Text

Initial Exam 2012-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML120720301
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	02/21/2012
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	;
	Gerald Laska
References
	Download: ML120720301 (321)
	v • d • e

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2012-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 1, 100% power, EOL Turnover: Maintain current conditions; currently in 0-GO-5 Section 5.2, At Power Conditions Target CTs: Manually start the 1 B-B EDG prior to placing equipment in PTL in ECA-0.0 Manually start the 1 B-B SI pump prior to completion of ES-0.5 step 1 1.

Event No.

1.

Malt. No.

CV1 1 Event Type*

l-ATC/SRO

[ Event Description VCT Level Channel 129 tails high. The ATC will manually control VCT

]

level by placing 1-LCV-62-1 18 in VCT position using the ARP.

2. CC1OA C-BOP/SRO The lA-A CCS Pump trip coupled with a failure of the lB-B CCS pump TS-SRO to auto start. The BOP will manually start the 1 B-B CCS pump using

. AOP-M.03. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines the 1 A-A pre-insert CCS pump is INOPERABLE.

CCO9B 2.a Set C-ATC/SRO The Letdown Demin Bypass valve tails to auto shift to BYPASS, the ATC yp_cv37=- will manually bypass the Letdown Demins using the ARP.

3. RCO5 C-ATC/SRO A small leak will develop PORV 68-334. The ATC will shut the isolation TS-SRO valve 68-333 to isolate the PORV using Immediate Operator Actions and AOP-R.05. The SRO will address Tech Spec and determines the PORV is INOPERABLE.

4. TS-SRO The crew receives notification from Engineering that SI Pumps lA-A and 1 B-B have the wrong grade of lube oil. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines both SI pumps are INOPERABLE.

5. R ATC The crew initiates a power reduction using AOP-C.03 in order to comply N BOP!SRO withthe LCO action requirements and station a management directive

6. THO2C M-All A SBLOCA will develop. The crew will respond using E-0 to trip the reactor and initiate Safety Injection and ultimately transition to E-l.

7. EDO1 M-AlI Loss of Off-Site Power resulting in a loss of power to both 6.9 KV Shutdown Boards.

8. EGO8B C-BOP 1 B-B EDG fails to auto start.

lA-A EDG trips and cannot be started.

pre-insert The BOP manually starts 1 B-B EDG to energize shutdown board 1 B-B.

EGO2A

9. CVO1 B C-ATC lB-B CCP pump breaker trips.

pre-insert The 1 B-B SI fails to auto start, the ATC manually starts the 1 B-B SI SI13B pump.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 2012-301 Scenario 1 Summary EVENT 1 Following turnover when directed by the lead examiner, VCT Level Channel 129 fails high. The ATC will manually control VCT level by placing 1 -LCV-62-1 18 in VCT position using the APP.

EVENT 2 When directed by the lead examiner, the 1 A-A CCS Pump trip coupled with a failure of the 1 B-B CCS pump to auto start. The BOP will manually start the 1 B-B CCS pump using AOP-M.03. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines the lA-A CCS pump is INOPERABLE and enters LCO 3.7.3.

EVENT 2.a The Letdown Demin Bypass valve fails to auto shift to BYPASS, the ATC will manually bypass the Letdown Demins using the APP.

EVENT 3 When directed by the lead examiner, a small leak will develop PORV 68-334. The ATC will shut the isolation valve 68-333 to isolate the PORV using AOP-R.05. The SRO will address Tech Spec and determines the PORV is INOPERABLE.

EVENT 4 When directed by the lead examiner, the crew will receive notification from Engineering that SI Pumps lA-A and lB-B have the wrong grade of lube oil. The SRO addresses Tech Spec and determines both SI pumps are INOPERABLE. The SRO will determine the action of LCO 3.0.3 applies and makes preparation to reduce power within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

EVENT 5 The crew initiates a power reduction using AOP-C.03 in order to comply with the LCO action requirements and a station management directive.

EVENT 6 When directed by the lead examiner, a SBLOCA will develop. The crew will respond using E-0 to trip the reactor and initiate Safety Injection and ultimately transition to E-1.

EVENT 7 and 8 Shortly after the trip when directed by the lead examiner, off-site power will be lost. In addition, 1 B-B EDG fails to auto start, and must be started manually. The lA-A EDG trips and cannot be started. The BOP manually starts 1 B-B EDG to energize shutdown board lB-B.

EVENT 9 During implementation of the EOPs, the 1 B-B CCP Pump trips and the 1 B-B SI pump fails to auto start. The ATC manually starts the 1 B-B SI pump.

The scenario terminates as directed by the Lead Examiner upon completion of FR-Z.1 EOP flow: E-0, FR-Z.1, E-1 (Note; ECA-0.0 MAY be entered briefly prior to starting EDG)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 1 of 61 Event

Description:

Volume Control Tank Level Transmitter LT-62-129 Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 1 VCT Level Ch 129 fails high Indications available:

. Alarm XA-55-6C, A-3, LS-62-129A1B VOLUME CONTATCL TANK LEVEL HI-LOW (If actual VCT level gets to the low level alarm setpoint.

. 1-LT-62-129 Indication failing high (ICS or M-6 Trend Recorder)

. ICS VCT Low Pressure alarm LS-62-1 29A1B VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL HI-LOW Probable 1. High Level Causes [a VCT divert valve malfunction or misaligned.

[b] Letdown flow rate greater than makeup flow rate.

[c] I -LT 1 30A failing high.

CAUTION If actual level is permitted to become low, charging pump gas intrusion could occur. [C.5]

NOTE 1 High failure of i-LT-62-129A or l-LT-62-130A defeats auto switch over to RWST on low level.

NOTE 2 High failure of i-LT-62-129A will divert letdown flow with NO affect on Auto makeup.

ATC Responds to ARP 1 -AR-MS-C A-3.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

[1] COMPARE indicated level between fl-LI-62-129] (i-M-6) and ATC ICS computer point LOII2A (i-LT-62-130).

[31 IF i-LT-62-129A or 130A failed high, THEN ENSURE [1 -LCV-62-1 18] in VCT position USING [1 -HS-62-1 I ]

ATC AND manually operate as required to maintain VCT level.

Low failure of 1-LT-62-130A will initiate Auto makeup.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 2 of 61 Event

Description:

Volume Control Tank Level Transmitter LT-62-129 Fails High

[61 iF HIGH level, THEN ta] ENSURE [1LCV-62-1i8i iHgned to HUT

[b] STOP VCT makeup Examiner Note: SRO may discuss effect of failure as per Notes 1 and 2 above.

Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Orerations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue the next event when desired.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 3 of 61 Event

Description:

1 A-A CCS Pump trip, the BOP will manually start the 1 B-B CCS pump Time Position Applicants Action or Behaviors Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 2, lA-A CCS Pump trip Indications available:

O-AR-M27-B-A, Al, CCS REAC BLDG SUPPLY HEADER FLOW LOW O-AR-M27-B-A, E4, ERCW/CCS PUMP MOTOR TRIP Trip indication on lA-A CCS Pump (Red light off, Green and white lights off)

ERCW!CCS PUMP MOTOR TRIP

[2] IF CCS motor trip, THEN GO TO AOP-FvLO3, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

[3] DETERMINE which motor tripped.

[41 TURN control switch to OFF position to reset alarm.

[5] DISPATCH operator to investigate cause of alarm.

[61 EVALUATE LCO 3.7.3 (CCS) or 3.7A (ERCW).

CCS REAC BLDG SUPPLY HEADER FLOW LOW

[1] IF Phase B isolation, THEN CONTINUE with emergency procedure(s) in progress.

[2] CHECK reactor building supply header flow by observing 11 -FI-70-1421.

[31 ENSURE CCS heat exchanger aligned properly in accordance with I -SO-70-1. Component Cooling Water System Train A.

[4] IF pump problem exists with inservice pump, THEN START standby CCS pump if available.

[5] IF loss of component cooling water is suspected, THEN GO TO AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Coolihg Water.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 4 of 61 Event

Description:

1 A-A CCS Pump trip, the BOP will manually start the 1 B-B CCS pump Time fl Position fl Applicants Action or Behaviors BOP Responds to ARP O-AR-M27-B-A, Al or E4.

GOP May place lA-A CCS pump HS in PTL BOP May place the 15-B pump HS to START based on prudent operator actions.

SRO Transitions to AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water DIAGNOSE the failure:

GOTO IF... SECTION PAGE CCS Pump trip OR 2.1 4 CCS Pump failure (running pump NOT pumping forward)

SRO Enter AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water SRO Determine section 2.1 applies (CCS Pump Trip or Failure) 2.1 CCS Pump Trip or Failure CAUTION

If Train A CCS flow is lost and CANNOT be restored promptly OR if RCP motor thrust bearing temp alarm (M-5B, E-3) is received, then RCPs must be stopped in Step 3 to prevent damage.

If any Containment Spray Pump is running with NO CCS cooling, spray pump may experience bearing failure after 10 minutes.

I IDENTIFY and LOCK OUT failed CCS Pump [O-M-27B]

BOP

2. CHECK affected pump aligned to supply Train A COS.

NOTE If reactor must be tripped, the CR0 or an extra UO should be assigned to continue with this AOP.

3. ENSURE affected units standby CCS SRO Pump (aligned to Train A) RUNNING.

GOP Place the 1 B-B pump HS to START.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 5 of 61 Event

Description:

1 A-A CCS Pump trip, the BOP will manually start the 1 B-B CCS pump Time Position Applicants Action or Behaviors

4. CHECK Train A CCS Heat Exchanger inlet pressure NORMAL for present plant conditions.

[1-Pl-70-24A, IA1/1A2 008 HX]

[2-PI-70-17A, 2A112A2 CCS HX]

. Between 87 psig and 110 psig NOTE

When Train A CCS is out of service, the affected units Train A COPs, SI Pumps, and RHR Pumps are INOPERABLE for ECCS purposes due to not being able to fulfill their design function for sump recirculation (due to loss of CCS to RHR Hx).

. If necessary, the affected COPs. SI Pumps, and RHR Pumps can be operated without CCS cooling water to mechanical seal HXs. [C.41

5. EVALUATE Tech Specs and EPIP-i SRO USING Appendix H.

SRO Enters the LCO 3.7.3 Action for CCS Loop A C r Ma, momentarHv enter LCO 3.6.2.1 .a action and 3.5.2. Action a.

LIMITING CONDII1ON FOR OPERA1ION 31.3 At least two independent component cooling water loops shalt be OPERABLE.

APPIJCABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3 and 4.

ACTION:

VVth only one component cooIin water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be n at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the foIowi:ng 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

6. IF standby Thermal Barrier Booster Pump(s) running, BOP THEN ENSURE one pump in standby USING 1 (2)-SO-70-1, Component Cooling Water System.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 6 of 61 Event

Description:

1 A-A CCS Pump trip, the BOP will manually start the 1 B-B CCS pump Time Position Applicants Action or Behaviors 7.2.1 Shutdown of CCS (Thermal Barrier) Booster Pump IA-A

[1] IF U-i Thermal Barrier HXs are to remain in service, THEN ENSURE CCS Booster Pump lB-B running per Section 5.2. (NIA if HXs are to be taken out of BOP service)

[2] STOP CCS Booster Pump lA-A with 11-HS-70-131A1 AND PLACE [1 -HS-70-1 31 Al in A-P AUTO.

1st IV 7.2.2 Shutdown of CCS (Thermal Barrier) Booster Pump lB-B

[1] IF U-i Thermal Barrier HXs are to remain in service, THEN ENSURE CCS Booster Pump lA-A running per Section 5.2. (NIA if HXs are to be taken out of service)

[2] STOP CCS Booster Pump 1 B-B with f1-HS-70-130A1 AND PLACE 11-HS-70-130A1 in A-P AUTO.

1st IV

[3] IF pump is to be taken out of service, THEN PLACE 1I-HS-70-130A1 in PULL-TO-LOCK.

Manually stops one Thermal Barrier Booster Pump and places HS in A-P SOP AUTO, if required.

7. GOTOStepl5.

CREW

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 7 of 61 Event

Description:

1 A-A CCS Pump trip, the BOP will manually start the 1 B-B CCS pump Time Position Applicants Action or Behaviors

15. NOTIFY SM to evaluate OPDP-9, Emergent Issue Response.

16. INITIATE Maintenance on failed pump.

CREW

17. GO TO appropriate plant procedure.

END OF SECTION A fl -a I nnnn

ivianuaiav utaces i-- iio VII1T reouireo.

cI4 i Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue next event when Technical Specifications are identified.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 8 of 61 Event

Description:

PORV 68-334 leaks, the ATC will shut the isolation valve 68-333 to isolate the PORV Time Position fl Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: at Lead Examiner direction, insert Event 3, 1-FCV-68-334 Pressurizer PORV fails 5% Open Indications/Alarms:

Indications 1-M-4:

1-XX-68-363A, PZR PORV ACOUSTIC MONITORS: XI-68-334A indicates elevated acoustic (flow) noise; (Possible)

1 -Tl-68-331: 68-340.334, XE-340.334 TAILPIPE TEMPS 1-M-5

RCS PR PRESS (Chs 1-4), 1-Pl-68-340A, 334, 323, 322: showing RCS (Pzr) pressure going down; (Possible)

PRT LEVEL, 1-Ll-68-300 shows an increasing trend (magnitude proportional to time PORV remained open) (Possible)

PRT PRESSURE, 1-Pl-68-301 shows an increasing trend (magnitude proportional to time PORV remained open) (Possible)

PRT TEMPERATURE, 1-Tl-68-309 shows an increasing trend (magnitude proportional to time PORV remained open) (Possible)

RCS PZR PRESS Recorder 1-PR-68-340 shows a decreasing pressure trend proportional to time PORV remained open (Possible)

RCS LOOP 1 HL WIDE RANGE PRESS Recorder 1-PR-68-69 shows a decreasing pressure trend proportional to time PORV remained open (Possible) 1-M-6

RCS WR HL PRESSURE LOOP 3 1-Pl-68-66A, shows a decreasing pressure value; (Possible)

RCS HL PRESS WIDE RANGE 1-PI-68-62, shows a decreasing pressure value; (Possible)

RCS HL PRESS WIDE RANGE 1-Pl-68-69, shows a decreasing pressure value; (Possible)

Annunciators:

1-M-5

. 1-XA-55-5A D-2: PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE LINES TEMP HIGH

1-XA-55-5A D-4: PS-68-340G1F PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOW BACKUP HTRS ON (Possible)

E-2: TS-68-331 PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF LINE TEMP HIGH

1-XA-55-5C B-6: XS-68-363 PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE OPEN (Possible)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 9 of 61 Event

Description:

PORV 68-334 leaks, the ATC will shut the isolation valve 68-333 to isolate the PORV Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TS-68-33 I PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF LINE TEMP HIGH

[1] IF PZR pressure is less than 2315 psig (PORV reset) THEN ENSURE both power relief valves cIosed

[2] IF PORV failed open or suspected partially open, THEN GO TO AOP-L04, Pressurizer Instrument and Control Malfunctions.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Places 1 -HS-68-334A, PZR PORV to CLOSE (PORV does not respond>

ATC Places 1 -HS-68-333A, BLOCK Valve FOR PORV 334, to CLOSE as an Immediate Operator Action.

ATC Responds to ARP 1 -AR-M5-A, E-2.

SRO transitions to AOP-l.04, Pressurizer Instrument And Control SRO Malfunctions Section 2.1, Uncontrolled RCS pressure drop due to open PORV in Modes 1-3 NOTE: If spray valve is open due to pressure instrument failure, then Section Z3 is the appropriate entry point.

DIAGNOSE the failure:

GOTO iF... SECTION PAGE Uncontrolled RCS pressure drop due to open PORV 2.1 4 in Modes 1-3

Aooendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 10 of 61 Event

Description:

PORV 68-334 leaks, the ATC will shut the isolation valve 68-333 to isolate the PORV Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 2.1 Uncontrolled RCS Pressure Drop Due to Open PORV in Modes 1-3 CAUTION Partially open PORV may display no light indications.

NOTE Step I is an IMMEDIATE ACTION.

1 CHECK pzr PORVs CLOSED: CLOSE affected PORV and/or block valve as necessary to stop RCS pressure drop.

. valve position indication IF PORV and/or block valve cannot be

. acoustic monitors. closed or isolated ATC THEN TRIP the reactor AND INITIATE Safety Injection AND GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection ATC 2. MONITOR RCS pressure STABLE or RISING.

ATC 3. CHECK SI signal NOT actuated.

ATC 4. ENSURE available pzr heaters ENERGIZED as necessary.

CAUTION RCS pressure changes and changes in RCS boron concentration (due to differences between pzr and RCS boron) may impact core reactivity.

5. MONITOR reactor power:

a. CHECK reactor in Mode I or 2.

ATC

b. MONITOR core thermal power for unexpected changes.

6. EVALUATE EPIP-1 Emergency Plan SRO Classification Matrix.

SRO Consults with the SM to address EPIP-1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 11 of 61 Event

Description:

PORV 68-334 leaks, the ATC will shut the isolation valve 68-333 to isolate the PORV Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for applicability:

SRO

. 3.2.5 DNB Parameters

. 3.4.3.2, PORVs LIMITING CONDITiON FOR OPERATiON 32.5 The following ONE related parameters shall be maintained within the limits shown on Table 32-1:

a Reactor Coolant System (RCS)T lx Pressurizer Pressure c RCS Total Flaw Rate APPlJABlUTY: MODE 1 ACTION:

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hour&

TABLE 3.2-1 DM8 PARAMETERS LIMITS 4LocsItt PARAMETER Coerat Reactor Coolant System T, 4 83 F Pressurizer Pressure 2220 psia*

Reactor Coolant System Figure 3 2-I Total Flow 3A.32 Twn power relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shalt be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 2, and 3 ACTION:

lx With one PORV inoperable and incapable of RCS pressure control, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and rerrxwe power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hixtrs and in HOT SHUTOO within the following 6 hot.irs.

May enter LCO 3.25b action if RCS pressure goes less than 2220 psia.

SRO Enters LCO 3.4.3.2 Action b.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 12 of 61 Event

Description:

PORV 68-334 leaks, the ATC will shut the isolation valve 68-333 to isolate the PORV Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. IF PORV block valve must be closed OR power must be removed from block valve to comply with LCO 3.4.3.2, THEN REFER TO 0-SO-68-3, Pressurizer Pressure Control System.

Examiner Note: The following CREW Brief and Notification actions are not contained in the procedure.

Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Manacjement Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue the next event when the SRO completes Tech Spec evaluation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2012-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 4 Page 13 of 61 Event

Description:

SI Pumps 1 A-A and 1 B-B have the wrong grade of lube oil Applicants Actions or Behavior Receives call that SI Pumps lA-A and lB-B have the wrong grade of lube oil, affecting operability of both pumps.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 35.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

1.. In MODE 3, both safety injection (SI) pump flow paths may be isolated by closing the isolation valves for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to perform pressure iscation valve testing per SR 4.4.6.3.

2. In MODE 3, ECCS pumps may be made incapable of injecting to support transition into or from the APPLICABILITY of LCO 3.4.12, Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)

System, for upto 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or until the temperature of all RCS cold legs exceeds LTOP arming temperature (35019 specified in the PTLR plus 25SF, whichever comes first:

APPIJCABIUTY: MODES 1,2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. Aith one or more trans noperacle and ith at least 100% of the ECCS flow equrvalent to a s ngle OPERABLE ECCS tram available, restore The ncçerabIe trains) o OPERABLE status nThin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or he n at feast HOT STANDBY 4thmn me rext 6 hcurs ano in HOT SHUTDOWN wiThin the dllng 5 ours.

b. ..th less dan lCO% of :e ECOS flow equtwalent to a ircte OPERABLE ECCS train aailab:e, n-media:ey enter LCO 3 0 3.

3/4 L1MNG CONDITIONS FOR OPEATION AND SIJRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.0 APIJCAB1LiTY LiMITING CCNDITICN FOR OFERATION 3.0.3 Wren a Limiting Condition fu Operation .s not met, except as proded in the assodated ACTION equrremenls. vthrn one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit n a MODE in which the Specification does not apply by plactng it. as applicable, :n:

t at Feast HOT STANDBY within the r.ext 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

2 At eaSt HOT SHIJTDOIvN w:!-in the Inq S hours, and 3 At least COLD SHJDCAN with n the subsequent 24 ours.

Arere correctre measures are competed that perrmt operation ..noert-e ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be :aken n accordance th the specited tine Irnits as easuree from tbe tme of failure to meet the Limiting Conoition for Operation. Eyceptions to these requmrernents are stated fl the ndiidual SpeciItca:crs.

SRO Enters LCO 3.0.3 Transitions to AOP AOP-C.03 Rapid Shutdown Or Load Reduction after SRO receiving call from the SM Examiner Note: If desired, prompt the Booth Operator to provide the cue from station management to reduce power within one hour.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 14 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: No action required for Event 5, Rapid Power reduction SRO Directs performance of AOP-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD REDUCTION.

1 ENSURE crew has been briefed on reactivity SRO management expectations USING Appendix A.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT BRIEFING NOTE This appendix should be used in addition to event-based brief.

[1] ENSURE crew has been briefed on the following:

Reason for Rapid Shutdown or Load Reduction

Load Reduction Rate:________

Desired final power level:______

Reactivity Management expectations:

Unit Supervisor shall concur with all reactivity manipulations

Ensure reactor responding as expected using diverse indications

Tavg-Tref Mismatch requirements:

3F control band

5F reactor trip criteria

Crew focus will be on reducing power in a controlled and conservative manner.

OATC will monitor rod insertion limits and AFD limit

Boration source:

Crew will monitor reactor trip and turbine trip criteria using App. B

CR0 will stop secondary plant equipment using App C.

f time permits, review expected annunciators (cx. Computer Alarm, Upper and Lower Flux 0ev)

Termination Criteria (conditions requiring Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, or condition no longer requiring rapid load reduction):

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 15 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Chooses a power reduction rate of 2% to 3% final power level of 20% and BAT as SRO the boration source.

2. NOTIFY ronowing personnel of rapid shutdown or load reduction.

. Load Coordinator C.11 CREW * :;hernis ru

Radiat on Protection

. Plant Management CREW Makes notifications as required.

3. MONITOR reactoriturbine tnp NOT required CREW USING Appendix B, Reactor and Turbine Tdp criteria Examiner note: Appendix B reactor and turbine trip criteria see page 18

4. CHECK VALVE POSITION LIMIT light BOP DARK on EHC panel. {M-21 NOTE: Boration volumes and flowrates listed in this procedure are recommendations and may be adjusted as necessary.

5. INITIATE boration:

a. CHECK rod control AVAILABLE:

ATC

Control Bank D rods capable of being moved

NO dropped or misaligned rods in Control Bank D.

5. b. CHECK Control Bank 0 group position greater tFian 200 steps.

ATC c CHECK boration capability from BAT AVAILABLE

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 16 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Ii DETERMiNE recommended boration volume from BAT:

8O0 gal to reduce power from 100% to 20%

OR SRO

10 gal for each 1% power reduction (from current power level)

OR

volume recommended by Reactor Engineering.

SRO Determines 800 gal to reduce power from 100% to 20%.

5. e. DETERMINE recommended boration tlcwrate from table below or from Reactor Engineering:

SRO LOAD REDUCTION BORATION 1min) 0 RATE( FLOWRATE I 2% 30gpm 3% -45 gprn SRO Chooses a 2% to 3% load reduction rate.

f. ENSURE concurrence obta ned from AT STA for boration volume and flowrate

g. ENSURE bonc ac!d ansfer pump ATC aI!gned to blender n FAST speed.

h. ADJUST FcV 138 to establish ATC desired flow rate.

ATC Adjusts FCV-62-1 38 to between 30 to 45 gpm

f. CONTROL borat on flow as required to nject desired boric acid volume.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 17 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION: If borating from the RWST, Turbine Load Reduction Rate greater than 2% per minute could result in violating Rod Insertion Limit.

6. INATE load reduction as follows:

a. ADJUST load rate to desired value:

between 1% and 4% per minute if borating via FCV 138 BOP OR

between 1% and 3% per minute If borattng ia normal bcration (App H)

OR

2% per minute If bcrating frcm RWST.

BOP Adjusts load rate approx 2% to 3 % per minute

b. ADJUST setter for desired power level:

BOP ir DESIRED RX POWER LEVEL RECOMMENDED SETTER VALUE 20%orless 15 BOP Adj 3tssettertol5

6. C. VERIFY boraton flow estabhshed.

BOP ci INITIATE turbne load reduction by depressing GO pushbutton.

BOP Depresses GO pushbutton.

e. CONTROL turtne load reduction as necessary to reduce power to desired level.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # Event# 5 Page 18 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. MONITOR T-avgiT-ref mismatch:

ATC

a. CHECK T-ret indicahon VAJ LB LE.

7. b. MONITOR automatic rod control ATC maintaining T-agiT-ref msmatch less than 3 F

2 ATC Coordinates with the BOP to maintain Tavg/T-ref mismatch less than 3F.

8. MONITOR automatic control of BOP 1FV pump speed AVAILABLE.

9. STOP secondari plant equipment BOP USING Appendix C, Sendaiy Pant Equipment.

Examiner Note: Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment starts at page 19.

Examiner Note: Additional AOP-C.03 steps not included as required power reduction should be complete at or around this step.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 19 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 APPENDIX B REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA REACTOR TRIP CRITERIA TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA Turbine trip required or imminent Turbine vibration exceeding 14 mils with reactor power greater than P-9 (50%) with one of the following:

Uncontrolled rod movement which CANNOT be

high vibration on multiple bearings stopped by pladng rods in MANUAL o-c.oi OR Loss of SIG level control:

abnormal noiseNibration apparent level dropping or rising toward trip setpoint and level CANNOT be restored (A0P-SJ1 More than one dropped rod ço.cii T-avg/T-ret mismatch CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F (refer to Step 7 or App. E) 30% turbine load: < 30% turbine load:

Condenser Pressure> 2.7 psia AND CANNOT Condenser Pressure> 1.72 psia be restored wIthin 5 minutes op-s.o (AoP-S.c2)

Any automatic reactor trip setpoint reached Any automatic turbine trip setpoint reached OR automatic trip imminent: OR automatic trip imminent

Turbine trip above P-9 (50%)

High Stator Cooling Water temp 90°C

Safety injection OR Stator D/P 12 psig below normal

Power Range high flux 109%

Both MFPTs tripped

Power Range flux rate +/-5% in 2 seconds

Low Auto Stop Oil pressure 45 psig

Pressurizer high level 92%

High 51(3 level 81% narrow range

Pressurizer pressure low 1970 psig

Main Turb Bearing Oil low pressure 7 psig

Pressurizer pressure nigh 2385 psig

Thrust Bearing Oil high pressure 60 psig

RCSlowfIow 90%

Turbine Overspeed 1980 rpm

RCP undervoitage 5.022 kilovolts

Loss of EHC pressure

RCP underfrequency 56.0 Hz a Generator PCSs tripped.

a OTT 115% (varIable)

OPT 108.7% (variable) a S/G low level 10.7% [15% EAM]

SSPS general warning in both trains

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 20 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 APPENDIX C SECONDARY PLANT EQUIPMENT

[1] ENSURE plant announcement(s) made on the following:

starting rapid shutdown (or load reduction) due to (reason) a stopping secondary plant equipment NOTE I if reactor power will be reduced below 50%, AUO should be on station at #3 heater drain tank (if possible) when 60% power is reached NOTE 2 Dispatching of AUO in Steps 2] and 3] may be performed out of sequence.

[2] IF reactor power will be reduced below 50%,

ThEN DISPATCH AUO with Appendix J (Unit 1) or K (Unit 2) to #3 Heater Drain Tank

[3] IF one MFP will be shutdown using this appendix, THEN DISPATCH AUO to OPEN MFWP recirc manual Isolation valve for MFWP to be removed from service: (N/A valves NOT opened)

UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN q 1 IA i-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of IA condenser E lB 1-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706. Northeast corner of 1A condenser 2 24 2-VLV-3--576 TB ci 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser 2B 2VLV3-577 TB eL 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 21 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 APPENDIX C

[41 IF BOTH of the following conditions are met

power is being reduced as directed by AOP-S.01 (Main Feedwater Malfunctions) or AOP-S04 (Condensate or Heater Drain Malfunctions)

leaving secondary pumps in service is desired, THEN GO TO Step [8].

[5] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 80% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

La] ENSURE one Cond Demin Booster Pump STOPPED.

[b] ENSURE associated suction valve CLOSED:

CONDDEMIN OR B FCV-2-285 L FCV-2-28G_[Lij

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 22 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03

[6] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 7O-75%

THEN PERFORM the following:

ta] ENSURE one Condensate Booster Pump STOPPED.

[b] ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:

CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED q A FCV-2-94 L B FCV2-87 E L C FCV-2-81

[c] PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:

(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary)

1-SO-213-1 Section T2 OR a 2-SO-213-1 Section 73

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 23 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 71 WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 65% or less THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP remaining two Cond Demin Booster Pumps simulneously.

[b] ENSURE suction valves CLOSED:

COND DEMIN BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED1 A FCV-2-290 D B FCV-2-285 C FCV-2-280 E

[C] STOP one No. 3 Heater Drain pump. Li

[d] STOP one No. I Heater Drain pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 24 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03

[8] IF reactor power will be maintained greater than 50%,

THEN GO TO Notes prior to Step [11].

CAUTiON Isolation of all three intermediate heater strings could occur if turbine is tripped prior to fully opening LCV-6-105A and B using Appendix J or K.

[91 WHEN reactor power is less than 60%

AND AUO with App. J (Unit 1) or K (Unit 2 is on station at #3 Heater Drain Tank, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP #3 Heater Drain Tank Pumps El

[b] NOTIFY AUO to perform App. J (Unit 1) or App. K (Unit 2),

Fully Opening #3 Heater Drain Tank Bypass Valves.

[c] CLOSE isolation valves from #3 Htr Drain Pumps to heater sthngs:

VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED I FCV-S-108 Htr Drain 1k Pump 3 to Htr String A El FCV-6-109 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr String B El FCV-f3-l 10 Htr Drain 1k Pump 3 to Htr String C El

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 25 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 NOTE I The following step ensures that MFW Bypass valves are available to control feedwater flow at low power.

NOTE 2 If any MFW Reg valve is in MANUAL, the associated MFW Bypass valve controller should remain in MANUAL to prevent undesired opening of bypass valve.

[10] WHEN Reactor power is less than 50%,

THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] lF all MFW Reg Valves are in AUTO, THEN PLACE MEW Bypass Reg Valve controllers in AUTO.

Eb] IF any MEW Reg Valve is in MANUAL, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) MAINTAIN MFW Bypass Reg Valve in MANUAL for SIG with MEW Reg valve in MANUAL.

2) PLACE MEW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO for remaining SJGs.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 26 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03 NOTE I If performing this AOP to reduce power to allow shutting down one MFW pump the affected MFWP may be removed from service at power level less than 55% (Unit 1) or 65% (Unft 2).

NOTE 2 AFW start function on loss of both MFW pumps is inoperable when a MEW pump is RESET but NOT pumping forward LCO 3321 (Unit 1) or 332 (Unit 2) allows AEW start channel to be inoperable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months when shutting down a MFWR

[113 WHEN it is desired to remove one MFW pump from service AND power level is less than applicable limit:

turbine impulse pressure less than approximately 45%

OR

reactor power less than value specified in Note 1 THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE MFWP Recirc Manual Isolation valve OPEN for MFWP to be removed from service: (N/A valves NOT opened)

UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION lA i-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of 1A condenser 1

16 1-VLV-3-577 TB el. 706, Northeast corner of IA condenser 2-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser 2

26 2-VLV-3--577 TB el. 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser

[b] THROTTLE OPEN recirc valve in MANUAL (30-50% OPEN) for MFWP to be removed from service.

[ci PLACE speed controller in MANUAL for MFWP to be removed from service

[dl REDUCE speed gradually on MFWP to be removed from Service. E

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 27 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03

[11J (Continued)

Eel ENSURE proper loading on remaining MFWP.

UI IF MFWP CANNOT be fully unloaded with speed controer THEN PERFORM one of the following:

NOTIFY l&C to slowly adjust hand speed changer for affected MFWP UNTIL MFWP is fully unloaded E OR

THROTTLE OPEN recirc valve for affected MFWP to assist in unloading MFWP OR

SLOWLY CLOSE governor valve by bumping closed governor valve positioner (if operable)

OR

OBTAIN SRO concurrence that MFWP flow is sufficiently low to allow tripping MFWR

[g] WHEN MFWP is unloaded sufficiently, THEN TRIP affected MFWP,

[h] CLOSE recirc valve for MFWP removed from service. fl

[I] CLOSE recirc valve Manual Isolation inlet valve for MFWP removed from service.

U] OPEN drain valves for MFWP removed from service: [M3j

[HS46-14], MFWP A drain valves OR

[HS46-41i MFWP B drain valves fl

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 28 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03

[12] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 45% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP remaining No. 7 Heater Drain pump.

[b] CLOSE isolation valves from #7 Heater Drain Pumps to heater strings:

VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED -4 FCV-B-i 43 Htr Drain Tk Pump 7 to Htr String A El FCV 163 Htr Drain Tk Pump 7 to Htr String B El FCV-$-1 84 Htr Drain Tk Pump 7 to Htr String C El

[13] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 30% or less THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE main turbine EHC controls in IMP OUT.

[b] IF #3 heater di in tank pumps are sbU running THEN PEF FORM Step [9]

[C] STOP one of two remaining Condensate Booster Pumps.

(step continued on next ae)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 29 of 61 Event

Description:

Power reduction using AOP-C.03

[13] (Continued)

[d] ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:

OR FCV-2-87 OR 1 c FCV-2-81 tel STOP one of three Hotwell Pumps EfI PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seat injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:

(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary)

I -SO-2i3-t Section 7 2 OR

2-80-2/3-i Section 73

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 30 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: at Lead Examiner direction, insert Event 6 SBLOCA resulting in reactor trip and safety injection.

Indications/Alarms:

Indications 1-M-4:

RCS PZR LVL, i-LI-68-339A, shows a decreasing level value

RCS PZR LVL, 1-Ll-68-335A, shows a decreasing level value

RCS PZR LVL, i-LI-68-320, shows a decreasing level value

1-XI-94-1 01/1 02, Core Exit Temp Margin to Saturation (exo sensors Tm A & B) pressure indications trending down.

1-M-5:

RCS PR PRESS (Chs 1-4), i-PI-68-340A, 334, 323, 322: showing RCS (Pzr) pressure going down;

RCS PZR PRESS Recorder 1 -PR-68-340 shows a decreasing pressure trend;

RCS LOOP 1 HL WIDE RANGE PRESS Recorder 1 -PR-68-69 shows a decreasing pressure trend.

1 -M-6:

RCS WR HL PRESSURE LOOP 3 1-PI-68-66A, shows a decreasing pressure value;

RCS HL PRESS WIDE RANGE i-PI-68-62, shows a decreasing pressure value;

RCS HL PRESS WIDE RANGE 1-Pl-68-69, shows a decreasing pressure value; Annunciators 1-M-5:

1-XA-55-5C Window B-i: TS-30-31 LOWER COMPT TEMP HIGH

B-3: TS-30-241 LOWER COMPT MOISTURE HI

B-4: TS-30-240 LOWER COMPT MOISTURE HI 1 -M-6:

1-XA-55-6E Window C-6: ZS-61 -1 86 ICE CONDENSER LOWER INLET DOOR OPEN Examiner Note: following IOA performance, prior to Steps 1-4 immediate action verification, ATC/BOP surveys MCBs for any expected automatic system response that failed to occur. Upon discovery, they may take manual action(s) to align plant systems as expected for the event in progress. (Ref. EPM-4, Prudent Operator Actions)

Examiner Note: Based on plant conditions the SRO may direct the crew to manually trip the Reactor and initiate Safety Injection.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 31 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDGI1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW Performs the first four steps of E-O unprompted.

SRO Directs performance of E-O NOTE 1 Steps I through 4 are immediate action steps.

NOTE 2 This procedure has a toldout page.

CRITICAL May place HS-63-15A B SI pump to START based on prudent operator TASK ATC actions.

1 VERIFY reactor TRIPPED

Reactor trip breakers OPEN

Reactor tnp bypass breakers DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC

Rod bottom lights LIT

Rod position indicators less than or equal to 12 steps.

Neutron flux DROPPING

2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:

BOP

Turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. VERIFY at least one 6.9KV shutdown ATTEMPT to start DIGs.

board ENERGIZED on this unit.

IF power CANNOT be immediately restored to at least one shutdown board BOP on this unit, THEN GO TO ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power.

CRITICAL BOP Places DO EMER START I-IS to START Examiner Note: The BOP has guidance to manually start the 1 B-B EDG, the 1 A-A EDG has a malfunction and will not start. If the crew fails to start the 1 B-B EDG in E-O, the crew will transition to ECA 0.0. Go to page 49 for ECA-0.0 details.

Examiner Note: Following SI actuation, the lA-A DG fails to start. BOP Operator will manually start 1 B-B EDG from either 1-M-1 using 1-HS-82-15, DG EMERG START or back panel 0-M-26A using emergency start pushbutton 0-HS-82-16A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 32 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCAJL0ss of Off-Site Power/EDGJ1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

& DETERMINE if SI actuated:

ATC

ECCSpumpsRUNNING.

Any SI alarm LIT [M-4D].

5 PERFORM ES-05, Equipment BOP Verifications WHILE continuing in this proCedure.

Continue with the performance of E-O REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY SRO/ATC INJECTION BOP Performs ES-O.5, Equipment Verifications go to page 54 for details SRO Addresses foldout page, see next page for details.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 33 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site PowerIEDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:

RCS pressure less than 1250 psig AND at least one CCP or SI pump running OR

Phase B Isolation, THEN STOP all RcPs EVENT DIAGNOSTICS a IF any SIG pressure is dropping uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:

a CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

b IF any 515 pressure continues to drop uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE SI actuated

2) IF at least one S/S is intact (S/S pressure controlled or rising),

THEN ISOLATE AFW to faulted SIG(s):

CLOSE AFW level control valves for faulted SIG(s)

IF any AFW valve for faulted S/S CANNOT be CLOSED, THEN PERFORM Appendix E, Isolating AFW to Faulted S/&

3) ENSURE at least one 01 the following condlttons met:

total AFW flow greater than 440 gprn OR

Narrow Range level greater than 10% E25% ADV] in at least one intact 51G.

a IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-0,0, Loss of All AC Power TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS

IF CST level less than 5%, THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW.

IF RWST level less than 27%, THEN GO TO ES-i 3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 34 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink available:

a. CHECK total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm.

b. CHECK narrow range level b. MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 10% [25% ADV] greater than 440 gpm in at least one SIG. UNTIL narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADV]

in atleastoneSfG.

c. CONTROL feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 10% [25% ADVI and 50%

in intact or ruptured S/Gs.

Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm ATC/BQP until S/G are greater than 10% NR 7 CHECK if main steam lines should be isolated a CHECK if any of the following a GO TO Step 8.

conditions have occurred:

Any SIG pressure less than 600 psig ATC OR

. Any 5/0 pressure dropping UNCONTROLLED OR

Phase B actuation.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 35 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCAJLoss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. CHECK RCP trip criteria:

a. CHECK the following:

. RCS pressure less than 1250 psig ATC AND

. At least one CCP OR SI pump RUNNING.

b. STOP RCPs.

9. MONITOR RCS temperatures: IF temperature less than 547F and dropping, IF any RCP running, THEN THEN PERFORM the following:

CHECK T-avg stable at or trending to between 547°F and 552°F. a. ENSURE steam dumps and atmospheric reliefs CLOSED.

OR

b. IF cooldown continues, a IF RCPs stopped, THEN THEN CONTROL total feed flow:

CHECK T-cold stable at or trending ATC/BOP 1) ENSURE total AFW flow t o b e tveen 547°F an d 552°F less than or equal to 600 gpm.

2) MAINTAIN total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL narrow range level is greater than 10% [25% ADVI in at least one S/G.

C. IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

TAppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 36 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCNLoss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK pressurizer PORVs, safeties, and spray valves:

a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.

b. Pressurizer safety valves CLOSED.

ATC c. Normal spray valves CLOSED.

d. Power to at least one block valve AVAILABLE.

e. At least one block valve OPEN.

11. DETERMINE if S/G secondary pressure boundaries are INTACT:

CHECK all S/G pressures ATC CONTROLLED or RISING.

CHECK all S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

12. DETERMINE if S/G tubes are INTACT:

. All S/G narrow range levels CONTROLLED or DROPPING ATC

. Secondary radiation NORMAL US1NG Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors. (App. A performed in ES-0.5).

13. DETERMINE if RCS is INTACT: PERFORM the following:

. Containment pressure NORMAL

a. INiTIATE ES-0.5 Appendix D,

. Containment sump level NORMAL Hydrogen Mitigation Actions.

ATC

LOWER COMPT TEMP HIGH alarm b. MONITOR status trees.

DARK. [M-5C, B11

Containment radiation NORMAL c. GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or USING Appendix B, Containment Secondary Coolant.

Rad Monitors. (App. B performed in ES-05

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 37 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCAJLoss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via lOS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).

When a RED Path for Containment is evident on lOS, the SRO will transition to FR-Z.1, go to page 46 for detaHs.

E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT NOTE This procedure has a foldout page.

See next page for details

1. CHECK RCP trip criteria:

a. CHECK the following: a. GO TO Step 2.

. At least one CCP OR SI pump RUNNING ATC AND

. RCS pressure less than 1250 psig.

b. STOP RCPs.

2. CHECK S/G secondary pressure boundaries INTACT:

ATC/BOP

S/G pressures CONTROLLED or RISING

SIG pressures greater than 140 psig.

3. MAINTAIN Intact S/G narrow range levels:

a. Greater than 10% [25% ADVI.

