ML110390425

Initial Exam 2010-302 Post Exam Comments

ML110390425
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	02/04/2011
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
References
50-327/10-302, 50-328/10-302
Download: ML110390425 (31)

Text

ENCLOSURE 5 Substantive Comments Note: There were two substantive comments made by applicants following the written examination, with explanations concerning why the comments were accepted.

September 2010 Written examination comments.

The following substantive comments are being submitted for consideration during the grading of the Licensing exam that was administered at the Sequoyah Nuclear Station on September 29, 2010.

The first comment is submitted by candidate Question #41, Which ONE of the following ice condenser temperatures is within the optimal range in accordance with 0-SO-61 -1, Ice Condenser Cooling, and one of the potential adverse affects of being outside this range?

A. 19°F; excessive concrete expansion B. 19°F; operation outside technical specification limit C. 27°F; excessive concrete expansion D. 27°F; operation outside technical specification limit Comment; The question has two parts, (1) the optimal temperature range and (2) one of the potential adverse affects of being outside this range.

Since the optimal temperature range is 18°F to 20°F, then either A or B has the correct temperature, however, since the candidate wasnt sure how far outside the optimal temperature limit they could be, then they assumed that once temperature was greater than 27°F, you would be outside the technical specification limit and that would have an adverse affect on operation, since the plant would be in an LCO and may have to shutdown. Also from 1-SO-OPS-000-002.0, Daily Shift Log, 3.0 Precautions and Limitations, C. The Ice condenser may be operated at a temperature outside the optimum range, provided technical specifications limits are maintained, in accordance with Engineering recommendations to support system maintenance or planned outages. Thus the plant could operate outside the optimal limit as long as the technical specification limit was not exceeded. Based on this criterion, this would make B also a correct answer.

Site Recommendation:

It was intended that the adverse affects of operating outside the optimal range was physical in nature, testing the candidates knowledge of the potential adverse affects of not maintaining the ice condenser temperature within established optimal limit, (as indentified in the distractor analysis the Final safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 6.5.7.2 identifies 19°F to be the optimal temperature range to minimize the condition of concrete expansion, floor heaving and frost buildup.) However, since the adverse affect asked for in the question was not limited to a physical condition or a physical affect, then it would be reasonable that an adverse administrative affect (operating outside the technical specification limit, thus rending the ice condenser bed inoperable) could also be assumed. This would make both A and B correct.

Since either an adverse affect could be interpreted as physical or administrative, Sequoyah station concludes that both A and B are considered as correct answers.

Additionally the following comment was submitted by (applicant

1. 95. Given the following:

Unit-i outage schedule logic changes for a planned 28-day refueling outage are being reviewed by an SRO to determine if they are safety significant in accordance with SPP-7.2, Outage Management, Appendix E, Outage Schedule Logic Change Control.

in accordance with Appendix E, which ONE of the following proposed logic changes would meet the criteria for a Safety Significant change?

A. Reschedule the Unit-i loop #2 MSIV seat inspection from the core empty mid-loop period to the time period during core reload while SG secondary manways are removed for inspection.

B. increase the cavity level from 711 feet to 712 feet elevation to minimize dose while unlatching control rods.

C. Add a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> activity to perform preventative maintenance on the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump before entry into Mode 4.

D. Change the window for a contract diver to enter the CCW pump intake bay from the end of the outage (before starting CCW pumps) to the beginning of the outage (after securing CCW Pumps.)

Comment: Since the Condenser Circulating Water system (CCW) intake bay is common to both units, diving operations could affect both units. As per SPP-7.2, Appendix E, (provided as a reference) the SRO is to evaluate if the activity would meet any of the listed criteria, item 15 asks if the activity will affect the non-outage unit and if so then that item would be considered a safety significant change and would require additional evaluation. Since diving could affect the non-outage unit then D is a correct answer.

Response: After evaluating the question and choices against the criteria of SPP-7.2, Appendix E, and industry OE associated with diving operations, it is plausible that an SRO could reasonably conclude that a diving operation, in the vicinity of the CCW pumps, could (and would) have an impact on the operation of the non-outage unit. Thus per the direction of SPP 7.2, Appendix E, which was provided to the SRO candidates evaluating the events, we agree with the comment and consider A and 0 as correct answers.

