Text

301 Draft Simulator Scenarios
	ML112270230
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	08/08/2011
From:	; NRC/RGN-II/DRS/OLB
To:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
	05-424/11-301, 05-425/11-301
	Download: ML112270230 (205)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: VOGTLE Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: __Capehart___________________ Operators _____________________________

__Meeks_____________________ _____________________________

__Hopkins____________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 75 % Power BOL.

Equipment OOS: CCW Pump 5, Air Compressor 3 Turnover: Raise power to 80%, Power Range high flux setpoints @ 109%. Step 4.1.47 of 12004-C in effect.

INFO LCO 3.7.7 CCW Train A, Containment mini-purge in service.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ES 01 - Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip ES 08 - Train A Auto SI Failure SI 06A - SIP A Auto Start Failure SI 03B - SIP B Trips on Start Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A R (OATC) Raise Reactor power to 80%.

R (SS)

N (UO) 2 SG-03A1 I (UO) Steam Generator Pressure Channel Fails High (100%) I (SS)

TS (SS) LCO 3.3.2, INFO LCO 3.3.3, and LCO 3.3.4 3 CV-07 C (OATC) Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS C (SS)

TS (SS) INFO LCO TR 13.1.3 and INFO LCO TR 13.1.5 4 N/A N (OATC) Restore Normal Charging and Letdown to service N (SS) 5 NI-07D C (UO) PR NIS N-44 Upper Detector Fails Low C (SS)

TS (SS) LCO 3.3.1 FU 2a, 2b, 3, 6, and 16 1

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description RD-16 M Ejected Rod H-8 6

ES-01 (CREW) Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip ES-08 Train A Auto SI Failure With SIP A Auto Start Failure and Trip of C-OATC 7 SI-06A SIP B C - SS SI-03B AF05A, C - UO AFW Pumps Auto Actuation Failure (all 3 pumps) With Manual Starts 8

B, C C - SS Available

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

Raise Reactor power to 80%.

Verifiable actions:

OATC - Withdraws rods and/or dilutes RCS to raise power.

UO - Depresses load increase pushbutton to raise turbine load.

Event 2:

Steam Generator # 1 Pressure Channel Transmitter PT-514 Fails High Verifiable actions:

UO - Places Main Feed Water Pumps Master Controller in manual and affected SG Main Feed Regulating Valve to manual and returns SG NR level to program level of 65%.

Technical specifications:

LCO 3.3.2 FU 1e Condition D, LCO 3.3.2 FU 4d(1) Condition D, INFO LCO 3.3.3 FU 8 and LCO 3.3.4 FU 13 Condition A 2

Event 3:

Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Verifiable actions:

OATC - Closes letdown orifice isolation valves and letdown isolation valves.

Technical specifications:

TR 13.1.3 Boration Flow paths - INFO LCO only TR 13.1.5 Charging pumps - INFO LCO only Event 4:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow.

Verifiable actions:

OATC - Restores normal charging and letdown to service.

Technical specifications:

NONE Event 5:

PR NIS N-44 fails low requiring entry into AOP-18002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Verifiable actions:

UO - Defeats failed NI channel N-44 at the NIS racks by placing the Upper and Lower Sections, Power Mismatch, Rod Stop Bypass, and Comparator Channel Defeat switches to the N44 position.

Technical Specifications: LCO 3.3.1 FU 2a, 2b 3, 6, and 16 Event 6:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip.

Verifiable actions:

OATC -Manually trips reactor by placing one or both reactor trip hand switches to the trip position.

Event 7:

Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence.

Verifiable actions:

OATC - Manually actuates Safety Injection, manually starts SI Pump A.

OATC - Manually trips RCPs no later than step 11 of E-0.

3

Event 8:

AFW pump auto actuation failures (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Verifiable actions:

UO - Manually starts both MDAFW pumps and TDAFW pumps per UO Initial Actions Page of E-0.

CRITICAL STEPS:

1. Manually trips reactor in response to an automatic reactor trip failure.

2. Manually starts safety injection pump(SIP) A due to auto start failure with SIP B tripping during safety injection train B loading sequence to provide intermediate head ECCS injection flow into the core.

3. Trips all reactor coolant pumps due to criteria being met on foldout page or no later than step 11 of E-0, 19000-C. Tripping reactor coolant pump when required prevents uncovering the core if tripped later in the scenario.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Raise Reactor power to 80% per 12004-C, step 4.1.47.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 4.1.47 Briefs OATC and UO defining roles, key parameters to monitor, reactivity control using Rods or Dilution, and main turbine loading rate.

Maintains Reactivity Oversite Function during power ascension to 80%

RTP. Controls control room access and any distractions.

OATC/UO Obtains permisssion from SS to increase Turbine load per 13800, "Main Turbine Operation." Coordinates power ascension with one another while monitoring critical parameters.i.e, Turbine load, Mwe, Reactor Power, Delta T, Tave/Tref. AFD, Pressurizer pressure, Pressurizer Level, Charging flow, Seal injection, Steam Generator levels, pressure, flow and MFPT Delta pressure.

PROCEED TO NEXT EVENT: When Reactor Power Increased to 80% RTP or at Examiners Request.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Loop 1 Controlling Pressure Channel PT-514 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose failure of main steam pressure channel:

Alarms:

SG Flow Mismatch (all 4 loops)

Indications:

All 4 SG levels rising

All 4 SG feed rates above steam rates

Both MFP speeds increasing

MFP discharge pressure rising UO IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS:

AOP 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation F1. Check steam and feed flows MATCHED on ALL SGs RNO. Takes manual control of the following as necessary to restore NR level between 60% and 70%:

Affected SG feed flow valves

MFP(s) speed SS Directs actions of UO / OATC using AOP 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation (Crew Update)

UO F2. Check controlling steam flow channel AFFECTED BY PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILURE 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Loop 1 Controlling Pressure Channel PT-514 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS/UO F3. Select an unaffected channel using Table F1.

TABLE F1 AFFECTED SG ASSOCIATED SELECTOR SG PRESSURE SG FLOW SWITCH INSTRUMENT CHANNEL PT-514 F512 PT-515 F513 FS-512C 1 SS/UO F4. Return MFP(s) speed controls to AUTO.

SS/UO F5. Return SG feed flow valves to AUTO.

OATC/UO F6. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page SS/UO *F7. Check SG level control maintains NR level AT 65%.

RNO Take manual control of the following as necessary to maintain NR level between 60% and 70%:

Affected SG feed flow valves.

MFP(s) speed SS F8. Notify I&C to initiate repairs.

Contacts SSS to perform the following:

Notify I&C to initiate repairs

Write a Condition Report

Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Loop 1 Controlling Pressure Channel PT-514 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS F9. Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509-C,Bypass Test Instrumentation (BTI) Panel Operation, if desired.

SS F10. Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per Table F2 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (TS 3.3.2)

NOTE: Will not trip bistables, have been taught to BTI Instrumentation.

SS F11. Initiate the applicable actions of Technical Specification 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 3.3.4.

SS *F12. Check repairs and surveillances complete.

RNO. Perform the following:

a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step F13.

b. Return to procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: PROCEED WITH NEXT EVENT MALFUNCTION:

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

CVCS Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose NCP trip:

Indications:

NCP breaker trips:

Red - OFF Green - ON Amber - ON Charging line flow (FI-121) drops to 0 GPM RCP seal injection flows drop to 0 GPM Alarms:

CHARGING PUMP OVERLOAD TRIP CHARGING LINE HI/LO FLOW RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW REGEN HX LTDN HI TEMP 4160V SWGR 1NA05 TROUBLE OATC 18007-C IMMEDIATE ACTIONS B1. Isolate letdown:

a. Close letdown orifice isolation valves:

HV-8149A

HV-8149B

HV-8149C

b. Close letdown isolation valves:

LV-459

LV-460 SS Enters 18007-C, Section B (Crew update)

Verifies immediate action B1 with OATC 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

CVCS Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO B2. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC *B3 Trend RCP Seal Parameters listed in ATTACHMENT A.

ATTACHMENT A RCP SEAL PARAMETER INDICATION NOTE The following points are accessible under IPC Group 62.

PARAMETER IPC POINT RCP Seal Injection Flow:

RCP 1 F0131 RCP 2 F0129 RCP 3 F0127 RCP 4 F0125 RCP Seal Injection Temperature: T0140 (Measured at VCT Outlet)

Number 1 Seal Leakoff High Flow:

RCP 1 F0161 RCP 2 F0160 RCP 3 F0159 RCP 4 F0158 Number 1 Seal Inlet Temperature:

RCP 1 T0181 / T0417 RCP 2 T0182 / T0437 RCP 3 T0183 / T0457 RCP 4 T0184 / T0477 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

CVCS Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B4. Check charging pump(s) - OPERATING NORMALLY:

Discharge flow trend - STABLE.

Discharge pressure trend - STABLE.

VCT level - IN NORMAL BAND.

Bus current - STABLE.

Suction pressure - STABLE SO will report after dispatched for the NCP and its breaker:

NCP pump bearings hot and over current relays tripped for breaker 1NA05-08.

The crew may perform this RNO OATC RNO B4. Perform the following:

a. Stop charging pumps.

b. Determine and correct cause of charging pump abnormal operations.

c. IF loss of suction to charging pumps has occurred, THEN do NOT start charging pumps until the cause of the loss of suction is understood and all affected piping and components are vented.

d. IF gas binding of charging pumps occurred, THEN do NOT start charging pumps until the cause of the gas binding is understood and all affected piping and components are vented.

OATC B5. Locate and isolate any charging system leakage.

OATC B6. Check ACCW system - IN SERVICE.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

CVCS Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B7. Check normal charging valves - OPEN:

HV-8105

HV-8106

HV-8146 or HV-8147

HV-8485A and B

FV-121 OATC *B8. Check normal charging flow - ESTABLISHED.

RNO

B8. Perform the following:

a) WHEN normal charging flowpath can be established, THEN place normal charging and letdown in service by initiating 13006-1, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

b) Go to Step B10.

OATC Refer to Event 4 for placing normal CVCS charging and letdown in service per SOP 13006-1.

OATC B10. Establish Seal Injection flow to all RCPs - 8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC B11. Check RCP seal injection flow - ESTABLISHED.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 5 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

CVCS Normal Charging Pump (NCP) TRIPS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS NOTE Operation of the excess letdown flowpath will bypass the CVCS demineralizers. This may impact RCS chemistry control.

OATC *B12. Control PRZR level - IN PROGRAM BAND.

SS B13. Initiate the following Technical Specifications and/or Technical Requirements as necessary:

LCO 3.5.2 LCO 3.5.3 LCO 3.5.5 TR 13.1.2 TR 13.1.3 TR 13.1.4 TR 13.1.5 - INFO ONLY OATC B14. Check normal charging flow - ESTABLISHED.

SS B15. Return to procedure and step in effect.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2 Returning Normal Charging and Letdown to Service OATC 4.4.2.1 IF a Charging Pump is NOT in service, Go To Section 4.4.13 to start the NCP OR an available Centrifugal Charging Pump, THEN Return To this section.

OATC 13006-C Section 4.4.13 CAUTIONS

At BOL, while borating to maintain Tavg, the calculated delta boron concentration between the RCS and the last time the CCP/NCP was placed in service may be incorrect. Experience has shown that high concentrations of borated water tend to collect in the suction piping of the idle pumps, resulting in a higher boron concentration in the CCP/NCP than the RCS.

This may cause and unexpected boration and temperature reduction when the pump is placed in service or tested.

Restart of a charging pump should not be delayed in order to flush the pump prior to start.

OATC 4.4.13.1 PRIOR to starting the pump and based on the conditions described in the first caution above, a slight boration should be anticipated and a briefing on compensatory actions to offset the boration should be conducted.

OATC CAUTION A determination should be made that loss of the Charging Pump was not due to air/gas binding before starting the same or another pump.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.13.2 Dispatch an Operator to perform pump pre-start checks.

NOTE: Expect system operators dispatched to check on NCP and NCP breaker for cause of trip.

OATC 4.4.13.3 Verify VCT LEVEL 1LI-185 indicates between 30 and 80%.

OATC 4.4.13.4 Verify OPEN VCT OUTLET ISOLATION Valves:

1-LV-0112B

1-LV-0112C OATC 4.4.13.5 Verify OPEN CCP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-8110.

OATC NOTE CCP-1A is only capable of flows up to 102 gpm at NOPT. It may not be used with 120 gpm letdown. At higher than normal RCS pressure, the flow will be reduced even more.

NOTE: PRIOR TO STEP 4.4.13.6 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.13.6 IF starting a CCP perform the following:

IF starting CCP-A:

a. Open CCP-A SUCTION 1-HV-8471A.

b. Open CCP-A MINIFLOW 1-HV-8111A.

c. Verify OPEN CCP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-8110.

d. Close CCP-A SAFETY GRADE CHG 1-HV-0190A.

e. Open CCP-A DISCHARGE ISOLATION 1-HV-8485A.

IF starting CCP-B: (Expect this option)

a. Open CCP-B SUCTION 1-HV-8471B.

b. Open CCP-B MINIFLOW 1-HV-8111B.

c. Verify OPEN CCP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-8110.

d. Close CCP-B SAFETY GRADE CHG 1-HV-0190B.

e. Open CCP-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION 1-HV-8485B.

f. Open CCP DISCHARGE HEADER CROSSCONNECT 1-HV-8438.

OATC NOTE The desired position of NCP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109 prior to a pump start is closed. The NCP Miniflow valve will open after a pump start and will remain open until the pump is shut down.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.13.7 IF starting the NCP, verify ACCW flow through the NCP Motor Cooler is established.

NOTE: This step will be N/A.

OATC 4.4.13.8 Set 1HC-182 for Maximum Seal Flow (0% demand).

OATC 4.4.13.9 Verify Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 in MAN and set to minimum.

OATC NOTE Normal and Alternate charging paths should be alternated over plant life to equalize thermal stress. The transfer should be performed at cold shutdown conditions to avoid thermal transients. Normal charging should be in service during even-numbered fuel cycles. Alternate charging should be in service during odd-numbered fuel cycles. Swapping nozzles at NOPT should be avoided.

OATC 4.4.13.10 Verify OPEN one of the following:

NORMAL CHARGING TO LOOP 1 1-HV-8146 OR ALTERNATE CHARGING TO LOOP 4 1-HV-8147 OATC 4.4.13.11 Verify OPEN CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION Valves:

1-HV-8105

1-HV-8106 OATC 4.4.13.12 Verify the ALOP of the CCP to be started is running as indicated by the QMCB red indicating lamp lit.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.13.13 Start the desired CCP or NCP:

CCP-A 1HS-273A OR CCP-B 1HS-274A OR NCP 1HS-275 OATC 4.4.13.14 IF a CCP was started, verify the selected CCP ALOP red indicating lamp goes off (on QMCB) shortly after the pump is started.

OATC 4.4.13.15 IF the NCP was started, verify NCP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109 opens.

OATC 4.4.13.16 Simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust Seal Flow Control 1HC-182 to obtain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP.

Adjust Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 to obtain the desired charging flow.

OATC 4.4.13.17 Return To 13006-1, Section 4.4.2 to continue establishing Normal Letdown and Charging.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 6 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 13006-C Section 4.4.2 NOTES

This section also applies to returning normal charging and letdown to service following termination of safety injection.

Letdown is to be established as soon as possible after initiating flow through a Charging Nozzle.

OATC 4.4.2.2 IF NCP is in service, verify NCP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109 is open.

NOTE: NCP Not In Service. This Step N/A.

OATC 4.4.2.3 Perform the following:

a. Close LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valves:

1-HV-8149A

1-HV-8149B

1-HV-8149C

b. Close LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves:

1-LV-460

1-LV-459

c. Close PZR AUX SPRAY VALVE 1-HV-8145

d. Open CVCS LETDOWN PIPE BREAK PROT ISOLATION 1-HV-15214.

e. Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV IRC 1-HV-8160.

f. Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV ORC 1-HV-8152.

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 7 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.3

g. Place Letdown Pressure Controller 1PIC-131 in MAN and adjust output to between 50% and 75%.

h. Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in MAN and adjust output to the most current position as recorded on the Control Room Rounds Sheets.

i. Verify PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1LR-459 greater than 17%.

NOTE If Normal Charging and Letdown are being returned to service as directed from Section 4.4.15, one of the valves in Substep j.

and both valves in Step 4.4.2.4 will already be open.

4.4.2.3

j. Verify one of the following are OPEN:

NORMAL CHARGING TO LOOP 1 1-HV-8146 (even-numbered fuel cycle)

OR ALTERNATE CHARGING TO LOOP 4 1-HV-8147 (odd-numbered fuel cycle)

OATC 4.4.2.4 Verify CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION Valves are OPEN:

1-HV-8106

1-HV-8105 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 8 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.5 Simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust 1HC-182 output to maintain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP.

Adjust 1FIC-121 to raise CHG FLOW 1FI-121A to between 80 and 90 gpm.

OATC 4.4.2.6 Open LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves by holding their handswitches in OPEN UNTIL the valves are fully open:

1-LV-460 1HS-460

1-LV-459 1HS-459 OATC 4.4.2.7 Establish Letdown flow:

a. Simultaneously open a Letdown Orifice and maintain pressure by performing the following:

Open one LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valve by holding its handswitch in the OPEN position until fully open:

1HS-8149B (75 gpm - odd fuel cycles)

OR 1HS-8149C (75 gpm - even fuel cycles)

OR 1HS-8149A (45 gpm)

Adjust 1PIC-131A to maintain LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A between 360 and 380 psig.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 9 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.7

b. Record the letdown orifice that was placed in service in the Unit Control Log.

OATC 4.4.2.8 WHEN LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A stabilizes between 360 and 380 psig, place 1PIC-131 in AUTO.

OATC 4.4.2.9 Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in AUTO and verify it maintains temperature less than or equal to 115°F.

OATC 4.4.2.10 Verify LETDOWN REGEN HX OUT 1TI-127 indicates less than 380°F.

OATC 4.4.2.11 Monitor 1LR-459 Pressurizer Level and Pressurizer Level Setpoint.

OATC 4.4.2.12 Maintain Pressurizer Level within 1% of Level Setpoint using 1FIC-121.

OATC 4.4.2.13 Place Pressurizer Level Control in automatic UNLESS it is to remain in Manual under Tagout or Caution tag:

a. Verify PRZR Level Controller 1LIC-459 in AUTO.

b. AFTER level has been stable within 1% of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place 1FIC-121 in AUTO.

OATC 4.4.2.14 IF this section was performed to restore normal charging and letdown to service following termination of Safety Injection, Return To 19011-C, "ES-1.1 SI Termination".

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 10 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE: If the crew opts to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM then these additional steps of procedure. 13006-1 Section 4.2.4 will apply. IF NOT PROCEED TO NEXT EVENT.

OATC 4.2.4 Raising Letdown Flow (45 gpm to 120 gpm) or (75 gpm to 120 gpm)

NOTE Table 1 may be reviewed for specific charging flow and letdown orifice combinations and conditions.

TABLE 1 Required Manual Final Charging 1TI-127 1TI-127 Desired Initial Flow for Temperature ° Final Final Temperature ° Letdown Charging Transfer: 1PIC-131 Initial Orifice Orifice(s) Charging 1PIC-131 Flow Flow GPM Pressure PSIG In service In service Flow Pressure PSIG Swap 45 ~58 gpm ~90 - 100 <290° 8149A 8149B ~87 gpm ~290° AUTO to 75 gpm or 100 to 120 8149C ~370 AUTO Raise 75 ~87 gpm ~120 - <290° 8149B (8149B or ~132 gpm ~290° AUTO to 120 130 or 8149C) 100 to 120 8149C and ~370 AUTO 8149A Swap 75 ~87 gpm ~90 - 100 <290° 8149B 8149C ~87 gpm ~290° AUTO to 75 or or 100 to 120 8149C 8149B ~370 AUTO Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTIONS

CCP-1B or the NCP must be used for 120 gpm letdown. CCP-1A is only capable of flows up to 102 gpm at NOPT. It may not be used with 120 gpm letdown. At higher than normal RCS pressure, the flow will be reduced even more.

Letdown temperature and pressure should be continuously monitored during the transfer. The Operator should manually intervene to control these limits during the transfer.

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 11 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.4.1 IF CCP-A is in service, swap to the NCP or CCP-B per Section 4.2.1 or 4.2.3 as applicable.

OATC 4.2.4.2 Maintain Seal Injection flows between 8 and 13 gpm per RCP.

OATC 4.2.4.3 IF the NCP is in service, perform the following:

a. Dispatch an operator to obtain NCP miniflow value as indicated on 1FI-10132 NCP MINIFLOW FLOW INDICATOR

b. Place Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 in MAN AND adjust charging until the sum of NCP miniflow AND normal charging flow is greater than 120 gpm.

NOTE Reducing seal injection flow before closing miniflow will help keep seal flow from exceeding maximum limit when 1-HV-8109 goes closed.

4.2.4.3

c. Adjust SEAL FLOW CONTROL 1HC-182 as necessary to maintain Seal Injection flows approximately 8 gpm.

d. Close NCP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109.

OATC 4.2.4.4 WITH Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 in MAN, simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust 1FIC-121 until charging flow is approximately 120 to 130 gpm.

Adjust SEAL FLOW CONTROL 1HC-182 as necessary to maintain Seal Injection flows between 8 and 13 gpm.

11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 12 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.4.5 Verify Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet 1TI-127 temperature remains less than 290°F.

CAUTION The time at reduced letdown pressure should be as short as possible to minimize orifice erosion.

OATC 4.2.4.6 Place Letdown Pressure Controller 1PIC-131 pressure controller in MAN AND adjust LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A pressure to between 190 and 200 psig.

NOTE Steps 4.2.4.7 and 4.2.4.8 should be performed concurrently to minimize the potential for orifice erosion.

ALB07-F03 LTDN HX OUT HI FLOW OATC 4.2.4.7 Open the selected LETDOWN ORIFICE isolation valve:

1HS-8149A for 45 gpm orifice isolation 1-HV-8149A.

OR 1HS-8149B for 75 gpm orifice isolation 1-HV-8149B (odd fuel cycles).

OR 1HS-8149C for 75 gpm orifice isolation 1-HV-8149C (even fuel cycles).

12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 13 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.4.8 Adjust 1PIC-131 to maintain letdown pressure between 360 and 380 psig.

OATC 4.2.4.9 WHEN LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A stabilizes between 360 and 380 psig, place 1PIC-131 in AUTO.

OATC 4.2.4.10 Monitor 1LR-459 Pressurizer Actual Level and Level Setpoint.

OATC 4.2.4.11 Adjust 1FIC-121 to maintain Pressurizer Level within 1% of setpoint.

OATC 4.2.4.12 Place Pressurizer Level Control in automatic UNLESS it is to remain in Manual under Tagout or Caution tag:

a. Verify PRZR Level Controller 1LIC-459 in AUTO.

b. AFTER level has been stable within 1% of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place 1FIC-121 in AUTO.

OATC 4.2.4.13 Adjust LETDOWN HEAT EXCH OUTLET 1TIC-130 to maintain LETDOWN HEAT EXCH OUTLET 1TI-130 below 115°F, and place in AUTO.

