ML110060717
| ML110060717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/2008 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N10-0355 S2.OP-AB.FUEL-0001(Q), Rev 5 | |
| Download: ML110060717 (13) | |
Text
PSEG Internal Use Only PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C.
SALEM/OPERATIONS S2.0P-AB.FUEL-000l(Q) - REV. 5 FUEL HANDLING INCIDENT Biennial Review Performed: Yes No J Pagelofl Change Package(s) and Affected Document Number(s) incorporated into this revision: None The following OTSC(s) were incorporated into this revision: None REVISION
SUMMARY
The following changes were incorporated into this revision:
Revised Steps 3.6.D and CAS Step 2.0.D, and incorporated Completion and Review Step 4.1 to provide additional clarification regarding logging charcoal filter hours OP-SA-4 70-1001, Cyclic Data Monitoring Program. This change was incorporated to provide additional clarification regarding the logging of charcoal filter hours, is in response to Operator Feedback, and is considered to be editorial in nature.
[70075982-0020] [70083883-0040]
Revised procedure to reflect current procedure format requirements.
IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS None Effective Date: 10\\ 0\\ \\ 7..OOCC
\\
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q)
FUEL HANDLING INCIDENT 1.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS DATE: __ TIME:_
1.1 Any incident involving nuclear fuel with indication of damage to fuel assembly or a radiological release.
2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 2.1 None 3.0 SUBSEOUENT ACTIONS 3.1 INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.
3.2 NOTIFY personnel at the scene of the incident to:
A.
STOP all fuel transfers in progress.
B.
EVACUATE all non-essential personnel from the scene.
3.3 Has the incident occurred in the Fuel Handling Building?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 3.8 I
V NOTE Time Emergency actions are dependent upon the location of the fuel assembly. The quickest path should be taken to place the fuel assembly in a safe condition.
3.4 NOTIFY personnel in the Fuel Handling Building to place any fuel assembly being handled into the emergency rack X-3, or designated location, whichever takes less time.
3.5 PRESS FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION, EXH FLTR TRAINS, HEPA 22 PLUS CHAR pushbutton.
Salem 2 Page 1 of8 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q) 3.6 ENSURE the following:
A.
All available Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Fans are running.
B.
HEPA 22 PLUS CHAR and SEQUENCE COMPLETE lights illuminate.
C.
HEPA 21 ONLY and SEQUENCE COMPLETE lights extinguish.
D.
RECORD Fuel Handling Building Charcoal Filter inservice time lAW OP-SA-470-1001, Cyclic Data Monitoring Program.
E.
FHB Truck Bay Roll Up Door is CLOSED.
F.
FHB Watertight Door remains CLOSED (with the exception of normal passage).
3.7 GO TO Step 3.14 3.8 Has the incident occurred in Containment?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 3.10 V
3.9 RETURN to Step 3.1 for symptom rediagnosis or as directed by the CRS.
NOTE Time Time Emergency actions are dependent upon the location of the fuel assembly. The quickest path should be taken to place the fuel assembly in a safe condition.
3.10 NOTIFY personnel at the scene of the incident to perform one of the following:
Salem 2 A.
IF the mast tube is indexed over the upender, THEN INSERT the fuel assembly in the upender AND LOWER the upender to the horizontal position.
B.
IF the mast tube is NOT indexed over the upender, THEN PLACE the fuel assembly into the core in its designated location, OR the emergency location P-l 0 whichever takes less time.
C.
IF the P-IO is NOT available (Le. refueling is at the core peripheral area),
THEN PLACE the fuel assembly in the upender and lower the upender to the horizontal position.
Page 2 of8 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q) 3.11 Is the Containment Equipment Hatch open?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step 3.13 I
Time V
3.12 ISOLATE Containment as follows:
A.
INITIATE S2.0P-AB.CONT-0001(Q), Containment Closure.
B.
GO TO Step 3.14.
3.13 ISOLATE Containment as follows:
NOTE Either the Containment Purge system or the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System, with suction from the containment atmosphere, with the associated radiation monitoring will be available whenever movement of irradiated fuel is in progress in the Containment and the Containment Equipment Hatch is open. This is to ensure airflow is into the Containment and that radiation monitoring remains available.
A.
ENSURE one ofthe following:
- 1.
A Containment Purge is in progress lAW S2.0P-SO. WG-0006(Q),
Containment Purge to the Plant Vent.
- 2.
ABV is in service lAW S2.0P-SO.ABV-0001(Q), Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Operation, with at least one personnel airlock open between Containment and the Auxiliary Building.
NOTE Either the Containment Purge shall remain inservice OR at least one personnel airlock shall remain open, with ABV inservice, to ensure airflow into the Containment and radiation monitoring remains available while the equipment hatch is open.
Containment Closure shall be accomplished within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> lAW S2.0P-AB.CONT-0001 (Q).
B.
INITIATE S2.0P-AB.CONT-0001(Q), Containment Closure.
Salem 2 Page 3 of8 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q) 3.14 NOTIFY Radiation Protection of the following:
Location of incident Details of incident Affected personnel, if any SURVEY the area to determine radiological conditions SAMPLE the area for airborne activity and contamination 3.15 IF fuel transfer cart is in the Fuel Handling Building or Fuel Transfer Canal, THEN RETURN the fuel transfer cart to the Containment.