SQN ICE CONDENSER COOLING 0-SO-61-1 0 Rev. 30 Page 8 of 131 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (Continued)

B. Trapping cold glycol solution between two isolated valves must be avoided. When isolating a component, close one valve only, until fluid warms up to ambient, or open a vent between the two closed valves.

C. Raw cooling water header pressure should normally be maintained greater than 40 psig to glycol chiller packages. If available, the standby RCW booster pump should be started in accordance with 0-SO-24-1 as necessary to maintain system pressure.

If NO ROW booster pump can be started, 0-SO-24-1 provides guidance on raising RCW header pressure to allow short-term operation of a few glycol chiller packages while restoring a ROW booster pump.

D. During cooldown, the differential temperature between the glycol supply temperature and the averaged measured floor surface temperature (Appendix G), should not exceed 20°F.

E. In order to minimize sublimation, frost buildup, and ice condenser door binding problems, the Ice Condenser temp should be maintained within the optimum range of 18°F to 20°F. [C.1]

F. If glycol flow is left on the shutdown chiller unit, the bypass valve around the temperature control valve in the cooling water flow path must be left open at all times to prevent freezing.

G. The following apply to the AHUs:

1. Heat tracing on the AHU defrost drains must be maintained continuously while plenum temperature is below freezing. If power is lost to both heating circuits for any length of time, the drain pipes must be inspected for signs of damage due to freezing.

2. If isolation of an AHU is necessary, use the odd numbered isolation valves if possible. Even numbered return valves are used for flow balance, and they should be returned to their previous position if closure is necessary.

3. When removing an AHU from service for maintenance, open circuit breaker OB #1, so it will not unnecessarily add its defrost heat to the ice condenser during the normal defrost cycle.

4. Do not operate any AHU that is not completely assembled.

When air bypasses the coils due to the front or side panels being removed, it is adding warmer air to the wall panels. All sheetmetal panels must be installed on the front and sides of the AHUs. Open CB #1, unless all sheetmetal panels are installed.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER ICE BED LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5.1. The ice bed shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The stored ice having a boron concentration of 1800 ppm and 2500 ppm boron as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5,

b. Flow channels through the ice condenser,

c. A maximum ice bed temperature of less than or equal 27° F,

d. A total ice weight of at least 2,225,880 pounds at a 95% level of confidence, and

e. 1944 ice baskets.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Wth the ice bed inoperable, restore the ice bed to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5.1 The ice condenser shall be determined OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27°F.

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying, by visual inspection, accumulation of ice on structural members comprising flow channels through the ice bed is 15 percent blockage of the total flow area for each safety analysis section.

September 30, 2002 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-26 Amendment No. 4, 126, 131, 224, 267, 269, 277, 279

Outage Management SPP-7.2 NPG Standard Rev. 0020 Programs and Page 35 of45 Processes Appendix E (Page 1 of 2)

Outage Schedule Logic Change Control (IOSR) or issuance of Rev. C if an IOSR was Subsequent to the Independent Outage Safety Review ges which involve the modification of logic relation not performed, all significant outage schedule chan following process.

between outage activities will be controlled by the the Outage Schedule Logic Change Form A. The proposed schedule change is documented on (OSLCF) SPP-7.2-2, Attachment 1 of this procedure.

each time a logic change to the outage An OSLCF is initiated by the responsible individual through D of the OSLCF.

schedule is required. The initiator must complete items A documented on the OSLCF and evaluates B. A licensed SRO reviews the requested logic change approved and proceed. This review by a whether the change to the outage schedule should be a review consistent with the initial SRO is to ensure safety significant changes receive le. The SRO should consider the criteria independent outage safety review of the outage schedu ed: If the answer to any of these below when determining if the change should be approv riate actions are taken to minimize the safety questions is yes, the reviewer should ensure approp to approval. If the logic change requires a risk resulting from incorporating the logic change prior ge to the defense in depth strategy with major system window change, or could present a challen consulted to convene an Independent safety significance, the Unit Outage Manager will be opinions on whether the change should Outage Safety Review team to provide additional expert approve a schedule change, deemed safety be approved. The plant manager, or designee, will significant via the following questions.

SRO review questions for consideration:

temperature, etc.) and other

1. Perturb the stability of RHR parameters (flow, pressure, operational parameters (operating pump amperes, etc.)?

temperature below the minimum value

2. Alter plant configurations that would result in RCS used to analyze reactor shutdown margin?

3. Reduce the reactor cavity or reactor vessel inventory?

Cooling redundancy?

