (EIR)* to be prepared in response to a proposal by Western LNG Terminal Company to site an LNG terminal at Point Conception, Santa Barbara County, California.

The requirements of the County are fc,r assistance from the State in addressing LNG safety and systems l~eliability and vessel traffic issues.

• In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Santa Barbara, the Governor's Offic:e of Planning and Research is coordinating State and Federal agency involvement in this project and is performing the necessary contractual managenmnt functions to accomplish analysis of the issues described above.

OPR envisions an active role for Federal agencies in this project and hav~secured technic,Ll. assistance and review participation from the FEA, the Federal Maritime Administration, the Department of the Na~

and U.S. Coast Guar::l, the FPC, NASA, and others.

We are particularly interested in the p,i.rticipation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in regard to the sei.smic safety and sabotage issues that will be studied as a part of this p.~:oj ect.

Please advise us of the name of a representative of your Commission who we may contact "i:n r,eigard to the above issues.

I have discussed this request with Dr. No:C"man Eisenberg, of the Transportation and Standards Branch, who advised me to get in touch with you.

Thank you for your,aLttention in this matter, and I will look forward to contacting you in tl~Le near future.

NJA:nb Encl.

Sincerely,

<-;r;~-. ~

~~

dich Project Administration Assistant

, I--";.;; a

• .'.}(:L:=.:.;::; i=<EGULATC;:;'( CC:".".';:SiC,'J Robert L. Solomon Chief, Policy and Program Evaluation Office Energy Resources Conserva 1:ion and Development Commission 1111 Howe Avenue, MS3O Sacramento, California 95825

Dear Rob,

For your information I am enclosing a Federal Register Notice on LNG Safety Standards dated Apt*il 21, 1977.

I've not yet had a chance to review it.

I received your April 11, 1977 letter but have not yet received the responses to the request for proposals.

Enclosure:

As stated Brian K. Grimes, Chief Environmental Evaluation Branch Division of Operating Reactors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

STATE OF CALIFORNIA-THE RESOURCES AGENCY l!DMUND G. BROWN JR., GoYernc

=========================:==============================================-============

ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION 1111 HOWE AVENUE t MS 30 SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95825 (916) 322-2021 Mr. Brian Grimes Chief, Environmental Evaluation Branch United States Nuclea1r Regulatory Corrmission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Brian:

April 11, 1977 I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and B111 again when I was fn Washington.

The state's review of the proposed LNG terminals continues, while the out-look for new legislation that would reorganize the LNG siting function remains uncertain. 1~herefore we are simply trying to pre-position as much of the analytical work, especially on safety, as we can.

As we discussed in Wctshington, I am enclosing a copy of the contractor task statement on thE! safety portions of the Point Conception Environmental Impact Report.

We will have responses to the request for proposals within about one week.

We will forward directly to your office copies of the proposals on the saf,eity analysis tasks; and, if you can designated the appropriate technical people to have an 1nfonnal look at these responses, we can make a decisi1:1n on the best way to get your input - perhaps by a conference call with our technical liaison, or better yet, an fnfonnal visit by yourself or a member of your staff. As agreed, this will be a strictly infonnal, 111,onvoting" participation by NRC, and we'll take ft step-by-step from thi~re.

I am-also enclosing some material regarding our position in the Pacific Indonesia LNG proceedfng, where we have advocated a federal certificate condition requiring a *nnal Safety Analysis Report" for the LNG facility. -

Aside from any futurEi technical assistance that might be arranged, one of the areas where your office might be most helpful, again on an informal basis, would be in dE!Veloping more specific and precfse language for the actual permit condit1,on. Since neither we nor the FPC have had any experi-ence with a conditiori of this type, we would be very interested in your input as to how to dEivelop this condition so that it would achieve the objectives described fn the excerpts from my testtmony before the FPC.

Mr:-Brian Grimes Apri 1 11, 1977 Page 2 I'll check with you in about two weeks, after you've had a chance to look over some of these materials.

RLS:dh Enclosures Best regards,

/7./4/!--~

ROBERT L. sdtoMON Chief, Policy and Program Evaluation Office

Robert L. Solomon Apri 1 8, 1977 To:

Randy Deutsch, California Public Utilities Commission Re:

FSAR Condition California recommends. that the Federal Power Commission, in its certificate of public convenience* and necessity for the proposed LNG facility, establish a condition requirin9 a Final Safety Analysis Report {FSAR).

