|
---|
Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML23320A1122024-01-18018 January 2024 NRC to Fws, Concurrence with Endangered Species Act Determinations for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal, Issuance of Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, and Opportunity for Public Comment ML23355A2722023-12-21021 December 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Schedule Revision for Emergency Preparedness Staff Augmentation Times License Amendment Request ML23318A1172023-11-13013 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Formal Issuance of RAIs for North Anna Technical Support Center (TSC) License Amendment Request (LAR) (L-2023-LLA-0006) ML23257A2092023-09-14014 September 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Formal Issuance of 2nd Round RAIs for Surry Units 1&2 and North Anna Units 1&2 Emergency Plans LAR ML23243A9862023-08-31031 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAIs for EP Staff Augmentation Times LAR (L-2022-LLA-0166) ML23219A1602023-08-0707 August 2023 003 Radiation Safety Baseline Inspection Information Request ML23171B0522023-06-20020 June 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI for Review of Appendix F to DOM-NAF-2-P (Redacted) ML23075A0232023-03-15015 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI - License Amend Req (LAR) to Revise Tech Spec (Ts) 3.6.8 Limiting Condition for Operation to Remove Refueling Water Chemical Addition Tank and Replace the Containment Sump Buffer North Anna, 1 and 2 (L-2022-LLA-0162 ML23067A2162023-03-0707 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI for North Anna, 1 & 2, Surry 1 & 2, Millstone, 2 & 3, Request for Approval of App. F Fleet Report DOM-NAF-2-P, Qual of the Framatome ORFEO-GAIA and ORFEO-NMGRID CHF Correlations in the Dominion VIPRE-D Computer Code ML23060A0932023-03-0101 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Formal Issuance of RAIs for Surry/North Anna Emergency Plans LAR ML23059A2282023-02-28028 February 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAIs for Containment Buffer Change to Natb (L-2022-LLA-0162) ML23039A1712023-02-0808 February 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for Technical Support Center (TSC) Relocation (L-2023-LLA-0006) ML23018A0352023-01-17017 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for Fleet Report Re Appendix F of DOM-NAF-2-P (L-2022-LLT-0003) ML22342B1472022-12-0808 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for LAR Re NAPS Post LOCA Buffer Change (L-2022-LLA-0162) ML22335A4842022-12-0101 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for LAR North Anna Power Station - Units 1 and 2 and Surry Power Station - Units 1 and 2 Emergency Plan Staff Augmentation Times (L-2022-LLA-0166) ML22242A0452022-08-23023 August 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Dominion GL 04-02 Response Draft RAIs (L-2017-LRC-0000) ML22174A3552022-06-23023 June 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for Dominion Fleet LAR to Implement TSTF-554 (L-2022-LLA-0078) ML22104A0252022-04-14014 April 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Dominion Presentation Slides for April 21, 2022 Public Meeting on Emergency Preparedness Submittal for the North Anna Power Station and the Surry Power Station ML22083A2102022-03-24024 March 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAI - Relief Request N2-14-LMT-003 Fourth Ten Year Inservice Inspection Interval ML22032A0962022-02-0101 February 2022 002 Radiation Safety Baseline Inspection Information Request ML22018A0272022-01-18018 January 2022 2022 All RFI Responses - Exercise and Program Inspections - Revl ML22007A2672022-01-0707 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - North Anna, Unit 2, ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request N2-14-LMT-003 Fourth Interval Third Period Limited Examinations (L-2021-LLR-0088) ML21335A0812021-12-0101 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for OMN-28 Request Alternative to ISTC-3700, Position Verification Testing (L-2021-LLR-0086) ML21334A1922021-11-30030 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Audit Plan for Reactor Core Thermal-Hydraulics Using the VIPRE-D Appendix E Review ML21327A3652021-11-23023 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAI for TSTF-577 LAR ML21326A1502021-11-22022 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for Relocation of Unit Staff Requirements to the QAPD