4. Reduce the spent fuel pit inventory or challenge SF s required to provide reactor vessel

5. Reduce the availability of systems or support system tion load?

makeup water consistent with the decay heat genera

6. Minimize the availability of low pressure injection?

vessel makeup water consistent with

7. Reduce the availability of alternate sources of reactor the decay heat generation rate?

temporary equipment that could reduce

8. Increase the probability of jeopardizing installed safety system availability?

9. Isolate of the operable boration flow path?

t NPG Standard Outage Management SPP-7.2 Programs and Rev. 0020 Processes Page 36 of 45 Appendix E (Page 2 of 2)

Outage Schedule Logic Change Control

10. Cause leakage of water into the RCS or spent fuel pit which would dilute the boron concentration to a value below the minimum required?

11. Affect bus outages or switchyard outages?

12. Reduce the availability of onsite or offsite electrical power supplies or support systems?

13. Increase the probability of fuel or other core component mishandling or damage?

14. Reduce the ability to isolate containment when required?

1 5. Affect the non-outage unit?

After reviewing the above questions, the SRO signs the OSLCF for approval if warranted. If the SRO rejects the change, the OSLCF is returned to the originator with an explanation of why it was rejected for enhancement or cancellation as appropriate.

C. Following SRO approval of an OSLCF, the Outage Manager reviews the OSLCF for completeness and determines if additional reviews are required. This determination is based on the following criteria:

1. Logic changes for work activities within a system window which change the sequence of scheduled work and do not pose a potential challenge to the defense in depth strategy can be approved by the Outage Manager.

2. Logic changes which move a work activity scheduled in Modes 5 or 6 (PWR only) to the empty reactor vessel period can be approved by the Outage Manager.

3. Logic changes for work activities on the equipment and systems affecting system operations require review and concurrence by the Operations Management representative in the 0CC, in addition to the original SROs approval. As an example: IF the logic change moves the activity out of its scheduled work window Qj has the potential to challenge the stations defense in depth strategy, Operations management concurrence in 0CC is required, as well as Outage Manager and Plant Manager, or outage shift designees.

4. Logic changes for work activities on equipment and systems not identified above can be approved by the Outage Manager.

schedule in D. Following approval of the OSLCF, the Outage Manager directs changing the outage by the Outage Manager. OSLCFs accordance with the OSLCF. Approved OSLCFs are retained that are not approved are returned to the originator for cancellation or further processing.

to other outage E. Copies of approved OSLCFs should be distributed to the Outage Manager and participants that viill be affected by the change as deemed necessary.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000 November 15, 2010 ES-501 Mr. Richard S. Baldwin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue, NE, Suitel200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1 257 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 NRC Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Subject:

Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Initial Examinations -

05000327/2010302 and 05000328/2010302

Reference:

NRC letter to TVA, Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Initial Examinations 05000327/2010302 and 05000328/2010302, dated October 6, 2010 In accordance with Examination Standard (ES) 501, Initial Post-Examination Activities, of NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, substantive comments related to the examination were provided in the referenced letter.

The purpose of this letter is to provide supplemental information to the substantive comments submitted in the referenced letter. The enclosure provides the supplemental information as discussed with Craig Kontz of your staff on November 5, 2010.

There are no commitments contained in this submittal. Should you require additional information regarding this matter, please contact Michael Buckner at (423) 843-4208 or contact Beth A. Wetzel at (423) 843-7170.

NOV 16 2010 Printed on recycled paper

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000 November 15, 2010 ES-501 Mr. Richard S. Baldwin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue, NE, Suitel 200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units I and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 NRC Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Subject:

Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Initial Examinations -

0500032712010302 and 0500032812010302

Reference:

NRC letter to TVA, Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Initial Examinations 05000327/2010302 and 05000328/2010302, dated October 6, 2010 In accordance with Examination Standard (ES) 501, Initial Post-Examination Activities, of NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, substantive comments related to the examination were provided in the referenced letter.

The purpose of this letter is to provide supplemental information to the substantive comments submitted in the referenced letter. The enclosure provides the supplemental information as discussed with Craig Kontz of your staff on November 5, 2010.

There are no commitments contained in this submittal. Should you require additional information regarding this matter, please contact Michael Buckner at (423) 843-4208 or contact Beth A. Wetzel at (423) 843-7170.

