ML112850050

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Denial of a Request for Notice of Enforcement Discretion for Constellation Energy Nuclear Group Regarding Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (NOED No. 11-1-001)
ML112850050
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/12/2011
From: Mcginty T
Division Reactor Projects I
To: Spina J
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group
Dentel, G RGN-I/DRP/BR1/610-337-5233
References
NOED 11-1-001
Download: ML112850050 (6)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 0ctober L2, TOIL Mr. James Spina, Interim Site Vice President Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC 1650 Calvert Cliffs ParkwaY Lusby, Maryland 20657 - 4702

SUBJECT:

DENIAL OF A REQUEST FOR NOTICE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FOR CONSTELLATION ENERGY NUCLEAR GROUP REGARDING CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (NOED NO. 11-1-001)

Dear Mr. Spina:

On Octobe r 3,2e11, your staff verbally requested that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) exercise oiscr6tion not to enforce compliance with certain actions required in the Calvert at Cliffs Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). Your staff stated that on October 3, 2011, 10:3S a.m. (EDT), Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and2 entered TS 3.0.3, 'LCO Action Not Met,"

requiring place the affected units in hot standby (Mode 3) within that action be initiated within one hour to The cause of the dual Unit TS 3.0.3 seven hours and hot shutdown (Mode 4) within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

the entry was due to planned maintenance on the Unit 2 salt water (SW) headerwhich impacted opeiability of the 24 emergency diesel generator (EDG)_ and an emergent failure of the 1A EDG

'A' EDG battery .h.rger, which imfacte-d the op6rability of the 1A EDG. The inoperability of the on boih uniti at the same time caused the 'A' train station battery chargers to become inoperable on both units. With two channels of DC electrical sources being inoperable on 91ch TS unii and no specific TS required action for two inoperable DC channels, your staff entered 3.0.3 for both units. you and your staff requested that a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) be issued pursuant to tne NRC's policy reggldlng exercise of discretion for an operating

'Generafstatement of Policy and Procedures for NRC iacility as set forth in Section Vll.c, of the Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. You requested that this discretion permit continued facility operation for both units and be effective for approximately eight hours, irom 5
35 p.m. (EDT) on October 3,2Q11, to 2:00 a.m. (EDT) on October 4,2011, to allow the Unit 2 SW header to be returned to service.

This letter documents the results of our telephone conference call on October 3,2011, at principal NtC approximately 1:1S p.m. (EDT) with you and other members of your staff, and the participants (iisted in the enclosure to this letter), when the NRC verbally denied your request for process bn NOED. At the time of the call, Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 were operating, but in the request justification for a proposed of shutting down in accordance with TS 3.0.3. Your and your NOED was submitted in your letter dated October 5,2011. During the conference call, 2:00 a.m. on staff described the actions planned to retest and restore the Unit 2 SW header by October 4.2011. After the discussions, the NRC denied your NOED request'

J. Spina 2 After the verbal NOED denial, your staff completed troubleshooting activities on the 1A EDG battery charger, returned the bbttery charger to operable status and exited TS 3.0.3 at 4:05 p'm' on Oitober 3, 2011, prior to its expiration. Calvert Ctiffs Units 1 and 2 were restored to full power on October 4,2011.

During the telephone call between your staff and NRC representatives on October 3,2011, we descri-bed our NOED process outlined in NRC Inspection Manual, Part 9900, "Technical Guidance, Operations - Notices of Enforcement Discretion," dated February 7, 2005. The NOED process is designed to address unanticipated temporary non-compliances with license conditions and TSs. Wnen an NOED is issued, it is recognized that the operating license will be violated, but the NRC is exercising discretion to not enforce compliance with the operating license ior a specified time period. The NRC statf expects to issue NOEDs infrequently' Although requirements may dictate that a plant be shutdown, refueling activities be suspended, or a pllnt startup be delayed, the NRC staff is under no obligation to issue an NOED. NOEDs are issued on a case-by-iase basis, considering the individual plant circumstances. An NOED will be issued only if the NRC staff is clearly satisfied that such action is warranted from a public health and safety standPoint.

ln order for the NRC to approve an NOED request, a number of factors must be adequately demonstrated for the NRC staff to have the necessary confidence that the approval will not involve any net increase in radiological risk and, therefore, not impose any undue risk to the health and safety of the public. In the case of your specific NOED request, we concluded that your request for an NOED could not be granted because, based upon the information that you provided, we could not clearly satisfy ourselves that the requested action involved no safety impact in accordance with the enforiement policy and statf guidancg._The NRC noted your staff was not fully prepared for the in-depth discussion concerning the NOED re_quest and had difficulty aOOiessing the criteria to support the NOED. Specifically, your NOED request ha-d no!

been reviewed by four plant on-site review committee (PORC) and your risk assessment failed to satisfy the requiiements for granting an NOED. These factors are discussed in detail below:

o Inadequate PORC Review and Approval:

During the conference call, your staff discussed that the NOED request had not received pORC approval prior to youi staff's request for an NOED. The NRC considers PORC approvaito be a'requirement before granting an NOED. You informed us that your staff entered this inadequate review and preparation into your corrective action process (CR-201 1-009912).

