ML103050194

Initial Exam 2010-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios

ML103050194
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	07/16/2010
From:	Division of Nuclear Materials Safety II
To:
References
50-338/10-301, 50-339/10-301
Download: ML103050194 (230)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Edwin Lea flnnr,+nrc, Richard Baldwin Mark Riches Initial Conditions: Reactor is at approximately 52% power MOL ramping up. Unit was returned to power yesterday following main turbine work, and cleared chemistry hold 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago. 1-FW-P-3A was tagged last shift for motor bearing replacement. Rod control is currently in manual while the instrument shop troubleshoots a problem with auto rod control.

Turnover: Continue to ramp unit to 100% using manual rod control until auto rod control is available. Support maintenance on 1-FW-P-3A.

Event Maif. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 Ramp unit up using normal ramping OP (S) 2 TU1 101 C (B) (5) EHC pump trips and standby pump doesnt auto-start RC1 901 IIC(R) (S) Pressurizer pressure transmitter failure causes PORV to open and it sticks RCO7OI TS (S) open. Operator must isolate using block valve.

4 C (B) (S) Running BC pump trips. Standby pump does not auto start.

RCO4 TS (5) RCS leak in containment 6 BC0302 C (ALL) Remaining BC pump will develop impeller damage requiring a reactor trip RCO1O1 M (ALL) RCS leak worsens to SBLOCA S11303 C (B) Phase A does not occur automatically S11304 C (R) (5) C RCP cannot be stopped with switch Scenario may be ended when the crew has transitioned to 1-E-1 or transitions to 1- E-1 from 1-FR-C.2 (Events 8-9 occur during event 7 and are numbered only for use on Forms 301-5 and 301-6)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 1 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 2 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Ramp unit up using normal ramping OP

2. Running EHC pump trips/standby doesnt auto-start Pressurizer pressure transmitter failure (causes PORV to open and stick)

4. Running BC pump trips/standby doesnt auto-start RCS leak in containment

6. Remaining BC pump develops impeller damage RCS leak worsens to SBLOCA Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 3 SBLOCA, Phase A does automatically occur, B RCP cannot be tripped with switch Total Malfunctions 8 Running EHC pump trips/standby doesnt auto-start, pressurizer pressure transmitter failure, running BC pump trips/standby doesnt auto-start, RCS leak in containment, BC pump develops impeller damage, SBLOCA, Phase A does automatically occur, A RCP cannot be tripped with switch Abnomial Events 5 Running EHC pump trips/standby doesnt auto-start, pressurizer pressure transmitter failure, running BC pump trips/standby doesnt auto-start, RCS leak in containment, BC pump develops impeller damage Major Transients 1 SBLOCA EOPs Entered 2 ES-O.1, E-1 EOP Contingencies (1) Possible entry into 1-FR-C.2 Critical Tasks 4 SCENARIO DURATION 120 Minutes 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 3 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 1 Reactor is at approximately 52% power MOL ramping up. Unit was returned to power yesterday following main turbine work, and cleared chemistry hold 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago. Rods are in manual due to a problem with auto rod control. 1 -FW-P-3A was tagged last shift for motor bearing replacement. Shift orders are to continue to ramp to 100% power and support the maintenance on 1 -FW-P-3A.

The crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1 -OP-2. 1, Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1 . Once reactor power has increased sufficiently, the first failure can occur.

The rurming EHC pump will trip and the standby pump will not auto-start. The crew will be expected to respond JAW the AR for low EHC system pressure and start the standby EHC pump. At this time the crew will be informed that the problem with auto rod control had been repaired and rods can be placed in auto at their discretion. Once the standby EHC pump is running, the next event can occur.

Pressurizer pressure transmitter, 1 -RC-PT- 1444, will fail high resulting in a pressurizer PORV, 1-RC-PCV-1455C, opening and sticking open. The crew will enter 1-AP-44 Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure, and the RO will attempt to manually close the PORV and then close the block valve. Once the crew has stabilized the plant the Unit Supervisor (US) will refer to technical specifications. Once Tech Specs have been reviewed, the next event can occur.

The running bearing cooling pump, 1-BC-P-lA, will trip. The crew should identify the loss of bearing cooling and respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water.

The BOP will determine that the standby bearing cooling pump did not automatically start, and start 1-BC-P-lB. Once the BC System has been restored, the next event can occur.

An RCS leak will occur and the crew should identify the leak by observing increasing containment sump and radiation levels. The leak will increase to approximately 30 gpm. The crew will be expected to respond JAW 1-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage. The US will consult TS 3.4.13. Due to the reduced power level, the crew may consider making a containment entry to look for the leak. The crew may also decide, due to the size of the leak, to ramp the unit off-line.

Next, the remaining BC pump will develop impeller damage and will degrade. The crew will re-renter 1-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water, and trip the unit due to no BC pumps delivering water. After immediate actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, are complete, the crew will perform actions in 1-AP-19 and secure equipment cooled by BC.

Eventually a transition will be made to 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, where the crew will throttle Auxiliary Feedwater. At this time the next event will occur.

The RCS leak will worsen to the point where SI is desired. The crew will re-enter 1 -E-0 and initiate safety injection. RCS subcooling will require the tripping of the RCPs. When the RO attempts to trip C RCP it will not trip and the crew will either have to open the feeder breaker for C SS bus, or dispatch an operator to locally trip the breaker for C RCP. Phase A isolation will not occur automatically and will have to be manually initiated. The crew will transition to 1 -E- 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. (1-FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, may be applicable.) Once safety injection has been reset in 1 -E- 1, (or the crew has transitioned from 1-FR-C.2 to 1-E-1), the scenario may be terminated.

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SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at approximately 52% power. Unit was returned to power yesterday following main turbine work, and cleared chemistry hold 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago. RCS boron is 1217 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

Rods are in manual due to a problem with auto rod control. 1 -FW-P-3A was tagged last shift for motor bearing replacement. Maintenance rule window is green.

Shift Orders:

Continue to ramp to 100% power and support the maintenance on l-FW-P-3A.

2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 5 Revision 0

EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at approximately 50% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1 -OP-2. 1, Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power increases

• Turbine power increases

. Tavg/Tref increase

• Generator megawatts increase NOTE: The crew may raise primary temperature prior to ramping the turbine.

BOP verifies/sets desired ramp rate (.3%

per minute).

BOP adjusts limiter position, as required.

BOP increases turbine setter to desired position.

BOP presses GO on turbine.

BOP monitors turbine ramp.

RO starts a dilution when required.

RO withdraws control rods to maintain Tave within 1.5°F of Tref with rods above insertion limits.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has ramped a sufficient amount, or as determined by the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 2: Given that an EHC pump has tripped and the backup EHC pump has not auto-started, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator T-B4.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciators K-F5 and T-B4 will illuminate

• 11 EHC pump trips A

t

. Bu EHC pump does not auto-start 1

BOP identifies K-F5, TURB SUPERV PANEL TROUBLE.

Crew identifies T-B4, ER FLUID RESERVOIR LOW- PRESSURE.

NOTE: Crew should stop the ramp.

BOP identifies no EHC pump running.

US directs BOP to start the standby EHC pump, 1 -TM-P-4.

BOP manually starts 1-TM-P-4.

NOTE: If the crew dispatches an operator to look at EHC pumps, the operator will report that 1-TM-P-3 is unusually hot, and 1-TM-P-4 appears normal.

US requests Work Control Center supervisor to make notifications of the failure and initiate WR and CR.

NOTE: At this time call and tell crew that the instrument techs have replaced a blown fuse in rod control. Rods may be placed back in AUTO at the crews discretion.

NOTE: The next event can occur after the backup EHC pump is running.

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EVENT 3: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and indications present of a failed Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators B-H2, B-F7, and C-D1 illuminate

• 1-RC-PI-1444 indicates high pressure

• Master pressure controller goes to max output

• l-RCPCV-l455C opens and will not close

• Both spray valves open

• RCS pressure decreases RO identifies annunciator C-D 1, PRESSURIZER SAFETY OR PORV OPEN.

RO identifies annunciator B-F7, PZR HI-LO PRESS.

NOTE: Identification of channel failure may not happen at this time.

RO identifies pressurizer pressure channel PT-1444 failed high.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-44.

RO checks PRZR PORVs closed. (NO)

CT1 Crew takes manual control of RCS pressure:

• RO attempts to close 1-RC-PCV-1455C

• RO closes 1-RC-MOV-1536

• RO checks master pressure controller controlling properly

• RO places master pressure controller in manual and reduces output (OR manually closes 1-RC-PCV-1455A and_1455B).

RO verifies spray valves are closed.

RO verifies all PRZR heaters are energized RO checks 1-CH-HCV-131 1 closed.

Crew checks PRZR safeties closed.

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EVENT 3: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and indications present of a failed Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO verifies all PORVS closed or isolated.

RO checks RCS pressure.

US refers to TS:

3.4.1A DNB -2 hours to restore, if pressure dropped < 2205 psig 3.4.11 C PORV 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to remove power from block valve 3.4.13A RCS leakage (during time PORV was open and unisolated) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to return to within limits.

US requests Work Control Center supervisor to make notifications of the failure, and to submit WRs and CRs.

NOTE: The next event may occur once Good time to allow a brief while the unit parameters have stabilized and T.S. plant stabilizes.

have been reviewed.

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EVENT 4: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the running bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water.

TIME I - EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciators F-F4 and F-E4 illuminate

. 1-BC-P-lA has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit)

. 1-BC-P-lB does not auto-start BOP identifies annunciator F-F4, BC WTR PP lA-lB AUTO TRIP SYS MISALIGNED.

BOP identifies 1-BC-P-lA has tripped.

BOP identifies that 1-BC-P-lB did not automatically start.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-19.

BOP checks status of BC pumps.

BOP starts 1-BC-P-lB.

BOP verifies at least one BC pump running normally.

Crew verifies that BC system is operating tower-to-tower.

Crew verifies that BC system is operating normally:

• System intact

. Tower level normal

• Tower fans running.

Crew monitors main generator temperatures:

. Annunciator T-C 1 not lit

. Annunciator K-B7 not lit

• Local temperatures at leads bus ducting

<_120°C.

Crew dispatches operator to check equipment supplied by BC:

MFP, Cond pumps, EHC, VP, HPs, LPs.

US reports loss of BC pump and failure of standby pump to auto-start and requests assistance, WR and CR.

NOTE: When sent to investigate, the operator will report that the B pump is running fine and there is an overcurrent trip on the breaker for 1-BC-P-lA.

2O1ONRCRUN1 Page 10 RevisionO

EVENT 4: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the running bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has restored BC or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of an RCS leak greater than technical specification limits, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage.

TIME I - EXPECTED ACTION I iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Charging flow increases

. Containment sump level increases

. Containment radiation increases

. Annunciator K-D2 illuminates Crew identifies any of the following:

charging flow increasing, VCT level decreasing, containment sump and radiation levels increasing.

US directs entry into l-AP-16.

Crew verifies unit in mode 1.

RO verifies primary parameters under operator control. (YES)

RO checks LCV- 111 5A not diverted.

RO verifies letdown in service with normal indications for flow, temperatures, pressures, and radiation.

RO checks excess letdown temperature and pressure.

RO checks charging system pressures, flows, temperatures, and AB sump level.

Crew checks Auxiliary Building sump level normal.

Crew checks containment sump pumping rate, containment temperature, pressure and radiation levels.

NOTE: US will direct 1-AP-5 entry for containment radiation indications. Steps are on following page.

Crew determines that containment sump pumping rate has increased and radiation levels are high.

Crew checks Safeguards area sump levels, radiation levels, temperature.

Crew checks sample system.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of an RCS leak greater than technical specification limits, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 16, l?Jfl5jflg Primary Plant Leakage.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks no CVCS manipulation in progress.

RO checks RCP thermal barrier flows.

Crew checks for activities that could affect leakage.

Crew checks other parameters are normal:

CC head tank, RHR, PRT, PORVs and safeties, containment pressure and temperature, CC HX rad monitor.

Crew checks SG radiation monitors.

BOP proceeds to attachment 5 of 1-AP-5: AP-5 steps

. Contacts HP for appropriate sampling

. Informs US to refer to EALs

• When hi-hi alarm comes in:

• Starts an RCS leakrate, when possible

• Asks for containment sump sample

.__Verifies_AP-16_initiated.

Crew performs flow balance and determines approximate leakrate.

US refers to Tech. Spec. 3.4.l3A and determines that leakage must be reduced to within limits in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

US directs crew to commence unit NOTE: If consulted, the OMOC will shutdown or commences preparations for a concur with the decision made by the containment entry. crew to either ramp off-line, or make a containment entry to look for the leak.

NOTE: The next event may occur once EAL SU6.1 the crew has either started preparations for a ramp or for a containment entry.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a total loss of bearing cooling occurs, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water, 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciator F-E4 illuminates 1-BC-P-lB amps decrease (later amps will increase)

. Later, annunciators K-F5 and T-C 1 illuminate if unit not tripped BOP identifies annunciators F-E4, BC WTR DISCHG HDR LO PRESS.

BOP identifies decreasing amps on 1-BC-P-lB.

US directs entry into l-AP-19.

BOP checks one BC pump operating with normal amps. (NO)

BOP verifies at least one BC pump supplying system. (NO)

NOTE: If sent, operator will report that 1-BC-P-lB is making a loud noise and he recommends securing it.

Crew determines BC cannot be restored.

US directs crew to enter 1 -E-0, while continuing with 1-AP-19.

Crew manually trips the reactor.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.

Crew checks if safety injection has actuated or is required. (NO)

US directs crew to transition to 1 -ES-0. 1.

NOTE: The following steps are from 1-ES-O.l. Crew may perform steps from 1-AP-19 at this time (see below.)

Procedures may be performed concurrently.

US holds transient brief.

Crew checks RCS temperature. ES-O.1 steps 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 14 Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a total loss of bearing cooling occurs, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water,? 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and l-ES-0.l, Reactor Trip Response.

TIIvIE EXPECTED ACTION iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew throttles aux feedwater flow.

RO verifies charging in service.

NOTE: The following actions are from 1-AP-19.

Crew starts all available auxiliary feedwater AP-19 steps pumps.

Crew feeds steam generator to maintain levels.

Crew secures components cooled by bearing cooling:

• Main Feed pumps

• Main Condensate pumps

• Station Vacuum Priming pumps

. EHC pumps

• HP heater drain pumps NOTE: Crew may start lining up to feed C SG. If so, two RCPs will be secured at this time.

NOTE: The next event can occur once AFW has been throttled and components cooled by BC secured.

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EVENT 7: Given that the unit has been tripped and a SBLOCA has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and l-E-l, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. RCS pressure and level decrease

. Containment sump level increases more rapidly

. Annunciator J-A6 illuminates, if not previously lit

. Phase A does not actuate automatically

. C RCP will not stop from control room Crew identifies that the RCS leak has worsened.

NOTE: Crew may first maximize charging and isolate letdown. This will not stop the pressurizer level decrease.

US directs crew to initiate safety injection ES-O.1 CAP attached and return to E-O.

RO and BOP manually initiate safety injection.

Crew verifies reactor trip.

Crew verifies turbine trip.

Crew verifies emergency busses energized.

Crew checks if SI has occurred or is necessary. (YES)

Crew manually initiates safety injection.

RO reports that CAP items 1, 3(4) apply. E-O CAP attached US directs RO to perform CAP item(s) 3(4).

NOTE: 1-RC-P-1C cannot be stopped using the benchboard switch.

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EVENT 7: Given that the unit has been tripped and a SBLOCA has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and l-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT2 Crew stops all RCPs: When directed by procedure

. RO stops A and B RCPs

. BOP opens breaker for C SS bus OR dispatches operator to open breaker for C RCP.

CT3 Crew takes action to prevent HHSI When all criteria are met or completion pump runout by performing the of transfer to recirculation mode, following: whichever comes first.

. Verifies RCS pressure < 1275 [1475]

psig çj RCPs tripped

. RO closes all charging pump recirc valves.

US holds transient brief.

NOTE: Since FRs are applicable, 1-FR-C.2 may be entered at any time. See steps on next page.

US initiates attachment 4(5).

CT4 Crew actuates Phase A isolation Per attachment 4 (attached)

Crew manually initiates both trains of Phase A.

RO verifies SI flow.

Crew verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS Tave stable at or trending to 547°F.

NOTE: When CDA actuates the crew E-O CAP attached will do CAP item 6 or perform steps per attachment 4 to backup CDA and verify CC stopped and QS pumps running.

Crew adjusts AFW flow, as required.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

RO verifies RCPs are stopped.

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EVENT 7: Given that the unit has been tripped and a SBLOCA has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1 -E- 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO verifies charging pump recirc valves closed.

BOP checks SGs not faulted. (YES)

BOP checks SGs not ruptured. (YES)

Crew checks if RCS is intact inside containment. (NO)

Crew verifies proper valve alignment: C.2 steps

. RWST suctions open

. VCT suctions closed

. Normal charging isolations closed

. BIT recircs closed

. BIT inlets and outlets open

. LHSI suctions from RWST open

. LHSI discharges to HHSI closed

. LHSI pump discharges open.

Crew verifies SI flow indicated:

. HHSIflow

. LHSI flow, if applicable.

Crew checks RCS vent paths:

. Power to PORV block valves available

. PORVs closed

. At least one PORV block valve open

. Reactor vent valves closed

. Pressurizer vent valves closed.

Crew checks at least one RCP running.

(NO)

NOTE: RVLIS should now indicate

>48%.

Crew checks core cooling:

RVLIS full range >48%

CETCs less than 700°F.

Crew returns to procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated once C.2 is complete.

US directs crew to transition to 1-E-1. E-1 steps US holds transient brief.

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EVENT 7: Given that the unit has been tripped and a SBLOCA has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-E-l, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION 1ISESTRUCTOR REMARKS RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

BOP checks SGs not faulted. (YES)

BOP checks intact SG levels.

BOP checks secondary radiation:

. RO resets SI, Phase A, and AMSAC NOTE: The scenario may be terminated EAL FA1 .1 until orange path on core after the crew exits C.2 or when crew cooling, at that time FS 1 .1.

resets SI in E-1.

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REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Operating Procedure 1 -OP-2. 1, Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1 . 94 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure. 19 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage. 26 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water. 16 Emergency Procedure 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. 42 Emergency Procedure 1-E-l, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. 24 Emergency Procedure 1-ES-O.l, Reactor Trip Response. 28 Functional Restoration Procedure 1 -FR-C .2, Response to Degraded Core 11 Cooling.

Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, Human Performance. 3 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988 LNPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 20 Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS AHACHMENT 1- SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM AHACHMENT 2- SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3- SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 21 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 22 Revision 0

SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN1 Initial conditions

1. RecallIC 187

2. Ensure Tave (555-565), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Rack out 1-FW-P-3A breaker and close manual discharge valve.