OATC 4.2.4.14 Record the letdown orifice that was placed-in service or removed-from-service in the Unit Control Log.

OATC 4.2.4.15 Notify Chemistry that Letdown Flow has been raised.

OATC 4.2.4.16 Notify Reactor Engineering that Letdown Flow has been changed and to monitor for impacts.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 14 of 14 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Restore Normal Charging and Letdown per procedure Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 18007-C, Section B, Loss of Charging Flow RNO Step B8, using procedure 13006-1, CVCS Section 4.4.2.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

PR NIS N-44 fails low requiring entry into AOP-18002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose failure of PRNI channel:

Alarms POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION POWER RANGE HI NEURTON FLX RATE ALERT POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLX HI SETPOINT ALERT OVERPOWER ROD STOP Control Board NI-44C AFD goes to - 12%

NI-44B Power goes to 111%

No inward motion of control rods in manual Trip Status Light Board (TSLB)

NI-44 Hi Set Hi flux bistable - ON NI-44 Hi rate bistable - ON OATC AOP 18002-C IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION B1. Place rods in manual SS Enters AOP 18002-C, Section B, POWER RANGE DRAWER N41, N42, N43, N44 MALFUNCTION (Crew Update)

OATC B1. Place rods are in manual.

UO B2. Terminate any load change in progress.

OATC B3. Checks THERMAL POWER GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 75%.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

PR NIS N-44 fails low requiring entry into AOP-18002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS B4. Directs Engineers to perform 88015-C, QUADRANT POWER TILT MEASUREMENT USING MOVEABLE INCORE DETECTOR SYSTEM as required by Tech Spec SR 3.2.4.2 UO B5. Perform the following:

a. Selects the affected channel for the following at the NIS racks:

ROD STOP BYPASS switch.

COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch.

POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch.

UPPER SECTION switch.

LOWER SECTION switch.

b. Reset rate trip.

OATC B6. Restore Tavg to program OATC B7. Place rods in AUTO if desired OATC B8. Check the operable Power Range Channel(s) indicating properly on NR-45.

SS B9. Notify I&C to initiate repairs 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

PR NIS N-44 fails low requiring entry into AOP-18002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS B10. Bypass affected channel NIS and NSSS grouping using 13509-C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION Not expected to bypass to allow I&C to troubleshoot the failed PRNI SS / OATC B11. Within one hour, check the following interlocks are in their required state for existing unit conditions. (TS 3.3.1)

P-7

P-8

P-9

P-10 SS / UO B12. Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months place the inoperable Power Range Channel in trip by performing the following: (TS 3.3.1)

a. Remove the AC Control Power Fuses on the affected drawer.

b. Trip overtemperature delta-T bistables for affected channel CHANNEL CAB FRAME/ B/S SWITCHES CARD N-41 1 8/22 3 TS-411C 1 8/22 4 TS-411D N-42 2 8/22 3 TS-421C 2 8/22 4 TS-421D N-43 3 8/22 3 TS-431C 3 8/22 4 TS-431D N-44 4 8/22 3 TS-441C 4 8/22 4 TS-441D 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

PR NIS N-44 fails low requiring entry into AOP-18002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS B13. Initiate 14915, SPECIAL CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE LOGS.

(Data Sheet 7 for QPTR is the applicable portion of this procedure since reactor power is > 75 %.)

SS B14. Initiate the applicable actions of the following Technical Specifications:

- Table 3.3.1-1 Function 2

- Table 3.3.1-1 Function 3

- Table 3.3.1-1 Function 6

- Table 3.3.1-1 Function 16 Function 2a - PR flux High trip - Condition D Function 2b - PR flux Low trip - Condition E Function 3 - PR flux high positive rate trip - Condition E Function 6 - OTT - Condition E Function 16 - Trip Interlocks:

P Condition S P Condition S P Condition S P-10 & Input to P Condition R SS / UO B15. If necessary to calibrate the remaining OPERABLE Power range NI channels:

a. Restore failed channel to normal alignment by performing 13501, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM, Sections 4.1.4 and 4.1.5

b. Perform 14030, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT CALORIMETRIC CALIBRATION, for the OPERABLE Power Range NI Channels.

c. When all required OPERABLE Power Range NI channel adjustments are complete, repeat Step B5 for the failed channel.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

PR NIS N-44 fails low requiring entry into AOP-18002-C, Section B for PR NIS Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO B16. Initiate 13501-C, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM, when repairs and surveillances are complete.

SS B17. Return to procedure and step in effect 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses LOCA (Ejected Rod) with an ATWT CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions Per E-0, 19000-C, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC 1. Check Reactor Trip

Rod Bottom Lights - LIT

Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN

Neutron Flux - LOWERING RNO

1. Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches.

IF Reactor NOT tripped, THEN go to 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION / ATWT.

UO 2. Check Turbine Trip:

All Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED UO 3. Check Power to AC Emergency Buses:

a. AC Emergency Busses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

4160V AC 1E Busses

b. AC Emergency Buses - ALL ENERGIZED:

4160V AC 1E Busses

480V AC 1E Busses OATC 4. Check if SI is actuated:

Any SI annunciator - LIT

SI ACTUATED BPLP window - LIT SS __ Go to Step 6 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / CREW 6. Initiate the Foldout Page.

RCP TRIP CRITERIA.

Trip all RCPs if BOTH conditions listed below occur:

a. CCPs or SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

b. RCP Trip Parameter - RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN 1375 PSIG.

OATC Recognizes RCP TRIP CRITERIA met per foldout page and CRITICAL trips ALL RCPs between now and PRIOR to step 12 of E-0.

7. Perform the following:

OATC

OATC Initial Actions Page UO

UO Initial Actions Page Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 1. Check both Trains of ECCS equipment-ALIGNING FOR INJECTION PHASE

MLB indication.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: SI Train A Fails to Auto Actuate RNO Step 1. Actuate SI.

Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 2. Check Containment Isolation Phase A - ACTUATED

CIA MLB indication 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 3. Check ECCS Pumps and NCP status:

a. CCPs - RUNNING.

b. SI Pumps - RUNNING.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: SI Pump A Fails to Auto Start. SI Pump B Trips during load sequence.

RNO CRITICAL Step 3b. Start SI Pump.A

c. RHR Pumps - RUNNING.

d. NCP - TRIPPED.

Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 4. Verify CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 5. Verify proper NSCW system operation:

a. NSCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

b. NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN handswitches

- IN AUTO:

HS-1668A

HS-1669A 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 6. Verify Containment Cooling Units:

a. ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED

MLB indication

b. NSCW Cooler isolation valves - OPEN:

MLB indication Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 7. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED

CVI MLB indication Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 8. Check Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21.5 PSIG.

Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 9. Check ECCS flows:

a. BIT Flow.

b. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1625 PSIG.

c. SI Pump flow.

d. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 300 PSIG RNO Step 9d. Go to Step 10.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 10. Check ECCS Valve alignment - PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs.

Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 11. Check ACCW Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Performs OATC Initial Actions of E- 0.

OATC Step 12. Adjust Seal Injection flow to RCPs - 8 to 13 GPM.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

CREW RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OF E-0 CONTINUING AT STEP 8.

Performs UO Initial Actions of E- 0 UO Step 1. Check AFW Pumps - RUNNING

MDAFW Pumps

TDAFW Pump, if required Performs UO Initial Actions of E- 0 UO Step 2. Check NR level in at least one SG - GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE]

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 6 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Performs UO Initial Actions of E- 0 UO Step 3. Check if main steamlines should be isolated:

a. Check for one or more of the following conditions:

_ Any steamline pressure - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 585 PSIG.

_ Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG.

_ Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI - BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate - ONTWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLINE.

RNO Step 3a. Go to Step 4 Performs UO Initial Actions of E- 0 UO Step 4. Verify FW Isolation Valves closed:

MFIVs

BFIVs

MFRVs

BFRVs 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 7 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Performs UO Initial Actions of E- 0 UO Step 5. Verify SG Blowdown isolated:

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, C, and D in the CLOSE position.

SG Sample Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

Performs UO Initial Actions of E- 0 UO Step 6. Verify Diesel Generators - RUNNING.

Performs UO Initial Actions of E- 0 UO Step 7. Throttle total AFW flow as necessary to maintain SG NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%.

Performs UO Initial Actions of E- 0 UO Step 8. Verify both MFPs - TRIPPED.

Performs UO Initial Actions of E- 0 UO Step 9. Check Main Generator Output Breakers - OPEN.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

CREW RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OF E-0 CONTINUING AT STEP 8.

7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 8 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC / UO 8. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page SS *9. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557º F:

OATC __. With RCP(s) running - RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE

-OR-

__ Without RCP(s) running - RCS WR COLD LEG TEMPERATURES RNO UO Step *9 IF temperature is less than 557ºF and lowering, THEN perform the following as necessary

a. Stop dumping steam.

b. Perform the following as appropriate:

__ IF at least one SG NR level greater than 10% [32%

ADVERSE], THEN lower total feed flow.

-OR-

__ IF all SG NR levels less than 10% [32% ADVERSE],

THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 GPM.

c. IF cooldown continues THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

d. IF temperature greater than 557ºF and rising THEN dump steam.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 9 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 10. Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:

OATC a. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED AND IN AUTO.

b. Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.

c. Power available to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.

d. PRZR PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN RNO Step 10*d. Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.

SS 11. Check if RCPs should be stopped:

OATC a. ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

CCP or SI Pump.

b. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1375 PSIG.

CRITICAL c. Stop all RCPs.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: ALL RCPs should be stopped prior to initiating next step.

SS 12. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

UO a. SG Pressures:

__ Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner.

-OR-

__ Any completely depressurized.

RNO SS Step 12a. Go to Step 13.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 10 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 13. Check SG Tubes intact:

UO a. Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b. Secondary radiation NORMAL:

MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:

RE-13120 (SG1)

RE-13121 (SG2)

RE-13122 (SG3)

RE-13119 (SG4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839C

RE-12838D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation.

c. Check SG levels - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RNO SS Step 13c. Go to Step 14.

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 11 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 14. Check if RCS is intact inside Containment:

Containment radiation - NORMAL.

Containment pressure - NORMA.L

Containment Emergency Recirculation Sump levels - NORMAL RNO Step 14. Go to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT SS Transitions to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT (Crew Update) 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT CREW 1. Initiate the following:

OATC/UO

Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.

OATC

Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

SS 2. Initiate 91001-C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS OATC *3. Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs - 8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC 4. Check if RCPs should be stopped:

a. ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING:

CCP or SI Pump

b. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1375 PSIG

c. Stop all RCPs.

11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 12 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 5. Check ACCW Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

UO 6. Place Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service by initiating 13130, POST-ACCIDENT HYDROGEN CONTROL NOTE: Expect request for extra operator to perform this action SS 7. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

UO a. Identify faulted SG(s):

__ ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

-OR-

__ ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.

RNO Step 7a. Go to Step 8 SS *8. Check intact SG levels:

UO a. NR level - AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10% [32%

ADVERSE].

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%.

c. NR level - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

RNO SS Step *8c. Go to step 9.

12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 13 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 9. Check SG Tubes intact:

UO a. Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b. Secondary radiation NORMAL:

MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:

RE-13120 (SG1)

RE-13121 (SG2)

RE-13122 (SG3)

RE-13119 (SG4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839C

RE-12838D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation.

c. Check SG levels - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RNO Step 9c. Go to Step 10.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 14 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS *10. Check PRZR PORVs and Block Valves:

OATC a. Power to PRZR PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.

b. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED.

c. PRZR PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RNO Step 10c. IF NOT closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV, AND WHEN PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig, THEN verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve.

d. Any RCS WR CL temperature - LESS THAN 220ºF.

RNO Step 10d. WHEN any RCS CL temperature lowers to less than 220ºF, THEN arm COPS.

SS __ Go to Step 11.

SS *11. Check if ECCS flow should be reduced:

OATC a. RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 24ºF [38ºF ADVERSE].

RNO SS Step 11a. Go to Step 12.

SS *12. Check if Containment Spray should be stopped:

OATC a. CS Pumps - RUNNING.

RNO SS Step 12a. Go to Step 13.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 15 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW CAUTIONS

If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:

RHR Pumps

SI Pumps

Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units

Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).

ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CRI is reset).

SS 13. Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:

OATC a. RHR Pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.

b. RCS pressure:

1) Greater than 300 psig

2) Stable or rising

c. Reset SI

d. Stop RHR Pumps OATC *14. IF RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 300 psig, THEN restart RHR Pumps SS 15. Check RCS and SG pressures:

UO

Pressure in all SGs - STABLE OR RISING.

OATC

RCS pressure - STABLE OR LOWERING 15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 16 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 16. Check if DGs should be stopped:

UO a. AC Emergency Busses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER

b. Reset SI, if necessary OATC

c. Stop any unloaded DG and place in standby by initiating UO 13145, DIESEL GENERATORS

d. Check Stub Busses - ENERGIZED UO

NB01

NB10 RNO 16d. Energize Stub Busses by performing the following as necessary:

NB01 NB10

1) Open breaker NB01-01 1) Open breaker NB10-01

2) Close breaker AA02-22 2) Close breaker BA03-18

3) Close breaker NB01-01 3) Close breaker NB10-01 SS 17. Check Cold Leg recirculation capability:

a. Power available to:

OATC Train A components:

HV-8811A - CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-A SUCTION.

RHR Pump A - OPERABLE.

HV-8809A - RHR PMP-A TO COLD LEG 1&2 ISO VLV.

RHR Heat Exchanger A - OPERABLE

-OR-Train B components:

HV-8811B - CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-B SUCTION.

RHR Pump B - OPERABLE.

HV-8809B - RHR PMP-B TO COLD LEG 3&4 ISO VLV.

RHR Heat Exchanger B - OPERABLE.

16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 17 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 18. Check Auxiliary Building leak detection systems:

a. PLANT VENT Radiation Monitors - NORMAL:

RE-12442A EFFL PART

RE-12442B EFFL IODINE

RE-12442C EFFL RAD

RE-12444C RADIOGAS RAD

b. Auxiliary Building break detection system on QPCP - ALL LEAK DETECTION STATUS LIGHTS NOT LIT.

SS/UO 19. Direct Chemistry to obtain samples:

For boron, pH, and radioactivity::

RCS

BOTH Containment Emergency Sumps(if cold leg recirculation has been established.

For radioactivity, hydrogen and oxygen concentrations:

Containment atmosphere.

SS/UO 20. Evaluate plant equipment:

a. Secure unnecessary plant equipment.

b. Within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of SI actuation isolate NSCW Corrosion Monitor Racks:

Close 1202-U4-179.

Close 1202-U4-180 (located in NSCTs on NSCW return header).

c. Repair or make available inoperable equipment which may be required.

17

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 18 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 20. d. Consult TSC for additional equipment to be started or actions to be taken to assist in recovery including.

H2 Monitors

CRDM Fans

Within 5 days, initiate Containment inspection/cleanup if Containment Spray actuated and was terminated prior to recirculation SS *21 In the event of a Design Basis Accident, the following apply concerning conservation of Ultimate Heat Sink inventory:

IF a DBA LOCA coincident with a LOSP has occurred, THEN secure one train of NSCW within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the initiating event per 13150, NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER SYSTEM.

IF a DBA LOCA without an LOSP has occurred and normal NSCW makeup is lost, THEN secure one train of NSCW within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the loss of makeup capability per 13150, NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER SYSTEM.

SS 22. Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required:

OATC a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 300 PSIG.

SS b. Go to 19012-C, ES-1.2 POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION.(Crew Update) 18

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 19 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 19012-C, ES-1.2 POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION.

SS 1. Initiate the following:

OATC / UO

Continuous Actions and Foldout Page OATC

Critical Safety function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

SS CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:

RHR Pumps

SI Pumps

Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units

Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).

ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CRI is reset).

OATC 2. Reset SI CAUTION Respositioning Phase A Isolation Valves may cause radiation problems throughout the plant.

OATC 3. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A 19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 20 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 4. Establish Instrument Air to Containment:

UO a. Instrument Air Pressure - GREATER THAN 100 PSIG.

b. Open INSTR AIR CNMT ISO VLV HV-9378.

OATC c. Verify PRZR Spray Valves operating as required.

SS 5. Check AC BUSSES:

UO a. Emergency Buses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER.

b. All Non -1E 4160/480V Busses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER.

c. Check Stub Busses - ENERGIZED:

NB01

NB10 SS 6. De-energize PRZR Heaters:

OATC a. Control Group C - PULL-TO-LOCK.

b. Backup Groups A, B, D - OFF.

SS c. Consult TSC for a minimum indicated PRZR water level before re-energizing PRZR Heaters.

20

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 21 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 7. Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:

OATC a. RHR Pumps - ANYRUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.

b. RCS pressure

Greater than300 psig

Stable or rising

Stop RHR Pumps taking suction from the RWST.

SS *8. IF RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less OATC than 300 psig THEN restart pumps.

SS *9. Check intact SG levels:

UO a. NR level - AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10%

[32% ADVERSE]

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%.

c. NR level - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

RNO 9c. Go to Step 10.

21

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 22 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE:

When the low steamline pressure SI/SLI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

SS 10. Check if low steamline pressure SI/SLI should be blocked:

UO a. Steam Dumps - AVAILABLE.

OATC b. PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2000 PSIG UO C. High steam pressure rate alarms - CLEAR.

UO D. Block low steamline pressure SI/SLI using the following:

HS-40068

HS-40069 SS 11. Check if automatic Steam Dump isolation should be bypassed:

OATC a. RCS temperature - GREATER THAN 550ºF.

b. As RCS cooldown is initiated, hold HS-0500A and HS-0500B in the BYPASS INTERLOCK position until RCS temperature is less than 550ºF.

SS *12 Initiate RCS cooldown to cold shutdown:

a. Monitor shutdown margin by initiating 14005, SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND KEFF CALCULATIONS.

22

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 23 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO b. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100ºF/HR.

c. Use RHR system if in service.

d. Dump steam to Condenser from intact SG(s) using Steam Dumps:

Place PIC-507 in Manual.

Match demand on SG Header Pressure Controller PIC-507 and SD demand meter UI-500.

Transfer Steam Dumps to STM PRESS mode.

Open available Steam Dumps by slowly raising demand on PIC-507.

OATC 13. Check RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 24ºF [38ºF ADVERSE].

SS 14. Check if ECCS is in service:

OATC

SI pumps - ANY RUNNING.

-OR-

FLOW THROUGH BIT.

-OR-

RHR Pumps - ANY RUNNING IN SI MODE.

23

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 24 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 15. Check if RCS depression required:

OATC

PRZR Level - LESS THAN 19% [50% ADVERSE]

OATC 16. Check Normal Spray - AVAILABLE RNO

16. Go to Step 18 OATC 18. Check at least one PRZR PORV - AVAILABLE OATC 19. Check at least one PRZR PORV block Valve - AVAILABLE.

NOTE The Upper Head region of the vessel may void during RCS depressurization if RCPs are not running. This will result in a rapidly rising PRZR level.

OATC 20. Depressurize RCS using a PRZR PORV to refill PRZR:

a. Arm one available train of COPS and check PRZR PORV Block Valve - OPEN.

b. Open one PRZR PORV.

SS c. Go to Step 23.

24

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 25 of 25 Event No.: 6, 7 and 8 Event

Description:

Rod H8 Ejects From The Core (Primary LOCA) with failure of Reactor to auto trip. Train A Auto SI Actuation Failure, SI Pump A Auto Start Failure and SI Pump B trips during SI loading sequence. AFW pumps auto actuation failure (all 3 pumps) with manual starts available.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS *23. Check depressurization termination criteria met:

OATC a. PRZR level - GREATER THAN 19% [50% ADVERSE].

b. Terminate RCS depressurization:

1) Verify Normal PRZR Spray valve(s) - CLOSED.

2) Verify PRZR PORV9s) - CLOSED.

3) Block COPS.

4) Check Auxiliary Spray - IN SERVICE RNO

23. Go to Step 24.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF SCENARIO.

25

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _Vogtle____________ Scenario No.: ___2____ Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: __Capehart__________________ Operators: _____________________________

__Meeks_____________________ _____________________________

__Hopkins____________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% Power, MOL.

Equipment OOS: CCW pump 5, Air Compressor 3 Turnover: Maintain 100% power, and INFO LCO 3.7.7 CCW Train A, Containment Mini-purge is in service.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ES 01 - Failure of Manual Reactor Trip Override CNMT Spray Pump B hand switch to STOP ES 22B - BIT Discharge Isolation HV-8801B fails to auto open.

ES 25A and ES 25B - CNMT Mini-purge dampers HV-2628B and HV-2629B fail to auto close.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 SG02A I-SS SG NR controlling Level channel LT -551 fails high (AOP 18001-C

@ 100% I-UO Section E).

TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 / 3.3.2 2 CC01B C-SS Loss of CCW due to pump #3 trip with CCW pump 5 tagged out.

C-UO TS-SS LCO 3.7.7 3 CV05 C-SS CVCS LTDN HX tube leak @ 30 gpm.

@ 30% C-OATC RF AC06 Remote Function is to isolate letdown HX 4 N/A N-OATC Place Excess Letdown in Service N-SS 5 EL07A C-ALL Loss of 1AA02 due to fault on bus AOP 18031-C Section A RFs:

EL 22,24, TS-SS LCO 3.8.1 / 3.7.5 32,33,35 Remote functions are for restoring power from alternate sources.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 6 RC04A C-OATC Small RCS Pressure boundary leak from Hot leg weld (5.0 gpm)

@ 0.1% C-SS AOP 18004C entry. NOTE: This takes ~ 7.5 minutes to cause a rad alarm TS-SS LCO 3.4.13 for RCS Leakage 7 N/A R-OATC Initiates lowering Reactor power for plant shutdown per UOP-12004-C.

R-SS N-UO 8 RC03D M-ALL DBA LOCA EOP 19000 to 19010 to 19251 (CNMT Orange path)

ES 01 C-OATC AUTO REACTOR TRIP FAILURE 9 ES 22A C-SS BIT Discharge Isolation valve 1-HV-8801B fails to auto open.

ES 22B C-OATC 10 ES 25A C-SS CVI dampers HV-2628B & HV-2629B fail to auto close (mini purge)

ES 25B C-UO 11 ES01 C-SS CS Pump B auto & manual start failure.

Override C-OATC CSP HS When SO is sent to investigate CS pump report breaker racked in too far. Remove override when directed to re-rack the breaker.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

SG1 controlling NR level channel LT-551 fails high requiring entry into AOP 18001-C section E.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Take manual control of SG1 MFRV and match feed flow to steam flow. Select unaffected channel for control &

place MFRV back in automatic.

Technical Specifications:

3.3.1 RTS function 13 condition E - action trip B/S in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.3.2 ESFAS Function 5c (P-14) Condition I, 6b (AFW on SG lo-lo level) Condition D

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 2:

CCW train A pump 3 trip. Pump 5 cannot be started. AOP 18020-C entry required.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Place train A pumps in PTL. Start unaffected train CCW per SOP-13715.

Technical Specifications:

3.7.7 Condition A - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to restore.

Events 3 & 4:

The CVCS letdown HX tube leak requires AOP 18007 and ARP 17100 entry to isolate letdown heat exchanger and to implement the loss of letdown AOP.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Isolates letdown HX from RCS using the following valves per ARP-17100 for RE-1950.