ATC/BO P

b. Between 10% [25% ADVI and 50%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 38 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDG/i A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:

. RCS pressure less than 1250 psig AND at least one CCP or SI pump running OR

Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs.

SI REINITIATION CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:

RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs less than 40F OR

Pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained greater than 10% [20% ADVI, THEN RAISE ECCS flow by performing one or both of the following as necessary:

ESTABLISH CCP1T flow USING Appendix C

START CCPs or SI pumps manually.

EVENT DIAGNOSTICS

IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power a IF any S/G pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner or less than 140 psig AND S/G NOT isolated, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

IF any S/G has level rising in uncontrolled manner or has abnormal radiation.

THEN:

a. RAISE ECCS flow by performing one or both of the following as necessary:

ESTABLISH CCPIT flow USING Appendix C

START CCPs or SI pumps manually.

b. GO TO E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS

IF CST level less than 5%,

THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW.

IF RWST level less than 27%.

THEN GO TO ES-i .3. Transfer to RHR Containment Sump.

[ Aooendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # i Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 39 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. VERIFY secondary radiation NORMAL:

a. CHECK secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors.

b. NOTIFY Chem Lab to take S/G activity samples.

c. WHEN Chem Lab is ready to sample S/Os.

THEN PERFORM the following:

ATC

1) ENSURE FCV-1 5-43 Blowdown Flow Control valve CLOSED.

2) ENSURE Phase A RESET.

3) OPEN blowdown isolation valves.

d. NOTIFY RADCON to survey main steam lines and Sf0 blowdown.

e. WHEN Sf0 samples completed, THEN CLOSE blowdown isolation valves.

CAUTION Any time a pressurizer PORV opens, there is a possibility that it may stick open.

5. MONITOR pressurizer PORV5 and block valves:

a. Power to block valves AVAILABLE, a. DISPATCH personnel to restore power to block valves USING EA-201 -1.

480V Board Room Breaker Alignments.

ATC b. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED. b. IF pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig, THEN CLOSE pressurizer PORVs.

IF pressurizer PORV CANNOT be closed, THEN CLOSE its block valve.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 40 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCAJLoss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. MONITOR SI termination criteria:

ATC a. RCS subcooling based on core exit TICs a. GO TO Step 7.

greater than 40F. IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIPIIII_

7. MONITOR if containment spray should be stopped:

a. CHECK any containment spray pump a. GO TO Step 8.

RUNNING.

ATC

b. CHECK containment pressure b. GO TO Step 8.

less than 2.0 psig. IIIIIIIIuIIIIIIIIuIIIIIIIIIIIII_

ATC 8. MONITOR shutdown boards continuously energized.

9. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RCS pressure:

1) Greater than 300 psig ATC

2) STABLE or RISING.

b. CHECK RHR pump suction aligned from RWST.

c. ENSURE SI signal RESET.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 41 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDG/i A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. d. STOP RHR pumps and PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. MONITOR RCS pressure greater than 300 psig.

Manually places 1 -HS-63-1 34A and 1 34B SI Reset to RESET, places 1 -HS-74-1 OA ATC and 20A RHR Pumps A & B to STOP.

NOTE I S/G pressures dropping slowly during a LOCA with no faulted SIG should be considered stable in the following step.

NOTE 2 RCS pressure rising slightly during a LOCA vhich is NOT isolated should be considered stable in the following step.

10. DETERMINE if SI termination criteria should be checked again:

a. CHECK pressure in all S/Gs ATC STABLE or RISING.

Li CHECK RCS pressure STABLE or DROPPING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 42 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCAJL0ss of Off-Site Power/EDG/i A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ii. DETERMINE if diesel generators should be stopped:

a. VERIFY shutdown boards ENERGIZED from start busses.

ATC

b. ENSURE SI signal RESET.

c. STOP any unloaded diesel generators and PLACE in standby USING EA-82-i, Placing D/Gs in Standby.

12. MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and recombiners should be turned on:

a. ENSURE ice condenser AHU breakers opened USING EA-201-i, 480 V Board Room Breaker Alignments.

ATC

b. CHECK hydrogen concentration measurement AVAILABLE:

. Hydrogen analyzers have been in ANALYZE for at least 5 minutes.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 43 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. c. CHECK containment hydrogen concentration less than 6%.

d. WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers have been opened, THEN ENSURE hydrogen igniters ENERGIZED USING Appendix D.

e. CHECK containment hydrogen concentration less than 05%. [M-10]

13. MONITOR if containment vacuum control should be returned to normal:

a. CHECK containment pressure less than 1 O psig.

ATC

b. VERIFY containment vacuum relief isolation valves OPEN: [Panel 6K]

. FCV-30-46

. FCV-30-47

. FCV-30-48.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 44 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

14. INITIATE evaluation of plant status:

a. ENSURE cold leg recirculation capability:

1) Power to at least one RHR pump AVAILABLE.

2) Capability to operate the following valves AVAILABLE:

FCV-63-72 and FCV-74-3 (for RHR Pump A-A).

OR

FCV-63-73 and FCV-74-21 (for RHR Pump B-B).

ATC b. CHECK Auxiliary Building radiation:

1) Area Radiation Monitors RR901A and RR901B NORMAL.

2) Aux Bldg Vent monitor recorder O-RR-90-1O1 NORMAL (prior to isolation).

14. c. MONITOR containment sump level less than 68%.

d. NOTIFY TSC to initiate post-accident sampling as necessary.

e. EVALUATE plant equipment status USING EA-0-4, Evaluation of Equipment Status.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 45 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCAIL0ss of Off-Site Power/EDG/i A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

15. DETERMINE if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required:

a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 300 psig.

SRO

b. GO TO ES-i .2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Scenario may be terminated when the SRO transitions to ES-i .2 or earlier, at discretion of Lead Examiner.

rAendix D Reciuired Onerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6,7,8,9 Page 46 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCAJLoss of Off-Site Power/EDGJ1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FR-Li Actions NOTE [1 this procedure has been entered for an orange path and performance of ECA-I. 1 (Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation) is required, FR-Li may be performed concurrently with ECA-l 1.

1 MONITOR RWST level BOP greater than 27%.

2. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:

BOP 1 6K PHASE B GREEN

Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN

3. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.

BOP

4. DETERMINE if this procedure should be exited:

a, CHECK for faulted S/G: a. GO TO Step 5.

BOP Any SJG pressure DROPPING in an uncontrolled manner OR

Any SIG pressure ess than 140 psig.

5. VERIFY containment spray Operation:

a. IF ECA-1 .1, LOSS of RHR Sump Recirculation, is IN EFFECT, THEN PERFORM the rollowing:

1) OPERATE containment spray as directed by ECA-l.1.

2> GO TO Step .

BOP

b. VERIFY containment spray pumps RUNNING.

C. CHECK RWST level greater than 27%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6.7.8.9 Page 47 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. d. VERIFY containment spray suction ALIGNED to RWST:

FCV-72-22 OPEN

FCV-72-21 OPEN.

e VERIFY containment spray discharge valves OPEN:

FCV-72-39 BOP

FCV-72-2.

f. VERIFY containment spray recirc vatves CLOSED:

FCV72-34

FCV-72-13.

g. VERIFY containment spray 110w greater than 4750 gpm on each train.

6. MONITOR containment air return fans:

WHEN at least 10 minutes BOP have elapsed from Phase 5, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.

7. VERIFY containment ventilation dampers CLOSED:

BOP Panel 6K CNTMT VENT GREEN

Panel 6L CNTMT VENT GREEN.

8. VERIFY Phase A valves CLOSED:

BOP Panet 6K PHASE A GREEN

Panel 6L PHASE A GREEN.

9. VERIFY cntmnt vacuum relief isolation valves CLOSED: fPnI 6K MANUALI FCV-30-46 BOP

FCV.30-47

FCV30.48.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 Page 48 of 61 Event

Description:

SBLOCA/Loss of Off-Site Power/EDG/1 A-A Fails/i B-B Charging and SI Pump fail to Auto Start Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. VERIFY MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves BOP CLOSED.

11 DETERMINE f any SIG Intact:

a. CHECK at least one S/G pressure:

BOP CONTROLLED or RISING AND

Greater than 140 psig.

CAUTION Isolating all SIGS will result in a loss of secondary heat sink.

12. DETERMINE f any S)G Faulted:

a. CHECK SG pressures a. GO TO Step 13.

- Any S?G pressure DROPPING BO P in an uncontrolled manner OR

. Any SIG pressure less than 140 psig.

13. MONITOR it RHR spray should be placed in service:

BOP a CHECKtpeIollowing: a. GOTOSIep14

Containment pressure greater than 9.5 psig

14. MONITOR t containment spray should be stopped:

a. CHECK any containment spray pump a. GO TO Step IS RUNNING.

BOP

b. CHECK containment pressure b. GO TO Step 15.

less than 2.0 p51g.

15. RETURN TO procedure and step

[rt effect BOP END

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 8 Page 49 of 61 Event

Description:

ECA-O.O Actions, it required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ECA-OO, Loss Of All AC Power Examiner Note: The 1 A-A DG fails to start. BOP Operator is expected to manually start 1 B-B EDG from either 1-M-1 using 1-HS-82-15, DG EMERG START lA-A, 2A-A, lB-B, 2B-B handswitch or back panel 0-26A using emergency start pushbutton 0-HS-82-1 6A.

NOTE Steps 1, 2, and 3 are immediate action steps.

1. SUSPEND FRP implementation and SRO MONITOR status trees for information only.

2. VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:

. Reactor trip breakers OPEN ATC

Reactor trip bypass breakers OPEN or DISCONNECTED

Neutron flux DROPPING

3. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:

BOP

ALL turbine stop valves CLOSED

[SSPS status lights on M-6].

ATC 4. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.

NOTE Step 5 should be handed off to a Unit Operator.

5. PERFORM the following notifications:

a. NOTIFY four AUOs to report to MCR immediately to be available as necessary for DC load shed and BOP local operation of TD AFW LCVs.

b. NOTIFY Site Security to station officers at key vital doors USING SSI-1, Security Instructions for Members of the Security Force.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 8 Page 50 of 61 Event

Description:

ECA-O.O Actions, if required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. CHECK RCS ISOLATED:

a, Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.

b. Letdown isolation valves CLOSED:

FCV-62-69

FCV-62-70

FCV-62-72

FCV-62-73 ATC

FCV-62-74

c. Excess letdown isolation valves CLOSED:

FCV-62-54

FCV-62-55

d. Reactor vessel head vents CLOSED:

FSV-68-394

FSV-68-395

FSV-68-396

FSV-68-397 NOTE On loss of auxiliary control air, TD AFW LCVs fail open.

Auxiliary air compressors are powered from 480V C&A Vent Boards 2A1-A and 2B1-B.

7. MONITOR AFW flow:

BOP

a. CHECK TD AFW pump RUNNING.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 8 Page 51 of 61 Event

Description:

ECA-O.O Actions, if required Time Position__II Applicants Actions or Behavior

b. CONTROL TD AFW pump BOP USING EA-3.-1. MCR Operation of TD AFW Pump.

Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 BOP gpm_and less than 600_gpm_until S/G are_greater than 10% NR.

7. c. MONITOR Aux Control Air AVAILABLE:

BOTH Unit 2 Shutdown Boards ENERGIZED

Train A and B Aux Control Air pressure on 1-M-15 (prior to DC load-shedding).

d. MAINTAIN AFW flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADVI in at least one 81G.

e. CONTROL intact or ruptured S/G narrow range levels between 10% [25% ADVI and 50%.

CAUTION DO NOT attempt to start DIGs if both trains of ERCW are unavailable due to catastrophic event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 8 Page 52 of 61 Event

Description:

ECA-O.O Actions, if required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The lA-A DG fails to start. BOP Operator is expected to manually start 18-B EDG from either 1-M-1 using 1-HS-82-15, DG EMERG START or back panel O-M-26A using emergency start pushbutton O-HS-82-1 6A.

8. ATTEMPT to restore power to any shutdown board on this unit:

a. CHECK for any of the following: a IF BOTH D/Gs on this unit are KNOWN to be NOT capable of

any D/G on this unit potentially supplying power to shutdown boards, available (capable of supplying THEN power to shutdown board> GO TO Substep 8.d.

OR

availability of any D/G on this unit is UNKNOWN.

b. RESET D/G start lockout relays for DIG(S) to be started. [0-M-26]

c. EMERGENCY START diesel c. ACTUATE SI to attempt generators. [M-1 switch and to start D/Gs.

M-26 pushbutton]

ENSURE DIG lockout relay RESET for D/G(S) to be started.

CRITICAL BOP Places 1-HS-82-15, DG EMER START HS to START d VERIFY . east one shutdown board ENERGIZED from D/G on this un.t.

e. VERIFY EROW supply estab[shed o running diesel qenerators

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 8 Page 53 of 61 Event

Description:

ECA-O.O Actions, if required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. CHECK at east one shutdown board on this unt ENERG1ZED

9. RESUME FRP mplementation

h. RETURN TO procedure and step n effect.

OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# Event# ES-O.5 Page 54 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ES-O5 Actions BOP I VERIFY D/Gs RUNNING.

CRITICAL BOP BOP Places 1-HS-82-15, DG EMER START HS to START Z VERIFY D/G ERCW supply valves OPEN H

BOP 3. VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.

4. VERIFY CCS pumps RUNNING:

Pump IA-A (2A-A)

BOP

Pump 1 B-B 2B-B)

Pump C-S BOP 5. VERIFY ECTS fans RUNLNG.

BOP 6. VERIFY generator breakers OPEN, 7 NOTIFY at least two AUOs to report BOP to MCR to be available for local actions

8. VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:

a. MD AFW pumps BOP

b. TD AFW pump.

NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been taken to control SIG levels, to establish flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted SJG.

Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # Event # ES-0.5 Page 55 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. CHECK AFW valve ahgnment:

a VERiFY MD AFW LCVs in AUTO.

BOP ii VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN.

c. VERIFY MD AFW pump redrculation valves FCV-3-400 and FCV-3-$Oi CLOSED.

10. VERIFY MEW Isolation:

. a. CHECK MEW pumps TRIPPED,

b. ENSUREthe following:

BOP

MEW regulatIng valves CLOSED MEW regulating bypass valve controllers in MANUAL with output ZERO

MEW isolation valves CLOSED.

11 MONITOR ECCS cperatiori:

a VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING.

BOP COPs

RHR pumps

SI pumps CRITICAL BOP Places HS-63-1 5A, B SI pump to START.

Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # Event # ES-0.5 Page 56 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

b. VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.

c. CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.

d. VERIFY SI pump flow.

BOP

e. CHECK RCS pressure e. GO TO Step 12 less than 300 psig.

f. VERIFY RHR pump flow.

12. VERIFY ESF systems ALIGNED:

a. Phase A ACTUATED:

PHASE A TRAIN A alarm LIT

[M-6C, B51.

PHASE A TRAIN B alarm LIT

[M-6C, B61,

b. Cntmt Vent Isolation ACTUATED:

CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT M-6C, C5j.

CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT M-6C, C6J..

c. Status monitor panels:

BOP 6COARK

GD DARK

GE LIT OUTSIDE outhned area

GHDARK 6J LIT.

ci. Train A status panel 6K:

CNTMT VENT GREEN

PHASEAGREEN

e. Train B status panei6L:

CNTMT VENT GREEN

PHASE A GREEN

OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# Event# ESO.5 Page 57 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. MONITOR for containment spray and Phase B actuation:

a. CHECK for any of the following:

Phase B ACTUATED OR

Containment pressure greater than 2.8 psig.

b. VERIFY containment spray INITIATED:

1) Containment spray pumps RUNNING.

2) Containment spray header isolation valves FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2 OPEN.

BOP

3) Containment spray recirculation valves to RWST FCV-72-34 and FCV-72-.13 CLOSED.

4) Containment spray header flow greater than 4750 gpm per train.

5) Panel 6E LIT.

c. VERIFY Phase B ACTUATED:

PHASE B TRAIN A alarm LIT

[M-6C, A5].

PHASE B TRAIN B alarm LiT

[M-6C, A6J.

d. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.

e. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:

Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN.

Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN.

Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # Event # ES-0.5 Page 58 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

f. WHEN 10 minutes have elapsed, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.

NOTE The continuous action in Step 14 remains applicable if containment pressure rises above 1.5 psig after ES-O.5 is completed.

i4 MONITOR if containment vacuum relict isolabon valves should be closed:

BOP a. CHECK containment pressure a. GO TO Step 15.

greater than 1.5 psig.

15. CHECK secondary and containment rad monitors USING the following:

BOP

Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors a Appendix B, Containment Rad Monitor&

APPENDIX A SECONDARY RAD MONITORS

1. IF SI occurred on Unit 1.

THEN CHECK following rad monitors including available trends prior to isolation:

Condenser exhaust recorder I -RR901 19 BOP

51(3 blowdown recorder i-RR-90-120

Unit I Main steam line rad: monitors [i-Ni-30J Post-Accident rad recorder 1-RR-90-268B points 3 (blue). 4 (violet), 5 (black), and 6 (turquoise),

[1 -M-31 (back of I -M-30)j

3. NOTIFY Unit Supervisor whether secondary radiation is NORMAL or HIGH.

Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # Event # ES-0.5 Page 59 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior APPENDIX B CONTAINMENT RAD MONITORS

1. IF SI occurred on Unit 1.

THEN CHECK following rad monitors:

BOP

Upper containment post-accident rad monitors 1-RM-90-271A and 1-RM-90-272A NORMAL [i-M-30J

Lower containment post-accident rad monitors I -RM-90-273A and I -RM-90-274A NORMAL [1 -M-30j a Containment rad recorders l-RR-90-112 and I-RR-90-106 NORMAL [O-M-i 2] (prior to isolation).

16. WHEN directed by E-O, THEN BO P PERFORM Appendix 0, Hydrogen Mitigation Action&

17.. CHECK pocket sump pumps STOPPED:

[M-1 5, upper left corner]

HS-77-410, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and BOP Equipment Drain Sump pump A

HS-77-41 1, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump B

18. DISPATCH personnel to perform BOP EA-O- 1, Equipment Checks Following ESF Actuation 19 ENSURE plant announcement has been BOP nade regarding Reactor Trip and SL

20. PERFORM Appendix E, Spent Fuel BOP cooling Actions, as time permts.

Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # Event # ES-0.5 Page 60 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior APPENDIX 0 HYDROGEN MITIGATION ACTIONS NOTE This appendix should only be performed when directed by step in E-O.

1. DISPATCH AUQ to open ice condenser AHU breakers USING EA-201 -1, 480V Board Room Breaker Alignments. LI

2. PLACE hydrogen analyzers in service:

a. ENSURE the following switches in ANALYZE position: [M-1 01

HS-43-200A, Cntmt H2 Analyzer Fan A LI

HS-43210A, Cntmt H2 Analyzer Fan B.

b.

RECORD time: LI CAUTION If inadequate core cooling (red path) has occurred, hydrogen Igniters should NOT be energized until containment hydrogen concentration is determined to be less than 6%. Hydrogen analyzers require 5 minute warmup after being placed in ANALYZE.

3. WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers have been opened, THEN PLACE hydrogen igniters switches in ON position: [M-10)

HS-268-73, H2 lgniters Group A. LI

HS-268-74, H2 Igniters Group B. LI

4. WHEN hydrogen igniters and analyzers have been placed in service.

THEN NOTiFY Unit Supervisor. LI END OF TEXT

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # Critical Task(s) Page 61 of 61 Event

Description:

Critical Task Listing Critical Tasks: Critical Task Statement

1. Manually start the 1 B-B EDG prior to placing equipment in PTL in ECA-OM

2. Manually start the 1 B-B SI pump prior to completion of ES-O.5 step 1 1.

fl IJIvL_

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario 2 op Test No.: 2012-301 No.:

Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 1 at 48% RTP in MODE 1 in O-GO-5.

Turnover: Maintain power at 48% until directed by management.

Target CTs: Depressurize RCS to meet SI termination criteria prior to the ruptured SG dome level exceeding 100%.

Isolate steam flow from and feed flow to ruptured SG prior to initiation of RCS Cooldown to target temperature.

Establish cooldown and maintain RCS temperature so that transition from E3 does not occur because the RCS temperature causes an extreme (red-path) or a severe (orange-path) challenge to the subcriticality and/or the integrity CSF Event No. Malt. No. Event Type* Event Description

1. CVO1 B C-ATC/SRO The 1 B-B CCP trips resulting in a loss of letdown, the ATC will address the ARP TS-SRO and start the lA-A CCP using AOP-M.09. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines the 1 B-B CCP pump is INOPERABLE.

1 .a N ATC The ATC will restore letdown.

2. RX25B C-BOP/SRO Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails high. The MFP Master Controller shifts to MANUAL resulting in lowering feed flow to all SGs. The BOP maintains S/G levels with the MFP Master Controller in MANUAL using AOP S.01.

3. NIO7A I-ATC/SRO NIS Power Range instrument Channel I fails high, the ATC places rod control in TS-SRO manual due to inadvertent insertion using immediate operator actions and AOP C.01. The ATC will defeat the failed channel and the ATC will place rod control to automatic AOP-l.01. The SRO addresses Tech Specs and determines the power range instrument to be INOPERABLE.

4. THO5B C-ATC/SRO A 47 gpm SG Tube Leak develops on the #2 SIG. The ATC will manually TS-SRO increase charging flow and isolate letdown using AOP-R.01. The SRO addresses Tech Specs and determines entry into LCO 3.4.6.2.c is required.

4.a Set ypjcl3=- Blowdown Isolation valve 15-44 fails to auto-isolate, the BOP dispatches an AUO 1 to locally isolate valve 1 5-44.

5. R ATC The crew initiates a power reduction using AOP-C.03 due to the SGTL N BOP/SRO

6. THO5B M-AIl The #2 SGTL will degrade to a SGTR 800 gpm over five minutes. The crew will respond by initiating a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection using E-0 and ultimately isolate #2 S/G and depressurize the RCS using E-3.

7. FWO4B C-BOP #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open. The BOP will stop the lA-A MDAFW Pump and shut the #2 TDAFW LCV to reduce the inflow to the #2 SG using E-0 and ES-0.5.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 2012-301 Scenario 2 Summary EVENT 1 Following turnover when directed by the lead examiner, the 1 B-B CCP trips resulting in a loss of letdown, the ATC will address the ARP and start the lA-A CCP using AOP-M.09. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines entry into LCO 3.5.2 action A and TRM item 3.1.2.4 is required.

EVENT 2 When directed by the lead examiner, Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails high. The MFP Master Controller shifts to MANUAL resulting in lowering feed flow to all SGs. The BOP maintains SIG levels with the MFP Master Controller in MANUAL using AOP-S.O1.

EVENT 3 When directed by the lead examiner, NIS power range channel I will fail high resulting in rod insertion. The ATC will place rod control to manual control to stop the insertion using Immediate Operator Actions and AOP-C.O1. The BOP will defeat the failed channel and the ATC will place rod control to automatic AOP-l.O1. The SRO addresses Tech Specs and determines the power range instrument to be INOPERABLE and entry into LCO 3.3.1 .1 Table 3.3-1 functional unit 2, 3, & 4 Action 2 is required.

EVENT 4 When directed by the lead examiner, a 47 gpm SG Tube Leak develops on the #2 SIG. The ATC will manually increase charging flow and isolate letdown using AOP-R.O1. The SRO addresses Tech Specs and determines entry into LCO 3.4.6.2.c is required.

EVENT 4.a Blowdown Isolation valve 1 5-44 fails to auto-isolate, the BOP dispatches an AUO to locally isolate valve 15-44.

EVENT 5 The crew initiates a power reduction using AOP-C.03 due to the SGTL.

EVENT 6 The #2 SGTL will degrade to a SGTR -8OO gpm over five minutes. The crew will respond by initiating a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection using E-O and ultimately isolate #2 SIG and depressurize the RCS using E-3.

EVENT 7 During EOP implementation, the #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve fails open. The BOP will stop the lA-A MDAFW Pump and shut the #2 TDAFW LCV to reduce the inflow to the #2 SG using E-O and ES-O.5.

EOP flow: E-O, E-3 The scenario terminates as directed by the Lead Examiner upon completion of E-3 Step 24, CCPIT isolation.

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 1 of 71 Event

Description:

1 B-B CCP trip Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 1, lB-B CCP Trip Indications! Annunciators available:

Annunciators:

1-M-1

. i-AR-Mi-B, E-3, MOTOR TRIPOUT PNL 1-M-1 THRU 1-M-6 1-M-6

. 1-AR-M6-C, D-3, FS-62-93A1B CHARGING LINE FLOW ABNORMAL Indications:

i-M-5

. i-AR-M5-B, C-3, FS-62-i, REAC COOL PMPS SEAL WATER FLOW LO FS-62-1 REAC COOL PMPS SEAL WATER FLOW LO

[1] CHECK seal water flow to each pump on flow indicators on i-M-5 or locally in 690 penetration room.

[2] IF all seal water supply flows are low, THEN CONSIDER the following:

[a] ADJUST [i-PCV-62-89] as necessary.

[bi IF [1 -PCV-62-891 has failed, THEN ADJUST seal flows as necessary using the manual isolations and/or bypass valves in accordance with 1 -SO-62-l.

[C] IF seal water injection filter is the problem, THEN CHANGE filters in accordance with I -SO-62-7, Seal Injection Pilte, s d] IF loss of runnina CCP has occurred. THEN GO TO AOP-M09. Lo3 of 1ha,q,n7 ATC Places HS-62-104A to STOP Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

SRO Transitions to AOP M.09, LOSS OF CHARGING

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event# 1 Page 2 of 71 Event

Description:

1 B-B CCP trip Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior

1. CHECK any CCP RUNNING. GO TO Step 4.

ATC

4. ENSURE normal lehiown ISOLATED:

. FCV-62-72 CLOSED ATC

FCV-62-73 CLOSED

FCV-62-74 CLOSED.

5. ENSURE excess letdown ISOLATED:

ATC

FCV-62-54 CLOSED

FCV62-55 CLOSED.

CAUTION If both RCP thermal barrier cooling flow and seal injection flow have been lost. RCP seals will overheat rapidly.

NOTE It all RCP seal cooling has been lost, ths AQP takes precedence over AOP-R04. RCP Malfunctions, and AOP-M03, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

6. MONITOR RCP lower bearing and seal water temperatures:

IF any RCP lower bearing temp or seal water temp is greater than 230F, ATC THEN GO TO Notes prior to Step 18.

7. CHECK charging/seal injection header ATC INTACT (NO indication of rupture)

& ENSURE CCP suction path established:

a. CHECK SI signal NOT actuated.

b. ENSURE suction from VCT established:

ATC

. VCT level greater than 13%

LcV62-132 and LcV-62-133 VCT Outlet to CCP OPEN.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event# 1 Page 3 of 71 Event

Description:

1 B-B CCP trip Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior CAUTION It gas intrusion is suspected. NO CCP should be started UNTIL CCP has been vented (addressed in later steps).

9. CHECK if any COP available for immediate start:

CCP available ATC AND

gas intrusion is NOT suspected 10 DISPATCH AIJO to loca lv veri COP CREW is ready o e started NOTE [F RCP thermal barner cooling is established and sufficient time exists for local nspectlon of tile standby pump, then CCP start in Step 1 1 should be delayed until aer inspection is completed STARTaailableCCP ATC ATC Places HS-62-108A, 1A Charging Pump to START ATC 12 CHECK SI signal NOT actuated.

ATC i3 MONITOR COP suction aligned to VCT.

14. ENSURE normal charging and letdown iF RCP seal injection flow established USING EA-62-5, Estabuishirig CANNOT be estabhshed or maintarned.

ATC Normal Charging and Letdown. THEN GO TO Notes prior to Step 18 Transitions to EA-62-5, ESTABLISHING NORMAL CHARGING AND ATC LETDOWN Examiner note: The following are from EA-62-5. SRO continues the performance of AOP-M.09 actions on page 6.

Arnendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # Page 4 of 71 Event

Description:

1 B-B CCP trip Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior Z IF normal letdown flow is to be established.

THEN GO TO Section 43.

ATC NOTE EA-62-3, Establishing Excess Letdown, may be utilized if Normal Letdown cannot be estabJished

1. IF c1arging flaw NOT established, ATC THEN PERFORM Section 42 ATC 2. VERIFY pressurizer level greater an 1 7%

3 ENSURE letowi orifice isoiaton valves CLOSED:

LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED ATC FCV-62-72 D FCV-62-73 C FCV52-74 C 4 OPEN letdown so1allon valves:

LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVES OPEN ATC FCV-62-69 C FCV-62-70 C FCV-62-77 C NOTE Placing cooling water on the Letdown Heat Exchanger prior to restoring letdown flaw should prevent TlS62-795iA from actuating and ftilly opening 1CV701 92

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 1 Page 5 of 71 Event

Description:

1 B-B CCP trip Applicants Actions or behavior PLACE [RIC-62-781 in MANUAL AND OPEN flCV-TO-i 92] to 50%.

TC PLACE letdown pressure controller [PCV-62-81] in MANUAL and ATC ADJUST output between 40% and 50%. (50%-60% Open).

Places letdown pressure controller PCV-62-81 to MANUAL and ADJUST ATC output between 40 and 50%, (50%-60% open).

ATC 7, ADJUST charging flow as necessary to prevent flashing in the letdown line.

8. OPEN letdown ormce isolation iaIves as needed:

LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION VALVES OPEN ATC FcV-62j2 FCV-62-73 FCV-62-74 1J

9. ADJUST letdown pressure controller [PCV-62-811 output to obtain desired pressure.

Adjusts letdown pressure controller PCV-62-81 output to obtain desired ATC pressure.

10. ADJUST letdown pressure controller 1fV-624l] setpoint to match existinq pressure.

Adjusts letdown pressure controller PCV-62-81 setpoint to match existing ATC pressure.

11. PLACE letdown pressure controller ffçV-62-&1] in AUTO.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 6 of 71 Event

Description:

1 B-B CCP trip Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior NOTE Normal letdown temperature is 1OG°F ATC 12. ADJUST IHIC$278A] to btan desired letdown ernperature as indicated on [Tl-62-78].

Adjusts HIC-62-78A Letdown Controller to obtain desired letdown ATC temperature, as indicated on Tl-62-78.

ATC - PLACE [HIC-62-78A] in AUTO.

ATC Places Letdown Controller HIC-62-78A in AUTO Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Examiner Note: Letdown temperature may swing due to repeated actuation of TIS-62-79B/A, which causes letdown temperature control valve TCV-70-192 to fully open.

Examiner Note: SRO continues the performance of AOP-M.09 actions here 15, NOTIFY STA or other ava lable SRO licensed operator to refer to App. A, Tech Spec Impacts.

SRO Enters LCO 35.2 Action a LIi1fliNG CONDITION FOR OPERATiON 3.5.2 Tw EGOS trains shall be OPERABLE.

In MODE 3. bc4h saIey injection (SI) pump ow paths may be isolated by closing the soIation aite for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to perform pressure isoIatici valve testing per SR 4.4.5.3.

2 In MODES. EGGS pumos nwy be made incapable oflrecting to support transition too or from the APPLICABILITY of LCD 3.4.12. Low Teo,peratore Ove ,ressure Protecrion LTOP)

Sseni, for upto4 tours cc until the temperature of ll RCS cold legs exceeds LTOP anng wrnperature i30F) specified in the PT cius2F, whichever comes Irat APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2 and 3.

ACTiON:

a. With one or more trtens inoperable and leth at eas 11)0% of the EGGS flow equisteent to a sitie OPERABLE EGGS Irad available, restore the ncperable. traitt(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be n at least HOT STANDBY wthin the next S hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the fclowlog S hours.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenano# 2 Event# 1 Page 7 of 71 Event

Description:

1 B-B COP trip Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior LIIMTING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

TR 3. .24 At least wo charg p..mps sha1 be OPERABLE.

APPIiOABILITY: IODES 1.2, to 3.

ACTlON:

Whh only c ohargg p.tinp OPERABLE, restore at least two darxtg pimcs to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY asd b.cated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equxaIent to at least 1% delta kk at 2OOF within the next FJ hours; restore at least two ohargin pumps to OPERABLE status withto the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN vaithin the next 30 hcur Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations ManaQement Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue next event when the SRO has addresses Tech Specs and the TRM.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 8 of 71 Event

Description:

Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 2, Feed water header pressure transmitter fails high; PT-3-1 B.

Indications/Alarms Annunciator:

1-M-3

1-XA-55-3B-D1 MAIN FEEDWATER DIGITAL CONTROL SYS TRANSFER TO MANUAL Indications:

1-M-3

FW MASTER CONTROLLER shifts to MANUAL (AMBER) 1-M-4

1-FI-3-35A, 35B, 48A, 48B, 90A, 90B, 103A, 103B, SG-1 thru 4 SG FW INLET FLOW Chs 1&2 increasing flow- above steam flow ICS

Thermal Power Increasing MAIN FEEDWATER DIGITAL CONTROL SYS TRANSFER TO MANUAL

[Ij IF using the hand controllers to determine whith Digital Feedwater controller(s) has ransferred to manual, TI-lEN DETERMINE which controller(s) in Manual by ORANGE baclciit Manuai on contrcUer

[2 IF using the OCS Operator Disay nionitors to determine which Digital Feeater cortrdler(s has transferTed to MANUAL, ThEN OBSERVE controller(s) yellaW status light being UT.

[3j ADJUST controller(s) to maintain system parameters steady.

4J NOTIFY US Which centrcllarts) are in manual and sVstem status

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 9 of 71 Event

Description:

Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[9 IF any of the following occur

Syotem pameters can NOT be maintained OR a AtthediscredonoftheUS THEN GO TO any of the following:

a AOP-C 03, Emergency Shutdown

ACP-S.O1, Main Feedwater Malfunctions

E-0. Reactor Thp or Safe injection BOP Responds to ARP 1 -AR-M3B D-1.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Evaluator Note: For this event, crew may respond per the Annunciator Response Procedure directly enter AOP-S.O1 Section 2.2. Section 2.2 Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step; the BOP may perform the action(s) associated with Step 1 from memory without direction.

BOP Manually raises output MFP (Master) Speed Control to maintain S/G levels.

SRO Transitions to AOP-S.O1, MAIN FEEDWATER MALFUNCTIONS section 2.2

1. DIAGNOSE the failure:

IF GO TO PAGE

..- SECTION Failure of Automatic SIG Level Control 2.1 4 Failure of Automatic MFW Pump Control 22 7 Loss of One Main Feedwater Pump 2.3 12 Above 76% (Unit ii or 77% (Unit 2) Turbine Load Main Feedwater Pump Trip 2.4 19 Below 76% (Unit 1) or 77% (Unit 2) Turbine Load NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACT] ON MFP (Master) Speed control shIfts to MANUAL, manually controls MFP BOP (Master) Speed to maintain S/G levels.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 10 of 71 Event

Description:

Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails high Time

( Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. RESTORE feedwater pressure:

a. ENSURE affected MEP speed controller(s) in MANUAL:

MFPT A & B Speed Control OR

MFPT A Speed Controller BOP OR

MFPT B Speed Controller b ADJUST speed on affected MFP s) to restore feedwa er pressure to normal ( 040 psg at full power).

Manually raises output MFP (Master) Speed Control to maintain SIG levels BOP on program level.

Z DETERMINE if MFP trip is needed.

BOP a CHECK BOTH MFW pumps INSER CE CAUTION: Feed flow transients may impact core thermal power.

3. MAINTAIN steam generator level(s)

BOP on program NOTE: Appendix C or DCS Operator Display monitors MFP Contror screen may be used to determine program feedwater DIP for current power

4. MAINTAIN MFP discharge pressure BOP on program USING DCS Operator Display monitors, ICS, or available control board indications.

CAUTION Reactor operation at low power levels for extended periods may challenge reactivity control due to xenon changes.

BOP 5 CHECK Reactor power greater than 5%.

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 11 of 71 Event

Description:

Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW 6. INiTIATE repairs on railed equiprnent

7. WHEN automatic control of affected MFW pump controller(s) i avaflable and reliable.

THEN PLACE controller(s) in AUTO USiNG 1 2-SO-98-1 Distributed Gantrot System.

SRO NOTE: Instructions for restoring bypassed instrument channels are contained in I .2-SO-98-1.

8. 00 TO appropnate plant procedure.

END OF SECTION Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

END OF SECTION Lead Examiner may cue the next event when plant is stable with MFP speed control in manual.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 12 of 71 Event

Description:

MS Power Range instrument Channel I fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 3, NIS Power Range Channel 1 (N41) OUTPUT Signal Failure High Indications available:

Control Rods Inserting M-4 Indicator ramps to full scale

1-AR-M4-B. D3 IPRS NIS POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WITHDRAWAL STOP

1-AR-M6-A. Bi NC-41U/NC-41-K NIS POWER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE

1-AR-M6-A. Dl NC-41R NIS POWER RANGE HIGH SETPOINT HIGH FLUX LEVEL Takes Immediate action to place HS-85-51 10 ROD CONTROL MODE ATC SELECTOR in MANUAL.

SRO Transitions to AOP-C.01 Rod Control System Malfunctions 1 DIAGNOSE the failure:

GOTO IF... SECTION PAGE Uncontrolled rod bank movement (rod movement NOT due to actual T-avg/T-ref mismatch 21 4 or change in reactoriturb[ne power)

NOTE: Step I is an immediate action step.

I STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a PLACE rod control in MAN.

ATC 11 CHECK rod motion STOPPED Takes Immediate action to place HS-85-51 10 ROD CONTROL MODE ATC SELECTOR in MANUAL.

CAUTION: Control Rods should NOT be manually withdrawn during a plant transient.

Z CHECK for plant transient:

ATC a. CHECK reactor power and T-avg STABLE

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 3 Page 13 of 71 Event

Description:

NIS Power Range instrument Channel I fails high Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CII ECK for instrumentation malfunction:

a. CHECK all Vital Instrument Power Boards ENERGIZED:

ATC

. VITAL POWER BOARD UV OR BREAKER TRIP alarms [M-1C windows A-7, 8-7, 0-7, and D-7]

DARK

b. CHECK nuclear nstmmentation b. GO TO AOP-LOi, Nuclear Instrument ATC OPERABLE Malfunction.

DIAGNOSE the failure:

GOTO IF...

SECTION PAGE Power Range Failure 2.3 14 j

PLACE rod control in MAN.

ATC

2. IF power rise is in progress, ATC THEN STABILIZE reactor power at current level,

3. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for appcabilitv:

. 3.3:1,1 (331). Reactor Trfp System Instrumentatton

3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown S RO Instrumentation

. 3.3.3.7, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

4.2.4.2, QPTR with one PR Channel Inoperable

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 3 Page 14 of 71 Event

Description:

NIS Power Range instrument Channel I fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters LCO 3.3.1.1 Action 2 and 6 LIM TI 3 %DITICN FC OR..RATVN 33.1.1 As mn mum, Ii res rtrip system sirumeneston h3n s nd r rlacks of Th 3.3-1 siIO RABLE.

PPLICABIUTY- A siwn n Table 3 3-1 A CT OK As shown n Table 3.3-1.

2. PocRsnge Neutron Fkx 4 2 3 1, 2 2

3. Power Rn9e Neutron Ftix 4 2 3 1 2 2 NIgH Po&te Rare

7. Overlemperature T Four 4 2 3 1 2 6 Loop Cperaon S. cpowerrFourLoop 4 2 3 1,2 6 coerabon

4. CHECK TI-tREE power range channels ATC OPERABLE.

5. PLACE following switches located on Detector Current Comparator drawer

[M-13, N50] in position corresponding to railed Power Range Channel:

. Upper Section CREW

. Lower Section

. Appropriate Rod Stop Bypass switch

. Appropriate Power Mismatch Bypass switch Places Upper & Lower Section, Rod Stop Bypass switch & Power Mismatch ATC Bypass switches to N-41 6 DEFEAT Tailed Power Range channel USING Comparator Channel Defeat switch CREW

. Comparator and Rate Drawer

[M-13. N37]

ATC Places Comparator Channel Defeat switch to N-41 CAUTION: Control rods should NOT be manually withdrawn during a plant transient.

NOTE: Tavg is required to be within 1°F of Tref when restating autcmallc rod controL

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 3 Page 15 of 71 Event

Description:

NIS Power Range instrument Channel I fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. RESTORE Tavg as necessary USING one of the following:

manual rod control OR ATC

. RCS borationidilution OR

turbtne load reduction Places HS-85-51 11 Rod control to OUT to restore TAVE to within 1.5 deg F of ATC TREF

8. IF reactor power s greater than P-S (1 O %)

THEN ENSURE OPERABLE Power Rane channel selected on the follow ng ATC

NR-45 Recorder M-4]

RCS Temp T recorder (green pen>

[M-5, XS-68-2B1

9. IF auto rod control is desired, ATC THEN RESTORE rcd control to AUTO.

ATC Places HS-85-51 10 ROD CONTROL MODE SELECTOR in AUTO.

10. CHECK reactor power greater than 75%. GO TO Step 12.

CREW

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 16 of 71 Event

Description:

NIS Power Range instrument Channel I fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. NOTIFY &Cto remove failed power range channel from service USING appropriate Appendix:

POWER RANGE PROT CHANNEL APPENDIX CH N-41 I A N.42 II B CREW N-43 Ill C N-44 IV D

13. GO TO appropriate plant procedure.

END OF SECTION Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

When technical specifications have been identified or at discretion of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 17 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 4, #2 SG Tube Leakage of -47 gpm Indications available:

Annunciators:

1-M-1

. O-XA-55-12A Window B-5, 1-RA-120N121A, STM GEN BLDN LlO SAMP MON HI RAD

. O-XA-55-12A Window D-3, 1-RA-90-99A, CNDS VAC PMP LO RNG AIR EXH MON HIGH RAD

. XA-55-30 C-8, RA-421A, MN STM LN HI RAD Indications available:

Devations or unexpected indications on any of the following may indicate a steam generator tube leak:

1. Charging iTow rises to maintain Pressurizer level.

2. Rise n makeup to VCT.

3. Rising activity on:

. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust Radiation Monitor

SIG Slowdown Uquid Radiation Mortor

Main Steam Line Monitor

4. 816 sample results indicating greater than or equal to 5 gallons per day (gpd) on any 816.

