ML110060814
| ML110060814 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem |
| Issue date: | 02/07/2008 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N10-0355 S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q Rev 3 | |
| Download: ML110060814 (21) | |
Text
PSEG Internal Use Only PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C.
SALEM/OPERATIONS S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q) ~ REV. 3 FLOODING Biennial Review Performed: Yes No.-£.
Change Package(s) and Affected Document Numbers incorporated into this revision:
DCP No. 80089591 DCP Rev. No. _1 _ AD No. P08 AD Rev. No. _0_
The following OTSC(s) were incorporated into this revision: None REVISION
SUMMARY
The following changes were incorporated into this revision:
Page.1. of..L Revised Attachment 1 to provide additional guidance regarding Calculated Flood Rate (gpm),
Estimated Time to Submerge Vital Equipment (min), and Equipment Affected due to the installation of a Fire Protection Sprinkler System in the 64' Switchgear Area.
The 64' Switchgear Area Fire Protection Sprinkler System was installed by DCP 80089591, 82 C02 Replacement - 64', 78' and 84' Elevations.
[80089591~0070~01251 IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS Effective Date:
0 Z/ o-zlc:!6 I
DCP 80089591, 82 C02 Replacement - 64'. 78' and 84' Elevations
s2.OP~AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
FLOODING 1.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS DATE: ____ TIME: __ _
1.1 In plant flooding except containment as indicated by the fonowing:
Report from personnel of flooding from piping systems or tanks outside of Containment Unexpected sump alanns in the Auxiliary or Turbine Buildings 2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 2.1 None 3.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 3.1 SEND Operators to determine exact source and severity of flooding.
3.2 Is the Circulating Water System the source of flooding?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 3.9 I
V 3.3 STOP the affected Circulating Water Pump by depressing the Emergency Trip pushbutton.
CAUTION Time Operation of the flood sump pump or release of water to the environment, may cause a NJPDES violation. Shift Supervisor permission required prior to operating flood pump.
3.4 START all available sump pumps and water removal equipment in affected area.
3.5 NOTIFY Site Services and Maintenance Department to assist in dewatering efforts and protection ofpersonnel/equipment.
3.6 ATTEMPT to isolate the leak.
Salem 2 Page 1 of14 Rev. 3
S2.0P-AB.Zz..0002(Q) 3.7 STABILIZE the unit at the available Circulating Water System configuration.
3.8 GO TO S2.0P-AB.CW-OOOl(Q). Circulating Water System Malfunction.
Time 3.9 Is the Service Water System the source of flooding?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 3.11 I
Time V
3.10 INITIATE S2.0P~AB.SW-OOOl(Q), Loss of Service Water Header Pressure.
3.11 REFER to the appropriate Attachment for the following affected areas:
[C0361]
64' Switchgear Room, Attachment 1 Relay Room, Attachment 2 Aux Bldg 84', Attachment 3 Aux Bldg 122', Attachment 4 Chiller Room, Attachment 5 SW Pump Bays, Attachment 6 Corridor adjacent to 84', Attachment 7 Switchgear Room 3.12 START all available sump pumps in affected areas.
3.13 NOTIFY Operators at the scene to attempt to ISOLATE the leak.
Salem 2 Page 2 of 14 Rev. 3
S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q) 3.14 Is severe flooding occuning as indicated by any of the following?
Safety Related equipment endangered or rendered inoperable Equipment important to safe plant operation endangered or rendered inoperable, including:
Control Air System ElectIical Power sources Flooding in excess of available water removal equipment YES I
NO-->
GO TO Step 3.16 V
3.15 INITIATE the appropriate Integrated Operating Procedures to place the unit in Mode required by SM/CRS.
3.16 Is the flooding occurring in a Radiologically Controlled Area?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 3.18 I
V 3.17 NOTIFY Radiation Protection and Chemistry Department to sample flood water and calculate releases.
3.18 NOTIFY Site Services and Maintenance Departments to assist in dewatering efforts and protection ofpersonne1/equipment.
3.19 NOTIFY Engineering and appropriate Maintenance Departments to assist in assessing equipment damage.
3.20 When the source of flooding is isolated, SEND Operators to inspect all areas adjacent to affected areas for flooding damage.