Pnnte o, rcycIed pape

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 November 15, 2010 Sincerely, 7?;;

Christopher R. Church Site Vice-President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Enclosure:

Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Initial Examinations Supplemental Substantive Comments (ES-402)

BAW:NRT:SKD Enclosure

ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS I AND 2 Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Initial Examinations Supplemental Substantive Comments (ES-402)

The following provides supplemental information to the NRC post examination questions.

NRC Question I Simulator Job Performance Measure (JPM) G Need new evaluation criteria and basis for evaluating the applicants use of Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) M.04 Appendix E with centrifugal charging pump (CCP) and volume control tank (VCT) for establishing make-up. The issues of capacity (flow rate and overall available volume) need to be addressed as an alternative for residual heat removal (RHR) from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

TVA Response I This JPM was developed as an alternate path JPM such that when the candidates determined that the Appendix A criteria for establishing flow from the RWST through the CCPs in Step 1 could not be established, the candidate would then move on to Step 2 and establish makeup flow from the RWST through an alternate path using the RHR pumps. After reviewing the step sequence and the use of check boxes as each step is performed, it would be reasonable and logical that a candidate would go back to Step 5 of the AOP after not being able to open the suction valves from the RWST to the CCPs and conclude that the next step should be the guidance in Step 5 response not obtained (RNO) column that directs the candidate to perform Appendix E of AOP-M.04. This is not the direction given to the candidate in the JPM initiating cues, (which was to establish makeup to the refueling cavity from the RWST as soon as possible) however; the direction to perform Appendix E does have a logical flow path.

Although making up to the refueling cavity using a CCP taking suction from the VCT does reduce the rate of makeup to that of VCT makeup flow (120 gpm given the plant conditions for the JPM) vs potential makeup from injection by using a CCP taking suction from the RWST

( 400 gpm ) or RHR pumps (3000 gpm ), the rate of makeup flow was not a critical task of the JPM. Since the candidates did not know what the leak rate was, they would not know if Appendix A or Appendix E flow path was adequate until after determining if refueling cavity level was recovering or not. Determining a change in refueling cavity level to indicate how effective the makeup is in recovering level was not part of the JPM, only establishing makeup flow.

The site would evaluate the candidate as satisfactory if they assumed that makeup flow from the RWST could not be established when the CCP suction valves would not open using Appendix A and then applied the Step 5 RNO column direction of implementing Appendix E.

A revised copy of JPM G, with the alternate method of makeup to the refueling cavity using Appendix E is attached.

NRC Question 2 Administrative JPM A.1 .A Overtime Restrictions TVA Standard Programs and Processes (SPP) -1.5, Section 3.2.1.A.5, requires At least a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in any 9 calendar day period.

a. How is this requirement applied I implemented at the station?

b. How should this requirement have been applied / evaluated for the schedule given in the JPM?

TVA Response 2(a)

The actual application at the station is by using a Personnel Qualification and Scheduling software program in the Shift Operations Management System (eSOMS). This program has the criteria identified in NPG-SPP-03.21, Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits. This is the official program used to track worker hours (actual and projected) to ensure the site is complying with the requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs.

The application of Section 3.2.1 .A.5 of At least a 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in any 9 calendar day period is actually a 216-hour period. The computer program evaluates the 34-hour break based on the start of work following a break of at least 34 continuous hours. Therefore, the computer program would evaluate the 216 hours0.0025 days <br />0.06 hours <br />3.571429e-4 weeks <br />8.2188e-5 months <br /> since the end of the last break of at least 34 continuous hours for another break of at least 34 continuous hours in length.

TVA Response 2(b)

Normally any hours scheduled to be worked (or planned to be worked) are processed using eSOMS to determine if any of the established criteria from Section 3.2.1 would be violated.

The JPM as administered had the candidates do a manual calculation of a work schedule based on the hours presented. During development and validation it was determined that two critical tasks (work hour violations) were present. It was not identified that a violation of Item 3.2.1 .A.5 (a 34 hr break in any 9 calendar day period) had been committed. The work hours given in the JPM were processed through the eSOMS software and the computer program did identify the two predetermined work hour violations, (one on May 30, 2010, for a violation of greater than 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> in 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period and one on June 4, 2010, for a violation of greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7 day period); however, it did not identify a violation of Item 3.2.1 .A.5.