I -RA-90-99A CNDS VAC PMP LO RNG AIR EXH MON HIGH RAD

I Appendix D Recwired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 2 Event# 4 Page 18 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[I] CHECK l-RR-90-99 rate meter and l-RR 119 on panel O-M-12 for indications of increased radiation.

NOTE Alarm validity may be determined based on absence of instrument malfunction alarm, indicated response of the rad monitor, and, if possible, other indications such as blowdown monitor (recognizing the difference in response time due to blowdown transport time).

[21 IF alarm is valid, THEN NOTIFY RCL to perform i-CEM-068-l 37.5 Primary to Secondary Leakage via Steam Generators.

[3J IF alarm is valid, THEN GO TO AOP-RO1. Steam Generator Tube Leak. [C2]

iRA-i2OAIi 21A.

STM GEN BLDN LIQ SAMP MON HI RAD

[1] ENSURE fl-FCV-15-441 CLOSED to isolate release.

With Steam Generator B lowdown out of service resultant low flows invalidate any 1-RM-90-120/121 High Rad Alarm.

BOP Dispatches TB AUO to locally close valve FCV 15-44.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

SRO j Transitions to AOP R.O1 Examiner note if the crew implements section 2.2 go to page 24

Lppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 19 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. DIAGNOSE the failure:

IF... GOTO SECTION PAGE SRO High Secondary Radiation AND Pressurizer level dropping OR Charging flow rising

1. MONITOR if Pressurizer level can be maintained:

a. CONTROL charging flow USING FCV-62-93 and FCV-62-89 ATC as necessary to maintain pzr level on program.

b. MONITOR pressurizer level STABLE or RISING.

Places FCV-62-93 in manual and controls charging flow, may adjust ATC HIC-62-89A to maintain RCP Seal Flow

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 20 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

b. MONITOR pressurizer level STABLE b. PERFORM the following:

or RISING.

) ENSURE letdown so[ated:

ATC 8 FCV-52-72 CLOSED 8 FCV-62-73 CLOSED

FCV-2-74 CLOSED If pressurizer level is still dropping, places HS-FCV-62-72, FCV-62-73 ATC CLOSED, and FCV-62-74 to CLOSE.

NOTE I Appendix F or G can be used to estimate leak rate.

NOTE 2 If letdown was isolated in Step 1, the leak rate may have exceeded the capacity of one CCP in the normal charging alignment (EAL I .2.2P).

Examiner note; Appendix F starts on page 28

2. EVALUATE EPIP-1, Emergency Plan SRO Classification Matrix.

SRO Directs SM to evaluate EPIP-l

3. MONITOR VCT level:

MAINTAIN VCT level greater than 13%

ATC USING auto or manual makeup

. CHECK VCT makeup capability adequate to maintain level.

4. MONITOR indications of leaking S/G:

a. NOTIFY Chem Lab to evaluate Primary to Secondary Leakage USING 1 (2)-Sl-CEM-066-1 37.5:

CREW

Method 1 Rapid Identification of Leaking Steam Generators

Method 3, Condenser Vacuum Exhaust (CVE) Sampling for Determination of Primary-to Secondary (PIS) Leakage.

b. NOTiFY Radiation Protection to monitor Turbine Building and site environment:

CREW

Steam lines

. S/G blowdown

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 21 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior C. IDENTIFY leaking S/G(s)

USING any of the following:

. Unexpected rise in any SIG narrow range level OR e SIG sample results CREW OR

. Radiation Protection survey of main steamlines and S/G blowdown lines OR

. High radiation on any main steamline radiation monitor.

CREW Identifies SGTL on S/S #2.

Evaluator Note: SRO may refer to Operations Chemistry Information Sheet in turnover package.

5. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for applicability:

. 3.4S2, Operational Leakage

. 31.1 A, Secondary Coolant ActMty 3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shaft be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, b, 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,

c. 150 gallons per day of primary-to-secondarj leakage throngh any one steam generator, and

d. 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILiTY: MODES 1,2. 3 and 4 ACT ON 1, With anj Reactor Coolant System leakage greater an any one of the above I nits exclucing RESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or primary-to-secondarj leakage reduce the leakage rate to within I ivits with n 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN vith n the fdlowin 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SRO Enters 3.4.6.2.c, Operational Leakage action a.

NOTE Initiating shutdown required by Tech Specs requires 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months NRC notification per SPP-3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 22 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. INITIATE rapid shutdown by performing the following:

a. ANNOUNCE SIG tube leak on PA system.

b. PERFORM rapid shutdown CREW USING AOP-C.03 WHILE continuing in this section.

c. ENSURE power reduced to less than 50% within one hour.

d. ENSURE unit in Mode 3 within the following 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Examiner note AOP-C.03 actions start on page 30 T MINIMIZE Spread of contamination:

a. IF tube leak identified on S/G #1 AND SIG #4 is intact, THEN PERFORM the following:

BOP

1) EVALUATE LCO 37 I 2.

2) CLOSE FCV-1-15 TDAFWP steam supply from SIG #1

3) ENSURE FCV-i-16 TDAFWP steam supply from 51(3 #4 OPEN.

Lppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 2 Event# 4 Page 23 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

b. PERFORM EA-Q-3, Minimizrng Secondary Plant Contamination.

c. IF SIG blowdown is allgned to the river, THEN TERMINATE SIG Blowdown to river:

1) ENSURE S/C blowdown flow control BOP FCV-1 5-43 CLOSED.

2) DISPATCH operator to perform EA-15-i, Realigning S/G Blowdown to Cond DL

3) WHEN EA-15-1 completed, THEN ADJUST FCV-15-43 to establish desired blowdown 110w.

7. d. NOTIFY Chem Lab to determine release rate for condenser vacuum exhaust USING O-SI-CEM-030-41 5.0 and 0-Sl-CEM-030-407.2.

e. NOTIFY Chem Lab to evaluate rerouting steam generator sample drain lines to FDCT USING 0-il-CEM-000-Ol 6.4.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 24 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I WHEN notified by Chemistry to bypass Condensate Dl, THEN DISPATCH AUO to bypass pol[shers on affected unit:

Unit 1 Only:

PLACE i-HS-14-3, Condensate Polisher Bypass Valve to OPEN.

[Cond Dl BIdgj BOP

Unit 2 Only:

PLACE 2-HS-14-3, condensate Polisher Bypass Valve to OPEN.

[Cond Dl Bidgi

g. EVALUATE Appendix C, Contingency Plan for Control and Processing of Large Volumes of Contaminated Water [C. 51 Examiner note Section 2.2 starts here.

NOTE This section provides steps to monitor primary to secondary leakage and directs unit shutdown if leakage limits are :exceeded Entry into this section is required when secondary radiation monitors indicate a rise in primary-to-secondary leakage or when Chemistry determines SIC leak rate exceeds 5 gal per day (gpd) t MONITOR charging flow and IF Charging flow rising Pressurizer level STABLE OR Pressurizer level dropping due to SIC tube 1eak ATC THEN GO TO Section 2.1

2. EVALUATE EPIP-1, Emergency Pan SRO Classification Matrix.

SRO Directs SM to evaluate EPIP-1.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 25 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for app licability:

ATC

3.4.6.2, Operational Leakage

3.7.L4. SecondaW Coolant Activity NOTE Lower containment rad monitor count rate rising concurrently with secondary rad monitors may indicate a sudden fuel defect, which could give a false indication of S!G tube leak. Threshold values for correlating RM-90-9911 19 count rate to SIG tube leakage must be recalculated if RCS activity has changed significantly 4, INITIATE sampling to confirm S/G leak:

a. CHECK lower containment rad monitor CREW count rate STABLE or DROPPING.

b. PERFORM Appendix E, Chemistry Sampling Actions.

CAUTiON: The clock starts for power reduction or shutdown in Step when any valid indication is available that the applicable leak rate threshold is exceeded.

Required time limits for power reduction or shutdown should NOT be exceeded due to delays in confirming leak rate.

NOTE 1: Based on monitor sensitivity, condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitor (RM-90-99 or -119) is preferred indication for leak rate monitoring. Other secondary rad monitors (if available) anctlor SIG sampling should be used for confirmation.

Conrirmation time should be Kept to a minimum.

NOTE 2: Rad Monitor values (cpm) must be converted to a gallons per day (gpd) equivalency to determine leakrate. Correlation of RM-90-9911 19 responses to Primary -

Secondary leak rates and limits are provided by Chemistry in turnover package.

NOTE 3: Steady State conditions (less than 10% power change per hour) are required to accurately correlate cpm readings with gpd leakage.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 7 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event# 4 Page 26 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position j} Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. MONiTOR pnmaiy-to-secondary leak rate:

a. PERFORM Appendix A, Radiation Monitor Trending Data every 15 mm, USING available rad monitor&

ii VERIFY rise in count rate validated by at least one of the following:

SRO

sample results confirming rise in S/G activity OR

two independent secondary rad monitors showing rise in count rate.

C. REFER TO Appendix B, Summary of Action Levels for S/G Tube Leak.

NOTE I When monitoring leakage using radiation monitors, primary to secondary leakage should be monitored over several minutes to ensure that rise in leakage is not a temporary spike.

NOTE 2 Leakage action levels apply to leak rate from a single SIG If unable to determine leakage from individual S/Os, total leakage should be assumed to be coming from one Sf0.

6. MONITOR shutdown requirements:

BOP a. CHECK condenser vacuum exhaust mci monitor RM-SO-99 or RM-90-1 19 OPERABLE.

NOTE If leak rate exceeds 75 gal per day (Action Level 3) based upon condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitor and NO Sf0 blowdown rad monitor is available to validate leak, required actions to shut down shall be initiated based upon the one available rad monitor.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event# 4 Page 27 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. b. CHECK Primary to Secondary leak b. IF Teak rate in affected S/G(s) rate in affected SIG(s) greater than or equal to 75 gal per y, less than 75 gal per day. THEN PERFORM the following:

l ENSURE power less than 50%

BOP within 1 hr and unt in Mode 3 within next 2 hrs (total of 3 hrs).

2) GO TO Section 2.1 to shut down Examiner Note: crew should realize leak is sufficient and transitions to section 2.1, page 7 Step 6 RNO

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 28 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak SON STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK AOP-R.O1 Rev.26 Page 1 of I APPENDIX F ESTIMATING RCS LEAK RATE USING CVCS FLOW BALANCE NOTE I This method is recommended when leak requires rise in charging flow greater than -10 gpm.

Appendix G is more accurate for smaller leak rates.

NOTE 2 This appendix assumes RCS temperature and charging flow are approximately constant.

INITIAL FINAL CHANGE PZR Level [1]

(neQatve fcr )evel decrease)

Time Charging Flow [3]

Letdown Flow [4]

Total RCP Seal Return Flow [5]

Pressurizer Level Conversion Pressurizer level conversion Time Change Pzr Level Rate of Change change factor (poste f)eversng)

X 62gal!% ÷ mm = gprn step [11 above step f2] above [61 Leak Rate Calculation Charging Flow Letdown Flow Seal Return Pzr Level Instrument error RCS Leak Flow Rate of Change correction factor Rate

+ 3gpm = gprn step P1 above step 4] above step [5J above step [6] above Page 64 of 68

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 29 of 71 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak SON STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK AOP-R.O1 Rev. 26 Page 1 of I APPENDIXG ESTIMATING RCS LEAK RATE USING VCT AND PZR LEVEL CAUTION This appendix CANNOT be used during VCT makeup. boratiori. or dilution.

NOTE This appendix assumes RCS temperature is approximately constant.

VCT LEVEL (% PZR LEVEL (%) TIME (mink INITIAL FiNAL CHANGE [Ii [21 [31

{pcsidve for ievel decrease) (positive for level decrease)

VCT Level Conversion VCT level change conversion Time Change VCT Level factor Rate of Change (positte for level lcwedng)

% x 20 gal I % mm = qpru step [1] above step [31 above [4]

Pressurizer Level Conversion Pressurizer level conversion Time Change Pzr Level change factor Rate of Change positive for revel lowering)

% X 52ga1/% ÷ mm = gprn step 12] above step [3] above [5]

Leak Rate Calculation VCT Level Pzr Level RCS Leak Rate Rate of Change Rate of Change

+ gpm step [4] above step [5J above Page 65 of 68

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event# 5 Page 30 of 71 Event Descnption: Power reduction Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: No action required for Event 5, Rapid Power reduction SRO Directs performance of AOP.-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD REDUCTION.

1. ENSURE crew has been briefed on reactivity SRO management expectations USiNG Appendix A.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT BRIEFING NOTE This appendix should be used in addition to event-based brief.

(1] ENSURE crew has been briefed on the following:

Reason for Rapid Shutdown or Load Reduction

Load Reduction Rate:________

Desired final power level:______

Reactivity Management expectations:

Unit Supervisor shall concur with all reactivity manipulations

Ensure reactor responding as expected using diverse indications

Tavg-Tref Mismatch requirements:

3F control band

5F reactor trip criteria

Crew focus will be on reducing power in a controlled and conservative manner.

OATC will monitor rod insertion limits and AFD limit

Boration source:

Crew will monitor reactor trip and turbine trip criteria using App. B

CR0 will stop secondary plant equipment using App. C.

If time permits, review expected annunciators (ex. Computer Alarm, Upper and Lower Flux Dev)

Termination Criteria (conditions requiring Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, or condition no longer requiring rapid load reduction):

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 31 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. NOTIFY rollowing personnel of rapid shutdown or load reduction:

a Load Coordinator [C11 CREW

Chemistry

Radiation Protection

Plant Management CREW Makes notifications as required.

3 MONITOR reactor/turbine trip NOT required CREW USING Appendix B, Reactor and Turbine Trip Criteria Examiner note: Appendix B reactor and turbine trip criteria see page 32

& CHECK VALVE POSITION LIMIT light BC DARK on EHC panel. [M-2]

NOTE: Boration volumes and flowrates listed in this procedure are recommendations and may be adjusted as necessary 5 INmATE boration:

a CHECK rod contml AVAILABLE:

ATC

Control Bank D rods capable of being moved

NO dropped or misaligned rods in Control Bank D.

5 Ii CHECK Control Bank D group position greater than 200 step&

ATC c CHECK boration capability from BAT AVAILABLE

Arnjendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event# 5 Page 32 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

d. DETERMINE recommended boration volume from BAT:

800 gal to reduce power from 100% to 20%

OR SRO

. 10 gal for cacti 1% power reduction (from current power level)

OR

. volume recommended by Reactor Engineering.

SRO Determines 280 gal to reduce power from 48% to 20%.

5. e DETERMINE recommended boration flowrate from table below or from Reactor Engineering:

SRO 1 LOAD REDUCTION BORATION RATE(%ImIn) 2% 3ogpm 7°* 45 gpm SRO Chooses a 2% to 3% load reduction rate.

f ENSURE concurrence obtarned from AT STA for boration volume and flowrate.

g ENSURE boric add fransfer pump ATC ;igned to blender : FAST speed

h. ADJUST FCV-62-i8 to estabhsh ATC desired flcw rate ATC Adjusts FCV-.62-1 38 to between 30 to 45 gpm.

t CONTROL boration flow as reqinred to inject desIred boric acId volume

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 33 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION: If borating from the RWST, Turbine Load Reduction Rate greater than 2% per minute could result in violating Rod Insertion Limit.

6. INiTIATE load reduction as follows:

a ADJUST load rate to desifed value:

. between 1% and 4% per minute ii borating via FCV 138 BOP OR

. beIveen 1 and :3% per minute t horatng va normal bcration (App. H)

OR

2% per minute if borating from RWST BOP Adjusts load rate approx 2% to 3 % per minute b ADJUST setter for desred power Ieiel:

BOP f RX POWER DESIRED LEVEL RECOMMENDED SETTER VALUE 20% or less 15

6. C. VERIFY boration flow established.

BOP c1 INITIATE turbine load reduction by depressing GO pustibutton.

e. CONTROL turbine load reduction as necessary to reduce power to desired leveL

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 34 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. MONiTOR T-avgfT-ref mismatch:

ATC

a. CHECK Tre indication AVAILABLE

7. b. MONITOR automatic rod controi ATC maintaining Tavglr-ref mismatch less than 3°F ATC Coordinates with the BOP to maintain T-avglT-ref mismatch less than 3°F BOP MONITOR automatic control at MFW pump speed AVAlI.BLE.

9 STOP secondary plant equipment BOP USING Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment.

Examiner Note: Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment starts at page 36.

Examiner Note: Additional AOP-C.03 steps not included as required power reduction should be complete at or around this step.

Examiner Note: When the crew has sufficiently reduced power go to event 6 page 46.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 35 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction APPENDIX B REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA REACTOR TRIP CRiTERIA TURBINE TRiP CRITERIA Turbine tnp required or imminent Turbine vibration exceeding 14 mils with reactor power greater than P-9 (50%) with one of the following:

Uncontrofled rod movement which CANNOT be

high vibration on multiple bearings stopped by placing rods in MANUAL o-c.oi) OR Loss of S1G level control:

abnormal noise/vibration apparent level dropping or rising toward trip setpoint and level CANNOT be restored OP-so1)

More than one dropped rod op-c.oi T-avg/T-ref mismatch CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F (refer to Step 7 or App. E) 30% turbine load: < 30% turbine load:

Condenser Pressure > 2.7 psia AND CANNOT Condenser Pressure> I 72 psia be restored Within 5 minutes IAOP-S.02) cAOP-Sc2)

Any automatic reactor trip setpoint reached Any automatic turbine trip setpoint reached OR automatic trip imminent: OR automatic trip imminent

Turbine trip above P-9 (50%)

High Stator Cooling Water temp 90°C

Safety injection OR Stator D/P 12 psig below normal

Power Range high flux 11)9%

Both MFPTs tripped

Power Range flux rate +/-5% in 2 seconds

Low Auto Stop Oil pressure 45 psig

Pressurizer high level 92%

High 51(3 level 81% narrow range

Pressurizer pressure low 1970 psig

Main Turb Bearing Oil low pressure 7 psig

Pressurizer pressure high 2385 psig

Thrust Bearing Oil high pressure 60 psig

RCS low flow 90%

Turbine Overspeed 1980 rpm

RCP undervoitage 5.022 kilovolts

Loss of EHC pressure

RCP underfrequency 56.0 Hz

Generator PCBs tripped.

OThT 115% (variable>

a OPT 108.7% (variable)

SJG low level 10,7% [15% EAMI

SSPS general warning in both trains

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 36 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction APPENDIX C SECONDARY PLANT EQUIPMENT

[1] ENSURE plant announcement(s) made on the following:

starling rapid shutdown (or load reduction) due to (reason)

stopping secondary plant equipment NOTE I If reactor power will be reduced below 50%, AUO should be on station at #3 heater drain tank (if possible) when 60% power is reached.

NOTE 2 Dispatching of AUO in Steps [2] and [3] may be performed out of sequenCe.

[2] IF reactor power will be reduced below 50%,

THEN DISPATCH AUO with Appendix J (Unit 1)01 K (Unit 2 to #3 Heater Drain Tank.

[3] IF one MFP will be shutdown using this appendix, THEN DISPATCH AUO to OPEN MFWP recirc manual Isolation valve for M:FWP to be removed from service: (NIA valves NOT opened)

UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN IA 1-VLV-3--576 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of 1A condenser 18 1-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of IA condenser 2 2A 2-VLV-3--576 TB eL 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser E 28 2-VLV-3-577 TB ci. 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 37 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction APPENDIX C 4J IF BOTH of the following conditions are met:

power is being reduced as directed by AOP.-S.01 (Main Feedwater Malfunctions) or AOPSO4 (Condensate or Heater Drain Malfunctions) leaving secondary pumps in service is desired, THEN GO TO Step [8].

[51 WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 80% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE one Cond Demin Booster Pump STOPPED.

[b] ENSURE associated suction vave CLOSED:

OR B FCV2-285

LzL i

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 38 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction

[6] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 70-75%,

THEN PERFORM the following:

tal ENSURE one Condensate Booster Pump STOPPED LI

[b] ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:

CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED I A FCV-2-94 LI OR FCV-2-87 LI OR FCV2-8i

[ci PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:

(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary)

1-50-213-i Section T2 OR

2-50-213-i Section T3 LI

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 39 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction

[71 WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 65% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP remaining two Cond Demin Booster Pumps simultaneously.

[b] ENSURE suction valves CLOSED:

COND DEMIN BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED A FCV-2-290 B FCJ-2285 C FCV-2-280

[c] STOP one No. 3 Heater Drain pump.

[d] STOP one No. 7 Heater Drain pump. n

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 40 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction

[8J IF reactor power will be maintained greater than 5:0%,

THEN GO TO Notes prior to Step [ii].

CAUTION Isolation of all three intermediate heater strings could occur if turbine is tripped prior to fully opening LCV-6-105A and B using Appendix J or K.

[91 WHEN reactor power is less than 60%

AND AUO with App. J (Unit 1) or K (Unit 2) is on station at #3 Heater Drain Tank, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP #3 Heater Drain Tank Pumps.

[b] NOTIFY AUO to perform App. J (Unit 1) or App. K (Unit 2),

Fully Opening #3 Heater Drain Tank Bypass Valves.

[c] CLOSE isolation valves from #3 Htr Drain Pumps to heater strings:

VALVE DESCRLPTTON CLOSED -4 FCV-6108 Htr Drain 1k Pump 3 to Htr String A FCV-6-109 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr String B FCV-6.-1 10 Htr Drain 1k Pump 3 to Htr String C

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 41 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction NOTE I The following step ensures that MFW Bypass valves are available to control feedwater flow at low power.

NOTE 2 If any MFW Reg valve is in MANUAL, the associated MEW Bypass valve controller should remain in MANUAL to prevent undesired opening of bypass valve.

[1Oj WHEN Reactor power is less than 50%,

THEN PERFORM the following:

[] IF all MEW Reg Valves are in AUTO, THEN PLACE MEW Bypass Reg Valve controllers in AUTO.

[b] IF any MEW Reg Valve is in MANUAL, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) MAINTAIN MFW Bypass Reg Valve in MANUAL for SIG with MEW Reg valve in MANUAL.

2) PLACE MEW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO for remaining S/Gs.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 42 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction NOTE I If performing this AOP to reduce power to allow shutting down one MAN pump, the affected MFWP may be removed from service at power level less than 55% (Unit 1) or 65% (Unit 2).

NOTE 2 AFW start function on loss of both MFW pumps is inoperable when a MFW pump is RESET but NOT pumping forward. [CO 3.3.2.1 (Unit 1)or 3.3.2 (Unit 2) allows AFW start channel to be inoperable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months when shutting down a MFWR

[IIJ WHEN it is desired to remove one MEW pump from service AND power level is less than applicable limit:

turbine impulse pressure less than approximately 45%

OR

reactor power less than value specified in Note I THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE MF\NP Recirc Manual Isolation valve OPEN for MFWP to be removed from service: (N/A valves NOT opened)

UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN J IA 1-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of 1A condenser 1

IB 1 -VLV-3-577 TB ci 706, Northeast corner of 1 A condenser 2A 2-VLV-3-576 TB ci 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser 2

2B 2-VLV-3-577 TB ci 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser

[b] THROTTLE OPEN recirc valve in MANUAL (30-50% OPEN) for MFWP to be removed from service. El

[c] PLACE speed controller in MANUAL for MFWP to be removed from service El

[d] REDUCE speed gradually on MFWP to be removed from service.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 43 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction

[111 (Continued) te] ENSURE proper loading on remaining MFWP.

E3 IF MFWP CANNOT be fully unloaded with speed controller, THEN PERFORM one of the following:

NOTIFY l&C to slowly adjust hand speed changer for affected MFWP UNTIL MFWP is fully unloaded, OR

THROTTLE OPEN recirc valve for affected MFWP to assist in unloading MFWP OR

SLOWLY CLOSE governor valve by bumping closed governor valve positioner (if operable)

OR

OBTAIN SRO concurrence that MFWP flow is sufficiently low to allow tripping MFWR

[g] WHEN MFWP is unloaded suffic:iently THEN TRIP affected MFWP.

[h] CLOSE recirc valve for MFWP removed from service.

[i] CLOSE recirc valve Manual Isolation inlet valve for MFWP removed from service. E U] OPEN drain valves for MFWP removed from service: [M-31

[HS46-14], MFWP A drain valves .

E OR

[HS46411 MFWP B drain valves. E

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 44 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction

[12 WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 45% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP remaining No. 7 Heater Drain pump.

[b] CLOSE isolation valves from #7 Heater Drain Pumps to heater strings:

VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED FCV-&-143 Htr Drain Tk Pump 7 to Htr String A LI FCV-6-163 Htr Drain Tk Pump 7 to Htr String B LI FCV-6-1 84 Htr Drain Tk Pump 7 to Htr String C LI

[13] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 30% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE main turbine EHC controls in IMP OUT.

[b] IF #3 heater drain tank pumps are still running, THEN PERFORM Step [9J.

[c] STOP one of two remaining Condensate Booster Pumps El (step continued on next pane)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 45 of 71 Event

Description:

Power reduction

[13] (Continued)

[d] ENSURE associated CBP sucüon valve CLOSED:

OR FCV-2-87 E OR

[ C FCV-2-81

[eJ STOP one of three Hotwell Pumps.

f] PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:

(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary) i-SO2/3-i Section 72 OR

. 2-SO-213-i Section T3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 6,7 Page 46 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time fl Position fl Applicants Actions or Behaviors Booth Operator: When directed, initiate Event 7 Increases the SGTL to 800 gpm over three minutes.

Indications available:

1-M-3:

LOOP #2 FEEDWATER MAIN REG VALVE indicator shows a lower teed flow that steam flow; 1-M-4:

LOOP #2 FF indicators showing lower flow than SF for a constant power level.

RCS Pzr LEVEL Chs, 1-LI-68-339A, 335A & 320 going down slowly initially; 1-M-5:

RCS PZR LEVEL 1-LR-68-339 shows Pzr level trending down initially.

1-PR-68-69, RCS LOOP 1 HL WIDE RANGE PRESS indicator trending down.

CHARGING HDR FLOW lFl-62-93A indicating above normal flow to maintain Pzr level on program.

1 -M-6:

1-Pl-68-66A, HL Pressure LOOP 3 indicator trending down.

1-PI-68-62, RCS HL Press WR indicator trending down.

1-Pl-68-69, RCS HL Press WR indicator trending down.

Examiner Note: following IOA performance, prior to Steps 1-4 immediate action verification, ATC/BOP surveys MCBs for any expected automatic system response that failed to occur. Upon discovery, they may take manual action(s) to align plant systems as expected for the event in progress. (Ref. EPM-4, Prudent Operator Actions)

Examiner Note: Based on plant concfltions the SRO may direct the crew to manually trip the Reactor and initiate Safety Injection.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 47 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position fl Applicants Actions or Behaviors CREW Performs the first four steps of E-O unprompted.

SRO Directs performance of E-O NOTE 1 Steps I through 4 are immediate action steps.

NOTE 2 This procedure has a foldout page.

1. VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:

Reactor trip breakers OPEN

Reactor trip bypass breakers DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC

Rod bottom lights LIT

Rod position indicators less than or equal to 12 steps.

Neutron flux DROPPING

2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:

BOP

Turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. VERIFY at least one 6,9KV shutdown ATTEMPT to start DIGs.

board ENERGIZED on this unit.

IF power CANNOT be immediately restored to at least one shutdown board BOP on this unit, THEN GO TO ECA-O.O. Loss of All AC Power.

4. DETERMINE if SI actuated:

ATC

ECCS pumps RUNNING,

Any SI alarm UT (M-4D].

5. PERFORM ES-Q,5, Equipment BOP Verifications WHILE continuing in this procedure.

Continue with the performance of E-O REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY RO/ATC INJECTION BOP Performs ES-O.5, Equipment Verifications go to page 65 for details

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 48 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level control Valve Fails Open Time I Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behaviors SRO Addresses foldout page.

FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the tollowrng conditions occurs;

RCS pressure less than 1250 psig AND at least one CCP or SI pump running OR

Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs.

EVENT DIAGNOSTICS

IF any SIG pressure is dropping uncontrolled. THEN PERFORM the following:

a CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

b. IF any Sf0 pressure continues to drop uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE SI actuated.

2 IF at least one 5/0 is intact (Si G pressure controlled or rising),

THEN ISOLATE AFW to faulted S!G(s):

CLOSE AFW level control valves for faulted S/G(s)

IF any AFW valve for faulted S/G CANNOT be CLOSED, THEN PERFORM Appendix E, Isolating AFW to Faulted Sf0,

3) ENSURE at least one of the following conditions met:

total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm OR

Narrow Range level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one intact Sf0.

IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS

IF CST level less than 5%, THEN AUGN AFW suction to ERCW.

IF RWST level less than 27%, THEN GO TO ES-i .3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 49 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink available:

a. CHECK total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm.

b. CHECK narrow range level b. MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 10% [25% ADV] greater than 440 gpm ATC in at least one 8/G. UNTIL narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADVI in at least one SIG.

c. CONTROL feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%

in intact or ruptured S/Gs.

Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm ATC/BOP until S/G are greater than 10% NR.

Evaluator Note: ATC/BOP may perform the POA stated above to isolate AFW to the affected SG, once at least 1 of 4 SGs is >10% NR for heat sink concerns.

7. CHECK if main steam lines should be isolated:

a. CHECK if any of the following a. GO TO Step 8.

conditions have occurred:

Any S!G pressure less than 600 psig ATC OR a Any SIG pressure dropping UNCONTROLLED OR

Phase B actuation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 50 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

& CHECK RCP trip criteria:

a. CHECK the following: a GO TO Step 9

RCS pressure ATC less than 1250 psig AND

At least one CCP OR SI pump DI ,IhIId(

9. MONITOR RCS temperatures: IF temperature less than 547°F and dropping, IF any RCP running, THEN THEN PERFORM the following:

CHECK T-avg stable at or trending to between 547°F and 552°F. a. ENSURE steam dumps and atmospheric reliefs CLOSED.

OR

b. IF cooldown continues, IF RCPs stopped, ThEN THEN CONTROL total feed flow:

CHECK T-cold stable at or trending ATC/BOP 1) ENSURE total AFW flow to between 547°F and 552°F.

less than or equal to 600 gpm.

2) MAINTAIN total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL narrow range level is greater than 10% [25% ADVI in at least one SIG.

c. IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 51 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm ATC/BOP and less than 600 gpm until S/G are greater than 10% NR.

10. CHECK pressurizer PORVs, safeties, and spray valves:

a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.

b. Pressurizer safety valves CLOSED.

ATC c. Normal spray valves CLOSED.

d. Power to at least one block valve AVAILABLE.

e. At least one block valve OPEN.

11. DETERMINE if SIG secondary pressure boundaries are INTACT:

CHECK all S/C pressures ATC CONTROLLED or RISING.

CHECK all S/C pressures greater than 140 psig.

12. DETERMINE if SIG tubes are INTACT: IF any SIG has level rising n an uncontrolled manner

All SIC narrow range levels OR has high radiation, CONTROLLED or DROPPING THEN PERFORM the following:

ATC

Secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A, Secondary Rad a MONITOR status trees.

Monitors. (App. A performed in ES-0.5i. b GO TO E-3. Steam Generator TLibe Rupture SRO determines S/G #2 is ruptured and directs monitoring status trees and SRO transitions to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via SPDS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 1 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 52 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open FOLDOUT PAGE SI REINATION CRITERIA IF SI has been terminated AND either of the following conditions occurs:

RCS subcoollng based on core exit T/CS less than 4OF OR

Pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained greater than 10% [20% ADV],

THEN a ESTABLISH ECCS flow by performing one or both of me following:

ESTABLISH CCPIT 110w as necessary USING Appendix C

START CCPs or SI pumps manually as necessary Li GO TO ECA-3. 1, SGTR and LOCA Subcooled Recovery EVENT DIAGNOSTICS

IF both trains of shutdown boards deenergized, THEN GO TO ECA-00, Loss of All AC Power.

IF any SJG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner or less than 140 psig AND SIG NOT isolated AND S/G NOT needed for RCS cooldown, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

IF any Intact S/G has level rising in an uncontrolled manner OR has abnormal radiation, THEN STOP any deliberate RCS cooldown or depressunzation and GO TO E-3 Step I TANK SWITCHOVER SETFOINTS

IF CST level less than 5%,

THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERW

IF RWST level less than 27%,

THEN GO TO ES-13, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 53 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC 1. MONITOR at [east one RCP RUNNING.

Z MONITOR RCP tiip criteria:

a. CHECK the following: a GO TO Step 3.

RCS pressure less than 1250 psig ATC AND

At least one CCP OR SI pump RUNNING.

b. STOP RCPs.

3 MONITOR indications of Ruptured S/G(s):

a IDENTIFY Ruptured 510(s) as indicated by any of the following:

Unexpected rise in any SIG narrow range level.

OR

High radiation from any S/G Crew sample OR

RADCON survey off main steam

[ines and S!G blowdown lines.

OR

High radiation on any main steamline radiation monitor.

CAUTION If the TD AFW pump is the only source of feed flow. isolating both steam supplies will result in loss of secondary heat sink.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 6,7 Page 54 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. ISOLATE flow from Ruptured 5/0(s):

ATC/BOP a ADJUST Ruptured SIG(s) atmospheric rellef controller setpoint to 87% in AUTO. (1040 psIg)

ATD/BOP Places PI-1-13A setpointto 87%

b. CHECK Ruptured SJG(s) b. WHEN Ruptured SIG(s) pressure atmospheric relief hand switch in less than 1040 psig, P-AUTO and valve(s) CLOSED. THEN PERFORM the following:

1> VERIFY atmospheric relief CLOSED.

2) IF atmospheric relief NOT closed, ATC/BO P THEN CLOSE atmospheric relief.

IF Ruptured SIG(s) atmospheric relief CANNOT be closed.

THEN DISPATCH personnel to close atmospheric relief USING EA-1-2.

Local Control of SIG PORVs.

c CHECK SIG Al or#4 ruptured c. GO TO Substep 4.e SRO Determines SG 2 Is RUPTURED I

ATC/BOP . VERIFY Ruptured SIG(s) blowdown isolation valves CLOSED.

f. CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) MSIV ATC/BOP and MSIV bypass valve.

CRITICAL ATC/BOP Places HS-1-1 1A MSIV S/G #2 to CLOSE.

5. MONITOR Ruptured 51(3(s) level.

ATC/BO P

a. CHECK mptured SG narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADVI.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 6,7 Page 55 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior b ENSURE AFW isolated b. IF any AFW valve for ruptured S/G to ruptured Sf0: CANNOT be CLOSED AND atfected AFW ftowpath

1) CLOSE AFW LCVs is NOT isolated locally, for ruptured Sf0. THEN PERFORM Appendbc E, Isolating 2} PLACE Turline Driven AFW AFW to Ruptured Sf0.

LCV for ruptured 510 in CLOSE PULL TO LOCK APPENDIX E ISOLATING AFW TO RUPTURED SIG IF motor-nven AFW LCV for ruptured SIG CANNOT be dosed, ATc/BOP THEN PERFORM the following:

a. IF at least one other AFW pump is available, THEN PLACE alfected MO AFW pump n PULL TO LOCK.

CRmCAL.

ATC/BQP Places HS-3-1 1 8A AFW Pump I A-A to STOP using APP E.

CRITICAL AT/BOP Places HS 31 73A to CLOSE and PTL 6 VERIFY Ruptured SG ISOLATED from Intact SIG(s):

a CHECK either of the oHow ng conditIons SATISFIED

Ruptured S G MSIVS and MSFV bypass valves CLOSED OR ATC/BOP

MSIV(s) and MSIV bypass valve(s)

CLOSED on Intact 510(s) to be used for RCS cooldowri.

b CHECK 510 #1 or #4 ruptured. b GO TO Step T

7. CHECK Ruptured 8/0 pressure ATC/BOP greater than 550 psig (Unit 1) or 425 psig (Unit 2).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 6,7 Page 56 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Blocking low steamline pressure SI as soon as pressunzer pressure is less than 1960 psig will prevent an inadvertent MSIV closure and keep the condenser aiailable for steam dump.

After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint :is exceeded

The 1250 psig RCP trip criterion is NOT applicable after RCS cooldown is initiated in the following step.

& INITIATE RCS cooldown:

a DETERMINE target core exit T/C temperature based on Ruptured S/G pressure:

ATC/BOP Lowest Ruptured Target Core Exit S/G pressure (psig) TIC Temp (CF) 1000 1049 466 A

SRO/ATC Determine target cooldown temperature of 486 deg F.

B b WHEN RCS pressure less than 1960 psg THEN PERFORM the followlng

) BLOCK low steaml ne pressure

2) CHECK STEAMLINE PRESS iSOL/SI BLOCK RATE 1SOL ENABLE permissive LIT.

[M-4A. A4]

SOP Places HS-63-135A and 135B LO STM LINE PRESS SIS BLOCK to BLOCK. *

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 57 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior c DUMP steam to condenser from Intact S/G(s) at maximum achievable rate:

1) CHECK condenser available:

C-9 condenser interlock permissive LIT. [M-4A. EG]

Intact SG MSIVs OPEN.

2) PLACE steam dumps in OFF,

3) ENSURE steam dumps in steam pressure mode with demand less than 25%

4) PLACE steam dumps in ON.

5) ADJUST steam dump demand to fULLY OPEN three cooldown valves.

6) WHEN T-avg is less than 54QF.

THEN BYPASS steam dump nterlock.

7) RAISE AFW flow to ntact S?Gs as necessary to support cooldown.

BOP Places HS-1-103A and 103B, STEAM DUMP A/B FSV to OFF then ON Places HS-1 -1 03D, STM DUMP MODE SEL to RESET then STEAM PRESS BOP when TAVG is less than 540 deg F Raises output on PlC-i -33, STEAM DUMP PRESSURE CONTROL to fully BOP open three Steam Dump Valves.

Places HS-l-103A and 103B, STEAM DUMP A/B FSV to OFF then BYPASS BOP INTLK when TAVG is less than 540 deg F

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 1 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 58 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

& d. WHEN core exit TiCs less than target temperature determined in Substep 8.a, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) CLOSE steam dumps or SIG atmospheric reliefs.

2) REDUCE total AFW flow to less than $G0 gpm to stop cooldown, MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL level greater than 10% [25% ADV]

in at least one Intact S/G

3) MAINTAIN core exit T/Cs less than target temperature USING steam dumps or atmospheric reliefs.

9. MAINTAIN intact S/G narrow range levels:

a. Greater than 10% 25% ADVI b Between 20% [25% ADVj and 50%

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 6,7 Page 59 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. MONITOR pressurizer PORVs and block valves:

a Power to block valves AVAILABLE ATC

b. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED c At least one block valve OPEN.

11. RESET SI signal.

BOP 12. MONITOR AC busses energized from start busses.

ATC 13. ENSURE Phase A and Phase B RESET 14, CHECK control air established to containment: [Panel 6K and 6L1

. i-FcV32-80 (2-FCV.-32-81)

Train A essential air OPEN ATC

. i-FCV-32-102 (2-FCV-32-i03)

Train 8 essential air OPEN

. I -FCV-32-1 10 (2-FOV-32-i 11) non-essential air OPEN.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 6,7 Page 60 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 15 DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

i CHECK RHR pump suction aligned from RWST.

b. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 300 psig.

c STOP RHR pumps and PLACE in A-AUTO.

d MONITOR RCS pressure greater than 300 psig.

ATC Places HS-74-1OA and 20A RHR Pumps 1A and 1 B to STOP

16. CHECK if RCS cooldown should be stopped:

a. CHECK core exit T/Cs less than target temperature determined in Substep &a.

b. CLOSE steam dumps or atmospheric reliet&

BOP c. REDUCE total AFW flow to less than 600 gpm to stop cooldown MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gprn UNTIL level greater than 10% L25% ADVI in at least one Intact S/G.

d. MAINTAIN core exit TICs less than target temperature USING steam dumps or atmospheric reliefs CRmCAL BOP Reduces output on PIC-1-33, STEAM DUMP PRESSURE CONTROL toO

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 61 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

17. MONITOR Ruptured SIG(s) pressure BOP STABLE or RiSING.

ATC 18. CHECK RCS subcocling based on core exit TICS greater than 60cF.

19. DEPRESSURIZE RCS to minimize break flow arid to refill pressurizer

a. CHECK normal pressurizer spray AVAILABLE.

b. INITIATE maximum available pressurizer spray.

c. CHECK depressurization rate ADEQUATE.

d REDUCE RCS pressure UNTIL any of the following conditions (also listed on handout page) are met:

Both of the following:

1) RCS pressure less than Ruptured 510(s) pressure AND

2) Pressurizer level greater than 10% [20% ADV].

OR

Pressurizer level greater than 65%

OR

RCS subcooling based on core exit TICs less than 40F.

[Apendix D ReQuired Orerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 6,7 Page 62 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior e CLOSE spray valve(s)

1) Normal spray valves.

2) Auxiliary spray valve.

1. GO TO Caution pnor to Step 22.

Paces PIC-68-340A PZR PRESSURE CONTROL to MANUAL and raises ATC output CRITICAL Reduces PIC-68-340A PZR PRESSURE CONTROL output when ATC TASK depressurization criteria is met.

CAUTION Any delay in terminating SI after termination criteria are met may cause Ruptured SIG(s) overfill.

rApendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # 6,7 Page 63 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position f Applicants Actions or Behavior 22, CHECK if ECCS flow should be terminated:

a. RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs greater than 40°F.

b. Secondary heat sink:

Narrow range level n at least one Intact S/S greater than 10% [25% ADVJ ATC OR

Total feed flow to S/Gs greater than 440 gpm AVAILABLE.

c. RCS pressure STABLE or RISING.

d. Pressuiizer level greater than 10% [20% ADVJ.