3.21 NOTIFY the SMiCRS to refer to Technical Specifications and the Event Classification Guide.
Salem 2 Page 3 of 14 Time Time Rev. 3
S2,OP-AB,ZZ-0002(Q) 4.0 Comp-letion and Review 4.1 CIRCLE Entry Condition in Section 1.0, OR EXPLAIN Entry Condition in Comments Section of Attachment 8.
4.2 COMPLETE Attachment 8, Sections 1.0 and 2.0 AND FORW ARD this procedure to SM/CRS for review and approval.
4.3 SM/CRS PERFORM the following; Salem 2 4.3.1.
REVIEW this procedure with Attachment 8 for completeness and accuracy.
4.3.2.
COMPLETE Attachment 8, Section 3.0.
4.3.3.
FORWARD completed procedure to Operations Staff.
END OF PROCEDURE Page 4 of 14 Rev. 3
S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
C0361 Source of Water DM 1 in. header FP Sprinkler System
(*)
ATTACHMENT 1 (Page 1 of 1) 64' SWITCHGEAR ROOM Calc Flood Rate Est. Time to Submerge (gpm)
Vital Equipment 60 300 min 281 65 min
(*) Sprinkler Activation causes alarm in Control Room.
NOTES Equipment Affected 4160 VAC Vital Busses 4160 VAC Vital Busses
- 1.
Possible second source of flooding is from 84' Switchgear Room. See Attachment 7.
- 2.
Floor drains are assumed closed.
- 3.
4160 VAC buses are considered disabled at 6 inches water level.
- 4.
Calculated Flood Rate is the difference between source flow rate and room drainage capacity, including door seals and other penetrations.
- 5.
Assumes double ended rupture of piping to produce calculated flood rate.
Salem 2 Page 5 of 14 Rev. 3
s2.0 P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
C0361 Source of Water Calc Flood Rate (gpm)
ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 1 of 1)
RELAY ROOM Est. Time to Submerge Vital Equipment Equipment Affected 28 VDC Buses, DM 1 in. header 120 o min 115 V AC Vital lost Buses NOTES
- 1.
Time to submerge is zero due to cable routing under floor.
- 2.
Floor drains are assumed closed.
- 3.
Calculated Flood Rate is the difference between source,flow rate and room drainage capacity, including door seals and other penetrations.
- 4.
Assumes double ended rupture of piping to produce ca16ulated flood rate.
Salem 2 Page 6of14 Rev. 3
82.oP-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
C0361 Source of Water AFST 4 in. header AFST 6-10 in. header CCW 4-12 in. header DM 1-2 in. header DM 4-8 in. header FP 5 in. header RWST 4 in. header RWST
~ 3 in. header SW 4 in. header SW
- 6 in. header ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 1 of2)
AUXILIARY BUILDING 84' Calc Flood Rate Est. Time to Submerge (gpm)
Vital Equipment 0
no damage 740-6500 14-120 min 0-6700 no damage 0
no damage 500 180 min 2800 30 min 0
no damage 1100-36000 2-80 min 4400-8300 10-20 min 0
no damage 2000 no damage 14000-30000 3-6 min (1)
AFW Pumps, CCW Pumps, SJ Pumps, Charging Pumps, CS Pumps, and West Valve Vital Control Centers Salem 2 Page 7 of14 Equipment Affected (1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
Rev. 3
S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 2 of2)
AUXILIARY BUILDING 84' NOTES
- 1.
CCW flooding will not damage Safe Shutdown equipment due to insufficient volume.
- 2.
Calculated flood rates above are in excess of estimated floor drain rate 0[2500 gpm.
- 3.
Equipment is considered disabled at 18 inches water level.
- 4.
23 AFW Pump can be affected by cross connected floor drains to pump cubicle.
- 5.
Calculated Flood Rate is the difference between source flow rate and room drainage capacity, including door seals and other penetrations.
- 6.
Assumes double ended rupture of piping to produce calculated flood rate.