The FSAR condition described below is analogous in concept; but not neces-sarily in procedure, to the requirement for acceptance of an FSAR by the Nuclear Regulatory Corm,ission (NRC) before a nuclear power plant may be granted an operati,ng 11icense.

The need for a final, as distinct from a preliminary, safety aria lys is is bas i ca Hy the same for a 1 iquefi ed natural gas facility as it is for a nuclear plant. The NRC is specifically required, under the original At,:,mic Energy Act, to implement a dual. licensing procedure--

first issuing a construction permit, and then an operating license-.

In contrast, the FSAR co1,dition proposed by California is in the nature of a certificate condition that would be established and relieved through appro-priate administrative action by the FPC.

The certificateconditfonshould set forth specific procedures and guidelines for implementation.

The applicant would be responsible for providing neces-sary technical data arid studies documenting final design and engineering, construction, testing, start~up and initial operation. In addition to general engineering and construction information, the applicant would be required to submit detai 1 ed inform,ation on critical safety-related systems and procedures that have not been available for review by the FPC as of the time when the project is certificated. This would include, but not necessarily be limited to, app1icant 1s detail1~d infonnation on marine operations (including informa-tion to be made available to the State, according to the applicant, in April 1977. and which has, accordingly, not been available for FPC review on the record of the present case); additional data on testing, start-up, operating, maintenance,, repair and overhaul procedures; plans for response to marine and 1 and-bas E!d emergency con di ti ons; and hazard eva 1 uati ons for any significant design changes or specification of systems and/or components not finalized as of th1:i time of certification of the project.

The F:PC will be responsible for development of the actual Final Safety Analysis Report, which could be perfonned either by FPC staff, or by the FPC's technical agent or contractor(s),.

The development of the document would proceed con-currently with progress on*design and construction of the project, to minimize the time required in the compilation of the FSAR, as well as providing an

• ongoing design audit and construction monitoring function.

There should be a procedure for time-limited review of the document (and perhaps periodic pro9ress reports on an ongoing basis, to m1nimize time required for final review}, and ther1~ should be provision for involvement of the state and/or other intervenors in the form of opportunity to corrment within the appropriate review period, as on an EIS-supplement.

Final acceptance of the FSAR by the Federal Power Comnission would be required before the plant could receive fts first full cargo of LNG.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D, C. 20555 MAR. 1 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman Rowden Conmissioner Gilinsky Corrmissioner Kennedy THRU:

Lee V. Gossick csi;'..::: Lu v, Gc:S$iet Executive Director for Operations FROM:

William J. Dircks Assistant Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FROM CALIFORNIA ENERGY RESOURCE ccrMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE IN NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEWS On Thursday:. February 24, Brian Grimes of NRR and I met with Robert Solomon:. Chief of Policy and Program Evaluation, for the California Energy Resources Conservation and Development (CERCDC}.

Solomon had.requE!sted the meeting in order to explore the feasibility of securing NRC assistance in the review of the health and safety aspects of a proposed LNG facility to be constructed in California.

The FPC is conduc:ting prpceedings relating to an LNG facility to be located in California: California officials represented by the Energy Corrmis::; ion have testified before the FPC and have expressed concern about the need for additional resources and measures to assur-1:! system safety in the post penni tting stages.

Such additional m1!asures would include final design review, monitoring of construction and plans, monitoring of facility operation, and assurance of acceptable safety contingency planning.

California has requested that FPC should condition its certificate approvals to not,a:llow the facility to operate until a final safety analysis report (.F'SAR) has been completed and accepted and it has been detennined that the facility has been built in accordance with the tenns and conditions of the FSAR.

The FSAR proeess, which the Conmiss*ion pointed out should be similar to the FSAR process used by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:. would entail detailed independent review of final design and construction, safety contingency planning and testing, and should extend through initial start-up.

J I

i

.~--------------------

The* Comniss1or,ers The State Ene1*gy Cormtission-feels that the technical know-how for the impleri1entation of the envisioned FSAA process does not exist either i1t the State or local level or w1th the FPC.

In the vfew of the St.ate ColTJ'Tlission, such expertise 1s well established and p~sently iexists 1n NRC, the Department of Defense. and NASA.