23. STOP the following ECCS pumps:

a. STOPSlpurnpsand PLACE in A-AUTO.

ATC b. CHECK ofisite power supplying shutdown boards.

c. STOP all BUT one CCP and PLACE .n A-4UTO.

ATC Places HS-63-1OA and 15A SI Pump IA and 1 B to STOP

rAppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7 Page 64 of 71 Event

Description:

2 SGTR and #2 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open Time Position A Applicants Actions or Behavior

24. ISOLATE CCPlT

a. CLOSE inlet solation valves FCV-63-39 and FCV-63-4O ATC

b. CLOSE outlet isolation valves FCV-6326 and FCV-63-25 Scenario may be terminated when the CCPIT is isolated or earlier, at discretion of Lead Examiner

Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 rAppendix D 2 Event # ES-O.5 Page 65 of 71 Op Test No.: NRC 2O123O1 Scenario #

Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications, ES-O.5 Applicants Actions or Behavior Time Position L Equipment Verifications, ES-O.5 will need to decide how control Evaluator Note: #1 SG MDAFW Level Control Valve Fails Open; the crew

1 SG to prevent overfill.

BOP 1. VERIFY DiGs RUNNING.

BOP 2. VERIFY DiG ERCW supply valves OPEN.

3. VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps BOP RUNN1NG,

4. VERIFY CCS pumps RUNMNG:

Pump IA-A (2A-A)

BOP

Pump lB-B (28-B)

Pump C-S.

BOP 5. VERIFY EGTS fans RUNNING.

BOP 6. VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.

7. NOTIFY at least two AUOs to report BOP to MCR to be available for local actions.

8. VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:

a. MDAFWpurnps BOP

b. TD AFW pump.

NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual acUon has been taken to control SIG levels, to establish flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted SIG, Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 pendix D Event# ES-0.5 Page 66 of 71 Op Test No.: NRC 20 12-301 Scenario # 2 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications, ES-O.5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. CHECK AEW valve allgnment:

a. VERIFY MD AFW LCVs n AUTO.

BOP b. VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN.

c. VERIFY MD AFW pump recirculaton valves FCV-3-400 and FCV-3-401 CLOSED.

10, VERIFY MFW Isolation:

a. CHECK MFW pumps TRIPPED,

b. ENSURE the following:

BOP

MFW regulating valves CLOSED

MFW regulating bypass valve controllers in MANUAL wiir output ZERO

MFW sotation valves CLOSED.

11. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING:

CCPs

RHR pumps BOP SI pumps

b. VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.

c. CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.

d. VERIFY SI pump flow.

Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

[ZAppendix D 2 Event# ES-0.5 Page 67 of 71 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario #

Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications, ES-O.5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

e. CHECK RCS pressure e. GO TO Step 12.

less than 300 psig.

f. VERIFY RHR pump flow.

1Z VERIFY ESF systems ALIGNED:

a. Phase A ACTUATED:

PHASE A TRAiN A alarm LIT

[M-6C, B5]

a PHASE A TRAIN B alarm LIT

[M-6C, 69.

b. Cntmt Vent isolation ACTIJATED:

a CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, C5]

CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT M-6C, c6]

c Status monitor panels:

BOP 6CDARK

6D DARK

6E LIT OUTSIDE outlined area

6H DARK

6J:L1T d Train A status panel 6K:

CNTMT VENT GREEN

PHASE A GREEN e Train B status panel 6L:

CNTMT VENT GREEN

PHASE A GREEN

rAendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # ES-0.5 Page 68 of 71 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications, ES-O.5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. MONITOR for containment spray and Phase B actuation:

a. CHECK for any of the following:

Phase B ACTUATED OR

Containment pressure greater than 2.8 psig.

b. VERIFY containment spray INITIATED:

1) Containment spray pumps RUNNING.

2) Containment spray header isolation valves FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2 OPEN.

3) Containment spray recirculation valves to RWST FCV-7234 BOP and FCV-72-13 CLOSED.

4) Containment spray header flow greater than 4750 gpm per train.

5) Panel 6E LIT.

c. VERIFY Phase B ACTUATED:

PHASE B TRAIN A alarm LIT

[M-6C. A5].

PHASE B TRAIN B alarm LIT

[M-6C, A6].

d. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.

e. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:

Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN.

Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN.

f. WHEN 10 minutes have elapsed, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.

ppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 2 Event # ES-0.5 Page 69 of 71 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications, ES-O.5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE The continuous action in Step 14 remains applicable it containment pressure rises above 1.5 psig after ES-0,5 is completed.

14. MONITOR f containment vacuum reller isolation valves should be closed:

BOP a. CHECK containment pressure a. GO TO Step 15.

greater than 1.5 psig, 15 CHECK secondary and containment rad monitors USING the following:

BOP a Appendix A., Secondary Rad Monitors

Appendix B, Containment Rad Monitors.

APPENDIX A SECONDARY RAD MONITORS

1. IF Sl occurred on Unit 1, THEN CHECK following lad monitors including available trends prior to isolation:

Condenser exhaust recorder 1 -RR 119 BOP

SIG blowdown recorder 1-RR 120

Unit 1 Main steam line rad monitors [i-M-301

PostAcddent rad recorder 1 -RR-90-268B points 3 (blue), 4 (violet), 5 (black), and 6 (turquoise).

[I -M*-31 (back of I -M-30)1

3. NOTiFY Unit Supervisor whether secondary radiation is NORMAL or HIGH

Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 rAppendix D Scenario # 2 Event # ES-0.5 Page 70 of 71 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications, ES-O.5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior APPENDIX B CONTAiNMENT RAD MONITORS

1. IF SI occurred on Unit 1.

THEN CHECK following rad monitors:

BOP

Upper containment post-accident rad monitors i-RM-90-271A and i-RM-90-272A NORMAL [i-M-301

Lower containment post-accident rad monitors 1 -RM-90-273A and I -RM-90-274A NORMAL [I -M-30]

Containment rad recorders I-RR-9Q-1 12 and 1-RR-90-106 NORMAL ED-Mi 2] (prior to isolation).

16. WHEN directed by E-Q, THEN BOP PERFORM Appendix 0, Hydrogen Mitigation Actions.

17, CHECK pocket sump pumps STOPPED:

[M-15, upper left corner]

HS-77-4 10. Rx Bldg Aux Floor and BOP Equipment Drain Sump pump A

HS-77-41 I, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump B.

18. DISPATCH personnel to perform BOP EA 1. Equipment Checks Following ESF ActUation.

19. ENSURE plant announcement has been BOP made regarding Reactor Trip and SI.

20. PERFORM Appendix E, Spent Fuei BOP Cooling Actions, as time permits.

END OF TEXT

Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

[Apendix D 2 Event# Page 71 of 71 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenailo #

Event

Description:

Critical Task Critical Tasks: Critical Task Statement

1. Depressurize RCS to meet SI termination criteria prior to the ruptured SG dome level exceeding 100%.

2. Isolate steam flow from and feed flow to ruptured SG prior to initiation of RCS Cooldown to target temperature.

Establish cooldown and maintain RCS temperature so that transition from E3 does not

3. occur because the RCS temperature causes an extreme (red-path) or a severe (orange path)_challenge to the subcriticality and/or the integrity CSF

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2012-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 2, 2% Reactor Power, A Main Feedwater Pump I/S Turnover: Continue Plant Startup. Currently at 0-GO-4, Section 5.1 Step 4.

Target CTs: Manually initiate a Phase B isolation prior to completing ES-0.5 step 13.

Manually stop one Containment Spray Pump prior to completing ES-i .3 step 2 Manually align CCP and SI pump flowpath for sump Recirc prior to completing ES-i .3 step 12 Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description

1. N/A R-ATC Continue Power Increase from 2%.

N-SRO l.a N/A N-BOP Place feed Reg Valves in AUTO using 0-GO-4.Section 5.1 Step 4

2. MSO9 C-BOP/SRO Gland Seal Steam Regulator, 1 -PCV-47-i 83 fails closed, challenging condenser vacuum. The BOP will manually control gland seal pressure bypass FCV-47-i 81 using the ARP.

3. CV25A I-ATC/SRO CVCS Letdown Pressure instrument PT-62-81 fails low. The ATC will manually control letdown pressure using the ARP. The crew may decide to isolate Letdown and place Excess Letdown in service.

4. RXO7A l-ATC/SRO The Pressurizer Pressure instrument PT 68-340 will fail high resulting in pressurizer spray valves opening. The ATC will manually close the spray valves TS SR and stop the RCS depressurization using immediate operator actions and AOP 1.04. The SRO will address Tech Spec and determine the instrument is INOPERABLE.

5. set ypjx29=-i C-BOP/SRO PT-i -33 develops a slow failure, the BOP will manually close the Steam Dumps using AOP-S.05 set ypxrx 29=0.875 r:120

6. THO1 B TS-SRO A Small RCS Leak (21 gpm) in Loop 2 Hot leg will develop. The crew will respond using AOP-R.05. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determine that RCS Leakage is in excess of LCO requirements.

7. THO1 B M-All The RCS leak increases to a LOCA, the crew will initiate a Rx trip and Safety

. Injection and transitions to E-0. During the performance of E-0, the Hi-Hi Pre-nsert containment pressure logic to initiate Phase B containment isolation fails. The RPO7 C-ATC ATC will manually initiate a Phase B using prudent operator actions.

8. RHR14 M-AII The crew will transition from E-0 to E-1 and ultimately ES-i .3 to align RHR to the Containment Sump.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline 2012-301 Scenario 3 Summary EVENT 1 The crew will assume the shift, place the feed reg valves in AUTO using 0-GO-4.Section 5.1 Step 4 and continue the power increase.

EVENT 2 When directed by the lead examiner, Gland Seal Steam Regulator, 1-PCV-47-183 fails closed, challenging condenser vacuum. The BOP will manually control gland seal pressure bypass FCV-47-1 81 using the ARP.

EVENT 3 When directed by the lead examiner, CVCS Letdown Pressure instrument PT-62-81 fails low.

The ATC will manually control letdown pressure using the ARP. The crew may decide to isolate Letdown and place Excess Letdown in service.

EVENT 4 When directed by the lead examiner, the Pressurizer Pressure instrument PT 68-340 will fail high resulting in pressurizer spray valves opening. The ATC will take immediate operator action (IOA) to manually close the spray valves and stop the RCS depressurization. The crew will respond using AOP 1.04, Pressurizer Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.3 to implement mitigating actions, select another controlling channel, and return spray control to automatic. The SRO will enter LCO 3.2.5.b; 3.3.1.1.

Functional Units 7, 9, 10, Action 6; 3.3.2.1 Functional Units i.d- Action 17, 8.a- Actions 22a EVENT 5 - PT-i -33 develops a slow failure, the BOP will manually close the the Steam Dumps using AOP S.05 EVENT 6 When directed by the lead examiner, a small unisolable RCS leak (20-25 gpm) will occur. The crew will respond to ARP5 1 -AR-M5C B-i, B-3, 1 -AR-M6-E S-6 and 0-AR-Mi 2A A-i, A-4, which will direct them to implement AOP-R.05, RCS Leak and Leak Source Identification to attempt actions to isolate leak.

The SRO will enter LCO 3.4.6.2.a or b action a.

EVENT 7 When directed by the lead examiner, the RCS leak will be increased to a Large Break LOCA requiring Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. The crew will implement E-0, Reactor Trip/SI. During the performance of E-0, the Hi-Hi containment pressure logic to initiate Phase B containment isolation fails.

The ATC will manually initiate a Phase B using prudent operator actions. During the transition to E-1, status tree monitoring will occur. The crew will identify red path condition and implement FR-Z.i for High Containment Pressure and potentially FR-P.i for Pressurized Thermal Shock RED Path.

EVENT 8 During performance of the EOPs, the RWST b-b level will occur requiring the crew to transition from E-0 to El and ultimately ES-i .3 to align RHR to the Containment Sump.

The scenario terminates as directed by the Lead Examiner upon completion of FR-Z.i and FR-P-i if applicable, when ECCS is aligned for RHR sump recirculation using one train of RHR.

EOPfIow: E-0, E-i, FR-Z.i, FR-P.i, ES-i.3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Page 1 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: No action required for event 1 Indications Available: None Applicable Examiner Note: The crew will shift Feed Reg Valves to AUTO using O-GO-4, Section 5.1 Actions To Be Performed Prior To Raising Reactor Power.

5i Actions To Be Peiormed Prior To Raising Reactor Power (continued)

NOTES

1) MEW Bypass valves will be using single element control, which means the desired SG level setpoint will be compared to the actual SG level until adequate steam and feedwater flow are available. Single Element to Three Element control transition occurs at 13% RTP (.494E6 LBM/HR steam flow per loop).

2) MFW Reg valves may have a positive deviation if reactor power is in the upper range of the control band (1-4%) in the following step.

[4] PERFORM the foHowing:

14.1] ENSURE four MFW Bypass Reg valves in AUTO.

j4.2] ENSURE MFW Req. valves have minimal controller devialion.

BOP [4,3] ENSURE MFW Req. valves are CLOSED 14.41 PLACE MEW Req. valves in AUTO.

14.51 ENSURE MEW valve control mode in 3 Element Enabled (click target located in the center of each screen under the appropriate Loop # Control button) 1 BOP Depresses AUTO pushbutton for FIC-3-35, 48, 90 and 103.

Direct a load increase in accordance with 0-GO-4, Reactor Power Ascension To SRO Between 13% And 15% RTP, Section 5.2, and 0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.1 or Section 6.2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-302 Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Page 2 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTES

1) Actions effecting reactivity are directed in the following step. 0-30-62-7 requirements shall be adhered to for reactivity changes (i.e. reactivity balance amounts of boric acid or Water). All appropriate verifications and peer checks shall be utilized during Performance.

2) Recommended dilution rate is 50 to 75 gallon batches every 12 to 15 minutes for a steady power rise. Rod movement should be limited to 1/2 step increments approximately every 1 1/2 minutes. Dilution and rod movement rates may be adjusted depending on SG level control stability.

3) Control Rod withdrawal and I or dilution requirements may be significantly impacted by the change in core reactivity due to changing Xenon concentration.

[31 INITIATE a methodical and deliberate reactor po\ver ascent by CREW manual adjustment of the control banks or by diluting the RCS.

Examiner Note: The following Steps are from 0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.2, Dilute CAUTION 1 When making an RCS dilution of 3000 gallons, it should be done in batches with an RCS boron concentration verification at the halfway point (e.g.. 1500 gallons). Allow at least 15 minutes between batches. [C.5] [C.7j CAUTION 2 Returning the Boric Acid Blender to service after unplugging, cleaning, or maintenance on the Boric Acid System could introduce debris, sludge, air or chunks of solidified boron into the CCP suction resulting in pump damage. Extreme care must be exercised to properly flush the Boric Acid Blender system following an outage. tC.2]

NOTE I If an excessive amount of dilution is required (plant startup), the pressurizer heaters should be energized to cause pressurizer spray operation for equalizing boron concentration in RCS and pressurizer.

NOTE 2 Dilute mode will be used anytime a long-term positive reactivity addition is desired. The operator should use the normal dilute mode whenever conditions permit.

Examiner Note: Dilutions will be performed based on the Reactor Engineering provided Reactivity Spreadsheet; based on 0-GO-4 Notes, recommended dilution rate is 50 to 75 gallon batches every 12 to 15 minutes for a steady power increase. During subsequent power escalation, large volume dilutions will be divided evenly over each hour as determined by the crew [i.e.: one-third, one-quarter of the volume over each hours period (e.g.: -60 gallons, 4 times per hour for 240 gallons for the first hour)].

Examiner Note: use time compression as required to facilitate power increase.

ATC [1] ENSURE unit is NOT in a Tech Spec or TRM action that prohibits positive reactivity additions. [C.1J NOTE: HUT level increase of 1% is equal to 1380 gallons (TI-28 fig. 34).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 3 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC [2] ENSURE sufficient capacity available in the HUT selected to receive expected amounts of CVCS letdown: (N/A if not used)

HUT LEVEL INITIALS ATC [3] ENSURE makeup system is aligned for AUTO operation in accordance with Section 5.1.

ATC [4] RECORD the quantity of dilution water required to achieve desired boron concentration using Appendix D. (N/A for minor power changes)

NOTE Due to eyeball interpolation the verified calculation may slightly differ from the initial calculation. The following signoff indicates that any differences in the two results have been discussed and are close enough to be considered validated.

ATC [5] PERFORM Appendix I Independent Verification of Calculation for Amount of Boric Acid or Primary Water. (N/A if App. D was performed by SRO to verify data from Rx Engineering)

(Step not required provided in shift turnover package)

ATC [6] PLACE FHS-62-140A1, Boric Acid Supply to Blender Flow Control Switch to the STOP position.

ATC [7] PLACE IHS-62-140B1, CVCS Makeup Selector Switch to the DILUTE position.

ATC [8] ENSURE IHS-62-1 4001, Boric Acid Valve to the Blender is CLOSED (Green light is UT).

ATC [9] SET IFQ-62-1421, Batch Integrator for the desired quantity NOTE Primary Water Flow Controller [FC-62-142] receives its reference signal (70 gpm) from setpoint potentiometer (dial indicator) located on panel M-6. A setpoint of 35% corresponds to a 70 gpm primary water flow rate ATC 1 [10] ADJUST [FC-62-1 421, Primary Makeup Water Flow Controller for the desired flow rate ATC [11] PLACE IHS-62-140A1, Boric Acid Supply to Blender Flow Control Switch to the START position.

ATC [12] VERIFY the following;

[a] Inlet to top of VCT [FCV-62-1281 is OPEN.

[b] Primary Water flow by [FI-62-142A1 OR IFQ-62-1 421.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-302 Scenario# 3 Event# Page 4 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Time Position fl Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Alternate dilution in small amounts is acceptable on a regular basis, provided no significant changes in seal water temperature or seal leakoff are indicated.

Batches of 5 to 10 gallons may be added through FCV-62-144 on a frequency not to exceed once per 30 minutes. ICS points for No. 1 seal leakoffs and seal water temperatures on the RCPs should be monitored during and after dilution.

ATC [13] IF primary water addition to the bottom of the VCT [FCV-62-1 441 is desired, THEN ATC [a] CLOSE IFCV-62-1281 with IHS-62-1281.

ATC [b] OPEN [FCV-62-1441 with rHS-62-1441.

ATC [c] VERIFY Primary Water flow by IFI-62-142A1 OR rFQ-62-1 421.

NOTE It may take approximately 15 minutes before any changes to reactivity are indicated on nuclear instrumentation or RCS temperature indication.

ATC [14] MONITOR nuclear instrumentation and reactor coolant temperature to ensure the proper response from dilution.

ATC [15] IF FLI-62-1 291, Volume Control Tank Level, increases to 63 percent, THEN ENSURE [LCV-62-1181, Volume Control Tank Divert Valve OPENS to divert excess water to the Holdup Tanks.

ATC [16] WHEN dilution is complete, THEN ATC [a] PLMCE FHS-62-140A1, Boric Acid to Blender Flow Control Switch to the STOP position.

ATC [b] IF [FCV-62-1441 was previously OPENED, THEN CLOSE FFCV-62-1 441 with FHS-62-l 441.

ATC [c] VERIFY no primary water flow on either FFI-62-142A1 OR IFQ-62-1 421.

ATC [d] ENSURE rFCV-62-1 281 is CLOSED ATC [17] IF power increase in progress and additional dilutions will be required, THEN use this table to re-perform steps [4] through [18] (next page)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 5 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Unit_________________ Date____

6.2 Dilute (Continued)

(17] IF power ascension in progress and additional dilutions will be required, THEN use this table to re-perform steps [4] through [18].

STEP 1 2 3 t41 RECORD the quanti of dilution water required to achieve desired boron concentration using Appendix D.

(5] PERFORM Appendix I, IV of Calculation for amount of BA or PW (B] PLACE tHS-62-149] Bonc Acid Supply to Blender Flow Control SwItch to the STOP position. v vcv ici (7] PLACE [HS 6214B], CVCS Makeup Selector Switch to the DILUTE position, El El El (8] ENSURE [HS-62-140D] Boric Add Valve to Blender is CLOSED (Green right LIT. El El El

[9] SET WQ-62-1421 Batch Integrator for the desired quantity / j_ .,j_.

(10] ADJUST [FC-62-1421, Primary Makeup Water Flow Controller for tile desired

/ /

flow rate. v ? ?

[11] PLACE FHS-62-140A] BA Supply to Blender Flow Control SWitch to START / / I__

- - - -v - v (12] VERIFY the following:

[a] inlet to top of VCT [FCV-621281 is OPEN. El El El

[b] Primary Water flow by [F142-142AJ or (FQ42-142]. [1 E] El (13] IF PW addition to top of VCT [FCV-62-1 281 is not warranted, but PW addition to the bottom of the VCT fFCV42-144] is desired, THEN

[a] CLOSE [FCV-42-128]wtth [jS-62-i28] El El El

[b] OPEN [FCV62-1 44] with [HS-62-1441. El El El

[a] VERIFY Primary Water flow by [Fl-62142A3 or [FQ-62-1 421. El El El (14] MONITOR nuclear instrumentation and reactor coolant temperature to ensure the proper response from dilution, (15] IF fU$2-129], VCT level, rises to 63 percent, THEN ENSURE

[LCV42-1 18],_VCT Divert Valve,_OPENS to_divert_excess_water to the_HUTS.

[161 WHEN dilution is complete, THEN

[a] PLACE [HS-62-140A], Boric. Acid to Blender Flow Control Switch to STOP i

[b] IF tFCV-62-1441 wa.s previously OPENED. THEN CLOSE [FCV-62-1 44]

with [HS-62-144]. El El El

[C] VERIFY no primary water flow on either [Fl-62142A1 or [FQ-62-i 42]. El El El

[d] ENSURE (FCV-62-128] is CLOSED. El El El (18]IF Step [17] will be repeated THEN PERFORM the following:

a] PLACE [HS-62.140B1, CVCS Makeup Selector Switch to the AUTO position.

VL CV

[b] PLACE [HS-62-140A1 BA to Blender Flow Control Switch to START position. LI

[c] ENSURE dilution IS logged in Unit Narrative Log El

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 6 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC [19] REALIGN the blender controls for AUTO makeup to the CVCS in accordance with Section 5.1.

ATC [20] ENSURE dilution(s) is logged in Unit Narrative Log.

NOTE Sample may be obtained at normal RCS sample intervals provided the unit is at power and the unit response following the dilution is as expected.

ATC [21] IF RCS boron sample is required, THEN NOTIFY Chem Lab to obtain RCS boron sample.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 7 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior O-SO-85-1, Control Rod Drive System, Section 6.4, Transferring from Manual to Auto Rod Control; &

Section 6.5, Transferring from Auto to Manual Rod Control Examiner Note: As stated in each sections procedural Step 1 Note 1, the operators will use a laminated copy of Sections 6.4 & 6.5 available on the book desk under the glass at 1-M-4. It has been verified as current, in-effect revision routinely to assure currency.

NOTES

1) A laminated copy of this section can be maintained in the Unit Control Room for repetitive use for routine rod manipulation&

2) Defeating or restoring Tavg/DeFta T or NIS channel may cause step change in input to rod controL A delay of at least 3 minutes prior to returning rod control to automatic will allow lead/lag signal to decay off.

3) This Section may be N/A if Rod Control is being returned to AUTO in response to a transient (runback) condition.

ATC [1] ENSURE turbine power is greater than 15 percent.

ATC [2] ENSURE Window 31 (E-3), LOW TURB IMPULSE PRESS ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED C-5, Permissive light on panel [XA-55-4A] is NOT LIT.

ATC [3] ENSURE less than 1 degree TavglTref mismatch.

ATC [4] PLACE [HS-85-5110], Rod Control Mode Selector in the AUTO position.

ATC [5] VERIFY Rod Speed Indicator [SI-41 2], indicates 8 Steps/minute.

End of Section 6.4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-302 Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Page 8 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior Section 6.5, Transferring from Auto to Manual Rod Control NOTES

1) A laminated copy of this section can be maintained in the Unit Control Room for repetitive use for routine rod manipuiations

2) Manual rod withdrawal is inhibited by any of the following signals:

A. C-i, High Flux Intermediate Range Monitor B. C-2, High Flux Power Range Monitor C. C-3 Overtemperature Delta-T D. C-4, Overpower Delta-T ATC [1] PLACE [HS-85-5110], Rod Control Mode Selector in the MANUAL position.

ATC [2] VERIFY Rod Speed Indicator [SI-412], indicates 48 Steps/minute.

ATC [3] IF control rod movement is required, THEN ADJUST position using [HS 85-5111], Rod Control Switch.

ATC [4] IF it is desired to leave [HS-85-5110], Rod Control Mode Selector in Manual for an extended period of time, THEN PLACE this Section in the Active Procedures Book.

ATC [5] WHEN it is desired to place [HS-85-5110], Rod Control Mode Selector to Automatic, THEN GO TO Section 6.4.

End of Section 6.5

Aooendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 9 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior O-GO-4, Section 5.2 Reactor Power Ascension To Between 13% And 15% RTP Examiner Note: Crew will coordinate control rod withdrawal and dilutions based on the Reactor Engineering provided Reactivity Spreadsheet and would coordinate rod withdrawal and dilutions observing the guidance the Step 3 NOTES above.

Examiner Note: Mode change call is made using Loop AT indications on the MCB and ICS, not Nls; NIs may be referred to during the MODE change determination Refer to O-GO-4 Section 3.1, Precaution C, specifically bullets 2 & 3 (below):

C During startup, NIS power range indication may be reading significantly higher than true power until calibration adjustments are made The following should be used to determine the most accurate indication for comparison with NIS:

When reactor power is less than or equal to 15% use average loop AT (U 048 5).

When reactor power is greater than 15%, use LEFM core thermal power indication (U21 18). If LEFM is NOT available, then continue using average ioop AT up to 40%. (U11 18 wiH be used above 40% with LEFM unavailable)

[4] WHEN reactor power is above 5%,

ATC THEN LOG Mode 1 entry in the Unit Narrative Log.

ATC would be monitoring the mode change; any crew member may make the initial identification however the SRO should announce transition to MODE 1 based on Loop SRO AT indication. Normally, both MCB and ICS indications are reviewed for MODE transition verification.

Crew member replaces the MODE 2 sign with MODE 1 sign on 1 -M-4 under the clock.

MAINTAIN the SG levels on program by periodically adjusting the MFW Bypass controller level setpoints using Appendix B and 1, 2-S098-1, Distributed Control System (DCS).

Examiner Note: According to turnover information, the crew will not prepare for nor perform MT roll; Step 6 is N/A for this exam.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 10 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 1 3-15% RTP Time Position

[ Applicants Actions or Behavior

[6] IF Turbine Roll in parallel with power increase is desired, N/A THEN PERFORM Section 5.3 in parallel with the remainder of this section.

[7] IF the intermediate range rod stop setpoint is reached before P-b energizes, ATC THEN

[7.1] STOP the power escalation.

[7.2] CONTACT Reactor Engineering to evaluate power range calibration. [C.3]

When the crew has sufficiently raised power the Lead examiner may proceed to Event 2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 11 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP Examiner note: The following 5 pages are the guidance for maintaining SIG levels using the DCS (Digital Feed Control).

6.1 Changing MFW Bypass Reg Valve Controller Setpoint With Hand Controller Using the JOG Method NOTES

1) With the MFW Bypass Reg Valve controller in auto, SG level setpoints are digitally limited to between 30 and 50%. This action prevents an inadvertent setpoint insertion by the operator from causing too much of a level swing.

2) MFW Bypass Reg Valve controller setpoint can NOT be changed when the Turbine Impulse program is in controL Turbine Impulse program will take control above -27%

during a power rise and reset at less than 23% for a power reduction.

3) SG setpoints can be changed from either the DCS Operator Display monitor or the hand controller station.

4) Two handed operation will be required to change the SG controller setpoint, when using the hand controller.

5) Setpoint push button will change from gray to red on the Hand Controller and the DCS Operator Display monitor.

[1] PRESS and HOLD SETFOINT push button for applicable Bypass Reg Valve (N/A valves not operated):

S/G UNID INITIALS I 1-LIC-3-35 2 1 -LIC-3-48 3 1 -L1C-3-90 4 I-LIC-3-103

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 12 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP NOTE The following method (JOG method) will cause the setpoint to change in 05% increments each time the button is pressed. The push buttons are momentary contact closure type so continuously holding the push button down will NOT change the setpoint The push button will have to be released and then pressed again to change the setpoint.

[2] PRESS either the raise () or the lower (<c) push buttons to obtain the desired setpoint (N/A valves not operated):

SIG UNID INITIALS I I -LIC-3-35 2 1 -LIC-3-48 3 1 -LIC-3-.90 4 1 -LIC-3-1 03

[3] RELEASE the SETPOINT push button (N/A valves not operated)

SIG UNID INITIALS 1 1 -LIC-3-35 2 1-LlC-3-48 3 1-LlC-390 4 1-LTC-3-103

[4] REP EAT Steps S. 1 [1 ]-6 1 [3J as necessary to maintain S/G level in desired range End of Section

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 13 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP 6.2 Changing MFW Bypass Reg Valve Controller Setpoint With DCS Operator Display Monitor NOTES

1) With the MFW Bypass Reg Valve controller in auto, SG level setpoints are digitally limited to between 30 and 50%. This action prevents an inadvertent setpoint insertion by the operator from causing too much of a level swing.

2) MFW Bypass Reg Valve controller setpoint can NOT be changed when the Turbine Impulse program is in control. Turbine Impulse program will take control above 27%

during a power rise and reset at less than -23% for a power reduction.

3) SG setpoints can be changed from either the DCS Operator Display monitor or the hand controller station.

4) Setpoint push button will change from gray to red on the Hand Controller and the DCS Operator Display monitor.

[11 SELECT the appropriate feedwater controller display screen from either DOS Operator Display monitors (N/A valves not operated).

LOOP UNID INITIALS 1 1-LIC-3-35 2 1 -LI 0-3-48 3 1 -LIC-3-90 4 1-LlC-3-103

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 56 Event

Description:

Raise plant power to 13-15% RTP 6.2 Changing MFW Bypass Reg Valve Controller Setpoint With DCS Operator Display Monitor (continued)

[2j SELECT the SETPOINT push button for applicable Bypass Reg Valve (N/A others).

LOOP UNID INITIALS I 1-LIC-3-35 2 1-LIC-3-48 3 1-LIC-3-90 4 I-LIC-3-103 NOTE Using the JOG method will cause the setpoint to change in 0.5% increments each time the button is pressed. The push buttons are momentary contact closure type. so continuously holding the push button down will NOT change the setpoint. The push button will have to be released and then pressed again to change the setpoint.

[3] IF using the JOG method (preferred),THEN SELECT either the raise (E>) or the lower (<1) push buttons to obtain the desired setpoint. D NOTES

1) The RAMP method of changing Bypass Reg Valve setpoints is NOT preferred. This is due to the large rate of change in valve position.

2) Using the RAMP push button along with the raise () or the lower (<1<1) push buttons will cause the setpoint to change at a rate of 1.67% per second. A change of 0%-100% would take approximately 1 minute.

[4] IF using the RAMP method, THEN SELECT the raise (L>) or the lower (1<) push button to obtain the desired setpoint. D

[5] WHEN the desired setpoint is obtained, THEN CONFIRM SETPOINT is correctly displayed on the screen. 0

[6] SELECT the SETPQINT push button. E]

[7] CONFIRM SETPOINT push button changes from red to gray.

End of Section

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-302 Scenario# 3 Event# 2 Page 15 of 56 Event

Description:

Gland Seal Steam Regulator, 1 -PCV-47-1 83 fails closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor: When directed, initiate Event 2 Indications available:

. Annunciator XA-55-2A Window A-5 PIS-47-196 TURBINE SEAL STEAM PRESS. ABNORMAL

. Indicator 1-PI-47-189 indicates z12 psig

. Indicator 1-PI-47-187 indicates 0 psig

. Main Condenser Vacuum 0.5 to 0.8 psig PS.47-196B TURBINE SEAL STEAM PRESS. ABNORMAL

[1 CHECK 11 -P147-1871 on 1-M-2 to pfy header pressure

( 25 psig).

[21 header pressure low, ThEN IF

[aj BUMP OPEN r1-FCV-474511 steam seal bypass to restore heier pressure. (1-Pl-47-189 19 psig)

[b] PERFORM 1-50-2-9, Condenser Vacuum And Turbine Steam Seal System Operation to complete bypass of 1-PCV-47-183.

[31 IF fleader pressure is high due to 1-PC1-47-183 failure. THEN

[a) THRO111E 11 -FCV47-1801 locally to restore header pressure to approxiTmately 125 psig.

IF 1-FCV-47-1&O is NOT responste, ThEN locally THROITLE f1-VLV47-W11 PCV manual loolation to restore header pressure to approximately 125 psg

[cj WHEN header pressure contrciIed THEN Bypass 1-PCV-47-i 83 USING 1-S0-2-9 Condenser Vacuum And Turbine Steam Seal System Operation.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Responds to alarm using ARP 1 -AR-M2A, A5 PIres 1-i - OPEN as required to raise pressure on P1-47-187 and

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 16 of 56 Event

Description:

Gland Seal Steam Regulator, 1 -PCV-47-1 83 fails closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[41 IF Header pressure is high due to failure of I -FCV-471 93 THEN BYPASS 1-FCV-47-193 in accordancewith 1-90-2-9, Condenser Vacuum and Turbine Steam Seal System Operation.

[6] CHECK operation of PCV-47-183 HP Steam Seal.

[9 CHECK plant computer to deterrrne which seal has abnormal Pr sure.

BOP [7] DISPATCH operator to determine steam seal supply pressure to each seal (on local indicator)

[81 ADJUST steam seal supy pressure to t3 psg usmg the manual bypass valve located below the gmting on the turbine skirt for the applicable steam seal USING 1-S0-2-9 Condenser Vacuum And Turbine Steam Seal System Operation.

[9] MONITOR condenser vacuunt Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue next event when Gland Seal Steam has been restored.

Aendix D Reciuired Oijerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 17 of 56 Event

Description:

CVCS Letdown Pressure instrument PT-62-81 fails low Time 1 Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor: When directed, initiate Event 3 CVCS Letdown Pressure instrument PT-62-81 fails low.

Indications available:

Annunciator XA-55-6C Window C-4 Indicator 1-Fl-62-82 indicates O gpm [M-6]

Indicator 1-PI-62-81 indicates pressure lowers to 0 psig [M-6]

TS 75 LOW PRESSURE LETDOWN RELIEF TEMP HIGH

[1] MONITOR etdoi presswe on j1-PI-62611.

[21 IF 11-PCV-62-811 s Closed, THEN TAKE manual confrd of fi-PCV-62-i} and RESTORE normal etdown ff

[31 MONITOR cw cress 1etdov refiet tailpipe temp on

[1 -Tl-.62-751.

[41 MONITOR VCT and PRT levels.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

ATC Responds to alarm using ARP 1-AR-M6C, C4 Places PCV-62-81 Letdown Pressure Pressure Controlto MANUAL and ATC lowers output.

Examiner Note: If normal letdown flowpath remains in service, PCV-62-81 will remain in manual control for the remainder of the scenario; and, the ATC is expected to manually control letdown pressure.

Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue the next event when charging flow is controlled.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 18 of 56 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Controlling Channel Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 3 Controlling Pzr Pressure Transmitter PT 68-340 Fails High Indications/Alarms Annunciator:

1-M-5

1-XA-55-5A Window 8-3, PS-68-340F/G PRESSURIZER PRESS ABOVE REF SET POINT 1-M-6

1-XA-55-6A Window C-5, PS-68-340A PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESSURE Indications 1-M-5

1-Pl-68-334, 323, 322 RCS PZR PRESS indicators decreasing Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:

1-M-4

1-Xl-68-340B & 340D RED indicating lights illuminated indicating Pzr Spray Valves open PS-68-340F1G PRESSURIZER PRESS ABOVE REF SET POINT

[1] CHECK pressurizer pressure

[21 IF channel failed, ThEN GO TO AOP-I04, Presswizer lnsthiment Ma1funcon

[31 IF pressurizer pressure hh, ThEN PERFORM the foilo.4ng:

[aj ENSURE pressurizer teaters OFF

[b] ENSURE pressurizer spray valves OPEN.

[cj ADJUST plant paranieters as necessar,r.

[4] EVAIJJATETS 33.1, 3.32, 3.3.3.5.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

ATC Responds to alarm using ARP 1 -AR-M5A, B3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 19 of 56 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Controlling Channel Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Places PIC-68-340A, Master Pressure Controller in MANUAL and lowers output.

OR ATC Places PZR Spray controllers PIC-68-3400 (Loop 1) and/or PIC-68-340B (Loop 2) and lowers output.

Using immediate operator actions (lOAs)

SRO Transitions to AOP-I.04 Pressurizer Instrument And Control Malfunctions.

NOTE: If spray valve is open due to pressure instrument failure, then Section 2.3 is the appropriate entry point.

1. DIAGNOSE the failure:

IF...

GOTO SECTION I PAGE Pressurizer Pressure Instrument OR Controller Malfunction 2.3 11 NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE AcTION.

1. CHECK normal spray valves CLOSED. tF RCS pressure s less than 2260 psg, THEN CLOSE affected spray valve(s)

USING the following:

PIC-68-3$OA, Master Pressure Controller.

SRO OR PZR Spray controllers PIC-68-340D (Loop 1) and/or PIC-68-340B (Loop 2).

I durin ATC Z MONITOR pressurizer pressure stable or trending to desired pressure.

NOTE: Appendix L ShOWS layout of PZR pressure control for operator reference.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 20 of 56 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Controlling Channel Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CHECK Pt-68-340A NORMAL. PERFORM the followng:

a. ENSURE PRESS CONTROL SELECTOR swtch XS-68-3400 n PT-68-334 & 323.

b. ENSURE LOOP TAVG .T REC/SEL selector sv.tch XS682B ATC nLOOP23or4 c ENSURE PRESS REC CHANNEL SELECTOR XS-68-3405 n PT-68-334, PT-68-323 or PT-68-322

d. GO TO Caution prior to Step 8 Places PRESS CONTROL SELECTOR switch XS-68-340D in PT-68-334 &

ATC 323.

Places LOOP TAVG AT REC/SEL selector switch XS-68-2B in LOOP 2,3, ATC or 4.

CAUTION RCS pressure changes and changes in RCS boron concentration (due to differences between par and RCS boron) may cause small change in core reactivity.

8. MONITOR reactor power:

a CHECK reactor in Model or 2..

ATC b.. MONITOR core thermal power for unexpected changes.

9. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for applicablity:

. 3.2.5 DNB Parameters

. 3.3.1:1 (3.3.1), ReactorTrip System SRO Instrumentation

3.3.2.1 (3.3.2), ESF Actuation System Instrumentation

. 3.3.3.5 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 21 of 56 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Controlling Channel Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3.2.5 The fofowiig DNB related pameters shad be mntsined whNn the ilmits shown on Table 3.2-1:

a. Racto Coolant System (RCS)T

b. Pressurizer Pressure

c. RCS Total Flow Rate APPLICABILITY: MODEl ACTION:

W:lh any of the above parameters exceeding 1s [Enit, restore the parameter to within is limit withn 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or re&oe THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER wihin the next SRO 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

UM IS 4 Loops PARAMETER Opera1on Reactor Coolant Syste T -

°essurzer Pres re - 2220 osa Reactor Coorant System Fire 3 2-t Total Flow If in MODE 1 enters LCO 3.2.5 Action if RCS Pressure decreases to less SRO than 2220 psia.

LlMflt4G CONDITION FOR OPERATION

.3.1 .1 As a mnrnu the reactor thp system sthimentabon chan s and a rlocLts of Table 3 3-1 urIl be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shawn a Table 3.3-1.

ACTON As shown n Table 3 3-1.

. essunzer Pressure-Low 4 2 3 t. 2 6 SRO

0. Pessunzer Pressure H 4s 4 2 3 1,2 6 ACTION 6- Nih the n.anber of OPERABLE channels one less an the Tht Nunoerof Channels. STARTUP andfor POWER OPERATION may proceed cro..ed the f wrtg conoilons are satofied a The nopeab e h el rs placed the tapped nlion th 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months b The H ni at Channels OPER,..BLE requrement s met weer, the noperable ha el nay ce bypassed or to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for survedlance .est g ther chann rS.eolca 4 .1.1 SRO Enters LCO 3.3.1 1 Action 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 22 of 56 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Controlling Channel Fails High Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LLMO1NG CONDON FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Mtuatin Systee, IESFASI nstrumentabon chacee4s and nteriocks shown ii, Table 33-3 shall be OPERAELE vth their trip seoires set isteetwith the values shown in the Nominal Trio Setpcint column of Table 3.3-4.

APPLICABILITY: As s4wn n Table 3.34.

ACTION:

a. With an ESFAS instrunientat.ori channel or interiock trip setpoint ess conservate than the IUe StIY*Ifl in the M able Vatues column. of Tabte 3:34, eCtC the cbnei pw-able and appy the apeable ACTION requwefnent of Table 3.3-3 until the thannel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adusted conaisteot wnh the omnal Trip Setpoint value.

b. With an ESFAS instrumentabon channel or intwiock inoperable, take the ACTION shown In Table 3.3-3.

SRO 1 AFET- FJECTI3, R P AI FEEDWATER SOAT ON d essun:er Pressure- 2 1 i.e IT ow ACTON 17 - Wth u-c nutiber cOFERBLE Charnels one less oan the Tc1a Nurrcecof Cannels, STAPT1.P ardor POWER OPERATION ray proceed prooed lIre c ow na cond:tions ae sat sled

a. The noperabe lhael s placed n the :ricced 00410 ilOfi wth r 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months .

b TheM rrr Cannels DPEPAELE reoJ rwneis s net: hcwe.er. te

-cperao e rtanne may be bytassed foruc o 4 hc.s for s-jrveiliance test -

uercbanncs per .:oecifoat:on 4..2.l SRO Enters LCQ 3.3.2.1 Action 17 l0 CHECK PZR PRESS and PZR SPRAY WHEN malfunction has been identified controllers n AUTO AND isolated or corrected.

