ML111670887
| ML111670887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1978 |
| From: | James E Wisconsin Public Service Corp |
| To: | James Keppler NRC/OI/RGN-III/FO |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111670754 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-510 NUDOCS 7809180043 | |
| Download: ML111670887 (2) | |
Text
W SCON S N PUBL IC SERVICE CORPORATION P.O. Box 1200, Green Boy, Wisconsin 54305
.Mugust '15, 1978'.
Mr. Janes G. Reppler, Reg Dir Office of-Inspection & Enforcement Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Rd Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Dear Mr. Ke:
.-ler:
Docket 50-305
.Operating License.DPR-43 I
&..7 Insection Reprt 78-07 This letter is to inform your office of the results of our evaluation of the reactor vessel cavity exposure incidedt of May 2, 1978, and our review of the I & E Inspection Report 78-07 which addresses that event.
The event of Yhy 2, 1978, as presented in the Inspection Report 78-07, indicated a general lack of procedural control and intimidation by a me"ber of our supervisory staff, when in fact, a more complete investigation has revealed that the contrary is true and a personnel error was the cause of the event.
The =ain differences between the investigation performed by members or your staff and our investigation was that the refueling coordinator and the auxiliary operator.who also had involvemednt in the events of May 2, 1978, were included in our interviews.
The main points of fact which were identified by inclusion of those individuals were:
- 1.
The-lead He man was fully aware that an entry was desired to the Reactor. Cavity and had dispatched a technician from within contain ment to outside containment for the purpose of acquiring what he awarently believed the necessary ecuipment to make such an entry assuJing the radiation levels were within reason.
That manner c:
dealing with the short tern entry into the reactor cavity was CnOsistent wizh proper control, procedures, and H? practice.
- 2.
The B? techrnician was not known by the Shift Suoervisor prior to the entry.
Approximazely five mi:.u:es af:er :e Shift Supev:iscr's departure fro= the cavity area after the entry, the EP technician
.inquired as to whom the individual was that made the entry.
At that time he was informed that it was the Shift Supervisor.
- 3.
The HP Supervisor was first informed of the event by the lead H?
man on site in such a manner so as to indicate that the expDosure was minor in magnitude. At the insistence of the Night Refueling Coordinator, the HP Supervisor was requested to investigate the event immediately.
The above, when considered in the context of the other statements and inforat-ion discussed in the inspection report, leads us to conclusions significantly different than those presented in the inspection report.
IL appears Lit the implied intimidation by the Shift Supervisor identified in the inspection Report paragraph f could not have occurred.
It is most difficult to accept the scenario when item 2 above is considered in the evaluation.
We find that the lead H? man on site was apparently in concurrence with the decisicn to enter the reactor vessel cavity and believed that no major problen existe:.
That position is confirmed by the action taken following the entry and ackn-.legement of a full scale dosimeter reading upon exit.
Had the lead F?
can believed that very high radiation fields existed to the extent that entry would have been precluded, his actions following the entry would have been different.
The -. Supervisor was apparently not alerted to the potential of overexposure by t"-e first call by the lead HP man at about 0330 since a second call was necessary to alert him of the significance of the event. That sequence could only have occurred had the lead HP man indicated that no problems of significance existed to the EP Supervisor.
As a result of the above considerations, which were not included in the.inspectors investigation, we find that the conclusions presented in the Inspection Report and the subsequent Enforcement Action to be in error.,/, It is clearly evident that the HIP group did not acknowledge the existence of a 2000 R field in the Reactor Cavity due to an incomplete survey by one of their contracted personnel which we consider a personnel error.- It is also clearly evident that the Shift Supervisor followed proper procedure and established practice in his requesting HP assistance prior to the entry.
With the obViuus human error by he
&P group in the failura to completely assess the hazards within the reactor cavity.and the acknowledgement that intimidation could not have occurred, the conclusions presented in the I & E Inspection Report are not supported by fact and we cannot concur with them.
Should you desire to pursue this matter further, please contact me personally.
V=-Zr tulv
- yours, Senior
? ePresident
?Dl gineering