Bypasses CVCS demins by placing 1-HS-0129 to the VCT position.

Diverts Letdown to the HUT by placing 1-HS-0112A to the HUT position.

Verifies closed letdown orifice isolation valves 1-HV-8149A, B, C.

Verifies closed letdown isolation valves 1-LV-459 and 1-LV-460.

Verifies closed letdown containment penetration valves 1-HV-8152 and 1-HV-8160.

Sets 1-PV-0131 to maximum pressure.

Sets 1-TV-0130 to maximum temperature.

OATC - Places excess letdown in service per SOP-13008-C, Excess Letdown.

Opens 1-HV-8153 and 1-HV-8154 Excess Letdown Isolations.

Opens 1-HC-0123 to control Excess Letdown temperature and pressure within procedural limits.

Adjusts charging and seal injection using 1-FIC-0121 and 1-HC-0182 to control pressurizer level.

Technical Specifications:

N/A Event 5:

Fault on 1E switchgear results in loss of power to 1AA02.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Emergency trips DG-1A, reduces TDAFWP flow, reduces turbine load as necessary.

OATC - Verifies reactor power stays below license limit by using Control Rods and RCS boron as necessary.

UO - Re-aligns the Containment HVAC to Train B.

Technical Specifications:

3.8.1 AC Electrical Sources, Conditions A and B, 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating, Condition A & 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater, Condition C for 2 Trains Inoperable.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 6:

Small RCS unidentified leak requiring AOP 18004-C entry. Crew will reduce power to comply with LCO 3.4.13 condition B actions.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Adjusts charging using FIC-0121 and seal injection using HC-0182 to determine leak rate.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13 Conditions A for RCS Unidentified Leakage > 1.0 gpm.

Event 7:

Crew initiates unit shutdown due to excessive RCS unidentified leakage.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Inserts controls rods and/or borates RCS as necessary to lower reactor power.

Events 8, 9, 10 and 11:

The DBA LOCA with equipment failures requires transition to 19251-C due to CNMT orange path.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - manually perform reactor trip.

OATC - manually opens BIT Discharge Isolation valve UO - manually close CVI dampers & valves.

OATC - manually start Containment Spray pump B when available.

CRITICAL ACTIONS:

1) Start CNMT Spray pump B to reduce CNMT barrier challenge from Orange to Yellow to preclude failure of the Containment barrier.

2) Manually open BIT isolation valve HV-8801B in order to provide HHSI during DBA LOCA to ensure adequate core heat removal.

3) Manually close either HV-2628B or HV-2629B in the Containment Mini-flow path to preclude a radioactive release to the environment during DBA LCA.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

SG # 1 controlling level channel LT-551 fails HIGH requiring UO to take manual control of SG # 1 MFRV to control SG levels, selects and unaffected level channel and returns SG # 1 MFRV to Auto.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose the failure of SG # 1 controlling level channel LT-551.

Symptoms / alarms:

STM GEN 1 HI / LO LVL DEVIATION

STM GEN 1 HI-HI LEVEL ALERT.

Indications:

MFRV # 1 throttling shut

Feed flow < steam flow on SG # 1 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS SS / UO E1. Check Steam and feed flows - MATCHED ON ALL SGS.

IOA RNO E1. Take manual control of affected SG feed flow valves to restore NR level between 60% and 70%.

SS Enters AOP-18001-C, Section E for Failure of SG Level Instrumentation SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS SS / UO E2. Selects unaffected SG level channel for control. (Selects 1LT-519, Ch II on 1LS-519C)

UO E3. Return SG feed flow valves control to automatic.

OATC / UO E4. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO *E5. Check SG level control maintains NR level - AT 65%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

SG # 1 controlling level channel LT-551 fails HIGH requiring UO to take manual control of SG # 1 MFRV to control SG levels, selects and unaffected level channel and returns SG # 1 MFRV to Auto.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS E6 Notify I & C to initiate repairs.

NOTE: SS calls SSS at C&T to notify the Operations Duty Management of the AOP 18001-C entry, write a CR and notify maintenance of failed channel.

SS E7. Bypass the affected channel per 13509-C, Bypass Test Instrumentation (BTI) Panel Operation.

NOTE: It is not expected the SS will desire to bypass the channel.

SS E8. Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per TABLE E1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

NOTE: It is not expected the SS will trip bistables at this time.

SS E9. Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS 3.3.1

TS 3.3.2 LCO 3.3.1 FU 13 CONDITION E SG LO-LO LEVEL RX TRIP LCO 3.3.2 FU 5c CONDITION I P-14, FWI LCO 3.3.2 FU 6b CONDITION D SG LO-LO LEVEL AFW ACTUATION SS *E10. Check repairs and surveillances - COMPLETE.

RNO

E10 Perform the following:

a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete THEN perform Step E11.

b. Return to procedure and step in effect.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A trip of running CCW pump # 3 will occur with CCW pump # 5 tagged out.

The crew will enter AOP-18020-C for Loss of CCW. The procedure will direct placing the unaffected train in service after securing Train A CCW Pump #1. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling will be swapped from Train A to Train B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose loss of CCW Train A by any of the following indications:

Symptoms / Alarms:

CCW TRAIN A LO HDR PRESS alarm

CCW TRAIN A LO FLOW alarm

CCW TRAIN A LO HDR PRESS alarm

CCW TRAIN A RHR PMP SEAL LO FLOW alarm

NSCW CCW ACCW TRAIN A TEMP ALARM

CCW TRAIN A RHR HX LO FLOW Indications:

CCW pump # 3 green and amber lights lit on hand switch.

CCW system flows and pressures low.

SS Enters AOP-18020-C for Loss of CCW. (Crew Update)

UO 1. Check CCW pumps in affected train - Two Running (NO)

RNO:

1. No available pump on the affected train.

UO 2. Check CCW Train A operating parameters.

Flow - approximately 9000 gpm - (NO)

Pressure - approximately 90 psig - (NO)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A trip of running CCW pump # 3 will occur with CCW pump # 5 tagged out.

The crew will enter AOP-18020-C for Loss of CCW. The procedure will direct placing the unaffected train in service after securing Train A CCW Pump #1. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling will be swapped from Train A to Train B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

2. cont.

RNO UO 2b. Place the UNAFFECTED train in service by initiating 13715B-1, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM.

UO SOP 13715B-1 Section 4.1, CCW Train B Startup from Standby.

UO Step 4.1.2.2. Marks steps 4.1.2.3, 4.1.2.5, 4.1.2.9 and 4.1.2.10 N/A.

UO Step 4.1.2.4. Simultaneously start two (2) Train B CCW Pumps.

CCW Pump 2: 1-HS-1853A

CCW Pump 4: 1-HS-1855A

CCW Pump 6: 1-HS-1857A UO Step 4.1.2.6: Check CCW Pump Discharge Header Train B 1-PI-1875 rises to about 90 psig.

UO Step 4.1.2.7: Check CCW Pump Discharge Header Train B 1-FI-1877 rises to about 9000 gpm.

UO Step 4.1.2.8. Notify Chemistry of CCW Train B startup so chemicals may be added if needed and proper operation of radiation monitor may be verified.

SS/UO Returns to 18020-C, RNO Step 2d. Go to Step 4.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A trip of running CCW pump # 3 will occur with CCW pump # 5 tagged out.

The crew will enter AOP-18020-C for Loss of CCW. The procedure will direct placing the unaffected train in service after securing Train A CCW Pump #1. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling will be swapped from Train A to Train B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 18020-C SS / UO

4. Verify NSCW supply header flow FI-1640B (1641B) -

APPROXIMATELY 17000 GPM.

SS / OATC 5. Check RHR - REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING RNO

5. Go to Step 9.

UO 9. Check affected train RHR pump - INJECTING IN COLD LEG INJECTION MODE.

RNO

9. Stop affected train RHR pump if running. (Not Running).

UO 10. Check the following:

__ Both extinguished:

ALB03-A05 CCW TRAIN B SURGE TK LO-LO LEVEL

ALB03-B05 CCW TRAIN B SURGE TK HI/LO LEVEL.

CREW 11. Check Affected CCW Train - NO ABNORMAL LEAKAGE.

SS 12. Restore the affected CCW loop to service by initiating 13715A-1.

RNO:

12. Initiate applicable ACTION items for:

TS: LCO 3.7.7 Condition A - Restore train to OPERABLE status. (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months )

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

A trip of running CCW pump # 3 will occur with CCW pump # 5 tagged out.

The crew will enter AOP-18020-C for Loss of CCW. The procedure will direct placing the unaffected train in service after securing Train A CCW Pump #1. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling will be swapped from Train A to Train B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / UO 13. Locally check spent fuel pool temperature - LESS THAN130ºF.

Cue: Spent Fuel Pool Temperature is 131ºF and slowly rising.

RNO

13. Place the UNAFFECTED SFPC train in service by initiating 13719-1 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM.

UO 14. Verify Fuel Handling Building Normal HVAC units - IN OPERATION:

1541-A7-001 (002)

-AND-

1541-N7-001 (002)

SS 15. Return to procedure and step in effect. (UOP-12004)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 9 Event No.: 3-4 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate Alarm and High Radiation (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

125 Position Applicants Action or Behavior Time CREW Indications:

Intermediate and High radiation Alarm Annunciate.

1RE-1950 showing alarm condition on IPC and will trend upward.

OATC / UO References ARP 17005-1, Window B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check the Safety Related Display Console (QRM2), the RMS Communications Console (QRM1) and the Plant Computer to determine the monitor in alarm and Go To 17100-1, "Annunciator Response Procedure For The Process And Effluent Radiation Monitor System (RMS)" or 17102-1, "Annunciator Response Procedure For The Safety Related Display Control QRM2" as appropriate, NOTE: CREW Determines 1RE1950 In HIGH Alarm.

2. IF alarm is for 1-RE-2562A or C, refer to response for High Alarm in 17102-1. (N/A)

3. Initiate a CR documenting Alarm condition.

UO References ARP 17100-1, "Annunciator Response Procedure For The Process And Effluent Radiation Monitor System (RMS)" for 1RE-1950.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 9 Event No.: 3-4 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate Alarm and High Radiation (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / UO ARP 17100-1, 1RE-1950 Actions:

Step 1. Request Chemistry to sample and analyze the ACCW.

SS / UO Step 2. Notify Health Physics of the alarm, CREW Step 3. Locate the source of the in-leakage.

a. Check IPC points T0145, P0135, and F0134 (IPC Group 21) for changes, in an attempt to determine if a Letdown HX tube leak. (YES)

NOTE: Identifies changes and DIAGNOSES Letdown HX tube leakage.

b. Check IPC points T2714, T2716, T2718, and T2720 (IPC Group 242) for changes, in an attempt to determine if leakage is from RCP thermal barrier. (NO)

SS Step 4. Isolate the source if possible.

OATC Step 5. IF 1-RE-1950 is reading high due to LTDN HX tube leakage:

Critical a. Place LETDOWN TO DEMIN/VCT 1-TV-0129 to the VCT position using 1-HS-0129. (CV required.)

Critical (1) Verify 1-TV-0129 aligns to the VCT. (CV required.)

Critical b. Place VCT HUT LETDOWN DIVERT 1-LV-0112A to the HUT position using 1-HS-0112A. (CV required.)

Critical (1) Verify 1-LV-0112A aligns to the RHUT. (CV required.)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 9 Event No.: 3-4 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate Alarm and High Radiation (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 5. Cont.

Critical c. Isolate letdown. Verify closed: (CV required)

(1) 1-HV-8149A, B, C.

(2) 1-LV-0459.

(3) 1-LV-0460.

(4) 1-HV-8152.

(5) 1-HV-8160.

(6) 1-PV-0131, set to max pressure.

(7) 1-TV-0130, set to max temperature.

d. Shut Letdown Heat Exchanger manual valves:

(1) (AB-A08) 1-1208-U6-041.

(2) (AB-A17) 1-1217-U4-126.

(3) (AB-108) 1-1217-U4-129.

SS / UO e. Notify Chemistry.

SS f. Initiate 18007-C, CVCS MALFUNCTION to deal with the loss of letdown.

NOTE: SS SHOULD HAVE UO COMPLETE STEPS IN ARP WHILE HE TRANSITIONS TO 18007-C.

UO Step 6. Obtain detector trend from the IPC computer UO Step 7. Monitor the channel for further changes.

UO Step 8, Step 9 and Step 10 are N/A.

SS Initiates AOP 18007-C, CVCS MALFUNCTION per Step 5f. above

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 9 Event No.: 3-4 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate Alarm and High Radiation (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 18007-C,CVCS MALFUNCTION Section A, TOTAL LOSS OF LETDOWN FLOW.

OATC A1. Isolate letdown relief flowpath by performing the following:

a. Close letdown orifice isolation valves:

HV-8149A

HV-8149B

HV-8149C

b. Close letdown isolation valves:

LV-459

LV-460 NOTE: A1a. and b. Previously performed in ARP 17100-1 OATC A2. Adjust HC-182 and FIC-121 as necessary to establish the following:

Seal injection flow to all RCPs - 8 TO 13 GPM.

-AND-

Charging flow - APPROXIMATELY 10 GPM GREATER THAN TOTAL SEAL INJECTION FLOW.

NOTE: Steps A3 THROUGH Steps A5 Do Not Apply Under This Condition:

A6. Identify and correct cause for loss of letdown.

NOTE: Identified as CVCS LTDN HX tube leak earlier.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 9 Event No.: 3-4 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate Alarm and High Radiation (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / OATC A7. Check normal letdown - AVAILABLE.

RNO A7. Perform the following:

a. Establish Excess Letdown by initiating 13008, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM EXCESS LETDOWN.

b. Go to Step A9.

OATC INITIATES SOP 13008-1. Section 4.1 EXCESS LETDOWN TO SEAL RETURN HEADER.

NOTE Independent Verifications performed within Section 4.1 are documented on Checklist 1.

OATC 4.1 EXCESS LETDOWN TO SEAL RETURN HEADER OATC 4.1.1 Verify that a Charging Pump is running.

OATC 4.1.2 Verify CLOSED RX HEAD VENT TO EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION 1-HV-8098.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 9 Event No.: 3-4 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate Alarm and High Radiation (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.3 Verify flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN, 1HC-123 is set to closed (0% demand).

OATC 4.1.4 Verify OPEN RCPs Seal Leakoff Isolation valves:

1-HV-8100 RCPS SEAL LEAKOFF ORC ISOLATION.

1-HV-8112 RCPS SEAL LEAKOFF IRC ISOLATION.

OATC 4.1.5 Verify EXCESS LETDOWN TO VCT, 1-HS-8143 is in the OPEN VCT position.

OATC 4.1.6 Verify Reactor power is maintained 3622.6 MWT while Excess Letdown is in service and LEFM is in service. IF LEFM is NOT in service, maintain power 3562 MWT per guidance of 12004-C.

OATC 4.1.7 Open EXCESS LETDOWN LINE Isolation Valves:

1-HV-8153 EXCESS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV.

1-HV-8154 EXCESS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV.

OATC 4.1.8 Record the following:

Pressure on indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1PI-124.

Temperature on indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1TI-122.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 9 Event No.: 3-4 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate Alarm and High Radiation (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.9 WHILE establishing excess letdown, perform the following:

Monitor pressure rise on pressure indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1PI-124 and verify it remains less than 50 pounds above pressure recorded in Step 4.1.8.

Monitor temperature rise on temperature indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1TI-122 and verify it remains less than 165 degrees.

OATC 4.1.10 Slowly adjust output flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN Critical 1HC-123 to establish maximum allowable flow (estimated to be approximately 30 gpm). (CV Required)

OATC 4.1.11 Perform the following as required to maintain desired pressurizer level:

Adjust charging using CHARGING LINE CONTROL, 1FIC-121.

Adjust seal injection using SEAL FLOW CONTROL, 1HC-182.

SS / OATC 4.1.12 IF normal letdown is isolated, align the outlet of the Seal Water Heat Exchanger to the Volume Control Tank spray nozzle as follows: (IV REQUIRED) (N/A if previously performed):

Unlock and open CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO VCT, 1-1208-U6-104 (KEY 1OP2-281).

(RA-26)

Close CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO NCP SUCTION, 1-1208-U6-106. (RA-26)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 9 Event No.: 3-4 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate Alarm and High Radiation (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.1.13 IF directed by SS to transfer excess letdown to the RCDT, perform the following:

NOTE TO EXAMINER: SS WILL NOT DIRECT EXCESS LTDN TO RCDT.

OATC 4.1.14 IF the Seal Water Heat Exchanger Outlet was aligned to the Volume Control Tank, restore normal alignment as follows:

NOTE: NOT TO BE PERFORMED UNTIL CVCS LTDN HX TUBES HAVE BEEN REPAIRED OR PLUGGED.

SS CONTINUES WITH 18007-C, CVCS MALFUNCTION A7.b. RNO Go to Step A9.

OATC / UO A9. Initiate Continuous Actions Page.

OATC *A10. Verify PRZR level - TRENDING TO PROGRAM.

SS / OATC *A11 Check normal letdown flow - ESTABLISHED.

RNO

A11. Perform the following:

a. WHEN normal letdown capability is restored, THEN restore normal letdown by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

b. Evaluate the impact of continued power operation with normal letdown out of service.

SS Return to procedure and step in effect. (12004-C)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of 9 Event No.: 3-4 Event

Description:

A 30 gpm leak develops in the CVCS LTDN HX tubes that is within the capacity of normal charging. CVCS letdown flow on FI-121A will indicate lower letdown flow and an Intermediate Alarm and High Radiation (within 2 minutes) on 1-RE-1950 will annunciate.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose loss of power to 1AA02:

Alarms:

DG1A EMERGENCY START 4160V SWGR 1AA02 TROUBLE Indications:

Electric fault on 1AA02 Control room lighting dims due to loss of 1/2 of the lights 1AA02 white bus potential lights go out DG-1A starts SS Enters AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems (Crew Update)

OATC *1. Check power to 1E 4160V Emergency busses -AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED:

4160V AC 1E Busses.

OATC *2. Check Reactor power - LESS THAN 100%:

UQ1118 - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100% MWT for the applicable unit.

NIs - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

T - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

2. Cont.

RNO UO *2. Perform the following:

a. Reduce TDAFW pump speed to not less than 1535 rpm.

b. Throttle affected MDAFW pump discharge valves.

NOTE: MDAFW A WILL BE DE-ENERGIZED & NOT RUNNING

__ IF Reactor power is still greater than 100%, THEN reduce turbine load at approximately 10 megawatt increments to maintain Reactor power less than 100%.

UO 3. Check affected train Diesel Generator RUNNING.

UO 4. Check NSCW status on affected train:

a. PUMPS - TWO RUNNING (None are running.)

RNO

4. Perform the following

1) Trip affected DG by depressing both EMERGENCY STOP pushbuttons.

2) Go to Section A. LOSS OF POWER WITH DG FAILING TO TIE TO BUS.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 18031-C, SECTION A: LOSS OF POWER WITH DG FAILING TO TIE TO BUS UO A1. Verify NSCW pumps on unaffected train (B) TWO RUNNING.

OATC A2. Verify charging pump RUNNING:

__ NCP.

-OR-

__ Unaffected train CCP.

UO A3. Verify CCW pumps on unaffected train TWO RUNNING.

SS / OATC A4. Check RHR status:

a. Check RHR - REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING.

RNO A4. Go to Step A5.

OATC / UO A5. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO *A6. Check AFW status:

a. Check AFW system - NEEDED TO MAINTAIN SG LEVELS. (NO) 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RNO UO a. Perform the following:

1) Reduce TDAFW pump speed to not less than 1535 rpm.

SS 2) Go to Step A7.

NOTE: TDAFW PUMP SPEED SHOULD HAVE BEEN LOWERED IN STEP 2 MAIN BODY OF 18031-C, TO REDUCE REACTOR POWER TO LESS THAN 100%.

UO A7. Verify ACCW pump on unaffected train RUNNING.

UO A8. Verify four CNMT cooling units on unaffected train running in high speed using 13120, CONTAINMENT BUILDING COOLING SYSTEM.

NOTE: Will start Train B CNMT Coolers 3,4,7,8 on high speed using step 4.2.3 or 4.8.5 of SOP 13120-1:

Fan 3, 1 HS 12583D Fan 7, 1 HS 12585D Fan 4, 1 HS 2583D Fan 8, 1 HS 2585D UO A9. Verify CRDM fans on unaffected train TWO RUNNING.

NOTE: STARTS CRDM FAN #4 UO A10. Verify reactor cavity cooling unit on unaffected train ONE RUNNING.

NOTE: STARTS REACTOR CAVITY COOLING UNIT #2 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO A11. Verify SFP cooling pump on unaffected train running using 13719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM IPC Points:

ZD3405 ZD3411 NOTE: UNAFFECTED TRAIN WAS STARTED IN EVENT #2.

UO A12. Verify the following unaffected train Class 1E 480V load centers

- ENERGIZED:

Train B

BB06

BB07

BB16

NB10 UO A13. Verify unaffected MCCs energized by observing - NO TROUBLE ALARMS.

SS A14. Open doors that have installed door stops in the following AFFECTED Control Building rooms:

UNIT 1

TR A B52, B55, B76 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS A15. Initiate the following:

CRITICAL a. 14230, OFFSITE AC CIRCUIT VERIFICATION AND CAPACITY / CAPABILITY EVALUATION.

b. Verify SAT energized using 13418 C, STANDBY AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER.

NOTE: THIS STEP PERFORMS THE 1 HOUR ACTIONS FOR LCO 3.8.1 FOR OFF-SITE SOURCES AND THE SAT.

OATC A16. Verify DRPI - ENERGIZED.

UO *A17. Check DC bus loads:

a. Verify 125V DC battery loads - LESS THAN THE FOLLOWING LIMITS:

AD1B 300 AMPS - expect 200 amps

BD1B 300 AMPS - expect 0 amps

CD1B 100 AMPS - expect 80 amps

DD1B 80 AMPS - expect 0 amps

b. Monitor all 1E battery bus voltages - REMAIN GREATER THAN 105V DC.

UO / OATC A18. Check Reactor Makeup System:

a. Unaffected boric acid transfer pump RUNNING OR SELECTED TO AUTO.

RNO

a. Manually start unaffected boric acid transfer pump as necessary.

-OR-

__ Place unaffected pump handswitch in AUTO.

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior A18 cont.

UO b. Unaffected reactor makeup water pump RUNNING OR SELECTED TO AUTO.

RNO

b. Perform the following:

Manually start unaffected reactor make-up water pump, as necessary.

-OR-

Place unaffected pump handswitch in AUTO.

UO *A19. Verify battery charger in service for non-1E batteries:

ND1

ND2

ND3A

ND3B NOTE: WILL DIRECT CONTROL BUILDING OPERATOR TO PLACE BATTERY CHARGERS IN SERVICE FOR 1ND1 AND 1ND3A USING 13406-1, 125V DC NON 1E ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM USING SECTION 4.1.3 UO A20. Transfer any de-energized NYS, NYRS, and NYR busses to alternate sources by initiating 13432, 120V AC NON 1E INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

NOTE: 1NYRS AND 1NYR WILL NEED TO BE TRANSFERRED TO ALTERNATE POWER SOURCES.

