ML111190112
| ML111190112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/2011 |
| From: | Widmann M NRC/RGN-II/DRS/OLB |
| To: | Nazar M Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| ER-11-301 | |
| Download: ML111190112 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000335/2011301
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
April 29, 2011
Mr. Mano Nazar
Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Florida Power & Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420
SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION
REPORT 05000335/2011301 AND 05000389/2011301
Dear Mr. Stall:
During the period of February 21 - March 3 2011, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
administered operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to
operate the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. At the conclusion of the tests, the examiners discussed
preliminary findings related to the operating tests and the written examination submittal with
those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report. The written examination was
administered by your staff on March 17, 2011.
Two Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants and ten Reactor Operator (RO) applicants
passed both the operating examinations and the written examination. One SRO applicant failed
the written examination. One RO applicant failed the simulator portion of the operating test, and
one RO applicant failed the walk-through portion of the operating test. There were two post-
examination comments concerning the operating test. These comments and the NRC
resolution of these comments are summarized in Enclosure 2. A Simulator Fidelity Report is
included in this report as Enclosure 3.
The initial examination submittal was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed
examination. All examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the staff were made
according to NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,
Revision 9, Supplement 1.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document
system (ADAMS).
FP&L 2
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.adams.html (the
Public Electronic Reading Room).
If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 997-4550.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos: 50-335, 50-389
Enclosures:
1. Report Details
2. Facility Comments and NRC Resolution
3. Simulator Fidelity Report
cc: w/encls. (See page 3)
FP&L 3
cc w/encl: Bryan Koon
Richard L. Anderson Director
Site Vice President Florida Division of Emergency Management
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
Donna Calabrese
Robert J. Hughes Emergency Preparedness Manager
Plant General Manager St. Lucie Plant
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
J. Kammel
Gene St. Pierre Radiological Emergency Planning
Vice President, Fleet Support Administrator
Florida Power & Light Company Department of Public Safety
Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution
Ronnie Lingle Mano Nazar
Operations Manager Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Officer
Electronic Mail Distribution Nuclear Division
Florida Power & Light Company
Eric Katzman P.O. Box 14000
Licensing Manager Juno Beach, FL 33408
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution Senior Resident Inspector
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Larry Nicholson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Director P.O. Box 6090
Licensing Jensen Beach, FL 34957-2010
Florida Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution Seth B. Duston, Training Manager
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Alison Brown Electronic Mail Distribution
Nuclear Licensing
Florida Power & Light Company Faye Outlaw
Electronic Mail Distribution County Administrator
St. Lucie County
Mitch S. Ross Electronic Mail Distribution
Vice President and Associate General
Counsel Jack Southard, Director
Florida Power & Light Company Public Safety Department
Electronic Mail Distribution St. Lucie County
Electronic Mail Distribution
Marjan Mashhadi, Senior Attorney Mail Distribution
Florida Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution Florida Power and Light Company
ATTN: Mr. Seth Duston
William A. Passetti, Chief Training Manager
Florida Bureau of Radiation Control St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Department of Health 6351 South Ocean Drive
Electronic Mail Distribution Jensen Beach, FL 34957
ML111190112 X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII: DRS RII: DRS RII:DRP
NAME G. Laska M. Bates K. Schaaf M. Widmann D. Rich
DATE 04/27/2011 04/27/201 04/27/2011 04/28/2011 04/27/2011
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No.: 05000335, 05000389
Report No.: 05000335/2009301, 05000389/2009301
Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L)
Facility: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location: 6351 S. Ocean Drive
Jensen Beach, FL 34957
Dates: Operating Test - February 21 - March 3, 2011
Written Examination - March 17, 2011
Examiners: G. Laska, Chief Examiner, Senior Operations Examiner
M. Bates, Senior Operations Engineer
K. Schaaf, Operations Engineer
Approved by: Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER 05000335/2011301, 05000389/2011301, 02/21-03/03/2011, and 03/17/2011; St. Lucie
Nuclear Plant, Licensed Operator Examinations.
The NRC examiners conducted operator licensing initial examinations in accordance with the
guidance in NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Supp.1, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for
Power Reactors. This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements of
10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45.
The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of February 21 - March 3, 2011.
Members of the St. Lucie Power Plant training staff administered the written examination on
March 17, 2011. The written examination outline was provided by the NRC. The written
examination, operating test outlines and operating test details were developed by the St. Lucie
Nuclear Plant training staff.
Two Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and ten Reactor Operator (RO) applicants passed both the
written and operating examinations. One SRO applicant failed the written examination. One
RO applicant failed the simulator portion and one RO failed the walk-through portion of the
operating test, Two SRO applicants and ten RO applicants were issued operating licenses.
There were two post examination comments.
No findings were identified.
Enclosure 1
REPORT DETAILS
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
a. Inspection Scope
The St. Lucie Nuclear Plant training staff developed the written examination and
operating test. NRC regional examiners reviewed the proposed examination material to
determine whether it was developed in accordance with NUREG-1021, Operator
Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 9, Supplement 1.
Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee were made
according to NUREG-1021, and incorporated into the final version of the examination
materials.
The examiners reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing
and administering the examinations to ensure examination security and integrity
complied with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests. Two near miss
examination security events occurred during exam administration. The first near miss
occurred on February 25, 2011, when one applicant was escorted to the rest room.
After the applicant entered the rest room, the escort went back to the sequester room
leaving the applicant unmonitored. Because all of the other applicants were in the
sequester room, or on the simulator, no portion of the exam was compromised. The
licensee documented this event in AR number 01626098. The second near miss
occurred on February 28, 2011. While administering scenarios on the simulator,
communications were heard on the radio between members of an outage group working
on the turbine deck. Use of the radios was immediately stopped. Examiners determined
that an exam compromise did not take place. Communications over the radio were
limited to event #1, or event # 2 etc. No mention of actual scenario content was ever
transmitted over the radio. The licensee documented this event in AR number
01626119.
The examiners evaluated three SRO and twelve RO applicants who were being
assessed under the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered
the operating tests during the period of February 21 - March 3, 2011. Members of the
St. Lucie Power Plant training staff administered the written examination on March 17,
2011. The evaluations of the applicants and review of documentation were performed to
determine if the applicants, who applied for licenses to operate the St. Lucie Nuclear
Plant, met requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. The NRC determined, using NUREG-1021 that the
licensees initial examination submittal was within the range of acceptability expected for
a proposed examination.
Enclosure 1
4
Two SRO and ten RO applicants passed both the written and operating examinations.
A copy of the final written RO, SRO examinations, and answer keys with all changes
incorporated may be accessed not earlier than March 17, 2013, in the ADAMS system
(ADAMS Accession Number(s) ML111090206 and ML111090212).
Copies of all individual examination reports were sent to the facility Training Manager for
evaluation and determination of appropriate remedial training.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On March 3, 2011, the examination team discussed generic issues associated with the
operating test with Mr. R. Anderson, Site Vice President, and members of the St. Lucie
Nuclear Plant staff. The examiners asked the licensee whether any materials examined
during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee personnel
R. Anderson - Site Vice President
R. Lingle - Operations Manager
J. Klauck - Operations Shift Manager
S. Duston - Training Manager
T. Benton - Operations Training Supervisor
D. Lanyi - Operations SRO
J. Willsey- Operations Class Mentor
F. Dennis - ILT Training Supervisor
K. Frehafer - Licensing
NRC personnel
T. Hoag, SRI
S. Sanchez, RI
Enclosure 1
Facility Comments and NRC Resolution
A complete Text of the licensees post examination comments can be found in ADAMS under
Accession Number ML111090216.
Licensee Comments:
Items:
(1) JPM S-3, Perform Control Room Actions for Loss of Safety Related AC Bus-Unit 2
Facility Comment:
Step 3 and Step 4 of the JPM S-3 are incorrectly designated as Critical Steps.
Basis:
The aforementioned steps require the applicant to place the 2A and 2C Charging pump control
switches to STOP and place Letdown Isolation valves to close. This is directed in accordance
with 2-AOP-47.01A, Loss of A Safety Related AC Bus.
The basis for these steps is to establish a known configuration for subsequent power
restoration. Based upon the conditions established by the JPM, the loss of power automatically
isolated letdown and secured charging. In the event these actions are not completed, if an auto
action of the charging pump resulted in a pump start, the size of the load would not damage or
potentially overload a bus. There is no safety significance by not completing these steps;
therefore these steps are not critical for these conditions.
The immediate actions of 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown, which apply to this event,
require that Charging be secured and control switches placed in auto. This is not consistent
with the steps of 2-AOP-47.01A, Loss of A Safety Related AC Bus.
The initial conditions of this JPM has letdown isolated due to loss of the 2A5 480V Load center.
Immediate Operator actions of 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown requires the Operator to
STOP the Charging pumps and RETURN the control switches to AUTO in the event of loss of
letdown.
If the applicant stopped the Charging pumps and placed the switches to auto, the backup
Charging pump would cycle in response to lowering Pressurizer level of -3% deviation from
setpoint and stop at +3.6% deviation from setpoint. These setpoints are such that the Tech
Spec limits for high/low Pressurizer level are not exceeded. The simulator setup for this JPM
requires the Pressurizer Pressure and Level channels be selected to Y channel. By doing so,
the automatic response of the Charging pumps to Pressurizer level deviation is not affected by
the loss of 2A5 480V LC.
2-AOP-47.01A, Loss of A Safety Related AC Bus, directs the Operator to ENSURE the Train A
Charging pump control switch is placed in STOP. This step is based on possible cycling of the
backup charging pump due possible failure of selected Pressurizer level channel from loss of
power. That is not the case for this JPM as stated in the above paragraph. Therefore, not
placing the control switches in STOP is NOT critical.
