ML12215A421

9/5/12 Meeting Summary for Tennessee Valley Authority Regarding Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Appendix R (Fire Protection)

ML12215A421
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	10/10/2012
From:	Siva Lingam Plant Licensing Branch II
To:
Lingam, Siva
Shared Package
ML12215A413	List: ML12215A420 ML12215A421 ML12215A425
References
Download: ML12215A421 (4)

Text

\.-,<-",1\ REGuz, UNITED STATES

~~(, "'01' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f?

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0 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Ii:

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October 10, 2012

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"'" ..,.0 LICENSEE: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

FACILITY: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 SUB..IECT:

SUMMARY

OF SEPTEMBER 5,2012, MEETING WITH TVA TO DISCUSS SEOUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2,10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX R (FIRE PROTECTION)

On September 5,2012, a Category 1 public meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and representatives of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss TVA's approach to multiple spurious operation (MSO) circuit failure resolutions at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (SON, Units 1 and 2).

Prior to the meeting, TVA sent the slide presentation that was used during the meeting to the NRC. This slide presentation can be found at Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12215A425. During the meeting, the licensee discussed the slides in detail and the NRC asked clarifying questions concerning the technical aspects of the MSO circuit failure resolutions that were described. A few specific items the licensee discussed include:

• The scope of new or modified equipment that will be needed when implementing the multiple circuit failure resolution to SON, Units 1 and 2, which include approximately:

• 16,700ft of conduit,

• 74,000ft of cable,

• 6,350ft of stainless steel tubing,

• 2,400ft of Thermo Lag,

• 6,000 electrical terminations,

• 2,000 electrical supports, and

• 80 plant end-of-line devices

• That SON, Units 1 and 2 do not currently have a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) analysis specific to fire protection, and they did not use the PRA when evaluating the need for the modifications. However, TVA did use the SON, Units 1 and 2 internal events PRA to support the modifications discussed during the meeting.

The licensee responded to the following NRC staff's questions:

• Whether or not the scenarios were evaluated against Revision 3 to Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 00-01, "Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis,,?1 The slide 1 ADAMS Accession No. ML112910147

-2 presentation states that the scenarios were evaluated against Rev. 2 to NEI 00-01. The licensee responded to this question during the meeting and indicated that the scenarios evaluated were from Rev. 3 to NEI 00-01.

• What changes, if any, are you making to your design change process to ensure that future modifications to the plant consider multiple spurious circuit failure issues? The licensee mentioned that they have a very robust design change process. The changes they are making to address MSO concerns are being incorporated into their design documentation and any subsequent changes to the plant will be evaluated to determine what the impact of the change will be.

Some specific questions the NRC staff asked the licensee to consider during their review:

• Do MSO related modifications affect or not affect any of the licensing basis analyses including accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, thermal-hydraulic (TH) coping analysis satisfying the station blackout rule, and TH analysis supporting the 72-hour mission time?

• What, if any, Technical Specification (TS) implications might be caused by MSO related modifications?

• What, if any, PRA implications or common cause problems from enhancements might be caused by MSO related modifications?

• What, if any, entry conditions for TS events and MSO related modifications will cause and how this will inter-relate with fire protection?

No proprietary information was discussed at the meeting and no members of the public were present. A list of attendees is enclosed.

Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-1564 or siva.lingam@nrc.gov.

~~.~

Siva P. Lingam Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Enclosure:

List of Attendees cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

LIST OF ATTENDEES SEPTEMBER 5. 2012 MEETING WITH TENESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX R (FIRE PROTECTION)

Eddie Turner Joe Shea Joe Williams P. Todd Noe Behrouz Ahmadi Brenda Simril Robert Egli Clyde Mackaman (by phone)

Joseph Giitter, NRR Samson Lee, NRR Jessie Quichocho, NRR Siva Lingam, NRR Jeff Whited, NRR Susan Lent, NRR Summer Sun, NRR Harry Barrett, NRR Gary Cooper, NRR Chuck Moulton, NRR Daniel Frumkin, NRR Alex Klein, NRR George Lapinsky, NRR (by phone)

John Rogge, RI (by phone)

John Mateychick, RIV (by phone)

Ronald Langstaff, Rill (by phone)

Mike King, RII (by phone)

Steve Alferink, RIV (by phone)

Stephanie Achen, RIV (by phone)

John Watkins, RIV (by phone)

Greg Pick, RIV (by phone)

Enclosure

-2

• presentation states that the scenarios were evaluated against Rev. 2 to NEI 00-01. The licensee responded to this question during the meeting and indicated that the scenarios evaluated were from Rev. 3 to NEI 00-01.

• What changes, if any, are you making to your design change process to ensure that future modifications to the plant consider multiple spurious circuit failure issues? The licensee mentioned that they have a very robust design change process. The changes they are making to address MSO concerns are being incorporated into their design documentation and any subsequent changes to the plant will be evaluated to determine what the impact of the change will be.

Some specific questions the NRC staff asked the licensee to consider during their review:

• Do MSO related modifications affect or not affect any of the licensing basis analyses including accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, thermal-hydraulic (TH) coping analysis satisfying the station blackout rule, and TH analysis supporting the 72-hour mission time?

• What, if any, Technical Specification (TS) implications might be caused by MSO related modifications?

• What, if any, PRA implications or common cause problems from enhancements might be caused by MSO related modifications?

• What, if any, entry conditions for TS events and MSO related modifications will cause and how this will inter-relate with fire protection?

No proprietary information was discussed at the meeting and no members of the public were present. A list of attendees is enclosed.

Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-1564 or siva.lingam@nrc.gov.

IRA!

Siva P. Lingam Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Enclosure:

List of Attendees cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Distribution:

PUBLIC LPl2-2 RtF G. Pick, RIV G. Cooper, NRR RldsNrrPMSequoyah RidsNrrPMBrownsFerry RidsNrrLABClayton C. Moulton, NRR Rids NrrDorlLpl2-2 RidsOpaMaii RidsNrrDeEeeb J. Watkins, RIV RidsRgn2MailCenter RidsOgcRp G. Lapinsky, NRR S. Alferink. RIV RidsAcrsAcnw MailCTR RidsNrrDraApla J. Rogge, RI H. Barrett, NRR T. Wertz, NRR D. Merzke, NRR S. Achen, RIV J. Mateychick, RIV S. Kennedy, EDO S. Lent, NRR D. Frumkin, NRR R. Langstaff, RII RidsNrrDraAfpb RidsNrrDraAhpb RidsNrrDra M. King, RII J. Whited, NRR S. Sun, NRR