NOTE: MAIN FEED PUMP B SPEED CONTROL WILL BE LOCKED UP DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO THE CONTROL SYSTEM RELAY. THE UO WILL USE ARP 17015-1 WINDOW C05 TO RESTORE NORMAL SPEED CONTROL AFTER POWER IS RESTORED.

7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

REFERENCES:

ARP 17015-1 WINDOW C05

[MFPT LOSS OF FW SIGNAL]

1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE Failure of automatic control signal supplied to the Main Feedwater Pump Turbine (MFPT) Controllers.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Check which pump is locked up on Signal Memory Function (SMF) at the MFPT cabinet in the North side of the Control Room.

4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTES

MFPT speed will be maintained at the last speed reference signal received by the SMF from the Process Control System speed reference signal.

If desirable to prevent excessive transients in the Feedwater System, the Manual Control Potentiometer at MFPT A(B)

Motor Speed Changer 1 HS 3151(3152) may be adjusted to obtain zero deviation on the MFPT A(B) AUTO/MAN Transfer Deviation 1 SI 3153(3154) prior to switching to manual control. Counterclockwise raises the deviation indicator and clockwise lowers the indicator.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ARP 17015-1 UO 1. IF the automatic control signal is lost, perform the following:

a. Place MFPT A(B) Motor Speed Changer 1 HS 3151 (3152) in MAN.

b. Slowly adjust speed to maintain feedwater pressure as required to maintain the Feedwater Control Valve in the controlling band.

2. IF equipment failure is indicated, initiate maintenance.

3. WHEN the automatic control signal is restored (indicated by alarm clearing), perform the following:

a. Return Speed Control to automatic by adjusting 1 SIC 509B(509C) to obtain zero deviation on 1 SI 3153(3154).

b. Place MFPT A(B) Motor Speed Changer 1 HS 3151(3152) in AUTO.

4. Verify SMF resets for pump previously identified as locked up on SMF.

5. Operate MFPTs per 13615 1 depending on number of pumps operating.

18031-C SS A21. Check Control Room Emergency Lighting:

a. Check bus loss of power expected duration - GREATER THAN 90 MINUTES. (YES)

b. Transfer emergency lighting to the unaffected unit by placing MAIN CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING LOSP TRANSFER SWITCH on AFFECTED unit to LOSP position:

NOTE: STEP A21.b. IS PERFORMED LOCALLY.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 10 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS A22. Initiate applicable Technical Specification requirements listed in TS ATTACHMENT A.

ATTACHMENT A LCO Name Condition(s) 3.8.1 AC Sources A, B, and E 3.8.9 Distribution Systems A 3.7.5 AFW C A23. Check the fault condition cleared.

RNO A23. Return to Step A1.

NOTE: END OF EVENT 5 10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 11 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

ATTACHMENT A Potential Applicable LCOs & TRs Requiring Short Term Response LCO/TR Mode Limiting Condition Required Actions 3.1.7 1-2 Lost Rod Pos Ind Immediately enter TS 3.0.3 3.4.15 1-4 All RCS leak detection instrumentation Immediately enter TS 3.0.3 inop 3.7.10 All Both CREFS trains in one unit inop Immediately place other unit trains in 3.7.11 emergency mode 3.7.12 3.8.9 1-4 Loss of safety function due to loss of Immediately enter TS 3.0.3 3.8.10 5,6 power Immediately declare supported systems inop, or stop fuel movement/reactivity addition 3.4.6 4 Required RCS loops and/or RHR trains Immediately restore req'd loops/trains to service 3.4.7 5 3.4.8 5 3.5.3 4 Required ECCS train inop Immediately initiate restoration 3.8.2 5,6 Loss of required AC Source Immediately declare required systems w/o offsite power inop or suspend fuel movement 3.8.5 5,6 Loss of required DC Sources Immediately declare affected features inop or suspend fuel movement activities 3.9.5 6 RHR train requirements are not met for Immediately stop fuel movement and dilutions 3.9.6 refueling and restore required trains and/or water level 13.9.5 All One or both FHB HVAC trains inop Immediately verify remaining train operable or suspend fuel movement activities 13.1.8 3-5 Lost required DRPI Immediately open RTBs 13.1.9 13.1.2 5,6 Required boric acid injection source Immediately suspend fuel movement and/or 13.1.4 and/or pump inop reactivity changes 3.6.3 1-4 Both CNMT pen iso valves are inop 1 hr: Isolate affected penetrations 3.8.1 1-4 Loss of offsite source 1 hr: Complete 14230 Loss of DG 1 hr: Verify SAT Operable 4 hr: Determine redundant safety features operable 11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 12 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

3.4.5 3 Required RCS loops inop with RTBs 1 hr: Restore loop or open RTBs closed 3.8.4 1-4 Loss of DC source due to other than inop 2 hrs: Restore all 4 DC sources to operable battery The above Technical Specifications and the following additional Specifications should be referenced for long term required actions:

3.3.2 1-2 ESFAS instrumentation FU 6d: Loss of AFWAS from trip of both MFPs 3.3.3 1-3 PAMS instrumentation FU 19: Loss of CNMT H2 monitor heat tracing.

(Note cross train relationship; Train A heat tracing fed from Train B power.

Train B heat tracing fed from Train A power.

3.3.4 1-3 Remote shutdown system 3.4.9 1-3 Pressurizer 2 heater groups each with 150 kw capacity and capable of being powered from emergency source 3.4.16 All RCS activity Chemistry notified if power changed more than 15% in one hour (SR 3.4.16.2) 3.5.2 1-3 ECCS 3.6.6 1-4 CNMT spray and CNMT clrs 3.7.4 1-3 SG ARVs Also affects 3.3.4 3.7.5 1-3 AFW pumps & disch vlvs 2 or more trains may be inop 3.7.7 1-4 CCW system 3.7.8 1-4 NSCW system 3.7.9 1-4 Ultimate heat sink 3.7.13 1-4 Piping pen units 3.7.14 1-4 ESF chillers 13.1.3 1-4 Boration flow paths 13.1.5 1-4 Charging pumps - operating 13.7.4 All Thermal barriers 3.4.12 4-6 COPS ODCM All RE-12444, RE-12442, RE-2565, RE-2562 are affected by loss of heat tracing for sample lines.

12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 13 of 13 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RAT (1NXRA) supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip open due to a fault on the bus. DG-1A will start, but will not re-energize 1AA02 due to a Bus Fault. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power to less than 100%, and shift electrical loads to Train B 1E bus 1BA03, as well as implement tech specs for loss of AC power.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

RCS leakage will develop that is within the capacity of the normal charging flow path to maintain PRZR level and pressure. A 5 gpm RCS leak will take about 5-7 minutes before a RAD ALARM will annunciate. The crew will be required to enter AOP 18004-C for RCS Leakage. The leak is 5 gpm from a hot leg weld and the crew will enter LCO 3.4.13.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses an RCS leak has developed:

Symptoms / alarms:

INTERMEDIATE AND HIGH RADIATION ALARMS (7.5 minutes after initiation)

Indications:

RE-2562 showing alarm condition on SRDC

Unexplained change in charging flow.

Charging - letdown flow mismatch.

PRZR level lowering.

SS Enters AOP-18004-C, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE.

(Crew Update)

SS Chooses Section A: RCS leakage (Mode1, 2, and 3 with RCS Pressure

>1000 psig.

A1. Check plant conditions:

__In Mode 1 or 2 OATC / UO A2. Initiate the Continuous Actions page.

OATC *A3. Maintains PRZR level.

a. Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level.

b. Check PRZR level STABLE OR RISING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

RCS leakage will develop that is within the capacity of the normal charging flow path to maintain PRZR level and pressure. A 5 gpm RCS leak will take about 5-7 minutes before a RAD ALARM will annunciate. The crew will be required to enter AOP 18004-C for RCS Leakage. The leak is 5 gpm from a hot leg weld and the crew will enter LCO 3.4.13.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION The NCP will NOT have miniflow when the CCP normal miniflow valves are closed

A4. Maintain VCT level using automatic or manual makeup control.

OATC SS A5. Initiate NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY CLASIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

OATC A6. Verify PRZR PORVs closed.

OATC A7. Check PRZR Safety Valves CLOSED.

OATC / UO A8. Stop any load changes in progress.

OATC A9. Check PRZR pressure TRENDING TO PROGRAM.

OATC *A10. Monitor CTMT pressure:

Less than 3.8 psig.

Stable OATC A11. Initiate 14905, RCS LEAKAGE CALCULATION (INVENTORY BALANCE) to verify TS 3.4.13 compliance.

NOTE: The RO should be able to determine by a rough leak balance that leak rate is approximately 5 gpm.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 3 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

RCS leakage will develop that is within the capacity of the normal charging flow path to maintain PRZR level and pressure. A 5 gpm RCS leak will take about 5-7 minutes before a RAD ALARM will annunciate. The crew will be required to enter AOP 18004-C for RCS Leakage. The leak is 5 gpm from a hot leg weld and the crew will enter LCO 3.4.13.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS CAUTION Non-essential personnel should be evacuated from containment if conditions warrant. However, a containment entry may be necessary to identify the source of the leakage, if conditions permit.

A12. Locate the source of the leak using ATTACHMENT A.

NOTE: ATTACHMENT A WILL NOT HELP IDENTIFY LEAKAGE.

SS A13. Isolate the leak.

RNO A13. Perform the following:

a. Initiate applicable ACTION item of TS 3.4.13.

b. IF an unidentified leak greater than 1 gpm or any pressure boundary leak, THEN place the unit in cold shutdown as soon as possible within limits of applicable UOP.

c. IF SG tube leakage is detected by secondary radiation levels, THEN Go to 18009-C, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK.

SS Transitions to UOP 12004-C Section 4.2 Power Descent(Crew Update)

NOTE TO EXAMINER: THIS IS THE START OF EVENT 7.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 4 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction IAW UOP 12004-C as a result of a unidentified leak of approximately 5 gpm.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 12004-1 SS 4.2 POWER DESCENT 4.2.1 IF power descent is for a planned power reduction, verify that the Reactivity Management Plan has been approved WHEN required by NMP-OS-001, Reactivity Management, AND that it has been reviewed by the control room crew.

NOTE: THIS IS AN UNPLANNED POWER REDUCTION.

SS 4.2.2 IF unit shutdown/cooldown is anticipated AND with Chemistry Department concurrence, initiate RCS and Pressurizer Gaseous Activity Degassing by performing the following:

a. Direct Chemistry to sample the RCS to obtain baseline data per 31110-C Collection Of Data For Shutdown Primary Chemistry Calculations.

b. Place Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Line in service.

c. Notify Chemistry to adjust the pressurizer steam space sample flow rate to maximum.

OATC d. Energize the Pressurizer Backup Heaters to enhance RCS degassing.

NOTE Dissolved Hydrogen must remain greater than 25 cc/kg until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to shutdown and above 15 cc/kg while the reactor is critical.

OATC e. Initiate lowering RCS dissolved Hydrogen by performing the following:

(1) Adjust VCT pressure to minimum allowed (18 psig) to allow hydrogen concentration to slowly fall.

(2) Raise VCT gas purge flow rate to the Gaseous Waste Processing System to approximately 1.2 scfm using HIC-1094, as limited by the Waste Gas Recombiner.

(1985304126) 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 4 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction IAW UOP 12004-C as a result of a unidentified leak of approximately 5 gpm.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.2.2 cont.

NOTE Max L/D flow of 120 gpm should be maintained to ensure maximum Lithium removal rate.

f. Maximize CVCS letdown purification flow rate, per 13006, Chemical Volume And Control System.

NOTE: NORMAL LETDOWN OOS MAX LTDN 30 GPM.

g. Per Chemistry direction, place cation bed in service for Lithium removal.

h. Consult with Chemistry AND if required for containment atmosphere cleanup, start one or both Containment Pre-access Filter Units per 13125, "Containment Purge System."

i. Consult with Chemistry and if not already in progress, initiate 16035, " Chemistry/Operations Interface For RCS Chemistry Control During Scheduled Plant Shutdowns", for degassing the RCS.

SS 4.2.3 IF it is anticipated that the reactor shutdown will be performed by manually inserting the control and shutdown banks AND IF the All Rods Out (ARO) setpoint is above or below 228 steps:

a. Reposition rods to an ARO position of 228 steps per 13502, "Control Rod Drive And Position Indication System."

b. Notify Reactor Engineering to adjust IPC setpoints to restore the ROD DEVIATION alarm, (ALB010D06), to operable. (Compensatory action is described in 17010, "ARP for ALB10 on Panel 1C1 on MCB.")

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 4 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction IAW UOP 12004-C as a result of a unidentified leak of approximately 5 gpm.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.4 Control Tavg within 2°F of Tref during the power reduction by performing the following. (1985303667)

OATC a. Place the Rod Control System in MANUAL. (CV Required)

OATC / UO b. WHILE reducing turbine load, adjust control rods/boron as necessary to maintain AFD within limits per the AFD control strategy and guidelines of Section 4.3.2.

c. IF it is intended to continue power operation at a reduced power plateau, THEN AFD should be trended and maintained at or near the AFD target value.

SS NOTE Aux. Steam should not be required in service following unit shutdown if that units power is below 25%.

4.2.5 IF the auxiliary steam will be required following unit shutdown, initiate the following:

a. Pressurize the Auxiliary Steam Header from the opposite unit per 13761, "Auxiliary Steam System."

b. Start the second Steam Jet Air Ejector on auxiliary steam per 13620, "Condenser Air Ejection System."

c. Transfer Turbine Steam Seal supply to the Auxiliary Steam Supply per 13825, "Turbine Steam Seal System."

SS 4.2.6 Notify System Operator of upcoming power decrease.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 4 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction IAW UOP 12004-C as a result of a unidentified leak of approximately 5 gpm.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.2.7 Reduce turbine load as desired per 13800, "Main Turbine Operation."

SS a. Each time reactor power change exceeds 15% in a one hour period, notify Chemistry to perform the following samples:

(1988314683, 1988315234)

(1) RCS iodine sample per TS SR 3.4.16.2. (Required between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after reactor power changes greater than or equal to 15% in a one hour period)

(2) Gaseous release path samples per ODCM Table 3-3.

(3) Record the time of the change and the person contacted in the Control Room Log.

OATC / UO b. Maintain Tavg within 2°F of Tref.

PROCEED TO EVENT 8 AFTER A 5% POWER REDUCTION OR AT THE CHIEF NRC EXAMINERS REQUEST AFTER SEEING AN ADEQUATE POWER MANIPULATION.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose a PRI LOCA.

Indications:

PRZR pressure less than 1870 psig.

PRZR level lowering.

Containment pressure rising.

SI annunciator(s) lit.

SI ACTUATED BPLB window lit.

CREW Performs Immediate Operator Actions for EOP 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION SS Enters EOP 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION (Crew Update)

OATC 1. Check Reactor trip:

IOA

Rod Bottom Lights - LIT (Lights are NOT LIT)

Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN (RTBs are CLOSED)

Neutron Flux - LOWERING RNO

1. Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches.

NOTE: REACTOR MANUALLY TRIPS FROM HANDSWITCH.

UO 2. Check Turbine trip:

IOA

All Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 3. Checks power to the AC Emergency Busses:

IOA a. AC Emergency Busses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

b. AC Emergency Busses - ALL ENERGIZED: (NO)

4160 V AC 1E Busses

480V AC 1E Busses RNO

b. Try to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus while continuing with Step 4. (Bus fault still present.)

OATC 4. Check if SI is actuated.

IOA

Any SI annunciator - LIT. (YES)

SI ACTUATED BPLB window - LIT. (YES)

Go to Step 6.

SS 6. Initiate the Foldout Page.

RCP TRIP CRITERIA.

Trip all RCPs if BOTH conditions listed below occur:

a. CCPs or SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

b. RCP Trip Parameter - RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN 1375 PSIG.

OATC Recognizes RCP TRIP CRITERIA met per foldout page and Critical trips ALL RCPs between now and PRIOR to step 12 of E-0.

CNMT SPRAY ACTUATION CRITERIA

a. CNMT Spray Actuated.

b. CNMT Spray Pump discharge valves open.

c. CNMT Spray Pumps Running (None running.)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE: Train A (No Power), Train B fails to start.

When UO attempts to start CS Pump B, fails to start manually.

Dispatches SO to investigate failure of pump to start. After X minutes, Simulator Operator will report the breaker was racked in too far. SS orders switch placed in PTL and THEN orders the breaker re-racked.

7. Perform the following:

OATC

OATC Initial Actions Page.

UO

UO Initial Actions Page.

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 1. Check both Trains of ECCS equipment-ALIGNING FOR INJECTION PHASE

MLB indication. (TRAIN A NO POWER)

RNO Step 1. Actuate SI. (Cannot actuate Train A.)

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 2. Check Containment Isolation Phase A - ACTUATED:

CIA MLB indication. (TRAIN A NO POWER)

RNO Step 2. Actuate CIA

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 3. Check ECCS Pumps and NCP status:

a. CCPs - RUNNING.

b. SI Pumps - RUNNING.

c. RHR Pumps - RUNNING.

d. NCP - TRIPPED.

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 4. Verify CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 5. Verify proper NSCW system operation:

a. NSCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN

b. NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN handswitches

- IN AUTO:

HS-1668A

HS-1669A Step 6. Verify Containment Cooling Units:

a. ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED

MLB indication

b. NSCW Cooler isolation valves - OPEN:

MLB indication

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 7. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED

CVI MLB indication NOTE: HV-2628B & HV-2629B FAIL TO AUTO CLOSE RNO UO a. Perform the following:

CRITICAL

1) Close Dampers and Valves.

2) Start Piping Pen Units. (Train B Only)

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 8. Check Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21.5 PSIG. (NO)

RNO Step 8 Verify the following:

a. Containment Spray Actuated.

RNO (cont)

OATC Step 8. Verify the following:

b. Containment Spray Pump discharge valves open.

c. Containment Spray Pumps running.

NOTE TO EXAMINER:

TRAIN A NO POWER, TRAIN B FAILS TO AUTO OR MANUALLY START.

OPERATOR SHOULD BE DISPATCHED TO CS PUMP BREAKER.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 9. Check ECCS flows:

a. BIT Flow. (NONE INDICATED)

NOTE TO EXAMINER:

CRITICAL HV-8801B FAILS TO OPEN. THE OATC MAY CHOOSE TO OPEN HV-8801B PER MLB INDICATIONS SINCE THIS IS ONLY VALVE MISALIGNED.

RNO Step 9.a. Align Valves using ATTACHMENT B.

b. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1625 PSIG.

c. SI Pump flow.

d. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 300 PSIG

e. RHR Pump Flow PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 10. Check ECCS Valve alignment - PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs.

RNO CRITICAL Step 10. Align valves using ATTACHMENT B, ATTACHMENT C, and ATTACHMENT D as necessary.

NOTE TO EXAMINER:

IF VALVES WERE ALIGNED BASED ON MLBS THEN ATTACHMENT B MAY NOT BE PERFORMED. (Attachment C and D do not apply)

PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 11. Check ACCW Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

OATC Step 12. Adjust Seal Injection flow to RCPs - 8 to 13 GPM.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

UO Step 1. Check AFW Pumps - RUNNING

MDAFW Pumps

TDAFW Pump, if required PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

UO Step 2. Check NR level in at least one SG - GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE]

PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

UO Step 3. Check if main steamlines should be isolated:

a. Check for one or more of the following conditions:

_ Any steamline pressure - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 585 PSIG.

_ Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG.

_ Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI - BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate - ONTWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLINE.

b. Verify Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

UO Step 4. Verify FW Isolation Valves closed:

MFIVs

BFIVs

MFRVs

BFRVs PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

UO Step 5. Verify SG Blowdown isolated:

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, C, and D in the CLOSE position.

SG Sample Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

UO Step 6. Verify Diesel Generators - RUNNING. (TRAIN B ONLY)

PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

UO Step 7. Throttle total AFW flow as necessary to maintain SG NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%.

PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

UO Step 8. Verify both MFPs - TRIPPED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior PERFORMS UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

UO Step 9. Check Main Generator Output Breakers - OPEN.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

CREW RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OF E-0 CONTINUING AT STEP 8.

OATC / UO 8. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

o OATC *9. Check RCS temperature stable or trending to 557 F.

With RCP(s) running - RCS Average Temperature.

-OR-

Without RCP(s) running - RCS WR COLD LEG TEMPERATURES.

RNO o

UO *Step 9. IF temperature is less than 557 F and lowering, THEN perform the following as necessary:

a. Stop dumping steam.

b. Perform the following as appropriate:

__ IF at least one SG NR level greater than 10%

[32% ADVERSE] THEN lower total feed flow.

-OR-

__ IF all SG NR levels less than 10% [32%

ADVERSE] THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 gpm.

c. IF cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

o

d. IF temperature greater than 557 F and rising, THEN dump steam.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 10 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS CAUTION A PRZR PORV Block Valve which was closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV should not be opened unless used to prevent challenging the PRZR Safeties.

OATC 10. Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:

a. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED AND IN AUTO.

b. Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.

c. Power to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.

d. PRZR PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RNO

d. Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.

OATC 11. Check if RCPs should be stopped.

a. ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

CCP or SI Pump

b. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1375 psig.

CRITICAL c. STOP all RCPs.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 11 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / UO 12. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. SG Pressures:

__ Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner.

-OR-

__ Any completely depressurized.

RNO

a. Go to Step 13 SS / UO 13. Check SG Tubes intact:

a. Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b. Secondary radiation NORMAL:

MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:

RE-13120 (SG1)

RE-13121 (SG2)

RE-13122 (SG3)

RE-13119 (SG4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839C

RE-12838D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 12 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

13. cont.

UO c. Check SG levels ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RNO SS c. Go to Step 14 OATC 14. Check if RCS is intact inside Containment:

Containment radiation - NORMAL.

Containment pressure - NORMA.L

Containment Emergency Recirculation Sump levels -

NORMAL RNO SS 14. Go to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT SS Transitions to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT (Crew Update) 19010-C CREW 1. Initiate the following:

OATC/UO

Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.

OATC

Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

SS Transitions to 19251-C RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE due to ORANGE PATH. (Crew Update)

CUE: Simulator Operator reports that the CS pump breaker has been re-racked after entry into 19251-C.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 13 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 19251-C NOTE TO EXAMINER:

The Crew will Start Train B CS Pump on report that breaker has been re-racked sometime during 19251-C and Scenario will end on Transition Back to 19010-C SS 1. Initiate the following:

OATC / UO

Continuous Actions Page

NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

OATC *2. Check RWST level - GREATER THAN 29%.

OATC 3. Check Containment Isolation Phase A - ACTUATED:

CIA MLB indication OATC 4. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

a. Dampers and Valves CLOSED:

CVI MLB indication.

SS CAUTION If 19111-C, ECA-1.1 LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION is in effect, Containment Spray should be operated as directed in 19111-C, ECA-1.1 LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION rather than as in Step 5 below.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 14 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 5. Check if Containment Spray is required:

a. Containment pressure - HAS RISEN TO GREATER THAN 21.5 PSIG.

b. CS - ACTUATED.