4. Place red sticker on 1-FW-P-3A.

5. Set D bank rods at 154.

6. Reactivity plan available.

7. Designate 1 J as the protected train. Dont forget to lower the sign on the Safeguards panel.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC Auto start failure of EHC Switch override:

pump TMP4ASTPOff PRZR PORV 145 SC sticks Malfunction:

when opened RC19O1 Failure of standby BC pump Remote function:

to auto-start BCP AUTO DEFEAT = T 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 23 Revision 0

CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

Failure of Auto Phase A Malfunctions:

S11303, S11304 Set up triggers to delete these malfunctions if either Phase A switch is turned:

Trigger 10 PHASEAISO11NIT .EQ. 1 DMF S11303 Trigger 11 PHASEAISO21NIT .EQ. 1 DMF S11304 Trigger 12 PHASEAISO1INIT .EQ. 1 DMF SI1304 Trigger 13 PHASEAISO2INIT .EQ. 1 DMF S11303 Failure of C RCP breaker Switch overrides:

to open RCP1C_START, Override = ON RCP 1C STOP, Override = OFF RCP iC_LOCK, Override = OFF SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Unit Ramp NOTE: The next event will occur once the crew has ramped a sufficient amount.

2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 24 Revision 0

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

2) EHC pump trip Malfunction:

TU1 101, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 2 NOTE: If the crew dispatches an operator to look at EHC pumps, the operator will report that 1-TM-P-3 is unusually hot, and 1-TM-P-4 appears normal.

NOTE: At this time call and tell crew that the instrument techs have replaced a blown fuse in rod control. Rods may be placed back in AUTO at the crews discretion.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the backup EHC pump is running, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

3) PT 1444 fails high Malfunction:

RCO7O1, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 1, Stop = 1, Trigger = 3 NOTE: When directed to de-energize 1-RC-MOV-1536, use trigger 15. (Breaker # is 1H1-2S F3)

MOV Control:

RCMOV536RACKTN = RACKOUT, Trigger =15 NOTE: The next event may occur once T.S. have been reviewed, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

4) Loss ofA BC pump Remote functions:

BCP lA_PROTECT = T, Delay time 5, Trigger =4 NOTE: When sent to investigate, the operator will report that there is an overcurrent drop on the breaker for A BC pump.

B pump is running fine.

NOTE: When sent to check local temperatures, can report they are about 80°C. (This will take 10-15 minutes to do. Must get ladder and strobe light.)

NOTE: The next event will occur once BC is restored, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

5) RCS leak Malfunction:

RCO4, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 300, Severity = 5, Trigger = 5 Leak is approximately 30 gpm.

NOTE: If consulted, the OMOC will concur with the decision made by the crew to either ramp off-line, or make a containment entry to look for the leak.

NOTE: The next event may occur once the crew has either started preparations for a ramp or for a containment.

6) Loss of BC Malfunction:

BC0302, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 60, Severity = 100, Trigger = 6 NOTE: If sent, operator will report that 1-BC-P-lB is making a loud noise and he recommends securing it.

NOTE: If crew takes 1-BC-P-lA out of PTL, then change BCP1A_PROTECT back to TRUE.

NOTE: The next event can occur once AFW has been throttled and components cooled by BC secured.

7) SBLOCA Malfunction:

RCO1O1, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 180, Severity = 0.8, Trigger = 7 On trigger screen for trigger 7:

DMF RCO4 NOTE: When sent to locally trip B RCP:

Update RCP lB_LOCK to ON NOTE: The scellario may be terminated after the crew exits 1-FR-C.2 or after resetting SI in 1-E-l.

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ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 27 Revision 0

SIMULATOR REQUAJJFICATION EXAMINATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat siik availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at approximately 50% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1-OP-2.l, Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R705 Dilute the RCS using the blender.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 29 Revision 0

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that an EHC pump has tripped and the backup EHC pump has not auto-started, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator T-B4.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

None CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 30 Revision 0

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and indications present of a failed Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R634 Respond to a loss of Reactor Coolant System pressure CRITICAL TASK:

See Next page 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 31 Revision 0

T Statement:

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.

Safety Significance:

Failure to close the PORV or block MOV under the postulated plant conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release) In this case, the RCS fission-product barrier can be restored to full integrity simply by closing the PORV or block MOV. Therefore, failure to close the PORV or MOV also represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

Cues:

Valid indication of pressure decreasing by the presence of various annunciators, indication of PORV open, and RCS pressure indication decreasing.

Performance Indicator:

RO manually closes l-RC-PCV-1456 or l-RC-MOV-1535 Feedback:

RCS pressure decrease stopped.

WOG

Reference:

E-O -- M Background Conditions:

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.

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EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the running bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R522 Stabilize the unit following a loss of bearing cooling water CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 33 Revision 0

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of an RCS leak greater than technical specification limits, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R520 Respond to increasing primary-plant leakage S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 34 Revision 0

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a total loss of bearing cooling occurs, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with i-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water, 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ES-O. 1, Reactor Trip Response.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

Ri 85 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2OiONRCRLTN i Page 35 Revision 0

EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit has been tripped and a SBLOCA has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and i-E-l, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

Ri 85 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection R727 Perform the phase A isolation verification following a safety injection actuation CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages 2010 NRC RUN 1 Page 36 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew stops Reactor Coolant Pumps.

Safety Significance:

Tripping RCPS at this time prevents excessive depletion of RCS water inventory through a small break in the RCS which might lead to severe core uncovery if the RCPs were tripped for some reason later in the accident. The RCPs should be tripped before RCS inventory is depleted to the point where tripping the pumps would cause the break to immediately uncover.

Cues:

Indication of:

• Subcooling less than 25°F [85°F].

• At least one charging pump running and flowing to the RCS.

Performance Indicator:

RO/BOP places control switch(es) for A and C RCPs in STOP.

AND RO/BOP stop B RCP by either:

Opening feeder breaker for B SS bus OR Dispatching operator to open breaker locally Feedback:

Indication/annunciation of no RCPs running.

WOG

Reference:

RCP Trip/Restart Background Document.

Conditions:

Prior to completing the step directing its performance.

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CT Statement:

Crew takes action to prevent HHSI pump runout.

Safety Significance:

Failure to prevent HHSI pump runout constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity.

Cues:

that SI is actuated and is required and

• Indication of RCS pressure less than 1275 psig [1475 psig] and

• RCps tripped Performance Indicator:

RO closes charging pump recirc valves:

• l-CH-MOV-1 275A

• l-CH-MOV-1 275B

• 1-CH-MOV-1275C.

Feedback:

Charging pump recirc valves indicate closed.

WOG

Reference:

None.

Conditions:

When all criteria are met OR completion of transfer to recirculation mode, whichever comes first.

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CT Statement:

Crew actuates Phase A isolation.

Safety Significance:

Failure to close at least one containment isolation valve on each phase A penetration constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release. In this case, the containment barrier is needlessly left in a degraded condition.

Cues:

Indication that SI is required, but not actuated; absence of annunciation that PhaseA isolation is actuated; indication that phase A containment isolation valves are open.

Performance Indicator:

Crew manually actuates Phase A containment isolation.

Feedback:

Containment isolation valves close.

Containment phase A isolation alarm.

WOG

Reference:

E-O -- 0 Background Conditions:

Prior to completion of step requiring its performance.

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ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at approximately 50% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with I -OP-2. 1, Unit Startup from Mode2to Mode 1.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power increases

• Turbine power increases

• Tavg!Tref increase

• Generator megawatts increase EVENT 2: Given that an EHC pump has tripped and the backup EHC pump has not auto-started, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator T-B4.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators K-F5 and T-B4 will illuminate

• A EHC pump trips

• B EHC pump does not auto-start EVENT 3: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and indications present of a failed Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators B-H2, B-F7, and C-D 1 illuminate

• 1-RC-PI-1444 indicates high pressure

• Master pressure controller goes to max output

• l-RC-PCV-1455C opens and will not close

• Both spray valves open

• RCS pressure decreases EVENT 4: Given the plant is in Mode 1 and the running bearing cooling water pump has tripped the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators F-F4 and F-E4 illuminate

• 1-BC-P-lA has a breaker misalignment (amber and green lights lit)

• 1-BC-P-lB does not auto-start 2010 NRC RUN 1 Date Revision 0

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of an RCS leak greater than technical specification limits, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Charging flow increases

• Containment sump level increases

• Containment radiation increases

• Annunciator K-D2 illuminates EVENT 6 Given that the unit is at power and a total loss of bearing cooling occurs, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-19, Loss of Bearing Cooling Water, 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciator F-E4 illuminates

• 1-BC-P-lB amps decrease (later amps will increase)

• Later, annunciators K-F5 and T-C1 illuminate if unit not tripped EVENT 7: Given that the unit has been tripped and a SBLOCA has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-0, Reactor Tnp or Safety Injection, and 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• RCS pressure and level decrease

• Containment sump level increases more rapidly

• Annunciator J-A6 illuminates, if not previously lit

• Phase A does not actuate automatically

• C RCP will not stop from control room 2010 NRC RUN 1 Date Revision 0

CONTINUOUS ACTION PAGE FOR 1-E-0

1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CRITERIA IF either of the following conditions exist, THEN use setpoints in brackets:

C

• 20 psia Containment pressure, OR C

• Containment radiation has reached or exceeded 1 .0E5 R/hr (70% on High Range Recorder).

2. SI FLOW CRITERIA C

• IF SI is actuated AND High-Head Cold Leg SI flow is NOT indicated, THEN perform ATTACHMENT 6, MANUAL VERIFICATION OF SI FLOWPATH.

C

• IF SI is actuated AND no Low-Head SI Pump is running, THEN manually start available pumps.

3. RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF both conditions listed below exist, THEN trip all RCPs:

C

• Charging Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND FLOWING TO RCS, AND C

• RCS subcooling based on Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN 25°F [85°F].

4. CHARGING PUMP RECIRC PATH CRITERIA C

• IF RCS pressure decreases to less than 1275 psig [1475 psig] AND RCPs tripped, THEN close Charging Pump Recirc Valves.

C

• IF RCS pressure increases to 2000 psig, THEN open Charging Pump Recirc Valves.

5. ECST LEVEL CRITERIA C WHEN the ECST level decreases to 40%, THEN initiate 1 -AP-22.5, LOSS OF EMERGENCY CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK 1 -CN-TK-1.

6. CDA ACTUATION CRITERIA IF Containment pressure exceeds 28 psia OR 20 psia with Containment Radiation greater than 2 R/hr, THEN do the following:

C a. Manually actuate CDA.

C b. Ensure CC Pumps STOPPED.

C c. Stop all RCPs.

C d. Ensure QS Pumps RUNNING.

C e. Ensure QS Pump Discharge MOVs OPEN.

f. Initiate the following Attachments, when directed by ATTACHMENT 4, EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION:

C

• ATTACHMENT 2, VERIFICATION OF PHASE B ISOLATION C

• ATTACHMENT 3, PRIMARY PLANT VENTILATION ALIGNMENT

7. FAULTED SG ISOLATION C IF SI is in progress, THEN ATTACHMENT 7, FAULTED SG ISOLATION may be used for guidance on faulted SG(s) isolation and AFW flow control.

8. RUPTURED SG ISOLATION C H SI is in progress, THEN ATTACHMENT 8, RUPTURED SG ISOLATION may be used for guidance on ruptured SG(s) isolation and AFW flow control.

9. CONTAINMENT RECIRC MODE CRITERIA C To prevent possible radioactive release from the RWST, VCT level should be maintained greater than 12%.

10. RCP CRITERIA C Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

11. REACTIVITY CONTROL CRITERIA C An Operator should be sent to locally close and lock 1 -CH-21 7, PG to Blender Isolation Valve.

CONTINUOUS ACTION PAGE FOR 1-ES-0.1

1. SI ACTUATION CRITERIA IF either condition listed below occurs, THEN manually initiate SI AND GO TO 1 -E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, STEP 1:

D

• RCS subcooling based on Core Exit TCs LESS THAN 25° F, OR D

• SI Actuation occurs OR is required.

2. ECST LEVEL CRITERIA D WHEN the ECST level decreases to 40%, THEN initiate 1-AP-22.5, LOSS OF EMERGENCY CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK 1 -CN-TK-1.

3. RCP CRITERIA D

• RCPs should be run in the following order of priority to provide PRZR spray: C, A D

• WHEN an RCP is stopped, THEN isolate PRZR spray from the stopped RCP.

4. REACTIVITY CONTROL CRITERIA D An Operator should be sent to locally close and lock 1 -CH-21 7, PG to Blender Isolation Valve.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Edwin Lea Operators:________________________________

Richard Baldwin Mark Riches Initial Conditions: Unit at 100% power MOL. 1-FW-P-3A was tagged last shift for motor bearing replacement.

Turnover: Maintain 100% power and support maintenance on 1-FW-P-3A.

Event MaIf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description HLD for B HPHDT fails partially open and pump trips. Standby 1 C B 1

Condensate pump will not auto-start.

2 N 10204 N-44 fails high N (R) (S) N-44 is placed in trip 2a 3 FW1203 Feed flow channel fails low on B SG R (R) (5) Crew receives call from system operator directing them to ramp the unit to N (B) 80% power within the next 30 minutes. Crew ramps unit down 4a RD14 C (R) (5) Rods fail to move in automatic during ramp FW1602 M (ALL) Feed line break occurs on B SG 6 S108 I (All) Auto SI will not actuate when required 7 C (R) (S) BOP SI switch does not actuate SI 8 C (B) (5) Terry Turbine does not start automatically Scenario may be stopped once SI has been terminated in 1-ES-il.

(Events 6-8 occur during event 5 and are numbered only for use on Forms 301-5 and 301-6)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2010 NRC RU1 2 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 2 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. HLD divert fails open on B HP heater drain pump/Condensate pump wont auto-start

2. N-44 fails high 2a. N-44 is placed in trip Selected feed flow channel fails low on B SG Crew ramps down per system operator 4a. Control rods fail to move in automatic during ramp Feed line breaks on B SG Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 3 Safety injection fails to actuate automatically, BOP SI switch fails to actuate SI, terry turbine fails to start automatically Total Malfunctions 7 HLD divert fails open on B HP heater drain pump/Condensate pump will not auto-start, N-44 fails high, selected feed flow channel fails low on B SG, control rods fail to move in automatic during ramp, safety injection fails to actuate automatically, BOP SI switch fails top actuate SI, terry turbine fails to start automatically Abnormal Events 3 HLD divert fails open on B HP heater drain pump/Condensate pump will not auto-start, N-44 fails high, selected feed flow channel fails low on B SG Major Transients 1 Feed line breaks on B SG EOPs Entered 2 l-E-2, l-ES-l.l EOP Contingencies 0 Critical Tasks 3 SCENARIO DURATION 90 Minutes 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 3 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 2 The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power. All equipment is available except for AFW pump, 1-FW-P-3A, which was tagged out last shift for motor bearing replacement. Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on A AFW pump.

After the crew takes the shift, the high-level divert on 1-SD-TK-1B will fail open and B HP heater drain pump will trip. The standby Condensate pump will not start automatically when required. The crew will enter 1-AP-31, Loss of Main Feedwater, and start the standby (B)

Condensate pump manually. The crew may also enter 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase, and ramp the turbine back due to power being slightly high because of the colder feedwater. An operator will be dispatched to investigate and will report back that 1-SD-LCV-107B is failed open due to the setpoint dial being loose. When directed the operator will either fix the setpoint dial or isolate the HLD. Once the unit is stabilized, the next event can occur.

Power Range Instrument, N-44, will fail high. Control rods will step in. The RO will recognize the failure and place rods in manual per the immediate actions of 1-AP-4.3, Malflmction of Nuclear Instrumentation (Power Range). The crew will place the instrument in trip (Normal event) and the US will review applicable TS. Once the crew has discussed returning temperature to normal, the next event can occur.

The selected feed flow channel (III) will fail low on B SG. The crew will enter 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation, and place the MFRV in manual to control SG level. The AP will swap the selected channels and allow the MFRV to be returned to auto. Once the MOP has been identified and TS reviewed, the next event may occur.

A call will come in from the MOC requesting that Unit 1 at North Anna be ramped to 80%

power over the next 30 minutes. The crew will ramp using 1-OP-2.2, Unit Operation from Mode 1 to Mode 2. Rods will fail to move in automatic and will have to be inserted in manual. Once an acceptable power decrease has occurred, the next event may be implemented.

A feed line break will occur on B SG inside containment. The crew will diagnose and enter 1 -E-0,Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Safety Injection will not actuate automatically. The SI switch on the BOP side will not cause SI to actuate (only the RO switch will work). The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, 1 -FW-P-2, will not start automatically. The crew will continue through 1-E-0 and transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Once the generator is isolated the crew will transition to 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination, and terminate safety injection. At this time the scenario can be stopped.

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SCENARIO TURNOVER ShEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1017 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

1 -FW-P-3A was tagged outlast shift for motor bearing replacement. Maintenance rule window is green.

Shift Orders:

Maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-FW-P-3A.

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EVENT 1: Given that a High Pressure Heater Drain Tank high-level divert has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3 1, Loss of Main Feedwater, and 1-AP-3 8, Excessive Load Increase.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciator Q-E4 illuminates 1-SD-P-lB trips as indicated by amber light lit

. Reactor power increases slightly

• Main feed pump suction pressure decreases

. Standby condensate pump does not auto-start Crew identifies annunciator Q-E4, 2 PT HTR DR RECVR TK B HI-LO LEVEL.

BOP identifies level decreasing in B HP heater drain tank.

BOP identifies trip of 1-SD-P-lB.

US directs entry into l-AP-31.

BOP verifies power> 70%.

BOP verifies 2 main feed pump running.

BOP checks main feed pump suction pressure> 300 psig and stable. (NO)

BOP starts B condensate pump.

NOTE: Crew may not ramp unit down since indicated power increase is small.

In this case AP-38 will not be entered.

Crew identifies increase in reactor power.

US directs entry into AP-38.

RO verifies steam dumps closed.

BOP verifies SG PORVs indicate closed.

Crew ramps turbine down until power indicates 100%.

NOTE: PCS will indicate opening of 2B high-level divert.

Watchstander is dispatched to investigate cause for trip of B HP.

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EVENT 1: Given that a High Pressure Heater Drain Tank high-level divert has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, Loss of Main Feedwater, and 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: Watchstander will report 1-SD-LCV-107B partially open with dial for setpoint loose.

Crew instructs isolation of 1-SD-LCV-1 07B using either controller or manual isolation.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the unit is stable and 1-SD-LCV-107B has been returned to service or isolated, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 2/2a: Given that the unit is at power and power-range channel N-44 has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP-4.3, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation (Power Range).

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I 11STRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. N-44 indicates> 120%

. Control rods step in at maximum speed

. RCS pressure and TAVE decrease RO identifies control rods stepping in.

RO identifies N-44 failed high.

US directs entry into 1-AP-4.3.

CT 1 Crew stops control rod movement Critical Task

• Prior to rod b-b insertion limit due to N-44 failure.

• Crew verifies power not increasing.

. RO places rod control in MANUAL.

. BOP verifies FRV B/P valves in MANUAL.

Crew verifies three power-range instruments operable.

Crew verifies unit in mode 1.

