ML111650720
| ML111650720 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1991 |
| From: | Evers K Wisconsin Public Service Corp |
| To: | NRC/IRM |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111650721 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9107300143 | |
| Download: ML111650720 (4) | |
Text
ACCELERATED DISTbBUTION DEMONSTRION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9107300143 DOC.DATE: 91/07/25 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-305 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Wisconsin Public Servic AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION EVERS,K.H.
Wisconsin Public Service Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
DOCKET #
05000305 R
SUBJECT:
Requests that encl Table 9.3-5,Pages 1 & 2 of 3 be inserted into 1991 updated SAR for Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.Table inadvertently omitted from 910719 submittal.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: A053D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL TITLE: OR Submittal: Updated FSAR (50.71) and hendments I
D S
SIZE:69-NOTES:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-3 LA HANSEN,A.
COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
0 1
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-3 PD COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
0 INTERNAL: ACRS NRR/DST 8E2 RGN3 EXTERNAL: IHS NSIC 2
1 1
1 1
2 0
1 1
1 OOe.DOX/IRB REG FILE NRC PDR SAIC LINER,R 1
01 1
1 1
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR A
D D
S 1
1 1
1 R
D S
A D
D S
/
13 ENCL 10
WPSC (414) 433-1598 TELECOPIER (414) 433-5544 0
Lam EASYLINK 62891993 WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION 600 North Adams
- P.O. Box 19002
- Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 July 25, 1991 10 CFR 50.71(e)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant UNdated Safety Analysis Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e), the 1991 revision of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) was transmitted to you on July 19, 1991. One of the changes referenced in the cover letter was inadvertently omitted and is attached to this letter.
Please integrate this page into the 1991 USAR update in the following manner:
Remove Insert Table 9.3-5, Pages 1 and 2 of 3 New Table 9.3-5, Pages 1 and 2 of 3 The description and safety evaluation for the change to Table 9.3-5 were included in the original 1991 USAR update submittal.
If this transmittal raises any questions or problems feel free to contact a member of my staff for assistance.
Sincerely, K. H. Evers Manager - Nuclear Power MDS/jms Attach.
cc - Mr. Patrick Castleman, US NRC US NRC, Region III 9107300143 9107:25 FPR ADOCK 05000305 LIC\\NRC\\NRC2-1
(g:\\wpfiles\\ic\\usai TABLE 9.3-5 PAGE 1 OF 3 AUXILIARY COOLANT SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSES Component Failure Connents and Consequences
- 1. Component cooling water pumps
- 2. Component cooling water pumps
- 3. Component cooling heat exchanger
- 4. Residual heat removal pump
- 5. Residual heat removal pump
- 6. Remote operated valves inside contain ment in the residual heat removal pump suction lines Rupture of pump casing Pump fails to start Tube or shell rupture Rupture of a pump casing Pump fails to, start Valve fails to open in one of the suction lines The casing and shell are designed for 150 psi and 200'F which exceed maximum operating conditions. The pumps are inspectable and protected against credible missiles. Rupture is not considered credible.
One operating pump will supply sufficient flow for emergency cooling.
Rupture is considered improbable because of low operating pressures. Each heat exchanger can be isolated and one heat exchanger can carry the total emergency heat load.
The casing and shell are designed for 600 psi and 400oF. The pump is protected from overpressurization by two normally closed valves in the pump suction line and by an open relief line, containing a relief valve, back to the pressurizer relief tank. The pump is inspectable and is located in the Auxiliary Building, protected against credible missiles.
Rupture is considered unlikely, but in any event the pump can be isolated.
One operating pump furnishes half of the flow required to meet design cooldown rate.
This increases the time necessary for plant cooldown.
One suction path is adequate for plant cooldown; however, the time required to cool down may increase slightly.
Rev. 9 7/1/91
(g:\\wpfiles\\lic\\usar\\tbls9.wpf)
TABLE 9.3-5 PAGE 2 OF 3 AUXILIARY COOLANT SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSES Component Failure Comments and Consequences
- 7. Remote operated valves inside con containment on the residual heat removal pump discharge line
- 8. Residual heat exchanger
- 9. Spent fuel pool pump
- 10. Spent fuel pool pump
- 11.
Spent fuel pool pump valve fails to open Tube or shell rupture Rupture of a pump casing Pump stops run ning and cannot be started Suction strainer plugs Pump discharge pressure gauge shows pump shutoff head indicating no flow. The low head safety injection lines may be opened and utilized to direct flow directly into the reactor vessel. A reactor coolant pump must be operated.
Rupture is considered unlikely, but, in any event, the faulty heat exchanger may heat exchanger may be isolated.
The casing and shell are designed for 300 psig and 150'F which exceeds maximum operating conditions. The pump is inspectable and is located in the Auxiliary Building, protected against credible accidents.
Rupture is considered unlikely; however, pump can be isolated.
The system will operate at less than full capacity until stopped pump is repaired or replaced. The system can adequately remove heat from the pool following removal of one-third of the core from the reactor.
In the event the entire core has to be unloaded and stored, and one pump is out of service, two safety Class I sources of water (the RWST and a 6" service water Supply line) are available to provide the necessary cooling until the failed pump is placed into service.
There is sufficient time to stop the pumps and clean the strainer before the spent fuel pool temperature becomes too high.
Rev. 9