RNO 5b. Actuate Containment Spray.

c. CS Pumps - RUNNING RNO 5c. Start Pumps.

6. Check containment spray valve alignment:

a. Check RWST level - GREATER THAN 8%

b. Check Containment Spray injection phase alignment:

1) CS Pump RWST suction valves - OPEN:

HV-9017A - CNMT SPRAY PUMP A RWST SUCT ISO VLV

HV-9017B - CNMT SPRAY PUMP B RWST SUCT ISO VLV.

2) CNMT SPRAY ISO VLV - OPEN:

HV-9001A

HV-9001B

c. Go to Step 8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 15 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTION Local observation of CS Pump suction and discharge pressure gauges should only be performed if radiation levels permit.

UNIT 1 (AB D75) UNIT 2 (AB D06)

SS 8. Check proper CS operation using the following indications, if available:

Train B CS:

__ Pump suction pressure PI-0973 GREATER THAN 7 PSIG.

__ Pump discharge pressure PI-0975 APPROXIMATELY 185 PSIG ABOVE SUCTION PRESSURE.

__ Containment pressure STABLE OR LOWERING.

OATC OATC 9. Verify Containment Cooling Units:

a. ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED:

MLB indication.

b. NSCW Cooler isolation valves - OPEN:

MLB indication.

UO 10. Verify Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves CLOSED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 16 of 16 Event No.: 8 , 9 , 10, 11 Event

Description:

During the power reduction, the hot leg weld that is leaking will break and result in a DBA LOCA. Reactor Fails to Auto Trip on Actuation Signal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTIONS

At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

If all SGs are faulted, at least 30 gpm feed flow should be maintained to each SG.

11. Check if feed flow should be isolated to any SG:

a. Pressure in all SGs:

__ ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

-OR-

__ ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RNO

a. Go to Step 14.

SS 14. Return to procedure and step in effect.

SS Transition back to 19010-C. (Crew Update)

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF SCENARIO #2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _Vogtle____________ Scenario No.: ___3____ Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: __Capehart__________________ Operators: _____________________________

__Meeks_____________________ _____________________________

__Hopkins____________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% Power.

Equipment OOS: CCW pump 5, Air Compressor 3 Turnover: Maintain 100% power, INFO LCO 3.7.7 CCW Train A, Containment Mini-purge is in service.

LCO 3.5.1 is in effect due to low Nitrogen pressure on Accumulator # 3 which has a slow leak and the N2 manifold was not available. The N2 manifold is now available and aligned per SOP-13707-C. Pressurize Accumulator # 3 to normal pressure after assuming the shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

Lower accumulator # 3 pressure below 626 psig to require LCO 3.5.1 entry.

T2- Override BD1M Trouble annunciator ON, HV-3009 green and red lights OFF, HV-3009 in OPEN position, Remote Function PR02 for PORV 456A power supply racked out.

ES 23A / ES 23B HV-8105 / HV-8106, ES 24C / ES 24E LV-112C / LS-112E auto actuation failures.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A N-UO Raise accumulator # 3s pressure via Nitrogen system to clear LCO N-SS 3.5.1 for SI Accumulators.

2 Loss C-SS 125V DC MCC 1BD1M will de-energize causing PORV-456A and BD1M C-OATC HV-3009 TDAFW Steam supply from loop # 1 to fail as is.

(Preload above) TS-SS LCO 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feed Water and LCO 3.4.11 PORVs, LCO 3.4.12 COPS INFO 3 FW02D I-UO Loop # 4 SG Feed Flow instrument fails high.

@ 100% I-SS 4 PR02A I-OATC PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high.

100% I-SS TS-SS LCOs 3.3.1 FU 6, FU 8a, and 8b & 3.3.2 FU 1d , P-11 FU 8b (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months action) 5 SG01A C-OATC SGTL on SG # 1 of ~ 30 gpm

@ 3% C-SS TS-SS LCO 3.4.13 for SG tube Leakage

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 6 N/A R-OATC Lower power per AOP-18013, Rapid Down power N-UO R-SS 7 SG01A M-ALL DBA SGTR on SG#1 Raise from 3% Reactor Trip and Safety Injection to 45%

8 MS12A C-UO Main Steam Isolations valves HV-3006A / HV-3006B fail to open state.

(Preload) C-SS 9 PR07@ C-OATC PRZR Spray valve PV-455B fails almost fully open.

90% C-SS

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

Raise accumulator # 3 pressure to normal range to clear LCO 3.5.1, Accumulators Verifiable Actions:

UO - Opens Accumulator N2 isolation valve 1HV-8880 and accumulator # 3 vent valve either 1HV-8875C or 1HV-8875G to raise accumulator # 3s pressure. Monitor accumulator # 3s pressure on plant meters and / or IPC computer.

Closes vent valve and accumulator N2 isolation valve after desired pressure is reached.

Technical Specifications:

3.5.1, LCO for Accumulators is cleared.

Event 2:

Loss of 125V DC MCC 1BD1M Verifiable Actions:

OATC places 1HS-8000B in closed position to isolate PORV-456A which is de-energized.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.7.5 Condition A for TDAFW Steam Supply valves, LCO 3.4.11 Condition B for PORV Incapable of being cycled.

INFO LCO 3.4.12, COPS

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3:

Steam Generator # 4 Feed Flow fails high, the SS will have to enter 18001, Section G.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Performs IOA and takes manual control of MFRV # 4 and MFPT speed control to control SG # 4 level at program.

Swaps controlling feed channel selector switch to an unaffected channel, restores feed flow to auto when stable.

Technical Specifications:

Not applicable.

Event 4:

PRZR pressure transmitter PT-455 fails high, the SS will have to enter 18001, Section C.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Performs IOA and takes manual control of PRZR spray valves (closes sprays), PRZR PORV PV-455A, closes PORV, PRZR heaters and energizes as necessary to raise PRZR pressure.

Swaps PRZR pressure control to an unaffected channel (457 / 456), adjusts PRZR Master Controller to 25%

demand and places in auto. Places PORV 455A, PRZR spray controllers, and PRZR heaters in auto.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation FU 6 for OT delta T, FU 8a PRZR Low Pressure, FU 8b PRZR High Pressure.

LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation FU 1d, PRZR Low Pressure SI, FU 8b for PRZR Pressure P-11 Permissive.

LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Event 5:

Small SGTL of ~ 30 gpm.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Adjusts charging and seal injection using FV-0121 Charging Controller and HIC-0182 Seal Controller to stabilize PRZR level and to determine an approximate leakage rate.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13, RCS Identified Leakage, Condition A for SGTL in excess of limits.

Event 6:

Power reduction per AOP-18013, Rapid Down Power due to SGTL > 5 gpm.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Manually inserts control rods and borates as necessary.

UO - Manually reduces Turbine Load using Load Set Potentiometer or Load Decrease Pushbutton.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 7:

SGTR on SG # 1 Verifiable Actions:

nd OATC - Raises charging flow to attempt to maintain PRZR level, isolates CVCS Letdown, starts a 2 charging pump.

OATC - Manually trips the reactor in response to inability to control PRZR level.

OATC - Manually closes 1HV-8105 / 1HV-8106, manually closes 1LV-112C, manually opens 1LV-112E. All which fail to properly position on SI actuation. These may be realigned per MLB indication or Attachment B of E-0.

Event 8:

MSIVs fails to close on ruptured SG # 1 requiring alternate steps to isolate ruptured SG.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Manually trips TDAFW pump using T & T valve due to 1HV-3009 having no power.

UO - Manually closes MSIV and Bypasses on SGs # 2, 3, and 4 due to MSIV loop # 1 will not close.

UO - Places SJAE # 2 hand switch to the OFF position.

UO - Manually adjusts ARV for Loop # 1 to 7.73 on potentiometer and controls SG # 1 pressure ~ 1160 psig.

UO - Manually isolate MDAFW and TDAFW flow to SG # 1 once NR level > 10%.

Event 9:

PRZR spray valve sticks open during RCS depressurization to refill PRZR.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Trips RCP # 4 by starting oil lift pump and then opening non-1E then 1E breaker.

CRITICAL ACTIONS:

1) Manually closes either 1HV-8105 and/or 1HV-8106 Normal Charging Isolations to prevent CCP runout and starving ECCS injection flow.

2) Isolates SG # 1 in E-3 by performing the following:

Manually trip the TDAFW pump using the T & T Valve in response to 1HV-3009 having no power while performing E-3 SG isolation steps.

Manually close MSIV and Bypasses on SGs # 2, 3, and 4 due to MSIVs loop # 1 will not close while performing E-3 SG isolation steps.

Manually places SJAE # 2 hand switch to the OFF position and verifies SJAE valves closing.

Manually adjust ARV for loop # 1 to 7.73 on potentiometer and control SG pressure at ~ 1160 psig during E-3 SG isolation steps.

Manually isolate MDAFW and TDAFW flow to SG # 1 once NR level is > 10% during E-3 SG isolation steps.

3) Trips RCP # 4 per RNO of E-3 when spray valve PV-455B will not close on RCS depressurization.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Raise Safety Injection Accumulator # 3 pressure via Nitrogen system to clear LCO 3.5.1 for SI Accumulators Pressure less than 626 psig per Annumciator Response Procedure 17006-1, Window C-4, ACCUM TANK 3 HI/LO PRESSURE being in alarm. The accumulator level is stable within TS limits. The crew will restore accumulator pressure by aligning and opening Nitrogen supply to the accumulator using SOP-13105-1, SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Section 4.2.2. (HP Nitrogen was aligned by previous shift.)

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Performs Section 4.2.2 of procedure 13105-1, SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM to Pressurize #3 Accumulator.

CAUTION Accumulator Nitrogen Supply/Vent Valves (1-HV-8875A-H) will hold pressure on the Accumulator side only. Therefore, when 1-HV-8880 is opened, all Accumulators are pressurized simultaneously.

UO 4.2.2.1 Verify High Pressure Nitrogen is available/aligned per 13707-C.

NOTE: HP Nitrogen was aligned by previous shift.

UO 4.2.2.2 Open ACCUM N2 ISO VLV 1-HV-8880.

UO 4.2.2.3 Monitor Accumulator pressures and check that are rising:

a. Accumulator 1 1-PI-0960A and 1-PI-0961A.

b. Accumulator 2 1-PI-0962A and 1-PI-0963A.

c. Accumulator 3 1-PI-0964A and 1-PI-0965A.

d. Accumulator 4 1-PI-0966A and 1-PI-0967A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Raise Safety Injection Accumulator # 3 pressure via Nitrogen system to clear LCO 3.5.1 for SI Accumulators Pressure less than 626 psig per Annumciator Response Procedure 17006-1, Window C-4, ACCUM TANK 3 HI/LO PRESSURE being in alarm. The accumulator level is stable within TS limits. The crew will restore accumulator pressure by aligning and opening Nitrogen supply to the accumulator using SOP-13105-1, SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Section 4.2.2. (HP Nitrogen was aligned by previous shift.)

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CAUTIONS

During Modes 1, 2, and 3 above 1000 psig, only one accumulator Nitrogen supply/vent should be opened at a time to verify the accumulator safety function is maintained.

In Mode 3 below 1000 psig and lower modes, all accumulator Nitrogen supply/vent valves may be open as required.

UO 4.2.2.4 Open the desired ACCUM N2 SUPPLY/VENT VLV:

Accumulator 1 1-HV-8875A and/or 1-HV-8875E Accumulator 2 1-HV-8875B and/or 1-HV-8875F Accumulator 3 1-HV-8875C and/or 1-HV-8875G Accumulator 4 1-HV-8875D and/or 1-HV-8875H UO 4.2.2.5 WHEN the Accumulators reach the desired pressure, close the valve opened in step 4.2.2.4. (IV REQUIRED)

UO 4.2.2.6 Repeat Steps 4.2.2.3 through 4.2.2.5 as necessary for remaining Accumulators.

NOTE: All other accumulators pressures are in band. Will not repeat)

UO 4.2.2.7 WHEN accumulators are at the desired pressure, close 1HV-8880. (IV REQUIRED)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

125V DC MCC 1BD1M will de-energize causing Annunciator ALB 34 Window B-2, 125 V DC MCC 1BD1M TROUBLE alarm to annunciate. A loss of 1BD1M causes PRZR PORV-456A and TDAFW steam supply HV-3009 (Loop 1) to fail as is.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Identifies Annunciator ALB 34 B02 in alarm and references Annunciator Response Procedure 17034-1 Window B02.

Step 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS (None)

Step 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS (None)

UO Step 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. Check for associated alarms and indications.

2. Dispatch an operator to MCC lBDlM to check for tripped breaker.

3. IF a breaker has tripped, check for thermal overload flags. For thermal overload flags which have thermal overload protection bypass devices installed, initiate maintenance to investigate and replace the thermal overload heater coils and thermal elements as necessary. Verify compliance with Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.9 and 3.8.10.

4. IF alarm is due to a breaker overload, determine and correct the fault.

5. IF alarm is due to a loss of DC control power, determine the reason and correct.

6. IF loss of MCC voltage is indicated, initiate maintenance as required.

7. Refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, SS 3.4.12, 3.7.5.

TS: LCO 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feed Water Condition A TS: LCO 3.4.11 PRZR PORVS Condition B TS: INFO LCO 3.4.12 COPS OATC Per LCO 3.4.11 Condition B action statement, OATC places block valve HV-8000B in CLOSE position and removes power to HV-8000B within one hour.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Controlling feed water flow channel for SG # 4 will fail high resulting in MFRV throttling shut and underfeeding SG # 4. MFPT speed control will also be affected. The crew will be required to perform IOAs of 18001-C section G for SG Flow Instrumentation Failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnoses failure of SG # 4 controlling feed flow instrument:

Symptoms / alarms / indications:

STM GEN 4 FLOW MISMATCH

Any unexplained steam / feed flow mismatch indication UO Performs IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS of AOP-18001 section G.

G1. Checks steam and feed flows - MATCHED ON ALL SGS.

RNO G1. Take manual control of the following as necessary to restore NR level between 60% and 70%:

Affected SG feed flow valves (Loop 4)

MFP(s) speed.

SS Verifies immediate operator actions performed with UO.

Enters AOP 18001-C, Section G. (Crew Update)

SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 18001-C Section G UO G2. Select an unaffected control channel. (Gets peer Check)

UO G3. Return MFP(s) speed controls to AUTO.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Controlling feed water flow channel for SG # 4 will fail high resulting in MFRV throttling shut and underfeeding SG # 4. MFPT speed control will also be affected. The crew will be required to perform IOAs of 18001-C section G for SG Flow Instrumentation Failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO G4. Return SG feed flow valve to AUTO. (Loop 4)

OATC / UO G5. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page UO *G6. Check SG level control maintains NR level - AT 65%.

SS G7. Notifies I & C to initiate repairs:

Calls SS C & T to perform the following:

Notify Operations Duty of AOP entry.

Write a Condition Report.

Notify Maintenance of the failure.

G8. Check repairs and surveillances - COMPLETE.

RNO

G8. Perform the following:

a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step G9.

b. Return to procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: Repairs are not expected to be completed.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Crew will respond to the high failure of a PRZR pressure primary controlling channel (PT-455) resulting in BOTH PRZR Sprays opening and PORV-455 opening. Block valves HV-8000A/B will shut and the PORV will close WHEN 2 / 3 pressure channels lower below 2185 psig. The PORV will cycle around 2185 psig to 2200 psig until manual action is taken to close the PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose failure of the PRZR pressure channel PI-455.

Symptoms / alarms:

ALB11-B03 PRZR HI PRESS

ALB11-C03 PRZR HI PRESS CHANNEL ALERT

ALB12-F04 PV-455 OPEN SIGNAL

ALB11-D02 PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS ON

ALB12-D03 PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK Indications:

PRZR Spray valves both open

PORV-455 open indication on hand switch.

Other 3 PRZR pressure channels pressure lowering.

Block valve HV-8000A/B closing.

OATC 18001- C, SECTION C, IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS C1. Check RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING.

RNO C1. Perform the following:

Close spray valves.

Close affected PRZR PORV.

Operate PRZR heaters as necessary.

SS Verifies immediate operator actions performed with OATC.

Enters AOP 18001-C, Section C. (Crew Update)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Crew will respond to the high failure of a PRZR pressure primary controlling channel (PT-455) resulting in BOTH PRZR Sprays opening and PORV-455 opening. Block valves HV-8000A/B will shut and the PORV will close WHEN 2 / 3 pressure channels lower below 2185 psig. The PORV will cycle around 2185 psig to 2200 psig until manual action is taken to close the PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 18001-C SECTION C SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION Failure of the controlling channel may saturate the Master Pressure Controller and cause inadvertent operation of the spray valves during recovery OATC C2. Check Controlling channel - OPERATING PROPERLY.

RNO C2. Perform the following:

a. Place HS-455A in close.

b. Place PRZR spray valve controllers in manual.

OATC / UO C3. Initiate the Continuous Actions page.

OATC *C4. Control PRZR pressure using heaters and sprays

- BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG.

OATC C5. Check PIC-455A Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller IN -

AUTO WITH OUTPUT SIGNAL APPROXIMATELY 25%.

RNO C5. Places PIC-455 in manual and adjusts controller output to approximately 25%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Crew will respond to the high failure of a PRZR pressure primary controlling channel (PT-455) resulting in BOTH PRZR Sprays opening and PORV-455 opening. Block valves HV-8000A/B will shut and the PORV will close WHEN 2 / 3 pressure channels lower below 2185 psig. The PORV will cycle around 2185 psig to 2200 psig until manual action is taken to close the PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC C6. Check affected channel selected on PS-455F PRZR PRESS CNTL SELECT.

OATC C7. Select unaffected channels on PS-455F:

Select channel 457 / 456 for control since PT-455 failed high.

OATC C8. Perform the following:

a. Check PRZR pressure - STABLE AT APPROXIMATELY 2235 PSIG

b. Place PRZR heaters in AUTO.

c. Place PRZR spray valve controllers in AUTO.

RNO C8.a. Adjust PRZR pressure to approximately 2235 psig using PRZR heaters and sprays.

OATC C9. Places PORVs in AUTO and verify proper operation.

OATC C10. Return PRZR pressure Master controller to AUTO.

OATC C11. Select same channel on PS-455G PRZR PRESS REC SEL as selected on PS-455F.

OATC / SS C12. Check P-11 status light on BPLP indicates correctly for plant condition within one hour. (Not Lit)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Crew will respond to the high failure of a PRZR pressure primary controlling channel (PT-455) resulting in BOTH PRZR Sprays opening and PORV-455 opening. Block valves HV-8000A/B will shut and the PORV will close WHEN 2 / 3 pressure channels lower below 2185 psig. The PORV will cycle around 2185 psig to 2200 psig until manual action is taken to close the PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS C13. Notify I & C to initiate repairs.

Calls SS C & T to perform the following:

Notify Operations Duty of AOP entry.

Write a Condition Report.

Notify Maintenance of the failure.

SS C14. Bypass the affected channel per 13509-C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION if desired.

NOTE: It is not expected the SS will desire to bypass the channel.

SS C15. Trip the affected channel bistables and place the associated MASTER TEST switches in TEST position per TABLE C1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2).

NOTE: It is not expected the SS will trip affected channel bistables SS C16. Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS: 3.3.1 FU 6 Condition E OTT RX TRIP

TS: 3.3.1 FU 8a Condition M PZR LO PRESS RX TRIP

TS: 3.3.1 FU 8b Condition E PZR HI PRESS RX TRIP

TS: 3.3.2 FU1d Condition D LOW PZR PRESS SI

TS: 3.3.2 FU 8b Condition L PZR pressure, P-11 SS *C17. Check repairs and surveillances - COMPLETE.

RNO

C17. Perform the following:

a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step C18.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 4 Event No.: 5 and 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL greater than 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose SG Tube Leakage:

ALARMS:

INTMD RADIATION ALARM HIGH RADIATION RE-0724 - Primary to secondary leakage monitor RE-0810 - SJAE low range monitor RE-12839C - SJAE monitor INDICATIONS:

Charging flow increases if in auto (expect manual control)

PRZR level slowly lowers SS Enters AOP 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak. (Crew Update)

OATC / UO 1. Initiate continuous actions page OATC *2. Maintain PRZR level:

a. Adjusting charging flow

b. Check PRZR level stable or rising

3. Try to identify affected SG:

SS a. Direct Chemistry attempt to identify the leaking SG by initiating 31120-C, CHEMISTRY STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK ACTIONS.

UO

b. Check SG level indications stable or rising with relatively lower feed flow rate (will not be able to tell) 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 4 Event No.: 5 and 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL greater than 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTION The NCP will NOT have miniflow when the CCP normal miniflow valves are closed.

4. Verify VCT level maintained with automatic makeup control.

OATC 5. Check leak rate less than 5 GPM as determined by

[charging - (letdown + seal leakoff)] mismatch.

NOTE: (Leak rate will be ~ 30 GPM)

RNO SS 5. Perform the following:

a. Initiate 18013-C, RAPID POWER REDUCTION.

b. Be in mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

c. Go to step 11.

SS Initiates a unit shutdown per AOP-18013-C, Rapid Down Power Entry Condition Target Approx. Time @

3-5%/min 17015-D05 MFPT High Vibrations <70% RTP 5-8 minutes 17015-E01 17019-B04 Condenser Low Vacuum Vacuum >22.42" 18025-C or Circ Water Pump Trip Hg and STABLE or or Loss of Utility Water RISING 18009-C SG Tube Leak (75 gpd <50% RTP within 1 10-17 minutes with an ROC 30 gpd/hr) hour 18009-C SG Tube Leak ( 5 gpm) 20% RTP within 1 16-27 minutes hour & trip reactor 18039-C Confirmed Loose Part 20% RTP quickly 16-27 minutes SS determination based As determined by on plant conditions the SS 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 4 Event No.: 5 and 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL greater than 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 2. Verify rods in AUTO.

UO 3. Reduce Turbine Load at the desired rate up to 5%/min (60 MWE/min).

OATC 4. Borate as necessary by initiating 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

OATC / UO 5. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC / UO *6. Check desired ramp rate - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MIN.

RNO

6. IF conditions warrant a turbine load rate greater than 5%/min, THEN perform the following:

a. Trip the reactor.

b. Go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

OATC *7. Maintain Tavg within 6°F of Tref:

a. Monitor Tavg/Tref deviation (UT-0495).

b. Verify rods inserting as required.

c. Energize Pressurizer back-up heaters as necessary.

RNO

7b. Manual rod control should be used with insertions of up to 5 steps at a time.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 4 Event No.: 5 and 6 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 30 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL greater than 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC / UO *8. Maintain reactor power and turbine power - MATCHED.

a. Balance reactor power with secondary power reduction using boration and control rods.

b. Check rate of reactor power reduction - ADEQUATE FOR PLANT CONDITIONS.

c. Check RCS Tavg GREATER THAN 551°F (TS 3.4.2).

d. Check RCS Tavg - WITHIN 6°F OF TREF.

OATC *9. Maintain PRZR Pressure - AT 2235 PSIG.

OATC *10. Maintain PRZR Level - AT PROGRAM.