Crew verifies 1-hour permissives for Tech Spec 3.3.1:

• Function 1 8b - P-7 permissive. P-G2 NOT LIT since >10% power

• Function 18d - P-b permissive. P-D2 will be LIT since >10%.

• Function 18c - P-8 permissive. P-Fl will be NOT LIT since >30 % power RO verifies TAVE and Tpj matched within 1.5°F.

Crew discusses/restores Tave to within

+/-0.5°F of Tref, if required.

Crew maintains control rods above the insertion limit and the AFD monitor annunciator clear.

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EVENT 2/2a: Given that the unit is at power and power-range channel N-44 has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP-4.3, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation (Power Range).

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS 2a RO places N-44 in trip. Normal event

. N-44 is selected on Comparator Channel Defeat

. N-44 is defeated on Rod Stop Bypass

. N-44 is defeated on Upper section

. N-44 is defeated on Lower section

• Control power fuses are removed.

Crew selects N-43 on the N-16 panel, if necessary.

Crew notifies chemistry N-44 input to OLCMS is unreliable.

Crew checks reactor power greater than 5%

and removes computer points from scan.

US reviews Technical Specifications:

3.3.1 Functions 2a, Condition D and 3aJ3b, Condition E, require channel to be placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (Functions 1 8b, 1 8c, and 1 8d are 1 -hour permissives which were verified previously.)

Crew verifies permissives were checked and N44 was placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Crew determines if rod control should be placed in AUTO.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew places N-44 in trip and TS are reviewed, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a selected feed flow channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I 1NSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciators F-F2 and F-D2 illuminate

. B MFRV ramps open

. B SO Channel III feed flow(l-FW-FI-1487) is down scale low BOP identifies annunciators F-D2, STM GEN lB FW < STM FLOW CH Ill-TV, and F-F2, SO lB LEVEL ERROR, are illuminated.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of l-AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP identifies B SO feedwater flow channel III has failed low.

BOP takes manual control of B SO water level.

Crew verifies first stage pressure indications normal.

Crew verifies pressurizer level indications are normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal:

. RO verifies operable pressurizer level channel selected

. RO verifies emergency bus backup heaters are restored

. RO verifies letdown in service

. RO verifies pressurizer level control in AUTO

. RO verifies control group heaters are not tripped.

Crew verifies both first stage pressure channels normal.

Crew verifies all SGWLC channels selected to an operable channel. (NO) 2O1ONRCRUN2 Page 10 Revision 0

EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a selected feed flow channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew swaps to operable SGWLC channels.

• RO verifies control rods in manual

• RO places steam dumps in either OFF or steam pressure mode

• BOP checks all bypass MRFVs in manual

• BOP places all MFRVs in manual

• Crew selects channel IV on SGWLCS

• Crew verifies all SG level channels are operable

• BOP verifies steam generator levels are on program

• BOP places MFRVs in Auto

• RO returns steam dumps to Tave mode.

RO matches Tave and Tref and returns rods to auto, as required.

Crew verifies that B SG feedwater flow channel III is the only failed channel.

US directs RO to enter 1-MOP-55.78.

US reviews TS 3.3.1 Function 15 Condition E and determines that channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has swapped channels and the US has referred to tech specs, or as directed by the lead evaluator. Rods should be verified to be in AUTO before continuing.

2O1ONRCRUN2 Page 11 Revision 0

EVENT 4/4a: Given that the system operator has directed that Unit 1 reduce power, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-OP-2.2, Unit Operation from Mode 1 to Mode 2, or l-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Tave decreases

. Turbine load and megawatts decrease

• Rods fail to move in auto after initial insertion NOTE: A call will be received from the MOC requesting that North Anna Unit 1 reduce power to 80% within the next 30 minutes.

US directs crew to prepare to ramp per 1-OP-2.2 or 1-AP-2.2.

NOTE: Crew will likely use a standard ramp plan from book. 1-AP-2.2 steps are included on following page.

RO locks on all available pressurizer heaters.

US makes notifications.

BOP prepares turbine for ramp:

. Verifies/removes turbine from limiter

• Transfers turbine to IMP-TN US gives attachment to BOP for turbine operations.

BOP starts lowering turbine load at specified rate.

RO borates, as required, to maintain rods within normal range.

NOTE: Control rods will operate in AUTO the first time they are required to move automatically. After that auto rod control will be disabled and the RO will have to drive rods manually.

RO identifies that control rods are not manually inserting.

RO places rods in manual and inserts them, as required.

Crew directs operator to remove the LP heater drain pumps from service.

NOTE: The following steps are from 1-AP-2.2.

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EVENT 4/4a: Given that the system operator has directed that Unit 1 reduce power, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-OP-2.2, Unit Operation from Mode 1 to Mode 2, or 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO initiates boration using either AP-2.2 attachment 5 or standard ramp plan.

BOP verifies/places turbine load control is in IMP-IN.

BOP initiates turbine load reduction per attachment 4 using OPER AUTO.

RO verifies rods in Auto.

RO energizes pressurizer heaters, as required.

RO verifies proper rod insertion. Rods will only insert in auto the first time.

RO monitors steam dumps for proper operation.

RO maintains control rods above lo b-b limits and AFD in spec.

US initiates appropriate notifications and evaluates EPIPs.

NOTE: The next event can occur once manual control rod operation has been initiated and a sufficient ramp has been observed.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a main feedline break has occurred in containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, 1-E-2, Fau1ted SG Iso1ation, and 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. B SG pressure decreases

. Containment sump level increases

. Annunciators J-A6, F-F2, J-F2 illuminate

. Containment pressure increases

• Automatic SI does not occur l-FW-P-2 does not start automatically BOP identifies B SG level decreasing.

Crew identifies containment sump level increasing.

US directs crew to enter 1-E-O.

RO/BOP manually trip the reactor.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies emergency busses are energized.

Crew identifies need to manually safety inject.

CT 2 Crew manually initiates safety BOP switch will not work. RO must injection, turn his/her switch RO manually actuates safety injection.

NOTE: The crew may identify that 1-FW-P-2 did not auto-start and manually start it or they may wait for attachment 4 to start it.

RO checks no CAP items 1-4 apply.

US holds transient brief.

US initiates attachments 4(5) and 7. See attached.

NOTE: If crew does not attempt to open the terry turbine trip valves they may enter 1-FR-H.1. They should then open the valves per H.1 and return to 1-E-O.

Crew manually opens i-MS-TV-lilA and 1-MS-TV-i 1 lB per attachment 4 or 1-E-O.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a main feedline break has occurred in containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,H 1-E-2, Faulted SG Isolation, and 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew verifies SI flow.

Crew verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS average temperature.

RO checks pressurizer PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

Crew checks SGs not faulted. (NO)

US holds a transient brief.

Crew transitions to 1-E-2.

BOP closes MSTVs and bypass valves.

BOP checks pressures in all SGs.

Crew identifies faulted SG as B.

NOTE: Crew will have already isolated B SG per attachment of E-O. They will continue with verifying the BD trip valves are closed.

CT 3 Crew isolates the faulted SG. Critical Task

. BOP verifies MFW isolated. *Prjor to transition out of E-2

• BOP closes 1-FW-MOV-100B.

. BOP verifies 1-FW-HCV-100B closed.

. BOP verifies B SG PORV closed.

. BOP verifies all SG blowdown trip valves closed.

. Crew dispatches an operator to locally close 1-MS-57 (attachment 1)

. Crew dispatches an operator to verify closed_1-MS-58.

BOP checks ECST level.

BOP establishes IA to containment.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a main feedline break has occurred in containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -EM, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, i-E-2, Faulted SG Isolation, and i-ES-i.i, SI Termination.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks secondary radiation:

. RO resets SI, Phase A, and AMSAC

. Crew checks last known SG blowdown radiation

. Crew checks last known AE radiation

. Crew checks MS line and Terry turbine radiation.

Crew checks if SI can be terminated.

(YES)

US directs crew to transition to 1 -ES-i .1.

RO verifies/resets SI.

RO stops all but one charging pump and places in Auto.

Crew checks RCS pressure stable or increasing.

Crew isolates the BIT:

. BOP checks LHSI suctions from containment sump are closed

. RO verifies/opens l-CH-MOV-l373

. RO verifies/opens CHP recirc valves

. BOP closes BIT inlet valves

. BOP closes BIT outlet valves

. BOP verifies i-SI-MOV-i836 and i-SI MOV-i869A_and_1869B_are_closed.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated No EAL after the crew terminates SI, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

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REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Operating Procedure 1-OP-2.2, Unit Operation from Mode 1 to Mode 2. 63 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction. 19 Abnormal Procedure i-AP-31, Loss of Main Feedwater. 8 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase. 16 Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-4.3, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation (Power 19 Range).

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation. 24 Maintenance Operating Procedure 1-MOP-55.78, Feed Flow Instrumentation. 7 Emergency Procedure 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. 42 Emergency Procedure 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. 12 Emergency Procedure 1-ES-i. 1, SI Termination. 21 Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, Human Performance. 3 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: 1NPO 88-003, Jan. 1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 17 Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS AHACHMENT 1- SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2- SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3- SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 18 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2O1ONRCRLTN2 Page 19 RevisionO

SIMULATOR OPERATOWS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN2 Initial conditions

1. RecalliC 188

2. Ensure Tave (575-5 85), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Rack out breaker for 1-FW-P-3A and close manual discharge valve.

4. Place red sticker on 1-FW-P-3A.

5. Designate 1J as the protected train. Dont forget to lower sign on Safeguards panel.

6. Verify enough standard ramp plans (100 to 80% at 0.3%/mm and 100 to 80% at 1%/mm) are available to replace any that get written on.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

Auto-start failure of l-CN-P- Switch override:

lB CNP1B_ASTOP = OFF SI fails to automatically Malfunction:

actuate S108 BOP SI switch does not Switch override:

work SAF1NJ2INIT = OFF Terry Turbine fails to Remote function:

automatically start FWP2_AUTQDEFEAT T 2O1ONRCRUN2 Page 20 Revision 0

SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) 1-SD-LCV-107A failure Remote function:

SDLCV1O7BSETPT, Delay time =5, Ramp = 30, Value = 1, Trigger = 1 NOTE: If called to investigate, wait at least 3 minutes and report that 1-SD-LCV-107B is partially open and controller dial is loose.

If operator or I&C is directed to fix this:

Ramp setpoint to 35% over 120 seconds Report that you have adjusted dial, locked it in, and tank level is recovering. Adjust as necessary to keep alarms clear.

NOTE: The next event will occur once the unit is stable and 1-SD-LCV-107B has been isolated, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

2) Power-range channel IV Malfunction:

failure N10204, Delay time = 5, Severity = 1, Trigger = 2 NOTE: If permission is requested to restore Tave/Tref to within 0.5°F by withdrawing control rods, etc, then grant permission by agreeing with whatever method they choose.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes unit and places N-44 in trip, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

3) SG channel III feed flow Malfunction:

fails low FW1203, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 30, Stop = -1, Trigger = 3 NOTE: After the crew has swapped channels and the US has referred to TS-3.3.1, the next event may occur.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUThHCATIONS

4) Unit ramp per system NOTE: Call as the MOC requesting that North Anna Unit 1 operator reduce power to 80% within the next 30 minutes.

This is due to problems elsewhere on the grid. (Can tell that you will call back with any additional information they ask for since you have other calls to make right now.)

NOTE: Insert the following malfunction once rods have moved once in auto.

Malfunction:

RD 14, Trigger 4 NOTE: The next event can occur once manual control rod operation has been initiated and a sufficient ramp has been observed.

5) Feed line break in Malfunction:

containment FW1602, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 300, Severity = 50, Trigger = 5 NOTE: When dispatched, close 1-MS-57 using monitor, PNID, or the following trigger:

MS 57, Delay 30, Ramp = 30, Trigger = 11 NOTE: Scenario can be terminated when crew terminates SI in ES-1.1, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

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ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 23 Revision 0

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION TERM1NAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that a High Pressure Heater Drain Tank high-level divert has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3 1, Loss of Main Feedwater, and l-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R78 1 Respond to a loss of main feedwater.

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 25 Revision 0

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and power-range channel N-44 has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-4.3, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation (Power Range).

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R7 13 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a malfunction of power-range nuclear instrumentation.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 26 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew takes action to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.

Safety Significance:

Core reactivity is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel. It is expected that the operator will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous conditions during power operation.

Cues:

Indication of a failed power range NI.

Continuous inward control rod motion with TAVE and TREF matched.

Performance Indicator:

RO places rod control in manual.

Feedback:

Rod motion stops.

WOG

Reference:

None.

Conditions:

Prior to a rod 1-1 insertion limit.

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EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a selected feed flow channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure.

S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 28 Revision 0

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the system operator has directed that Unit 1 reduce power, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-OP-2.2, Unit Operation from Mode 1 to Mode 2, or l-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R706 Borate the Reactor Coolant System using the blender.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 29 Revision 0

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a main feedline break has occurred in containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, l-E-2, Faulted SG Isolation, and 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

Ri 85 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection R727 Perform the phase A isolation verification following a safety injection actuation Ri 83 Identify and isolate a faulted steam generator.

Ri 89 Terminate safety injection.

CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages 2010 NRC RUN 2 Page 30 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew manually initiates safety injection.

Safety Significance:

Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity.

Cues:

Indication!annunciation that SI is required, with NO indication that SI has actuated.

Performance Indicator:

RO manually actuates safety injection.

Feedback:

Indicationlannunciation that SI has actuated.

WOG

Reference:

E-0 D-Background.

Conditions:

Prior to transitioning out of E-0.

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CT Statement:

Crew isolates faulted Steam Generator.

Safety Significance:

Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the integrity CSF beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. For the reference plant, neither of these transients (blowdown of a single SG with or without RCPs running) constitutes an orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF. However, if the faulted SG is not isolated, the cooldown transient for reactor vessel inlet temperature could result in an orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF, especially if RCPs are not running.

Cues:

B SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely depressurized and Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the faulted SG Performance Indicator:

BOP closes l-FW-MOV-100B to secure AFW flow to A steam generator.

Feedback:

AFW flow indication to B steam generator decreases to zero.

WOG

Reference:

E-2 A-Background.

Conditions:

Prior to transitioning out of E-2.

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ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1 Given that a High Pressure Heater Drain Tank high-level divert has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-31, Loss of Main Feedwater, and 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciator Q-E4 illuminates

• 1-SD-P-lB trips as indicated by amber light lit

• Reactor power increases slightly

• Main feed pump suction pressure decreases

• Standby condensate pump does not auto-start EVENT 2 Given that the unit is at power and power-range channel N-44 has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-4.3, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation (Power Range).

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• N-44 indicates> 120%

• Control rods step in at maximum speed

• RCS pressure and TAVE decrease EVENT 3 Given that the umt is at power and a selected feed flow channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators F-F2 and F-D2 illuminate

• B MFRV ramps open

• B SG Channel III feed flow(1-FW-FI-1487) is down scale low EVENT 4 Given that the system operator has directed that Unit 1 reduce power, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-OP-2 2, Unit Operation from Mode ito Mode 2, or 1-AP-2 2, Fast Load Reduction SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Tave decreases

• Turbine load and megawatts decrease

• Rods fail to move in auto after initial insertion 2010 NRC RUN 2 Date Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a main feedline break has occurred in containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, 1-E-2, Faulted SG Isolation, and 1-ES-1.l, SI Termination)

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• B SG pressure decreases

• Containment sump level increases

• Annunciators J-A6, F-F2, J-F2 illuminate

• Containment pressure increases

• Automatic SI does not occur

• 1 -FW-P-2 does not start automatically 2010 NRC RUN 2 Date Revision 0

Appendix P Scenario Outline Form ES-P-i Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Edwin Lea Operators:________________________________

Richard Baldwin Mark Riches Initial Conditions: Unit at 100% power MOL.

1-FW-P-3A was tagged last shift for motor bear ing replacement.

Turnover: Ramp unit down, perform TVFT, and then return unit tolOO% power.

Event Maif. No. Event No. Type* Event I Description 1 R(R)(S)

N (B) Ramp unit down for turbine valve freedom test 2 RC0803 Pressurizer level instrument 1461 fails high 3 C(B)

CCO2O1 Running CC pump trips with failure of standby pump to auto-start 4 C(R)(S)

CH1602 Running charging pump trips and the standby pump fails to auto start 4a N (R) (5) Restore letdown 5 MSO1OI A Steam flow channel Ill fails high causing MFRV to open FWO5OI 6 M (All) A MFRV fails closed with failure of reactor to trip automatically or RD32138 manually.

7 C (All) Emergency borate valve wont open. BIT mus t be injected.

8 TUO3 C (B) (S) Turbine will not trip automatically or manually Scenario may be stopped once crew transition s back to 1-E-0 and verifies immediate actions.

(Events 7-8 occur during event 6 and are num bered only for use on Forms 301-5 and 301-6.)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 3 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 2 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Ramp down in preparation for TVFT

2. Selected pressurizer level instrument fails high

3. Running CC pump trips/standby pump fails to auto-start

4. Running charging pump trips/standby pump fails to auto-start 4a. Restore letdown

5. Selected A Steam flow channel fails high

6. A MFRV fails closed/ATWS Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 3 Reactor doesnt trip automatically or manually, turbine will not trip automatically, emergency borate valve thermals out Total Malfunctions 8 Pressurizer level instrument fails high, running CC pump trips/standby pump fails to auto-start, running charging pump trips/standby pump fails to auto-start, selected A Steam flow channel fails high, A MFRV fails closed, reactor doesnt trip automatically or manually, turbine will not trip automatically, emergency borate valve thermals out Abnormal Events 4 Pressurizer level instrument fails high, running CC pump trips/standby pump fails to auto-start, running charging pump trips/standby pump fails to auto-start, selected A Steam flow channel fails high Major Transients 1 ATWS EOPs Entered 1 1-FR-S.l EOP Contingencies 1 1-FR-S.l Critical Tasks 2 SCENARIO DURATION 120 Minutes 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 3 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 3 The scenario will start with the unit at 100% power. l-FW-P-3A was tagged out last shift for motor bearing replacement. Shift orders are to ramp down for a TVFT, perform the test, and return the unit to 100% power.

After the crew takes the unit, they will commence a unit power reduction in accordance with 1 -PT-34.3, Turbine Valve Freedom Test. Once a sufficient load reduction has been observed, the next event may occur.

One of the controlling pressurizer level channels will fail high. This will cause the charging flow control valve, 1- CH-FCV-1122, to ramp closed. With letdown still in service, pressurizer level will slowly decrease. The crew will enter 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation, and take manual control of 1-CH-FCV-1 122 and restore charging flow. The RO will swap to an operable channel of pressurizer level for control and return pressurizer level control to automatic. The crew will identify the correct MOP and the US will consult Tech Specs. At this time the next event can occur.

The running CC pump will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto-start. The crew will enter 1-AP-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water, and start the standby pump. The US will consult Tech Specs (none applicable). At this time the next event can occur.