The procedure requires evaluating any 9 calendar days and it would appear that a violation of the 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in any 9 day requirement may occur on June 7, 2010. However, because of evaluating the 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break in 9-day period at the end of the workday or start of the next work day, not during a non-workday, there is a greater than 34 hour3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> break for the work hours listed in the JPM. If a candidate determined that a potential violation did occur for this instance it would be a conservative call and would actually need to be verified through the use of the official tracking tool (eSOMS). This would not constitute a failure by the candidate, only an item which would need further evaluation.

JPM Sm G Page 1 of 18 Rev. 1 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT September2010 NRC Exam SIM G (RO\SRO)

Initiate Makeup to the Refueling Cavity (rev. 1)

JPM Sim G Page 2 of 18 Rev. 1 ROISRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task: Initiate Makeup to the Refueling Cavity Task#: 3210110401 (RO)

Task Standard: Makeup to the refueling cavity via the RHR Pumps is initiated per AOP-M.04.(preferred method)

Makeup to the refueling cavity via the CCPs and VCT is initiated per AOP-M.04. (alternate)

Time Critical Task: YES: NO: X K/A Reference/Ratings: 036AA2.02 (3.4/4.1) 004A4.08 (3.8/3.4) 036AK3.03 (3.7/4.1)

Method of Testing:

Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Evaluation Method:

Simulator X In-Plant Classroom Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:

Trainee Name Evaluator: /

Name! Signature DATE Performance Rating: SAT: UNSAT:

Validation Time: 15 minutes Total Time:

Performance Time: Start Time: Finish Time:

COMMENTS

JPM Sim G Page 3 of 18 Rev. 1 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:

1. Critical steps are identified in step SAT/UNSAT Column by bold print Critical Step.

2. Any UNSAT requires comments

3. Initialize the simulator to IC-i 14 and complete the following setup.

4. Override # AN:OVRDN_584 to ON, to bring in alarm for SPENT FUEL PIT LEVEL.

5. Override ZA0L168320, ZA0LI68321, ZAOL168335A, ZA0LI68339A at 50 to simulate PZR at refueling level.

6. Override ZAOPI6866A, ZA0P16869, ZAOPl6862 at 35 to simulate refuel flood up pressure.

7. Override AN:OVRDN_l 695 to OFF to keep midloop high level alarm from alarming.

8. Override (FCV-62-135 & 136, CCP Suction from VCT, CLOSED. (ZLOHS62I35A_Green f:ON, ZLOHS62I36A_Green f:ON, ZDIHS62I35Af:0 (close), ZDIHS62I36Af:0 (close)

9. Insure operator performs the following required actions for SELF-CHECKING;

a. Identifies the correct unit, train, component, etc.

b. Reviews the intended action and expected response.

c. Compares the actual response to the expected response.

10. Add Caution Order tag to FCV-63-i per 0-GO-13 App. 0. (jumpers placed to remove seal in)

Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

AOP-M.04, Section 2.0, 2.1, and Appendix A & B

REFERENCES:

1. AOP-M.04, Sect 2.1 & Appendix A Refueling Malfunctions Rev No. 9

2. AOP-M.04, Sect 2.1 & Appendix E Refueling Malfunctions Rev No. 9 Task Number Task Title Cont TRJ 3210110401 (RO) Initiate Makeup to the Refueling Cavity I

JPM Sm G Page 4 of 18 Rev. 1 READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you.

All steps shall be performed for this task. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit I is in mode 6 performing refueling operations. Approximately 112 of the core has been off-loaded at this time.

2. There is one fuel assembly in transit to the spent fuel pit from the core. It is presently in the upender cart in transient to the spent fuei pit.

3. The refueling SRO in the reactor building has just informed you that there is an obvious drop in reactor cavity level.

4. A dedicated operator that has been assigned to monitor vessel level instruments, informs you that there is a decreasing trend in Reactor cavity level indicators.

INITIATING CUES:

1. The refueling SRO reports a confirmed reactor cavity seal failure is occurring.

2. Alarm on panel 1-M-6D (D3) SPENT FUEL PIT LEVEL HIGH-LOW has just actuated.

3. The refueling SRO has requested makeup to the refueling cavity from the RWST as soon as possible

4. The US directs you to perform AOP-MM4, Refueling Malfunctions (single performer method).

5. Inform the refueling SRO (and Unit SRO) as soon as makeup is initiated.

JPM Sim G Page 5 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT NOTE: If operator responds using AR-M6-D window D-3. AUO is dispatched to the SFP to investigate the alarm. Operator determines that AOP-M.04 is the appropriate procedure.