. Insufficient Risk Evaluation Assessment:

During the conference call, your staff also discussed their evaluation of the safety signifiiance and the potential consequences of allowing operation of the facility at power biyond the allowed outage time, including the results of risk calculations. Your staff stated that the risk, as measured by incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) associated with the NOED was greater than 1E-6. This ICCDP exceeded the NOED guidance value of 5E-7. This risk estimate also did not consider external events which would increase your calculated risk. Additionally, your risk assessment did not provide an assessment of the incremental conditional large early release probability (tClgnp). Furthermore, the NRC staff was not convinced that att compensatory measures had been considered in order to ensure that there would be no net increase in risk. As a result of the incomplete risk assessment you could not demonstrate that

J. Spina to adequate compensatory actions were identified and could be effectively implemented period' mitigate the increased risk associated with the requested enforcement discretion The NRC determined that your NOED request did not demonstrate adequate risk - .

insights and informed judgments, as specifically required by our NOFD process. lf the

-approved, NOED was to have been a more in-depth discussion would have been necessary in order to assure ourselves that continued operation with the EDGs unavailable would be risk-neutral to plant safety.

that the ln summary, on the basis of the staff's evaluation of your request, we have concluded provided at the time of issuance o-f an NOED was not warranted because, with the information your request, we could not clearly satisfy ourselves that th-e requested action involved no safety impact in accordance with the enforcement policy and staff guidance' Sincerely, Timothy J. McGintY Acting Deputy Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-31 7; 50-31 8 License Nos. DPR-53; DPR-69

Enclosure:

As Stated cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

J. Spina adequate compensatory actions were identified and could be effectively implemented to mitigate the increased risk associated with the requested enforcement discretion period.

ThoNRC determined that your NOED request did not demonstrate adequate risk insights and informed judgments, as specifically required by our NOED process. lt is our position that your risk calculations were not sufficient to assure that all plant specific iisks were accounted for and appropriately compensated. lf the NOED was to have been approved, a more in-depth discussion would have been necessary in order to assure ourselves that continued operation with the EDGs unavailable would be risk-neutral to plant safety.

In summary, on the basis of the staff's evaluation of your request, we have concluded that the issuance oi an NOED was not warranted because, with the information provided at the time of your request, we could not clearly satisfy ourselves that the requested action involved no safety impact in accordance with the enforcement policy and staff guidance.

Sincerely, IRAI Timothy J. McGinty Acting Deputy Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-317; 50-318 License Nos. DPR-53: DPR-69 Distribution: (see attached)

SUNSI Review Complete: JRH (Reviewer's Initials)

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCHl\Calvert-Cliffs\CCNPP NOED DENlAI LCttCT RCV 1.dOCX After declaring this document'An Official Agency Record" it witl not be released to the Public.

Non-Public Designation Category: MD3.4 Non-Public ![

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachmenUenclosure "E" = Copy with attachmenUenclosure 'N" = No copy ML112850050 NRR/DORL OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRS NRR/DORL RI/DRP NSalgado/nls via email MEvans/mge via email DRoberts/djr NAME GDentel/gtd PWilson/prw 10t07111 DATE 10t06t11 10t06t11 10111111 10t11111 OFFICE RI/ORA NAME TMcGinty/tjm DATE 10111t11 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Distribution:

W. Dean, Regional Administrator D, Lew, Deputy Regional Administrator T. McGinty, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator D. Roberts, Director, DRP D. Ayres, Acting Deputy Director, DRP C. Miller, Director, DRS P. Wilson, Deputy Director, DRS G. Dentel, Branch Chief, Projects Branch 1 S. Kennedy, Senior Resident lnspector, Calvert Cliffs E. Torres, Resident Inspector C. Cahill, Senior Reactor Analyst, DRS N. Perry, Senior Project Engineer J. Hawkins, Project Engineer D. Screnci. Public Affairs Officer N. Sheehan. Public Affairs Officer K. Farrar, Regional Counsel N. McNamara D. Tifft, SLO NOED Resource OE Web Resource J. McHale, OEDO Coordinator RidsEdoMailCenterResource RidsOEMailCenterResource RidsNrrPMCalvertCliffs Resource RidsNrrDorlLpll -1 Resource

Principal Staff Members on the Oclober 3. 2011. Telephone Call Constellation Representatives:

Jim Spina, Interim Site Vice President, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP)

Christopher Costanzo, Plant General Manager, CCNPP Dave Frye, Manager, Operations, CCNPP Jim Stanley, Manager, Engineering Services, CCNPP Doug Lauver, Director of Licensing, CCNPP Pat Furio, Licensing, CCNPP NRC Reqion l:

Timothy McGinty, Acting Deputy RegionalAdministrator, Region I Peter Wilson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Region I Raymond Powell, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), Region I Glenn Dentel, Branch Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, DRP, Region I Chris Cahill, Senior Reactor Analyst, DRS, Region I Silas Kennedy, Senior Resident Inspector-Calvert Cliffs, Branch 1, DRP, Region I Edgardo Torres, Resident Inspector-Calvert Cliffs, Branch 1, DRP, Region I NRC Headquarters:

Michele Evans, Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing (DORL)

Nancy Salgado, Branch Chief, DORL Douglas Pickett, Senior Project Manager, DORL Sheldon Stuchell, Senior Project Manager, NOED Process Jeff Circle, Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst Enclosure