Salem 2 Page 8 of 14 Rev. 3
C0361 Source of Water CCW DM 1 in. header DM 3 in. header ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 1 of 1)
AUXILIARY BUILDING 122' Calc Flood Rate Est. Time to Submerge (gpm)
Vital Equipment 2600 no damage 0
no damage 1000 75 min NOTES 82.oP-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
Equipment Affected 2B Air Cond Vital Control Center 2B Air Cond Vital Control Center
- 1.
CCW flooding will not damage Safe Shutdown equipment due to insufficient volume.
- 2.
Calculated Flood Rate is the difference between source flow rate and room drainage capacity, including door seals and other penetrations.
- 3.
Equipment is considered disabled at 18 inches water level.
- 4.
Assumes double ended rupture of piping to produce calculated flood rate.
8alem2 Page 9 of 14 Rev. 3
S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
C0361 Source of Water SW 4 in. header CH ATTACHMENT 5 (Page 1 of 1)
CHILLER ROOM (PENETRATION AREA 100')
Calc Flood Rate
_(g~m}
4100 340 Est. Time to Submerge Vital Equipment 15 min no damage Equipment Affected CH Pumps and Chillers, Ventilation Vital Control Centers 5 in. header
==d=============~================~================~
NOTES
- 1.
CH flooding will not damage Safe Shutdown equipment due to insufficient volume.
- 2.
Chiller Systems can be cross connected to other unit.
3, Equipment is considered disabled at 18 inches water level.
- 4.
Calculated Flood Rate is the difference between source flow rate and room drainage capacity, including door seals and other penetrations.
- 5.
Assumes double ended lUpture ofpiping to produce calculated flood rate.
Salem 2 Page 10 of 14 Rev. 3
C0361 Source of Water SW 20-24 in. header ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 1 of 1)
SWPUMPBAYS Calc Flood Rate Est. Time to Submerge (gpm)
Vital Equipment 33000 1 min NOTES
- 1.
Single bay is affected by flooding. other bay and pumps remain available.
- 2.
Pumps are assumed disabled at a water depth of 2 ft.
S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
Equipment Affected SWPumps in affected bay
- 3.
Calculated Flood Rate is the difference between source flow rate and room drainage capacity, including door seals and other penetrations.
- 4.
Assumes double ended rupture of piping to produce calculated flood rate.
Salem 2 Page 11 of14 Rev. 3
ATTACHMENT 7 (Page 1 of 1)
S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
CORRIDOR ADJACENT TO 84' SWITCHGEAR ROOM C0361 Source of Water Calc Flood Rate Est. Time to Submerge Equipment (gpm)
Vital Equipment Affected DM 2800 N/A 64' Switchgear 8 in. header Room by drainage FP 4800 N/A 64' Switchgear 8 in. header Room by drainage NOTES
- 1.
This area provides a water source to 64' Switchgear Room only. No equipment in this area is required for Safe Shutdown.
- 2.
Calculated Flood Rate is the difference between source flow rate and room drainage capacity, including door seals and other penetrations.
- 3.
Assumes double ended rupture of piping to produce calculated flood rate.
Salem 2 Page 12 of 14 Rev. 3
1.0 COMMENTS
ATTACHMENT 8 (Page 1 of2)
COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET S2.0P.AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
(Include procedure deficiencies and corrective actions. Attach additional pages as necessary.)
Salem 2 Page 13 of 14 Rev. 3
S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
2.0 SIGNATURES
Print ATTACHMENT 8 (Page 2 of2)
COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET Initials Signature 3.0 SM/eRS FINAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL:
Date This procedure with Attachment 8 has been reviewed for completeness and accuracy.
Entry conditions have been identified, and all deficiencies (including corrective actions) have been clearly recorded in COMMENTS Section of this attachment.
Date:
Signature: __________________ _
SM/CRS Salem 2 Page 14 of14 Rev. 3
s2.OP~AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
FLOODING TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT
1.0 REFERENCES
1.1 Technical Documents:
Salem 2 A.
Salem Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report:
- 1.
Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design
- 2.
Section 3.6, Protection Against Dynamic Effects Associated With Postulated Rupture Of Piping
- 3.
Section 9.2, Water Systems B.
Salem Generating Station Technical Specifications Unit 2:
- 1.