SAT STEP 1: Obtain the appropriate procedure.

UNSAT Start Time STANDARD: Operator obtains a copy of AOP-M.04.

COMMENTS:

STEP 2: 1. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for applicability: SAT

• 3.9.8.2, RHR Low Water Level UNSAT

• 3.9.10, RVessel Water Level

• 3.9.11, Refueling Operations Spent Fuel Pit Water Level Cue: The US will evaluate the Tech Specs for applicability STANDARD: Operator notifies US of the need to evaluate these three Tech Spec items.

COMMENTS:

STEP 3: 2. EVALUATE EP1P-i, Emergency Plan initiating SAT Conditions Matrix.

UNSAT Cue: The SM will evaluate the Emergency Plan STANDARD: Operator notifies US/SM of the need to evaluate the Emergency Plan.

GO MM ENTS:

JPM Sim G Page 6 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 4: 3. Diagnose conditions to determine appropriate section, of SAT 1

AOP-M.04, to perform. UNSAT STANDARD: Based on plant indications and initial conditions, determines that section 2.1 must be performed and proceeds to page 4.

COMMENTS:

Caution 1: Loss of Spent Fuel Pit or Refueling Cavity level and subsequent loss of shielding may result in extremely high dose rates in Containment and Spent Fuel Pit areas.

Caution 2: If the reactor cavity water level drops to flange elevation with upender in vertical position, the top 0.25 inch of upender will extend above surface of water.

Note: Fuel Handling SRO. personnel required to place fuel in safe location, and Radcon personnel remain (if possible) until required actions are completed.

STEP 5: 2.1.1 ANNOUNCE to all non-essential personnel to evacuate SAT Containment and AB el. 734 Refuel Floor. UNSAT Cue: The SM would like you to make that announcement.

STANDARD: Operator makes this announcement.

COMMENTS:

JPM Sim G Page 7 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEPISTANDARD SATIUNSAT STEP 6: 2.1.2 ENSURE the following personnel notified that seal SAT failure has occurred: UNSAT

• Control Room

• RADCON to monitor refueling area and Aux Bldg as required

• Fuel Handling Supervisor Cue: The SM will ensure all control room personnel and the Fuel Handling Supervisor are aware of the event and that RADCON begins monitoring CNMT and the Aux Bldg.

STANDARD: Operator ensures these people are notified.

CO M ME NTS:

Caution: Failure to maintain RWST level greater than 5% may cause CCPs or RHR pumps to lose suction.

STEP 7: 2.1.3 MAINTAIN Refueling Cavity level as necessary: SAT

a. INITIATE makeup from RWST using Appendix A, Filling UNSAT Refueling Cavity from RWST.

b.

Cue: US directs makeup from RWST using CCP STANDARD: Operator obtains a copy of Appendix A Section A of AOP-M.04.

CO M ME NTS:

NOTE:The following are from Appendix A, Filling Refueling Cavity From RWST, Section A of AOP-M.04.

STEP 8: A.1 .a. VERIFY RWST level greater than 8%.

SAT UNSAT STANDARD: Operator verifies RWST level greater than 8% using one or more of the RWST level indicators located on M-6.

0DM ME N TS:

JPM Sim G Page 8 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEPISTANDARD SAT!UNSAT STEP 9: A.1 .b. ENSURE the following charging valves OPEN: SAT UNSAT FCV-62-90 STANDARD: Operator verifies FCV-62-90 open by observing 1-HS 90A RED light LIT.

COMMENTS:

STEP 10: A.1 .b. ENSURE the following charging valves OPEN: SAT UNSAT FCV-62-91 STANDARD: Operator verifies FCV-62-91 open by observing 1 -HS 91A RED light LIT COMMENTS:

STEP 11: A.1 .b. ENSURE the following charging valves OPEN: SAT UNSAT FCV-62-85 OR FCV-62-86 STANDARD: Operator verifies FCV-62-85 or 86 is open by observing 1-HS-62-85A or 1-HS-62-86A RED light LIT.

COMMENTS:

JPMSimG Page 9 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 12 A 1 c OPEN th roi1owng taive SAT FCV-62135 UNSAT Critical Step STANDARD: Operator pushes HSs (1-HS-62-135A and 1-HS-62-136A)

IN and turns to the OPEN position and determines that neither valve opens Green lights remain LIT for FCVs 135 and 136.