The running charging pump will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto-start. The crew may choose to start the pump that should have started automatically or to enter l-AP-49, Loss of Normal Charging. Once charging has been restored, the crew will proceed to restore letdown which isolated due to no running charging pumps. The US will review Tech Specs. At this time, the next event can occur.

The controlling steam flow channel on A SG will fail high, causing the A MFRV to open. The crew will enter 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation, and eventually swap to an operable channel of steam flow. The crew will identify the applicable MOP and the US will review Tech Specs. At this time, the next event can occur.

The A MFRV will fail closed. A reactor trip will not occur either automatically or manually. The crew will enter 1-FR-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power GenerationlATWS. The turbine will not trip and will have to be manually runback. When the crew tries to emergency borate, 1-SI-MOV-1350 will thermal out and the BIT will have to be injected. The crew will dispatch an operator to locally trip the reactor. Once the crew transitions back to 1 -E-0 and verifies immediate operator actions, the scenario may be terminated.

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SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1017 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is onunit2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

1 -FW-P-3A was tagged out last shift for motor-bearing replacement. Maintenance rule window is green.

Shift Orders:

Ramp unit down for TVFT, perform the test, and return unit to 100% power.

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EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at 100% power and a TVFT is to be performed, the crew will ramp the unit down in accordance with l-PT-34.3, Turbine Valve Freedom Test.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power decreases

. Turbine power decreases

. Tavg/Tref decrease

. Generator megawatts decrease US notifies the MOC that North Anna Unit 1 is reducing power for a TVFT, as required.

NOTE: Per the reactor engineer directions for the ramp, the RO will maintain Tave approximately 3 degrees higher than Tref using manual rod control. Directions are to ramp at 1%

per mm for the first 4 or 5%, then continue the ramp at 0.3% per minute.

BOP lowers Main Turbine load using Operator Auto.

RO borates as required to maintain control No boration is required.

rods in normal operating range.

BOP places turbine in IMP-IN:

. Matches Reference and Setter

. Pulses down VPL until light is lit

. Pulses up VPL until light is not lit

. Verifies tracking meter reads zero

. Pushes IMP-IN button

. Continues lowering turbine load.

NOTE: The next event can occur once a sufficient reactivity manipulation has occurred.

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EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling channel of pressurizer level has failed high, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciators B-F6 and B-G6 illuminate 1-RC-LI-1461 fails high 1 -RC-LCV- 145 9G output decreases 1-CH-FCV-1 122 ramps closed RO identifies annunciators B-F6, PRZ HI LEVEL CH I-Il-Ill, and B-G6, PRZ HI LEVEL- BU HTRS ON.

RO identifies 1 -RC-LI- 1461 failed high.

US directs crew to stop the ramp and enter 1-AP-3.

RO checks redundant instrumentation normal.

BOP checks SGWLC instrumentation normal.

BOP verifies turbine first stage pressure indications are normal.

RO checks pressurizer level indications normal. (NO)

RO places 1 -CH-FCV-1 122 in manual and increases charging flow to maintain pressurizer level.

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EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling channel of pressurizer level has failed high, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, Thoss of Vital Instrumentation.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal:

. RO selects operable pressurizer level channel 45 9/460

. RO verifies pressurizer level annunciators are proper for plant conditions

. RO verifies emergency backup heaters are restored

. RO verifies letdown in service

. RO verifies pressurizer level control in AUTO (NO)

. RO verifies/restores level to program

. RO adjusts output of 1-RC-LCV-1459G, as required

. RO places l-CH-FCV-1 122 in AUTO, when level restored

. RO verifies control group heaters are not_tripped.

Crew verifies both turbine first stage pressure channels are normal.

Crew verifies operable channels selected for SGWLC instruments.

Crew verifies that the pressurizer level channel is the only failed instrument.

Crew initiates 1-MOP-5 5.72.

NOTE: Crew may discuss rod control options at this time. If guidance is requested will ask what they want to do and agree with it.

US contacts WCC and requests WR, CR.

US references Technical Specifications:

3.3.1 (Function 9 Condition L 72 hours to place channel in trip)

TS 3.3.3 (Function 13 Info action).

NOTE: The next event can occur once the US has reviewed tech specs.

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EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and the running component cooling water pump has tripped, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 15, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciators G-F5, C-D 1, C-D2, and C-D3 illuminate

. B CC pump has no amps, breaker disagreement light

• A CC pump did not auto-start RO/BOP identifies annunciator G-F5, COMP. COOL PP lB AUTO TRIP.

BOP identifies A CC pump tripped and B not running.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-15.

Crew checks CC head tank level stable or increasing.

BOP verifies at least one unit 1 CC pump running. (NO)

BOP starts B CC pump.

BOP checks CC pump amps.

BOP checks CC flow normal.

Crew directs operator to check SW to CC HX delta Ps.

Crew directs electricians and Safeguards watchstander to investigate A CC pump breaker. (An overcurrent drop will be reported.)

Crew directs auxiliary building operator to investigate cause of CC pump trouble and to verify B CC pump is operating satisfactorily.

US evaluates TS 3.7.19 (no applicable actions).

US notifies the WCC of the failures and requests they submit WR,CR, and make notifications.

NOTE: The next event will occur once T.S. have been reviewed, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 4/4a: Given that the unit is at power and the running charging pump has tripped with no auto-start of the standby pump, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, Loss of Normal Charging.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• l-CH-P-1A trips

. 1-CR-P-lB does not start automatically

• Letdown isolates

. Annunciators C-A5, C-C5, C-G6 illuminate 1-CH-FCV-1122 demand goes to maximum RO identifies annunciator C-A5,CH PP1A 15H6 LOCKOUT, and C-C5, CH PP TO REGEN HX HI-LO FLOW.

NOTE: Crew may verify flowpath and start 1-CH-P-1B per the AR for C-A5, since it should have automatically started. If so, proceed to steps for restoration of letdown.

RO identifies that 1-CH-P-1A tripped and 1-CH-P-1B did not auto-start.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-49.

RO checks charging pump for gas binding.

(NO)

NOTE: If crew answers NO to the following question they will isolate letdown and continue with subsequent steps.

RO verifies charging pump manipulations in progress. (YES)

RO closes discharge MOVs for 1 -CH-P 1A.

RO checks running charging pump normal.

(NO, none running.)

RO verifies letdown orifices closed. Letdown isolation.

RO closes letdown isolation valves.

RO verifies VCT level is >12%.

RO checks charging pump suctions from VCT are open.

RO checks VCT pressure is >15 psig.

RO checks charging pump suction MOVs are open.

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EVENT 4/4a: Given that the unit is at power and the running charging pump has tripped with no auto-start of the standby pump, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, Loss of Normal Charging)

TIME EXPECTED ACTION iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO checks charging pump discharge MOVs are open.

RO checks charging line isolation valves are open.

RO checks 1-CH-FCV-l 122 has output demand indicated.

RO checks 1-CH-HCV-1310 is open.

RO checks charging parameters are normal. (NO)

RO closes 1-CH-FCV-1 122.

Crew checks for piping rupture:

. VCT and RWST level normal

• Aux building sump level normal

• No reports of piping ruptures

. Applicable radiation monitor readings are normal.

RO verifies running charging pump normal. (NO)

RO starts standby charging pump.

Crew makes up to the RCS using 1-OP-8.1.

NOTE: Crew may continue and open 1-CH-FCV-1122 when re-establishing letdown.

RO opens 1-CH-FCV-l 122 and establishes charging.

RO verifies seal injection flow.

Crew determines if letdown should be placed in service. (YES)

NOTE: If crew did not enter l-AP-49, they will most likely use l-OP-8.1 to restore letdown.

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EVENT 4/4a: Given that the unit is at power and the running charging pump has tripped with no auto-start of the standby pump, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, Loss of Normal Charging.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS 3a Crew restores letdown: Normal event

. RO establishes at least 25 gpm of charging

. RO puts i-CH-PCV-1 145 in manual

. RO fully opens 1-CH-PCV-1 145

. BOP verifies 1-CH-TV-1204A and B are open

. RO opens 1 -CH-LCV-i 460A and 1460B

. RO opens 1-CH-HCV-1200B

. RO adjusts 1-CH-PCV-1 145 to maintain 300 psig

. RO places 1-CH-PCV-1 145 in Auto

. RO places 1-CH-FCV-1 122 in Auto, if desired (may adjust 1-RC-LCV-1459G)

. RO maintains pressurizer pressure.

RO verifies charging parameters are normal:

. Discharge pressure

. Charging flow

• Motor amps.

US directs WCC to submit WR, CR.

US reviews Technical Specifications:

3.5.2 Condition A for having only one operable HHSI pump. Have 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore 2 trains to operable. (i-CH-P-1C is only operable when running due to no auto starts. 1-CR-P-lB also did not auto-start.)

NOTE: Once letdown is restored and tech specs have been reviewed, the next event can occur.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power, and a steam flow channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciators F-F2, F-G2, and F-D 1 illuminate

• Status light N-E7 illuminates 1-MS-FI-1474 fails high A MFRV demand increases A SG feed flow and level increase BOP identifies annunciator F-Fl, SG 1C LEVEL ERROR, and informs US.

Crew identifies A SG steam flow channel III failed high.

US directs entry into l-AP-3.

Crew verifies redundant instrument channels normal.

Crew verifies SG level control parameters normal. (NO)

BOP places A MFRV in MANUAL and adjusts to control A SG level.

Crew verifies turbine first-stage pressure channels normal.

RO verifies PRZR level indications are normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal.

Crew verifies both turbine first stage pressure channels normal.

Crew verifies operable channels selected for SGWLC. (NO) 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 13 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power, and a steam flow channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew swaps SGWLC channels:

. RO places rod control to MANUAL

• RO turns steam dumps off or swaps to steam pressure mode as directed by the US

. BOP places all MFRVs in MANUAL and verifies FRV B/Ps in MANUAL

. Crew swaps all SF/FF/First-stage pressure channels to channel IV

. BOP verifies CH III SG levels on program and returns MFRVs to AUTOMATIC

. RO returns steam dumps to TAVE mode

. RO returns rod control to AUTO, as required/desired.

Crew refers to 1-MOP-55.77 for placing the Pressurizer level channel already failed failed channel in trip, and MOP initiated.

US refers to Technical Specifications:

3.3.1 Function 15 Condition E 3.3.2 Functions lf, lg, 4d, and 4e Condition D Determines the failed channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

NOTE: The next event can occur after the crew swaps channels and the US has reviewed Tech Specs.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a main feed reg valve has failed closed and a reactor trip does not occur automatically or manually, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-FR-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power GenerationlATWS.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciator D-G2 illuminates

• l-FW-FCV-1488 indicates closed

• Feed flow to B SG decreases

• Reactor trip does not occur automatically or manually Crew identifies annunciator D-G2, STM GEN lB LO-LO LEVEL RX TRIP.

BOP identifies B MFRV closed.

Crew identifies that a reactor trip has not occurred.

US directs crew to enter l-E-0.

RO/BOP attempt to trip reactor.

US directs crew to enter l-FR-S.l.

BOP attempts to manually trip the turbine using pushbuttons. (NO)

CT1 BOP manually trips turbine:

BOP places both EHC pumps in PTL BOP manually run back turbine OR BOP closes MSTV and bypass valves.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a main feed reg valve has failed closed and a reactor trip does not occur automatically or manually, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power GenerationlATWS.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT2 Crew identifies the reactor did not trip and takes action to bring the reactor subcritical.

. RO verifies automatic rod insertion or manually inserts control rods

. (See turbine trip above)

. BOP checks AFW pumps running

. RO verifies at least one charging pump running

. RO places 1 -CH-P-2A in FAST

. RO attempts to open 1-CH-MOV-1350

. RO verifies adequate negative reactivity insertion (NO)

. RO opens charging pump suctions from RWST

. RO closes charging pump suctions from VCT

. BOP closes BIT recirc valves

. BOP opens BIT outlet valves

. BOP opens BIT inlet valves

• Crew closes letdown isolations

. RO closes charging line isolations

. RO checks PRZR pressure < 2335.

NOTE: Crew may have already dispatched operator for local actions.

Reactor will be tripped 3 minutes after operator is dispatched.

Crew checks if following trips have occurred:

Reactor trip Turbine trip.

Crew dispatches operator to locally trip the reactor.

Crew checks if reactor is subcritical. (YES) If no, (reactor not yet tripped) will continue in S. 1 for several more steps.

NOTE: Crew will initiate attachment 1 to establish normal charging and letdown.

US directs transition to 1 E-O.

RO verifies reactor trip.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a main feed reg valve has failed closed and a reactor trip does not occur automatically or manually, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-FR-S.l, Response to Nuclear Power GenerationlATWS.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies emergency busses are energized.

Crew verifies safety injection is not actuated or required.

NOTE: The scenario can be terminated EAL SS2.1.

at this time.

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REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Periodic Test 1-PT-34.3, Turbine Valve Freedom Test. 28 Operating Procedure 1-OP-8.1, Chemical and Volume Control System. 53 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation. 24 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water. 21 Abnormal Procedure l-AP-49, Loss of Normal Charging. 14 Maintenance Operating Procedure 1 -MOP-55 .72, Pressurizer Level 8 Instrumentation.

Maintenance Operating Procedure 1-MOP-5 5.77, Steam Flow Instrumentation. 8 Functional Restoration Procedure 1-FR-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power 16 Generation!ATWS.

Emergency Procedure 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. 42 Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, Human Performance. 3 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 18 Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1- SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3- SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 19 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 20 Revision 0

SIMULATOR OPERATOWS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN3 Initial conditions

1. RecalliC 189

2. Ensure Tave (575-585), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Verify 46 1/460 selected for pressurizer level control.

4. Rack out breaker for 1-FW-P-3A and close manual discharge valve.

5. Place sticker on 1-FW-P-3A.

6. Designate 1J as the protected train. Dont forget to lower sign on Safeguards panel.

7. Prepare a reactivity plan and fill out appropriate steps of 1 -PT-34.3.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

1-CC-P-lB will not auto start Remote function:

CCP1B Auto Defeat Auto Defeat l-CH-P-1B will not auto- Switch Override:

start CHP1BASTP = OFF Failure of reactor trip either Malfunctions:

automatically or manually RD32 RD3 8 Remote function:

AMSAC_DEFEAT = T Failure of turbine to trip Malfunctions:

either automatically or TUO2 manually TUO3 Emergency borate MOV MOV control:

failure CHMOV35ORACKJN, Remote value RACKOUT, Trigger =

11 Set up Trigger 11 as follows so that when valve starts to open it will thermal out:

CHMOV35O .GE. 0.1 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 21 Revision 0

SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Unit Ramp NOTE: Next event can occur once a sufficient reactivity manipulation has been observed.

2) Pressurizer level channel Malfunction:

failure RC0803, Delay time= 5, Ramp = 10, Severity = 1, Trigger = 2 NOTE: If asked about rod/temp control options, ask what they want to do and agree with what they say. (Can call back if they want OMOC opinion/permission.)

NOTE: The next event can occur once the US has reviewed tech specs.

3) Loss ofA CC pump Malfunction:

CCO2O1, Delay time = 5, Trigger = 3 NOTE: If sent to investigate: A pump looks fine locally, just no longer running. B pump looks good.

Safeguards: There is an overcurrent drop on breaker for 1-CC-P-lA.

NOTE: Can report CC HX delta Ps as either normal or approximately 4 psid on each fiX. (Can report immediately as you looked at them when checking out pumps.)

NOTE: The next event will occur once T.S. have been reviewed, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

4) A CHP trips on Malfunction:

overcurrent CH16O1, Delay time 5, Trigger = 4 NOTE: Once letdown is restored and tech specs have been reviewed, the next event can occur.

5) A SG Steam flow fails Malfunction:

high MSO1O1, Delay time = 5, Ramp 10, Severity = 1, Trigger = 5 NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the applicable MOP and the US has reviewed Tech Specs.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRJDE/COMMUNICATIONS

6) Failure of A Malfunction:

MFRV/ATWSQreloaded) FWO5O1, Delay time 5, Trigger = 6 NOTE: The following will open the reactor trip breakers 3 minutes after being inserted:

Remote functions:

SP_RTA_BKR F, Delay time 180, Trigger = 10 SP_RTB_BKR F, Delay time 181, Trigger = 10 NOTE: The scenario can be terminated once the crew has transitioned back to 1-E-O and finished verifying the immediate actions.

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ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 24 Revision 0

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTTVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at 100% power and a TVFT is to be performed, the crew will ramp the unit down in accordance with l-PT-34.3, Turbine Valve Freedom Test.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

None CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 26 Revision 0

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling channel of pressurizer level has failed high, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R633 Respond to a failure of the controlling pressurizer level channel CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 27 Revision 0

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and the running component cooling water pump has tripped, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R5 19 Respond to a loss of one or more component cooling water pumps CRITICAL TASK:

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EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and the running charging pump has tripped, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, Loss of Normal Charging.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R572 Restore charging flow following a loss of normal charging.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 29 Revision 0

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power, and a steam flow channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 3 Page 30 Revision 0

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a main feed reg valve has failed closed without a reactor trip occurring, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-FR-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power GenerationlATWS.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R224 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a nuclear power generationlATWS CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2O1ONRCRUN3 Page3l RevisionO

CT Statement:

Crew identifies reactor did not trip, transition to l-FR-S.l, Nuclear Power Generation!ATWS, and take actions to bring the reactor subcritical.

Safety Significance:

Failure to insert negative reactivity under the postulated plant conditions results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis..operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

Cues:

Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room.

Performance Indicator:

RO verifies control rods inserting in auto until rod speed less than manual, then inserts in manual Crew injects BIT

-OR-Crew dispatches operator to locally trip the reactor using attachment #3, Remote Reactor Trip.

Feedback:

• Control rods moving in or fully inserted.

BIT injecting.

• Neutron flux decreasing.

• Pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig.

WOG

Reference:

FR-S.1 -- C Background Conditions:

Prior to completion of step requiring its performance.

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CT Statement:

Crew manually trips the turbine in FR-S. 1 Safety Significance:

Failure to trip the turbine during an ATWS event could lead to violation of the RCS emergency stress limit.

Cues:

Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room, and indication that the turbine stop valves are fully open.

Performance Indicator:

BOP simultaneously depresses both turbine trip pushbuttons.

Feedback:

Turbine stop valves closed.

WOG

Reference:

FR-S.1 -- A Background Conditions:

Within 30 seconds of recognizing ATWS condition exists.