THEN PERFORM the toltoxng.

a. ENSURE Master P Pressure ATC Controller PIC68--330A Output Percent Meter is less than 40%.

b. ENSURE PZR PRESS Controller, ZR SPRAY controller, and PZR HTRS n AUTO Lowers output to less than 40% and places Master Pressure Controller in ATC AUTO OR Spray controllers PIC-68-340D (Loop 1) and/or PIC-68-340B (Loop 2) in AUTO.

NOTE: f performing AOP :n conunction with AOP-I. 11 for an Eagle LOP failure, then actions to hard trip bistables should be delayed until Eaqle system reset s attempted. Actions to hard trip bistables must be completed wlthin 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months UNLESS affected loop IS restored to operable status by resetting Eagle rack.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 23 of 56 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Controlling Channel Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. REMOVE failed pressurizer pressure channel from service:

a. CHECK any pressurizer pressure a. IF all channels are OPERABLE.

channel INOPERABLE. THEN GO TO Step 12.

b. CHECK OThT setpoint on affected b. GO TO Substep 11 ci.

channel NORMAL.

11. d. IF any of the following conditions exists:

transmitter signal failed (entire instrument loop affected CREW including OThT pressure input)

OR

OTAT pressure input potentially affected or status CANNOT be determined, THEN PERFORM applicable appendix:

PZR PRESSURE CHANNEL APPENDIX INSTRUMENT P-68-340 (P.455) I A CREW Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the CREW brief.

Operations Manaqement Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue next event when Pzr Pressure control is in AUTO and Tech Specs are identified

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 24 of 56 Event

Description:

PT-i -33 develops a slow failure, the BOP will manually close the the Steam Dumps using AOP-S.05 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 5 PT-i -33 Slow Failure Indications/Alarms Indications 1-M-4 1-Fl-3-103A, 103B SG-4 FW INLET FLOW CH-1, CH-2 indicating increasing flow (compared to SGs 1-3) 1-Fl-i -28A, 28B SG-4 STEAM FLOW CH-1, CH-2 indicating increasing flow (compared to SGs 1-3)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TS-68-2MIN RC LOOPS T AVG TS-68-2PIQ

!AUCT T AVG REAC COOL LOOPS DEVN HIGH-LOW T REF T AUCT HIGH-LOW OR TS$8-2J REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS LO LO TAVG (I] CHECK 1-XX-55-5 Trip Status and/or 1-XX-55-8A RX trip-SI panels for any bistables that may be Lit, AND EVALUATE reactor trip criteria with SRO.

(2] IF 2/4 cf the low low Tavg switches pick up and no normal cooldown in progress, THEN ENSURE steam dump/steam generator atmospheric relief valves close.

(3] IF instrument channel failed, THEN GO TO AOP-L02, RCS Loop RTD Instrument Malfunction.

[4) IF reactor is shutdown and being maintained in hot standby, THEN ADJUST steam dump control to maintain 547F Tavg,

[5] EVALUATE with SRO, secondary system malfunction as cause for coIdown.

[6] EVALUATE Technical Specifications if channel malfunction has occurred, Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 25 of 56 Event

Description:

PT-1-33 develops a slow failure, the BOP will manually close the the Steam Dumps using AOP-S.05 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

ATC Responds to alarm using ARP 1 -AR-M5A, A6 or M-6A-E2 May place PlC-i -33, STEAM DUUMP PRESSURE CONTROL to MANUAL BOP and reduce output based on prudent operations actions SRO Transitions to AOP-S.05, Steam Or Feedwater Leak 1 MONITOR personnel safety:

a IF steam or teedwater ilnes need to SRO be immediately isolated to protect persorine, THEN PERFORM tte following:

I MONITOR steam generator levels BOP STABLE on program.

3. CHECK the following: IF any S/G atmospheric relief valve or steam dump is leaking or failed open, BOP

SIG atmospheric relief valves CLOSED THEN CLOSE valve(s) USING MCR switch.

steam dumps CLOSED.

[ Lead Examiner may cue next event when Steam Dumps are closed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 26 of 56 Event

Description:

Small RCS Leak inside containment (Hot Leg Loop 2)

Time fl Position fl Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 5 RCS Loop 2 Hot Leg Leak -.21 Gpm.

Indications/Alarms Indications 1-M-5

l-LR-68-339, RCS PZR LEVEL actual level deviating low from program level indication

1-Fl-62-93A, CHARGING HDR FLOW increasing flow 1-M-6

i-Ll-62-129, VCT LEVEL decreasing

i-PDIR-30-133, CNTMT ANN increasing trend O-M-12

1-RR-90-106, CNTMT LOWER COMPT RADMON recorder shows increasing trend

l-RR-90-112, CNTMT UPPER COMPT RADMON recorder shows increasing trend

1-RI-90-106A, CNTMT LOWER COMPT RADMON-PART & GAS increasing counts

l-RM-90-112A, CNTMT UPPER COMPT RADMON-PART increasing counts

1-RM-90-112B, CNTMT UPPER COMPT RADMON-PART increasing counts Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:

Annunciator:

i-M-5 st 1

(

1-XA-55-5A C-5, LS-77-410A REACTOR BLDG AUX FL & EQ DRAIN SUMP HI one after -.12 mm)

O-M-12

O-XA-55-12A A-i, 1-RA-90-112A CNTMT BLDG UP COMPT AIR MON HIGH RAD

A-4, 1-RA-90-106A CNTMT BLDG LWR COMPT AIR MON HIGH RAD Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are Usted in this event guide.

Identifies Pzr below program, Charging flow increasing w/ VCT level ATC decreasing.

BOP Checks rad monitors, determines increasing trend on containment monitors SRO Transitions to AOP-R.05, RCS Leak and Leak Source Identification

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 27 of 56 Event

Description:

Small RCS Leak inside containment (Hot Leg Loop 2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF leak results in radiological hazard or safety hazard, THEN EVACUATE unnecessary personnel from affected areas.

2. DIAGNOSE the failure:

GOTO IF... SECTION PAGE ANY of the following indications with RCS temperature greater than 375F:

Pressurizer level dropping unexpectedly

Charging flow rising unexpectedly with stable pzr level 2.1 4

. VCT leveL dropping with Aux Bldg or Containment radiation rising

High Energy Line Break recorder indicating unexpected rise in temperalure

other indications of RCS leak (local or MCR)

1. CONTROL charging flow using one CCP:

a ADJUST FCV-62-93 and FCV-62-89 as necessary to ma ntain pzr evel ATC on program.

a MAINTAIN seal injection flow at least 6 gpm to each RCP.

Places HIC-62-93A Charging Flow Control, in MANUAL and raises FCV ATC 93 and while adjusting FCV-62-89 as necessary to maintain pzr level on program.

Examiner Note: Crew may implement RNO at this time to isolate letdown; Crew may return to perform RNO for Trip Rx and initiate SI later when Leak increases.

Examiner Note: Since this is a MONITOR step, the crew may continue in the procedure while developing a Pzr/RCS level trend. If so, steps 3, 4 or 5 could be the decision point and therefore initiate the reactor trip and E-O implementation. If a loss of Pzr level is imminent, the crew may decide to trip the reactor and transition to E-O based on this step.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 28 of 56 Event

Description:

Small RCS Leak inside containment (Hot Leg Loop 2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. MONITOR pressurizer level STABLE IF sufficient time is available, or RISING. THEN ISOLATE normal and excess letdown:

a. ENSURE FOV-62-72, 73, and 74 CLOSED.

b. CLOSE FV62-69 and 70 C. ENSURE FCV-62-54 and 55 CLOSED.

IF loss of pressurizer level is imminent ATC OR low pressure reactor trip (1970 psig) is imminent, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. TRIP the reactor

b. INIT1ATE Safety InJect on C. GO TO E-0. Reactor Tnp or Safety InJection Places HS-62-73A Letdown Orifice B Isol 75 gpm and HS-62-69A Letdown ATC Isol Loop 3 and HS-62-70A Letdown Isol Loop 4 to CLOSE when Pressurizer Level cannot be maintained.

3 MONITOR containment pressure IF containment pressure is STABLE or DROPP1NG. approaching 1.5 psig, THEN PERFORM the following a TRIP the reactor.

ATC ii INITIATE Safety Injection C. GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

CAUTION: If Unit is in Mode with low pressurizer pressure SI NOT blocked, SI should NOT be manually blocked to prevent safety injection.

4. MONITOR RCS pressure STABLE or RISING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 29 of 56 Event

Description:

Small RCS Leak inside containment (Hot Leg Loop 2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: RCS leak will progress into a SBLOCA. As the crew responds using AOP-R.05 Section 2.1, the lowering Pzr level and increased charging flow may result in a challenge to VCT Make-up capability. Subsequently the crew may initiate a reactor trip and enter E-O based on this step.

5 MAINTAIN VT level greater than 13%

USING automatic or manual makeup.

NOTE 1: Appendix I or J may be used to estimate RCS leak rate NOTE 2: 1! letdown was isolated in Step 2. the leak rate may have exceeded capacity of one CCP in the normal charging alignment (EAL I 2.2P).

Ii EVALUATE EPIP-1 Emergency Plan, Classification Matrix SRO

7. EVALUATE Tech SpecITRM LCOs USING Appendix K, Evaluating Tech Specs and TRM:

34.82 Reactor Coolant Systoi leakage slil be irnted to:

a Na PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,

b. I GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, c 150 ga8ors per day of y4o-eecondary eakage throt4 any one steam geratc4 and d 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant S.stem..

SRO APUCABILflY MODES 1. 2 3 and4 ACTION:

a Wrth any °RE° SURE BC P1DARY LEAKASE or w prm3ry-to-secon ry leakage not whn ts, be at e3st H0 STANDBY th n 6 our an n COLD 34-I TOOWN wn thef owsg 30 ho WhanyReactarC tSyseakagegrea1er n yoneortheatovehmts a dud PRESU E BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or pnmary-to-seconctey leakage reduce the leakage rare to beth n F ts within 4 hou roe at lease T° ANDEY rthrt next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and t COLD l-UTCOWN wthn the oHowng hours.

SRO Enters LCO 3.4.6.2 Action B Examiner Note: When the Exam inee enters LCO 3.4.6.2 proceed to Event 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 30 of 56 Event

Description:

Small RCS Leak inside containment (Hot Leg Loop 2)

SQN RCS LEAK AND LEAK SOURCE IDENTIFICATION AOP-R.05 Rev. 14 Page 1 of I APPENDIX I ESTIMATING RCS LEAK RATE USING CVCS FLOW BALANCE NOTE 1 Ths method is recommended when teak requires rise in charging flow greater than - 10 gpm Appendix J is more accurate for smaller leak rates.

NOTE 2 This appendix assumes RCS temperature and charging flow are approximately constant INITIAL FINAL CHANGE PZR Level [1]

re9tve for veI decres Time Charging Flew [3]

Letdown Flow [4]

Total RCP Seal Return Flow

[51 Pressurizer Level Conversion Pressurizer level conversion Time Change Pzr Level Rate of Change change factor (psi5ve for eI& rn)

% X 62 gal I % mm = gpm step [1] above step [2] above [6]

Leak Rate Calculation Charging Flow Letdown Flow Retum 1

Sea Pzr Level Instrument error RCS Leak Rate of Change correcon factor Rate

÷ 3gpm = gpm step [3] above step [4] above step [51 step [6] above above Page 73 of 80

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 31 of 56 Event

Description:

Small RCS Leak inside containment (Hot Leg Loop 2)

Page 1 of I APPENDIX J ESTIMA11NG RCS LEAK RATE USING VCT AND PZR LEVEL CAUTION This appendix CANNOT be used during VCT makeup, boration or dilution.

NOTE This appendix assumes RCS temperature is approximatety constant.

VCT LEVEL (%) PZR LEVEL {%) TIME (mm) lNAL FINAL CHANGE [1] [2] [3]

(posive for level decrease) (positive for level decrease)

VCT Level Conversion VCT fevel change conversion Time Change VCT Level factor Rate of Change (positive for level iowerinq)

%: X 2OgaI/% miii = gpm step [1] above step [31 above [4]

Pressurizer Level Conversion Pressurizer level conversion Time Change Pzr Level change factor Rate of Change (positive for level lowering)

X 62gali% ÷ fun = gprn step [2] above step E3] above [51 Leak Rate Calculation VCT Level Pzr Level RCS Leak Rate Rate of change Rate of Change

+ gpm step [43 above step [5] above Page 74 of 80

Aooendix D Reauired Ooerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 32 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 7 Loop #2 LOCA-To Require Rx Trip and Safety Injection.

Indications available:

1-M4:

1-XI-94-1 01/1 02, Core Exit Temp Margin to Saturation (exo sensors Tm A & B) pressure indications trending to SI actuation pressure value.

1-LI-68-339A, 335A, 320A, RCS PZR LEVEL indicators trending down (<5%)

1-M-5:

1-Pl-68-334, 1-Pl-68-323, 1-Pl-68-322, RCS PZR PRESS narrow range indicators trending to Rx Trip/SI actuation pressure values.

1-PR-68-69, RCS LOOP 1 HL WIDE RANGE PRESS indicator trending to Rx Trip/SI actuation pressure value.

1-PR-68-340, RCS PZR PRESS Recorder trending down;

1-PR-68-69, RCS LOOP 1 HL WIDE RANGE PRESS Recorder trending down;

1-LR-68-339, RCS PZR LEVEL Recorder trending down;

1-FI-68-93A, CHARGING HDR FLOW Indicator indicating 115-120 gpm (1 CCP at maximum flowrate);

1-M-6:

1-LI-62-129, VCT LEVEL Indicator trending down w/VCT M-U in progress;

1-FI-62-139A, BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Indicator stable at .-20-25 gpm;

1-FI-62-142A, PRIMARY WATER TO BLENDER Indicator stable at -70 gpm;

1-Pl-68-66A, HL Pressure LOOP 3 indicator trending to actuation pressure value.

1-PI-68-62, RCS HL Press WR indicator trending to actuation pressure value.

1-PI-68-69, RCS HL Press WR indicator trending to actuation pressure value.

1-PDI-30-42, 43, 44, 45, CNTMT PRESSURE WIDE RANGE Indicators trending up (1.5 psi-SI Actuation)

Direct Manual Reactor Trip and Safety Injection based on one of several SRO monitor steps in AOP-R05 for either Pressurizer level, Containment Pressure or RCS Pressure.

ATC Manually Trip the Reactor and Initiate SI.

SRO Enter and Direct performance of E-O, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

Examiner Note: following IOA performance, prior to Steps 1-4 immediate action verification, ATC/BOP surveys MCBs for any expected automatic system response that failed to occur. Upon discovery, they may take manual action(s) to align plant systems as expected for the event in progress. (Ref. EPM-4, Prudent Operator Actions)

Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via ICS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 33 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW Performs the first four steps of E-O unprompted.

SRO Directs performance of E-O NOTE 1 Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.

NOTE 2 This pmcedure has a foldout page.

CRITICAL Places HS-30-64A and 64B Phase B and CNTMT Vent Isol to ACTUATE as BOP TASK a prudent operator action.

1 VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:

Reactor tnp breakers OPEN

Reactor trip bypass breakers DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC

Rod bottom lights LIT

Rod position indicators less than or equal to 12 steps.

Neutron flux DROPPING

2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:

BOP Turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. VERIFY at least one &9:KV shutdown BOP board ENERGIZED on this unit.

4. DETERMINE if SI actuated:

ATC

ECCS pumps RUNNING.

Any SI alarm LIT [M-4D]

5. PERFORM ES-O.5, Equipment BOP Verifications WHILE continuing in this procedure.

Continue with the performance of E-O REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY SRO/ATC INJECTION BOP Performs ES-O.5, Equipment Verifications go to page 50 for details SRO Addresses foldout page, see next page for details.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 34 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:

RCS pressure less than 1250 psig AND at least one CCP or SI pump running OR

Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs EVENT DIAGNOSTICS

IF any SIC pressure is dropping uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:

a CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

b. IF any SIC pressure continues to drop uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE SI actuated.

2) IF at least one SIG is intact (SIC pressure controlled or rising),

THEN ISOLATE AFW to faulted S/C(s):

a CLOSE AFW level control valves for faulted S/C(s)

IF any AFW valve for faulted S/G CANNOT be CLOSED, THEN PERFORM Appendix E, Isolating AFW to Faulted SIC.

3) ENSURE at least one of the following conditions met:

total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm OR

Narrow Range level greater than 10% p25% AD!] in at least one intact SIC.

a IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-00, Loss of All AC PoWer.

TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS a IF CST level less than 5%, THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW a IF RWST level less than 27%, THEN GO TO ES-i .3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump..

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 35 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCAJFailure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink available:

a. CHECK total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm.

b. CHECK narrow range level b. MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 10% [25% ADVI greater than 440 gpm ATC in at least one 81G. UNTIL narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADVJ in at least one SIG.

c. CONTROL feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 10% [25% ADVI and 50%

in intact or ruptured S/Gs.

7 CHECK if main steam lines should be isolated:

a. CHECK if any of the following a. GOTOStep8.

conditions have occurred:

Any SIG pressure less than 600 psig ATC OR

Any S/C pressure dropping UNCONTROLLED OR

Phase B actuation

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-302 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 36 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. CHECK RCP trip criteria:

a. CHECK the following:

. RCS pressure less than 1250 psig ATC AND

. At least one COP OR SI pump RUNNING.

b. STOP RCPs.

ATC Manually places KS 68-8A, 31A, 50A, and 73A RCPs to STOP

9. MONITOR RCS temperatures: IF temperature less than 547°F and dropping,

. IF any RCP running, THEN THEN PERFORM the following:

CHECK T-avg stable at or trending to between 547°F and 552°F. a. ENSURE steam dumps and atmospheric reliefs CLOSED.

OR

b. IF cooldown continues, IF RCPs stopped, THEN THEN CONTROL total feed flow:

CHECK T-cold stable at or trending ATC/BOP 1) ENSURE total AFW flow t 0 b e seen 547°F an d 552°F

. less than or equal to 600 gpm 2> MAINTAIN total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL narrow range level is greater than 10% [25% ADV]

in at least one SIG.

c. IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, ThEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 37 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm ATC/BOP and less than 600 gpm until S/G are greater than 25% NR.

10. CHECK pressurizer PORVs, safeties.

and spray valves:

a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.

b. Pressurizer safety valves CLOSED.

ATC c. Normal spray valves CLOSED.

d. Power to at least one block valve AVAILABLE.

e. At least one block valve OPEN.

1 1. DETERMINE if SIG secondary pressure boundaries are INTACT:

CHECK all S/G pressures ATC CONTROLLED or RISING.

CHECK all S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

12. DETERMINE if S/G tubes are INTACT:

. All S/G narrow range levels CONTROLLED or DROPPING ATC

. Secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A. Secondary Rad Monitors. (App. A performed in ES-0.5).

13. DETERMINE if RCS is INTACT: PERFORM the following:

Containment pressure NORMAL

a. INITIATE ES-0.5 Appendix D,

. Containment sump level NORMAL Hydrogen Mitigation Action&

ATC

LOWER COMPT TEMP HIGH alarm Ii MONITOR status trees.

DARK [M-5C, Bli

Containment radiation NORMAL C. GO TO Ei, Loss of Reactor or USING Appendix 8, Containment secondary Coolant.

Rad Monitors. (App. 8 performed Ln ES-OS)

Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via SPDS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 38 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When a RED Path for Containment is evident on SPDS, the SRO will transition to FR-Z.i, go to page 46 for details When a RED Path is for PTS evident on SPDS, the SRO will transition to FR-Ri, go to page 48 for details E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT NOTE This procedure has a foldout page.

See next page for details

1. CHECK RCP trip criteria:

a. CHECK the following: a. GO TO Step 2.

. At least one CCP OR SI pump RUNNING ATC AND

. RCS pressure less than 1250 psig.

b. STOP RCPs.

2. CHECK SIG secondary pressure boundaries INTACT:

BOP

SIG pressures CONTROLLED or RISING

S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

3. MAINTAIN Intact S/G narrow range levels:

a. Greater than 10% [25% ADV).

BOP

b. Between 10% [25% ADVI and 50%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 39 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCAlFailure of Phase B to Actuate.

FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:

RCS pressure less than 1250 psig AND at least one COP or SI pump running OR

Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs.

SI REINITIATION CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:

RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs less than 40F OR

Pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained greater than 10% [20% ADVJ, THEN RAISE ECCS flow by performing one or both of the following as necessary:

ESTABLISH CCPIT flow USING Appendix C

START COPs or SI pumps manually.

EVENT DIAGNOSTICS

IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

IF any S/G pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner or less than 140 psig AND SIG NOT isolated, THEN GO TO E-2. Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

IF any S/G has level rising in uncontrolled manner or has abnormal radiation, THEN:

a. RAISE ECCS flow by performing one or both of the following as necessary:

ESTABLISH CCPIT flow USING Appendix C

START CCPs or SI pumps manually

b. GO TO E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS

IF CST level less than 5%.

THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW.

IF RWST level less than 27%.

THEN GO TO ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 40 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCAJFailure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. VERIFY secondary radiation NORMAL:

a. CHECK secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors.

b. NOTIFY Chem Lab to take SIG activity samples.

c. WHEN Chem Lab is ready to sample SIGs, THEN PERFORM the following:

ATC

1) ENSURE FCV-1 5-43 Blowdown Flow Control valve CLOSED.

2> ENSURE Phase A RESET.

3) OPEN blowdown isolation valves.

d. NOTIFY RADCON to survey main steam lines and S/G blowdown.

e. WHEN S/G samples completed, THEN CLOSE blowdown isolation valves.

CAUTION Any time a pressurizer PORV opens, there is a possibility that it may stick open.

5. MONITOR pressurizer PORVs and block valves:

a. Power to block valves AVAILABLE, a. DISPATCH personnel to restore power to block valves USING EA-201 -1, 480V Board Room Breaker Alignments.

ATC b. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED. b. IF pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig, THEN CLOSE pressurizer PORV5.

IF pressurizer PORV CANNOT be closed, THEN CLOSE its block valve.

Aooendix D Reauired Ooerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 41 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCAJFaiIure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. MONITOR SI termination criteria:

ATC a. RCS subcoolirig based on core exit T/CS a. GO TO Step 7, greater than 40F. lIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Examiner Note: When alarm M6E-E4 is on the crew will transition to ES-i .3 Transfer To RHR Containment Sump LS-63$OA RWST LVL LO Corrective [1] IF SIS has occurred with RWST level decreasg to 27%, THEN Actions PERFORM ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump, as applicable.

SRO Transitions to ES-i .3 Transfer To RHR Containment Sump.

CREW 1 SUSPEND FRP implementation.

2. DETERMINE if containment spray should be stopped:

a CHECK any containment spray pump RUNNING.

b. ENSURE the following:

ATC one Cntmt Spray pump in PULL-TO-LOCK

remaining Cntmt Spray pump RUNNING.

d. MONITOR one cntmt spray pump RUNNING and de[ivering Dow.

CRITICAL Places the A OR B Containment Spray 1 -HS-72-27A or 1 -HS-72-1 OA ATC TASK handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 42 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: If Containment pressure is less 2.0 psig than then go to step 2c RNO.

Examiner Note: If Containment pressure is still greater than 2.0 psig, then go to step 2 d

2. DETERMINE containment spray should he stopped:

c. CHECK containment pressure c PERFORM the fouowing:

greater than or equal to 20 psig

1) RESET containment spray signaL

2) ENSURE bath cntmt spray pumps STOPPED and ATC PLACE in A-AUTO.

3) CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves FCV-72-39 and FGV-722.

4) GO TO Step 3 Places both Containment Spray reset pushbuttons 1 -HS-72 43 and 1 -HS-72 42 ATC to RESET.

Places the remaining running Containment Spray Pump handswitch to STOP, both Containment Spray Pump handswitches to A-AUTO, places Containment ATC Spray discharge valve handswitches FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2 to close and proceeds to step 3.

2 DETERMINE it containment spray should be stopped:

ATC d. MONITOR one cntmt spray pump RUNNING and delivering flow.

Apoendix D Reauired Ooerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 43 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCAJFaiIure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3 MONITOR RHR automatic switchover:

a. CHECK containment sump level greater tttan 1i%

ATC

b. CHECK contamment sump valves FCV-63-72 and FCV-63-73 OPEN.

c. CHECK RHR suction valves FCV-74-3 and FCV-74-21 CLOSiNG.

4. MONITOR RWST supp to EGGS pumps:

ATC

RWST LVL LO-LO alarm DARK

[M-6E, E4].

RWST level greater than 8%

5 MONITOR RHR pumps RUNNING.

ATC CAUTION Transfer to sump recirculation may cause high radiation in Aux Building.

NOTE Step 6 should be handed oft to a Unit Operator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 44 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCAJFaiIure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. PERFORM the foflowing:

a DISPATCK personnel to restore power to FCV-63-! USING EA-201 -1, 4:80 V Board Room Breaker Aflgnments

b. OPEN RHR heat exchanger outlet valves FcV-70-1 56 and FCV-70-1 53 BOP c VERIFY CCS flow Fi 1 59A and Fl-70-165A greater than 5050 gpm.

d. MONITOR CCS temperature and surge tank level.

< BOP Places HS-70-156 and 153 RHR heat exchanger outlet valves to OPEN 7 VERIFY RHR automatic switchover

a. VERIFY containment sump valves FCV-S3-72 and FCV-63-73 OPEN.

ATC

b. ENSURE RWST to RHR suction valves FCV-74-3 and FCV-74-21 CLOSED.

CAUTION SI pump operation with miniflow isolated and RCS pressure above shutoff head will result in SI pump damage.

NOTE The following continuous action applies even after this procedure is exited.

8. MONITOR RCS pressure ATC less than 1500 psig.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 45 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 9 CLOSE Si pump mniflow to RWST valves:

ATC FCV-633

FCV-63-4

FCV-63-l 75 Places 1-HS-63-3A SI Pump Recirc to RWST Common AND 1-HS-63-4A SI ATC Pump 1 A Recirc to RWST AND 1 -HS-63-1 75A SI Pump 1 B Recirc to RWST to cLOSE i0 CLOSE RHR crosstie valves:

ATC FCV-74 33

FCV-74-35.

Places 1-HS-74-33A RHR HX 1A Crosstie Valve AND l-HS-74-35A RHR HX ATC 1 B Crosstie Valve to CLOSE It OPEN CCP and SI pump suctron valves from RHR:

ATC

FCV-63J

FCV-63-ti.

12. ALIGN RHR discharge to CCP and Si pump suction:

a OPEN RHR discharge to cCP suction ATC FCV-63-8.

b OPEN RHR discharge to SI pump Suction FC\63 I 1 -

CRITICAL Places 1 -HS-63-8A RHR 1 A to CCP Suction 1 -HS-63-1 1 1 B RHR to SI pump ATC TASK suction to OPEN Scenario may be terminated when the crew transfers RHR to Containment Sump step 12 or earlier, at discretion of Lead Examiner.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 46 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCNFailure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FR-Zi Actions NOTE if this procedure has been entered for an orange path and performance of ECA-1 i (Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation) is required, FR-Z. I may be performed concurrently with ECA- 1.1.

1. MONITOR RWST level ATC/BOP greater than 27%.

2. VERIFY Phase B: valves CLOSED:

ATC/BOP Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN

Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN.

ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.

ATC/BOP

4. DETERMINE if this procedure should be exited:

a. CHECK for faulted SIG: a. GO TO Step 5.

AnyS/Gpressure DROPPING ATC/BOP

OR

Any S!G pressure less than :140 psig

5. VERIFY containment spray operation:

a IF ECA1. I Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, is IN EFFECT.

THEN PERFORM the following:

1) OPERATE containment spray as directed by ECA-i.1,

2) GO TO Step 6.

ATC/BOP

b. VERIFY containment spray pumps RUNNING.

C. CHECK RWST level greater than 27%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 47 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. d. VERIFY containment spray suction ALiGNED to RWST:

FCV-72-22 OPEN

FCV-72-21 OPEN.

e. VERIFY contamment spray dscharge valves OPEN:

FCV-72-39 ATC/BOP . FCV-72-2.

1. VERIFY containment spray recirc valves CLOSED:

FCV-72-34

. FCV-72-13.

g. VERIFY containment spray 110w greater than 4750 gpm on each train.

6. MONITOR containment air return fans:

. WHEN at least 10 minutes ATC/BOP have elapsed from Phase B.

THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.

7. VERIFY containment ventilation dampers CLOSED:

ATC/BO P Panel 6K CNTMT VENT GREEN

Panel 6L CNTMT VENT GREEN.

8. VERIFY Phase A valves CLOSED:

ATC/BOP Panel 6K PHASE A GREEN

Panel 61 PHASE A GREEN.

9. VERIFY cnlmnt vacuum relief isolation valves CLOSED: [Pal 6K MANUALI FGV-30-46 ATC/BOP

FCV-30-47

FCV-30-$8.

10. VERIFY MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves ATC/BOP CLOSED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 48 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1 - DETERMINE t any SIG Intact:

a. CHECK at east one Sf0 pressure:

ATC/BOP CONTROLLED or RISING AND

Greater than 140 psig.

CAUTION Isolating all S/Os will result in a loss at secondary heat Siflic

12. DETERMINE if any St G Faulted:

a. CHECK S/G pressures: a. GO TO Step 13.

- Any S1G pressure DROPPING ATL,/ B..j P in an uncontrolled manner OR

Any S?G pressure lessthan 140 psig.

13. MONITOR if RHR spray should be placed in service:

ATC/BOP a. CHECK the lollowing: a. GO TO Step 14.

Containment pressure greater than 9.5 psig

14. MONITOR it containment spray should be stopped:

a. CHECK any containment spray pump a. GO TO Step 15.

RUNNING.

ATC/BOP

b. CHECK containment pressure h, GO TO Step 15, less than 2.0 psig.

15. RETURN TO procedure and step in etrect.

ATC/BOP END FR-P.1 Actions

1. MONITOR RWST level ATC!BOP greater than 21%

Aooendix D Reauired ODerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 49 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA/Failure of Phase B to Actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC/BOP 2 MONITOR CST eveI greater than 5%,

3. CHECK RCS pressure IF any of the fOllowing conditions exist:

greater than 300 psig. ,

RHR injectton flow on R-63-91A g FI-63-92A greater than 1000 gpm OR

both RHR pumps STOPPED ATC/BOP AND sump recirc capabhty has been lost THEN RETURN To procedure and step in effect.

ATC/BOP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event# ES-0.5 Page 50 of 56 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ES-O.5 Actions BOP I. VERIFY DIGS RUNNING..

BOP 2. VERIFY DIG ERCW supply valves OPEN.

BOP 3. VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.

4. VERIFY CCS pumps RUNNING:

Pump iA-A (2A-A)

BOP

Pump 1 B-B (26-6)

Pump C-S.

BOP 5. VERIFY EGTS fans RUNN1NG BOP 6. VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.

7. NOTIFY at least two AUOS to report BOP to MCR to be available for local actions.

8, VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:

a. MD AFW pumps BOP

b. TDAFW pump.

NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned it manual action has been taken to control SIG levels, to establish flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted 51G.

9. CHECK AFW valve alignment:

a. VERIFY MD AFW LCV5 in AUTO.

BOP b. VERIFY TD AFW LVs OPEN.

c. VERIFY MD AFW pump recircuiatIon valves FCV3400 and FCV-3-401 CLOSED.

Appendix D Reauired Qoerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 5 Event # ES-0.5 Page 51 of 56 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 10, VERIFY MFW Isolation:

a. CHECK MFW pumps TRIPPED.

b. ENSURE the fOIIOW:iflg:

BOP

fW regulating valves CLOSED MFW regulating bypass valve controllers in MANUAL wtth output ZERO

MFW isolation valves CLOSED.

11. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. VERIFY EGGS pumps RUNNING:

CCPs RHR pumps SI pumps

b. VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.

BOP C. CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.

d. VERIFY SI pump flow.

e. CHECK RCS pressure e. GO TO Step 12.

less than 300 psg.

if. VERIFY RHR pump flow.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # ES-0.5 Page 52 of 56 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. VERIFY ESF systems ALIGNED:

a. Phase A ACTUATED:

PHASE A TRAIN A alarm LIT

[M-6C, B5].

PHASE A TRAIN B alarm LIT

[M-6C, 66].

b. Cntrnt Vent Isolation ACTUATED:

CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, C5].

CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-GC, 06].

c. Status morntor panels:

BOP SC DARK

SD DARK

SE LIT OUTSIDE outhned area

6HOARK

6J LIT.

d. Train A status panel 6K:

CNTMTVENT GREEN

PHASEAGREEN

e. Train B status panel BL:

CNTMT VENT GREEN

PHASEAGREEN

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-302 Scenario# 5 Event# ES-O.5 Page 53 of 56 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. MONITOR for containment spray and Phase B actuation:

a. CHECK for any of the following:

Phase B ACTUATED OR

Containment pressure greater than 2.8 psig.

b. VERIFY containment spray IN ITIATED:

BOP

1) Containment spray pumps RUNNING.

2) Containment spray header isolation valves FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2 OPEN.

3) Containment spray recirculation valves to RWST FCV-72-34 and FCV-72-13 CLOSED.

4) Containment spray header flow greater than 4750 gpm per train.

5) Panel 6E LIT.

c. VERIFY Phase B ACTUATED:

PHASE B TRAIN A alarm LIT

[M-6C, A5].

PHASE B TRAIN B alarm LIT

{M-6C, A61.

d. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.

e. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:

Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN.

Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-302 Scenario # 5 Event # ES-0.5 Page 54 of 56 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

f. WHEN 10 minutes have elapsed, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING, NOTE The continuous action in Step 14 remains applicable if containment pressure rises above 1.5 psig after ES-a.5 is completed.

14. MONITOR f containment vacuum relief isolation valves should be closed:

BOP a. CHECK containment pressure a. GO TO Step 15.

greater than 1.5 psig.

15. CHECK secondary and containment rad monitors USING the following:

BOP

Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors

Appendix B, Containment Rad Monitors.

APPENDIX A SECONDARY RAD MONITORS

1. IF SI occurred on Unit 1.

THEN CHECK following rad monitors including available trends por to isolation:

Condenser exhaust recorder 1 -RR-90-1 19

S!G blowdown recorder 1-RR-90-120

Unit I Main steam line rad monitors [1-M-3O

Post-Accident rad recorder i-RR-90-268B points 3 (blue), 4 (violet), 5 (black), and 6 turquoise).

[1M31 (back of 1-M-30)i

3. NOTIFY Unit Supervisor whether secondary radiation is NORMAL or HIGH.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-302 Scenario # 5 Event # ES-0.5 Page 55 of 56 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior APPENDIX B CONTAINMENT RAD MONITORS I IF SI occurred on Unit 1.

THEN CHECK following rad monitors:

BOP a Upper containment post-accident rad monitors i-RM-90-27IA and 1-RM-90-272A NORMAL [i-M-303 a Lower containment post-accident rad monitors I -RM-90-273A and 1 -RM-90-274A NORMAL [1 -M-30]

a Containment rad recorders l-RR-90-i12 and i-RR-90-106 NORMAL [O-M-i 2] (prior to isolation).

16. WHEN directed by E-O, THEN BOP PERFORM Appendix D, Hydrogen Mitigation Actions.

17 CHECK pocket sump pumps STOPPED:

[M-15, upper left cornell a HS-77-41 Q, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and BOP Equipment Drain Sump pump A a HS774:i 1, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump 8.

18. DISPATCH personnel to perform BOP EA-O-1, Equipment Checks Following ESF Actuation.

19. ENSURE plant announcement has been BOP made regarding Reactor Trip and SI.

20. PERFORM Appendix E, Spent Fuel BOP Cooling Actions, as time permits.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-302 Scenario# 5 Event# Page 56 of 56 Event

Description:

Critical Task Critical Tasks: Critical Task Statement

1. Manually initiate a Phase B isolation prior to completing ES-O.5 step 13.

2. Manually stop one Containment Spray Pump prior to completing ES-i .3 step 2

3. Manually align CCP and SI pump flowpath for sump Recirc prior to completing ES-i .3 step 12

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 2012-301 Exam iners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 1, 100% power, BOL Turnover: Maintain current conditions; currently in O-GO-5 Section 5.2, At Power Conditions Target CTs: Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before completing the immediate-action steps of FR-S.1:

Direct de-energizing the control rod drive MG sets

Insert RCCAs

Establish emergency boration flow to the RCS Isolate AFW flow to the Faulted SG prior to completing E-2 step 4.

Manually close MS lvs prior to the completion E-2.

Event

1. RX24B Malf. No. Type*

C-

1. Event Description Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails low. The MFP Master BOP/SRO Controller shifts to MANUAL resulting in lowering feed flow to all SGs. The BOP maintains SIG levels with the MFP Master Controller in MANUAL using AOP S.01.

2. RX1 9 I- A gradual Auto Rod Motion withdrawal occurs due to a Tref Computer failure. The ATC/SRO ATC will place control rods to manual to stop rod motion using Immediate Operator Actions and AOP-C.O1.

3. RXO6A I- The controlling pressurizer level channel LT 68-339 will fail low resulting in ATC/SRO letdown isolation and de-energizing Pressurizer heaters. The ATC will remove the channel from service and restore Pressurizer heaters using AOP-I.04. The SRO T° .))FI.J will address Tech Specs and determines the instrument is INOPERABLE. The N-ATC ATC will restore letdown.

4. RDO7M2 TS-SRO A control rod will drop into the core, the crew will take action to stabilize the power using AOP-C.O1 .The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines entry into LCO 3.1.3.1 action c.4 is required.

5. R-ATC The crew will reduce power in response to the dropped rod using AOP-C.03 N

BOP/SRO

6. RCO2C C-ATC The #3 RCP motor trips with a failure of the RPS to initiate a Reactor Trip resulting in an ATWS. The crew will attempt to trip the Reactor from the control R P0 1 C C BOP

- room using E-0 and transition to FR-S.1 where the ATC manually inserts control

[pre-insert) rods and the BOP manually trips the main turbine and initiates emergency boration.

7. MSO6C M-AlI Following the reactor trip an unisolable steam leak will occur on Steam Generator Loop 3 outside containment upstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valve. The crew transitions to E-2.

8. IMF RP1 6K61 6AIB C-BOP All MSIVs fail to AUTO-CLOSE, the BOP manually closes the MSIVs using E-2.

IMF RP16K623A/B

9. FWO4C C-BOP The Loop #3 MDAFW LCV-3-148 fails open, the BOP will secure feed to the faulted Steam Generator tripping the 1 B-B MD AFW pump and manually closing the Turbine Driven AFW pump level control valve.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 2012-301 Scenario 4 Summary EVENT 1 Following turnover, Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails low. The MFP Master Controller shifts to MANUAL resulting in lowering feed flow to all SGs. The BOP maintains SIG levels with the MFP Master Controller in MANUAL using AOP-S.01.

EVENT 2 When directed by the lead examiner, gradual Auto Rod Motion insertion occurs due to a Tave Computer failure. The ATC will place control rods to manual to stop rod motion using Immediate Operator Actions and AOP-C.01.

EVENT 3 When directed by the lead examiner, the controlling pressurizer level channel LT 68-339 will fail low resulting in letdown isolation and de-energizing Pressurizer heaters. The ATC will remove the channel from service and restore Pressurizer heaters using AOP-l.04. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines the instrument is INOPERABLE and enters LCO 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3-1 functional unit 1 1 Action 6; TS 3.3.3.7 Table 3.3-10 Functional Units 7 Action 2.

EVENT 4 When directed by the lead examiner, a control rod will drop into the core, the crew will take action to stabilize the power using AOP-C.01 .The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines entry into LCO 3.1.3.1 action c.4 is required.

EVENT 5 The crew will reduce power in response to the dropped rod using AOP-C.03.

EVENT 6 When directed by the lead examiner, the #3 RCP motor trips with a failure of the RPS to initiate a Reactor Trip resulting in an ATWS. The crew will attempt to trip the Reactor from the control room using E-0 and transition to FR-S.1 where the ATC and manually inserts control rods and the BOP manually trips the main turbine and initiates emergency boration. The crew will direct operators to locally trip the reactor trip breakers.

EVENT 7 When the reactor is tripped and at Lead Examiner direction, an unisolable steam leak will occur on Steam Generator Loop 3 outside containment upstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valve. The crew will transition to E-0 and subsequently E-2, to isolate the #3 Steam Generator.

EVENT 8All MSIVs fail to AUTO-CLOSE, the BOP manually closes the MSIVs using E-2.

EVENT 9 During performance of the EOPs, the Loop #3 MDAFW LCV-3-1 48 fails open, the BOP will secure feed to the faulted Steam Generator tripping the 1 B-B MD AFW pump and manually closing the Turbine Driven AFW pump level control valve using the FOP of E-0.

E- Procedure Path: E-0, FR-S.1, E-0, E-2 The scenario terminates as directed by the Lead Examiner when the crew has isolated the #3 S/G using E 2.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 1 of 62 Event

Description:

Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails low Time fl Position fl Applicants Actions or behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 1 Feed water header pressure transmitter fails low; PT-3-1 Indications/Alarms Annunciator:

1-M-3

1-XA-55-3C, C-i PS-3-4 NO 1 FW HTR PRESSURE Low

1-XA-55-3B, D-i Main Feedwater Digital Control Sys Transfer To Manual Indications:

1-M-4

1-FI-3-35A, 35B, 48A, 48B, 90A, 908, 103A, 103B, SG-1 thru 4 SG FW INLET FLOW Chs 1&2 increasing flow- above steam flow i-M-3

FW MASTER CONTROLLER shifts to MANUAL (AMBER) 1-M-4

i-Fl-3-35A, 35B, 48A, 48B, 90A, gOB, iO3A, 1038, SG-i thru 4 SG FW INLET FLOW Chs i&2 increasing flow- above steam flow Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:

Indications:

Cs

Thermal Power Increasing MAIN FEEDWATER DIGITAL CONTROL SYS TRANSFER TO MANUAL

[1] IF using the hand controllers to determine which DIgital Feedwater ontroller(s) has transferred to rnanu.