Enclosure 2
2
This step is an action step, therefore, in accordance with the stations procedure writers guide,
the step is capitalized and bolded. This is consistent with all action statements in PSLs
upgraded procedures.
Facility Recommendation:
Revise JPM S-3, Perform Control Room Actions for Loss of Safety Related AC Bus - Unit 2,
steps 3 and 4, to remove the critical step designation.
NRC RESOLUTION:
The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation. After reviewing the licensees contention
and supporting documentation, it appears steps 3 and 4 are not critical to the completion of the
task.
Based on the above discussion, the licensees recommendation was accepted; JPM S-3 steps 3
and 4 were changed to remove the critical step designation.
(2) Admin JPM A-6, Respond to Security Event
Facility Comment:
Step 14 and 16, of the JPM A-3, is incorrectly designated as a Critical Step.
Basis:
The aforementioned steps requires the applicant to annotate on the Florida Nuclear Plant
Emergency Notification Form that This is a Drill, and selection of the affected unit. These
steps are procedurally directed per EPIP-08, Off-site Notifications and Protective Action
Recommendations.
The basis for these steps is to identify that this is a drill rather than documentation of an actual
emergency, and specify the affected unit. In accordance with EPIP-08, Attachment 1A, step 1,
during exercises, drills or tests, each message shall be checked THIS IS A DRILL. Additionally,
selection of the affected unit is required to be only one with additional information provided if
both units are impacted. These are asterisked steps on Attachment 1, of the Florida Nuclear
Plant Emergency Notification Form, which states, items are evaluated for NRC Performance
Indicators. During development of the JPM, the standards for NRC performance indicators
acceptance criteria were used to define the critical steps for the applicants exam.
In accordance with ADM-25.02, Appendix L, Drill/Exercise Performance step C, source
documents for the NRC performance indicators are; Drill Reports, LOCT Simulator Evaluation
Critique Sheets, and Actual Event Reports. This applicant JPM does NOT fall under this criteria
and is not used for NRC performance indicators. Therefore the asterisk step on Attachment 1,
of the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form does not apply.
The JPM initial condition does not inform the applicant that this is a drill or simulated condition.
Applicant confusion can arise as to the condition to which they respond to this step. Emergency
Drills and LOCT Simulator evaluations conduct a pre-exercise drill brief.
Enclosure 2
3
There is no safety significance for selecting either this is a drill or actual emergency. The state
watch office was not actually contacted. Selecting both units as being affected again has no
safety significance. These issues are solely with procedural compliance. Since the stations
administrative procedures do not apply, the stations position is that these two steps should be
designated as NOT Critical.
Facility Recommendation:
Revise JPM A-6, Respond to Security Event, steps 14 and 16, to remove the critical step
designation.
NRC RESOLUTION:
The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation. After reviewing the licensees contention
and supporting documentation, it appears that step 14 and 16 were not critical steps required to
complete the task.
Based on the above discussion, the licensees recommendation was accepted, Administrative
JPM A-6 was changed, and the critical step designation was removed from steps 14 and 16.
Enclosure 2
SIMULATOR FIDELITY REPORT
Facility Licensee: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Facility Docket Nos.: 05000335/2011301, 05000389/2011301
Operating Test Administered: February 21 - March 3, 2011
This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit
or inspection findings and, without further verification and review in accordance with Inspection
Procedure 71111.11 are not indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.46. No licensee
action is required in response to these observations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating test, examiners observed the following:
Item Description
Instabilities were observed When performing a JPM that had operators align a flowpath from
on the charging system. the charging pump to the A HPSI header using Appendix T of
EOP-99, extremely violent flow oscillations were observed. AR
number 01626092 was written to document this issue.
An Invalid Request was During scenario 7, operators received an Invalid Request on the
received while attempting DEH system while attempting to roll the main turbine to rated
to roll the main turbine. speed. AR number 01626089 was written to document this issue.
Select Yokogawa chart During one scenario select Yokogawa chart recorders failed to
recorders fail to clear and clear when the next simulator scenario was loaded.
reset. Approximately 15 minutes of exam time was lost. AR number
01624555 was written to document this issue.
RCP shaft seizure did not During the administration of Simulator JPM f, RESTART RCPs
occur following a loss of oil DURING EOP IMPLEMENTATION Unit 2 the RCP failed to seize
level. and trip following a loss of oil from the lower oil reservoir and high
thrust bearing temperature alarms. AR number 01626016 was
written to document this issue.
High Pressure Safety During the administration of Simulator JPM e Establish Alternate
Injection flow was Charging Flowpath to RCS Through A HPSI Header, HPSI flow
indicated with pump was indicated on flow transmitters with charging pump discharge
discharge pressure less pressure less than RCS pressure. AR number 01626099 was
than RCS pressure written to document this issue.
Enclosure 3