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ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at 100% power and a TVFT is to be performed, the crew will ramp the unit down in accordance with 1-PT-34.3, Turbine Valve Freedom Test.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power decreases

• Turbine power decreases

• Tavg/Tref decrease

• Generator megawatts decrease EVENT 2: Given that the unit is at power and a controlling channel of pressurizer level has failed high, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators B-F6 and B-G6 illuminate

• l-RC-LI-l461 fails high

• 1-RC-LCV-1459G output decreases

• 1-CH-FCV-l 122 ramps closed EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and the running component cooling water pump has tripped, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 15, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators G-F5, C-D1, C-D2, and C-D3 illuminate

• B CC pump has no amps, breaker disagreement light

• A CC pump did not auto-start EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and the running charging pump has tripped with no auto-start of the standby pump, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-49, Loss of Normal Charging.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• 1-CH-P-1A trips

• l-CH-P-1B does not start automatically

• Letdown isolates

• Annunciators C-A5, C-C5, C-G6 illuminate

• 1-CH-FCV-1122 demand goes to maximum 2010 NRC RUN 3 Date Revision 0

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power, and a steam flow channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators F-F2, F-G2, and F-D 1 illuminate

• Status light N-E7 illuminates

• 1-MS-FI-1474 fails high

• A MFRV demand increases

• A SG feed flow and level increase EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a main feed reg valve has failed closed and a reactor trip does not occur automatically or manually, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-FR-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power GenerationlATWS.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciator D-G2 illuminates

• 1-FW-FCV-1488 indicates closed

• Feed flow to B SG decreases

• Reactor trip does not occur automatically or manually 2010 NRC RUN 3 Date Revision 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Edwin Lea Operators:________________________________

Richard Baldwin Mark Riches Initial Conditions: Unit at approximately 23% power MOL with ramp held to allow turnover. Unit was returned to service last shift after an outage to repair a leak on the EHC interface valve. 1-SI-P-lB was tagged out last shift for maintenance.

Turnover: Shift orders are to ramp unit to approximately 30% power for a possible chemistry hold and support maintenance on 1-SI-P-lB.

Event Maif. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 R(R)(S)

Commence ramping unit to 30% power N (B) 2 MSO2OI First stage pressure channel Ill fails high, rods step out 2a N (R) (S) Place steam dumps in steam pressure mode 3 TS (5) Inoperable sample system trip valve CAO4O1 Containment Instrument Air relief valve lifts and standby IA compressor C B S CAO2 doesnt auto start 5 C (R) (S) Thermal barrier trip valve closes on B RCP, can be re-opened 6 RC3902 C (All) B RCP high vibrations requiring unitlpump trip 7 RC0302 M (All) B Reactor Coolant suction loop breaks (LBLOCA) 8 QSO3 C (All) Failure of automatic CDA 9 C (B) (S) Failure of A QS pump to start automatically 10 ELO6O1 480V H bus is de-energized ten minutes after QS pump is manually C (All) started Scenario may be terminated anytime after crew has entered 1-ECA-1.1.

(Events 8-10 occur during event 7 and are numbered only for use on Forms 301-5 and 301-6.)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 4 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 2 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION Commence ramping unit to 30% power

2. First stage pressure channel III fails high 2a. Steam dumps are placed in steam pressure mode Sample system trip valve is inoperable Containment Instrument Air relief valve lifts/standby IA compressor fails to start Thermal barrier trip valve closes on B RCP

6. B RCP has high vibrations requiring unit trip B Reactor Coolant suction loop breaks

8. H 480V busses are de-energized Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 3 H 480V busses are de-energized, failure of auto CDA, A QS pump fails to start automatically Total Malfunctions 8 First stage pressure channel III fails high, containment Instrument Air relief valve lifts/standby IA compressor fails to start, thermal barrier trip valve closes on B RCP, B RCP has high vibrations requiring unit trip, B Reactor Coolant suction loop breaks, H 480V busses are de-energized, failure of auto CDA, A QS pump fails to start automatically Abnormal Events 3 First stage pressure channel III fails high, containment Instrument Air relief valve lifts/standby IA compressor fails to start, thermal barrier trip valve closes on B RCP Major Transients 1 B Reactor Coolant suction loop breaks EOPs Entered 3 l-ES-0.l, l-E-1, 1-ECA-1.1 EOP Contingencies 1 1 -ECA- 1.1 Critical Tasks 3 SCENARIO DURATION 120 Minutes 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 3 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 4 The scenario begins with the unit at approximately 23% power. The unit is being returned to service after an outage to repair a leak on the EHC interface valve. 1-SI-P-I B is tagged out for maintenance. Shift orders are to ramp to 30% power for a possible chemistry hold.

Once the crew takes the unit they will begin a ramp to 30% power using 1-OP-2.1, Operation from Mode 2 to Mode 1 . Once a sufficient reactivity change has been observed, the next event can occur.

The selected first stage pressure instrument will fail high and rods will step out. The crew will enter l-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation, and place control rods in manual. The procedure will direct placing the steam dumps in steam pressure mode and swapping to the redundant channel of first stage pressure. Once this is done and the US has reviewed tech specs, the next event can occur.

A call will come from the WCC informing the crew that during the engineering review of 1-PT-213.10 it is was discovered that 1-SS-TV-104A failed to stroke in the desired time band. The PT was performed at the end of last shift and the bad stroke time was not identified at that time.

The US will refer to TS 3.6.3 and make preparations to have 1-SS-TV-103B de-energized and tagged. The next event can occur at this time.

A relief valve will lift on the containment air receivers and containment instrument air pressure will decrease. This will cause instrument air pressure outside containment to decrease.

The standby instrument air compressor will not start automatically. The crew will enter 1 -AP-28, Loss of Instrument Air, and start the standby compressor. The procedure will direct isolating containment instrument air by closing one of the trip valves. Once this is done, the relief valve will reseat and containment instrument air pressure will return to normal. The next event can occur once outside and inside instrument air pressures have recovered.

The thermal barrier trip valve for the B RCP, 1-CC-TV-116B, will close unexpectedly.

The crew will use the AR for annunciator C-C4 and re-open the valve to restore flow. Once CC flow is restored, the next event will occur.

The B RCP will develop high vibrations that require the pump to be tripped. The crew will enter 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and once the reactor is tripped they will trip the RCP. The crew will transition to 1 -ES-0. 1, Reactor Trip Response, and adjust AFW flows. At this time the suction loop for the RCP will break off. The A QS pump will not start automatically. Some time after the A QS pump is manually started, the H 480-V busses will lose power. The crew will transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor and Secondary Coolant, and then to 1 -ECA- 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. Any time after the crew has entered 1-ECA- 1.1, the scenario can be terminated.

2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 4 Revision 0

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at approximately 23% power being held for turnover. The unit is being returned to service after an outage to repair a leak on the EHC interface valve. RCS boron is 1345 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

1-SI-P-lB was tagged out last shift for maintenance. Maintenance rule window is green.

Shift Orders:

Ramp the unit to 30% power for a possible chemistry hold. Support maintenance on 1-SI-P-lB.

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EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at approximately 23% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1 -OP-2. 1, Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Reactor power increases

. Turbine power increases

. Tavg/Tref increase

. Generator megawatts increase BOP removes turbine from limiter: BOP will use Attachment 8 of 1-OP-2.1

. Lowers reference to perform turbine operations.

• Sets desired ramp rate

• Presses GO

• Presses HOLD when VPL light goes off.

BOP adjusts limiter position by pressing the VVE POS LIMIT A pusbutton.

BOP verifies/sets desired ramp rate.

BOP increases turbine setter to desired position.

BOP presses GO on turbine.

BOP monitors turbine ramp.

RO starts a dilution when required.

RO monitors control rods to maintain Tave within 1.5°F of Tref with rods above insertion limits.

NOTE: The next event can occur once a It is best to be either definitively above sufficient power change has been or below P-8 (30%) by observing power achieved, and permissive light P-Fl. (Turbine trip/reactor trip).

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EVENT 2/2a: Given that the unit is at power and the controlling first stage pressure channel has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation)

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials) l-MS-PI-l446 slowly fails high Control rods step out Reactor power increases*

Steam flows increase RCS pressure decreases RCS temperature increases Annunciator B-A7 illuminates RO identifies control rods stepping out unexpectedly.

Crew identifies failure of first stage pressure channel III.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant instrumentation is normal.

BOP verifies SGWLC instruments are normal.

BOP verifies turbine first stage pressure instruments normal. (NO)

CT1 RO places control rods in manual *prlor to reactor trip on low pressurizer pressure BOP manually controls SG level on program.

Crew verifies pressurizer level indications are normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal:

. RO verifies operable pressurizer level channel selected

. RO verifies emergency bus backup heaters are restored

. R.O verifies letdown in service

. RO verifies pressurizer level control in AUTO

. RO verifies control group heaters are not_tripped.

Crew verifies both turbine first stage pressure channels are normal. (NO) 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 7 Revision 0

EVENT 2/2a: Given that the unit is at power and the controlling first stage pressure channel has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS 2a RO swaps steam dumps to steam pressure Normal mode:

. RO places both STEAM DUMP TNTLK switches to OFF/RESET

. RO places steam dump controller to manual

. RO places MODE SELECTOR switch to STEAM PRESS

. RO ensures steam dump demand is zero

. RO returns steam dump controller to Auto

. RO verifies steam dump demand is zero

. RO places both STEAM DUMP INTLK switches_to_ON.

Crew verifies operable channels are selected for all SGWLC instruments. (NO)

Crew swaps to operable SGWLC channels.

. RO verifies control rods in manual

. Crew verifies steam dumps in steam pressure mode

. BOP checks all bypass MRFVs in manual

. BOP places all MFRVs in manual

. Crew selects channel IV on SGWLCS

. Crew verifies all SG level channels are operable

. BOP verifies steam generator levels are on program

. BOP places MFRVs in Auto

. RO verifies steam dumps are available

. RO leaves steam dumps in steam pressure mode.

RO matches Tave and Tref and returns rods to auto, as required.

Crew verifies that channel III first stage pressure is the only failed channel.

US directs RO to enter 1-MOP-55.81.

Crew performs section 5.1 of MOP to verifr 1-hour (P 13) permissive:

/

. Verifies P-F2 is not lit

. Verifies L-F3 and/or L-F4 is lit 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 8 Revision 0

EVENT 2/2a: Given that the unit is at power and the controlling first stage pressure channel has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation)

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS US reviews Technical Specifications:

. 3.3.1 (functions 18b and e Condition R 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> permissives)

. 3.3.2 (functions if, ig, 4d, 4e Condition D 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to place in trip)

NOTE: Once the crew has performed one hour permissive checks and the US has reviewed TS, the next event can occur. (Crew may still be adjusting Tave, the next event is mainly for the US.)

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EVENT 3: Given that a report has been received that a containment isolation valve has failed its stroke time PT, the US will respond in accordance with Technical Specifications.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• l-SS-TV-104B indicates that power has been removed, when applicable US receives phone call from WCC stating that Engineering was reviewing 1-PT-2 13.10, which was performed at the end of the previous shift, and has found that 1-SS-TV-i 04A stroke time was not within its required time. This was not identified by the previous shift.

US refers to TS 3.6.3 Condition A and instructs that power be removed from 1-SS-TV-lO4B within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Crew makes preparations to remove power from 1-SS-TV-104B and tag it.

NOTE: The next event will occur once TS has been reviewed.

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EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a loss of instrument air has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-28, Loss of Instrument Air.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciators J-E2, F-F8, and J-E8 illuminate

• Instrument air pressure steadily decreases 1-IA-C-i does not auto-start BOP identifies annunciators J-E2, CONT INST AIR HDR LOW PRESS OR COMP B TROUBLE, and later F-F8, SAND FLTR IA SUPPLY LO PRESS, and J-E8, INSTRUMENT AIR LOW PRESSURE.

BOP identifies instrument air pressure decreasing.

US directs crew to enter 1 -AP-28.

CT2 Crew manually starts all available *Prior to instrument air pressure going compressors. <70 psig 1-IA-C-i 1 -SA-C- 1

• BOP checks IA pressure <70 PSIG. (NO)

US informs crew that they will trip the reactor and shut the MSTVs if IA pressure drops below 70 PSIG.

US dispatches watchstanders to determine cause of loss of IA.

BOP verifies IA pressure> 94 PSIG. (NO)

NOTE: Letdown HCV may go to mid-position depending on containment IA pressure.

BOP isolates IA to containment by closing 1-IA-TV-i 02A.

NOTE: Relief valve on air receiver will reset at this time BOP checks outside IA increasing. (YES)

Crew continues attempts to recover containment instrument air.

NOTE: The next event can occur once outside and inside IA pressures have recovered. 1-AP-28 steps continued below.

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EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a loss of instrument air has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-28, Loss of Instrument Air.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks RHR status.

Crew checks RCPs running.

• Crew verifies RCPs temperature normal.

Crew checks RCP seal cooling normal.

Crew checks PRZR PORV accumulators.

Crew maintains RCS pressure stable.

Crew maintains PRZR level stable.

Crew checks containment IA pressure increasing. (YES)

NOTE: Team may decide not to restore outside instrument air to containment.

Crew reopens containment instrument air trip valve(s).

Crew verifies containment cooling normal.

Crew verifies instrument air pressure greater than 94 psig Crew returns air compressors to normal.

Crew dispatches operator to locally check 2-IA-TV-2 11 closed.

Crew checks letdown in service.

Crew verifies attachment for AFW, not initiated.

SRO ensures corrective actions initiated.

NOTE: The next event may occur once the crew has isolated IA to containment, and containment IA pressure has returned to normal.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a thermal barrier trip valve has unexpectedly closed, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator C-C4.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciator C-C4 illuminates

. 1-CC-FT-i 16B pegs low

. l-CC-TV-116B indicates closed RO identifies annunciator C-C4, RCP lA B-C THERM BARR CC HI-LO FLOW.

RO identifies that l-CC-TV-116B is closed.

Crew refers to AR for annunciator C-C4.

RO opens 1-CC-TV-116B.

NOTE: The next event can occur once thermal barrier flow has been restored to B RCP.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a high vibration alarm has been received for B Reactor Coolant Pump, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and l-ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciator A-E6 illuminates

. B RCP show high vibrations RO identifies annunciator A-E6, RCP lB VIBRATION ALERT/DANGER.

Crew checks RCP vibrations on backboards panel.

Crew identifies that B RCP vibrations require tripping the RCP.

US directs crew to perform the immediate operator actions of 1 -E-O.

RO/BOP trip the reactor.

BOP verifies the turbine is tripped.

RO verifies emergency busses are energized.

Crew verifies SI is not actuated or required.

Crew stops B RCP once the reactor has been verified shutdown.

US directs transition to l-ES-O.1.

US holds transient brief.

RO checks RCS temperature stable or trending to 547°F.

BOP adjusts AFW flow.

NOTE: The next event can occur once AFW flows are adjusted.

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EVENT 7: Given that a LBLOCA has occurred with a loss of emergency coolant recirculation, the crew will respond in accordance with l-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, l-E-l, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and l-ECA-l.l, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

t TIME I EXPECTED ACTION NSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. RCS pressure and level decrease unexpectedly

. Containment pressure and temperature increase

. Containment sump level increases

. CDA does not automatically actuate 1-SI-P-lB has a sheared shaft 1-QS-P-1A does not start automatically

. Later: 1H 480V busses de-energize Crew identifies that RCS pressure and level are rapidly decreasing.

US directs crew to initiate safety injection and enter l-E-O.

Crew verifies reactor is tripped.

BOP verifies turbine is tripped.

RO verifies emergency busses are energized.

Crew identifies that SI is actuated.

Crew manually initiates safety injection.

NOTE: During this time FRs are applicable. FR-P.1 will be entered when it is identified unless a higher path exists at that time.

RO checks CAP items 1-6 and reports that CAP attached items 1, 3(4), and 6 are applicable.

US directs RO to perform actions for CAP items 3 then 4.

RO checks one CHP running and flowing.

RO checks RCS subcooling < 85°F.

RO stops all RCPs.

RO checks RCS pressure < 1475 psig RO checks RCPs tripped RO closes charging pump recircs.

US directs crew to perform actions for CAP item 6.

NOTE: CDA will not actuate automatically.

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EVENT 7: Given that a LBLOCA has occurred with a loss of emergency coolant recirculation, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, 1E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and 1-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT3 Crew manually actuates CDA: *prior to completion of step requiring

. BOP ensures CC pumps are stopped performance

. RO ensures RCPs are stopped

. BOP ensures QS pumps are running (NO)

. BOP starts 1-QS-P-1A

. BOP ensures QS discharge MOVs are open US holds transient brief.

US initiates attachments 2, 3, 4(5). Attached Crew verifies SI flow:

• Crew verifies HHSI flow indicated

• Crew verifies RCS pressure > 225 psig

[450 psig]

. Crew verifies LHSI pump flow indicated Crew verifies AFW flow

• RO checks RCS average temperature.

• RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria. (Actions already taken.)

Crew verifies SGs not faulted.

Crew verifies SG tubes not ruptured.

Crew verifies RCS intact. (NO)

US directs entry into 1 -E-. 1.

Crew checks RCS pressure >225 psig [450 P.1 steps psig].

BOP verifies both LHSI pumps are running. (NO)

BOP states that B LHSI pump is tagged out.

BOP checks if either LHSI pump flow is>

1000 gpm.

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EVENT 7: Given that a LBLOCA has occurred with a loss of emergency coolant recirculation, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and 1-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew returns to procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: Ten minutes after 1-QS-P-1A This will cause AFW IICVs to open was started the 111 480V busses will de- and C SG level will increase until energize. manually isolated.

Crew identifies that loads off of 1H 480V busses have lost power.

US directs an operator to enter 0-AP-lO. AP-lO diagnostic steps are attached US reports loss of busses to WCC and requests craft support.

NOTE: Approximately 10 minutes after craft assistance has been requested, a report will be made that there appears to be a problem with breaker 15H8. The breaker is badly damaged and cannot currently be racked out.

US directs entry into 1-E-1. E-1 steps NOTE: At any time during the performance of 1-E-1 with RWST level less than 23%, the crew may proceed directly to 1-ES-1.3, which would result in transition to ECA-1.1 at step 8.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

BOP checks if SGs faulted.

• BOP checks intact SG levels.

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EVENT 7: Given that a LBLOCA has occurred with a loss of emergency coolant recirculation, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and 1 -ECA- 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION 1NSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks secondary radiation normal:

. RO resets SI and Phase A

• Crew verifies containment IA trip valves are open (NO)

• RO resets phase B

• Crew manually opens 1-IA-TV-102A and 1 02B (Crew will likely discuss prior loss of IA)

. RO resets AMSAC

• Crew checks secondary RMs last known and/or current values

• Crew verifies SG NR levels

• Crew initiates attachment to lace SG blowdown RMs in service

. Crew opens SG sample trip valves

. Crew directs chemistry to sample SGs.

• RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.

• Crew checks if SI can be terminated.

(NO)

• Crew checks if manual CDA is required.

• BOP checks quench spray pump status.

• Crew checks if casing cooling pumps should be stopped.

Crew checks if redundant recirc spray pumps can be stopped.

• Maintain containment pressure:

Checks RS sump level > 4lO, if not continues to next step. If so, operates RS to maintain pressure <13 psia.

Crew checks if LHSI pumps should be stopped. (NO)

• Crew checks if EDGs should be stopped.

Crew verifies power available to at least one train of cold leg recirculation. (NO)

US directs crew to transition to 1 -ECA- 1.1.

Crew checks emergency coolant ECA-1.1 steps recirculation equipment available.