UO *11. Maintain SG Level - BETWEEN 60% AND 70%.

SS 12. Notify the System Operator that a load reduction is in progress.

NOTE: After system operator notified of load reduction proceed with next malfunction EVENT 7-DBA SGTR ON SG #1

-OR-AT CHIEF EXAMINERS RECOMMENDATION.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Directs OATC actions per Continuous Action From AOP 18009-C, step 2 RNO.

OATC *2. Maintain PRZR Level:

a. Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level.

b. Check PRZR level - STABLE OR RISING.

RNO

2b. Perform the following:

1) Isolate letdown by closing:

a) Letdown Orifice Valves.

b) Letdown Isolation Valves.

c) Excess Letdown Valves.

2) Start an additional Charging Pump as necessary.

SS / OATC 3) IF PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a) Trip the Reactor.

b) When Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI.

c) Go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

SS Directs OATC / UO to perform IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR EOP 19000-C, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC 1. Check Reactor Trip

Rod Bottom Lights - LIT

Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN

Neutron Flux - LOWERING UO 2. Check Turbine Trip:

All Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED UO 3. Check Power to AC Emergency Buses:

a. AC Emergency Busses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

4160V AC 1E Busses

b. AC Emergency Buses - ALL ENERGIZED:

4160V AC 1E Busses

480V AC 1E Busses OATC 4. Check if SI is actuated:

Any SI annunciator - LIT

SI ACTUATED BPLP window - LIT SS __ Go to Step 6 SS / CREW 6. Initiate the Foldout Page.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / CREW 7. Perform the following:

OATC Initial Actions Page

UO Initial Actions Page OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 1. Check both Trains of ECCS equipment-ALIGNING FOR INJECTION PHASE

MLB indication.

OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 2. Check Containment Isolation Phase A - ACTUATED

CIA MLB indication OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 3. Check ECCS Pumps and NCP status:

a. CCPs - RUNNING.

b. SI Pumps - RUNNING.

c. RHR Pumps - RUNNING

d. NCP - TRIPPED OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 4. Verify CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 5. Verify proper NSCW system operation:

a. NSCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING PER TRAIN.

b. NSCW TOWER RTN HDR BYPASS BASIN handswitches

- IN AUTO:

HS-1668A

HS-1669A OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 6. Verify Containment Cooling Units:

a. ALL RUNNING IN LOW SPEED

MLB indication

b. NSCW Cooler isolation valves - OPEN:

MLB indication OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 7. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED

CVI MLB indication OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 8. Check Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 21.5 PSIG.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 9. Check ECCS flows:

a. BIT Flow.

b. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1625 PSIG.

RNO Step 9b. Go to Step 10.

OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 10. Check ECCS Valve alignment - PROPER INJECTION LINEUP INDICATED ON MLBs.

RNO Step 10. Align valves using ATTACHMENT B, ATTACHMENT C and ATTACHMENT D as necessary.

OATC may choose to align valves in accordance with MLB LIGHT CRITICAL BOXES not being lit for valves: 1HV-8105, 1HV-8106, 1LV-112E and 1-LV-112C since there are only four valves misaligned.

-OR-Use ATTACHMENT B to align ECCS valves for proper injection lineup.

OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 11. Check ACCW Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OATC Step 12. Adjust Seal Injection flow to RCPs - 8 to 13 GPM.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF OATC INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OF E-0 CONTINUING AT STEP 8 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 6 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO Step 1. Check AFW Pumps - RUNNING

MDAFW Pumps

TDAFW Pump, if required UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO Step 2. Check NR level in at least one SG - GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE]

UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO Step 3. Check if main steamlines should be isolated:

a. Check for one or more of the following conditions:

_ Any steamline pressure - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 585 PSIG.

_ Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 14.5 PSIG.

_ Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI - BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate - ONTWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLINE.

RNO Step 3a. Go to Step 4 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 7 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO Step 4. Verify FW Isolation Valves closed:

MFIVs

BFIVs

MFRVs

BFRVs UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO Step 5. Verify SG Blowdown isolated:

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches HS-7603A, B, C, and D in the CLOSE position.

SG Sample Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO Step 6. Verify Diesel Generators - RUNNING.

UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO Step 7. Throttle total AFW flow as necessary to maintain SG NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%.

UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO Step 8. Verify both MFPs - TRIPPED.

7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 8 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO INITIAL ACTIONS UO Step 9. Check Main Generator Output Breakers - OPEN.

NOTE TO EXAMINER: END OF UO INITIAL ACTIONS OF E-0.

CREW RETURNS TO MAIN BODY OF E-0 CONTINUING AT STEP 8.

SS Returns to Step 8 E-0 after completion of BOTH OATC & UO Initial Actions.

OATC / UO 8. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page SS *9. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557º F:

OATC __. With RCP(s) running - RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE

-OR-

__ Without RCP(s) running - RCS WR COLD LEG TEMPERATURES SS 10. Check PRZR PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves:

OATC a. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED AND IN AUTO.

NOTE: PORV Block Valve HV-8000B closed and de-energized earlier per LCO 3.4.11 condition B.

b. Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED.

c. Power to at least one Block Valve - AVAILABLE.

d. PRZR PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN RNO Step 10*d. Verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve when PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 9 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 11. Check if RCPs should be stopped:

OATC a. ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

CCP or SI Pump.

b. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1375 PSIG. (no)

RNO 11b. Go to Step 12.

SS 12. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

UO a. SG Pressures:

__ Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner.

-OR-

__ Any completely depressurized.

RNO SS Step 12a. Go to Step 13.

SS 13. Check SG Tubes intact:

UO a. Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b. Secondary radiation NORMAL:

MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:

RE-13120 (SG1)

RE-13121 (SG2)

RE-13122 (SG3)

RE-13119 (SG4) 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 10 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 13.Cont. CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839C

RE-12838D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation.

c. Check SG levels - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RNO 13b/c. Go to 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.

NOTE: Radiation will exist on rad monitors RE-12839-C, RE-0724, RE-0810. Also should possibly see an uncontrolled level rise SG # 1.

SS Transitions to 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (Crew Update) 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE CREW 1. Initiate the following:

OATC/UO

Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.

Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-0 OATC CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

SS 2. Initiate NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 11 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC *3. Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs - 8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC 4. Check if RCPs should be stopped:

a. ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING:

CCP or SI Pump

b. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1375 PSIG (no)

RNO 4b. IF RCS pressure lowers to less than 1375 psig prior to initiation of RCS cooldown in Step 17, THEN stop all RCPs and return to Step in affect.

UO *5. Identify Ruptured SG(s) by any of the following conditions:

Unexpected rise in any SG NR level. (SG #1)

High radiation from any SG sample.

High radiation from any SG steamline.

High radiation from any SG blowdown line.

CAUTION At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

6. Isolate Ruptured SG(s):

UO CRITICAL

a. Adjusts ruptured SG ARV(s) controller setpoint to 1160 psig (pot setting 7.73) 11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 12 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO *6.Cont. b. Check ruptured SG ARV(s) - CLOSED.

__ PV-3000 (SG 1)

RNO 6b. WHEN ruptured SG(s) pressure less than 1160 psig, THEN verify SG ARV is closed. (SG-1)

CAUTION If TDAFW Pump is the only available AFW Pump by closing PV-15129 using HS-15111.

UO 7. Close affected TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve(s):

__ HV-3009 (SG 1) LP -1 MS SUPPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP-1 RNO CRITICAL 7. IF at least one MDAFW Pump running, THEN trip TDAFW Pump by closing PV-15129 using HS-15111.

UO 8. Verify SG Blowdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED WITH HANDSWITCHES IN CLOSE POSITION.

UO 9. Isolate flow from the ruptured SG(s) by closing its Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves RNO

9. Perform the following:

CRITICAL a. Close all remaining Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves.( SGs 2, 3 and 4) 12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 13 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 9. Cont.

RNO 9b. Verify the following valves are closed:

Steam Dump valves:

Status lightboard ZLB-2

AUX AND MAIN STEAM SPARGERS valve:

HV-6194A.

Steam Jet Air Ejector valves:

HV-4084B, SJAE-1 MN & AUX STM SPLY VLV.

HV-4085B, SJAE-2 MN & AUX STM SPLY VLV.

MSR steam supply:

HV-6030, MSR A&C REHEAT STEAM SOURCE STOP VALVES.

HV-6015, MSR B&D REHEAT STEAM SOURCE STOP VALVES.

RNO 9c. Use intact SG ARV(s) for dumping steam CREW CAUTIONS

This procedure should be performed in a timely manner to assure that break flow in the ruptured SG(s) is terminated before water enters the SGs main steam piping.

Any ruptured SG that is also faulted, should remain Formatted: Font: 10 pt, Not Bold isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless Formatted: Font: 10 pt, Not Bold needed for RCS cooldown or SG activity sample.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 14 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO *10. Check ruptured SG(s) level:

a. SG NR level - GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE]

b. Stop feed flow to ruptured SG(s).

UO 11. Check ruptured SG(s) pressure GREATER THAN 290 PSIG.

NOTE When the low steamline pressure SI/SLI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

UO 12. Check if low steamline pressure SI / SLI should be blocked:

a. STEAM DUMPS - AVAILABLE RNO 12a. Go to Step 14.

UO 14. Raise intact SG levels prior to maximum rate cooldown.

UO 15. Checks at least one RCP - RUNNING 14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 15 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW 16. Determines required core exit temperature for cooldown:

Lowest Ruptured Core Exit SG Pressure Temperature (psig) (ºF) 1200 and greater 530 1100 to 1199 518 1000 to 1099 506 900 to 999 493 800 to 899 479 700 to 799 463 600 to 699 445 500 to 599 424 400 to 499 399 300 to 399 366 290 to 299 350 UO 17. Initiates RCS cooldown:

a. Dump steam to Condenser from intact SG(s) at maximum rate using Steam Dumps by slowly raising demand on PIC-507.

RNO 17a. Dump steam at maximum rate from intact SG ARV(s).

15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 16 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO *18. Check if RCS Cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core Exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

RNO

18a. WHEN Core Exits are less than required, THEN perform Steps 18b and 18c.

b. Stop RCS cooldown

c. Maintain core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

UO *19. Check intact SG levels:

a. NR level - AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10% [32%

ADVERSE].

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%.

c. NR level - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

RNO

19c. Go to Step 20 OATC 20. Check PRZR PORVs and Block valves:

a. Power to PRZR PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.

b. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED.

c. PRZR PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 17 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS CAUTIONS If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:

RHR Pumps

SI pumps

Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units

Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).

ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CRI is reset).

OATC 21. Reset SI SS CAUTION Repositioning Phase A Isolation Valves may cause radiation problems throughout plant

22. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A OATC 23. Establish Instrument Air to Containment:

a. Instrument air pressure - GREATER THAN 100 PSIG.

b. Open INSTR AIR CNMT ISO VLV HV-9378.

c. Verify PRZR Spray Valves operating as required 17

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 18 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 24. Check if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. RHR Pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.

b. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 300 PSIG OATC

c. Stop RHR Pumps OATC *25. IF RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 300 psig, THEN restart RHR Pumps.

OATC / UO *26. Check if RCS cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

RNO

26a. Do NOT proceed until core exit TCs less than required temperature.

UO b. Stop RCS cooldown.

UO c. Maintain Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

CAUTION SS Ruptured SG pressure and RCS subcooling should begin to rise as RCS pressure recovers after the cooldown is stopped.

UO 27. Check ruptured SG(s) pressure - STABLE OR RISING.

18

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 19 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 28. Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 44°F

[58°F ADVERSE].

OATC 29. Check all the following:

__ RCS pressure - GREATER THAN RUPTURED SG(s)

PRESSURE.

__ PRZR level - LESS THAN 75% [52% ADVERSE].

OATC 30. Check Normal PRZR Spray - AVAILABLE.

OATC 31. Depressurize RCS using NORMAL PRZR Spray to refill PRZR:

a. Spray PRZR with maximum available spray.

b. Normal PRZR Spray - EFFECTIVE AT REDUCING RCS PRESSURE.

c. Go to step 37.

OATC 37. Check if ANY of the following conditions are satisfied:

BOTH of the following:

1) RCS pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED SG(s)

PRESSURE.

2) PRZR level - GREATER THAN 9% [37%

ADVERSE].

-OR-

__ RCS Subcooling - LESS THAN 24ºF [38ºF ADVERSE].

-OR-

__ PRZR level - GREATER THAN 75% [52% ADVERSE].

19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 20 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 38. Terminate RCS depressurization:

a. Verify NORMAL PRZR Spray valve(s) - CLOSED.

CRITICAL RNO 38a. IF a Normal Spray valve can NOT be closed, THEN stop RCP 4.

__ IF PRZR pressure continues lowering uncontrollably, THEN stop RCP 1.

b. Verify PRZR PORV(s) - CLOSED.

c. Block COPS.

d. Check AUXILIARY SPRAY - IN SERVICE.

RNO 38d. Go to Step 39.

OATC 39. Check RCS pressure - RISING.

NOTE: END SCENARIO HERE OR CONTINUE WITH STEP 40 AT CHIEF EXAMINERS DISCRETION.

CAUTION ECCS FLOW SHOULD BE TERMINATED when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfilling of the ruptured SGs.

20

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 21 of 21 Event No.: 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

SGTL occurring on loop #1 develops into a DBA SGTR. The OATC will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually perform a Reactor Trip, verify Reactor Trip and actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR.

MSIV on ruptured SG #1 will fail to close requiring isolation of all other SG MSIVs. The OATC will have to stop RCP #4 upon termination of RCS depressurization due to a stuck open spray valve.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC / UO *40. Check if ECCS flow should be terminated:

b. RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 24ºF [38ºF ADVERSE].

c. Secondary Heat Sink:

__ Total feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 570 GPM AVAILABLE.

-OR-

__ NR level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE].

d. RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING.

e. PRZR level - GREATER THAN 9% [37% ADVERSE].

OATC 41. Stop ECCS Pumps and place in standby:

SI Pumps.

All but one CCP.

END OF SCENARIO 21

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: VOGTLE Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners ___Meeks _________________ Operators __Monica Williams___________

___ Capehart_______________ ___Mike Clayburn ___________

___ Hopkins _______________ ___Curtis Jenkins__ _________

Initial Conditions: 33% Rated Thermal Power Equilibrium Xenon EOL. UOP 12004-C, Power Operation Step 4.1.39.b in effect.

Turnover: The 13.8 kV busses have been transferred to their normal power supply. Transfer the 4160V AC Non-1E buses to the normal incoming source shift turnover. Continue power ascension at less than 8% per hour.

CCW pump 5 and Air Compressor # 3 tagged out, Containment Mini-purge in service.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ES 01 Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip ES 02 Failure of Manual Reactor Trip TU 18 Failure of Automatic Turbine Trip RD 07 Failure of Automatic Rod Motion AF 02B MDAFW A Trips on Start OR HS-5130A to STOP (MDAFW pump B)

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N-UO Transfer the 4160V AC busses per 13425/A/B/C, 4160V AC N-SS non 1E Electrical Distribution System 2 N/A R-OATC Continues power ascension.

R-SS N-UO 3 CV 13 I-OATC CVCS VCT level transmitter LV-112 fails high 100% I-SS 4 PR 03A I-OATC Pressurizer Controlling Level Channel LT-459 fails high (25% - 100%) I-SS Ramp 300 Sec TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 5 MS 11A I-UO 1PT-507 Steam Line Header Pressure slowly fails to 0 psig.

(67% - 0%) I-SS Ramp 60 sec TS-SS

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 6 FW 15A M-ALL MFPT A Sheared Shaft Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip (ATWT) with LOHS Failure of Manual Reactor Trip 7 TU 18 C-UO Auto Turbine Trip Failure C-SS 8 RD 07 C-OATC Control Banks Fail to Move on Auto Demand C-SS 9 AF 02A C-UO TDAFW pump Overspeed Trip C-SS

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor EVENT 1:

Transfers 1NA01, 1NA04 and 1NA05 to Normal Incoming Source (UAT).

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Turns on sync switch, verifies incoming and bus voltages matched and closes normal incoming breaker for all three 4160V Non 1E switchgears. Matches flag on all tripped alternate incoming breakers to clear alarms.

EVENT 2:

Crew continues power ascension at less than 8% per hour.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC -Withdraws control rods and or dilutes as necessary to maintain Tavg matched with T-ref during power ascension.

UO - Increases turbine load using load increase pushbutton.

EVENT 3:

CVCS Volume Control Tank (VCT) level transmitter LT-112 fails high.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Places VCT divert valve HV-112 to the VCT position using HS-112A.

Initiates 13009-C, Places CVCS VCT makeup system to off and sets up for manual makeup operation.

EVENT 4:

Pressurizer Controlling Level Channel LT- 459 fails high Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Places Charging control valve FV-121 in manual and returns PRZR level to program.

Selects alternate controlling channel and returns charging FCV-121 in auto.

Technical Specifications LCO 3.3.1, FU 9 EVENT 5:

Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) LT-990 Fails Low Verifiable Actions:

UO - Manually closes RWST Sludge Mixing System Isolation valve(s) HV-10957 which failed to auto close on low level.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.5.4 Condition B (SR 3.5.4.4) and TR 13.1.7 EVENTS 6, 7 and 8:

MFPT Train A Sheared shaft / Loss of all feedwater / ATWT / Loss of Heat Sink.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Turns both reactor trip hand switches to the reactor trip position.

Manually inserts control rods to reduce reactor power.

Starts an emergency boration by starting a Boric Acid Pump and opening HV-8104 and adjusts CVCS charging and Seal flow.

UO - Manually trips the main turbine

. Manually closes CVI dampers and valves.

Starts piping penetration units.

Establishes feed water flow to at least one steam generator.

CRITICAL TASKS:

1. OATC - Manually inserts control rods to reduce reactor power.

2. UO - Manually Trips main turbine to conserve steam generator inventory.

3. UO - Establishes AFW flow to at least one steam generator from the TDAFW Pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

The UO Transfers Non 1E 4160V AC Busses from the Alternate Incoming Source (RAT) to the Normal Incoming Source (UAT), per 13425A,B,C -1, 4160V AC Non-1E Electrical Distribution System.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS UOP 12004-C Step 4.1.39 C: SS directs UO to transfer the 4160V AC Non-1E Busses per 13425 A/B/C-1, 4160V AC Non-1E Electrical Distribution System.

UO 13425A-1 4.2.1 Transferring 4160V Bus 1NA01 from Alternate Incoming Source (RAT or SAT) To Normal Incoming Source (UAT)

a. Verify incoming voltage across phase A-B is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NA01 Normal Incoming Voltmeter.

b. Verify bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NA01 Voltmeter.

c. Place Breaker 1NA0103 Synchronization Switch to ON, NOTE Synchronization can be observed by dimming of the sync lights and no motion of the sync scope.

ALB-33-A03 4160V SWGR 1NA01 TROUBLE

d. Close Normal Incoming Breaker 1NA0103.

e. Verify Alternate Incoming Breaker 1NA0101 tripped,

f. Place 1-HS-1NA0101 in the NORMAL AFTER TRIP position to match the breaker target.

g. Check bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NA01 Voltmeter

h. Place Breaker 1NA0103 Synchronization Switch to OFF

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

The UO Transfers Non 1E 4160V AC Busses from the Alternate Incoming Source (RAT) to the Normal Incoming Source (UAT), per 13425A,B,C -1, 4160V AC Non-1E Electrical Distribution System.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 13425B-1 4.2.1 Transferring 4160V Bus 1NA04 from Alternate Incoming Source (RAT or SAT) To Normal Incoming Source (UAT)

a. Verify incoming voltage across phase A-B is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NA04 Normal Incoming Voltmeter.

b. Verify bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NA04 Voltmeter.

c. Place Breaker 1NA0403 Synchronization Switch to ON, NOTE Synchronization can be observed by dimming of the sync lights and no motion of the sync scope.

ALB-33-A04 4160V SWGR 1NA04 TROUBLE

d. Close Normal Incoming Breaker 1NA0403.

e. Verify Alternate Incoming Breaker 1NA0401 tripped,

f. Place 1-HS-1NA0401 in the NORMAL AFTER TRIP position to match the breaker target.

g. Check bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NA04 Voltmeter

h. Place Breaker 1NA0403 Synchronization Switch to OFF

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 3 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

The UO Transfers Non 1E 4160V AC Busses from the Alternate Incoming Source (RAT) to the Normal Incoming Source (UAT), per 13425A,B,C -1, 4160V AC Non-1E Electrical Distribution System.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 13425C-1 4.2.1 Transferring 4160V Bus 1NA05 from Alternate Incoming Source (RAT or SAT) To Normal Incoming Source (UAT)

a. Verify incoming voltage across phase A-B is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NA05 Normal Incoming Voltmeter.

b. Verify bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NA05 Voltmeter.

c. Place Breaker 1NA0503 Synchronization Switch to ON, NOTE Synchronization can be observed by dimming of the sync lights and no motion of the sync scope.

ALB-33-A05 4160V SWGR 1NA05 TROUBLE

d. Close Normal Incoming Breaker 1NA0503.

e. Verify Alternate Incoming Breaker 1NA0501 tripped,

f. Place 1-HS-1NA0501 in the NORMAL AFTER TRIP position to match the breaker target.

g. Check bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 4160 volts on Bus 1NA05 Voltmeter

h. Place Breaker 1NA0503 Synchronization Switch to OFF

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 9 Event No.: 2 and 3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension after transferring 4160V AC busses to the UATs, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Continues to withdraw rods and/or dilutes boron as necessary to maintain Tavg matched with Tref during power ascension.

UO Increases turbine load using load increase pushbutton.

CREW Diagnoses that CVS VCT level transmitter 1LT-112 failed high.

Indications:

VCT HI/LO LEVEL Annunciator OATC References ARP 17007-1 Window E05, VCT HI/LO LEVEL AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

NOTE VCT automatic makeup should have started at 30 percent or stopped at 50 percent.

1. Letdown flow diverts to the HUT WHEN 1-HS-0112A is in AUTO with VCT high level of 97 percent.

2. Charging Pump suction auto swaps to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) upon a Lo-Lo VCT level of 5.7 percent.

3. A summary of instrument setpoints associated with the VCT levels include:

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 9 Event No.: 2 and 3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension after transferring 4160V AC busses to the UATs, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC LI-0112 VCT LEVEL LI-0185 Trip open 112A 97% Modulate 112A full divert (if LIC-0185 pot @8.70)

Hi level alarm 92%

112A Trip Open 87% 112A starts to divert signal Resets (if LIC-0185 pot

@8.70)

Auto Makeup stops 50%

Auto Makeup starts 30%

Low level alarm 20% Low level alarm RWST auto 5.7%(2 of 2) RWST auto swapover swapover INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS:

Step 1: Check VCT level using 1-LI-0185 on the QMCB AND compare to 1-LI-0112 on the IPC OR on Trend Recorder XR-40053.

OATC Step 2: IF equipment failure is indicated by EITHER LT-0185 OR LT-0112 failed high, perform the following:

a. Place 1HS-112A to the VCT position NOTE Pump cavitation may be indicated by fluctuating discharge pressure and/or erratic flow.

b. Monitor charging pump(s) for signs of cavitation. IF cavitation is observed:

(1) Isolate letdown, (2) Stop any running charging pumps, (3) Initiate 18007-C Section B.