THEN DETERMINE which contrdIens) in Manual by ORANGE bacidit ManuaI on controller.

[21 IF using the DeS Operator Display monitors to determine which Digital Feedwaler controller(s) has transferred to MANUAL, THEN OBSERVE controller(s) yeHow status light being LIT.

I31 ADJUST controller(s) to maintain system parameters steady.

[41 NOTIFY US which controiler() are in rnantaI and system status

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 2 of 62 Event

Description:

Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails low Time Position I Applicants Actions or behavior

[5] IF any of the following occur

System parameters can NOT be maintained OR

At the discretion of the US THEN GO TO any of the foflowlrq:

AOP-C.03, Emergency Shutdawr a AOP-S.O1, Main Feedwaer Malfunctions

E-0, Reacto Trip cSaf&y Thjec.don BOP Responds to ARP 1 -AR-M3B D-1.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Evaluator Note: For this event, crew may respond per the Annunciator Response Procedure directly enter AOP-S.O1 Section 2.2. Section 2.2 Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step; the BOP may perform the action(s) associated with Step 1 from memory without direction.

BOP Manually lowers output MFP (Master) Speed Control to maintain SIG levels.

SRO Transitions to AOP-S.02, MAIN FEEDWATER MALFUNCTIONS section 2.2 DIAGNOSE the failure:

IF GO TO PAGE

... SECTION Failure of Automatic S1G Level Control 2.1 4 Failure of Automatic MFW Pump Control 2.2 7 Loss of One Main Feedwater Pump 2.3 12 Above 76% (Unit 1) or 77% (Unit 2) Turbine Load Main Feedwater Pump Trip 2.4 19 Below 76% (Un 1) or 77% (Un 2> Turbine Load NOTE Step I is an IMMEDIATE ACTION MFP (Master) Speed control shifts to MANUAL, manually control of MFP BOP (Master) Speed, reduces Main Turbine load as required to maintain Thermal Power within limits.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 3 of 62 Event

Description:

Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior

1. RESTORE feedwater pressure:

a. ENSURE affected MFP speed controller(s) in MANUAL;

MFPT A & B Speed Control OR

MEPT A Speed Controller BOP OR

MEPT B Speed Controller Ii ADJUST speed an affected MFP(s) to restore feedwater pressure to normal (1040 psig at full power).

Manually lowers output MFP (Master) Speed Control to maintain SIG levels BOP on program level.

2 DETERMINE if MEP tnp s needed:

BOP

.i CHECK BOTH MEW pumps IN SERVICE CAUTION: Feed flow transients may impact core thermal power.

3 MAINTAIN steam generator level(s)

BOP on program.

NOTE: Appendix C or DCS Operator Display monitors MFP Control screen may be used to determine program teeciwater DIP for current power.

4. MAINTAIN MFP d[scharge pressure BOP on program USING DCS Operator Display monitors, ICS, or available control board indications.

CAUTION Reactor operation at low power levels for extended periods may challenge reactivity control due to xenon changes.

BOP 5 CHECK Reactor power greater than 5%

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 4 of 62 Event

Description:

Feed water header pressure transmitter PT-3-1 B fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or behavior CREW 6. INITIATE repairs on failed equipment

7. WHEN automatic control of affected MFW pump controller(s) is available and reliable, THEN PLACE controller(s) in AUTO USING 1,2-30-98-i, Di.stnbuted Control System.

SRO NOTE: Instructions for restoring bypassed instrument channels are contained n 1 ,2-S0-98-1.

13. GO TO appropriate plant procedure.

END OF SECTION Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations ManaQement Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

END OF SECTION Lead Examiner may cue the next event when plant is stable with MFP speed control in manual.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 5 of 62 Event

Description:

Auto Rod Motion Failure (Tref Computer failure)

Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 2 Auto Rod Motion Failure (Tave Computer failure)

Indications available:

Annunciators:

. XA-55-5A Window C-6 1-M-5 Indication:

TR-68-2B, TREF increasing ramp TS-68-2P!Q REAC COOL. LOOPS T REF T AUCT HG K-LOW

[Ij COMPARE plant indicators to verify validity cf alarm.

NOTE I IF annuncIation is an expected response dwing the petformance of 1-RT-MOO-520-00iO, 20%

Load SIep Chanpe, rods should be left in AUTO NOTE 2 IF a rad load reduction is in progress and itomatic rod control is functional, AOP-C.03 aiIs reducing turbine toad rate prior to plactng rod control in manuaL

[2J IF AQP-C.03, Rapid Shctdown or Load rejection. is in progress, THEN Ia] REFER to AOP-C03 guidance for rod control operation.

[b] GO TO step [4]

[31 [F controls are in AUTO when alarm occurs, THEN PLACE rod control system (1-HS-85-5110) in manual and match Tavg with Tref

[4J IF rod control system is matfurctioning, or there is indication of a failure of the Tref signal to the rod control system, THEN GO TO AOP-C.O1. Rod Control System Maffunctions.

BOP Responds to ARP 1 -AR-M3B D-1.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Takes Immediate action to place HS-85-51 10 ROD CONTROL MODE ATC SELECTOR in MANUAL.

SRO Transitions to AOP-C.01 Rod Control System Malfunctions

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 2 Page 6 of 62 Event

Description:

Auto Rod Motion Failure (Tref Computer failure)

Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DIAGNOSE the failure:

GOTO lF. SECTION PAGE Uncontrolled rod bank moiement 2 1 4 (rod movement NOT due to actual T-avg/T-ref mismatch or change in reactor/turbine power)

NOTE: Step 1 is an immediate action step.

1 STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a. PLACE rod control in MAN ATC

b. CHECK rod motion STOPPED.

Places HS-85-5110 ROD CONTROL MODE SELECTOR in MANUAL if not ATC already done.

CAUTION: Control Rods should NOT be manually withdrawn during a plant trans lent.

2. CHECK for plant transient:

ATC a. CHECK reactor power and T-avg STABLE.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 2 Page 7 of 62 Event

Description:

Auto Rod Motion Failure (Tref Computer failure)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CHECK for instrumentation malfunction:

a. CHECK all Vital Instrument Power Boards ENERGIZED:

. VITAL POWER BOARD UV OR BREAKER TRIP alarms [M- IC windows A-7, 8-7, 0-7, and D-71 DARK ATC

b. CHECK nuclear instrumentation oPERABLE.

c CHECK RCS RTDs OPERABLE

d. CHECK turbine impulse pressure channels OPERABLE.

3. e. CHECK Tref OPERABLE e. PERFORM the following:

USING TR-68-2B.

1) PLACE Steam Dumps in Steam Pressure Mode USING 0-SO-i -2, Steam Dump System.

ATC

2) DETERMINE Program T 9 v

3 for current reactor power USING Appendix A or ICS (Trend Menu, Program T-avg}

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 4 Event# 2 Page 8 of 62 Event

Description:

Auto Rod Motion Failure (Tref Computer failure)

Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior O-SO-1-2, STEAM DUMP SYSTEM, section 8.2

&2 Placing Steam Dump Controls in Pressure Mode.

CAUTION Placing steam dumps in service with water accumulated in header could result in severe water hammer. Monitoring and confirmation of normal Main Steam Dump Drain Tank operation by 0-30-14-3 and 0-30-14-4 performance provides assurance that the line does not contain sufficient water to produce a water hammer.

[1] PLACE IHS-1-103A1 Steam Dump A FSV handswitrh to OFF.

[2] PLACE IHS-1 -1 0381 Steam Dump B FSV haridswitch to OFF.

[3] PLACE [HS-1-103D] Steam Dump Mode selector to STEAM PRESS. D

[4] VERIFY IXi-1 -1 O3AIB1 Steam Dumps Armed white light is LIT. C 5} IF [PlC-I -331 Steam Dump Controller in MANUAL, Th EN BOP ENSURE demand is Zero on controller. C

[6] IF lPIC-I -331 Steam Dump controller in AUTO, TH EN ADJUST setpoint to obtain zero output (demand). C CAUTION If a demand signal is present on XL-i-33 Steam Dump demand and dumps are armed, then the dump valves will open when Steam Dump FSV handswitches are placed in ON position.

/] PLACE IHS-1-103A1 Steam Dump A FSV handswitch to ON.

PLACE HIS-I-I 0381 Steam Dump B FSV handswitch to ON.

ADJUST IPIC-i -331 Steam Dump controller to maintain desired steam pressure. C END OF TEXT

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 9 of 62 Event

Description:

Auto Rod Motion Failure (Tref Computer failure)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

f. CHECK Auctioneered T-av g ATC OPERABLE USING TR-68-.2B.

4. CHECK for inadvertent RCS dilution:

a. CHECK evidence of dilution a. GO TO Step 5.

INDICATED:

ATC

VCT level indication OR

Tag rising unexplained with stable turbine load.

5 CHECK for inadvertent boration flow:

a. CHECK evidence of boration flow a. GO TO Step 6.

INDICATED:

Batch counters flow indication ATC OR

VCT level indication CR Tg dropping unexplained.

NOTE: When adjusting T-avg, reactivfty changes should be accomplished by only one method at a time.

6. RESTORE Tavg to within 1 .5F Of TTeI

. POSITION control rods OR ATC

ADJUST turbine load OR

. ADJUST RCS boron concentration USING O-SO-62-7, Boron Concentration Control,

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 10 of 62 Event

Description:

Auto Rod Motion Failure (Tref Computer failure)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Places HS-85-51 11 Rod Control to OUT as directed by the SRO to restore ATC RCS temperature within 1.5 deg F of TREF.

7. EVALUATE the following Tech SpecsiTRM for app licabiflty:

. 3.1 .1.1, Shutdown Margin T-avg.

Greater than 20OF

. 3.1.1.4, Minimum Temperature for CriticaHty SRO

3.1.3.1. Movable Control AssembHes, Group Height

. 3.1.3.5, Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit

3.1.3.6, Control Rod Insertion Limits

3.2, Power Distribution Limits (entire section)

8. CHECK cause of continuous rod motion IDENTIFIED.

CREW 9. ENSURE Maintenance initiated as required.

10. ENSURE Plant Management notifled of failure..

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 11 of 62 Event

Description:

Auto Rod Motion Failure (Tref Computer failure)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. WHEN problem corrected AND automatic rod control is available.

THEN PERFORM the following:

3. ENSURE Tavg and T-ret matched within 1°F ATC b PLACE control rods in AUTO USING O-SO 1. Rod Control System

12. GO TO appropriate plant procedure.

Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue next event when ready.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 12 of 62 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Controlling Channel LT 68-339 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 3 Controlling Pzr Lvi Transmitter tails low (LT 68-339)

Indications/Alarms Annunciator:

1-M-5

1-XA-55-5A C-3, PRESSURIZER LEVEL HIGH-LOW

E3, PRZR LVL LOW HEATER OFF & LETDOWN SECURED Indications:

1-M-4

1-LI-68-339 RCS PZR LEVEL indicates 0 level Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:

1-M-6

1-FI-62-82, LETDOWN HX OUTLET FLOW indicates 0 flow 0-M-27 O-XA-27B-B A-5, LETDOWN HX OUTLET FLOW/TEMP ABNORMAL LS-68-335D/E PRESSURIZER LEVEL HiGH-LOW

[11 CHECK pressizer level (I-Ll-68-339A 335A, 320)

[2J IF level is high, ThEN ENSURE backup heaters 0N

[31 ENSURE :le contr system is atternptth to return level to program with tetdown and chging

[4j IF level channel faiI., THEN GO TO A0P404. Presswizer instrument Malfuncbon.

BOP Responds to ARP 1 -AR-M5A C-3.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 - Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 13 of 62 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Controlling Channel LT 68-339 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Transitions to AOP 1.04, PRESSURIZER INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL SRO MALFUNCTIONS DIAGNOSE the failure:

QOTO IF... SECTION PAGE Pressurizer Level Instrument Malfunction 2.4 20 2.4 Pressurizer Level Instrument Malfunction CAUTION Chemistry sampling of PZR Liquid Space may result in additional bistables actuating due to impact on 1..LT-68-320 or 2-LT-68-335.

NOTE Appendix M shows layout of PZR level control for operator reference.

1. CHECK Ll-68--339 NORMAL. PERFORM the tollowing

a. ENSURE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL SELECTOR switch XS-68-339E in LT-68-335 & 320.

ATC b. ENSURE LEVEL REC CHANNEL SELECTOR switch XS-68-339B in LT68-320 or LT-68-335.

c. GO TO Step 4.

Places LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL SELECTOR switch XS-68-339E in LT ATO 335 & 320..

4 CHECK letdown IN SERVICE PERFORM the 101 owtng

a. EVALUATE manual control of charging 110w USING the following.

. HlC62-93A Charging Flow Control ATC . HIC-62-89A, Charging Seal Water Flow Control tr RESTORE letdown USING EA-62-5, Establishing Normal Charging and Letdown.

ATC vlay place HIC-62-93A, Charging Flow Control in MANUAL to control charging flow May adjust HIC-62-89A, Charging Seal Water Flow Controller to maintain seal ATC injection flow alarms clear.

Examiner note: The following are from EA-62-5, go to page 16 for AOP-l.-4 actions.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 14 of 62 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Controlling Channel LT 68-339 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EA-62-5 ESTABLISHING NORMAL CHARGING AND LETDOWN actions

2. IF normal letdown flow is to be established, THEN ATC GO TO Section 4.1 4.3 Establishing Normal Letdown Flow NOTE EA-62-3, Establishing Excess Letdown, may be utilized if Normal Letdown cannot be established.

1 - IF charging flow NOT established, ATC THEN PERFORM Section 4.2.

ATC 2. VERIFY pressurizer level greater than 17%.

3 ENSURE letdown orifice isolalion valves CLOSED:

LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED ATC FCV62-72 FCV-62--73 0 FCV-132-74 0 4 OPEN letdown isolation valves:

LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVES ATC FCV-62-69 FCV-62-70 FCV-62-77 NOTE Placing cooling water on the Letdown Heat Exchanger prior to restoring letdown flow should prevent TIS 62-79B1A from actuating and fully opening TCV-70-192.

5 PLACE [H1C42-78] in MANUAL, AND ATC OPEN EY-7O-1 921 to 50%. -

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 15 of 62 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Controlling Channel LT 68-339 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Places HIC-62-78 LD FIX Outlet Temp to MANUAL, and adjusts output to open ATC TCV-70-1 92 to 50%. -

S PLACE letdown pressure c ntrcller [PCV-62-81] in MANUAL and ADJUST cut Ut between 40 and 60°f (50 o-60% open)

Places letdown pressure controller PCV-62-81 to MANUAL and ADJUST output ATG between 40 and 50%, (50%-60% open).

7. ADJUST charging flow as necessary to prevent flashing in the ATC letdown line.

8. OPEN letdown orifice isolation valves as needed LETDOWN ORIFiCE ISOLATION VALVES OPEN ATC f

A V73 A

ATC Places HS-62-73 (or 74) Letdown Orifice B (or C) lsol 75 gpm to OPEN.

NOTE Normal letdown pressure s 325 psig at normal operating temperature

9. ADJUST letdown pressure controller [PCV.6241] output to obtain desired pressure.

Adjusts letdown pressure controller PCV-62-81 output to obtain desired ATC pressure.

10. ADJUST letdown pressure controller [PCV-62-81] setpont to match existing pressure Adjusts letdown pressure controller PCV-62-81 setpoint to match existing ATC pressure.

1 PLACE letdcwn pressure ccntrcller [PCV-62-81] in UTO NOTE Normal letdown temperature s 10QF.

ATC 12. ADJUST [HIC-62-78A1 to obtain desired letdown temperature, as indicated on [11-62-78].

Adjusts HIC-62-78A Letdown Controller to obtain desired letdown temperature, ATC as indicated on Tl-62-78.

ATC 13 PLACE [HIC-62-78A] n AUTO.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 16 of 62 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Controlling Channel LT 68-339 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Examiner Note: Letdown temperature may swing due to repeated actuation of TIS-62-79B/A, which causes letdown temperature control valve TCV-70-192 to fully open.

Examiner note: AOP-L04 actions recommence here.

5. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for applicability:

SRO

33.1 .1 (3.3.1), Reactor Trip System Instrumentation

3.3.3.7 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation UMrnNG CONDI11ON FOR OPERATION 33.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system nstrumentati channels and interlocks of ThbSe 3.3-1 S1SII be OPERAEIE.

APPtICABILITV As shois in Table 3.3-i.

iiiON:

As shown n Table 3.2I.

11. Pressurizer Water Lev& 3 2 2 1,2 8 High ACTION 6- With the nwnbec of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tots Numberof Channels, STARTUP andfor POWER OPERATION may proceed prowided the fclltrwing conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel b placed hi the tripped condition wtthhi 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

3.3,3.7 The accident monitorhig histrumenhoion channels shcmn in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: MODES 1.2 and 3.

ACT O

1 N As shown in Table 3.3-10

7. Pressunzer Leiel Wde Range

Insoumerit Loops f8-32U,-335-230)

ACTION 2- NOTE Also refer to the appbcadie action requrements from Tables 3.3-1 ntce ii may contain more restrictiie actions.

a. With the number of channels one iess than the minimum channels reqtEeci.

restore the inoperable channel to OPERABlE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the neat 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and hi HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 17 of 62 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Controlling Channel LT 68-339 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. ENSURE pressurizer heaters restored ATC to service.

CAUTION RCS pressure changes and changes in RCS boron concentration (due to differences between par and RCS boron) may impact core reactivity.

7. MONITOR reactor power:

a. CHECK reactor in Mode 1 or 2.

b. MONITOR core thermal power for unexpected changes.

NOTE:

If performing AOP in conjunction with AOP-l.1 1 for an Eagle LOP failure, then actions to hard trip bistables should be delayed until Eagle system reset is attempted. Actions to hard trip bistables must be completed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months UNLESS affected loop is restored to operable status by resetting Eagle rack.

& NOTIFY i&C to remove failed pressurizer level channel from service USING appropriate Appendix:

L-68-339 Appendix I Lead Examiner may cue the next event when Letdown is restored and Technical Specifications are addressed.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1

[ Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Time NRC 2012-301 Position Scenario #

Dropped Rod 4 Event #

Applicants Actions or Behavior 4 Page 18 of 62 Simulator Operator: When directed, initiate Event 4 Dropped Rod: M2 SOB A rod.

Indications/Alarms Annunciator:

1-M-4

. 1-AR-M4-B, 04, COMPUTER ALARM ROD 0EV & SEQ PWR RANGE TILTS

. 1-AR-M4-B, D7, FULL LENGTH RODS AT BOTTOM

. 1-AR-M4-B, E3, NIS POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION

. 1-AR-M4-B, B3, NIS POWER RANGE UPPER DETECTOR HI FLUX DEVN OR AUTO DEFEAT (Later)

. 1-AR-M4-B-C3, NIS POWER RANGE LOWER DETECTOR HI FLUX DEVN OR AUTO DEFEAT (Later)

Indications available:

1-M-4

. 1 Rod Bottom Light illuminated on M-4 IRPI Display FULL LENGTH RODS RODS AT BOTTOM

[1] CHECK rod position.

[2] IF more than one rod drops, THEN TRIP the reactor and GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection.

[3] IF a sinie rod dropped, THEN GO TO AOP-C.O 1 Rod Control System Malfwctions.

[4] IF RPI malfunction or failure, THEN GO TO AOP-C.O1. Rod Control Sysrem Malfunctions.

[5] IF dropped rod occurs or rod position irdication is the malfunction, THEN REFER TO Technical Specifications 12.4, 3,t3.1, 11.15, and 3.2.1.

BOP Responds to ARP 1 -AR-M4-B D-7.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 19 of 62 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. DIAGNOSE the Failure:

GOTO lF... SECTION PAGE Dropped shuidownicontrol rod(s) 2.2 10 with reactor initially in Mode 1 or 2 NOTE: Step 1 is an immediate action step.

ATC 1 PLACE rod control in MAN.

I VERIFY ONLY ONE rod dropped.

NOTE: If a dropped rod occurs at low power level, retrieval of the dropped rod is NOT the conservative action to take and could violate Tech Specs (if Mode 2 has been entered). [C.21

3. MONITOR reactor power ATC greater than 5%.

4. REDUCE load to control Tavg:

a MONITOR T-avg greater than 541 F, (LCQ 3.11.4)

BOP Ii CHECK main turbine loaclecL

c. REDUCE turbine load to establish Tavg within 3GF Of Tref BOP Lowers Main Turbine load to restore TAVE within 3 deg F of TREF

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 20 of 62 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. MONITOR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) less than 1 .Q9 USING one ot the foflowing:

. 1CS ATC OR

. 0-S[-NUc-ODO1 33.0, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.

6. EVALUATE tIle following Tech SpecsTRM for applicability:

. 3.1,1.4, Minimum Temperature for Criticality

. 3.1.3.1. Movable Control Assemblies, Group Height SRO

31.3.2, Position indication Systems -

Operating

3.1.3.5, Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit

. 3,1.3.6, Control Rod Insertion Limits

3.2, Power Distribution Limits (entire section)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1 A1 full length shutdom and noIi rods shall be OPERABLE and posoned within +/- 12 steps ndoated posaGn) of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2 ACTION:

c. With one full length rod misned frn its group step counter demand heit by more than SR0 +/- 12 steps Cindicared position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within one hoa either 1.. The rod is restored within the above aIrnerA, requirements, or I The remander of the rods n the group wth the mis.altgned rod are aligned to within +/-

12 steps of the nsaigred rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertt [mit of spe.cdicabon S.1..3. The ThERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pun uant to Specification 3.i,3 diming subseent operation, or

3. Th rod is decLied noperabte and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN r qurerrent of Specilication 3.1.1.1 is satisfied, POWER OPERATiON may then conthue provded thab

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 21 of 62 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 313.2 The shutdown anti control rod position indication system and the demand position indication system shall be OPERABLE anti capable of determining the control rod positions within +/- 12 steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

c. With a maxinum of one demand position indicator per bank inoperable either:

1. Verify that all rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of The bank are within a maximum of 12 steps of each other at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , or

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

LIMlTING CONDITION FOR OPERATiON 3.i .5 All shutdovm rode shall he limited in physcaI insertion as specified in the COLR, APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2#

ACTION:

a. With a rmaxh-um of one shutdown rod inserted beyond the insertion limit specified in the COLR, exre*t for suniellance testing pwsuant to 3pecifation 4.1.112 or when complying with ACTION ti of this specification, within one heureihe

1. Restore the rod to within the insertion limit Specified in the COLR, or

2. Declare the rod to be inoperaiNe and apply ACTION 3.1.3.1.03.

3.2.4 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO ta1I not exceed 1.02.

APPLICABIUTY: MODE 1 above 50% of RATED THERMAL PCWER ACTION:

a, With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO d termined to exceed 1 02 hut less than or squalID log:

1. CalcuLate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at east once per hoi until:

a) Ether the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO Is reduced to thin its limit, or b) THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER

2. Within 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months s:

a) Ether reduce the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO to within ts init. or b) Reduc* THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for eadi 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in excess of 1.02 and similarly reduce the Power Range Neuon Flux-High Trip Selpoints within the rext4 hour&

3. Verify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is within its icnit within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after excescing the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to Issa than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER wiThin the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Tr. selpoints to Ies than or equal tO 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER mthin the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , A. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to ittoreasing THERMAL POWER: subaequent POWER OPERATIQF4 above 50% of RATED THERMAL power may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is verified within Is Imit at ieast once per hour for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or unit verified acceptable at 5% crqreater RATED THERMAL POWER.

Enters LCO 3.1.3.1 Action C, 31.3.2 Action C, 3.1.3.5 Action A and 3.2.4 Action SRO A

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 22 of 62 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 4 Page 23 of 62 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Core thermal power must be reduced to less than 75% within one hour ind shutdown margin must be verified within one hour UNLESS dropped rod can be restored l:fl OflO hoUr (LCO 31 3.1 action C)

T PERFORM the following to comply with LCO 3.t31:

a INITIATE power reduction to less than 75% USING one of following:

a AOP-C,03, Rapid Shutdown or Load Reduction SRO OR a 0-GO-S. Normal Power Operation b VERIFY adequate Shutdown Margin within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months USING SI-NUC-O00-0380 Transitions to AOP-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD REDUCTION, go SRO to page 24 for details.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, the Lead Examiner may cue the next event

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 24 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: No action required for Event 5, Rapid Power reduction Directs performance of AOP-C.03 RAPID SHUTDOWN OR LOAD SRO REDUCTION.

1. ENSURE crew has been briefed on reactivity SRO management expectations USING Appendix A.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT BRIEFING NOTE This appendix should be used in addition to event-based brief

[1] ENSURE crew has been briefed on the following:

Reason for Rapid Shutdown or Load Reduction

Load Reduction Rate:________

Desired final power level:______

Reactivity Management expectations:

Unit Supervisor shall concur with all reactivity manipulations

Ensure reactor responding as expected using diverse indications

Tavg-Tref Mismatch requirements:

3F control band

5F reactor trip criteria

Crew focus will be on reducing power in a controlled and conservative manner.

OATC will monitor rod insertion limits and AFD limit

Boration source:

Crew will monitor reactor trip and turbine trip criteria using App. B

CR0 will stop secondary plant equipment using App C

If time permits, review expected annunciators (ex. Computer Alarm, Upper and Lower Flux 0ev)

Termination Criteria (conditions requiring Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, or condition no longer requiring rapid load reduction):

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 25 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Chooses a power reduction rate of 2% to 3% final power level of 75% and BAT SRO as the boration source.

2. NOTIFY fcHong personnel of rapid shutdown or load reduction:

. Load Coordinator C1]

CREW

Chemistry

. Radiation Protection a Plant Management CREW Makes notifications as required.

3. MONITOR reactoriturbine trip NOT required CREW USING Appendix 3, Reactor and Turbine Trip criteria, Examiner note: Appendix B reactor and turbine trip criteria see page 28 4 CHECK VALVE POSITION LIMIT light BOP DARK on EHC panel. [M-2]

NOTE: Boration volumes and flcrates listed in this procedure are recommendations and may be adjusted as neceSsary.

5. INITIATE boration:

a. CHECK rod control AVAILABLE:

ATC

Control Bank D rods capable of being moved

NO dropped or misaligned rods in Control Bank D.

5. b. CHECK Control Bank D group position greater than 200 steps.

ATC c CHECK boration capability from BAT AVAILABLE.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 26 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

d. DETERMINE recommended bcwation volume from BAT:

800 gal to reduce power from 100% to 20%

OR SRO

10 gal for each 1% power reduction (from current power level)

OR

volume recommended by Reactor Engineenng.

SRO Determines 250 gal to reduce power from 100% to 75%

5. e. DETERMINE recommended boration if owrate from table below or from Reactor Engineering:

SRO LOAD REDUCTION BORATION RATE( /min) FLOWRATE 2% -3O gpm I :3% 45 gpm SRO Chooses a 2% to 3% load reduction rate.

ENSURE ccncurrence obta ned from ATC STA for boration volume and tlowrate g ENSURE bonc acd transfer pump ATC aligned to blender n FAST speed

h. ADJUST FCV-62-138 to establish I

desired flow rate

f. CONTROL boration flow as required to inject desired boric acid volume.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 5 Page 27 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION: If borating from the RWST, Turbine Load Reduction Rate greater than 2% per minute could result in violating Rod Insertion Limit.

6 1NATE load reduction as follows:

a, ADJUST load rate to desired value:

a between 1% and 4% per minute if borating via FCV-62-138 BOP OR a between 1% and 3% per minute if borating via normal boratton (App. H)

OR a 2% per minute if borating from RWST.

BOP Adjusts load rate approx 2% to 3 % per r.

b ADJUST setter for desired power level:

II RX POWER DESIRED LEVEL RECOMMENDED SETTER VALUE BOP 80% 56 70% 46 BOP Adjusts setter to approx. 51

6. C. VERIFY boration flow estabIshed.

BOP ci. INITIATE turbine load reduction by depressing GO pushbUtton.

e CONTROL turbine load reduction as necessary to reduce power to desired level.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 5 Page 28 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. MONITOR T-avgiT-ref mismatch:

a. CHECK T-ref indication a. PERFORM the following:

AVAILABLE.

1) MONITOR Program T-avg for current reactor power USING 11-28 Figure 3 or ICS (NSSS I BOP, Program Reactor Average Temperature).

2) USE program T-avg in place of T-ref.

3) MAINTAIN T-avg within 3F of program T-avg USING manual rod ATC control.

4) ADJUST turbine load rate as necessary.

5) IF mismatch between T-avg and program value CANNOT be maintained less than 5F, THEN TRIP the reactor and GO TO E-0, Reactor Tdp or SafeLy Injection.

Coordinates with the BOP to maintain T-avglProgram T-ref mismatch less than ATC 3°F using the Tl-28 figure 3 or ICS.

BOP MONITOR automatIc control of MFW pump speed AVAILABLE 9 STOP secondarV plant equipment BOP USiNG Appendix C, Seconda,y Plant Equspment Examiner Note: Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment starts at page 29.

Examiner Note: Additional AOPC.O3 steps not included as required power reduction should be complete at or around this step.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 29 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction APPENDIX B REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA REACTOR TRIP CRITERIA TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA Turbine trip required or imminent Turbine vibration exceeding 14 mils with reactor power greater than P-9 (50%) with one of the following:

Uncontrolled rod movement which CANNOT be

high vibration on multiple bearings stopped by placing rods in MANUAL (AOP-C.OI) OR Loss of SIG level control:

abnormal noise!vibration apparent level dropping or rising toward trip setpoint arid level CANNOT be restored o-s.ai More than one dropped rod oC.o1)

T-avgiT-ref mismatch CANNOT be maintained less than 5°F (refer to Step 7 or App E) 30% turbine load: < 30% turbine load:

Condenser Pressure > 21 psia AND CANNOT Condenser Pressure> 112 psia be restored within 5 minutes (AOP-Srn) AOP-s.o2)

Any automatic reactor trip setpoint reached Any automatic turbine trip setpoint reached OR automatic trip imminent: OR automatic trip imminent:

Turbine trip above P-9 (50%)

High Stator Cooling Water temp 90CC

Safety injection OR Stator DIP 12 psig below normal

Power Range high flux 109% a Both MFPTs tripped

Power Range flux rate +/-5% in 2 seconds a Low Auto Stop Oil pressure 4.5 psig

Pressurizer high level 92%

High S!G level 81% narrow range

Pressurizer pressure low 1970 psig

Main Turb Bearing 01.110w pressure 7 psig

Pressurizer pressure high 2385 psig

Thrust Bearing Oil high pressure 60 psig a RCS low flow 90% a Turbine Overspeed 1980 rpm

RCP undervoltage 5022 kflovolts

Loss of EHC pressure

RCP underfrequency 560 Hz

Generator PCBs tripped

OThT 115% (variable)

OPT 1081% (variable) a S/G low level 101% 115% EAM]

SSPS general warning in both trains

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 APPENDIX C SECONDARY PLANT EQUIPMENT

[I] ENSURE plant announcement(s) made on the following:

starting rapid shutdown (or load reduction) due to (reason)

stopping secondary plant equipment NOTE I If reactor power will be reduced below 50%, AUO should be on station at #3 heater drain tank (if possible) when 60% power is reached NOTE 2 Dispatching of AUG in Steps [2] and [3] may be performed out of sequence.

[2] IF reactor power will be reduced below 50%

THEN DISPATCH AUG with Appendix J (Unit 1) or K (Unit 2) to #3 Heater Drain Tank.

[3] IF one MFP will be shutdown using this appendix, THEN DISPATCH AUG to OPEN MFWP recire manual Isolation valve for MFWP to be removed from service: (N/A valves NOT opened)

UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION IA i-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of 1A condenser lB l-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of IA condenser 2 2A 2-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser 2B 2-VLV-3--577 TB eL 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 31 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction APPENDLX C

[4J IF BOTH of the following conditions are met:

power s being reduced as directed by AOP-S01 (Math Feedwater Malfunctions) or AOP-S04 (Condensate or Heater Drain Malfunctions) a leaving secondary pumps in service is desired, THEN GO TO Step t8].

[5J WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 80% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

a] ENSURE one Cond Demin Booster Pump STOPPED U

[b] ENSURE associated suction valve CLOSED:

OR B FCV-2-285 n L LL ZL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 32 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction

[61 WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 7O-75%

THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE one Condensate Booster Pump STOPPED.

[b] ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:

CONDENSATE BOOSTER uiw SUCTION VALVE CLOSED A FCV-2--94 OR FCV-2-87 OR FCV-2-81

[ci PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:

(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary)

i-SO-213-i Section 7.2 OR

2-S0-213-1 Section T3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 33 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction J

[7] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 65% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP remaining two Cond Demin Booster Pumps si muftaneouSly

[b] ENSURE suction valves CLOSED:

COND DEMIN BOOSTER PUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSED q A FCV-229O Li B FCV-2-285 Li C FCV-2--280 Li fcj STOP one No 3 Heater Drain pump Li

[d] STOP one No 7 Heater Drain pump

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 34 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction

[81 IF reactor power will be maintained greater than 50%,

THEN GO TO Notes prior to Step [1 1] E CAUTION Isolation of all three intermediate heater strings could occur if turbine is tripped prior to fully opening LCV-6-105A and B using Appendix J or K.

[91 WHEN reactor power is less than 60%

AND AUO with App J (Un 1) or K (Lk:it 2) S on station at #3 Heater Drain Tank, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP #3 Heater Drain Tank Pumps.

[b] NOTIFY AUO to perform App. J (Unit 1) or App. K (j2),

Fully Opening #3 Heater Drain Tank Bypass Valves

[c] CLOSE isolation valves from #3 I-ltr Drain Pumps to heater strings:

VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED FCV-6-1 08 Htr Drain 1k Pump 3 to Htr String A FCV-6-109 Htr Drain 1k Pump 3 to Htr String B FCV-6-1 10 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr Stung C

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 35 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction NOTE I The following step ensures that MFW Bypass valves are available to control feedwater flow at low power.

NOTE 2 If any MEW Reg valve is in MANUAL, the associated MEW Bypass valve controller should remain in MANUAL to prevent undesired opening of bypass vaive

[101 WHEN Reactor power is less than 50%,

THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] IF all MFW Reg Valves are in AUTO, TN EN PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Valve controllers in AUTO

[b] IF any MEW Reg Valve is in MANUAL, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) MAINTAIN MEW Bypass Reg Valve in MANUAL for S/G with MEW Reg valve in MANUAL.

2) PLACE MEW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO for remaining S1Gs.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 36 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction NOTE 1 If performing this AOP to reduce power to allow shutting down one MEW pump, the affected MFWP may be removed from service at power level less than 55% (Unit 1) or 65% (Unit 2).

NOTE 2 AEW start function on loss of both MEW pumps is inoperable when a MFW pump is RESET but NOT pumping forward. LCO 332i (Unit 1) or 332 (Unit 2) allows AFW start channel to he inoperable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months when shutting down a MFWP.

[11 WHEN it is desired to remove one MFW pump from service AND power level is less than applicable limit:

turbine impulse pressure less than approximately 45%

OR

reactor power less than value specified in Note I THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE MFWP Recirc Manual Isolation valve OPEN for MFWP to be removed from service: (N/A valves NOT opened)

UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATiON OPEN IA i-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of IA condenser fl 16 1-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of IA condenser 2-VU/-3-576 TB: eL 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser 2

26 2-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser

[b] THROTTLE OPEN recirc valve in MANUAL (30-60% OPEN) for MFWP to be removed from service

[c] PLACE speed controller in MANUAL for MFWP to be removed from service E

[d] REDUCE speed gradually on MFWP to be removed from service

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1

[111 (Continued)

[e] ENSURE proper loading on resmaining MFWP.

[fJ IF MFWP CANNOT be fully unloaded with speed controller, TN EN PERFORM one of the following:

NOTiFY 1&C to slowly adjust hand speed changer for affected MFWP UNTIL MFWP is fully unloaded.

OR

THROTTLE OPEN iecirc valve for affected MFWP to assist in unloading MFWP OR

SLOWLY CLOSE governor valve by bumping closed governor valve positioner (if operable)

OR

OBTAIN SRO concurrence that MFWP flow is sufficiently low to allow tripping MFWP

[g] WHEN MFWP is unloaded sufficiently, THEN TRIP affected MFWP

[h] CLOSE recirc valve for MFWP removed from service.

VI CLOSE recirc valve Manual Isolation inlet valve for MFWP removed from service.

[j] OPEN drain valves for MFWP removed from service: [M-3]

1HS46-141, MFWP A drain valves -

OR

[HS4641], MEWP B drain valve&

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 38 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Reduction

[121 WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 45% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a3 STOP remaining No. 7 Heater Drain pump b] CLOSE isolation valves from #7 Heater Drain Pumps to heater strings:

VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED FCV-6-1 43 Htr Drain Th Pump 7 to Htr String A FCV-6.163 Htr Drain Tk Pump 7 to Htr String B FCV-6-184 Htr Drain Tk Pump I to Htr String C U

[133 WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 30% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE main turbine EHC controts in IMP OUT.

[b] IF #3 heater drain tank pumps are still running, THEN PERFORM Step [9] U te] STOP one of two remaining Condensate Booster Pumps U (steP continued on next oaQeI

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1

[13] (Continued)

Edi ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:

OR OR FCV-2-81 E J c FCV-2-81 E e] STOP one ot three Hotwell Pump&

[f PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:

(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary) 1-50-2/3-1 Section 7.2 OR

. 2-S0-2/3-1 Section 7.3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 40 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, initiate Event 7 #3 RCP tripIATWS Indications available:

Indications/Alarms Annunciator:

. 1 -M-4-D, D-3 One Loop Low Flow Reactor Trip Indications:

1-M-4

#3 RCP Tripped Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

ONE LOOP LOW FLOW REACTOR TRIP fi] IF reactor trips, THEN GO TO E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety injection.

SRO Transitions to E-O. Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Examiner Note: following lOA performance, prior to Steps 1-4 immediate action verification, ATC/BOP surveys MCBs for any expected automatic system response that failed to occur. Upon discovery, they may take manual action(s) to align plant systems as expected for the event in progress. (Ref. EPM-4, Prudent Operator Actions)

Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via SPDS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1 -FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).

CREW Performs the first four steps of E-O unprompted.

SRO Directs performance of E-O NOTE 1 Steps I through 4 are immediate action steps.

NOTE 2 This procedure has a foldout page

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 6 Page 41 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. VERIFY reactor TRIPPED: TRIP reactor

Reactor trip breakers OPEN IF reactor CANNOT be tripped, TH EN

Reactor trip bypass breakers PERFORM the following:

DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC a. MONITOR status trees.

Rod bottom eights LIT b GO TO FR-S. l Nuclear Power Rod position indicators Generation!ATWS less than or equal to 12 steps.

Neutron flux DROPPING SRO Transitions to FR-Si, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS CAUTION RCPs should NOT be tripped with reactor power greater than 5%.

NOTE Steps 1 and 2 are immediate action steps 1 VERIFY reactor TRIPPED: TRIP reactor.

Reactor trip breakers OPEN IF reactor trip breakers will NOT open, THEN

Reactor trip bypass breakers MAINTAIN auto or manual rod insertion OPEN or DISCONNECTED at max achievable rate ATC UNTIL rods are at bottom.

Neutron flux DROPPING

Rod bottom lights LIT

Rod position ndicators less than or equal to 12 steps.

CRrnCAL ATC Places HS-85-51 11 Rod Control to IN.

2 VERIFY turbine TRIPPED BOP ALL turbine stop valves CLOSED.

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 42 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time Position j Applicants Actions or Behavior 3.. CHECK AFW System operation:

a. MD AFW pumps RUNNING b TD AFW pump RUNN1NG BOP c MD AFW LCVs in AUTO.

d TOAFWLCVsOPEN d CHECK pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig.

BOP Places HS-1-51A Trip/Throttle Vlv Pos to OPEN.

BOP Places HS-3-174A, 173A,172A, and 175A Turbine AFW LCVs to OPEN

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 20 12-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 6 Page 43 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I---- -.

4 EMERGENCY BORATE RCS by performing the following

a. ENSURE at least one CCP RUNNING.

b. INmATE Emergency Boration USING EA-68-&

C. VERIFY charging flow path established:

FCV-629O OPEN II a FCV-62-91 OPEN

FCV-62*-86 or FCV-62-85 OPEN.

1. PLACE boric add transfer pumps in fast speed.

2. ADJUST emergency borate valve (FCV-62-1 381 to obtain boric acid flow between 35 gpm and 150 gpm on [Fi-82-137A1.

3. MONITOR emergency boration flow:

a. CHECK emergency boration flow established on [Fl-62-137A1. Li Examiner Note: When the crew has sufficiently taken the actions to meet the critical task for reactivity control for the ATWS direct the facility operator to allow the AUOs to open Rx Trip Bkrs in sequence.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 44 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time fl Position fl Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: When the crew has sufficiently taken the actions to meet the critical task for reactivity control for the ATWS direct the facility operator to insert Event 8.

Examiner Note: Crew may close MSIVs and attempt to isolate AFW to faulted SI.G WHEN REACTOR IS TRIPPED during performance of FR-S.1. When attempting to isolate AFW, level control valve will not close and crew may elect to stop 1 B AFW Pump at that time.

CRITICAL I Places HS-1 -22A Main Steam lsol SIG-3 to CLOSE.

TASK AT/BOP Places HS-3-1 72A, SG-3 Turbine AFP LCV to CLOSE Places HS-3-128A lB-B AFW Pump to STOP.

Evaluator Note: Auto SI will likely occur when MSIVs are closed after Rx Trip in FR-S.1 and as the faulted S/G depressurizes.