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EVENT 7: Given that a LBLOCA has occurred with a loss of emergency coolant recirculation, the crew will respond in accordance with l-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and 1 -ECA- 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS RO verifies/resets SI.

BOP resets SI recirc mode signal.

• BOP checks RWST level >8%. (YES)

Crew establishes one train of SI flow by stopping one HHSI pump.

NOTE: Scenario may be terminated after crew reduces to one train of SI flow.

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REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Operating Procedure 1 -OP-2. 1, Unit Operation from Mode 2 to Mode 1 . 95 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation. 24 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-28, Loss of Instrument Air. 30 Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-lO, Loss of Electrical Power. 62 Maintenance Operating Procedure 1-MOP-55.81, Turbine First Stage Pressure. 8 Emergency Procedure 1 -E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. 42 Emergency Procedure 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. 28 Emergency Procedure 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. 24 Functional Restoration Procedure 1 -FR-P. 1, Response to Imminent Pressurized 19 Thermal Shock.

Emergency Contingency Procedure 1-ECA1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant 16 Recirculation.

Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, Human Performance. 3 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003, Jan. 1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 20 Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1- SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2- SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3- SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 21 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN4 Page 22 Revision 0

SIMULATOR OPERATOWS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN 4 Initial conditions

1. RecalliC 190

2. Ensure Tave (550-560), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Reactivity plan available.

4. Set D bank rods at 146 steps.

5. Tagout 1-SI-P-lB by racking out breakers for pump and de-energizing MOVs.

6. Place red stickers on 1-SI-P-lB and MOVs.

7. Designate 1H as the protected train. Dont forget to lower protected train sign at Safeguards panel.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

Failure of 1-IA-C-i to auto Switch override start IAC 1_AUTO = OFF Failure of auto CDA Malfunction:

QSO3 Start failure of 1-Q5-P-1A Switch override:

QSP1A_AUTO = OFF Loss of 1H 480V busses Malfunction:

ELO6O1, Delay time 600, Value = True, Trigger 8 Set up trigger 8 to occur based on when l-QS-P-1A is manually started (amps)

QSP1A .GE. 0.1 SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Unit ramp NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has ramped a sufficient amount.

2O1ONRCRUN4 Page 23 Revision 0

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRThE/COMMU1ICATIONS

2) 1-MS-PT-1446 fails high Malfunction:

MSO2O1, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Severity = 1, Trigger = 2 NOTE: If called, agree with whatever temperature control method the crew suggests. They will most likely want to insert control rods to lower Tave.

NOTE: Once the crew has performed one hour permissive checks and the US has reviewed TS, the next event can occur.

The crew may still be adjusting Tave, the next event is mainly for the US.

3) Sample system TV failure NOTE: Call from WCC and tell the US that engineering was reviewing 1-PT-213.1O, which was performed at the end of the last shift, and found that 1-SS-TV-104A had an unsat stroke time that was not identified. The valve was inoperable as of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

I When told to de-energize 1-SS-TV-104B insert trigger 3:1 TVSS1O4B_GREEN = OFF, Trigger 3 TVSS1O4B RED = OFF, Trigger =3 On trigger screen:

SET SSTV1O4B RATE =0 NOTE: The next event will occur once TS has been reviewed and power removed from associated TV.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRTDE/COMMU1TICATIONS

4) Loss of Instrument Air Malfunctions:

CAO4O1, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 60, Severity = 70, Trigger = 4 CAO2, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 60, Severity = 75, Trigger = 4 NOTE: CAO2 to be deleted when crew closes containment isolation valve, after approximately 15 sec delete malfunction CAO4O1. MAKE SURE these triggers work (by Accepting them on the trigger page.)

Can set up on triggers as follows:

(Deletes malfunction CAO4O1 when an IA trip valve is closed)

Trigger 14 IATV1O2(1) .LE. 0.50 DMF CAO4O1 Trigger 16 IATV 102(2) .LE. 0.50 DMF CAO4O1 (Updates CAO2 to 0 after 15 seconds when an IA trip valve is closed)

Trigger 15 IATV 102(l).LE. 0.50 IMF CAO2 (0 15)0 Trigger 17 IATV 102(2) .LE. 0.50 IMFCAO2(015)0 NOTE: If asked to restore IA to containment using 1-IA-304, this is available on ExtremeView.

NOTE: If asked to locally check 2-IA-TV-211 closed, report back that it is (red light at panel in TB basement is NOT lit).

Or if Unit 2 CR0 called: annunciator J-E5 is NOT lit.

NOTE: The next event may occur once the crew has isolated IA to containment, and containment IA pressure has returned to normal.

5) Thermal Barrier trip valve On trigger screen for trigger 5:

closes Set CCTV116(1) 0 NOTE: The next event can occur once thermal barrier flow has been restored to B RCP.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION!OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

6) Hi vibrations on B RCP Malfunction:

RC3902, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 30, Severity 100, Trigger = 6 NOTE: The next event can occur once AFW flows are adjusted.

7) B RCS pump suction Malfunction:

rupture (LBLOCA)/Loss of RC0302, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 10, Severity 100, Trigger = 7 1H 480V busses NOTE: Will need to silence U-2 alarms using ExtremeView when bus is lost.

NOTE: If electricians are sent to investigate 111 480-V busses, wait 10 minutes and then inform the crew that there appears to be a problem with breaker 15118. The breaker is badly damaged and cannot currently be racked out.

If questioned later, keep reporting that the damaged breaker cannot be racked out and a plan will have to be developed to resolve this issue before power can be restored.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated once the crew stops one charging pump in 1-ECA-1.1.

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ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 27 Revision 0

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at approximately 23% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1-OP-2A, Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R705 Dilute the Reactor Coolant System using the blender CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 29 Revision 0

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and the controlling first stage pressure channel has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R7 19 Respond to a failure of the controlling first-stage pressure channel S70 Evaluate compliance with Technical Specifications CRITICAL TASK:

See next page 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 30 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew takes action in accordance with AP-3, to stop rod motion and stabilize the unit.

Safety Significance:

Core reactivity is not under control of the operator due to the failed control channel. It is expected that the operator will attempt to take manual actions to correct for anomalous conditions during power operation.

Cues:

Indication of a failed first stage pressure channel.

Continuous inward control rod motion with TAVE and TpF matched.

Performance Indicator:

RO places rod control to manual.

Feedback:

Rod motion stops WOG

Reference:

E-O Background Document Conditions:

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on low pressure 2O1ONRCRUN4 Page3l RevisionO

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that a report has been received that a containment isolation valve has failed its stroke time PT, the US will respond in accordance with Technical Specifications.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

S70 Evaluate compliance with Technical Specifications CRITICAL TASK:

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EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a loss of instrument air has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-28, Loss of Instrument Air.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R531 Respond to a loss of instrument air inside of the containment CRITICAL TASK:

See next page 2O1ONRCRUN4 Page33 RevisionO

CT Statement:

Crew starts all available air compressors.

Safety Significance:

Failure to start all available air compressors under the postulated plant conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of plant conditions which could result in a unit trip andlor safety injection. In this case, the instrument air pressure can be maintained above the trip set point by starting the air compressors. Therefore, failure to start the air compressors also represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

Cues:

Instrument air low pressure alarm.

Meter indication of low instrument air pressure.

Performance Indicator:

BOP starts all available air compressors.

Feedback:

Instrument air pressure stabilizes above the trip set point.

WOG

Reference:

None Conditions:

Prior to reaching the trip set point of 70 PSIG.

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EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a thermal barrier trip valve has unexpectedly closed, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator C-C4.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R769 Respond to an RCP THERM BARR CC HJILO FLOW alarm CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2O1ONRCRUN4 Page35 RevisionO

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a high vibration alarm has been received for B Reactor Coolant Pump, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ES-O.l, Reactor Trip Response.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

Ri 85 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection CRITICAL TASK:

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EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that a LBLOCA has occurred with a loss of emergency coolant recirculation, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, l-El, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and 1 -ECA- 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R727 Perform the phase A isolation verification following a safety injection actuation R728 Perform the phase B isolation verification following a containment depressurization actuation R73 1 Identify the highest-priority critical safety function CRITICAL TASK:

See next page 2010 NRC RTJN 4 Page 37 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew manually actuates CDA.

Safety Significance:

Failure to manually actuate CDA under the postulated conditions constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure of an ESF system or component.

Cues:

Indicationlannunciation that containment pressure has exceed the CDA setpoint with indication that CDA did not automatically initiate.

Performance Indicator:

RO/BOP manually actuates CDA.

Feedback:

Indicationlannunciation that CDA has actuated.

WOG

Reference:

E-O -- E Background Conditions:

Prior to having to enter 1 -FR-Z. 1 2010 NRC RUN 4 Page 38 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at approximately 23% power and the crew has been instructed to increase power, the crew will ramp the unit up in accordance with 1 -OP-2. 1, Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power increases

• Turbine power increases

• Tavg/Tref increase

• Generator megawatts increase EVENT 2 Given that the unit is at power and the controlling first stage pressure channel has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation SPD Verified: (Initials)

• 1MS-PI-1446 slowly fails high

• Control rods step out

• Reactor power increases

• Steam flows increase

• RCS pressure decreases

• RCS temperature increases

• Annunciator B-A7 illuminates EVENT 3: Given that a report has been received that a containment isolation valve has failed its stroke time PT, the US will respond in accordance with Technical Specifications.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• l-SSTV-lO4B indicates that power has been removed, when applicable EVENT 4 Given that the unit is at power and a loss of instrument air has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-28, Loss of Instrument Air SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators J-E2, F-F8, and J-E8 illuminate

• Instrument air pressure steadily decreases

• 1-IA-C-i does not auto-start 2010 NRC RUN 4 Date Revision 0

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and a thermal barrier trip valve has unexpectedly closed, the crew will respond in accordance with the AR for annunciator C-C4.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciator C-C4 illuminates

• 1-CC-FT-i 16B pegs low

• 1-CC-TV-i 16B indicates closed EVENT 6: Given that the unit is at power and a high vibration alarm has been received for B Reactor Coolant Pump, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and l-ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciator A-E6 illuminates

• B RCP show high vibrations EVENT 7: Given that a LBLOCA has occurred with a loss of emergency coolant recirculation, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and 1 -ECA- 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• RCS pressure and level decrease unexpectedly

• Containment pressure and temperature increase

• Containment sump level increases

• CDA does not automatically actuate

• 1-SI-P-lB has a sheared shafi

• l-QS-P-1A does not start automatically

• Later: 1H 480V busses de-energize 2010 NRC RUN 4 Date Revision 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Edwin Lea Operators:________________________________

Richard Baldwin Mark Riches Initial Conditions: Unit is at approximately 100% power MOL. 1 -FW-P-1 B was tagged out last shift to replace the motor bearings.

Turnover: Shift orders are to maintain current conditions and support maintenance on 1-FW-P-1 B.

Event Maif. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 RC2002 C (R) (S) 1-RC-PCV-1455B spray valve fails open and must be closed with SOV 2 ASO1 I (B)(S) Aux steam pressure transmitter fails low 2a Power reduction due to failed open MS to AS PCV 3 CH1202 I (R) (S) Failure of 1-CH-LT-1 112, VCT level transmitter high 4 MS1705 C SG pressure channel III fails high 5 Sl16 TS (S) RCS leak outside containment in Safeguards 6 S116 M (All) LOCA outside containment 7 C (All) Failure of SI to actuate automatically or manually 8 S11304 C(BOP) Failure of Train BofPhaseA Scenario may be terminated after crew has exited 1-ECA-1 2.

(Events 7-8 occur during event 6 and are numbered only for use on Forms 301-5 and_301-6.)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 5 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 2 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. 1-RC-PCV-1456B spray valve fails open and will not close with controller

2. Aux steam pressure transmitter fails low 2a. Power reduction due to AS pressure transmitter failure Failure of VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1 112, high C SG Steam pressure channel III fails high RCS leak outside containment

6. LOCA outside containment Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry 3 LOCA outside containment, failure of B train of Phase A, safety injection does not actuate automatically or manually Total Malfunctions 8 PRZR spray valve fails open, Aux steam pressure transmitter fails low, VCT level transmitter high, C SG Steam pressure channel III fails high, RCS leak outside containment, LOCA outside containment, failure ofB train of Phase A, safety injection does not actuate automatically or manually Abnormal Events 5 PRZR spray valve fails open, Aux steam pressure transmitter fails low, VCT level transmitter high, C SG Steam pressure channel III fails high, RCS leak outside containment Major Transients 1 LOCA outside containment EOPs Entered 2 1 -ECA- 1.2, 1 -E- 1 EOP Contingencies 1 1 -ECA- 1.2 Critical Tasks 3 SCENARIO DURATION Minutes 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 3 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 5 The scenario begins with the unit at 100% power. 1-FW-P-1B was tagged out last shift to replace the motor bearings. Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-FW-P-lB.

After the crew takes the shift, pressurizer spray valve 1-RC-PCV-1455B will fail open.

The crew will enter 1-AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure, and attempt to close the spray valve. The valve will not close with the controller, but will close using the SOV. Once the crew has stabilized the plant and the US has reviewed tech specs the next event can occur.

The Auxiliary Steam pressure transmitter will fail low causing the main steam to aux steam PCV to fail open. Reactor power will increase and the crew will enter 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase. Once the crew has placed 1-AS-PCV-105 in manual and closed it, the next event can occur.

At this time VCT Level transmitter 1-CH-LT-1 112 will fail high. The crew will respond in accordance with the AR for VCT HI-LO LEVEL L-l 12, by placing 1-CH-LCV-1 1 15A in manual and raising the output to 100% to stop diverting letdown to the stripper. The crew should discuss the loss of the RWST swapover on low VCT level. Once the crew has stopped the VCT divert the next event can occur.

Channel III of steam pressure on C SG will fail high. The crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation, and take control ofC MFRV. After swapping to an operable channel and reviewing TS, the next event may occur.

An RCS leak will start outside containment in the safeguards building. The crew will enter 1-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage, based on degrading primary plant conditions. Once the crew has determined that the leak is in Safeguards, the leak size will increase requiring a reactor trip. The crew will enter 1 -E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

The leak size will continue to increase until a safety injection is required. Automatic safety injection will not occur and the crew will not be able to manually initiate safety injection. The B train of Phase A will also fail to actuate. The crew will need to take manual actions for these failures, including swapping to the RWST due to the earlier level transmitter failure. The crew will eventually transition to 1-ECA-1 .2, LOCA Outside Containment, and isolate the leak. The crew will transition to l-E-l, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. At this time the scenario can be terminated.

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SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1017 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTTJ. Aux steam is on unit 2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

1 -FW-P- lB was tagged out last shift for motor bearing replacement. Maintenance rule window is green.

Shift Orders:

Maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-FW-P-1B.

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EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. PRZR spray valve l-RC-PCV-1455B has full open indication

. Master pressure controller output decreases

. PRZR pressure is decreases

. Spray valve controller will not close valve

. Annunciators B-F7 and B-H6 illuminate RU identifies annunciator B-F7, PRZ HI-LO PRESS and later B-H6, PRZ LO PRESS BU HTRS ON.

RU identifies RCS pressure decreasing.

US directs crew to enter 1 -AP-44.

RU monitors RCS pressure greater than 1870 psig.

RU checks PRZR PORVs closed.

RU checks master pressure controller not failed.

RU checks spray valves closed. (NO)

CT 1 Crew stops RCS pressure decrease: *prior to reaching an automatic

. RU attempts to manually closes spray reactor trip on low pressure valve (NO)

. RO closes REMOTE CLOSE SOV for spray valve.

RU verifies all PRZR heaters are energized.

RU checks that 1 -CH-HCV- 1311, Aux spray valve, is closed.

RU checks PRZR safety valves and PURVs closed.

RU verifies RCS pressure stable or increasing.

RU verifies RC S pressure returned to normal.

US refers to TS 3.4.1 DNB, Action A (2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), if pressure went below 2205 psig.

TS 3.4.11 and 3.4.13 are not applicable for this event.

2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 6 Revision 0

EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS US requests Work Control Center supervisor to inform the OMOC of the failure and initiate WR and CR.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has returned RCS pressure to normal, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 2/2a: Given that the unit is at power and 1-AS-PT-105 has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION I iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power increases

• Tave decreases

. Megawatts decrease 1-AS-PI-105 indicates low 1-AS-PC V-105 has 100% demand RO identifies that power is increasing and Tave is decreasing.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-38.

RO verifies steam dumps closed.

BOP verifies SG PORVs indicate closed.

Crew verifies main turbine load is normal and reactor power is 1 00% and stable.

(NO)

NOTE: It is possible that crew will start the ramp and then immediately close 1-AS-PC V-lOS.

Crew ramps unit to return power to previous level.

RO verifies proper auto rod control.

RO energizes pressurizer heaters to maintain RCS pressure, as required.

BOP checks turbine load control:

Crew verifies reactor power is reduced to the power level before the event started When power is returned to pre-event level BOP places turbine load control in IMP-IN.

• RO maintains rods above limits and AFD within limits.

Crew checks plant status stable:

. Main Generator output stable

• Tave on program with Tref

• Steam flow channel indications

• Turbine control in Operator Auto.

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EVENT 2/2a: Given that the unit is at power and 1-AS-PT-105 has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase)

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks plant steam systems:

. SG PORVs closed on SPDS/Locally

. Safety valves closed on SPDS/Locally

. MSR inlet FCVs normal

. 1-AS-PCV-105 operation normal

. Plant steam systems intact.

Crew identifies 1-AS-PCV-105 as being open and places it in manual and adjusts it.

Crew checks for RCS dilution.

Crew verifies that cause of load increase is corrected and stops ramp, as required.

RO checks steam dumps not in OFF/RESET.

US requests Work Control Center supervisor to inform the OMOC of the failure and initiate WR and CR.

NOTE: The next event may occur once the PCV is closed and power has been stabilized.

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EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, i-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciator C-A4 illuminates

• l-CH-LI-1 112 will indicate off-scale high

• l-CH-LCV-il 12C output will go to zero

• VCT level will decrease

• At Stripper level will increase RO identifies annunciator C-A4, VCT HI LO LEVEL L-i 12.

RO identifies 1 -CH-LT- 1112 is failed high and VCT is diverting to stripper.

US reads note in AR about l-CH-LT-1112 failing high loss of auto swapover capability on low VCT level, full divert to stripper.

RO places 1 -CH-LCV-ill 2C in manual and raises output to 100%.

US reviews TS 3.4.13 (RCS leakage) which applied while letdown was diverting to the stripper.

US makes notifications about 1 -CH-LT 1112 failure and requests instrument shop assistance along with WR, CR.

NOTE: The next event may occur once the letdown divert valve has been closed, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

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EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a main steam pressure channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• C SG steam pressure channel III fails high

• C SG steam flow channel III indicates high

• C MFRV ramps open

• C SG level increases

• Annunciators F-H 1 and F-H2 illuminate

• Status lights N-D3 and N-F3 illuminate BOP identifies annunciators F-Hi, HI STM LINE DP SG 1A LO, and F-H2, HI STM LINEDPSG1BLO.