3.16 IF the fuel transfer canal gate valve is open, THEN CLOSE the valve to isolate Spent Fuel Pool from Containment.
3.17 NOTIFY all personnel at the scene of the incident to perform the following:
EVACUATE the affected area.
CLOSE all doors upon exiting.
REPORT to the Control Point.
3.18 NOTIFY Reactor Engineering of the incident and request assistance.
3.19 NOTIFY the SM/CRS to refer to the Event Classification Guide and Technical Specifications.
3.20 When the cause of the incident is corrected and Radiation Protection concurs:
Salem 2 RETURN Fuel Handling Building ventilation to normal IA W S2.0P-SO.FHV-000l(Q), Fuel Handling Building Ventilation.
RETURN Containment Ventilation Systems to normal IA W S2.0P-SO.CBV -0001 (Q), Containment Ventilation Operation.
RESTORE access to Containment.
Page 4 of8 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q) 4.0 COMPLETION AND REVIEW 4.1 IF either of the following charcoal filters were placed inservice, THEN ENSURE Charcoal Filter Hours are logged lAW OP-SA-470-1001, Cyclic Data Monitoring Program:
Containment Iodine Removal Unit Charcoal Filter, or Fuel Handling Building Charcoal Filter.
4.2 CIRCLE Entry Condition number in Section 1.0, OR EXPLAIN Entry Condition in Comments Section of Attachment 2.
4.3 COMPLETE Attachment 2, Sections 1.0 and 2.0, AND FORWARD this procedure to SM/CRS for review and approval.
4.4 SM/CRS PERFORM the following:
Salem 2 A.
REVIEW this procedure with Attachments 1 and 2 for completeness and accuracy.
B.
COMPLETE Attachment 2, Section 3.0.
C.
FORWARD completed procedure to Operations Staff.
END OF PROCEDURE Page 5 of8 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-0001(Q)
ATTACHMENT 1 (Page 1 of 1)
CONTINUOUS ACTION
SUMMARY
1.0 IF AT ANY TIME radiation levels in the Fuel Handling Building or Containment reach or exceed 1 RIhr, THEN EVACUATE ALL personnel from the affected area.
2.0 IF AT ANY TIME Radiation Protection airborne sample results indicate Iodine activity in Containment, THEN OPERATE Iodine Removal Units as follows:
NOTE IRUs should be run only if iodine is present in Containment or when requested by Radiation Protection.
A.
PRESS Iodine Removal Unit 21 OR 22 START bezel.
B.
ENSURE SEQUENCE COMPLETE bezel illuminated for Unites) started.
C.
ENSURE AIR FLOW LO bezel alarms NOT illuminated.
D.
RECORD Containment Iodine Removal Unit Charcoal Filter in service time IA W OP-SA-470-1001, Cyclic Data Monitoring Program Salem 2 Page 6 of8 Rev. 5
1.0 COMMENTS
ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 1 of2)
COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q)
(Include procedure deficiencies and corrective actions. Attach additional pages as necessary.)
Salem 2 Page 7 of8 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q)
COMMENTS: (continued)
2.0 SIGNATURES
Print ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 2 of2)
COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET Initials Signature 3.0 SM/CRS FINAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL:
Date This procedure with Attachments 1 and 2 is reviewed for completeness and accuracy.
Entry conditions and all deficiencies, including corrective actions, are clearly recorded in the COMMENTS Section of this attachment.
Date:
Signature: __________________ _
SM/CRS Salem 2 Page 8 of8 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q)
1.0 REFERENCES
FUEL HANDLING INCIDENT TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT 1.1 Technical Documents A.
Salem Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report:
- 1.
Section 9.1, Fuel Storage and Handling
- 2.
Section 11, Radioactive Waste Management
- 3.
Section 15.4, Condition IV Faults, Fuel Handling Accident B.
Salem Generating Station Technical Specifications Unit 2:
- 1.
Table 3.3-6, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
- 2.
Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valves
- 3.
3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves
- 4.
3.7.7, Auxiliary Building Exhaust Air Filtration System
- 5.
3.9.9, Containment Purge and Pressure-Vacuum Relieflsolation System
- 6.
3.9.12, Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System C.
Configuration Baseline Documentation:
- 1.
DE-CB.FHV-0021(Q), Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System, Section 7, Accident Analysis D.
Technical/Engineering Letters:
- 1.
S-I-N300-MSE-0012, Accident Analysis, Fuel Handling Accident No.1 Unit, Salem Nuclear Generating Station*
1.2 Procedures A.
S2.0P-SO.CBV-000l(Q), Containment Ventilation Operation B.
S2.0P-SO.ABV-000l(Q), Auxiliary Building Ventilation Operation C.
S2.0P-SO.FHV-000l(Q), Fuel Handling Building Ventilation D.
S2.0P-ST.CAN-0006(Q), Refueling Operations - Containment Isolation E.
S2.0P-ST.FHV-000I(Q), Refueling Operations - Fuel Handling Building Ventilation F.