5 VERIFY Containment Purge isolated:

ATC a. VERIFY containment purge and vent dampers (System 30) CLOSED.

[Panel 6K and 6L]

6 MONITOR for SI signal:

a CHECK SI signal ACTUATED. a. IF SI signal is required, THEN ACTUATE SI signal.

IF SI signal is NOT required, THEN GO TO Step 7.

ATC

b. PERFORM the following WHILE continuing with this procedure:

1) E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Steps -1 through 4

2) ES-0.5, Equipment Verifications.

Performs E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Steps 1 through 4 and ES-BOP 0.5, Equipment Verifications as required go to page 56 for details.

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 6 Page 45 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 7, CHECK reactor and turbine trip status:

a. Reactor TRIPPED.

BOP

b. Turbine TRIPPED:

ALL turbine stop valves CLOSED.

& MONITOR reactor subcritical:

a Power range channels less than 5%.

ATC b. Intermediate range SUR NEGATIVE.

c. GO TO Step 19.

SRO 19 ENSURE status tree momtonng initiated.

Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via SPDS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).

ADoendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 6 Page 46 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 20 MAINTAIN SIG narrow range levels:

a. Greater than 10% 25% ADVI.

BOP

b. Between 0% i25% ADVI and 50%.

Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm BOP until SIC are greater than 10% NR.

21. MOMTOR boration termination criteria:

a. NOTIFY Chem Lab to sample RCS boron concentration..

Ii CHECK ror all of the following:

all control rods FULLY INSERTED

RCS temperature ATC greater than 540F

no RCS dilution has occurred.

c. WHEN emergency boration is no longer needed.

THEN STOP emergency boration USING EA-68-4, Emergency Boration.

22. RETURN TO procedure and step n effect.

END

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 6 Page 47 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs performance of E-O NOTE 1 Steps I through 4 are immediate action steps.

NOTE 2 This procedure has a foldout page.

1. VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:

Reactor trip breakers OPEN

Reactor trip bypass breakers DiSCONNECTED or OPEN ATC

Rod bottom lights LIT Rod position indicators less than or equal to 12 steps.

Neutron flux DROPPING

2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:

BOP

Turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. VERIFY at least one 6.9KV shutdown ATTEMPT to start D/GS.

beard ENERGIZED on this unit.

IF power CANNOT be immediately restored to at least one shutdown board BOP on this unit, THEN GO TO ECA-0.O, Loss of All AC Power.

4. DETERMINE if SI actuated:

ATC

ECCS pumps RUNNING,

Any SI aIam LT IM-$D1.

5. PERFORM ES-O.5, Equipment BOP Verifications WHILE continuing in this procedure.

Continue with the performance of E-O REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY SRO/ATC INJECTION BOP Performs ES-O.5, Equipment Verifications go to page 56 for details SRD Addresses foldout page, see next page for details.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 48 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip!ATWS FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA iF any of the following conditions occurs:

RCS pressure less than 1250 psig AND at least one CCP or SI pump running OR a Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs, EVENT DIAGNOSTICS

IF any 510 pressure is dropping uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:

a CLOSE MSIVS and MSIV bypass valves.

b. IF any SIG pressure continues to drop uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the fOllowing:

1) ENSURE SI actuated

2) IF at least one 510 is intact (510 pressure controlled or rising),

THEN ISOLATE AFW to faulted 510(s):

a CLOSE AFW level control valves for faulted 5/0(s)

IF any AFW valve for faulted S/C CANNOT be CLOSED, THEN PERFORM Appendix E, lsolating AFW to Faulted 510.

3) ENSURE at least one of the following conditions met:

total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm OR

Narrow Range level greater Than 10% 25% ADV} in at least one intact 510,

IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO EOA-O.0, Loss of All AC Power.

TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS

IF CST level less than 5°!o, THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW.

IF RWST level less than 27%, THEN GO TO ES-i .3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 6 Page 49 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior APPENDIX E ISOLATING AFW TO RUPTURED SIG IF motor-driven AFW LCV br ruptured SIG CANNOT be dosed.

ATC/BOP THEN PERFORM the following:

a. F at least one other AFW pump is available, THEN PLACE affected MD AFW pump in PULL TO LOCK CRITICAL Places HS-1-4A, HS-1-11A, HS-1-22A, HS-1-29A Main Steam Isol CLOSE.

TASK ATC/BOP Places HS-3-1 72A, SG-3 Turbine AFP LCV to CLOSE Places HS-3-128A 1 B-B AFW Pump to STOP.

6. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink available.

a. CHECK total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm.

b. CHECK narrow range level b. MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 10% [25% ADVI greater than 440 gpm ATC in at least one 81G. UNTIL narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADV]

in at least one SIG.

c. CONTROL feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%

in intact or ruptured S/Gs.

Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm ATC/BQP until SIG are greater than 10% NR.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 50 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip!ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. CHECK if main steam lines should be isolated:

a. CHECK if any of the following conditions have occurred:

. Any SIG pressure less than 00 psig OR

Any S/G pressure dropping ATC UNCONTROLLED OR

Phase B actuation.

b. ENSURE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves CLOSED.

c. ENSURE applicable Foldout Page actions COMPLETED.

CRITICAL If not already performed:

TASK ATC/BOP Places HS1-4A, HS-1-11A ,HS-1-22A ,& HS-1-29A Main Steam Isol CLOSE.

8. CHECK RCP trip criteria.

a. CHECK the following:

RCS pressure less than 1250 psig ATC AND

At least one COP OR SI pump RUNNING.

b. STOP RCPs.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 51 of 62 Event

Description:

RCP Trip/ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. MONITOR RCS temperatures: IF temperature less than 547°F and dropping.

. IF any RCP running. THEN THEN PERFORM the following:

CHECK T-avg stable at or trending to between 547°F and 552°F. a. ENSURE steam dumps and atmospheric reliefs CLOSED.

OR

b. IF cooldown continues.

. IF RCPs stopped. THEN THEN CONTROL total feed flow:

CHECKTcoId stable at or trending ATC/BOP 1) ENSURE total AFW flow

- less than or equal to 600 gpm.

2) MAINTAIN total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL narrow range level is greater than 10% [25% ADVI in at least one S/G.

c. IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

ATC/BOP Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm and less than 600 gpm until SIG are greater than 10% NR,

10. CHECK pressurizer PORV5, safeties, and spray valves:

a. Pressurizer PORVs CLoSED.

b. Pressurizer safety valves CLOSED.

ATC c. Normal spray valves CLOSED.

d. Power to at least one block valve AVAILABLE.

e. At least one block valve OPEN.

11. DETERMINE if SJG secondary pressure PERFORM the following:

boundaries are INTACT:

a. MONITOR status trees

CHECK all SIG pressures ATC CONTROLLED or RISING. b. GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

CHECK all SIG pressures greater than 140 psig SRO Transitions to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 7,8,9 Page 52 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Leak to Break 0/S Containment Upstream #3 MSIV, MSIVs & #3 SG MDAFWP Level Control Vlv fails open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, insert Event 7 MS Leak Outside Containment Loop #3 -

upstream of MSIV.

Indications available:

Indications/Alarms Annunciator:

. 1-M-4-D, F-1 STEAM LINE LO PRESS SI REACTOR TRIP Indications:

1-M-4

. All S/G Pressures Dropping uncontrolled Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION Unisolating a faulted SIG or secondary break should NOT be considered UNLESS needed for RCS cooldown.

1. CHECK MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves CLOSE valves CLOSED.

IF any MSIV OR MSIV bypass valve CANNOT be closed, THEN CLOSE valve USING EA- 1-I, Closing

.ISIVs Locally CRITICAL Places HS-1-4A, HS-1-11A, HS-1-22A, HS-1-29A Main Steam Isol BOP TASK CLOSE if not already done

2. CHECK ANY S1G secondary pressure bcundary INTACT BOP a Any S/G pressure CONTROLLED or RISING,

3. IDENTIFY Faulted S/G(s):

a. CHECK S!G pressures:

Any SIG pressure DROPPING SRO in an unntrolle manner.

OR

Any S1G pressure Less than 140 psig.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event# 7,8,9 Page 53 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Leak to Break 0/S Containment Upstream #3 MSIV, MSIVs & #3 SG MDAFWP Level Control Vlv fails open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS

Secondary heat sinl requires at least one SIG available.

It the TD AFW pump is the only source of feed flow, isolating both steam supplies will result in loss of secondary heat sink.

4. ISOLATE Faulted SIG(s):

a. ENSURE MFW isolated to faulted SIG(s) by any of the following:

BOP

feedwater isolation valve CLOSED [M-4]

OR

feedwater regulating valve and bypass valve CLOSED [M-31.

b. ENSURE AFW isolated to taulte S/G(s):

BOP a CLOSE MDAFWLV

CLOSE TD AFW LCV and PLACE in PULL TO LOCK CRITICAL Places HS-3-1 72A, SG-3 Turbine AFP LCV to CLOSE PTL, if not already TASK BOP done.

I Places HS-3-1 28A 1 B-B AFW Pump to STOP if not already done.

c. CHECK SIG #1 or #4 rau1te1. c. GO TO Substep 4.e.

BOP 4 e. VERIFY SIG blowdown valves CLOSED.

BOP

f. VERIFY abTospheric relief CLOSED.

BOP 5. CHECK CST level greater than 5%.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 7,8,9 Page 54 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Leak to Break 0/S Containment Upstream #3 MSIV, MSIVs & #3 SG MDAFWP Level Control Vlv fails open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. VERIFY secondar radiation NORMAL:

a. CHECK secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors.

(App. A also contained in ES-0.5)

b. NOTIFY Chem Lab to take SfG activity samples.

c. WHEN Chem Lab is ready to sample SIGs, THEN BOP PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE FCV-1 5-43 Blowdown Flow Control valve CLOSED,

2) ENSURE Phase A signal RESET,

3) OPEN biowdown isolation valves.

d. NOTIFY RADCON to survey main steam lines and SIG blowciown.

e. WHEN S!G samples completed, THEN CLOSE blowdown isolation valves.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 4 Event # 7,8,9 Page 55 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Leak to Break 0/S Containment Upstream #3 MSIV, MSIVs & #3 SG MDAFWP Level Control VIv fails open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T CHECK SI termination criteria:

a RcS subcooling based on core ext T/CS greater than 40T.

b. Secondary heat sink:

Narrow range level in at least one Intact SIG greater than 10% [25% ADVI OR BOP

Total teed flow to Intact SIGs greater than 440 gprn.

c. RGS pressure stable or rising

d. Pressurizer level greater than 10% [20% ADVJ.

e. GO TO ESi .1, SI Termination Lead Examiner may terminate the scenario at E-2 Step 7.e, SI Termination criteria determination.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2010302 Scenario # 7 Event # ES-0.5 Page 56 of 62 Event

Description:

Equipment verifications Time Position IL Applicants Actions or Behavior ES-O.5 Actions BOP 1. VERIFY DIGS RUNNING.

BOP 2. VERIFY DiG ERCW supply valves OPEN.

BOP 3. VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.

4. VERIFY CCs pumps RUNNING:

Pump IA-A (2A-A)

BOP

Pump 1 B-B (28-B)

Pump C-S.

BOP 5. VERIFY EGTS tans RUNNING.

BOP 6. VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.

7. NOTIFY at least two AUOS to report BOP to MCR to be available for local actions.

3. VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:

a. MD AFW pumps BOP

b. TD AFW pump.

NOTE AEW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been taken to control S/G levels, to establish flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted SIG.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2010302 Scenario # 7 Event # ES-0.5 Page 57 of 62 Event

Description:

Equipment verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 9 CHECK AFW valve alignment:

a. VERIFY MD AFW LCVs in AUTO.

BOP b. VERIFY TD AFW LCVS OPEN

c. VERIFY MD AFW pump recirculation valves FCV-3-400 and FCV-3-401 CLOSED, 10, VERIFY MFW Isolation:

a. CHECK MFW pumps TRiPPED.

b. ENsUREthefollowing:

BOP

MFW regulating valves CLOSED

MFW regulating bypass valve controllers in MANUAL with output ZERO

MFW isolation valves CLOSED.

ii. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING:

CCPs

RHRpurnps BOP

Sipumps

b. VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.

c CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig

d. VERIFY SI pump flow.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2010302 Scenario # 7 Event # ES-0.5 Page 58 of 62 Event

Description:

Equipment verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

e. CHECK RCS pressure e. GO TO Step 12 less than 300 pslg.

f. VERIFY RHR pump flow.

12. VERIFY ESF systems AliGNED:

a. Phase A ACTUATED:

PHASE A TRAIN A alarm UT

[M-6C, 851.

PHASE A TRAIN B alarm LIT

[M-6C, 86]

b Cntmt Vent Isolation ACTUATED:

CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-GC, C5J.

CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, C6].

c. Status monitor panels:

BOP

6CDARK 6DDARK

6E LIT OUTSIDE outlined area

6HDARK

6J LIT

d. Train A status panel 6K:

CNTMT VENT GREEN

PHASEAGREEN

e. Train B status panel 6L:

CNTMT VENT GREEN

PHASEA GREEN

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2010302 Scenario # 7 Event # ES-O.5 Page 59 of 62 Event

Description:

Equipment verifications Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. MONITOR for containment spray and Phase B actuation:

a. CHECK for any of the following:

Phase B ACTUATED OR

Containment pressure greater than 2.8 psig.

b. VERIFY containment spray INITIATED:

1) Containment spray pumps RUNNING.

2) Containment spray header isolation valves FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2 OPEN.

3) Containment spray recirculation valves to RWST FCV-72-34 BOP and FCV-72-13 CLOSED.

4) Containment spray header flow greater than 4750 gpm per train.

5) Panel 6E LIT.

c. VERIFY Phase B ACTUATED:

PHASE B TRAIN A alarm LIT

[M-6C, A5].

PHASE B TRAIN B alarm LIT

[M-6C. A6],

d. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.

e. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:

Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN.

Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN.

f. WHEN 10 minutes have elapsed, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: NRC 2010302 Scenario # 7 Event # ES-0.5 Page 60 of 62 Event

Description:

Equipment verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE The continuous action in Step 14 remains applicable if containment pressure rises above 1.5 psig after ES-05 is completed.

14 MONITOR if containment vacuum relief isolation valves should be closecl BOP a. CHECK containment pressure a. GO TO Step 15.

greater than 1.5 psig.

15, CHECK secondary and containmept rad monitors USING the following:

BOP

Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitors

Appendix B, Containment Rad Monitois.

APPENDIX A SECONDARY RAD MONITORS

1. IF SI occurred on Unit 1.

THEN CHECK following rad monitors including avaIlable trends prior to isolation:

Condenser exhaust recorder 1-RR-90-1 19

SIG blowdown recorder i-RR-90-120

urni I Main steam line Fad monitors [1-M-301 Post-Accident rad recorder 1 -RR-90-2688 points 3 (blue), 4 (violet), 5 (black), and 6 (turquoise).

[1 -M-31 (back of I -M-30)1

3. NOTIFY Unit Supervisor whether secondary radiation is NORMAL or HIGH.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2010302 Scenario # 7 Event # ES-0.5 Page 61 of 62 Event

Description:

Equipment verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior APPENDIX B CONTAINMENT RAD MONITORS i, IF SI occurred on Unit 1.

THEN CHECK following rad monitors:

BOP a Upper containment post-accident rad monitors 1-RM-90-27TA and i-RM-90-272A NORMAL [1-M-301 a Lower containment post-accident rad monitors 1-RM-90-273A and i-RM-90-274A NORMAL [1-M-30]

a Containment rad recorders 1-RR-90-i 12 and i-RR-90-i06 NORMAL [0-M- 12] (prior to isolation)

16. WHEN directed by E-0,

, THEN BP PERFORM Appendix D, Hydrogen Mitigation Actions.

17. CHECK pocket sump pumps STOPPED:

{M-15, upper left comerj a HS-77-41Q, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and BOP Equipment Drain Sump pump A

HS-77-4i 1, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump 8

18. DISPATCH personnel to perform BOP EA0-1, Equipment Checks Following ESF Actuation.

19 ENSURE plant announcement has been BOP made regarding Reactor Trip and SL

20. PERFORM Appendix E. Spent Fuel BOP cooling Actions, as time permits.

END OF TEXT

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2010302 Scenario # 7 Event # Critical Task(s) Page 62 of 62 Event

Description:

Critical Task Listing Critical Tasks: Critical Task Statement

1. Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before completing the immediate-action steps of FR-S.1:

. Direct de-energizing the control rod drive MG sets

Insert RCCAs

Establish emergency boration flow to the RCS

2. Isolate AFW flow to the Faulted SG prior to completing E-2 step 4.

3. Manually close MSIVs prior to the completion E-2.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Facility: Sequoyah Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: 2012-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 1, 100% power, MOL Turnover: Maintain current conditions; currently in 0-GO-5 Section 5.2, At Power Conditions Target CTs: Isolate AEW Flow to #4 Steam Generator Prior to completing E-2 step 4.

Manually start the 1 A-A or 1 B-B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed pumps and establish the minimum required AFW f low rate to the SGs before transition out of E-0.

Event No. MaIf. No. Event Type* Event Description

1. RXO2D1 l-ATC/SRO The Loop #4 T-cold instrument will fail high. The ATC will place rod control in TS-SRO manual using Immediate Operator Actions and AOP-l.02. The SRO will address Tech Spec and determines the instrument is INOPERABLE.

2. CC1 1 A C-BOP/SRO The 1 A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump breaker trips and the 1 B Thermal Barrier set yp cc2l b Booster Pump fails to AUTO Start. The BOP manually starts the 1 B Thermal

-1 [pre-insert] Barrier Booster Pump using the ARP.

3. CV25B l-ATC/SRO Letdown backpressure transmitter PT-62-81 fails high, the ATC places HIC 81 in MANUAL and controls letdown backpressure using the ARP.

4. RX16C TS-SRO Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low, the crew will enter AOP 1.06.

The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines the instrument is INOPERABLE.

5. CNO9 C-BOP/SRO Main Condenser Vacuum degrades with the standby Condenser Vacuum Pump CN1 1 B failing to start automatically. The BOP manually starts the standby Condenser Vacuum Pump using AOP-S.02.

6. N/A R-ATC The crew reduces plant power using AOP-C.03 due to Condenser Vacuum N- BOP/SRO Leak.

7. EDO1 M-All A loss of offsite AC power occurs causing a reactor trip. The crew will respond to the trip using E-0. The crew may subsequently address the loss of offsite power using AOP-P.01, Loss of Offsite Power.

8. IMF FWO9C C-BOP Both motor driven Auxiliary Feed pumps fail to AUTO start and the turbine IMF FWO7C driven Auxiliary Feed trips on overspeed. The BOP manually starts a Motor

. Driven Auxiliary Feed pumps and establish the minimum required AFW flow rate

[pre-insert]

to the SGs.

9. FW 23D M-AIl The #4 S/G will experience a feed line break inside the containment. The crew will initially transition to E-2, Faulted SG Isolation, to stabilize the plant by isolating AFW to the #4 S/G and ultimately transition to E-1, Loss of Rx or Secondary Coolant, to determine if SI termination criteria is met.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Attachment 1 2012-301 Scenario 5 Summary EVENT 1 Following turnover when directed by the lead examiner, the Loop #4 T-cold instrument will fail high. The ATC will place rod control to manual using Immediate Operator Actions. Additionally, the ATC will remove the affected instrument from service using AOP-l.02, RCS Loop RTD Instrument Malfunction.

The crew may enter AOR-C.01, for the unexpected rod motion. The SRO will determine entry in to LCO actions: 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3-1, functional units 7 and 8 Action 6, and 14c Action 10, 3.3.2.1, functional units 6.c.i.c and 6.c.ii.c both Action 37 are required.

EVENT 2 When directed by the lead examiner, the 1 A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump breaker trips and the 1 B Thermal Barrier Booster Pump fails to AUTO Start. The BOP manually starts the 1 B Thermal Barrier Booster Pump using the ARP.

EVENT 3 When directed by the lead examiner, Letdown backpressure transmitter PT-62-81 fails high, the ATC places HIC-62-81 in MANUAL and controls letdown backpressure using the ARP.

EVENT 4 Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low, the SRO will enter AOP 1.06. The SRO will address Tech Specs and determines the instrument is INOPERABLE and enter LCO 3.3.1 .1, 3.3.2.1, 3,3,3,7,10 and 3.3.5.7.

EVENT 5 When directed by the lead examiner Main Condenser Vacuum degrades with the standby Condenser Vacuum Pump failing to start automatically. The BOP manually starts the standby Condenser Vacuum Pump using AOP-S.02.

EVENT 6 The crew reduces plant power using AOP-C.03 due to Condenser Vacuum Leak.

EVENT 7 When directed by the lead examiner, loss of offsite AC power occurs. The crew will respond to the trip using E-0. The crew may subsequently address the loss of offsite power using AOP-P.01, Loss of Offsite Power.

EVENT 8 Both motor driven Auxiliary Feed pumps fail to AUTO start and the turbine driven Auxiliary Feed trips on overspeed. The BOP manually a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed pumps and establish the minimum required AFW flow rate to the SGs.

EVENT 9 The #4 S/G will experience a feed line break inside the containment. The crew will initially transition to E-2, Faulted SG Isolation, to stabilize the plant by isolating AFW to the #4 S/G and ultimately transition to E-1, Loss of Rx or Secondary Coolant, to determine if SI termination criteria is met.

EOP flow: E-0, E-2, El, FR-Z.1, FR-P.1 (possible)

The scenario terminates as directed by the Lead Examiner upon completion of S/G #4 isolation in E-2.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 1 of 61 Event

Description:

AC Loop #4 T-cold instrument fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor: When directed, initiate Event 1, RC Loop #4 T-cold Fails High Indications available:

Annunciators:

M-5

. 1 -XA-55-5A A-6 TS-68-2M/N RC LOOPS T AVG IAUCT T AVG DEVN HIGH-LOW

. 1 -XA-55-5A B-6 TS-68-2AIB REACTOR COOLANT LOOPStT DEVN HIGH-LOW

. 1-XA-55-5A B-6 TS-68-2P!Q REAC COOL LOOPS T REF T AUCT HIGH-LOW

. 1-XA-55-5A E-7 NARROW RANGE RTD FAILURE LOOP 4 1-M-5 indications:

. RCS Lp 4 Indicator, 1-TI-68-67E goes up;

. 1-Tl-68-67D: goes down

. 1-Tl-68-67B: goes down

. 1-XX-55-5, Reactor Trip Status Panel PROT. SET 4 TROUBLE Status light TS-68-2MIN RC LOOPS T AUG

!AIJCT T AVG DEVN HIGH-LOW

[1] CHECK 1-XX-55-5, Trip status panel fcc any bistables that may be lit, AND EVAUJATE Reactor Thp odteria with SRO by omparision with redundant instrumentation.

[2] IF reactor trips, THEN GO TO E-0. Reactor Trip or Safety Jnjectior

[31 IF Tavg channel failed, ThEN GO TO AOP-l.02, RCS LOOP RTD INSTRUMENT LFUNCTION.

[4] IF rod contrd systems malfunctithng, TI-lEN GO TO AOP-CD1, Rod Control System Malfunction&

ATC Responds to ARP 1-AR-M-5A A-6.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Takes Immediate action to place HS-85-5110 ROD CONTROL MODE ATC SELECTOR in MANUAL.

SRO Transitions to AOP-C.O1 Rod Control System Malfunctions

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 2 of 61 Event

Description:

RC Loop #4 T-cold instrument fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DIAGNOSE the failure:

GOTO IF... SECTION PAGE Uncontrolled rod bank movement (rod movement NOT due to actual T-avg/T-ref mismatch 2 1 4 or change in reactor/turbine power)

NOTE: Step 1 is an immediate action step I. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a. PLACE rod control in MAN.

ATC b CHECK rod motion STOPPED.

Places HS-85-51 10 ROD CONTROL MODE SELECTOR in MANUAL if not ATC already done.

CAUTION: Control Rods should NOT be manually withdrawn during a plant transient.

2. CHECK for plant transient:

ATC a. CHECK reactor power and T-avg STABLE.

3 CHECK for instmmentation malfunction:

a CHECK all Vital Ins-ument Power Boards ENERGIZED:

a VITAL POWER BOARD UV OR BREAKER TRIP alarms [M-i C windows A-7, B-7, C-7, and D-Tj DARK ATC b CHECK nuclear instrumentation OPERABLE.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 20i?-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 3 of 61 Event

Description:

AC Loop #4 T-cold instrument fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior C. CHECK RCS RTDs OPERABLE. c. GO TO AOP-[ 02, RCS Loop RTD ATC instrument Malfunction.

CAUTION: Control rods should NOT be manually withdrawn during a plant transient.

NOTE: Tavg must be within leF of Tref when restoring automatic. rod control.

SRO Transitions to AOP-L02 RCS LOOP RTD INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTION ATC 1 PLACE rod control in IANIJAL Places HS-85-51 10 ROD CONTROL MODE SELECTOR in MANUAL, if not ATC already done.

2. RESTORE Tavg as necessary U SING one of the following:

a manual rod Co trol ATC OR

RCS borationidiLution OR

turbine oad reducton Places HS-85-51 11 Rod Control to OUT as directed by the SRO to restore ATC RCS temperature within 1.5 deg F of TREF.

1 CHECK loop 1 temperature channel ATC OPERABLE ATC 4. CHECK loop 2 temperature channel OPERABLE CHECK loop 3 temperature channel AT

. OPERABLE.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 4 of 61 Event

Description:

RC Loop #4 T-cold instrument fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 6 CHECK loop 4 temperature ctannel PERFORM the following; OPERABLE.

a. PULL-TO-DEFEAT TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT switch XS-68-2M to LOOP 4 ATC b PULL-TO-DEFEAT AT CHANNEL DEFEAT switch XS-68-2D to LOOP 4 C. PLACE LOOP TAVG AT REGIS EL switch XS68-2B in LOOP 1 2, or 3 Places switch XS-68-2M in LOOP 4 and PULL-TO-DEFEAT TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT ATC Places switch XS-68-2D to LOOP 4 and PULL-TO-DEFEAT AT CHANNEL DEFEAT Places LOOP TAVG-AT REC/SEL switch XS-68-2B in LOOP 1, 2, or 3

7. EVALUATE the foUowing Tech Specs for appilcability:

. 3311 (33.i), Reactor Tiip System SRO Instrumentation

. 33.2 1 (3.2), Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 5 of 61 Event

Description:

RC Loop #4 T-cod instrument fais high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip symem instrumentation chanreis and irrtericxts of Taste 3.2-I shall he OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTtON As shown in TabIe3.3-1.

7. Ovettemperature T Fcur S Loop Operacon

3. 3ierpoweTFourLcop Opation ACTiON 8- With the number of OPERABLE ohannels one less than the Tot Numberof Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed prorided the tb/lowing conditions are satisfIed:

a. The inoperable chatumel is placed the tripped ccn6ticn within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

4. IRan Steam C3eneramor Water LevelLow-Low C, RCSLoopT 4 (1/loopl 1,2 10 ACTION 10- W$h the number of OPERABLE chamnels one Ies than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP ar/or POWER OPERAI1ON may proceed provided that within 8 i-ours, far the affected protection seL the Thp TIme Delays 1T and T j threshod power level for Iwo seconds 5

tine delay is adjusted to 0t. RTP.

SRO LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) ins/rumentation chareels arid interiocs shmnn in Table 33-3 shall tie OPERABLE with their tr seoints set consistent wilt the values ihewn in the Nominal Thp SeIpoint column ofTable 3.3-4.

APPLICABILiTY: As snosm in Table 3.3-S.

ACTION:

a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock yip setpont less conservative than the value shcem in the unable Viues column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel moperable and apy the apØlost/e ACTION requirement f Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored 10 OPERABLE status with the trip seoinr adusted consistent wilt the Nonsnal Trip Seipoirit value.

8. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER cc Main Slim Sen.

Water LvelLow-Low

i. Start Motor-Driven Pumps

c. ROE Lc.oo3T 4(I:Iccpj 2 3 1.2.3 Start Twbine Dtiven Pump c, ROE Loop iT 3 1,2,! 37

Appendix D Scenario Outline Attachment 1 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 6 of 61 Event

Description:

RC Loop #4 T-cold instrument fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ACThO4 37 - W4h the number of CPERABLE dimels one eas than the Total Nunberof Ctannels. STARTUP andtcr POWER OPERAJJON may rooeed r.roved that wthri 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . toy the afteced prceofcn set the Tr Tin Delays ad T) thresho powedevel rzeft seccoos tme delay a adjusted to C RTP.

SRO Enters LCO 3.3.1.1 Action 6 and Action 10 and enters LCO 3.3.2.1 Action 37 NOTE: If performing AOP in conjunction with AOP-I. ii for an Eagle LCP failure, then actions to hard trip bistables should be delayed until Eagle system reset is atternptect Actions to hard trip bistab[es must be completed within S hours UNLESS affected loop is restored to operable status by resetting Eagle rack.

8. NOT1Y l&C to remove failed TAVG AT loop from service USING appropriate Appendix:

INSTRUMENT RCS LOOP pzo rIIT APPENDIX NUMBER T-68-2 I A (T-41 1/412) 2 T-68-25 II B (T.-421/422)

. 3 T-68-44 Ill C (T-431/432) 4 T-68-67 IV 0 (T-441/442)

9. IF automatic rod control IS available, THEN RESTORE rod control to AUTO USING 0-SO 85- I ATC Places HS-85-5110 ROD CONTROL MODE SELECTOR in AUTO.

10. GO TO appropriate plant procedure END OF SECTION Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue next event when Technical Specifications are addressed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 7 of 61 Event

Description:

1 A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump breaker trips with a Failure of the 1 B Thermal Barrier Booster Pump to Auto Start Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor: When directed, initiate Event 2, 1 A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump Trip Indications available:

O-M-27-B-A Annunciators:

O-XA-27-B-A Window B-i: RC PUMPS THRM BARRIER RETURN HEADER FLOW LOW

. O-XA-27-B-A Window B-2: RC PUMP 1 BARRIER Outlet FLOW LOW

. O-XA-27-B-A Window 8-3: RC PUMP 2 BARRIER Outlet FLOW LOW

O-XA-27-B-A Window B-4: RC PUMP 3 BARRIER Outlet FLOW LOW

. O-XA-27-B-A Window 8-5: RC PUMP 4 BARRIER Outlet FLOW LOW RC PUMPS T[tRM BARRIER RETURN HEADER FLOW LOW

[11 CHECK CCS thermal harder return header flow by bseMng

[i-F1-70-81A1.

[2] IF pressure on CCS dictates. THEN

[a] START standby CCS pump.

[b] VERIFY CCS thermal banter booster pumps operathig

[3] IF 0-)A-55-12A Wndow 8-1 1-RA-90-i23A CCS UQ EFF MON HIGH RACY is alarming, THEN REFER to 0-AR-M12-A. [C.1i

[4] VERIFY CCS thermal harder isolation wthes 1-FCV-70-90, i-FCV-7O-133, i-FCV-70-37, and 1-FCV-70-134 are OPEN.

[al IF CCS to CP thermal banter coc4ing coils has isolated.

ThEN ENSURE UnIt I CCS thermal harder booster pump handswitches are in the stop PULL TO LOCK position AND GO TO AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water for a loss of Component Cooling Thermal Banter Booster Pump(s),

CA]

BOP Responds to ARP O-AR-M278-A B-i.

F

. rator.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

SRO Transitions to AOP-M.03 Loss Of Component Cooling Water section 2.2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event# 2 Page 8 of 61 Event

Description:

1 A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump breaker trips with a Failure of the 1 B Thermal Barrier Booster Pump to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DIAGNOSE the failure:

F GO TO SECTION PAGE CCS Thermal Barrier Booster Pump trfp or failure 22 13 NOTE If RCP seal injection flow is lost concurrently with loss of thermal barrier cooling.

then AOP-M.09 (Loss o Charging) takes precedence over AOP-M 03.

I IDENTIFY and LOCK OUT affected Thermal BOP Bamer Bocster Pump BOP Places HS-70-131 A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump lA-A to STOP PTL.

2 CHECK Thermal Barrier Isolation valves 0 P EN

FCV 70-87 BOP

FCV-70-90

FCV-70-133

FCV 134

3, ENSURE standby Thermal Barner Booster BOP Pump starts.

Places HS-70-l 30A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 1 B-B to START it not SOP already done.

4 ENSURE proper RCP seal ject on

Flow between 8 g*pm and 13 gpm BOP

VCT outlet temperature less than or equal to 130T

5. MONITOR RCP Seal and Lower Bearing BOP temperatures less than or equal to 225CF.

Aøøendix D Reauired Ooerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 9 of 61 Event

Description:

1 A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump breaker trips with a Failure of the 1 B Thermal Barrier Booster Pump to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. MONITOR GCS radiation levels STABLE or DROPPING:

BOP

RA9Q123A, CCS Liquid Effluent Monitor

Chemistiy Sample T NOTIFY SM to eiialuate OPDP-9, Emergent Issue Response SRO 8 INITIATE Maintenance as required CAUTION Automatic isolation of the thermal barrier can be caused by a heat exchanger tube leak. Realignment of the thermal barrier may cause additional leakage.

9. CHECK thermal barrier cool[ng in service BOP to affected unit

10. GO TO appropriate plant procedure SRO END OF SECTION Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Evaluator Note: Proceed to the next event when ready

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 10 of 61 Event

Description:

CVCS Letdown Pressure Control Valve Fails Closed (1-PCV-62-81)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor: When directed, initiate Event 3 Letdown backpressure transmitter PT-62-81 fails high.

Indications available:

Annunciator:

1-M-6

1-XA-55-6C B-4 FS-62-82 LOW PRESS LTDN FLOW HIGH PRESSURE HIGH Indicator:

1-Fl-62-82 indicates 70-75 gpm [M-6]

1-PI-62-81 indicates pressure rising from 325 to 500-550 psig [M-6]

FS-i2-82 LOW PRESS LTDN FLOW HIGH PRESSURE NIGH

[1) CHECK CRT SER point number to detemiine flow or pressure high

[2] CHECK letdown flow [1 -Fl-62.-82] and letdown pressure

[1 P1.&2.81] on M-6.

[3] IF RHR not inserice, THEN ADJUST fl-PC1-62-811 USING I1-I-UC432-81A1 and/or orifice isolation valves to control pressure and flow(Max. 120 gpni)

[4] IF RHR letdown insevice, THEN ADJUST [l-FCV-62.83] USING [i-HIC-62-33A] and 1i-PCV-&2-811 USING [1-HIC-62-BIAI to control etdown pressure and flow (Max. 120 gprn).

[5] If solid water operations in progress, THEN ADJUST ietdown and/or charging to control pressure.

[6] IF 11-PCV-62-811 FAILED, THEN EVALUATE bypassing USING 1-50-62-1 -

[7] IF Unit SRO deems it necessary, THEN

[a]: REMOVE nonnal letdown from serice in accordance wtth 1 -SO-62-1, Chemical and Volume Conbtil System

[bI PLACE excess letdown in service in accordance 4th 1-50-62-6, &cess Letdown.

[8] RESTORE cordticns to normal as soon as possible.

ATC Responds to ARP 1 -AR-M6C B-4.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 11 of 61 Event

Description:

CVCS Letdown Pressure Control Valve Fails Closed (1 -PCV-62-81)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Annunciator 1-XA-55-6C, D-3, FS-62-93A/B CHARGING LINE FLOW ABNORMAL is an expected continuous alarm condition (setpoint: 55 gpm;).

The ATC should re-establish/maintain 6-10 gpm/RCP stable supply flow conditions.

Annunciators 1-XA-55-5B, A-3, B-3, C-3, D-3 FS-62-XX REAC COOL PMPS SEAL LEAKOFF LOW FLOW may be actuated during transient conditions; operator response is to clear the condition.

Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue the next event when letdown flow is controlled manually by the ATC.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 12 of 61 Event

Description:

Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor: When directed, initiate Event 4 Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low.

Indications available:

Annunciator:

1-M-6

1-XA-55-6B C-i LS-3-940 STM GEN LOOP 3 LOW FW FLOW LOW WATER LEVEL.

. 1-XA-55-6B C-4 LS-3-93B STM GEN LOOP 3 LOW LOW WATER LEVEL.

Indicator:

i-Ll-3-94 indicates 0% gpm [M-4]

LS-3-93B STEAM GENERATOR LOOP 3 LOW LOW WATER LEVEL

[ii CHECK steam generator level, indicaons [14-1-3-971, 1-L1-3-941 and [1-L1-3-931.

[21 IF level channel failed, ThEN GO TO AOP-106, &earn Generator Instrument Malfunction.

ATC Responds to ARP 1 -AR-M6B C-4 Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

I c A r r DIAGNOSE the failure:

GOTO iF... SECTION PAGE S1G level instrument malfunction 22 8

1. VERIFY DCS is maintaining BOP S/G level on program.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 13 of 61 Event

Description:

Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for applicability:

a 3.3.1:1(3.3.1), Reactor Trip System I nstn.imentation

. 3.32.1 (3.3.2), Engineered Safety SRO Feature Actuation System Instrumentation a 3.33,5, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation

. 3,3.3.7, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation LRIITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 33.11 Ass minimum. the reactor thp system strumentat chanes and interlocks of Tabie 3.3-f shaH be OPERABLE.

APPUCABIUTY: As shown in Tthle 3.3-i.

ACTON A shown i Table 3.3-1.

14. Ma Steam Generator Water Ls-Low-Low A. Steam Generator Water 3-Slim Own. 2iStm, Sen. 2131m, Own, I2 9 ieveHLow-Low i any in each Advere) ooeratng Operating Sim. Sen 35w Sen.

SRO Ste.smGeneratorWsler 3-Strit Own. 2Strn.Gen. 2Stin.Gen. 12 9 LevelLow-Ljow EAM) h any in each ooeng operating Slim Sen. . Sen.

ACTION 9- W. the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tot fumberof Channels, STARTUP sndkc POWER OPERATION may proceed prc?ided the foilowing cohailions are satisfec:

a. The inoperable channel h placed tt the tripned ccntiilion wittilt hours,

b. For the affected protection set, the Thp TIme Delay for one affected steam generator {T s adlusted 10 match the Thp fine Delay for ntkpe affedted steam generars (T within 4 hocra.

c. The Mtimum Channels OPERABLE requirement s net howwer, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for sureilIance testh of other charn&s per Spetifoatton 4.3,1.1.1.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 14 of 61 Event

Description:

Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safely F ture Actuation Systwn (ESFAS) in mlon channels and interlocks shown in Table 33-3 haII be OPERABLE with their trp seoints 55rt Lstentwth the values choen in the Nominal Thp Setpoint column of Table 3.34.

APPLICABILITY: As snown in TIe 3.3-3.

ACTION:

a. With an ESFAS instrumentabon channel or interlock trip setpoinl less conservatIve than the walue shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.34, dedsie the channel operable and apØy the applicable ACTION requirement of TabAeS,3-3 until the channel is restored lo OPERABLE status with Ihe trip seoint adjusted consistent with the Nominal Ttip Selpoint walue,

b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock incoerable, take the ACTION shown h Table 3.3-3.

5. TURB4NE TRIP &

FSEOWATER ISOLATION

.3 Steam Generator 2Ioco 2ioooaiany 2Ioopnesch 1.2,3 .7 Water Level operating ioop operating loop High-High ACTION IT W.r*h the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP .artdfor POWER OPERATION may proceed proviced the following conditions e satisfied:

SRO 3. The inoperable channel i placed in the triored ccnd lion wthn S hours.

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements is met; however, the operable channel may be bypassed for up 1o4 hours for surveillance 1ehng Of:otherOhannelS per Specification 4.3.2.1.1

6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER

o. Main Sam Sen.

iater LevelLaw-Low

.Stt Moc-Drlven Pumps

a. Steam Generator 3-Sam 2Strn. C-en. 3-Sim. Sen.

Warer LevelLow- in any in eacn Law lAdversel operating operating Sam Sen. Sam Sen

b. Steam Sen 3iStm. Sen ZiStm, Sen. 3-Stm, Sen. 1,2,3 38 Water Level in any in each Low-Low EAM) operating operating St,ri. Sen. San. Sen.

c. Main San. Sen.

Water LevelLaw-Low ii. StartTurbineDrl-sen Pump

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 15 of 61 Event

Description:

Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Steam Generator 3Stm. Geri, 2Sfrn. Gen. 1Slm Den. 1,2, 3 36 Water LevelLow- n any in each Low (Adverse) operating c.perasng Stm.. Gen. Stm. Den

l. SteamOen 3tStm.Gen 2/Stm,Gen:. 123 36 Water Level in any in each Low-Low (EAMI operating operating Sto. Den. Stsn.. Den.

ACTION 36 - Wth the number of OPERABLE channels one less tri art the Totai Number of Channels, STARTUP anthor POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the fc1owig conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel Is placed In the tripced condItion wratin 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. For the aected orotecrion set, the ThpTln,e Delay for one affected steam enerator tT) is ad.rsted to match the Tr Time Delay for nnrltç& affected steam erterators (T) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

c. The MInimcrn Channels OPERABLE requirement Is meL however, the nnperabte channel may be b,passed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance teshog cf other channels per SpecifIcation 4.321.1.

8. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS

c. Steam Generator Level 3Soop 2lloop any ocp 31 1,2 22o P-14 loop ACTION 22 - Wth less than the MInImum Ncrnber of Channels OPERABLE, declare the interlock inoperle and verify that all affected channels of the funct,c*ss listed below are OPERABLE or apply the approprIate ACTION statecnent(s) for those ftnctions.

Functions to be evaluated are:

LIMITING CONDiTION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.7 The accident monitorIng Inatrumenration channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABIIJry: MODES 1,2 and 3.

