ML12013A384

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Lr - FW: Clarification Questions Related to the Response to RAI 3.5.2.2.1.7-1
ML12013A384
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 07/15/2011
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
Download: ML12013A384 (4)


Text

1 Davis-BesseNPEm Resource From:

CuadradoDeJesus, Samuel Sent:

Friday, July 15, 2011 9:21 AM To:

'custerc@firstenergycorp.com' Cc:

'dorts@firstenergycorp.com'

Subject:

FW: Clarification Questions Related to the Response to RAI 3.5.2.2.1.7-1 Attachments:

DB RAI AMR TRP 101 SCC - Mintz_Min SG RAI 7-8-2011 v70 (Containment Penetration).docx Cliff Can we have a teleconference next Monday as requested below?

Thanks From: Min, Seung Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2011 4:23 PM To: CuadradoDeJesus, Samuel Cc: Todd Mintz; Pham, Bo

Subject:

Clarification Questions Related to the Response to RAI 3.5.2.2.1.7-1 Good Afternoon, Sam, Dr. Todd Mintz and I need a teleconference call with the applicant to discuss the clarification questions regarding the response to RAI 3.5.2.2.1.7-1 as attached. If available, please, schedule a teleconference call for the coming Monday (7/18) or early next week in view of the schedule of Dr. Mintz.

If you have any comment or question, please, let us know.

Thanks, Seung Min Seung Min NRR/DLR/RARB Tel: 301-415-2045 Email: seung.min@nrc.gov M/S: O-11F1

Hearing Identifier:

Davis_BesseLicenseRenewal_Saf_NonPublic Email Number:

2950 Mail Envelope Properties (Samuel.CuadradoDeJesus@nrc.gov20110715092100)

Subject:

FW: Clarification Questions Related to the Response to RAI 3.5.2.2.1.7-1 Sent Date:

7/15/2011 9:21:09 AM Received Date:

7/15/2011 9:21:00 AM From:

CuadradoDeJesus, Samuel Created By:

Samuel.CuadradoDeJesus@nrc.gov Recipients:

"'dorts@firstenergycorp.com'" <dorts@firstenergycorp.com>

Tracking Status: None

"'custerc@firstenergycorp.com'" <custerc@firstenergycorp.com>

Tracking Status: None Post Office:

Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 846 7/15/2011 9:21:00 AM DB RAI AMR TRP 101 SCC - Mintz_Min SG RAI 7-8-2011 v70 (Containment Penetration).docx 22295 Options Priority:

Standard Return Notification:

No Reply Requested:

No Sensitivity:

Normal Expiration Date:

Recipients Received:

DRAFT Davis-Besse TRP 101 - Stress Corrosion Cracking Page 1 of 2 Clarification questions related to the response to RAI 3.5.2.2.1.7-1

=

Background===

By letter dated May 2, 2011, the staff issued RAI 3.5.2.2.1.7-1 requesting that the applicant justify why the water leakage addressed in LRA Section 3.5.2.2.1.10 is not conducive to stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel penetration sleeves and bellows. In its response dated June 3, 2011, the applicant stated that the below-grade leakage is due to a reoccurring issue of groundwater intrusion into the annulus between the containment and the shield building and a 2002 condition report identified that the two stainless steel bellows and flanges for the containment emergency sump recirculation valves had a rusty appearance. The applicant also stated that the corrective action directed sampling of the water and repairs to identify the source of the leakage. The applicant further stated that evaluation of the residue on the bellows identified that it contained calcium. In addition, the applicant stated that cracking due to stress corrosion cracking is not an applicable aging effect for these bellows because the normal temperature of these components is less than 60 °C (140 °F) and a review of plant operating experience confirmed that no other containment penetration bellows have been affected by groundwater intrusion and that cracking of penetration sleeves or bellows was not identified. In addition, the applicant stated that while cracking of penetration bellows and sleeves is not considered to be an applicable aging effect, these components are inspected by the Inservice Inspection Program -

IWE.

The staff also noted that LRA Section 3.5.2.2.1.1 states that the below-grade environment at Davis-Besse is aggressive (chlorides > 500 ppm and sulfates > 1,500 ppm) and sampling results indicated a chloride content maximum value of 2,870 ppm and a sulfate content maximum value of 1,700 ppm.

Issue In its review, the staff noted that even though generally speaking stress corrosion cracking is not a significant concern at temperature lower than 140 °F, there is a potential that evaporation of leaked ground water on the surfaces of the components may cause significant contamination with chloride or sulfate ions, which may have an adverse effect on the initiation of stress corrosion cracking of the components. Therefore, the staff found a need to further confirm whether or not the applicant identifies and performs necessary corrective actions to manage an adverse effect of ground water intrusion on stress corrosion cracking of the containment penetration components when the applicants operating experience (OE), including OE related to the Inservice Inspection Program - IWE and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Program, indicates ground water intrusion on the containment penetration components. The staff also found a need to clarify whether or not chloride or sulfate contamination was identified in the applicants evaluation of the reside on the bellows that are addressed in the applicants response to RAI 3.5.2.2.1.7-1.

DRAFT Davis-Besse TRP 101 - Stress Corrosion Cracking Page 2 of 2 Request

1. Describe whether or not the evaluation of the residue on the bellows, which are addressed in the applicants response to RAI 3.5.2.2.1.7-1, indicated the presence of chloride or sulfate contamination on the bellows. If data are available, describe the levels of chlorides and sulfates that were detected in the residue evaluation.
2. Confirm whether or not the applicant identifies and performs necessary corrective actions to manage an adverse effect of ground water intrusion on stress corrosion cracking of the containment penetration components when the applicants operating experience (OE), including the OE related to the Inservice Inspection Program - IWE and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Program, indicates ground water intrusion on the containment penetration components.

In addition, describe what corrective actions are taken in order to control the adverse environmental effect when the applicants operating experience indicates ground water intrusion on the components.