ML12108A207
| ML12108A207 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/2012 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Dudek M, NRR/JLD 301-415-6500 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML12101A283 | List: |
| References | |
| EDATS: SECY-2012-0159, G201202201, SECY-2012-0159 | |
| Download: ML12108A207 (2) | |
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QUESTION 1.
I understand determinations regarding emergency planning zones have been designated as a Tier III issue for long-term analysis. Can you explain why that approach was taken and what issues you seek to address over the long-term? Additionally, how long does the NRC anticipate it will take to develop new guidance on this issue? This is particularly important in New York where many of the reactors, such as Indian Point, Ginna, and the reactors at Oswego near major population centers where, without adequate planning, evacuation could be exceedingly difficult.
ANSWER.
For planning purposes, the Commission has defined a plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) as an area of approximately 10 miles in radius and an ingestion pathway EPZ as an area of approximately 50 miles in radius around each nuclear power plant. EPZ size and configuration may vary in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
Over the years, the NRC staff has conducted several studies that have confirmed the adequacy of this approach. The results of these studies have been published as NRC NUREG documents. The studies support the NRCs basis for concluding that the existing emergency preparedness framework and regulations provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency at a U.S. nuclear power plant.
QUESTION 1 Gillibrand/NRR 04/11/2012 Since the events of March 2011 at Fukushima Dai-ichi, the NRC staff has been focused on assessing the identified lessons-learned and making the necessary enhancements to its regulatory system in a systematic and methodical manner. Among the issues identified by the staff as having a nexus to the Fukushima event was the basis of the EPZ size. In contrast with the event in Japan, where information being received by the NRC was often conflicting and potentially unreliable, within the U.S., each licensee and affected State has a dedicated link to NRCs Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), which supplies a steady stream of important plant parameters. The NRC independently monitors plant conditions and protective recommendations made by the licensee and State. In light of these considerations, the NRC staff recommended that the EPZ size be reviewed as a longer-term activity to determine whether any enhancements to existing strategies are warranted. In December 2011, the Commission approved the staffs prioritization of those recommendations without significant schedule modification. The NRC staff will provide additional information to the Commission on its proposed plan to review EPZ size in a July 2012 Commission Paper which will address all of the longer term action items.