ACTtON As shown in Table 3.3-10

10. Ste,ant Generator Level (Natrow Range) 21s,team Istearn (instnanent Loops 3-03042.-052.-056-0P4,- generator generator O7,-107,-t10)

SRO ACTION I-NOTE. AtsarefertotheappiioableactionrequirementsfronsTables3.3-1 and 3.3-3, and LCD 3J3.3.6 sine they may contaIn more restrictive actions,

3. With the number ofchannet.s one less than the minimum channels reputed,

-estore the inoperable thannel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY wthin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in I-tOT SHUTDOWN wchin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Ix With the number ofthannels two less than the minimum channels requIred, restore at least one incoerable Channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANOBY within the net8 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN wIthin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 16 of 61 Event

Description:

Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters LCO 3.3.1.1 Action 9.

F.

NOTE 1: Failure of ONE out of three narrow range level channels will result in DCS averaging the two remaining good signals.

NOTE 2: Failure ot TWO level channels on any SIG will result in associated loop MFW reg valve and bypass valve control transfening to MANUAL.

3. VERIFY failed channel bypassed IF DCS has NOT bypassed failed channel, for affected loop: ThEN PERFORM the following:

S1G # Detail screen on DCS indicates failed transmitter bypassed. a. SELECT S/G Level Overlay by clicking on Narrow Range Lever window on DCS Operator Display monitor for affected loop.

b. IDENTIFY level channel to be bypassed.

BOP c. SELECT appropriate MAINT BYP SIGNAL button.

d. CONFIRM MAINT BYP SIGNAL button changes from gray to red.

e. VERIFY appropriate narrow range level column has yellow BYP displayed.

f. IF affected SJG level control in AUTO.

THEN MONITOR feed flow arid 51(3 level.

NOTE: If perlorming AOP in COnjunction with AOP-I.1 I for Eagle LCP Vailure, then actions to hard trip bistables should be delayed until Eagle system reset is attempted.

Actions to hard trip bistables must be completed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months UNLESS affected loop is restored to operable status by resetting Eagle rack.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 17 of 61 Event

Description:

Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. NOTIFY I&C to remove tailed S/G level instrument rrom service USING appropriate Appendix:

S1G INSTRUMENT PROT APPENDIX NUMBER Cli L-3-38(L-519) II M 1 L-3-39 (L-518) III N L-3-42 (L-5 17; IV 0 L-351 (L-529) I P BOP 2 L-.3-52 (L-528) III 0 L-355 (L527) IV R L-3-93 (L-539) I S 3 L-3-94 (L538) III T L-3-97 (L-537) IV U L-3-106(L549) II V 4 L-3--107 (L-548) Ill W L-3-iiO(L-S47) IV X NOTE: I ,2-SO-98-i contains instructions for restoration of bypassed instrument loop when repairs are complete.

5, INITIATE maintenance on failed instrument.

BOP (3. CHECK affected loop SJG level control in AUTO.

7. GO TO appropriate plant procedure.

SRO END OF SECTION Crew Performs a Crew Brief as time allows.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event# 4 Page 18 of 61 Event

Description:

Steam Gen Level Transmitter, LT 3-94 Fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Crew Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Lead Examiner may cue the next event when Tech Specs have been addressed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event# 5 Page 19 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum with Cond Vac Pp auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor: When directed, initiate Event 5, Loss of Condenser Vacuum- Leak Indications available:

O-M-12A, A-4, 1-RA-90-99B COND VAC PMP LO RNG AIR EXH MON INSTR MALFUNC

. 1-M-1 Main Generator load decreasing.

. 1-AR-M2-C, C6, CONDENSER VACUUM LOW

Condenser Vacuum degrading (Monitored on recorder or ICS), Air in leakage increasing PS-2JB CONDENSER VACUUM LOW (1] VERIFY alarm via [ifTh2-2I recorder.

[2] VERIFY reuired number of CCW pumps are inseivice.

[1 CHECK condenser vacuum exhaust on 1CS using ther

a. iF2700A if i-FCV-2-255 is dosed b, 1 F2263A if I -FCV-2-2S5 is oçn.

[4] IF condenser vacuum exhaust ikiw >45 CEM, ThEN ENSURE I-FCV-2-255 OPEN.

[5] [F alarm is valid. THEN GO TO AOP-S02. Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

[6] WHEN vacuum and air inleakage are returned to normal, THEN ENSURE 1-FCV-2-255 CLOSED and in P-AUTO.

BOP Responds to ARP 1 -AR-M2B C-6 Examiner Note: If the crew initiates a manual (or auto) Main Turbine/Reactor trip go to Event 7, page 38.

Examiner Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this event guide.

Examiner Note: The crew may recognize vacuum leak early and enter abnormal procedure AOP-S.02, Loss Of Condenser Vacuum, prior to alarm.

Examiner Note: The standby Condenser Vacuum Pump will fail to start automatically; manual start is available and should be manually started in response to this event.

SRO Transitions to AOP-S.02, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 5 Event# 5 Page 20 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum with Cond Vac Pp auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION Turbine will trip automatically when condenser pressure reaches 3.9 to 5.4 psia.

NOTE: Highest lead rig operable c ndenser pressure instrument shculd be used 1, MONITOR condenser pressure for turbIne trip cnteria LC.1]

a CHECK tLIfb ne load greater BOP tlan or e ual to 30

b. CHECK condenser pressure less than or equal to 2 7 psia.

2. ENSURE all a ailable condenser BOP acuuni pumps RUNNING.

BOP Places HS-2-1 76A CONDR VAC Pump 1 B to START.

Examiner Note: Direct the Booth Operator to lower the Main Condenser vacuum malfunction when the vacuum pump has been started.

CAUTION:

I BOP

3. ENSURE condenser vacuum breaker CLOSED.

If CCW intake blockage has occurred resulting in pump cavitation (swinging amps) or loss of suction to CCW pumps, continued CCW pump operation could result in pump damage.

4. MONITOR CCW Pump operation:

a. CHECK for any of the following: a. GO TO Step 5

less than two CCW Pumps RUNNING on affecteI Unit. [M-i 51 BOP [C_i]

OR

. Indication of severe intake blockage resulting in cavitaton or imminent loss of CCW pump suchon.

5. CHECK turbine gland seal steam supply BOP pressure between 120 psig and 130 psig

[M-2, P1-47-1871.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 5 Event# 5 Page 21 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum with Cond Vac Pp auto start failure Time Position j Applicants Actions or Behavior

& CHECK HP steam seal steam supply BOP between 16 psia and 20 psia

[M-2, P1-47-189].

7. CHECK annunciator P18-47-196 TURBINE SEAL STEAM PRESS.

BOP ABNORMAL DARK. [M-2A, window A51,

8. DISPATCH an operator to perform the following:

a. CHECK loop seal on vacuum breaker [Turbine Bldg. 706 elev.

b. CHECK the following components:

. Main Turbine rupture discs intact BOP

Condenser shell intact

. Main Feedwater Pump rupture discs intact

. Main Turbine exhaust hoods

c. VERIFY Main Steam Dump Drain Tank level control operating properly.

9. CHECK main turbinefgenerator on line.

BOP

10. CHECK condenser pressure STASLE or REDUCE turbne load as necessary DROPPING. to maintain condenser vacuum USING one of the following:

. AOP-C03. Rapid Shutdown or Load BOP Reduction (preferred)

OR

. Valve Pos1tion Limiter.

SRO Transitions to AOP-C 03 Rapid Shutdown Or Load Reduction

11. ENSURE control rods controlling in ATC AUTO.

Examiner Note: Direct the Booth Operator to stabilize Main Condenser vacuum when the load reduction has commenced.

Lead Examiner may cue next event when the CREW has stabilized power and condenser vacuum.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 22 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: No action required for Event 6, Rapid Power reduction SRO Directs performance of AOP-C.03 Rapid Shutdown Or Load Reduction.

I - ENSURE crew has been briefed on reactivity SRO management expectations USING Appendix A.

REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT BRIEFING NOTE This appendix should be used in addition to event-based briet ti] ENSURE crew has been briefed on the following:

Reason for Rapid Shutdown or Load Reduction

Load Reduction Rate:________

Desired final power level:______

Reactivity Management expectations:

a Unit Supervisor shall concur with all reactivity manipulations

Ensure reactor responding as expected using diverse indications

Tavg-Tref Mismatch requirements:

3F control band

5F reactor trip criteria

Crew focus will be on reducing power in a controlled and conservative manner.

a OATC will monitor rod insertion limits and AFD limit a Boration source:

Crew will monitor reactor trip and turbine trip criteria using App B

CRC will stop secondary plant equipment using App C

If time permits, review expected annunciators (cx. Computer Alarm, Upper and Lower Flux Dcv)

Termination Criteria (conditions requiring Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, or condition no longer requiring rapid load reduction):

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 23 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Chooses a power reduction rate of 2% to 3% final power level of 20% and BAT SRO as the boration source

2. NOTIFY fclIowng personnel of rapid shutdown or load reduction.

. Load Coordinator tC.11 CREW

Chern strv

Radiation Protec on

Plant Management CREW Makes notifications as required.

3. MONITOR reactor/turbine fri p NOT required CREW USING Appendix B, Reactor and Turbine Thp Criteria.

Examiner note: Appendix B reactor and turbine trip criteria see page 27.

4 CHECK VALVE POSITION LIMIT light BOP DARK on EHC panel. [M-2]

NOTE: Boration volumes and flowrates listed in this procedure are recommendations and may be adjusted as necessary.

5. INITIATE boration:

a CHECK rod control AVAILABLE:

ATC

Control Bank D rods capable of being moved

NO dropped or misaligned rods in Control Bank 0.

5 b CHECK Control Bank 0 group position greater than 200 steps.

ATC c CHECK boration capability from BAT AVAILABLE

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 24 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I DETERMiNE recommended boration volume from BAT:

800 gal to reduce power from 100% to 20%

OR SRO

. 10 gal for each 1% power reduction (from current power level)

OR

volume recommended by Reactor Engineering Determines a value of boration consistent with 10 gal for each 1 % power SRQ reduction

5. e DETERMINE recommended boratlon flowrate from table below or from Reactor Engineenng DESIRED RECOMMENDED RX POWER LEVEL SETTER VALUE 90% 76 80% 56 SRO 70% 46 60% 40 50% 35 40% 30 30% 25 20% or less 15 ENSURE concurrence obtained from A TC STA for boratfon volume and flowrate.

g. ENSURE boric add transfer pump ATC aligned to blender fn FAST speed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 25 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ADJUST FCV-62-138 to estabhsh ATC desired flow rate.

ATC Adjusts FCV621 38 to between 30 to 45 gpm.

f CONTROL boraton flow as required ATC to inject desired boric acid volume CAUTTON: If borating from the RWST, Turbine Load Reduction Rate greater than 2% per minute could result in violatitig Rod Insertion Limit.

6. INITIATE load reduction as Vollows:

a. ADJUST load rate to desired value:

between 1% and 4% per minute if borating via FCV-62-138 BOP OR

between 1% and 3% per minute if borating via normal boration (App. H)

OR

2% per minute if borating from RWST.

BOP Adjusts load rate approx 2% to 3 % per minute

b. ADJUST setter for desired power level:

BOP If RX POWER DESIRED LEVEL RECOMMENDED SETTER VALUE 20% or less 15 BOP Adjusts setter to 15

6. C. VERIFY boration flow established.

BOP

d. INITIATE turbine load reduction by depressing GO pushbutton.

BOP Depresses GO pushbutton.

Ajrjendix D Reauired Qoerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 26 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

e. CONTROL turbine load reduction BOP as necessary to reduce power to desired level 7 MO N ITOR T-avg!T-ret mismatch ATC a CHECK T-ret ndicatcn

?A!i I f fML_fLJL_i__.

7. b MONITOR automatic rod control ATC maintain ng T-avg!T- ef iii smatch ess an3F ATC Coordinates with the BOP to maintain T-avg/T-ref mismatch less than 3°F.

BOP MONITOR automatic control of MFW pump speed AVAILABLE

9. STOP secondary plant equipment BOP USING Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment.

Examiner Note: Appendix C, Secondary Plant Equipment starts at page 28.

Examiner Note: Additional AOP-C.03 steps not included as required power reduction should be complete at or around this step.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 27 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction APPENDIX S REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA REACTOR TRIP CRITERiA TURBINE TRIP CRITERIA Turbine tnp required or imminent Turbine vibration exceeding 14 mils with reactor power greater than P-9 (50%) with one of the following:

Uncontrolled rod movement wtich CANNOT be

high vibration on multiple bearings stopped by placing rods in MANUAL AGP-C.OI) OR Loss of SIG level control:

abnormal noisefvibration apparent level dropping or rising toward trip setpoint and level CANNOT be restored op-soi More than one dropped rod (AOP-C1 T-avglT-ref mismatch CANNOT be maintained less than 5F (refer to Step 7 or App. E) 30% turbine load: < 30% turbine load:

Condenser Pressure > 21 psia AND CANNOT Condenser Pressure> 112 psia be restored within 5 minutes cAop-so2) AOP-SO2 Any automatic reactor trip setpoint reached Any automatic turbine trip setpoint reached OR automatic trip imminent OR automatic trip imminent:

Turbine trip above P-9 (50%)

High Stator Cooling Water temp 90C

Safety injection OR Stator DIP 12 psig below normal

Power Range high flux 109%

Both MFPTs tripped

Power Range flux rate +/- 5% in 2 seconds

Low Auto Stop Oil pressure 45 psig

Pressurizer high level 92%

High S!G level 81% narrow range

Pressurizer pressure low 1970 psig

Main Turb Bearing Oil low pressure 7 psig

Pressurizer pressure high 2385 psig

Thrust Bearing Oil high pressure 60 psig

RCS low flow 90%

Turbine Overspeed 1980 rpm

RCP undervoltage 5022 kilovolts

Loss of EHC pressure

RCP underfrequency 560 Hz

Generator PCBs tilpped

OThT 115%(variable)

OPT 1081% (variable) a S!G low level 101% [15% EAM]

SSPS general warning in both trains

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 28 of 61 Event

Description:

Pant Power Reduction APPENDIX C SECONDARY PLANT EQUIPMENT

[1] ENSURE plant announcement(s) made on the following:

starting rapid shutdown (or load reduction) due to (reason)

stopping secondary plant equipment ü NOTE I If reactor power will be reduced below 50%, AUO should be on station at #3 heater drain tank (if possible) when 60% power is reached NOTE 2 Dispatching of AUO in Steps [2] and [3] may be performed out of sequence.

[2] IF reactor power wiil be reduced below 50%,

THEN DISPATCH AUO with Appendix J (Unit 1) or K (Unit 2) to #3 Heater Drain Tank E

[3] IF one MFP will be shutdown using this appendix, THEN DISPATCH AUO to OPEN MFIAP recirc manual Isolation valve for MFWP to be removed from service: (NIA valves NOT opened)

UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN 1 1A i-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of 1 A condenser lB i-VLV-3-577 TB eL 706, Northeast corner of IA condenser 2 2A 2-VLV-3-576 TB eL 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser 28 2-VLV-3--577 TB el. 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 29 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction APPENDIX C

[41 IF BOTH of the following conditions are met:

a power is being reduced as directed by AOP-S01 (Main Feedwater Malfunctions) or AOP-S04 (Condensate or Heater Drain Malfunctions) leaving secondary pumps in service is desired THEN GO TO Step [8]

[5J WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 80% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE one Cond Demin Booster Pump STOPPED.

[b] ENSURE associated suction valve CLOSED:

OR

[ B FCV-2-285 I

i

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 6 Page 30 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction

[6] WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 70-75%,

THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE one Condensate Booster Pump STOPPED.

b] ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:

CONDENSATE BOOSTER pup SUCTION VALVE CLOSED A FCV-2-94 E OR FCV-2-87 OR FCV-2-81

[c PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:

(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary)

1-50-2/3-i Section T2 OR

2-S0-213-i Section 73

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 31 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction

[7J WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 65% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP remaining two Cond Demin Booster Pumps simuftaneously.

[b] ENSURE suction valves CLOSED:

COND DEMIN BOOSTERPUMP SUCTION VALVE CLOSEDI A FCV-2-290 B FCV-2-.285 C FCV-2-280

[c STOP one No. 3 Heater Drain pump.

(d] STOP one No. 7 Heater Drain pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 32 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction

[8] IF reactor power will be maintained greater than 50%,

THEN GO TO Notes prior to Step [1i]

CAUTION Isolation of all three intermediate heater strings could occur if turbine is tripped prior to fully opening LCV-6-105A and B using Appendix J or K.

[9J WHEN reactor power is less than 60%

AND AUO with App J (Un 1) or K (Unit 2 is on station at #3 Heater Drain Tank, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP #3 Heater Drain Tank Pumps.

[b] NOTIFY AUO to perform App. J (Unit 1) or App. K (Unit 2)

Fully Opening #3 Heater Drain Tank Bypass Vaives

[c] CLOSE isolation valves from #3 Htr Drain Pumps to heater strings:

VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED I FCV-6-l 08 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr String A FCV-B-1 09 Htr Drain Tk Pump 3 to Htr String B FCV.6-1 10 Htr Drain 1k Pump 3 to Htr String C

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 33 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction NOTE I The following step ensures that MFW Bypass valves are available to control feedwater flow at low power NOTE 2 If any MFW Reg valve is in MANUAL, the associated MEW Bypass valve controer should remain in MANUAL to prevent undesired opening of bypass valve.

[IOj WHEN Reactor power is less than 50%,

THEN PERFORM the following:

a] IF all MEW Reg Valves are in AUTO, THEN PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Valve controllers in AUTO E

[b] IF any MEW Reg Valve is in MANUAL.

THEN PERFORM the following:

1) MAINTAIN MFW Bypass Reg Valve in MANUAL for SIG with MEW Reg valve in MANUAL

2) PLACE MEW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO for remaining SfGs.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 34 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction NOTE I If performing this AOP to reduce power to aflow shutting down one MFW pump, the affected MFWP may be removed from service at power level less than 55% (Unit I) or 65% (Unit 2.

NOTE 2 AFW start function on loss of both MFW pumps is inoperable when a MEW pump is RESET but NOT pumping forward. [CO 33.2 1 (Unit 1) or 332 (Unit 2) allows AEW start channel to be inoperable for up 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months when shutting down a MFWP.

[IIj WHEN it is desired to remove one MEW pump from service AND power level is less than applicable limit:

turbine impulse pressure less than approximately 45%

OR

reactor power less than value specified in Note 1 THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE MFWP Recirc Manual Isolation valve OPEN for MFWP to be removed from service: (N/A valves NOT opened)

UNIT MFWP VALVE LOCATION OPEN 1A 1-VLV-3-576 TB el. 706, Northeast corner of IA condenser 18 1 -VLV-3-577 TB el, 706, Northeast corner of 1 A condenser fl 2A 2-VLV-3--576 TB el. 706, Southeast corner of 2A condenser 2

28 2-VLV-3-577 18 eL 706. Southeast corner of 2A condenser

[b] THROTTLE OPEN recirc valve in MANUAL (30-50% OPEN) for MFWP to be removed from service.

[c] PLACE speed controller in MANUAL for MFWP to be removed from service

[d] REDUCE speed gradually on MFWP to be removed from service.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 35 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction

[lii (Continued)

[e] ENSURE proper Loading on remaining MFWR

[f] iF MFWP CANNOT be fully unloaded with speed controller, THEN PERFORM one of the following:

NOTIFY 1&C to slowly adjust hand speed changer far affected MFWP UNTIL MFWP s fully unloadeci OR

THROTTLE OPEN recirc valve for affected MFWP to assist in unloading MRVP OR

SLOWLY CLOSE governor valve by bumping closed governor valve positioner (if operable)

OR

OBTAIN SRO concurrence that MFWP flow is sufficiently low to allow tripping MFWP. fl

[g] WHEN MFWP is unloaded sufficientIy THEN TRIP affected MFWP. E

[h] CLOSE recirc valve for MFWP removed from service

[I] CLOSE recirc valve Manual lsolation inlet valve for MFWP removed from service.

U] OPEN drain valves for MFWP removed from sen/ice: [M-3]

[KS46-143, MFWP A drain valves OR

[HS-48-411. MFWP B drain valves. E

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 36 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction

[121 WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 45% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] STOP remaining No. 1 Heater Drain pump.

[b] CLOSE isolation valves from #7 Heater Drain Pumps to heater strings:

VALVE DESCRIPTION CLOSED -4 FCV-6-143 Htr Drain Tk Pump 7 to Htr String A FCV-6-163 Htr Drain Tk Pump 1 to Htr String B FCV-6-184 Htr Drain Tk Pump 7 to Htr String C

[131 WHEN turbine impulse pressure is approximately 30% or less, THEN PERFORM the following:

[a] ENSURE main turbine EHC controls in IMP OUT.

[b] IF #3 heater drain tank pumps are still running, THEN PERFORM Step [9].

[c] STOP one of two remaining Condensate Booster PumpS.

(step continued on next ae)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 37 of 61 Event

Description:

Plant Power Reduction

[13] (Continued)

[d] ENSURE associated CBP suction valve CLOSED:

OR FCV-2-87 OR C FCV-2-81 E e] STOP one of three Hotwell Pump&

Ef PERFORM applicable procedure to adjust seal injection water pressure on stopped CBP to prevent water intrusion in oil:

(may be assigned to another operator or delayed if necessary)

i-SO-213-i Section 7.2 OR a 2-SO-213-1 Section T3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event# 7,8,9 Page 38 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor: When directed, initiate Event, 7 Loss of Offsite AC Power Indications available:

Annunicators:

1-M-3

1-XA-55-3A, E-1, PS-2-129 LOW NPSH AT MFPS

1-XA-55-3C, C-6, LS-3-171D STM GEN #4 LEVEL LOW

1-XA-55-3C, E-6, LS-3-175D STM GEN #4 LEVEL LOW 1-M-5

1-XA-55-5A, A-7, FS-3-35A STEAM GEN FEEDWATER FLOW HIGH

1-XA-55-5A, 8-7, LS-3-42D STEAM GEN LVL HIGH-LOW DEVIATION 1-M-6

1-XA-55-6B, D-1, LS-3-107D STM GEN LOOP 4 LOW FW FLOW LOW WATER LEVEL

1-XA-55-6B, 0-4, LS-3-1 068 STEAM GENERATOR LOOP 4 LOW LOW WATER LEVEL

1-XA-55-6B, D-7, FS-3-1 038 STM GEN LOOP 4 STEAM/FEEDWATER FLOW MISMATCH Indicators:

1-M-4

1-Fl-i -1 03A, 103B, SG-4 FW INLET FLOW CH-i & 2: varying feedwater flow

1-Ll-3-110, 107, 106, SG-4NR LEVEL: decreasing level Significant Resultant Alarms/Indications:

Annunciators:

1-XA-55-2C, C-7, 0-7, E-7: LS-2-3A, 2-9A, 2-12A CONDENSER HOTWELL LEVEL ABNORMAL Deviations or unexpected conditions:

Increase in feedwater flow.

Deviations on feedwater regulating valves.

Main feedwater pump speed increasing.

Steam generator level dropping SRO Transitions to E-0 and Direct Immediate Operator Actions (lOAs)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9 Page 39 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: following IOA performance, prior to Steps 1-4 immediate action verification, ATC/BOP surveys MOBs for any expected automatic system response that failed to occur. Upon discovery, they may take manual action(s) to align plant systems as expected for the event in progress. (Ref. EPM-4, Prudent Operator Actions)

CREW Performs the first four steps of E-O unprompted.

SRO Directs performance of E-O NOTE I Steps I through 4 are immediate action steps.

NOTE 2 This procedure has a toldout page.

1. VERIFY reactor TRIPPED:

Reactor trip breakers OPEN

Reactor trip bypass breakers DISCONNECTED or OPEN ATC

Rod bottom lights LIT

Rod position indicators Less than or equal to 12 step&

Neutron flux DROPPING

2. VERIFY turbine TRIPPED:

BOP Turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. VERIFY at least one 6.9KV shutdown ATTEMPT to start DiGs.

board ENERGIZED on this unit.

IF power CANNOT be immediately restored to at least one shutdown board BOP on this unit.

THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

4. DETERMINE f SI actuated:

ATC

ECCS pumps RUNNING.

Any SI alarm LIT M-4D1.

Critical Task Places HS-3-1 18A and 128A, AFW Pump lA-A and lB-B to START based BOP on prudent operator actions.

Arendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7.8.9 Page 40 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. PERFORM ES-O.5, Equipment BOP Verifications WHILE continuing in this proce&ire.

Continue with the performance of E-O REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY SROIATC INJECTION BOP Performs ES-O.5, Equipment Verifications go to page 55 for details SRO Addresses foldout page, see next page for details.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8, 9 Page 41 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment FOLDOUT PAGE RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF any of the following conditions occurs:

RCS pressure less than 1250 psig AND at least one CCP or SI pump running OR

Phase B isolation, THEN STOP all RCPs EVENT DIAGNOSTICS

IF any SIC pressure is dropping uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:

a CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

b IF any S/G pressure continues to drop uncontrolled, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE SI actuated

2) IF at least one SIC is intact (SIC pressure controlled or rising),

THEN ISOLATE AFW to faulted S/C(s):

CLOSE AFW level control valves for faulted SIG(s)

IF any AFW valve for faulted S/C CANNOT be CLOSED, THEN PERFORM Appendix E, Isolating AFW to Faulted S/G

3) ENSURE at least one of the following conditions met:

total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm OR

Narrow Range level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one intact S/G.

IF both trains of shutdown boards cie-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-00, Loss of All AC Power.

TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS

IF CST level less than 5%, THEN AUGN AFW suction to ERCW.

IF RWST level less than 27%, THEN GO TO ES-i 3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event# 7,8,9 Page 42 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL Places HS-1-4A, HS-1-11A, HS-1-22A, HS-1-29A Main Steam Isol CLOSE.

TASK ATC/BOP Places HS-3-1 71 A, AFP 1 B-B LCV to SG-4 to ACC RESET then CLOSE.

6. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink available:

a. CHECKtoIaIAFWflow a. IF SIG narrow range level is greater than 440 gpm. less than 10% [25% ADV] in all SlGs, THEN START AFW pumps and ALIGN valves as necessary to raise AFW flow greater than 440 gpm.

ATC

b. CHECK narrow range level b. MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 10% [25% ADV] greater than 440 gpm in at least one 51G. UNTIL narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADV]

in at least one SIG.

c. CONTROL feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 10% [25% ADVI and 50%

in intact or ruptured SIGs.

Critical SOP Places HS-3-1 18A and 128A, AFW Pump lA-A and lB-S to START.

ATC/BOP Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm until S/G are greater than 10% (25% ADV) NR.

7. CHECK if main steam lines should be isolated:

a. CHECK if any of the following conditions have occurred:

Any SIG pressure less than 600 psig OR

Any S/G pressure dropping ATC UNCONTROLLED OR a Phase B actuation.

b. ENSURE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves CLOSED.

c. ENSURE applicable Foldout Page actions COMPLETED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8, 9 Page 43 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. CHECK RCP trip criteria:

a. CHECK the following:

. RCS pressure less than 1250 psig ATC AND

. At least one CCP OR SI pump RUNNING.

b. STOP RCPs.

9. MONITOR RCS temperatures: IF temperature less than 547T and dropping, IF any RCP running, THEN THEN PERFORM the following:

CHECK T-avg stable at or trending to between 547°F and 552°F. a. ENSURE steam dumps and atmospheric reliefs CLOSED.

OR

b. IF cooldown continues, IF RCPs stopped, THEN THEN CONTROL total feed flow:

CHECK T-cold stable at or trending ATC/BOP 1> ENSURE total AFW flow to between 547°F and 552°F.

less than or equal to 600 gpm.

2> MAINTAIN total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm UNTIL narrow range level is greater than 10% [25% ADV]

in at least one S)G.

c. IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8, 9 Page 44 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Manually controls AFW flow to maintain total AFW flow greater than 440 ATC/BOP gpm and less than 600 gpm until SIG are greater than 10% NR.

10. CHECK pressurizer PORVs. safeties.

and spray valves:

a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.

b. Pressurizer safety valves CLOSED.

ATC c. Normal spray valves CLOSED.

d. Power to at least one block valve AVAILABLE.

e. At least one block valve OPEN.

11. DETERMINE it S/G secondary pressure PERFORM the following:

boundaries are INTACT:

a. MONITOR status trees.

CHECK all SJG pressures ATC CONTROLLED or RISING. b. GO TO E-2. Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

CHECK all S!G pressures greater than 140 psig.

Examiner Note: MONITOR status trees, the crew will implement status tree monitoring via ICS. When a RED or ORANGE path status tree is observed, the SRO will designate one of the Board operators (typically the BOP) to verify status tree conditions using 1-FR-O, UNIT 1 STATUS TREES. Once verified, the SRO should direct the crew to transition to the appropriate RED and/or ORANGE path procedure(s).

When a RED Path for Containment is evident on ICS, the SRO will transition to FR-Z.1, go to page 53 for details.

CAUTION Unisolating a faulted SIG or secondary break should NOT be considered UNLESS needed for RCS cooldown.

1. CHECK MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves CLOSE Valves.

CLOSED.

IF any MSIV OR MSIV bypass valve ATC CANNOT be closed.

THEN CLOSE valve USING EA- 1 -1, Closing MSIVs Locally.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8, 9 Page 45 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. CHECK ANY SIG secondary pressure boundary INTACT:

BOP a Any SIC pressure CONTROLLED or RISING.

3 IDENTIFY Faulted S/C(s):

a. CHECK SG pressures:

a Any SO pressure DROPPING SRO n an uncontrolled manner.

OR

Any S/C pressure less than 140 psig.

SRO Identifies #4 SIG as faulted.

CAUTIONS

secondary heat sink requires at least one SIG available.

It the TO AFW pump is the only source of feed flow, isolating both steam supplies will result in loss of secondary heat sink.

4 ISOLATE Faulted S/C(S):

a. ENSURE MFW isolated to faulted S/G(s) by any of the following:

BOP

feedwater isolation valve CLOSED [M-4]

OR

feedwater regulating valve and bypass valve CLOSED (M-3].

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9 Page 46 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

b. ENSURE AFW isolated to faulted S/ 0(s):

BOP

CLOSE MD AFW LCV

CLOSETDAFWLCV and PLACE in PULL TO LOCK CRITICAL Places HS-3-1 71 A, AFP 1 B-B LCV to SG-4 to ACC RESET then CLOSE TASK ATC/BOP Places HS-3-1 75A, SG-4 Turbine AFP LCV to CLOSE.

c CHECK SIG #1 or #4 Iau lied.

BOP ct CLOSE TO AFW pump steam supply from faulted SIG FGV-1-15 (S/G#i)or FCV-1-16 (SIG #4).

& e. VERIFY SIG blowdown valves CLOSED BOP f VERIFY atmospfleric relief CLOSED.

5. CHECK CST level greater than 5%

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8, 9 Page 47 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. VERIFY secondary radiation NORMAL:

a. CHECK secondary radiation NORMAL USING Appendix A, Secondary Rad Monitor&

(App A also contained in ES-O.5)

b. NOTIFY Chem Lab to take S/G activity samples.

c. WHEN Cliem Lab is ready to sample SIGs, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE FCV-15-43 Blowdown Flow Control valve CLOSED.

2) ENSURE Phase A Signal RESET.

3) OPEN blowdown isolation valves

d. NOTIFY RADCON to survey main steam lines and S1G blowdown.

e. WHEN SIG samples completed, THEN CLOSE blowdown isolation valves.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 78,9 Page 48 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T CHECK SI teiminat[on criteria:

a RCS subcooling based on core exit TICS greater than 40F

b. Secondary heat sink:

Narrow range level in at least one Intact SIG greater than 10% [25% ADV]

OR

Total reed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 440 gpm

c. RCS pressure stable or iisthg.

d Pressurizer level greater than 10% 20% ADVI.

e. GO TO ES-ti, SI Termination.

SRO Transitions to ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION.

SRO Addresses FOP, see next page

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC2O12-301 Scenario# 1 Event# 7,8,9 Page 49 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment FOLDOUT PAGE SI REINITTATION CRITERIA IF SI has been terminated (CCPIT isolated, Si pumps stopped, and RHR pumps NOT running in ECCS mode)

AND either of the following conditions occurs:

RCS subcooling based on core exit T/CS less than 40F OR

Pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained greater than 10% [20% ADVJ, THEN i ESTABLISH ECCS flow by performing one or both of the following:

a ESTABUSH CCPIT flow as necessary USING Appendix 0 a START COPs or Si pumps manually as necessary b GO TO E-l, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant EVENT DIAGNOSTICS a IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized, THEN GO TO ECA-00, Loss of All AC Power

IF any SIC pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner or less than 140 psig AND S/S NOT isolated, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolatioti TANK SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS

IF CST level less than 5%,

THEN ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW.

IF RWST level less than 27%,

THEN GO TO ES-i 3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8, 9 Page 50 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE This procedure has a foldout page.

SRO Addresses FOP, see next page I MONITOR if containment spray should be stopped:

a. CHECK any containment spray pump a. GO TO Step 3 RUNNING.

ATC b CHECK containment pressure Ii WHEN containment pressure is less than 2.0 psig less than 2.0 psig, THEN PERFORM remainder of Step I GO TO Step 2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event# 7,8,9 Page 51 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. DETERMINE if one cntmt spray pump should be stopped:

i CHECK BOTh cntmt spray pumps RUNNING Ii CHECK any S/G faulted:

any S1G pressure dropping UNCONTROLLED OR

any SIG pressure less than 140 psig

c. CHECK containment spray suction aligned to RWST, ATC d RESET containment spray signal for cntmi spray pump to be stopped a STOP one cntrnt spray pump and PLACE in A-AUTO f CLOSE containment spray disdiarge valve for stopped pump:

a FCV-72-39 (Train A)

OR

FCV-72-2 (Train B).

g. MONITOR one cntmt spiay pump RUNN1NG and delivering fIow Places 1 -HS-72-.43 and 1 -HS-72-42 Containment Spray Reset to ATC RESET ATC Places 1-HS-72-27A and 10 A to Containment Spray pumps to STOP ATC RESETSISçnaI.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8, 9 Page 52 of 61 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite AC Power, Manual AFW Initiation, Loop #4 SG Feed Line Break Inside Containment Time fl Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Places 1-HS-63-134A and 1-HS-63-134B SI Reset to RESET 4 MONITOR shutdown b ards ATC ccntmuously energized

5. ENSURE only one CCP RUNNING:

a CHECK otisite power supplying shutdown boards.

ATC b STOP all BUT one CCP and PLACE in A-AUTO.

6 CHECK RCS pressure ATC STABLE or RISING ATC Places one Charging Pump 1-HS-63-108A or 104A to STOP 7 ISOLATE CCPIL a CLOSE CCPIT inlet valves FCV-63-39 and FCV-63-40.

b CLOSE CCPIT outlet valves FC 25 and F 26 ATC C. VERIFY CCPIT ow isolated:

FCV-63-39 and 40 CLOSED OR

. FCV-63-25 and 26 CLOSED ATC Places 1 -HS-63-39A and 1 -HS-63-40A CCPIT inlet valves to CLOSE.

Lead Examiner may terminate the scenario at ES-i .1 Step 7, CCPIT isolation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, 8 Page 53 of 61 Event

Description:

FR Z.1 and FR-P.1 Actions Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FR-Z.1 Actions NOTE 11 this procedure has been entered for an orange patti and performance of ECA-1. I (Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation) is required. FR-Z 1: may be performed concurrently with ECA.- 1,1

1. MONITOR RWST level ATC/BOP greater than 27%.

2. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSLO:

ATC/BOP Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN

Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN.

3. ENSURE RCPS STOPPED.

ATC/BOP

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7,8 Page 54 of 61 Event

Description:

FR Z.1 and FR-P.1 Actions Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. DETERMINE if ths procedure should be exted:

a. CHECK for faulted SIC:

Any SiC pressure DROPPING in an uncontrolled manner OR

Any S/C pressure less than 140 psig.

b. CHECK containment pressure less than 12 psig.

ATC/BOP C. CHECK at least one containment spray pump RUNNING and delivering flow.

d. CHECK at least one containment air return fan RUNNING.

e. RETURN to procedure and step in effect.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # Event 4* ES-0.5 Page 55 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ES-O.5 Actions BOP 1. VERIFY D/Gs RUNNING.

BOP 2. VERIFY D/G ERCW suppiy valves OPEN.

BOP 3. VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.

4. VERIFY CCS pumps RUNNING:

Pump IA-A (2A-A)

BOP

Pump lB-B (28-B)

Pump C-S.

BOP 5. VERIFY EGTS fans RUNNING.

BOP 6. VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.

7. NOTIFY at least two AUOs to report BOP to MCR to be available for local actions.

8. VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:

BOP a. MD AFW pumps

b. TDAFW pump.

Critical SOP Places HS-3-1 18A and 128A, AFW Pump lA-A and 1 B-B to START.

NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been taken to control S/G levels, to establish flew due to failure.

or to selate a faulted SG

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # Event # ES-0.5 Page 56 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. CHECK AFW valve ahgnment:

a. VERIFY MD AFW LCVs in AUTO.

BOP b VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN.

c. VERIFY MD AFVI pump recirculation valves FCV-3-400 and FcV-3-401 CLOSED.

10. VERIFY MFW Isolation:

a. CHECK MFW pumps TRIPPED.

b. ENSURE the following:

BOP MFW regulating valves CLOSED

MFW regulating bypass valve controllers in MANUAL with output ZERO

MFW isolation valves CLOSED.

11. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING:

CCPS

RHR pumps BOP

SI pumps

b. VERIFY CCP tiow through CCPIT.

c. CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # ES-0.5 Page 57 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

d. VERIFY SI pump flow e CHECK RCS pressure e. GO TO Step 12 less than 300 psg I. VERIFY RHR pump flow.

12. VERIFY ESE systems ALIGNED:

a. Phase A ACTUATED:

PHASE A TRAIN A alarm UT

[M-GC, 85].

PHASE A TRAIN B alarm LIT M-6C, 86].

b Cntmt Vent Isolation ACTUATED:

CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-SC, C5].

CNTMT VENT ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, C6J.

c Status monitor panels:

BOP

6COARK

SD DARK

SE LIT OUTSIDE outlined area

6HDARK

6JLIT,

d. Train A status panel 6K:

CNTMT VENT GREEN

PHASE A GREEN

e. Train B status panel 6L:

CNTMT VENT GREEN

PHASEAGREEN

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 201 2-301 Scenario # 1 Event # ES-0.5 Page 58 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. MONITOR for containment spray and Phase B actuation:

a. CHECK for any of the following:

Phase B ACTUATED OR

Containment pressure greater than 2.8 psig.

b. VERIFY containment spray INITIATED:

1) Containment spray pumps RUNNING.

2) Containment spray header isolation valves FCV-72-39 and FCV-72-2 OPEN.

3) Containment spray recirculation valves to RWST FCV-72-34 BOP and FCV-72-13 CLOSED.

4) Containment spray header flow greater than 4750 gpm per train.

5) Panel 6E LIT.

c. VERIFY Phase B ACTUATED:

PHASE B TRAIN A alarm LIT

[M-6C, A5].

PHASE B TRAIN B alarm LIT

[M-6C, A6].

d. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED.

e. VERIFY Phase B valves CLOSED:

Panel 6K PHASE B GREEN.

Panel 6L PHASE B GREEN.

f. WHEN 10 minutes have elapsed, THEN ENSURE containment air return fans RUNNING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # Event # ES-0.5 Page 59 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE The continuous action in Step 14 remains applicable if containment pressure uses above 1 5 psig after ES-05 is completed.

1& MONITOR if containment vacuum relief isolation: valves should be closed:

BOP a. CHECK containment pressure a. GO TO Step 15.

greater than 1.5 psig

15. CHECK secondary and containment rad monitors USING the following BOP

Appendix A, Secondary Pad Monitors

Appendix B, Containment Pad Monitors.

APPENDIX A SECONDARY RAD MONITORS

1. IF SI occurred on Unit 1.

THEN CHECK following lad monitors including available trends prior to isolation:

Condenser exhaust recorder 1-RR-90-1 19

SIG blowdown recorder l-RR-90-120

Unit 1 Main steam line rad monitors Ii-M-301

Post-Acddent rad recorder 1-RR9O-268B points 3 (blue), 4 (violet). 5 (black), and 6 (turquoise)

[i-M-31 (back of 1-M-30)]

3 NOTIFY Unit Supervisor whether secondary radiation is NORMAL or HIGH

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # ES-0.5 Page 60 of 61 Event

Description:

Equipment Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior APPENDIX B CONTAINMENT RAD MONITORS t IF SI occurred on Unit 1.

THEN CHECK following rad monitors:

BOP

. Upper containment post-accident rad monitors i-RM-90-271A and 1-RM-90-272A NORMAL [i-M-30}

Lower containment post-accident rad monitors 1-RM-90-273A and i-RM-90-274A NORMAL [1-M-3O

Containment rad recorders i-RR-90-i 12 and i-RR-90-106 NORMAL [0-M-12] (prior to isolation).

16. WHEN directed by E-0, THEN BOP PERFORM Appendix 0, Hydrogen Mitigation Actions.

17. CHECK pocket sump pumps STOPPED:

[M-15, upper left corner]

HS-7741 0, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and BOP Equipment Drain Sump pump A

HS-77-4i 1, Rx Bldg AUX Floor and Equipment Drain Sump_pump B 18 DISPATCH personnel to perform BOP EA-0-i, Equipment Checks Following ESF Actuation.

19 ENSURE plant announcement has been BOP made regarding Reactor Trip and SI.

20. PERFORM Appendix E, Spent Fuel BOP Cooling Actions, as time perrnits

Aørendix D Reauired Ooerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC 2012-301 Scenario # 1 Event # Page 61 of 61 Event

Description:

Critical task Critical Tasks: Critical Task Statement

1. Isolate AFW Flow to #4 Steam Generator Prior to completing E-2 step 4.

2. Manually start the 1 A-A or 1 B-B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed pumps and establish the minimum required AFW flow rate to the SGs before transition out of E-O.

ML120720301

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