LAR (L-2021-LLA-0195) ML21322A0962021-11-18018 November 2021 Final Request for Additional Information Set 5 - North Anna SLRA Safety Review (EPID No. L-2020-SLR-0000) - Email ML21312A0082021-11-0404 November 2021 Enclosure 2 - NAPS Draft SER Table A.1-1 Markup ML21312A0112021-11-0404 November 2021 Enclosure 3 - NAPS Draft SER Section 3 Comments ML21312A0012021-11-0404 November 2021 Comments on North Anna Draft SER ML21306A3302021-11-0202 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for TSTF-569 LAR ML21286A7372021-10-13013 October 2021 Additional Element Included in the Implementation Plan for the Surry Fuel Melt Safety Limit (SL) LAR ML21274A0022021-09-30030 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for TSTF-577 LAR (L-2021-LLA-0158) ML21312A0022021-09-21021 September 2021 Enclosure 1 - E-mail - NAPS SLR SER Appendix a for Dominion Review ML21312A0072021-09-21021 September 2021 Enclosure 1 - E-mail - Enclosure B - NAPS SER App a - Dominion Comments 9-21-2021 ML21312A0032021-09-21021 September 2021 Enclosure 1 - E-mail - Enclosure a - Dominion Table A4.4-1 Clean Version ML21256A0672021-09-13013 September 2021 Final Request for Confirmation of Information Set 2 - North Anna SLRA Safety Review (EPID No. L-2020-SLR-0000) - Email ML21152A1722021-09-0707 September 2021 NRC to Fws, NRC Issuance of Draft Environmental Impact Statement for North Anna Subsequent License Renewal, Opportunity for Public Comment, and Endangered Species Act Determinations ML21238A0942021-08-25025 August 2021 Draft Request for Additional Information Set Z - North Anna SLRA Safety Review (EPID No. L-2020-SLR-0000) - Email ML21225A5512021-08-13013 August 2021 Discussion Point for Public Meeting Regarding Fire Protection Piping Cyclic Loading - Transmittal E-mail ML21195A2442021-07-13013 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAI Appendix E to Topical Report DOM-NAF-2 Qualification of the Framatome BWU-I CHF Correlation in the Dominion Energy VIPRE-D Computer Code ML21188A1632021-07-0707 July 2021 Final Request for Additional Information Set 4 - North Anna SLRA Safety Review (EPID No. L-2020-SLR-0000) - Email ML21154A0152021-06-0101 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for Primary Grade Water LAR (L-2021-LLA-0082) ML21140A3682021-05-20020 May 2021 Response to North Anna Hardship (Temporary Staff Guidance Additional Guidance for FOF Inspections During the PHE) ML21140A3712021-05-19019 May 2021 FOF Discussion ML21123A2972021-05-0303 May 2021 Final Request for Additional Information Set 3 - North Anna SLRA Safety Review (EPID No. L-2020-SLR-0000) - E-mail ML21091A0022021-04-0101 April 2021 Final Request for Additional Information Set 2 - North Anna SLRA Safety Review (EPID No. L-2020-SLR-0000) - Email ML21076A4622021-03-17017 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAI for Versatile Internals and Component Program for Reactors Vipre Code Review (L-2021-LLT-0000) ML21075A0032021-03-12012 March 2021 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection Request for Information for - Brunswick, Catawba, North Anna, Oconee, Vogtle 1 & 2 ML21069A3522021-03-10010 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review for Topical Report DOM-NAF-2 VIPRE-D 2024-01-18
[Table view] |
Text
From: Franke. Mark - '
To: Walker Shakur; Suggs. LaDonna; Kolcum, Gregory; Jackson, Rahsean Cc: McCoy, Gerald; Claga. Rodney
Subject:
RE: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna Date: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 6:14:46 PM Attachments: imacieOO1,Dna Yes - while I am in HQ, Greg will serve as team lead and will also run the calls.
I'll be on the call tomorrow, but then am in HQ.
From: Walker, Shakur Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 6:11 PM To: Franke, Mark; Suggs, LaDonna; Kolcum, Gregory Cc: McCoy, Gerald; Clagg, Rodney
Subject:
RE: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna Will we have a call in the morning (0800)? Same number?
From: Franke, Mark Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 6:10 PM To: Suggs, LaDonna; Kolcum, Gregory; Walker, Shakur Cc: McCoy, Gerald; Clagg, Rodney
Subject:
RE: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna I agree. Gerry and I will be in HQ Thursday to hear what they have to say. We'll also have the opportunity to talk with Meena Khanna and George Wilson to get a feel for NRR's stance.
Let's keep going on our fact finding and reviews so we can cover the ground we need to cover.