US directs entry into l-AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP identifies C SG steam pressure channel III has failed along with C SG steam flow channel III.

BOP takes manual control of C SG water level.

Crew verifies first stage pressure indications normal.

RO verifies pressurizer level indications are normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal:

• RO verifies operable pressurizer level channel selected

• RO verifies emergency bus backup heaters are restored

• RO verifies letdown in service

• RO verifies pressurizer level control in AUTO

• RO verifies control group heaters are not tripped.

Crew verifies both first stage pressure channels normal.

Crew verifies all SGWLC channels selected to an operable channel. (NO) 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page ii Revision 0

EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a main steam pressure channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew swaps to operable SGWLC channels.

. RO verifies control rods in manual

. Crew places steam dumps in either OFF or steam pressure mode

. BOP checks all bypass MRFVs in manual

. BOP places all MFRVs in manual

• Crew selects channel IV on SGWLCS

. Crew verifies all SG level channels are operable

. BOP verifies steam generator levels are on program

. BOP places MFRVs in Auto

. RO returns steam dumps to Tave mode.

Crew verifies that C SG steam pressure channel III and C SG steam flow channel III are the only failed channels.

US reviews Tech Specs:

3.3.1 function 15, ConditionE 3.3.2 functions le, f g, 4d, and 4e Condition D.

Determines that the channel must be placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> applies.

Crew identifies 1-MOP-55.77 and 1-MOP-55.79.

NOTE: After the crew has swapped channels and the US has referred to tech specs, the next event may occur.

2O1ONRCRUN5 Page 12 RevisionO

EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a leak outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage, and l-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. RCS pressure and pressurizer level decrease

. Charging flow increases

. Annunciator A-Cl illuminates RO identifies charging flow increasing and PRZR level decreasing.

US directs entry into 1-AP-16.

Crew verifies unit in mode 1.

NOTE: Crew may initially determine that parameters are under control and not isolate letdown at this time.

• RO verifies primary parameters under operator control. (NO)

RO isolates letdown and maximizes charging flow.

RO commences a VCT makeup from the blender, as applicable.

RO checks 1 -CH-LCV-1 11 5A is not diverted.

RO verifies letdown in service with normal indications for flow, temperatures, pressures, and radiation.

RO checks excess letdown temperature and pressure.

RO checks charging system pressures, flows, temperatures, and AB sump level.

Crew checks Auxiliary Building sump level normal.

Crew checks Safeguards area parameters.

Crew identifies that leak is located in the Safeguards building.

RO reports that pressurizer/VCT level cannot be maintained.

NOTE: O-AP-5.2 will be applicable once the B Vent stack RM alarms. This alarm is located on U-2 side.

2O1ONRCRUN5 Page 13 Revision 0

EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a leak outside containment, the crewwill respond in accordance with l-AP-16, increasing Primary Plant Leakage, and l-E-O Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: TS 3.4.13 (RCS Leakage) will be EAL SU 6.1 applicable.

US directs crew to perform 1 -E-O immediate actions.

RO/BOP trip the reactor.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies emergency busses are energized.

RO/BOP check is SI is required. (NO)

US announces transition to 1 -ES-O. 1.

NOTE: RO may identify need to swap to the RWST before the leak has worsened.

US holds transient brief.

NOTE: The next event occurs 3 minutes after the reactor is tripped.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is shutdown and indications exist of a LOCA outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1 -ECA 1.2, LOCA Outside Containment.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I 11lSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. RCS pressure and level decrease

. Safeguards conditions worsen

. Safety injection fails to actuate either automatically or manually

• Train B of Phase A will fail to actuate manually RO identifies worsening RCS conditions.

US directs crew to initiate safety injection Automatic/manual initiation of SI is disabled Crew attempts to manually initiate SI.

RO identifies that CAP item 2 applies.

US directs crew to perform attachment 6. Attached NOTE: Crew may have already done the steps for swapping to the RWST due to low level.

CT 2 Crew establishes HHSI flow to the RCS:

. Crew opens 1-CH.-MOV-1115B or 111 5D

• Crew closes 1-CH-MOV-1115C or 1115E

• Crew closes 1-CH-MOV-1289A or 1289B

. Crew closes 1-SI-TV-1884A1B/C

• Crew opens 1-SI-MOV-1867C or 1867D

• Crew opens 1-SI-MOV-1867A or 1867B

. Crew starts l-CH-P-1B or lC

• Crew verifies SI flow indicated

• Crew verifies SI flow aligned through BIT

• Crew starts both LHSI pumps US initiates attachment 4(5). Attached 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 15 Revision 0

EVENT 6: Given that the unit is shutdownand indications exist of a LOCA outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION 1NSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: The crew will actuate Phase A in attachment 4. Train B will not actuate. Equipment will have to be manually operated in attachment 5.

Crew verifies SI flow.

Crew verifies AFW flow.

• RO checks RCS Tave stable at or trending to 547°F.

Crew throttles AFW flows.

• RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

Crew checks SGs not faulted. (YES)

Crew checks SGs not ruptured. (YES)

Crew checks if RCS is intact inside containment. (YES)

Crew checks for outside containment inventory loss. (YES)

US directs crew to transition to 1-ECA-1.2.

BOP verifies LHSI pump hot-leg valves closed.

BOP verifies SI accumulator sample valves closed.

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EVENT 6: Given that the unit is shutdown and indications exist of a LOCA outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT 3 Crew isolates LOCA outside containment before exiting 1-ECA-1.2.

• Crew verifies 1 -SI-MOV-i 890A and 1 890B are closed.

• Crew verifies SI accumulator sample isolation valves closed. (l-SI-HCV 1 850A-F)

• Crew closes LHSI pump cold-leg injection valves 1-SI-MOV-1890C and 1890D.

• Crew closes LHSI pump discharge valves_i-SI-MOV-i 864A_and_1 864B.

Crew checks RCS pressure increasing.

(YES)

US directs crew to transition to 1 -E- 1.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated EAL FS1.l (RCS/Containment) after the crew isolates the leak, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

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REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP- 44,Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure. 19 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP- 38, Excessive Load Increase. 16 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation. 24 Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-16, Increasing Primary Leakage. 26 Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-5.2, MGP Radiation Monitoring System. 22 Emergency Procedure 1 -E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection. 42 Emergency Procedure 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. 24 Emergency Contingency Procedure 1 -ECA- 1.2, LOCA Outside Containment. 6 Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, Human Performance. 3 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: 1NPO 8 8-003, Jan. 1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 18 Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1- SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2- SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3- SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 19 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 20 Revision 0

SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN5 Initial conditions

1. Recall IC 191

2. Ensure Tave (575-585), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Close discharge MOV, open power supply for MOV, and rack out breakers for l-FW-P-1B.

4. Place stickers on switches for 1-FW-P-1B and discharge MOV.

5. Designate 2H as the protected train.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

SI does not occur Malfunctions:

automatically or manually S1070 1 S10702 Train B of Phase A does not Malfunction:

actuate S11304 SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Pressurizer spray valve Malfunction:

failure RC2002, Delay time = 5, Value True, Trigger = 1 NOTE: The next event may occur after the crew has returned RCS pressure to normal and TS have been reviewed.

2) Failure of 1-AS-PT-lOS Malfunction:

ASO1, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 30, Severity= -1, Trigger 2 NOTE: If Unit 2 is contacted about AS pressure, can report that it is pegged high initially. After PCV is closed it returns to 200 psig.

NOTE: The next event may occur once the PCV is closed and power has been stabilized.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRDE/COMMUThHCATIONS

3) 1-CH-LT-1 112 fails high Malfunction:

CH12O1, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 10, Severity = 1, Trigger = 3 NOTE: The next event may occur once the letdown divert valve has been closed.

4) C SG steam pressure Malfunctioll:

channel III fails high MS 1705, Delay time = 5, Ramp 5, Severity = 1, Trigger = 4 NOTE: The next event can occur once the redundant channel is selected, the MOPs are identified, and the US has reviewed Tech Specs.

5) Leak outside containment Malfunction:

in Safeguards S116, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 180, Severity 16, Trigger = 5 NOTE: The next event will occur 3 minutes after the reactor is tripped.

6) LOCA outside Update malfunction:

containment Set up trigger 6 to update leak malfunction 3 minutes after the reactor is tripped:

RX_RTA_52 .EQ. 0 IlviF S116(6 180) 10030 NOTE: If sent to Safeguards building, report that you opened the door and saw a lot of steam. At that time you re-closed the door and did not enter.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated after the crew isolates the leak, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

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ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 23 Revision 0

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMiNATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, Thoss of Reactor Coolant Pressure)

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R634 Respond to a loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure S70 Evaluate compliance with Technical Specifications CRITICAL TASK:

See next page 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 25 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.

Safety Significance:

Failure to close the RCS spray valve under the postulated plant conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release. In this case, DNBR is reduced. Therefore, failure to close the spray valve represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

Cues:

Valid indication of pressure decreasing by the presence of various annunciators, indication of RCS spray valve open, and RCS pressure indication decreasing and procedurally directed by l-AP-44.

Performance Indicator:

RO places REMOTE CLOSE SOV in CLOSE for associated spray Feedback:

RCS pressure decrease stopped.

WOG

Reference:

N/A Conditions:

Prior to reaching an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.

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EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and 1-AS-PT-105 has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase CRITICAL TASK:

N/A 2010 NRC RUN 5 Page 27 Revision 0

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, l-CH-LT-1112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

None CRITICAL TASK:

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EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a main steam pressure channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure.

S70 Evaluate compliance with Technical Specifications CRITICAL TASK:

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EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a leak outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage, and l-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R520 Respond to increasing primary-plant leakage Ri 8 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection R727 Perform the phase A isolation verification following a safety injection actuation R730 Verify safety injection flow S70 Evaluate compliance with Technical Specifications CRITICAL TASK:

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CT Statement:

Crew establishes HHSI flow to the RCS.

Safety Significance:

Failure to establish HHSI flow constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity.

Cues:

Indication/annunciation of:

PRZR level requiring SI

• no HHSI flow

• no HHSI pumps running Performance Indicator:

RO/BOP manually aligns valves to establish charging pump cold leg injection.

• RO opens 1 -CH-MOV-ill 5B or 111 5D

• RO closes 1-CH-MOV-1115C or 1115E

• BOP closes l-SI-TV-1884A/B(/C)

• BOP opens 1-SI-MOV-1867C or 1867 D

• BOP opens 1-SI-MOV-1867A or 1867B Feedback:

HHSI flow to the cold legs is indicated.

WOG

Reference:

E-0 -- I Background Conditions:

Prior to completing the step directing its performance.

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EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is shutdown and indications exist of a LOCA outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and l-ECA-l.2, LOCA Outside Containment.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R727 Perform the phase A isolation verification following a safety injection actuation R730 Verify safety injection flow R761 Respond to a LOCA outside containment CRITICAL TASK:

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CT Statement:

Crew isolates LOCA outside containment.

Safety Significance:

Failure to isolate a LOCA outside containment (that can be isolated) degrades containment integrity beyond the level of degradation irreparably by the postulated conditions. It also constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of a barrier to fission product release and eventually to degraded ECCS capacity.

Cues:

that SI is actuated and is required and

• Indication and/or annunciation of abnormally high temperature in the safeguards building and

• Jndication and/or annunciation of abnormally high sump level in the safeguards building Performance Indicator:

BOP closes LHSI pump Cold Leg Injection valves.

• l-SI-MOV-1890C

• l-SI-MOV-1890D Feedback:

RCS pressure increasing.

WOG

Reference:

ECA-l.2 --A Background Conditions:

Before procedure transition.

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ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, Thoss of Reactor Coolant Pressure.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• PRZR spray valve l-RC-PCV-1455B has full open indication

• Master pressure controller output decreases

• PRZR pressure is decreases

• Spray valve controller will not close valve

• Annunciators B-F7 and B-H6 illuminate EVENT 2 Given that the unit is at power and l-AS-PT-105 has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with i-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power increases

• Tave decreases

• Megawatts decrease

• i-AS-PI-105 indicates low

• 1-AS-PCV-105 has 100% demand EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter, 1-CH-LT-1 112, has failed high, the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator response.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciator C-A4 illuminates

• 1 -CH-LI- 1112 will indicate off-scale high

• 1 -CH-LCV-ill 2C output will go to zero

• VCT level will decrease

• A Stripper level will increase EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a main steam pressure channel has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation SPD Verified: (Initials)

• C SG steam pressure channel III fails high

• C SG steam flow channel III indicates high

• C MFRV ramps open

• CSG level increases

• Annunciators F-Hi and F-H2 illuminate

• Status lights N-D3 and N-F3 illuminate 2010 NRC RUN 5 Date Revision 0

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of a leak outside containment, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 16, Increasing Primaiy Plant Leakage, and 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• RCS pressure and pressurizer level decrease

• Charging flow increases

• Annunciator A-Cl illuminates

• Safety injection fails to actuate either automatically or manually

• Train B of Phase A will fail to actuate manually EVENT 6: Given that the unit is shutdown and indications exist of a LOCA outside contaimuent, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• RCS pressure and level decrease

• Safeguards conditions worsen 2010 NRC RUN 5 Date Revision 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 6 (Spare) Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Edwin Lea Operators:________________________________

Richard Baldwin Mark Riches Initial Conditions: Unit at 100% power MOL. 1-FW-P-3A was tagged last shift for motor bearing replacement.

Turnover: Maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-FW-P-3A.

Event Maif. No. Event Event No. Type* Description C(R)(S) 1 CHO2 Leak on letdown line in the auxiliary building N(Ror la Place excess letdown in service B) (S) 2 SlOlOl C (B) (S) Nitrogen leak on A Accumulator 3 C (R) (5) Steam dump fails open (isolable from MCR) 4 FWO9O1 C SG level channel Ill fails high MSO9O1 C (ALL) Small steam leak on 40 manifold in turbine building R(R)(S) 5a Unit power decrease due to steam leak N (B) 6 MSO9O1 M (All) Steam leak in turbine building increases to size requiring reactor trip TUO3 C (B) (S) Turbine doesnt automatically trip 8 MS0503 C (B) (S) C MSTV doesnt close g C (All) C MS NRV thermals out while closing Scenario may be stopped after SI is terminated mi-ES-il.

(Events 7 9 occur during event 6 and are numbered only for use on Forms 301-5 and 301-6)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

DOMINION NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR EXAMINATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 6 2010 NRC RUN 6 Page 2 Revision 0

SiMULATOR EXAMINATION GUIDE EVENT DESCRIPTION

1. Leak on letdown line in Auxiliary building la. Place excess letdown in service

2. Nitrogen leak on A Accumulator

3. H Steam dump fails open

4. C SG level channel III fails high

5. Steam leak on 40 manifold 5a. Unit power reduction due to steam leak

6. Steam break at 40 manifold requiring reactor trip Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfimctions after EOP entry 3 Turbine doesnt trip automatically, C MSTV doesnt close, C NRV thermals out Total Malfunctions 9 Leak on letdown line in Auxiliary building, nitrogen leak on A Accumulator, H Steam dump fails open, C SG level channel III fails high, steam leak on 40 manifold, steam break at 40 manifold requiring reactor trip, turbine doesnt trip automatically, C MSTV doesnt close, C NRV thermals out Abnormal Events 5 leak on letdown line in Auxiliary building, nitrogen leak on A Accumulator, H Steam dump fails open, C SG level channel III fails high, steam leak on 40 manifold Major Transients 1 Steam break at 40 manifold EOPs Entered 2 1-E-2, 1-ES-l.l EOP Contingencies 0 Critical Tasks 3 SCENARIO DURATION 90 Minutes 2010 NRC RUN 6 Page 3 Revision 0

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

SCENARIO 2010 NRC RUN 6 Scenario begins with unit at 100% power. 1 -FW-P-3A was tagged out last shift for motor bearing replacement. Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1-FW-P-3A.

The first event will be a leak on the letdown line in the Auxiliary building. The crew will enter 1-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage, and isolate the leak. They will place excess letdown in service using 1-OP-8.5, Operation of Excess Letdown. The US will review Tech Specs for primary plant leakage.

The second event will be triggered with event 1 and cause a PCS alarm about 20 minutes later. The event is a slow nitrogen leak on the A SI Accumulator. The crew will enter 1 -OP 7.3,Filling, Sluicing, Draining, Pressurizing, and Venting SI Accumulators, and re-pressurize the accumulator with nitrogen. The US will review Tech Specs. Once the accumulator pressure is back in spec, the next event can occur.

The H steam dump will slowly fail open. The crew will enter 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase, and turn the steam dumps off. An operator should be dispatched to locally isolate the steam dump, the will allow the crew to return the dumps to normal. At this time, the next event can occur.

Level channel III on C SG will fail high causing the C IVFFRV to ramp closed. The crew will enter 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation, and the BOP will take manual control of the C MFRV. Once the crew has identified the correct MOP and the US has reviewed Tech Specs, the next event can occur. The MFRV will remain in manual.

A steam leak will occur on the 40 manifold in the turbine building. The crew will enter 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase, and ramp the unit back. Once a sufficient reactivity manipulation has been observed the next event can occur.

The steam leak will worsen and require the reactor to be tripped. The crew will enter 1 -E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The turbine will not trip automatically, but can be tripped manually with the pushbuttons. The C MSTV will not close and the crew will try to isolate using the NRV. The NRV will thermal out. The crew will transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator, isolate the SG, and eventually to 1-ES-i. 1, SI Termination. Once safety injection has been terminated the scenario can be stopped.

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SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crews performance of various tasks associated with the Initial License Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. A rough log should be maintained to aid in making reports and to help during briefs.

3. Respond to what you see. In the unlikely event that the simulator fails such that illogical indications result, the session will be terminated and the crew informed.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1017 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. Aux steam is onunit2.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

1 -FW-P-3A was tagged out last shift for motor bearing replacement. Maintenance rule window is green.

Shift Orders:

Maintain current plant conditions and support maintenance on 1 -FW-P-3A.

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EVENT 1/1 a: Given that the unit is at power, and indications exist of a letdown leak outside containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 16, increasing Primary Plant Leakage.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Letdown flow decreases on 1 -CH-FI- 1150

. VCT level steadily decreases

. Auxiliary building sump level steadily increases RO identifies decrease in letdown flow.

RO identifies decrease in VCT level.

BOP identifies increase in Aux building sump level.

Crew directs an operator to walkdown the Auxiliary Building and look for primary leaks.

US directs entry into 1-AP-16.

Crew verifies unit in mode 1.

RO verifies primary parameters under operator control. (YES)

RO checks LCV-1 1 15A not diverted.

NOTE: If sent, operator will report that a leak exists on the letdown piping in the Auxiliary Building penetration area. If the leak is already isolated, he will report that the floor is wet back at the letdown penetration.

RO verifies letdown in service with normal indications. (NO)

Crew isolates letdown and minimizes/isolates charging.

Crew verifies that the leak stopped.

NOTE: Crew will initiate 1-OP-8.5 while continuing with 1-AP-16.