What Solomon was seeking in his meeting with us was an 1nd1cat1on of any w1111ngness on the part of NRC to assist them fn:

-- Reviewing of the F!AR;

-- Establ'lsh1ng technical con<fit1ons for approval of project; I

-- Monitoring ana inspecting construct fen operations;

-- Rev1ew1:r,g initial sta:--t-up operations.

The State estfn:111tes that the NRC involvement would require several technical man y1!ars of effort over a three-year period.

If NRC agreed tc> assist it, the State would like FPC to contract with HRC to carr:y out the work.

If FPC refused, the State would contract directly with NRC.

We ended the mei!tfng with our agreeing to refer the matter to the Co1'11t11ss1oners.

We warned Mr. Solomon that, 1n view of the unusual*

nature of the proposal, the probable legal difficulties. and the very stringent nianpower constraints faced by rlRC fn carrying out its own nuclear 1program, it would be difficult to be optimistic about securing f1Jll-scale NRC support for the State 1n the endeavor

• Solomon said tha1: 1n view of the timing of FPC actions on the project he would be calling within a week to see if anything could be worked out.

If the Co1'11T11ss101~1 wishes to pursue this matter any further. we w111 secure the necessary legal and resource analyses.

- If the Com1ss1on wishes to provfde some level of support to the State short of the! fu11-scale effort laid out.by Solomon, we will explore altemathes with him.

Wf111am J. Direks Assistant Executive Dfeector

""'"' o.,A*:a+innc

~ f *~-.*.-

Enclosure D Testimonyof Camp Pendleton Officials

. Off!CIAL PRESS RELEASE LNG POLICY STAnMENT.

CAMP PENDLETON, Calif., May 15 -

The following statement was made at a California Coastal Com-mission public hearing today at Los Angeles.

• • • -::.*.-:-*-* ** *:::*:*:*:*:*:-:-:-:-*-:-*-:-:-:::*:-:-:-:-:-:*****:*:-:*:::*:-:-:-:-:-:-*:-:::*:*.*:-j his position and the position of the Secretary of the

@~;~~~Jt!~j~j@!~};)/t\\f}J~))~if)j(~ftt\\tl~)j Navy on the proposed establishment of a liquif.ied

- more -

-,-WWW--*---*---

LNG POLICY STATEMENT ADD 1.:.1-1-1 Camp Pendleton. houses the major ground combat*elements and a few of the air cc,mbat elements of the I Marine Amphibious Force or I MAF.

This force consists of the 1st Marine Division, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wi11g and a number or* associated combat and logis-tical commands -

3ll maintained in a high state of combat readi-ness for immediate use anywhere in the world *

. The camp itself i~ a prime training area 'for all these air and ground combat comm,3nds.

It contains 38,000 acres of ranges on which all the air and*ground weapons of the force -

including supersonic jet aircraft -

ar1::.regularly exercised. It also has the only beach areas in the Westei~*n United States on which I MAF can hone the am-phibious assault r1::sponsibilities assigned to U. S. Marines by f'ed-eral law.

. Construction 1:1f an LNG terminal at Camp Pendleton would have such a severe impac:.t on these facilities that the combat readiness of I MAF and assoc:i.ated elements of the U. s. Navy would be serious-ly -

perhaps irreparably -

degraded.

For example, we would have to terminate the training of large landing forces.

The 9,000-foot pier and LNG tanker activity,would prevent the deployment and maneuver of the naval. forces necessary for large landing eixercises.

Even small unit training could not re-ceive the aircraft support vital to the success of landing forces.

The LNG terminals ~md LNG tankers are hazardous areas, and high peri'ormance _aircraft cannot fly over them at low altitude without violating peacetimei safety rules.

We would also lose the use of our aircraft bombing range.

The oply air corridbr t;o this range passes right over the terminal site.

This corridor was designed by the Federal Aviation Administration and: the U.S. Navy,. to meet specific requirements.

It*keeps aircraft away from the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant, military and civilian housing areas and Gamp Pendleton*~ ammunition storage areas. It is used by fully armed aircraft -

that is, aircraft carrying clusters of 500-lb. bombs --- which fiy over the terminal site at low altitude and at speeds in excess of LJX) knots.

Constructioi:i <>f the terminal would also seriously inhibit train-ing with ground combat weapons.