Cue: If required, acknowledge and ask for recommended path to complete task.

This step is critical to attempt a supply to the refueling cavity makeup flowpath and then for the UO to determine the valve failure so the alternate path may be utilized.

CO M ME NTS:

Evaluator Note: The candidate should recommend using the alternate method of filling Reactor Cavity by performing step 2 of Appendix A, OR the candidate may determine that response was not obtained due to suction valves not opening, flow from RWST is not available and returns to AOP step 5, RNO column.

(If candidate returns to step 5, RNO to perform Appendix E, then go to JPM step 20)

STEP 13: Operator reports to US that neither COP suction from the SAT RWST will open.

UNSAT Cue: After operator reports not being able to open CCP suction valves, report as the US that you will contact Maintenance Shift Supervisor to investigate the cause of the valve failure.

STANDARD: Operator determines that step 2 of Appendix A is appropriate action to take or returns to step 5 RNO column for next action.

CO M ME NTS:

JPM Sim G Page 10 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEP/STANDARD SATIUNSAT NOTE: The following are from Appendix A, Section A, Step 2 of AOP-M.04.

STEP 14: A.2. IF initiating makeup from RWST using RHR Pump SAT suction, THEN PERFORM the following: UNSAT

a. VERIFY RWST level greater than 8%.

STANDARD: Operator verifies RWST level greater than 8% using one or more of the RWST level indicators located on M-6.

COMMENTS:

STEP 15: A.2. F initiating makeup from RWST using RHR Pump SAT suction, THEN PERFORM the following:

UNSAT

b. OPEN FGV- Critical Step STANDARD: Operator uses HS-63-1A and opens FCV-63-1, Observes Red light ON, Green light OFF.

This step is critical to provide a makeup flowpath from the RWST to the refueling cavity.

Ar.. IT L,LJIVIIVIIN I

JPM Sim G Page 11 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEPISTANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 16: A.2. IF initiating makeup from RWST using RHR Pump SAT suction, THEN PERFORM the following:

UNSAT ccL1SE.:

Critical Step FV 742 STANDARD: Operator uses HS-74-1A and CLOSES FCV-74-1, Observes Red light OFF, Green light ON. OR Operator uses HS-74-2A and CLOSES FCV-74-2, Observes Red light OFF. Green light ON This step is critical to isolate the normal RHR suction flowpath and to swap over to the RWST suction flowpath.

COMMENTS:

STEP 18: A.2.d VERlFYflowto RCS. SAT UNSAT STANDARD: Operator verifies flow into the RCS by observing flow on 1-Fl-63-91B or 1-Fl-63-92B.

COMMENTS:

JPM Sim G Page 12 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 19: Inform the US of flow from RWST to RCS/Refueling Cavity. SAT UNSAT STANDARD: Operator informs US and/or SM that flow has been established from RWST to Spent Fuel Pit.

Stop Time Cue: After operator reports that flow has been established, State This completes the JPM.

COMMENTS:

Evaluator Note: If candidate went back to Step 5 RNO start evaluation here STEP2O: 2.1.5.aRNO: SAT IF RWST NOT available, THEN PERFORM the following:

UNSAT

1) INITIATE makeup using normal charging with CCP suction aligned to VCT USING App. E, Refueling Cavity Makeup Using Normal Charging.

STANDARD: Operator transitions to App E to initiate makeup using normal charging.

0DM ME NTS:

JPM Sim G Page 13 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEPISTANDARD SAT/UNSAT NOTE: The following steps are from Appendix E, of AOP-M.04.

STEP 21 App E 1 ENSURE FCV-6281 Letdcwn BakPrsure SAT UN SAT STANDARD: Operator places Manual/Auto toggle switch to Manual on controller 1-HIC-62-81A and then moves toggle to the Critical Step right until valve position indicator is fully CLOSED (indicator needle stops moving to the right)

This is a critical step to stop letting down water from RHR system to conserve RCS inventory.

COMMENTS:

STEP 22: 2. ENSURE FCV-62-83, RHR Letdown CLOSED. SAT UNSAT STANDARD: Operator turns setpoint dial fully clockwise and observes position indicator goes fully to CLOSE (left) position CO M ME NTS:

JPM Sim G Page 14 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEP/STANDARD SATIUNSAT STEP 23: 3. ENSURE one of the following valves OPEN: SAT UNSAT FCV-62-85, Charging FCV to Loop 1 OR FCV-62-86, Charging FCV to Loop 4 STANDARD: Operator verifies FCV-62-86 is Open by observing switch for FCV-62-86 in the Open position and Red light On.