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EVENT 1/la: Given that the unit is at power, and indications exist of a letdown leak outside containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage.H TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS la Crew places excess letdown in service Normal using 1-OP-8.5:

• Closes l-CH-HCV-1137

• Verifies 1-CH-MOV 1380 and 1381 are open

• Has operator energize ioop drains

• Places 1-CH-HCV-1389 in VCT position

• Deletes F0134A point from processing, as necessary

• Places l-CH-FCV-1 122 in manual and closes

• Opens a loop drain valve

• Opens 1-CH-HCV-120l

• Slowly opens l-CH-HCV-1 137

• Maintains parameters US directs WCC to make notifications and initiate WR and CR.

US reviews RCS leakage Tech Spec 3.4.13 Action A (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />). Applicable until letdown was isolated and the leak stopped.

Crew initiates leak rate PT.

NOTE: Event 2 was inserted with event 1 and will be handled when it is identified.

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EVENT 2: Given that the plant is at power and a nitrogen leak has developed on an accumulator, the crew will respond in accordance with l-OP-7 3,Filling, Sluicing, Draining, Pressurizing, and Venting SI Accumulators.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. A accumulator pressure decreasing BOP identifies that A accumulator pressure is decreasing.

US directs crew to pressurize the accumulator using 1-OP-7.3.

BOP pressurizes A SI accumulator:

• Places 1-SI-HIC-100 at 0%

. Opens 1-SI-TV-lOO

. Slowly increases output of 1-SI-HIC-100

. Opens 1-SI-HCV-1853A

. Monitors pressure for desired pressure

. Places 1-SI-HIC-100 at 0%

. Closes l-SI-HCV-1853A

. Closes 1-SI-TV-100

. Places l-SI-HIC-100 at 100%

US reports nitrogen leak to WCC and requests WR, CR.

NOTE: Depending on when the crew identifies the nitrogen pressure decreasing and how long it takes them to start the makeup, the following TS may or may not be applicable.

US reviews TS 3.5.1 and determines that accumulator pressure must be kept ?599 psig or returned within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

NOTE: The next event can occur once accumulator is being pressurized and TS have been reviewed.

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EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a steam dump has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. A steam dump shows mid-position

. Reactor power increases (magnitude is dependent on how long valve open)

• Tave decreases

. Megawatts decrease Crew identifies increase in reactor power or steam dump H indicating partially open.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-38.

RO checks steam dumps closed. (NO)

CT1 RO takes steam dumps to OFF. *prior to a reactor trip signal being generated BOP verifies all SG PORVs closed.

BOP verifies main turbine load normal.

Crew verifies reactor power less than or equal to 100% and stable.

RO verifies proper rod operation.

RO energizes pressurizer heaters as necessary to maintain RCS pressure.

BOP checks turbine load control.

BOP places turbine in IMP-iN, when directed.

RO maintains control rods above b/b-b limits and AFD alarm clear.

Crew checks plant status stable.

BOP checks steam flow channel indications are normal.

BOP checks turbine control in operator auto.

NOTE: If an operator was dispatched to the steam dump, he will report an air demand signal of 9#.

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EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a steam dump has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew checks plant steam systems:

. SG PORVs and safeties

. MSR inlets

. MStoASPCV

. Plant steam systems.

Crew checks for RCS dilution.

NOTE: Crew may direct an operator to isolate air to steam dump to allow steam dumps to be returned to service.

Crew verifies cause for load increase has been corrected.

RO checks steam dump interlock switches in OFF/RESET.

NOTE: If crew has isolated the failed steam dump then they may return steam dumps to Tave mode.

Crew verifies steam dumps available.

RO places steam dumps in Tave mode, if applicable.

US directs WCC to make notification and submit WR and CR.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the unit is stable.

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EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Annunciators F-F3 and F-B3 are illuminated.

C Channel III SG level indicator (l-FW-LI-1496) is indicating off-scale low

. C MFRV ramps open and C SG level increases BOP identifies annunciators 1F-F3, SG 1C LEVEL ERROR, and 1F-B3, STM GEN 1C LO-LO LEVEL CR I, II, III.

BOP identifies C SG level channel III has failed low and notifies US.

US directs entry into 1-AP-3.

BOP checks redundant instrumentation normal.

BOP checks SGWLC parameters normal.

(NO)

BOP takes manual control of the C MFRV to restore SG level.

Crew verifies first-stage pressure indications normal.

RO verifies PRZR level channels normal.

RO verifies systems affected by pressurizer level channels are normal.

Crew verifies both turbine first stage pressure channels normal.

Crew verifies operable channels selected for SGWLC.

NOTE: The MFRV must remain in manual for this failure.

Crew verifies no other inoperable channels.

US references technical specifications:

3.3.1 Function 14, Condition E 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to place channel in trip 3.3.2 Functions 5b and 6b, Condition D 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to place channel in trip Crew identifies l-MOP-55.76.

US requests WCC to make notifications and submit WR and CR.

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EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

HME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS NOTE: The next event can occur after the crew has identified the appropriate MOP and the US has reviewed TS.

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EVENT 5: Given that the unit is at power, and a steam leak outside containment has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38. Excessive Load Increase.

11 TIME I - EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power increases

. Tave decreases

. RCS pressure and pressurizer level decrease

. MW decrease RO identifies reactor power increasing unexpectedly.

BOP identifies megawatts decreasing.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-38.

RO verifies all steam dumps closed.

BOP verifies all SG PORVs closed.

Crew verifies main turbine load normal and reactor power 100% and stable. (NO)

NOTE: If an operator is dispatched then the leak will be reported as being in the turbine building in the vicinity of the 40 header. If not, someone should report it within 5 minutes.

RO commences lowering Tave using boration/control rods.

BOP commences lowering main turbine load.

Crew checks reactor power reduced to the power level before the event started.

NOTE: If the crew decides to trip the reactor at this time, the next event will occur at that time.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has stabilized reactor power or decided to trip the unit.

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EVENT 6: Given that a steam leak outside containment has increased to a steam break, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

TIME I EXPECTED ACTION I INSTRUCTOR REMARKS SPD Verified: (Initials)

. Reactor power increases

. Tave decreases

. RCS pressure and pressurizer level decrease

. MW decrease

• Turbine does not automatically trip RO identifies degradation of primary plant parameters.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of l-E-O.

RO/BOP manually trip reactor.

CT2 BOP trips turbine: *pdor to a severe challenge (orange path)

• Presses manual trip pushbuttons to subcriticality or integrity CSFs OR transition to ECA-2.1 RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.

Crew checks if SI is actuated or required.

(YES)

Crew manually actuates safety injection.

RO reviews CAP items 1-6. Attached NOTE: If crew does not close MSTVs, a phone call will be made about steam blowing out in the turbine building. The C MSTV will not close. The attempt to close the NRV will be by either attachment 8 or 1-E-2.

Crew isolates steam leak: C MSTV will not close.

Crew closes A and B MSTVs C NRV will thermal out Crew attempts to close l-MS-NRV-1O1C US holds transient brief.

US initiates attachment 4(5) and 7. Attached NOTE: The following steps are from attachment 7 of l-E-O.

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EVENT 6: Given that a steam leak outside containment has increased to a steam break, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS CT3 Crew isolates faulted SG: *prior to exiting 1 E-2 Crew identifies faulted SG as Crew verifies all MSTVs closed (NO)

Crew closes all SG Non-Return valves and NRV bypasses Crew isolates Main feedwater Crew closes 1-JW-HCV-100C Crew verifies affected SG PORVs closed.

RO verifies SI flow. E-O steps Crew verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS Tave stable at or trending to 547°F.

Crew adjusts AFW flow, as required.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

RO verifies RCPs are stopped.

RO verifies charging pump recirc valves closed.

BOP checks SGs not faulted. (NO)

US directs transition to 1-E-2.

Crew verifies MS isolation.

Crew closes all SG NRVs, if not previously closed.

NOTE: If the A and B NRVs were not closed previously, it is possible the crew will transition to l-ECA-2.l. The CAP will return them to E-2 once any SG pressure is increasing.

Crew checks pressure in all SGs.

Crew identifies faulted SG as C.

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EVENT 6: Given that a steam leak outside containment has increased to a steam break, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,u and 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

TIME EXPECTED ACTION INSTRUCTOR REMARKS Crew verifies attachment 7 of 1-E-0 is complete. (If not, crew will isolate feed sources.)

Crew verifies SG BD TVs are closed.

Crew initiates attachment for local operations.

Crew checks ECST level is > 40%.

Crew verifies outside IA supplying containment.

Crew checks secondary radiation:

. RO resets SI, Phase A, and AMSAC

• Crew checks last known SG blowdown radiation

• Crew checks last known AE radiation

• Crew checks MS line and Terry turbine radiation.

Crew checks if SI can be terminated:

. RCS subcooling> 25°F

. Secondary heat sink

. RCS pressure stable or increasing

. Pressurizer level > 21%

US announces transition to 1-ES-i. 1, step 1.

RO resets both trains of SI.

RO stops one charging pump.

Crew checks RCS pressure stable or increasing.

Crew isolates BIT:

. Verify/open 1-CH-MOV-i373

. Verify/open i-CH-MOV-i275A/B/C

. Close BIT inlet isolations 1-SI-MOV-1867A/B

• Close BIT outlet isolations 1-SI-MOV-1867C/D

. Verify i-SI-MOV-1836, 1869A and 1 869B_are_closed.

NOTE: The scenario can be stopped No EAL once SI is terminated in 1-ES-1.1.

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2010 NRC RUN6 Page 17 Revision 0 REFERENCES PROCEDURE REV.

Operating Procedure i-OP-7.3,Filling, Sluicing, Draining, Pressurizing, and 50-P2 Venting SI Accumulators.

Operating Procedure i-OP-8.5, Operation of Excess Letdown. 20 Abnormal Procedure i-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage. 26 Abnormal Procedure i-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase. 16 Abnormal Procedure i-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation. 24 Maintenance Operating Procedure 1-MOP-55.76,Steam Generator Level. 7 Emergency Procedure i-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. 42 Emergency Procedure l-E-2, Faulted SG Isolation. 12 Emergency Procedure 1-ES-i .1, SI Termination. 21 Station Annunciator Response Procedures. N/A Guide and Reference Document PI-AA-5000, Human Performance. 3 INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: TNPO 88-003, Jan. 1988 INPO, ACAD 07-002 Simulator Training Guidelines Jan. 2007 2010 NRC RUN 6 Page 18 Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1- SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHMENT 2- SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET (Last page of scenario) 2010 NRC RUN 6 Page 19 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN 6 Page 20 Revision 0

SIMULATOR OPERATOWS COMPUTER PROGRAM 2010 NRC RUN6 Initial conditions

1. Recall IC 192

2. Ensure Tave (575-585), Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Rackout 1-FW-P-3A pump breaker and close discharge valve.

4. Place sticker on 1-FW-P-3A.

5. Designate 1J as the protected train.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START CONDITION MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

Failure of turbine to trip Malfunction:

automatically TUO3 UC MSTV doesnt close Malfunction:

C NRV thermals out MS0503 Switch Overrides:

MSTVAPPRCLOSE, Override = OFF MOV Control:

Set up trigger 15 on trigger screen to actuate when the NRV is about 50% closed MSNRV1O1C .LE. 0.5 MSNRV1O1CRACKIN = RACKOUT, Trigger =15 2O1ONRCRUN6 Page2l RevisionO

SCENARIO EVENTS EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Letdown leak Malfunction:

CHO2, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 120, Severity = 100, Trigger = 1 NOTE: When sent to penetration area, give a cue for current plant conditions, if leak not isolated then water is leaking out, if isolated then floor is wet and pipes are dripping water. Can later report that leak was downstream of 1-CH-TV-1204B.

Remote function:

HCV1557 ENERGIZE = T, Trigger =20 NOTE: The next event is on the same trigger and will be handled when it is identified.

2) A accumulator nitrogen Malfunction:

leak SIOlOl, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 30, Severity = 10, Trigger = 1 NOTE: The next event can occur once accumulator is being pressurized and TS have been reviewed.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

3) Steam dump failure Remote Function:

MSTCV4O8HDESD, Severity 50, Trigger =3 NOTE: Setup a trigger 9 to close the valve once when a steam dump switch is taken to OFF:

Trigger 9 SD2A_OFFRESET(1) .EQ. 1 .OR. SD2B_OFF RESET .EQ. 1 Command: IRF MSTCV408H DESD 0 NOTE: If sent to investigate, the TB operator can report a 9#

air demand signal on the valve.

NOTE: If directed to isolate air, report that air is isolated and valve is closed. (1-IA-1046 is air isolation valve to H steam dump.)

NOTE: If directed to isolate air then insert trigger 10 after air is isolated.

Lamp Overrides: (To give indication that 1-MS-TCV-1408H remains closed on reactor trip.)

TCV4O8H GREEN, Override = ON, Trigger = 10 TCV4O8H RED, Override OFF, Trigger = 10 NOTE: 1-MS-168 manually isolates B steam dump header.

NOTE: The next event will occur once the unit is stable, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

4) C SG level transmitter t Malfunction:

failure FWO 109, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 5, Severity -1, Trigger = 4 NOTE: The next event can occur after the crew has identified the appropriate MOP and the US has reviewed TS.

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EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

5) Steam leak on 40 Malfunctions:

manifold MS0901, Delay time 5, Ramp = 60, Severity = 0.5, Trigger 5 MS0902, Delay time 5, Ramp = 60, Severity = 0.5, Trigger 5 MS0903, Delay time = 5, Ramp = 60, Severity = 0.5, Trigger 5 NOTE: Once crew has identified the possibility of a steam leak: Call the control room as a mechanic or operator and tell the crew that you can see steam blowing up at the 40 manifold.

NOTE: The next event can occur once the crew has stabilized reactor power or decided to trip the unit.

6) Steam rupture at 40 Update malfunction MS0903 to 10% over 30 seconds using manifold trigger 6.

IMFMSO9O3 (6 0) 1030 NOTE: If crew does not close MSTVs after tripping reactor and turbine, call and report steam blowing across the turbine building mezzanine.

NOTE: Scenario can be stopped once crew has performed steps in 1-ES-l.1 2010 NRC RUN 6 Page 24 Revision 0

ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2010 NRC RUN 6 Page 25 Revision 0

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures, and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. During shift operations the shift manager will take a conservative course of action, especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated with plant evolutions.

B. During shift operations the shift manager will provide overall crew guidance by prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative procedures.

C. During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D. During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation strategy.

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EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power, and indications exist of a letdown leak outside containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R520 Respond to increasing primary plant leakage.

CRITICAL TASK:

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EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the plant is at power and a nitrogen leak has developed on an accumulator, the crew will respond in accordance with l-OP-7.3,Filling, Sluicing, Draining, Pressurizing, and Venting SI Accumulators.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R589 Pressurize a safety injection accumulator CRITICAL TASK:

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EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a steam dump has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase CRITICAL TASK:

See Next page 2010 NRC RUN 6 Page 29 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew stops power increase.

Safety Significance:

Failure to stop power increase and coolant temperature decrease would cause average coolant temperature to drop below the minimum temperature for criticality, and the following can not be assured : 1) Moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) Protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) P 12 interlock is above its setpoint, and 4) Compliance with Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50.

Cues:

Indication of power increase:

Several annunciators. (i.e. PRZR Hi/Lo Press, PRZR Lo Level)

Reactor power increasing.

• Steam flow increasing.

Performance Indicator:

RO places both steam dump interlock switches to off/reset.

Feedback:

Reactor power increase stopped Steam dumps indicate closed Steam flow decreased WOG

Reference:

None Conditions:

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on over power.

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EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure S70 Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

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EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that the unit is at power, and a steam leak outside containment has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase CRITICAL TASK:

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EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES EVENT GOAL: Given that a steam leak outside containment has increased to a steam break, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ES-l.l, SI Termination.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

Ri 85 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection Ri 89 Terminate safety injection R727 Perform the phase A isolation verification following a safety injection actuation CRITICAL TASK:

See following pages 2010 NRC RUN 6 Page 33 Revision 0

CT Statement:

Crew manually trips the turbine.

Safety Significance:

Failure to trip the turbine under the postulated conditions would cause an additional RCS cooldown beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Cues:

Indicationlannunciation that a reactor trip has occurred Indication that the turbine did not automatically or manually trip.

Indication of rapidly decreasing RCS temperatures Performance Indicator:

BOP places both EHC pumps in PTL OR manually runback turbine Feedback:

Annunciationlindication that all turbine stop valves are closed.

WOG

Reference:

E-O -- Q Background Conditions:

Prior to a severe challenge (orange path) to subcriticality or integrity CSFs OR transition to ECA-2.l.

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CT Statement:

Crew isolates faulted Steam Generator.

Safety Significance:

Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the integrity CSF beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. For the reference plant, neither of these transients (blowdown of a single SG with or without RCPs running) constitutes an orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF. However, if the faulted SG is not isolated, the cooldown transient for reactor vessel inlet temperature could result in an orange-path challenge to the integrity CSF, especially if RCPs are not running.

Cues:

• B SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely depressurized and Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the faulted SG Performance Indicator:

BOP closes 1-FW-HCV-100C to secure AFW flow to C steam generator.

Feedback:

AFW flow indication to C steam generator decreases to zero.

WOG

Reference:

E-2 -- A Background Conditions:

Prior to transitioning out of E-2.

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ATTACHMENT 3 SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE DATASHEET

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 1: Given that the unit is at power, and indications exist of a letdown leak outside containment, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1 -AP- 16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Letdown flow decreases on 1-CH-FI-1150

• VCT level steadily decreases

• Auxiliary building sump level steadily increases EVENT 2: Given that the plant is at power and a nitrogen leak has developed on an accumulator, the crew will respond in accordance with 1 -OP-7.3,Filling, Sluicing, Draining, Pressurizing, and Venting SI Accumulators.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• A accumulator pressure decreasing EVENT 3: Given that the unit is at power and a steam dump has failed open, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• A steam dump shows mid-position

• Reactor power increases (magnitude is dependent on how long valve open)

• Tave decreases

• Megawatts decrease EVENT 4: Given that the unit is at power and a steam generator level transmitter has failed, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Annunciators F-F3 and F-B3 are illuminated.

• C Channel III SG level indicator (1-FW-LI-1496) is indicating off-scale low

• C MFRV ramps open and C SG level increases 2O1ONRCRIJN6 Date Revision 0

Scenario Performance Datasheet EVENT 5 Given that the umt is at power, and a steam leak outside containment has occurred, the crew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-AP-38, Excessive Load Increase.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power increases

• Tave decreases

• RCS pressure and pressurizer level decrease

• MW decrease EVENT 6 Given that a steam leak outside containment has increased to a steam break, the ciew will be expected to respond in accordance with l-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 1-ES-1.l, SI Termination.

SPD Verified: (Initials)

• Reactor power increases

• Tave decreases

• RCS pressure and pressurizer level decrease

• MW decrease

• Turbine does not automatically trip 2010 NRC RUN 6 Date Revision 0