S2.0P-AB.RAD-000I(Q), Abnormal Radiation G.
S2.0P-AB.CONT-000I(Q), Containment Closure H.
OP-SA-470-1001, Cyclic Data Monitoring Program I.
SC.RE-FR.ZZ-OOIO(Q), Unanticipated Water Level Decrease Procedure Salem 2 Page 1 of4 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q) 1.3 Drawin::s A.
203566, No.1 & 2 Units Fuel Handling Area Vent. No. 11, 12,21 & 22 Exhaust Filter Units B.
205338, Unit No.2 Containment Ventilation C.
205322, Unit No.2 Diesel Area and Fuel Handling Building D.
239989, No.1 & 2 Units Fuel Handling Area Vent. No.1 & 2 Supply Units & No. 11, 21, 12 & 22 Exhaust Filter Units 1.4 Conformance Documents - None 1.5 Industry Concerns A.
INPO SER 82-43, Fractured Fuel Assembly Guide Tubes B.
INPO SER 86-21, Dropped Fuel Assembly at a PWR C.
NRC INFO 83-29, Fuel Binding Caused By Fuel Rack Deformation D.
NRC INFO 85-12, Recent Fuel Handling Events E.
NRC INFO 86-58, Dropped Fuel Assembly at Haddam Neck Plant 1.6 Other Salem 2 A.
DCP 2EC-3559, Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust Fan Interlock with Radiation Monitors B.
DCP 80004831, Deletion ofRMS Channels 2R24A & B, 2R25, 2R28, 2R29, 2R30, and2R33 C.
Tech Spec Amendment 245, Refueling Operations - Relaxation of Requirements Applicable During Movement of Irradiated Fuel Page 2 of4 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q) 2.0 DISCUSSION This procedure provides the instructions to follow during a Fuel Handling Incident. It is the intent of this discussion to provide the reasoning behind the logic and flowpath of the procedure.
It is not intended to provide additional direction to the procedure.
2.1 Entry Conditions - Entry conditions are based upon Refueling personnel recognizing a Fuel Handling Incident and reporting same to the Control Room. The symptoms available to personnel involved are as follows:
Actual observation of a Fuel Handling Incident Gas bubbles or discoloration of water in the vicinity of a fuel assembly Increasing activity or alarm on Radiation Monitors:
2RIIA, Containment Sampling Particulate 2R12A, Containment Sampling Noble Gas 2R12B, Containment Sampling Iodine 2R2, Containment - 130' elevation 2R5, Fuel Handling Building 2R9, Fuel Storage Area 2R32A, Fuel Handling Crane 2R44B, Stairway to Reactor Sump - 96' elevation 2.2 Immediate Actions - None Salem 2 Page 3 of 4 Rev. 5
S2.0P-AB.FUEL-OOOl(Q) 2.3 Subsequent Actions - When it is determined that a Fuel Handling Incident has occurred, all fuel transfers in progress are stopped. It is then determined where the incident has occurred and fuel in transit is placed in the nearest available safe location.
Salem 2 In the event the incident occurs in the Fuel Handling Building, any assembly in transit is placed in the emergency rack X-3, or designated location, whichever takes less time.
Additionally the Fuel Handling Ventilation Charcoal Filter is ensured in service and the FHB Truck Bay Roll Up Door and FHB Watertight Door are ensured closed to provide additional defense-in-depth to prevent a release to the environment.
If the incident occurs in the Containment, the refueling team is given the option of placing any fuel assembly in transit: in the upender when the mast tube is indexed over it, in the core in its designated location, or P-l 0 the emergency location whichever takes less time.
When the assembly is placed in the Upender, the frame is lowered to the horizontal position.
Containment Closure is established, if applicable, and the affected area ventilation system is aligned to provide protection of personnel and the general public from possible airborne activity. Containment Closure is dependent upon the status of the Containment Equipment Hatch. If the hatch is open, isolation of Containment Purge or closing of personnel airlocks is delayed until the hatch is closed by Maintenance to ensure a flow path exists (either via the Containment Purge or Aux Building Ventilation) which draws air into the Containment rather then out the open equipment hatch. This ensures that air in the Containment is being monitored by rad monitors prior to its release out the Plant Vent. Radiation Protection is notified to determine the Radiological conditions resulting from the incident.
Steps 3.15 and 3.16 then direct isolation of the Spent Fuel Pool from the Containment by first clearing the Fuel Transfer Tube of the Fuel Transfer Cart, and then closing the Fuel Transfer Tube Gate Valve.
Once all required fuel local protective actions are completed, the affected area is evacuated in Step 3.17. Reactor Engineering is contacted for assistance in determining further actions to be taken for any actual fuel damage. The Event Classification Guide is referenced to ensure compliance with the Emergency Plan and to satisfy any reporting requirements.
Applicable Technical Specifications are referenced to ensure License compliance.
High Iodine activity levels in the Containment are reduced using the installed Iodine Removal Units. Once the cause ofthe incident is determined and required restoration actions performed, the procedure is exited and normal operations resumed.
END OF DOCUMENT Page 4 of 4 Rev. 5