NRC 2011-0059, 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report for 2010
| ML111822833 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/2011 |
| From: | Jim Costedio Point Beach |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| NRC 2011-0059 | |
| Download: ML111822833 (4) | |
Text
July 1,201 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Dockets 50-266 and 50-301 Renewed License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 10 CFR 50.59 Summarv Report for 201 0 POINT BEACH NRC 201 1-0059 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)
NextEra Energy Point Beach (NextEra), LLC, is submitting the enclosed 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2, for calendar year 201 0.
This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.
Very truly yours, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC James Costedio w Licensing Manager Enclosure cc:
Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC PCSW NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 6610 Nuclear Road, Two Rivers, WI 54241
ENCLOSURE NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 10 CFR 50.59
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR 2010 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS Six facility changes, tests, and experiments were evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 during 2010. These changes were previously reported in the 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report for 2009 dated June 30,201 0.
COMMITMENT CHANGE EVALUATIONS LER 266-86-004-01. MSIV Air Svstem and Inservice Test: The original commitment required modifications to change the air system to facilitate testing of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The inservice test would be modified to collect more data than a simple passlfail of the Technical Specification (TS) limit for the closing time. The commitment was revised to allow air-operated valve diagnostic testing to be performed on each MSIV each refueling outage to collect data to assess the MSlVs performance.
Justification for Chanae: The air-operated valves (AOVs) diagnostic testing performed during refueling outage uses changes in air pressure requirements during stroking of the MSlVs to analyze the valve operator performance. Refueling outage frequency testing of these AOVs provides a more accurate measure of the actual performance or degradation of the MSIVs. The diagnostic tests obtain nearly continuous pressure measurements throughout the valve stroke.
This method allows the site to better determine if the valve is experiencing excessive packing friction or if the valveloperator has internal damage. (CCE 2010-001)
LER 266-92-006-00, Revise IST 2801285, Main Steam Stoo Valve Stroke Test: The original commitment required the modified MSlVs inservice test to collect additional data to more accurately reflect valve performance. The revised commitment changes the method of testing and data collection to utilize the results of AOV diagnostic testing to assess the performance of the MSlVs and their associated operators.
Justification for Chanae: The diagnostic testing provides a more detailed assessment of the component's condition. (CCE 201 0-002)
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LR Commitment 7: The original commitment required that plant process control procedures (design control, repairlreplacement, and welding) be revised to ensure that repair or replacement of Class 1 piping components within the scope of leak before break (LBB) would require a new LBB analyses based on replacement process andlor material properties due date or frequency. The commitment was revised because welding must be performed in accordance with Section XI requirements.
Justification for Chanae: LBB ramifications were addressed in the Section XI, Repair and Replacement Programs. Welding (grinding or modification) of LBB must be performed in accordance with the Section XI RepairIReplacement process. (CCE 201 0-003)
LR Commitment 8: This commitment required that PBNP implement NRC-approved industry activities resulting from MRP-227, to mange the applicable aging effects identified through the EPRl (Reactor Vessel internals Program). This commitment was closed to a similar reactor vessel internals License Renewal (LR) commitment 29 program to simplify tracking.
The commitment change was previously reported to the Commission via letter dated August 18,201 0.
LR Commitment 23: This commitment required that the flow-assisted corrosion (FAC) program implement the EPRl guidelines in NSAC-202L-R2. The commitment was revised to adopt the most recent revision of the guideline in the future.
Justification for Chanae: Revision 1 of NUREG-1 801 in Section XI-M2 provides for the use of later versions of EPRl guidelines. (CCE 201 0-003)
LR Commitment 24: The original commitment required, (1) the use of only ASTM D 2709 to determine the amount of contamination due to water and sediment in diesel fuel, (2) use of D 621 7 in lieu of D 2276 for particulate determination, (3) the use of a filter with a pore size no larger than 0.8 micron, and (4) the use of ASTM D 2274 for stability analysis. This commitment was revised to require the use of D 621 7-98 in lieu of D 2276 for particulate determination and removed the performance of a stability analysis because of inaccuracy of the test.
Justification for Chanae: Removing the stability testing per ASTM D2274 from the program is necessary because the stability is not the preferred method of determining the condition of the fuel due to its inaccuracies. (CCE 201 0-003)
LR Commitment 25: The original commitment required that the one-time inspection program methodology be submitted for NRC review. The program included various materiallenvironment combinations that would be inspected. Transmittal of the program methodology document to the NRC satisfied this one-time commitment. A subsequent revision to LR-TR-519 eliminated one element (cast ironlraw water, OTI sub-group 8f) from the one-time inspection program.
Justification for Chanae: The commitment was revised to remove the element of cast ironlraw water (OTI sub-group 8f) from LR-TR-519. Inspections of components within the original sub-group 8f were not performed. Six other cast ironlraw water VT inspection were performed in the OTI program (sub-group 7e) that included examinations for selective leaching. Subsequent review determined that aging management for the components within this element would be more appropriate accomplished with the open cycle cooling water program. (CCE 2010-005)
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LR Commitment 36: The commitment required the water chemistry program to be based upon the guidelines in EPRl TR-105714, PWR Primary Water Chemistry Guidelines, and EPRl TR-1021 34, PWR Secondary Water Chemistry Guidelines. The commitment was revised to allow for revisions to the guidelines to be used.
Justification of Chanae: Revision 1 of NUREG-1 801, Section XI-M2 provides for the use of later version of the EPRl guidelines. (CCE 2010-003)
LR Commitment 58: This commitment required a susceptible location in the fire protection system (i.e., uncoated/unwrapped piping) be inspected once prior to the period of extended operation and at least every 10 years during the period of extended operation. The commitment was revised to include coated piping in the inspection program.
Justification of Chanae: Coated piping was included in the population of susceptible piping to be inspected so piping installed during original construction would be inspected. The only uncoated piping installed at PBNP was within the last 8 years. (CCE 2010-003)
LR Commitment 66, In-Service Inspection Proaram: The original commitment required that as part of the ASME Section XI, Subsection IWB, IWC, and IWD Inservice Inspection Program, the requirements of Code Case N-616 would be supplemented by a W-2 visual examination performed each outage for Class 1 systems and each inspection period for Class 2 and 3 systems with the insulation removed from the bolted connections. The commitment was cancelled because a decision was made to not use Code Case N-616, as it was not useful for detecting aging mechanisms in bolted connections.
Justification for Chanae: The use of Code Case N-616 had been specifically approved for PBNP. When the decision was made to not use the Code Case, the commitment and its provisions were no longer necessary. (CCE 201 0-006)
Boric Acid Corrosion Monitorina Proaram: The original commitment required revision of the boric acid leakage and corrosion monitoring program (BALCM) reactor coolant leak test boundary document to include an inspection checklist consistent with the principal leakage locations. The commitment was revised to credit the Alloy 600 Management program that was developed as part of the implementation of license renewal commitments.
Justification for Chanae: Susceptible locations continue to require the bolted connections. The two program documents must be used together to address both bolted connections such as manways and other areas that are susceptible to boric acid corrosion. (CCE 2010-004)
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