NOTE: No Signs of Cavitation . Just a Failed Instrument.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 9 Event No.: 2 and 3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension after transferring 4160V AC busses to the UATs, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 2: cont.

c. Initiate Manual VCT Makeup per 13009-C.

d. Contact maintenance to initiate repairs.

OATC Step 3. IF level is low AND makeup is lost, initiate 18007-C, "Chemical And Volume Control System Malfunction." (N/A)

OATC Step 4: IF level is low due to system leakage, initiate 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage. (N/A)

OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS Step 1: IF VCT level is high: (N/A Step 1)

a. Stop Makeup.

b. Divert letdown flow to the Recycle Holdup Tank (HUT position) using 1-HS-0112A on the QMCB.

c. Operate makeup per 13009-1, "CVCS.

d. Reactor Makeup Control System."

SS Step 2: IF equipment failure is indicated, initiate maintenance as required OATC Step 3: IF an operating charging pump fails due to suspected gas binding (fluctuating discharge pressure AND flow), THEN the standby pump SHALL NOT be started UNTIL the cause of the gas binding is understood AND all effected piping and components have been vented.

NOTE: This Step Does Not Apply To Failure of LT-112.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 4 of 9 Event No.: 2 and 3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension after transferring 4160V AC busses to the UATs, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Directs OATC to Initiate Manual VCT Makeup per 13009-1 as Required to Maintain VCT Level Between 30 and 50%.

13009-1, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM CAUTIONS

If Manual Makeup is being performed to maintain VCT level when letdown is being diverted, letdown should not exceed 75 gpm.

BAST concentration is inaccurate until sampled following batching. Temperature and power should be closely monitored following manual makeup to the VCT with the BAST concentration inaccurate.

OATC Performs 13009-1, Section 4.6 MANUAL MAKEUP OATC Step 4.6.1 Manual Makeup At 100 GPM Total Flow NOTE Volumetric change in VCT is equal to 19.2 gallons per percent change in level.

OATC Step 4.6.1.1 Set TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 to the desired amount of Total Makeup Water.

CAUTION OATC Digital counters and thumbwheel settings on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1-FQ-0110 read in tenth-gallon increments.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 5 of 9 Event No.: 2 and 3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension after transferring 4160V AC busses to the UATs, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 4.6.1.2 Set BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator 1-FQI-0110 to the amount of boric acid calculated using the following formula:

Total M/U x RCS Cb Gallons of Boric Acid = BAST Cb OATC Step 4.6.1.3 Adjust BORIC ACID Flow Controller 1-FIC-0110 pot setting using the following formula and verify controller is in AUTO:

RCS Cb x 25 1-FIC-0110 pot setting = BAST Cb OATC Step 4.6.1.4 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

OATC Step 4.6.1.5 Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in MAN.

OATC Step 4.6.1.6 Verify the following:

BA TO BLENDER 1-HS-0110A in AUTO.

RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER 1-HS-0111A in AUTO.

One Boric Acid Transfer Pump in AUTO or START.

One Reactor Makeup Water Pump in AUTO or START.

Verify TOTAL MAKEUP Flow controller 1-FIC-0111 is in AUTO with pot is set for 100 gpm (approximately 6.25) total flowrate.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 6 of 9 Event No.: 2 and 3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension after transferring 4160V AC busses to the UATs, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE While letdown is configured for 120 gpm, the preferred flow path for Manual Makeup is through 1-FV-0110B BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT. The design capacity of the VCT spray nozzles would be challenged with 120 gpm letdown in service and the addition of the makeup flow upstream of the VCT (1X6AH04-00024). This could prevent makeup from reaching the desired flow rate. Thus, 1-FV-0111B should only be used if 1-FV-0110B is not available.

CAUTION With either Blender Outlet valve handswitch in the open position, an automatic isolation will not occur due to a Boric Acid and/or Total Makeup Flow Deviations OATC Step 4.6.1.7 Open one of the following valves:

BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT 1-FV-0110B

-OR-BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1-FV-0111B NOTES OATC

Manual makeup can be stopped at any time by placing 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

VCT level should be maintained between 30 and 87 percent.

(1-LIC-0185 controller pot should normally be set to 8.7.)

VCT Pressure 1-PI-115 should be maintained between 20 and 45 psig.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 7 of 9 Event No.: 2 and 3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension after transferring 4160V AC busses to the UATs, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 4.6.1.8 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START and perform the following:

Verify Boric Acid Transfer Pump is running.

Verify Reactor Makeup Water Pump is running.

Verify BORIC ACID TO BLENDER 1-FV-0110A throttles open to provide the correct flow of boric acid.

Verify REACTOR MU WTR TO BLENDER 1-FV-0111A throttles open to provide correct total flow.

If desired, control Boric Acid Flow controller 1-FIC-0110 by adjusting pot OR using up/down pushbuttons to control boric acid at the desired flowrate.

OATC Step 4.6.1.9 Monitor counters on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator 1-FQI-0110 and TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 and perform the following:

WHEN counter on 1-FQI-0110 BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator reaches its setpoint, verify 1-FV-0110A BORIC ACID TO BLENDER is closed.

WHEN counter on 1-FQI-0111 TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator reaches its setpoint, verify 1-FV-0111A REACTOR MAKEUP WATER TO BLENDER is closed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 8 of 9 Event No.: 2 and 3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension after transferring 4160V AC busses to the UATs, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 4.6.1.10 If desired, flush approximately 15 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water through 1-FV-0110B by performing the following:

a. Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A to ALT DIL.

b. Set TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 for 13 to 15 gals.

c. Place BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1-HS-0111B in CLOSE.

d. Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START.

e. Verify flow is indicated on 1-FI-0110B.

f. WHEN TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-0111 reaches the desired setpoint, verify 1-FV-0111A RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER is closed.

OATC Step 4.6.1.11 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller 1-FIC-0110 is in AUTO and potentiometer is set for current RCS Cb.

OATC Step 4.6.1.12 Align Reactor Makeup Control system for automatic operation as follows:

COMPONENT NAME POSITION

a. 1-HS-0111B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT AUTO

b. 1-HS-0110B BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCTION AUTO

c. 1-HS-40001A VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT AUTO

d. 1-HS-40001B VCT MAKEUP CONTROL START

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 9 of 9 Event No.: 2 and 3 Event

Description:

In the process of continuing the power ascension after transferring 4160V AC busses to the UATs, CVCS VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 Fails High.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Step 4.6.1.13 Verify the following valves are closed:

1-FV-0111B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT.

1-FV-0110B BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT.

OATC Step 4.6.1.14 IF Boric Acid Transfer Pump was placed in START at Step 4.6.1.6, return to AUTO or as directed by SS.

OATC Step 4.6.1.15 IF Reactor Makeup Water Pump was placed in START at Step 4.6.1.6, return to AUTO or as directed by SS.

OATC Step 4.6.1.16 Operate the Pressurizer Back-up Heaters as necessary to equalize Cb between the RCS and the Pressurizer.

NOTE Automatic Control Rod withdrawal function has been disabled. The only function enabled when Control Rod handswitch is placed in AUTO is automatic insertion when Tavg is at least 1.5 degrees above Tref.

OATC Step 4.6.1.17 Monitor RCS Tavg, control bank position, or power level as applicable.

SS Return to step and procedure in effect, UOP 12004-C.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR level channel 1LT-0459 fails high causing a reduction in charging flow. This will require the crew to enter AOP 18001-C, Section D, Failure of PRZR Level Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnoses that PZR level channel LI-459 has failed high and informs SS of the failure:

Indications:

PZR level channel I (459) goes to 100%

Charging flow lowers from 132 gpm Possible flashing in CVCS letdown line (flow oscillations)

Alarms:

PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEV AND HEATERS ON PRZR HI LEVEL CHANNEL ALERT REGEN HX LTDN HI TEMP NC PUMP LO FLOW CHARGING LINE HI/LO FLOW RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW SS Enters AOP 18001-C, Section D (Crew Update)

OATC / UO D1. Initiates the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC *D2. Check PRZR level TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.

RNO

D2. IF PRZR level instrument fails high, THEN perform the following as necessary:

Adjusts charging to prevent letdown from flashing

-OR-

Isolate letdown

__ IF PRZR level instrument fails low, THEN maintain charging flow approximately 10 gpm greater than total seal injection flow. (N/A) 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR level channel 1LT-0459 fails high causing a reduction in charging flow. This will require the crew to enter AOP 18001-C, Section D, Failure of PRZR Level Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC *D3. Maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 gpm OATC D4. Select an unaffected channel on LS-459D PRZR LVL CNTL SELECT.

Note: Should select 461 / 460 D5. Select same channel on LS-459E PRZR LVL REC SEL as selected on LS-459D.

Note: Should select 461 OATC *D6. Restore letdown flow by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, if required. (N/A)

NOTE: Steps for Letdown restoration are at the end of this event description if letdown was isolated by crew for this failure.

OATC D7. Check if PRZR heaters should be restored to service:

__ PRZR level controlling channel FAILED LOW.

RNO D7. Go to Step D9 OATC D9. Return PRZR level control to AUTO.

OATC *D10. Check PRZR level is maintained at program by auto control.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Controlling PZR level channel 1LT-0459 fails high causing a reduction in charging flow. This will require the crew to enter AOP 18001-C, Section D, Failure of PRZR Level Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS D11. Notify I&C to initiate repairs.

Notifies Duty Manager of AOP entry due to LT-459 Failure. Contacts SSS to generate a CR and Work Order on failed PRZR level channel LT-0459.

SS D12. Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509 C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

NOTE: Not expected to BTI affected instrument channels.

SS D13. Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per TABLE D1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . (TS 3.3.1)

NOTE: Not expected to TRIP affected channel bistables.

SS D14. Initiate the applicable actions of Technical Specification 3.3.1.

LCO 3.3.1 FU 9 Condition M PZR HI LEVEL TRIP > P-7

INFO LCO 3.3.3 PAMS - FU 6

3.3.4 FU 8 - Condition A - Remote Shutdown SS *D15. Check repairs and surveillances - COMPLETE.

NOTE: Repairs and surveillances not expected to be complete.

RNO

D15. Perform the following:

a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step D16

b. Return to procedure and step in effect.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

During Power Ascension, RWST Level Transmitter LT-990 Drifts Low.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnoses RWST Level Transmitter 1LT-0990 has Drifted Low.

Indications:

RWST LO LEVEL ALARM (ALB 06) WINDOW E04 SS / OATC Enters ARP 17006-1 for Window E04.

OATC 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves 1-HV-10957 (Train B, 1-LT-0991) and 1-HV-10958 (Train A, 1-LT-0990) close.

RWST SLUDGE MIXING SYSTEM PUMP WILL TRIP ON LOW FLOW DUE TO CLOSURE OF 1-HV-10958.

OATC 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE OATC 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. IF in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, and SI is not in progress, stop any operation that could be removing water from the RWST.

NOTE: No operations involving RWST in progress.

OATC 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

2. IF a system leak is indicated, dispatch personnel to locate and isolate the leak. (N/A)

OATC 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS

3. Restore RWST level to normal per 13701-1, "Boric Acid System." (N/A) 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

During Power Ascension, RWST Level Transmitter LT-990 Drifts Low.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS SS 4. Refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4 and TR 13.1.7.

DETERMINES ABOVE TS AND TR NOT APPLICABLE SS Returns to procedure and step in effect UOP 12004-C.

AT CHIEF EXAMINERS REQUEST PROCEED WITH NEXT EVENT.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses Loss of Feedwater Flow:

Symptoms/Indications:

ALB15-B05 MFPT DISCH HDR LO PRESS ALB13-A01(B01, C01, D01) STM GEM 1 (2,3,4) FLOW MISMATCH ALB13-A06(B06, C06, D06) STM GEN 1 (2,3,4) HI/LO LVL DEVIATION Unexpected Change in MFP Speed of P CREW Recognizes Failure of Reactor To AUTO TRIP SS Orders OATC and UO to perform Immediate Operator Action for 19000-C E-0 CREW 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION IMMEDIATE OPERATORACTIONS OATC 1. Check Reactor Trip

a. Rod Bottom Lights - LIT

b. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN

c. Neutron Flux - LOWERING RNO

1. Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches.

__ IF Reactor NOT tripped, THEN go to 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION / ATWT.

SS Transitions to 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWT (Crew Update)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION /

ATWT IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION RCPs should not be tripped with Reactor power greater than 5%.

OATC 1. Verify Reactor Trip:

IOA

Rod Bottom Lights - LIT

Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN

Neutron Flux - LOWERING RNO

1. Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip handswitches.

__ IF Reactor NOT tripped, THEN insert Control Rods.

UO 2. Verify Turbine Trip:

IOA

a. All Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

RNO 2a. Trip Turbine

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS UO 3. Check AFW Pumps - RUNNING.

MDAFW Pumps RNO

__ Start Pumps SS / UO

TDAFW Pump, if required.

Dispatches personnel to investigate MDAFW pumps and TDAFW pump failure NOTE TO EXAMINER: MDAFW PUMP A RUNNING WITH SHEARED SHAFT.

MDAFW PUMP B WILL NOT START (AUTO OR MANUAL). TDAFW PUMP WILL OVERSPEED WHEN STARTED (AUTO OR MANUAL).

OATC 4. Emergency borate the RCS:

CRITICAL

a. Start at least one Boric Acid Transfer Pump.

b. Verify a Charging Pump is running.

c. Open EMERGENCY BORATE valve HV-8104.

d. Verify charging flow - GREATER THAN 42 GPM.

e. Verify boric acid flow - GREATER THAN 30 GPM.

f. Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.

SS 5. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:

OATC a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:

CVI MLB indication

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 4 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 6. Initiate the following:

OATC / UO

Continuous Action Page.

SS

NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

SS *7. Check for SI:

OATC a. SI signal - EXISTS OR ACTUATED. (NO)

RNO

a. IF an SI signal is actuated during this procedure, THEN initiate ATTACHMENT A.

SS 8. Check the following trips have occurred:

OATC a. Reactor Trip.

RNO 8a. Locally trip the RTBs and Bypass Breakers.

UO b. Turbine Trip.

SS *9. Check Reactor power:

OATC a. LESS THAN 5%

RNO 9a. Go to Step 10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 5 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 10. Check Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN.

UO *11. Check SG levels:

a. NR level - AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10% [32%

ADVERSE].

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%.

UO *12. Check CST level - GREATER THAN 15%.

SS 13. Verify all dilution paths - ISOLATED:

OATC

RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER, FV-111A - CLOSED

Dispatch operator to verify CVCS RX M/U WTR TO CCP A ISOL, 1209-U4-183 - LOCKED CLOSED.

SS 10. Check for reactivity insertion from uncontrolled RCS cooldown:

OATC __ RCS temperature - LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

-OR-UO __ Any SG pressure - LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

CAUTION SS At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 6 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 15. Verify Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves - CLOSED.

UO 16. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. Identify intact SG(s):

SG pressures - ANY STABLE OR RISING.

b. Identify faulted SG(s)

__ ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

-OR-

__ ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.

RNO 16b. Go to Step 22.

OATC 22. Check Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN 1200ºF.

OATC 23. Check Reactor Power:

a. LESS THAN 5%. (YES)

b. IR SUR - LESS THAN 0 DPM. (YES)

OATC *24. Maintain emergency boration to provide adequate shutdown margin for subsequent plant conditions.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 7 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 25. Initiate CSFS Trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

CRITICAL NOTE TO EXAMINER: OATC SHOULD VERIFY RED PATH ON LOSS OF HEAT SINK IS VALID AND DIRECT SS TO GO TO 19231-C PRIOR TO 19000-C E-0 RE-ENTRY.

26. Return to procedure and step in effect. (19000-C)

CUE: SO dispatched to the TDAFW pump reports that the trip and throttle valve mechanical linkage is bent and maintenance is retrieving the spare from the warehouse.

SS Transitions to EOP 19231-C FR-H1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK. (Crew Update) 19231-C FR-H1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.

SS CAUTION Feed flow should NOT be re-established to any faulted SG if a non-faulted SG is available.

SS / UO Step 1. Check total feed flow capability to SG(s)

Greater than 570 gpm available. (NO)

-AND-

Less than 570 gpm due to Operator action.

RNO

1. Go to Step 3.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 8 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Step 3. Initiate the following:

OATC / UO

Continuous Actions Page for Prior to Establishing Feed and Bleed.

SS

NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTION.

SS Step 4. Check if secondary heat sink is required:

OATC a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE.

b. RCS WR temperature - GREATER THAN 350ºF.

SS *Step 5. Check CCP status - AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE.

SS *Step 6. Check if RCS bleed and feed is required:

a. Check the following:

__ WR level in any 3 SGs - LESS THAN 29% [44% ADVERSE].

__ RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 1335 PSIG DUE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.

RNO Step 6a. WHEN criteria for bleed and feed are met, THEN perform Steps 6.b and 6.c.

__ Go to Step 7.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 9 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / UO Step 7. Place Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service by initiating 13130, POST - ACCIDENT HYDROGEN CONTROL.

NOTE: NOT EXPECTED FOR UO TO PERFORM. CALLS SSS AT C&T.

UO Step *8. Check CST level - GREATER THAN 15%.

UO Step 9. Verify SG Blowdown Isolated:

SG Blowdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED WITH HANDSWITCHES IN CLOSE POSITION.

SG Sample Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

UO Step *10. Try to establish MDAFW flow to at least one SG:

a. Check MDAFW Pump - AVAILABLE. (NO)

Power available

Suction Pressure

Discharge pressure RNO 10.a Perform the following:

Initiate actions to restore an MDAFW Pump

Go to Step 11.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 10 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Step *11. Try to establish TDAFW flow to at least one SG:

a. Check TDAFW Pump AVAILABLE: (NO)

Steam admission valve HV-5106 - OPEN.

Trip & Throttle valve PV-15129 - OPEN (HS-15111). (NO)

Governor valve SV-15133 - OPERATING PROPERLY (PDIC-5180a.

RNO

11.a Perform the following:

Initiate 13610, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM to operate TDAFW Pump as necessary.

When TDAFW Pump is Started, THEN go to Step 11.b.

Go to Step 12.

OATC Step 12. Stop all RCPs.

OATC Step *13. Check if SI actuation is required.

__ PRZR level - CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 9%

[37% ADVERSE].

-OR-

__ RCS Subcooling - LESS THAN 24ºF [38ºF ADVERSE].

RNO Step*13: WHEN criteria for SI is met, THEN perform the following:

a. Verify SI Actuated

b. After 60 seconds, reset SI.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 11 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RNO Step*13: cont.

c. Cycle Reactor Trip Breakers.

d. Reset FWI.

__ Go to Step 15.

CUE: PRIOR TO STEP 15, C&T WILL PAGE UO AND REPORT TDAFW PUMP TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE HAS BEEN REPAIRED.

UO Reviews 13615-1 with System Operator whom is located at the TDAFW Pump House and Starts the TDAFW Pump. Notifies SS TDAFW Pump is running.

The SS should go back to continuous action step *11.a RNO WHEN TDAFW Pump is started, THEN go to step 11.b.

Step *15. Try to establish main FW flow to at least one SG:

a. Check condensate system - IN SERVICE NOTE TO EXAMINER: CONTINUE WITH STEP *11b NEXT PAGE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 12 of 12 Event No.: 6, 7, 8 and 9 Event

Description:

During power ascension, MFPT Train A will develop a sheared shaft resulting in a loss of all FW. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip (ATWT) and will not manually trip causing an ATWT condition. The Main Turbine fails to auto trip and must be manually tripped. The Auto Rod insertion is inoperable and must be manually inserted to shutdown the reactor. A Loss of All AFW will cause a RED Path on Heat Sink which must be addressed by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS / UO Step *11. cont.

UO b. Verify TDAFW pump throttle valves open:

HV-5122 TDAFW Pump to SG 1

HV-5125 TDAFW Pump to SG 2

HV-5127 TDAFW Pump to SG 3

HV-5120 TDAFW Pump to SG 4 Step *11. cont.

UO c. Check total flow to SG(s) - GREATER THAN 570 GPM.

RNO

11.c IF feed flow to at least one SG verified, THEN perform the following:

1) Maintain flow to restore NR level to greater than 10% [32%

ADVERSE].

SS 2) WHEN NR LEVEL GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE],

THEN return to procedure and step in effect. (19000-C, E-0)

END OF SCENARIO

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _Vogtle____________ Scenario No.: ___5____ Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Examiners: __Capehart__________________ Operators: _____________________________

__Meeks_____________________ _____________________________

__Hopkins____________________ _____________________________

-3 Initial Conditions: The plant is at 2 X 10 % power, EOL, Reactor startup in progress per 12003-C.

Equipment OOS: CCW pump # 5, Air Compressor # 3.

Turnover: Raise power to beyond the POAH and continue power ascension per 12004-C. Containment mini-purge is in service for a Containment entry on the next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

T4 - ALB08, window E04 (RCP SHAFT VIBRATION) illuminates.

T4 - ALB08 window F04 illuminates after 240 second time delay.

ES 01 - Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip ES 08 / ES 16 - Train A and B SI auto actuation failure.

ES 10 / ES 11 - Train A and Train B SLI Auto Actuation Failure Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description

-3 1 N/A R-OATC Raise power from 2 X 10 % to beyond the POAH per 12003-C.

R-SS N-UO Adjusts AFW flow after the POAH is reached to maintain SG levels.

C-UO NSCW pump # 4 trips with NSCW pump # 6 auto start failure.

2 NS02E C-SS NS07F TS-SS INFO LCO 3.7.8, Nuclear Service Cooling Water C-UO Steam generator ARV Loop # 4 fails open.

3 MS03D C-SS TS-SS INFO LCO 3.7.4, Atmospheric Relief Valves C-RO RCP # 2 shutdown after high vibration alarms received.

4 N/A C-SS TS-SS LCO 3.4.4, RCS Loops, Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 5 MS04B M-ALL SG # 2 Faulted IRC 0 - 40%

over 60 seconds

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 6 ES08 C-OATC Train A and B Auto SI Failure ES16 C-SS 7 ES10 C-UO Train A and B Auto SLI Failure ES11 C-SS

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

Power is at 2 X 10-3% power and critical data has been taken. The crew should raise reactor power from the present level to beyond the POAH and continue power ascension.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Withdraw control rods to establish a positive SUR and raise power to between 1 to 3% as read on the Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation, then stabilize reactor power using control rods.

UO - Raise AFW flow as the POAH is reached to maintain SG levels to preclude Reactor trip on SG levels.

Event 2:

NSCW pump # 4 locked rotor (pump trips) with failure of NSCW pump # 6 to auto start.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Manually starts NSCW pump # 6 per AOP-18021, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) direction to prevent pump runout of NSCW pump # 2.

Technical Specifications:

INFO LCO 3.7.8, Nuclear Service Cooling Water Event 3:

Steam Generator # 4 ARV PV-3030 pressure transmitter fails high resulting in PV-3030 opening causing a reactor power excursion and entry in AOP-18008-C, Secondary Steam Leak.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Manually closes PV-3030 to isolate the secondary coolant steam release, stopping the power excursion.