3.7.5, Flood Protection
- 2.
6.9, Reporting Requirements C.
Configuration Baseline Documentation - None D.
Technical/Engineering Letters:
- 1.
NSR HPES S 1-90-002, HPES Evaluation Of Valve Tagging Error That Resulted In Flooding And Contamination
- 2.
PSE&G PSLT NLR-188007, Service Water Event Special Report to NRC
- 3.
S-C-A900-MEE-OI58-0, Salem Engineering Evaluation - Internal Flooding Of Power Plant Buildings E.
Event Classification Guide:
- 1.
Section 8, Nonradioactive LeaklRelease
- 2.
Section 18, Technical Specification/Plant Status Changes Page 1 of6 Rev. 3
S2.0P-AB,ZZ-0002(Q)
1.2 Procedures
A.
S2.0P-AB.CW-OOOl(Q), Circulating Water System Malfunction B.
S2.0P-AB.SW-OOOl(Q), Loss of Service Water Header Pressure C.
Administrative Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0015(Q), Safety Tagging Program D.
E&PB Department Manual, Procedure GM8-EMP-027, Safety Classifications-Salem E.
E&PB Department Manual, Procedure GM8-EMP-009, Operation Design Change Control F.
DE-PS.ZZ-OOIO(Q). Internal Hazards Program 1.3 Drawings - None 1.4 Confonnance Documents:
A.
C0361. INPO SOER 85-05, Internal Flooding Of Power Plant Buildings 1.5 Industty Concerns Salem 2 A.
NRC IE Bulletin 80-24, Prevention Of Dam age Due To Water Leakage Inside Containment B.
INPO SOER 80-2, Plugging Of Floor Drains In Emergency Equipment Rooms C.
NSAC-60, A Probabilistic Risk Assessment Of Oconee Unit 3, June 1984 D.
INFO SER 07-88, Flooding Of Service Water Bay At Salem Unit 1 E.
INFO SER 15-89, Internal Flooding Resulting From Freeze Seal Failure F.
INFO SER 32-85, Internal Flooding Of Plant Pump House Resulted In Loss Of Circulating And Station Service Water For Two Units Page 2 of6 Rev. 3
S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
G.
INPO SER 84-50, Intemal Flooding Of Power Plant Buildings H.
INPO SER 81-2, Flooding OfRHR, Service Water, And Diesel Cooling Water Pumps I.
INPO SER 86-04, Intemal Flooding Of An Emergency Core Cooling System Pump Room J.
NRC INFO 83-44S 1, Potential Damage To Redundant Safety Equipment As A Result Of Backflow Tlu'ough The Equipment And Floor Drain System K.
NRC INFO 87-49, Deficiencies In Outside Containment Flood Protection L.
INPO Guideline, Assessment of Internal Flood Vulnerability 2.0 DISCUSSION 2.1 This procedure provides the direction necessary for plant operation with in plant flooding other than flooding in the Containment. It is the intent of this discussion to provide the reasoning behind the logic and flowpath ofthe procedure. It is not intended to provide additional direction to the procedure.
Salem 2 Due to multiple and various industry events, procedures for in plant flooding are necessary to ensure proper corrective actions are performed and availability of Safe Shutdown Equipment is maintained. INPO SOER 85-05 requires that all Nuclear Facilities analyze for vulnerability of Safe Shutdown Systems to in plant flooding, and that procedures adequately address causes, sources of flooding, and equipment potentially affected. Salem Engineering Department performed Engineering Evaluation S-C-A900-MEE-01S8-0 specifically to answer these requirements. Data from this evaluation is used extensively throughout this procedure. Assumptions used in this evaluation are extremely conservative to ensure all unanalyzed scenarios are enveloped by this safety analyses. These assumptions include:
All piping breaks are double ended guillotine ruptures of the diameter specified in the appropriate attachment.
Calculated flood rate is the rate of water entry into the affected area from the rupture minus the installed sump pump capacity minus the expected leak rate from any penetrations in the room or area.
Any submersion of equipment renders that component inoperable.
Page 3 of6 Rev. 3
82.oP-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
Only those flooding events which would cause or require a plant shutdown while the unit is in modes 1 or 2 were considered.