The terminal plans we have seen call for routing natural gas pipelines through the range impact areas.

And, rather obviously, we would be unable to fire high explosive ammunition in any area which <:ontained gas pipelines.

The routing of pipelines through training areas would also se-riously inhibit training with tanks and other mechanized equipment.

- more -

LNG POLICY STATEMENT ADD 2-2-2-2 It is also p,ertinent to note that the populatJ.on density.

• requirements assc1i:iated with LNG tenninals woulq force us to

. relocate a number of billeting areas assigned to troops of I MAF.

The costs of thes.,e relocations have not been refined, but they would be no less than $40 million.;._ and they could be as high as $75 million.

'rhis, as I understand it, is a cost which would have to be met by the company building the tex:minal*- one which would*be passed. on to the purchasers of natural gas *.

I.also must point out that the Secretary of Defense recent-ly directed the' Di~partment of the Navy to study the possible re-location and/or consolidation of a number of training activit,ies.

One of the prbposals under study calls for moving the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at ~>an Diego_ -..: and, possibly, the Marine Corps Re-crui t Depot at Parris Island, S. C. -

to. Camp Pendleton. If this is done, the most logical Camp Pendleton site for the depot or depots is an area south of the LNG tenninal site and adjacent to existing recruit t;raining areas *. Doing this might put the areas*

far above the population density requirements.

Because of al.l the things I have just told you, I must urge the commission to reject the staff recommendation and omit Camp Pendleton from fu:c*ther consideration as a site for an LNG terminal.

There -is one final point to make.

This nation,::an import natural gas -

and many other needed commodities -

because the seas are free.

American sea power guarantees that.

u. s. Marine:3 are a vital element of sea power.

Establishipg an LNG tenn1nal at Camp Pendleton would jeopar-dize the Marine Corps* ability to contribute to American sea power.

We think that wou1d be a foolish risk.

. Thank you.

---

wwww-----

l 1.AM CAPTAIN WAYNE COLLINS REPRESENTING THE WESTERN DIVISION, NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND, SAN :BRUNO, CALIFORNIA.

OUR COMMAi.'ID HAS REPRESENTED NAVY INSTALLATIONS IN CALIFORNIA IN M.l\\NY DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA'S COASTAL MA.~AGEMENT PROGRAM THROUGHOUT THE LAST FEW YEARS.

WE HAVE ALSO COORDINATED NAVY INTERESTS FOR SIMILAR PROGRAMS IN THE STATES OF WASHINGTON AND OREGON.

WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH YOUR STAFF'S RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE PROSPECTIVE USE OF A SITE AT CAMP PENDLETON FOR A LNG TERMINAL.

MY COMMENTS ARE RELATED TO THOSE OF GENERAL HOFFMAN'S, BUT MY COMMENTS DO NOT ADDRESS NAVY/MARINE CORPS

, I MISSION INTERFACES DIRECTLY BUT RATHER PINPOINT OBJECTIONS OF A GENERAL PLANNING POINT POLICY/OF VIEW..

WHILE TH:E:SE COMMENTS RELATE TO THE NAVY/MARINE CORPS SPECIFIC INTERESTS AT CAMP PENDLETON, THEY ALSO *Go BEYOND DIRECT_SPECIFICS OF THAT SITE. -

THE FIRST SUBJECT DEALS W:CTH YOUR STAFF'S VIEW AS REGARDS PUBLIC SAFETY IN THIS ISSUE.. THE STAFF SEEMS ~O BE CONCEIUIBD WITH SAFETY, AT LEAST IN SOME AREAS

• ALLOW ME TO CITE SEVERAL QUOTES/SUMMARIES OF STATEMENTS IN THE STAFF REPORT DEALING WITH SAFETY:

'A.

"THE SAFETY OF I.NG OPERATIONS REMAINS UNCERTAIN."

B.

!'THE SINGLE TERMINAL AUTHORIZED **** IS TO BE LOCATED AT A SITE REMOTE FROM HUMAN POPULATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE PROTECTION TO THE PUBLIC IGAtNST TIIE POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENT."

C.

