ML110460085
| ML110460085 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/15/2011 |
| From: | Jason Paige Plant Licensing Branch II |
| To: | Abbatiello T Florida Power & Light Co |
| Paige, Jason C, NRR/DORL,301-415-5888 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML110460085 (2) | |
Text
From:
Paige, Jason Sent:
Tuesday, February 15, 2011 8:37 AM To:
tom.abbatiello@fpl.com Cc:
Abbott, Liz; Tiemann, Philip; Tomonto, Bob
Subject:
Turkey Point EPU - Reactor Systems (SRXB) Requests for Additional Information - Round 1
- Tom, Below are requests for additional information (RAIs) regarding the Turkey Point Extended Power Uprate license amendment request. On February 10, 2011, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) discussed draft RAIs to gain a common understanding of the questions. The RAIs related to the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) analysis (SRXB-1.1 - SRXB-1.5), best estimate large break loss of coolant accident (SRXB-1.6), and licensing basis cross-walk of the general design criteria (SRXB-1.7).
During the call, it was concluded that questions SRXB-1.2 and SRXB-1.6 needed revising and questions SRXB-1.4 and SRXB-1.8 would be deleted. The below RAIs reflect the questions discussed during the February 10, 2011, call. FPL agreed upon providing its responses within 30 days of the date of this email. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me.
SRXB-1.1 Provide a thermal hydraulic analysis for Turkey Point at the proposed, uprated conditions, for a limiting margin-to-overfill/overfill scenario. One acceptable methodology would be for the analysis to align as closely as possible to what is approved in WCAP-10698-P-A; however, since the licensee has asserted that a limiting single failure is not in the Turkey Point licensing basis, this exception to the WCAP-10698-P-A methodology would be acceptable. Consider limiting single failures and discuss what they could be.
SRXB-1.2 For the revised margin to overfill analysis, provide a table comparing analytic assumptions used in WCAP-10698 to those used in the Turkey Point analyses, and justify any differences.
SRXB-1.3 For the SGTR analyses, provide a list of systems, components, and instruments that are credited for accident mitigation in the plant-specific EOPs. Specify whether each component is safety grade, consistent with Requirement (4) of the NRC staff SER approving WCAP-10698.
SRXB-1.4 Under assumed loss of offsite power (LOOP) conditions, address the functionality of each atmospheric dump valve (ADV). Discuss what, if any, mitigating function the ADV provides and its capability to perform that function under the assumed LOOP conditions.
SRXB-1.5 Identify any new operator actions credited in the revised margin to overfill analysis.
SRXB-1.6 Section 2.8.5.6.3 describes a more refined downcomer model. Provide the following specific information concerning the downcomer model:
- a. Provide a detailed description and diagram of the downcomer nodalization, including both fluid and heat structures.
- b. Identify the sources of heat modeled in the downcomer.
- c. Discuss how subcooled boiling in the downcomer is modeled.
SRXB-1.7 By letter dated October 21, 2010, the license amendment request (LAR) states, As noted in PTN Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 1.3, the General Design Criteria (GDC) used during licensing of the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant predate those provided today in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. The PTN GDCs were developed based on the 1967 Atomic Energy Commission Proposed General Design Criteria and are addressed in various sections of the UFSAR.
The LAR also identifies, as one of the GDCs in the Turkey Point licensing basis, PTN GDC-30, Reactivity Hold-down Capability: The reactivity control systems provided shall be capable of making the core subcritical under credible accident conditions with appropriate margins for contingencies and limiting any subsequent return to power such that there will be no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The LAR states that PTN GDC-30 is comparable to the current GDC-27.
However, the 1967 proposed GDC (32 FR 10213) that corresponds to PTN GDC-30 is Criterion 30--Reactivity Hold-down Capability (Category B). At least one of the reactivity control systems provided shall be capable of making and holding the core subcritical under any conditions with appropriate margins for contingencies.
Apparently, the 1967 proposed GDC-30 is more restrictive that PTN GDC-30.
Explain and justify the difference between PTN GDC-30 and its basis, and the 1967 proposed GDC-30.
Explain how PTN GDC-30 is considered to be equivalent to the current GDC-27, not the current GDC-26.
Jason Paige, Turkey Point Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Phone: (301) 415-5888