From: Suggs, LaDonna Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 5:32 PM To: Kolcum, Gregory; Walker, Shakur Cc: Franke, Mark; McCoy, Gerald; Clagg, Rodney
Subject:
RE: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna Team -
This appears to contradict what the licensee indicated while we were onsite with regard to their plans to return the EE system to an operable status. It was my understanding that the visual inspections were just the first phase in a tiered approach to recover the system and that following those inspections, they would be performing a battery of surveillance tests (comparable to those performed during a refueling outage) prior to returning the system to operable. The verbiage of the conclusion statement is a bit ambiguous, but it does seem to stop short of calling the system operable so I think we need to discuss this further amongst ourselves and with the licensee to get a clear understanding of what is meant by that statement ("Therefore, the EE system should be considered as fully qualified i deliver it design function.:') and what their subsequent plans are for the system prior to restart.
LaDonna B. Suggs I Reactor Inspector - RII/DRS/EB2 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 245 Peachtree Center Ave. NE, Suite 1200 I Atlanta, GA 30303 RD: 404.997.4539 JA F: 404.997.4515
>< LaDonna.Suoascbnrc.qov lwww.nrc.gov From: Kolcum, Gregory Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 4:58 PM To: Walker, Shakur; Suggs, LaDonna Cc: Franke, Mark; McCoy, Gerald; Clagg, Rodney
Subject:
FYI: seismic electrical inspection conclusions North Anna AIT team members will review.
From licensee log:
In conclusion, the inspections performed on the EE system have not identified components that would be considered inoperable or non functional as a result of damage due to the earthquake that occurred 8/23/2011. Therefore, the EE system should be considered as fully qualified to deliver its design function.
Details below.
9/6/2011 14:09 Emergency Electrical System Walkdowns:
No abnormal electrical issues have been encountered since the initial seismic event and all operating parameters are as expected. Walk downs on all equipment, external to operating cabinets and electrical switchgear, have been completed on 100% of the EE system with no seismic related deficiencies observed. Subsequent internal inspections in accordance with 0-GEP-30 ePOST SEISMIC EVENT ENGINEERING WALKDOWNZ of accessible equipment have also been conducted with the following percentages of completion noted below.
- 1. Transfer Buses: 100% of the equipment was inspected.
- 2. 4160VAC Switchgear 96%: Breakers 01-EE-BKR-15J12 and 01-EE-BKR-15J14 were not inspected because the current plant configuration did not allow for an open cubicle inspection. The sample set for the 4160VAC Switchgear was approximately 96% of the 55 breaker cubicles. With no seismic damage noted, it is acceptable to not inspect the remaining 4% of the sample set.
- 3. 480VAC load centers 100%
Motor Control Center Internal Cubical Inspections 95%: The following breakers were not inspected because the current plant configuration did not allow for an open cubicle inspection: 01-EE-BKR-1J1-2S-C1/F3 01-EE-BKR-1J1-3-B4, 02-EE-BKR-2i1-2N-K4, 02-EE-BKR-231-2S-F3, 02-EE-BKR-2H1-2N-H4/L3, 01-EE-BKR-1H1-2S-D1/F1/F2/G1/G2/G3/H2/H3/J1, 01-EE-BKR-1H1-2N-L3/M3/N3/P1/P2.
The following breakers were not inspected because cubicle doors were unable to be opened. A known issue exists with the Klockner Moeller Motor Control Centers where the breaker handle interlock does not fully release upon depression. Without full release of the mechanical interlock, the breaker cubicle door remains bound. This deficiency does not impede the any form of circuit protection for the Motor Control Center Cubicle. 02-EE-BKR-2H1-2S-F1/J4, 02-EE-BKR-2H1-4-A1/A4, 02-EE-BKR-2J1 D2R/D2L, 01-EE-BKR-1H1-2S-M1, 01-EE-BKR-1H1-2N-G2, 01-EE-BKR-1JI-2S-B2.
The sample set for the Motor Control Center Internal Cubical Inspections was approximately 95% of 632 breaker cubicles. With no seismic damage noted, it is acceptable to not inspect the remaining 5% of the sample set.
A review of the existing work orders for the system indentified no open deficiencies that would prohibit any system component from being considered functional or fully capable of performing its design function.
In conclusion, the inspections performed on the EE system have not identified components that would be considered inoperable or non functional as a result of damage due to the earthquake that occurred 8/23/2011. Therefore, the EE system should be considered as fully qualified to deliver its design.