COMMENTS:

C . C A A r I P I I rr .L .r... _...: . . p. , rr . S AT I I f. +. IZIUrc.L 1II uiiuwiiiy VdIV LJFI4. -

UNSAT FCV-62-90, Charging isolation FCV-62-91, Charging isolation STANDARD: Operator verifies FCV-62-90 and FCV-62-91 are Open by observing switch for each valve in A-Auto position and Red light On, Green light off for each valve.

COMMENTS:

Evaluator Note: The VCT makeup rate will be limited to 120 gpm for normal auto makeup, if charging is increased above this value then VCT makeup will be required.

JPM Sim G Page 15 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEPISTANDARD SATIUNSAT STEP 25: 5. ENSURE VCT makeup initiated as necessary to maintain SAT VCT level above 20%: UNSAT STANDARD: Operator verifies VCT level above 20% and notes the need to monitor level to ensure normal makeup initiates as necessary.

COMMENTS:

STEP 26: 6. ENSURE the following valves OPEN: SAT UNSAT FCV-62-132, CCP Suction from VCT FCV-62-133, CCP Suction from VCT STANDARD: Operator verifies that FCV-62-1 32 and FCV-62-1 33 are OPEN by observing control switches in A-Auto position and Red light ON, Green light Off COMMENTS:

JPM Sim G Page 16 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 27: 7. ENSURE the following valves CLOSED: SAT UNSAT FCV-62-135, CCP Suction from RWST FCV-62-136, CCP Suction from RWST STANDARD: Operator verifies that FCV-62-135 and FCV-62-136 are CLOSED by observing control switch indications Green light ON, Red light Off.

Evaluator Note: valves are failed closed per the previous JPM malfunction COMMENTS:

STEP 28: 8. ENSURE CCP running. SAT UNSAT STANDARD: Operator verifies that lB-B COP running by observing control switch in A-Auto position and Red light ON, Green light Off, and normal running amps, discharge pressure, for plant conditions.

COMMENTS:

Evauator Note: If candidate establishes greater than 120 gpm charging flow to the RCS in the next step, normal makeup flow will not be able to maintain JCT level greater than 20%

and they will eventually lose this source of makeup water if VOl level cannot be maintained.

JPM Sm G Page 17 of 18 Rev. 1 Job Performance Checklist STEP/STANDARD SATIUNSAT STEP 29 9. ADJUST FGV-62-89 ard FCV-62-93 t estabish deswed SAT UNSAT STANDARD: Operator adjusts charging flow by positioning control dial (turning dial counter clockwise) on 1-HC-82-93A to open ri ica

• • ep FCV-62-93 to establish 120 gpm flow to the RCS.

This step is critical to ensure that makeup flow is being provided to the RCS to attempt to makeup for inventory loss due to the Reactor Cavity Seal.

COMMENTS:

STEP 30: Inform the US of flow from VCT to RCS/Refueling Cavity. SAT UNSAT STANDARD: Operator informs US and/or SM that flow has been established from VCT to RCS/Refueling Cavity.

Stop Time Cue: After operator reports that flow has been established, State This completes the JPM.

COMMENTS:

End Of JPM

READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you.

All steps shall be performed for this task. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit I is in mode 6 performing refueling operations. Approximately 112 of the core has been off-loaded at this time.

2. There is one fuel assembly in transit to the spent fuel pit from the core. It is presently in the upender cart in transient to the spent fuel pit.

3. The refueling SRO in the reactor building has just informed you that there is an obvious drop in reactor cavity level.

4. A dedicated operator that has been assigned to monitor vessel level instruments, informs you that there is a decreasing trend in Reactor cavity level indicators.

INITIATING CUES:

1. The refueling SRO reports a confirmed reactor cavity seal failure is occurring.

2. Alarm on panel 1-M-6D (D3) SPENT FUEL PIT LEVEL HIGH-LOW has just actuated.

3. The refueling SRO has requested makeup to the refueling cavity from the RWST as soon as possible

4. The US directs you to perform AOP-M.04, Refueflng Malfunctions (single performer method).

5. inform the refueling SRO (and Unit SRO) as soon as makeup is initiated.