"THE COMMISS~ON 1:1,AS SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF MEASURES TO PREVENT AND '.r0 COPE WITH LNG ACCIDENTS ANP ABQUT THE RESEARCH UNDERTAKEN SO FAR TO PREDICT THE CONSEQUENCES OF LNG SPILLS, FIRES, AND VAPOR CLOUD DISPERSION."

D.

" **** THE COMMISSJ:ON HAS REMOVED LAS VARAS FROM.FURTHER CONSIDERATION AS A LNG TERMIUAL SITE TO MINIMIZE RISKS TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY ****

EVEN THOUGH THE, co~~tISSION'S OWN CONSULTA.~TS BELIEVE THAT DESIGN

E. ~. 30263:

(A) "NEW OR EXPANDED REFINERIES OR PETROCHEMICAL FACILITIES NOT OTHERWISE CONSISTENT WITH THE. PROVISIONS OF THIS DIVISION SHALL BE PERMITTED IF..*** (5) THE FACILITIES IS SITED SO AS TO PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT BU:e'FER AREA TO MINIMIZE ADVERSE IMPACTS ON SURROUNDING PROPERTY."

IT APPEARS THAT THE CLEAR INTENT OF SECTION 3 OF THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL MANAGEMENT ACT IS TO MAKE SURE COASTJ~L DEVELOPMENTS NOT.ONLY PROTECT PUBLIC ACCESS, RECREATION, MARINE ENVIRONMENT, ETC., :aUT TO ALSO ENSURE THAT NEW HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE PLANNED FULLY CONSIDERING PUBLIC SAFETY.

DESPITE THIS OBVIOUS

• INTENT, THE STAFF REPORT SAYS:

"SINCE THE SAFETY*OF LNG TERMINAL AND TANKER OPERATIONS IS NOT WITHIN THE COMMISSION'S LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION, ONLY LIMITED STUDY WAS MADE OF THESE SAE'ETY ISSUES."

ADDITIONALLY,: "THE BASIS FOR SITE RANKING IS THE HEAVY WEIGHTING OF COASTAL ACT POLICIES ON RECREATION, PUBLIC ACCESS, PROTECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, A.i.W MINIMIZING ADVERSE DEVELqPMENT IMPACTS **** LESS WEIGHT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE COASTAL ACT POLICIES PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF TERMINAL COST AND SAFETY DIFFERENCES AT THE SITES."

THESE LAST TWO STATEMENTS CLEARLY CONFLICT WITH THE INTENT OF CHAPTER 3 OF

• • THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL MANAGE.11:ENT. ACT AND Sl'AFF' S OWN WORDS QUOTED EARLIER VOICING CONCERN OVER SAFETY ISSUES AND THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF AT LEAST ONE SITE DUE SOLELY TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS.

CLEARLY >Jf'l. MAJOR LNG TERMINAL At~

RANKING EFFORT BY THE STATE WHICH DOES !!Q! FULLY INCLUDE~ASPECTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY IS LITTLE MORE THAN AN INTERESTING ACADEMIC EXERCISE.

THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC SAFETY MUST BE A MAJOR, AND WE WOULD SUGGEST THE PRIME, CONSIDERATION C/P~~l-f'1A"'t,INAL STATE DECISION ON SITING IS ~

~A s~o.,

Fil'-L IF, IN FACT, YOU FEEL THAT imUR RANKING CHARTER DOES NOT PERMIT CONSIDERATION

~

1'f,?,; OF PUBLIC SAFETY ISSUE:S, THEN THIS LIMITATION MUST BE FULLY DISCLOSED

TO THE~UBL~C THROUGH THE MEDIA AND THE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING PUBLIC SAFETY ARE NOT APPROPRIATE: IN YOUR REPORT - SUCH AS THE DISMISSAL OF ONE OR MORF.

SITES FOR SAFETY REASONS *. IF SAFETY~ A CONSIDERATION ~N YOUR FINDINGS, THEN YOU MUST THOROUGHLY EXPLORE ALL ASPECTS OF THE SAFETY ISSUE, NOT JUST THE ONES WICH ARE MOST FAVORABLE TO A PARTICULAR POINT OF VIEW OR WHICH MIGHT BE MOST tc.,£ ~l,t,,llc-.&:

~

l'HE U/6-,1,~

EASILY UNDERSTOOD. A THE o:n:RATIONAL HAZARDS AT CAMP PENDLETON, ~

~

Je,/SJ:.$ J MORE SEVERE FROM A PROBABILITY POINT OF VIEW* THAN SEISMICA CONSIDERING THE PROPOSED SITING OF A TRESTLE AND TANKER BERTH IN THE TRACK OF NAVAL SHIPS ON MANEUVER; AND SITING OF THI~ TERMINAL WHERE IT WOULD BE REGULARLY OVERFLOWN BY

.ARMED HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT AT LOW ALTITUD~ IN RESTRICTED AIR SPACE.