OATC - Manually inserts/withdraws rods as necessary to limit the power rise.

Technical Specifications:

INFO LCO 3.7.4, Atmospheric Relief Valves

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4:

RCP Shaft High and High High Vibration alarms received. CBO reports RCP # 2 indicates 22 mils and slowly rising.

A manual stop of the RCP is required per SOP-13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pumps. The crew will also be required to enter AOP-18005-C, Partial Loss of Flow.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Starts RCP oil lift pump for RCP # 2 OATC - Stops RCP # 2 by opening the non-1E hand switch first.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.4, RCS Loops Modes 1 and 2, Condition A Event 5:

A fault will occur on Steam Generator # 2 IRC with failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, failure of automatic reactor trip, and failure of automatic Safety Injection. E-0 shall be performed until a transition step to E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation is made. The crew will be required to manually trip the Reactor, manually actuate Safety Injection, and manually actuate an SLI. The crew will also be required to manually isolate AFW flow to the faulted SG from both the MDAFW and TDAFW pumps. The TDAFW steam supply to SG # 2 will also require isolation.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Manually trips the reactor to limit EOL power excursion due to positive reactivity added by uncontrolled RCS cool down.

OATC - Manually actuates SI to add negative reactivity to RCS to limit Reactor power excursion.

UO - Manually actuate steam line isolation using either SLI manual hand switch to limit power excursion due to positive reactivity addition and to limit Containment pressure rise to prevent exceeding design pressure limits.

UO - Isolates AFW flow to SG # 2 and isolates TDAFW steam supply to SG # 2 CRITICAL ACTIONS:

1) Manually trips the reactor from either Rx. Trip hand switch to limit power excursion due to positive reactivity addition from EOL steam line break.

2) Manually actuates Safety Injection from either SI hand switch to add negative reactivity to offset positive reactivity addition from uncontrolled cool down.

3) Isolates Main Steam Lines and SG # 2 in E-0 and/or E-2 to limit Reactor power excursion, RCS uncontrolled cool down to limit positive reactivity addition and limit PTS concerns, limit Containment pressure rise to prevent challenge of Containment barrier.

Manually actuates SLI from either SLI hand switch.

Isolates MDAFW and TDAFW discharge throttle valves to SG # 2

Isolates TDAFW steam supply to SG # 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

The Control Room Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the Reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods to establish a positive SUR and raise power to the POAH and continue power ascension.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

-3 OATC 4.2.25 Raise power to 2 X 10 % in the Intermediate Range by adjusting control rods as necessary to establish a SUR of approximately 0.5 dpm.

OATC 4.2.26 Stabilize power at an Intermediate Range indication of

-3 approximately 2 X 10 % and complete:

a. OSP 14940, "Estimated Critical Condition Calculation" Data Sheet 1, Actual Critical Data, OR

b. 88010-C, "Computer Calculation Of Estimated Critical Conditions" Data Sheet 3.

c. Place a copy of the above Data Sheet(s) in the Start-up Log tab of the Reactor Trip Log.

d. IF this reactor startup IS NOT a dilution to criticality for LPPT, Tavg recording per Data Sheet 2 can be terminated if ALB12A05 is NOT illuminated.

SS NOTE The Avg/Tref Deviation alarm, ALB12A05, provides actions to o

maintain Tavg above 551 F, the minimum temperature for criticality.

OATC 4.2.27 Monitor Tavg/Tref Deviation alarm, ALB12-A05, during the SS remainder of the startup and take corrective action as directed to o

maintain Tavg at 557 F +/-2°F. (TS SR 3.4.2.1)

UO 4.2.28 Unblock both Source Range channels HFASA circuits per 13501, Nuclear Instrumentation System.

(1) Source Range Channel N31 (2) Source Range Channel N32

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

The Control Room Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the Reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods to establish a positive SUR and raise power to the POAH and continue power ascension.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 4.2.29 IF this Reactor startup was a dilution to criticality for LPPT, perform LPPT-GAE/GBE-01.

This Step is N/A OATC 4.2.30 Verify Power Range Channels indicating properly on recorder NR-45.

SS NOTE OATC A spike in startup rate (SUR) will occur when intermediate range nuclear instruments (N35 and N36) automatically swap from pulse counting to MSV mode at about 3 X 10-2% power (rising).

SS CAUTION OATC Ensure alternate indications of Reactor power level are observed to back up nuclear instrumentation readings.

OATC 4.2.31 Raise power to approximately 1% to 3%.

UO 4.2.32 Verify steam dumps or, if applicable, S/G atmospheric relief valves, maintain Tavg at 557°F +/-2°F.

SS 4.2.33 Continue to power operation per 12004-C,"Power Operation (Mode 1).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions ______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Trip of B train NSCW pump #4 due to locked rotor. The standby NSCW pump #6 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train A NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose degraded NSCW conditions:

Trip of NSCW pump #4(1HS-1635A)

Green - ON Amber - ON Red - OFF Alarms:

NSCW TRAIN B LO HDR PRESS

NSCW TRAIN B DG CLR LO FLOW

NSCW TRAIN B RHR PMP & MTR CLR LO FLOW

NSCW TRAIN B CNMT CLR 1 & 2 LO FLOW

NSCW TRAIN B CNMT CLR 5 & 6 LO FLOW

NSCW TRN B RX CVTY CLG COIL LOW FLOW

TRAIN B SYS STATUS MON PNL ALERT

4160V SWGR 1BA03 TROUBLE Indications:

NSCW HDR PRESS 1PI-1636 drops to 50 psig.

NSCW Train B flow:

SUPPLY 1FI-1641B drops to 12,000 GPM.

RETURN 1FI-1641A drops to 12,000 GPM.

SS Enters AOP 18021-1, Loss of NSCW System (Crew Update)

UO 1. Check if catastrophic leakage from NSCW system - EXISTS.

SS RNO Go to Step 6.

UO 6. Verify NSCW pumps in affected train TWO OR MORE OPERATING:

NOTE: UO should start NSCW pump 5 here per procedure.

Supply header pressure greater than 70 psig.

Train A:PI-1636 Train B: PI-1637

Appendix D Required Operator Actions ______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Trip of B train NSCW pump #4 due to locked rotor. The standby NSCW pump #6 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train A NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

6. cont.

Supply header flow approximately 17,000 gpm.

Train A:FI-1640B Train B: FI-1641B UO 7. Check the following on the affected train:

NSCW pumps - THREE RUNNING.

-AND-

Low header pressure annunciator - EXTINGUISHED.

SS RNO Go to Step 9.

UO 9. Verify the following on the affected NSCW train:

Supply header pressure GREATER THAN 70 PSIG:

Train A:PI-1636 Train B: PI-1637

Supply header temperature computer indication LESS THAN 90°F:

Train A:TE-1642 Train B: TE-1643

Supply header flow APPROXIMATELY 17,000 GPM:

Train A:FI-1640B Train B: FI-1641B UO 10. Check NSCW cooling tower basin levels on affected NSCW train GREATER THAN 73%:

Train A:LI-1606 Train B: LI-1607 UO 11. Check proper operation of affected NSCW train:

Two pumps running.

Supply header pressure GREATER THAN 70 PSIG:

Train A:PI-1636 Train B: PI-1637

Appendix D Required Operator Actions ______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Trip of B train NSCW pump #4 due to locked rotor. The standby NSCW pump #6 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train A NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

11. cont.

Supply header temperature computer indication LESS THAN 90°F:

Train A: TE-1642 Train B: TE-1643

Supply header flow APPROXIMATELY 17,000 GPM:

Train A: FI-1640B Train B: FI-1641B SS 12. Go to Step 21.

UO 21. Check NSCW return temperature on affected train - LESS THAN 95°F:

Train A:TI-1676A Train B: TI-1677A SS 22. Return to procedure and step in effect.

SS INFO TS 3.7.8, Nuclear Service Cooling Water should be identified during this procedure.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

SG #4 ARV Pressure Transmitter Fails High resulting in a fully opened ARV. The crew will respond by performing the actions of AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage. The UO will be able to isolate the leak with manual operation of the ARV controller on the main control board.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnoses opening of SG ARV by the following indications:

MN STM SFTY VLVS LEAKING

TAVG/TREF DEVIATION

TAVG LO-LO ALERT

TERR (TAVG-TREF) LO

High ARV tailpipe temperature (back panel indication)

SG #4 ARV position indicating lights Red - ON, Green - OFF

Lowering RCS temperature

Rising Reactor power

SG #4 ARV controller indication (RED UP ARROW LIT)

SS Enters AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage (Crew Update)

1. Perform the following as necessary:

Reduce Turbine load if any of the following indications exceed 100% power:

OATC UQ1118 (GREATER THAN 100% MWT for the applicable unit)

NIs Ts

Isolate the leak. (UO closes SG ARV)

UO

IF leakage is such that significant hazard to personnel or equipment exists OR leakage rate is unstable and is worsening, THEN:

1) Trip the reactor.

2) WHEN reactor trip is verified, THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

3) Go to 19000-C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

OATC/UO 2. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

SG #4 ARV Pressure Transmitter Fails High resulting in a fully opened ARV. The crew will respond by performing the actions of AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage. The UO will be able to isolate the leak with manual operation of the ARV controller on the main control board.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO *3. Monitor steam leakage characteristics:

Small in magnitude such that no significant hazard to personnel or equipment exists.

Leakage rate is relatively stable and is not rapidly worsening.

OATC 4. Check the following:

a. Tavg - MATCHED WITH TREF

b. PRZR level - IN PROGRAM BAND

c. PRZR pressure - BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG UO d. SG levels - IN PROGRAM BAND UO 5. Check containment conditions - NORMAL:

Pressure

Temperature

Moisture

Sump level UO 6. Close SG blow down isolation valves if the source of leakage is unknown.

UO *7. Check CSTs level - GREATER THAN 80%.

UO *8. Monitor hotwell makeup rate - SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN LEVEL.

SS 9. Review applicable Technical Specification requirements.

LCO 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System - INFO ONLY LCO 3.7.4 ARVs - INFO ONLY SS 10. Perform one of the following:

Continue plant operation.

-OR-Commence a unit shutdown by initiating 12004 C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions ______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

High shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation. If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Alarms:

RCP SHAFT VIBRATION ALERT RCP SHAFT HI VIBRATION Refers to ARP 17008-1, windows E04 and F04.

OATC NOTES

Prompt action is required to confirm alarm validity and shut down affected RCP if required.

The Vibration Monitoring Panel displays auctioneered high vibration levels.

OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR WINDOW F04(Higher Alarm Threshold)

SS

1. Attempt to confirm validity of annunciator through related plant parameters.

Possible parameters to look at:

seal D/P

seal injection flow

seal leak off flow

bearing temperatures

lube oil alarms SS 2. Dispatch an operator to the Vibration Monitoring Panel 1-1201-P5-VMP to:

a. Identify the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) causing the alarm.

b. Check both vibration channels and alarm setpoints for shaft and frame of each RCP (32 points in all) to verify no obvious vibration monitoring equipment problems exist.

c. Attempt to reset alarm using COMMON RESET toggle switch.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions ______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

High shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation. If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 3. Refer to 13003-1, "Reactor Coolant Pump Operation" and shut down the affected RCP.

NOTE: The SO reports that RCP #2 shaft vibration channels are reading 21 mils, and the frame vibration channels are reading 2.5 mils. All other RCP channels indicate ~ 7 mils shaft and 1 mil frame. The common reset switch has been placed to reset to attempt to clear the alarm.

SS Determines section 4.3.1 of procedure 13003-1, is the correct section to use for RCP shutdown.

SS CAUTIONS

If RHR is in the Shutdown Cooling Mode, RCS Pressure shall be less than 365 psig prior to stopping a Reactor Coolant Pump (This is to preclude lifting a RHR Suction Relief).

If RCP #1 or #4 is to be stopped, the associated Spray Valve is placed in manual and closed to prevent spray short cycling.

Determines these cautions are N/A OATC 4.3.1.1 IF RCP #1 or #4 is to be stopped, place the associated spray valve in MANUAL and close the valve:

RCP 1: 1-PIC-0455C

RCP 4: 1-PIC-0455B OATC 4.3.1.2 IF in Modes 1 or 2, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:

a. Start the RCP Oil Lift Pump for affected RCP, if available.

Red - ON Green - OFF Blue - ON

Appendix D Required Operator Actions ______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

High shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation. If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC b. IF Reactor Power is Greater than 15% Rated Thermal Power:

NOTE to examiner: This casualty is initiated BELOW 15% Thermal Power.

OATC c. IF Reactor Power is less than 15% Rated Thermal Power:

(1) Stop the RCP by placing its Non-1E Control Switch in STOP and then placing its 1E Control Switch in STOP:

RCP Non-1E Control Switch 1E Control Switch Loop 2 1-HS-0496B 1-HS-0496A (2) Initiate 18005-C, Partial Loss Of Flow.

Notifies SS to initiate 18005-C.

OATC 4.3.1.3 IF in Mode 3 or below, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:

NOTE to examiner: Plant is in MODE 1.

OATC NOTE When stopping the last RCP, its Oil Lift Pump needs to run for at least 10 minutes after stopping the RCP.

OATC 4.3.1.4 WHEN the RCP has coasted to a stop (as indicated by reverse flow),

stop the RCP Oil Lift Pump.

HS-0556 placed in stop SS Initiates AOP 18005-C, Partial Loss of Flow (Crew Update).

UO 2. Stop any power changes in progress.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions ______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 4 of 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

High shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation. If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO 3. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO

4. Check affected loop SG NR Level - TRENDING TO 65%

RNO:

Control feed flow to maintain affected loop SG NR level between 60%

and 70%.

OATC/UO 5. Check Tavg - TRENDING TO PROGRAM OATC 6. Verify PRZR level - TRENDING TO PROGRAM OATC 7. Verify PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG OATC 8. Check RCP 1 and RCP 4 - RUNNING SS 9. Initiate shutdown to Mode 3 by initiating 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1).

(TS 3.4.4)

SS 10. Determine and correct the cause of the pump trip.

From this point in the scenario, Event 5 will be initiated.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 9 Event No.: 5, 6, 7 Event

Description:

A Steam line break will suddenly develop on SG #2 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, a failure of the automatic Reactor trip, and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually trip the Reactor and the UO will have to manually actuate SI and SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #2 and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses Event CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1 - Verifies Reactor Trip

Rod Bottom Lights - LIT

Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN

Neutron Flux - LOWERING RNO OATC 1. Trip Reactor using both Reactor trip hand switches.

CRITICAL IF Reactor NOT tripped, THEN go to 19211-C, FR-S.1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION / ATWT.

UO 2 - Verifies Turbine Trip

All Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED UO 3 - Checks Power to AC Emergency Buses 3a. at least 1 4160 1E bus energized - White lights - ON 3b. all AC Emergency buses energized - White lights - ON (4160V and 480V) 4 - Checks if SI / Actuated:

Any SI annunciator - LIT

SI BPLP status light - LIT OATC CRITICAL 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 9 Event No.: 5, 6, 7 Event

Description:

A Steam line break will suddenly develop on SG #2 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, a failure of the automatic Reactor trip, and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually trip the Reactor and the UO will have to manually actuate SI and SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #2 and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Cont.

RNO

4. Check if SI is required:

IF one or more of the following conditions has occurred:

PRZR pressure less than or equal to 1870 psig.

Steam line pressure less than or equal to 585 psig.

Containment pressure greater than or equal to 3.8 psig.

Automatic alignment of ECCS equipment to injection phase.

THEN actuate SI and go to Step 6.

SS Plant page for Reactor Trip / Safety Injection OATC / UO 6. Initiates Foldout Page

7. Initiate OATC Initial Actions pages SS Initiate UO Initial Actions pages.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 9 Event No.: 5, 6, 7 Event

Description:

A Steam line break will suddenly develop on SG #2 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, a failure of the automatic Reactor trip, and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually trip the Reactor and the UO will have to manually actuate SI and SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #2 and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Initial Operator Actions of E-0 1 Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

2 Checks Containment Isolation Phase A - actuated per MLBs 3 Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

a. CCPs - running

b. SI Pumps - running

c. RHR pumps - running

d. NCP - tripped 4 CCW pumps - only two running per train 5a NSCW pumps - only two running per train 5b NSCW tower return / bypass valves - in auto 6a Containment coolers running in LOW speed per MLBs 6b NSCW cooler isolation valves open per MLBs 7 CVI dampers and valves shut per MLBs OATC 8 Containment pressure remained < 21.5 RNO Verify the following:

a. Containment Spray actuated.

b. Containment Spray Pump discharge valves open.

c. Containment Spray Pumps running.

OATC 9 Checks ECCS flows:

a. BIT Flow - On scale

b. RCS pressure < 1625 psig (If NOT go to step 10)

c. SI pump flow

d. RCS pressure < 300 psig

e. RHR pump flow OATC 10 Checks ECCS valve alignment proper on MLBs 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 4 of 9 Event No.: 5, 6, 7 Event

Description:

A Steam line break will suddenly develop on SG #2 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, a failure of the automatic Reactor trip, and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually trip the Reactor and the UO will have to manually actuate SI and SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #2 and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 11 Checks at least one ACCW pump running 12 Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Initial Operator Actions of E-0

1. Check AFW pumps running:

MDAFW Pumps

TDAFW Pump, if required.

2. Checks NR SG levels - one > 10%, If not ensures at least 570 GPM flow

3. Check if Main Steam lines should be isolated:

a. Check for one or more of the following conditions:

Any SL Pressure < 585 psig

CNMT Pressure > 14.5 psig

Low Steam Pressure SI/SLI - BLOCKED AND High Steam Pressure Rate - ON TWO OR MORE CHANNELS OF ANY STEAMLINE.

CRITICAL b. Verify Main Steam line Isolation and Bypass Valves - CLOSED.

UO 4. Verifies FWI:

MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut UO 5. Verifies SGBD isolated:

places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close

verify SGBD sample isolations closed.

6. Verify Diesel Generators running.

7. Throttle AFW flow to control SG levels 10 - 65% NR

8. Verify both MFPs tripped.

9. Check Main Generator Output breakers open.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 5 of 9 Event No.: 5, 6, 7 Event

Description:

A Steam line break will suddenly develop on SG #2 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, a failure of the automatic Reactor trip, and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually trip the Reactor and the UO will have to manually actuate SI and SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #2 and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 19000-C OATC / UO 8. Initiate Continuous Actions pages.

OATC 9. Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 ºF using RCS Tavg.

UO RNO. If necessary, takes actions to control RCS temperature.

a. Stop dumping steam.

b. Perform the following as appropriate:

IF at least one SG NR level > 10% [32%] THEN lower total feed flow.

IF all SG NR levels < 10% [32%] THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 gpm.

c. If cooldown continues shuts MSIVs and BSIVs

d. If temperature > 557 ºF & rising then dump steam OATC 10. Checks PORVs, Block Valves, & Spray Valves

a. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED and in AUTO

b. Normal PRZR spray valves - CLOSED

c. Power available to at least one block valve - AVAILABLE.

d.*PRZR PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

d. RNO *Verify open at least one block valve when RCS pressure >

2185 psig.

OATC 11 - Checks if RCPs should be stopped

a. ECCS Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

-CCP or SI Pump

b. RCS pressure < 1375 psig RNO b. Go to Step 12.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 6 of 9 Event No.: 5, 6, 7 Event

Description:

A Steam line break will suddenly develop on SG #2 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, a failure of the automatic Reactor trip, and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually trip the Reactor and the UO will have to manually actuate SI and SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #2 and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO / SS 12 - Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. SG Pressures:

Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner, or

Completely depressurized.

b. Go to 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

SS Transitions to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation (Crew Update)

EOP 19020-C FAULTED SG ISOLATION ACTIONS OATC / UO 1. Initiate critical safety function status trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.

SS 2. Initiate 91001-C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.

SS contacts Shift Manager to implement EPIPs CAUTION SS At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

UO 3. Verify Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves - CLOSED UO 4. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. Identify intact SG(s):

SG pressures - ANY STABLE OR RISING 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 7 of 9 Event No.: 5, 6, 7 Event

Description:

A Steam line break will suddenly develop on SG #2 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, a failure of the automatic Reactor trip, and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually trip the Reactor and the UO will have to manually actuate SI and SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #2 and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

b. Identify faulted SG(s):

ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

-OR-ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED UO 5. Isolate Main Feedwater to the faulted SG(s):

Shut affected MFIVs:

CRITICAL HV-5228 (SG 2)

Shut affected BFIVs:

HV-15197 (SG 2)

UO 6. Isolate Auxiliary Feedwater to the faulted SG(s):

Shut affected MDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:

CRITICAL HV-5132 - SG 2 FROM MDAFW PMP-B

Shut affected TDAFW Pump Throttle Valves:

CRITICAL HV-5125 - SG 2 FROM TDAFW UO 7. Check at least one MDAFW Pump - RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF FEEDING SG(s) NEEDED FOR RCS COOLDOWN UO 8. Shut affected TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve(s):

CRITICAL HV-3019 (SG 2) LP-2 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP-1

9. Verify affected SG ARV(s) - SHUT:

PV-3010 (SG 2)

UO 10. Align SGBD valves for affected SG(s):

7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 8 of 9 Event No.: 5, 6, 7 Event

Description:

A Steam line break will suddenly develop on SG #2 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, a failure of the automatic Reactor trip, and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually trip the Reactor and the UO will have to manually actuate SI and SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #2 and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

Place SG Blowdown Isolation Valve hand switches in CLOSE position.

Shut Sample valves:

HV-9452 (SG 2)

UO 11. Verify faulted SG(s) remains isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown or SG activity sampling.

UO 12. Check CST level - GREATER THAN 15%

RNO: Swap to alternate CST by initiating 13610, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.

UO 13. Initiate checking SG tubes intact:

a. Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b. Secondary radiation - NORMAL:

1) MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:

RE-13120 (SG 1)

RE-13121 (SG 2)

RE-13122 (SG 3)

RE-13119 (SG 4)

2) CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-12839C

RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale)

3) STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown)

c. Check SG levels - ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RNO c. Go to Step 14.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions _______ Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 9 of 9 Event No.: 5, 6, 7 Event

Description:

A Steam line break will suddenly develop on SG #2 IRC with a failure of both trains of SLI to automatically isolate, a failure of the automatic Reactor trip, and failure of automatic SI. The crew will enter the EOP 19000-C and transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG Isolation. The OATC will have to manually trip the Reactor and the UO will have to manually actuate SI and SLI. The crew will be required to manually isolate AFW flow to SG #2 and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC / UO 14. Check if ECCS flow should be reduced:

a. RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 24°F [38°F ADVERSE]

RNO a. Go to Step 15.

b. Secondary Heat Sink:

Total feed flow to intact SGs - GREATER THAN 570 GPM

-OR-Narrow range level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 10% [32% ADVERSE]

RNO b. Go to Step 15.

c. RCS pressure - STABLE or RISING RNO c. Go to Step 15.

d. PRZR level - GREATER THAN 9% [37% ADVERSE]

RNO d. Go to Step 15.

SS e. Go to 19011-C, ES-1.1 SI TERMINATION.

SS 15. Go to 19010-C, E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

END OF SCENARIO 9

ML112270230

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