- The following areas were investigated:
- 64' and 84' switchgear rooms
- Re]ayroom
- 84' and 122' Auxiliary building elevations
- Service Water intake structure
- Chiller room 100' elevation penetration area
- Electlical penetration area
- Control room area The following areas were excluded since they do not contain equipment necessary for plant shutdown FOLLOWING AFLOODING EVENT, or have no credible flow paths for flood propagation:
78' and 100' piping penetrations Turbine Building Service Water System Vital Control Center rooms RHR Pump rooms Diesel Generator rooms For more detailed infonnation on Salem design cliteria, and assumptions used in the flooding analyses, refer to S-C-A900-MEE-0158-0, Internal Flooding Of Power Plant Buildings.
2.2 Entry Conditions - Entry conditions are based on a report of flooding being received or various sump high level alarms annunciating in the Control Room.
The symptoms available to the Operator are as follows:
Report of flooding from personnel in field Salem 2 Page 4 of6 Rev. 3
Salem 2 Sump AlanTIs:
OHA-B29, 21-23 SW PMP SUMP AREA LVL HI OHA-B30, 24-26 SW PMP SUMP AREA LVL HI OHA-C26, 21 RHR SMP OVRFLO OHA-C34, 22 RHR SMP OVRFLO OHA-043, TURE AREA LVLHI PMP START OHA-C33, RWSTIPWST OVRFLO Related Alarms:
OHA-B13, 21 SW HDR PRESS LO OHA-BI4, 22 SW HDR PRESS LO OHA-BI5, TURB AREA SW HDR PRESS LO OHA-08, TAC EXP TK LVL HI OR LO OHA-C35, SFP LVL LO OHA-G32, TAC PMP DISCH PRESS HI OR LO
+
OHA-B48, SW VLV RM FLOODED 2CCI Alarm, CC Surge Tank Level Hi-Lo 2CC2 Alarm, PWST Level Lo
+
2CC2 Alarm, AFWST Level Lo, Lo-Lo S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002(Q)
Panel 104 Alanns, Waste Hold Up Tank No 21122 High/Lo Level Panel 104 Alann, Sump Tank Level High/Lo Various Alanns on Auxiliary Alarm Typewriter Page 5 of6 Rev. 3
S2.0P.AB.ZZ-0002(Q) 2.3 Immediate Actions ~ None 2.4 Subsequent Actions - Initially, Operators are sent to determine the exact source of flooding and to report on equipment endangered or affected. If it is determined that the flooding is severe enough to jeopardize continued safe operation of the unit, the Unit is placed in a Mode determined by the SM/CRS to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications.
lfthe Circulating Water System or the Service Water System is the source of flooding, the operator is directed to stabilize the Unit and go to S2.0P-AB.CW-OOOl(Q) for further actions. For flooding from other sources, the Operator is directed to refer to the Attachment for the specific areas affected to determine equipment potentially affected and possible sources of flood water. Dewatering assistance from Site Services and Maintenance Departments is started as soon as possible while Operators attempt to isolate the leak.
All available sump pumps are started and portable pumps are used as needed and provided by Site Services. If flooding is from the Service Water System, direction is given to initiate S2.0P-AB.SW~OOOl(Q). Attachments are referenced to evaluate room flooding and the appropriate sump pumps are started in attempt to keep up with the leak to minimize flooding in the area.
Equipment important to plant safety is checked for ability to safely shutdown the Unit.
Initiation ofthe appropriate Integrated Operating Procedure is next to place the Unit in a Mode safe for operation depending on the location and severity of the leak.
For flooding in Radiologically Controlled Areas, samples are taken to calculate releases to the environment. Other Departments are notified to provide assistance in their areas of expertise where appropriate. All areas adjacent to the affected areas are inspected to ensure water damage has not occUl1'ed due to seepage or overflow.
The following departments are consulted for evaluation of potentially damaged equipment and restored or repaired as applicable:
Site Services Maintenance Engineering Technical Specifications and the Event Classification Guide is then referred to for applicable LeOs and classification of the event for notifications.
Salem 2 Page 6 of6 Rev. 3