YOU CANNOT PICK AND CHOOSE THE SAFETY ASPECTS YOU CONSIDER AS THE ONES BEST FITTING EITHER THE ANSWER YOU WANT OR THE ONES YOU BEST UNDERSTAND.

YOU MUST LOOK AT THE SAFETY QUESTION ~FULLY AND COMPLETELY, OR TELL THE WORLD THAT YOUR RANKING HAS NO CONSI:OERATIONS REGAR.DING THE QUESTION OFPUBUC SAFETY WITHIN IT, CH~.'

BUT IS LIMITED ONLY.TO CONSIDERATIONS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL M'rC:&:E:-

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-AS AN ADDED PARENTHETICAL C:iOMMENT ON SAFETY, WE STILL~ UNDERSTAND THE STATE'S POPULATION L Z,SPITE RESTRICTIONS, WHICH ARE CONCERNED ONLY WITH

• . PERMANENT ~~SIDENTS AND WORKERS NEAR A LNG TERMINAL.

WHEN YOU CONSIDER, (1) THAT INTERSTATE 5 IS ABOUT AS CLOSE AS YOU CAN GET TO THE SITE WinIOUT BEING ON IT, (2) AND THE STATE'S"PERMANENT POPULATION DENSITY RESTRICTION IS*ABOUT 27 PEOPLE LIVING OR WORKING WITHIN ONE MILE OF THE SITE, AND (3)

THAT THE STAFF REPORTS THE :PEAK DENSITY ON INTERSTATE 5 IN THE VICINITY OF HORNO CANYON TO BE 7,080 PEOPLE PER MILE1 IT IS DIFFICUL'.! F~R US TO UNDERSTAND THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THI!5 IS THE BEST SITE IN CALIFORNIA FOR THIS FACILITY.

THE SAFETY ISSUE SHOULD CEN:CER ON REDUCING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF POTENTIAL CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM TIIE MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT, NOT WHETHER THEY LIVE OR WORK IN THE AREA ON.A REGULAR BASIS.

PEOPLE ARE PEOPLE, WHETHER

. 'IREY ARE TRANSIENT OR NOT!

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• .I~ WOULD LIKE TO RAISE ONE LAST QUESTION OF A. DIFFERENT NATURE.

THIS ENTIRE YOU RANKING ISSUE WITH WHICH/ARE EMBROILED IS Bt.ING CARRIED OUT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE STATE'S COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRM, WHICH, IN TURN, IS UNDER THE JURISDICTIONAL UMBRELLA OF THE FEDERAL COASTAL MANAGEMENT ACT.

I AM CERTAIN YOU ARE AWARE OF 'IHE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE IN THE FEDERAL COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT:

"EXCLUDED FROM

.THE COASTAL ZONE* ARE L&'IDS THE USE OF WHICH IS BY LAW SUBJECT SOLELY TO THE DISCRETION OF OR WHICH IS HELD IN TRUST BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT."

OBVIOUSLY, NEITHER CAMP PENDLETON, NOR ANY OF THE OTHER NAVY/MARINE CORPS PROPERTY IN

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' CALIFORNIA, IS LOCATED'WITHIN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA'S COASTAL ZONE.

THE AUTHORITY OF THIS COASTAL ZONE COMMISSION TO PUBLfCLY CONSIDER FUTURE DEVELOPMENT ON THIS NON-EXCESS FEDERAL PROPERTY TO THE EXTENT OF INCLUDING THE SITE IN A PUBLIC RANKING LIST ALONG WITH OTHER SITES WHICH ARE UNDER THE COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION, AND USING RAMKING CRITERIA CONTAINED IN THE STATE'S COASTAL MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION, IS QUESTIONED.

THANK YOU FOR PERMilTING nm TIME FOR THESE COMMENTS.

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