L-10-087, Response to Enforcement Action EA-09-332 from Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Notice of Violation, Inspection Report No. 05000346-09-007
| ML102520102 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/2010 |
| From: | Allen B FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Satorius M Division of Nuclear Materials Safety III |
| References | |
| EA-09-332, IR-09-007, L-10-087 | |
| Download: ML102520102 (8) | |
Text
FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Barry S. Allen Vice President - Nuclear March 22, 2010 L-10-087 Mr. Mark A. Satorius, Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite ~~10 Lisle, IL 60532-4352
SUBJECT:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Docket Number 50-346, License Number NPF-3 Response to Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 05000346/2009007; EA-09-332 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor. Ohio 43449 419-321-7676 Fax. 4/9-321-7582 This letter proVides the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's (FENOC) response to apparent violations contained in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 2009-007, dated February 19, 2010, for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS).
A Component Design Basis Inspection (CDBI) was conducted from October 19, 2009, to November 20, 2009, with the results documented in NRC Inspection Report 2009-007. Based on the results of this inspection, one finding associated with two (2) apparent violations was identified with activities involving the DBNPS fuel transfer tube blind flanges and a DBNPS Technical Specification Amendment implemented ten years ago in March 2000. The apparent violations are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The referenced Inspection Report discusses these two (2) apparent violations (AV 05000346/2009007-01).
On March 1,2010, FENOC notified Mr. Jamie Benjamin of NRC Region III that FENOC would not be requesting a Regulatory Conference regarding the issues documented in the Inspection Report for the two (2) apparent violations. While, FENOC does not contest that the apparent violations occurred, FENOC respectfully requests the NRC consider the information provided in the attachment to this letter in support of the appropriate categorization of these apparent violations.
These issues were entered into the DBNPS Corrective Action Program. The investigations have been completed and corrective actions have been developed.
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 L-10-087 Page 2 of 2 As outlined in the Inspection Report cover letter, FENOC provides the attached information regarding the apparent violations.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Dale R. Wuokko, Site Regulatory Compliance Manager, at (419) 321-7120.
Sincerely,
..6:; 5. ALL-Barry S. Allen JCS
Attachment:
Response to Apparent Violations 50-346/2009-007-01 cc:
NRC Document Control Desk DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector DB-1 NRCINRR Project Manager Utility Radiological Safety Board
Attachment L-10-087 Page 1 of6 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Response to Apparent Violations 50-346/2009-007-01 Response to Apparent Violations Apparent Violations The following two paragraphs are from page 2 of the Inspection Report.
A finding associated with two Apparent Violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified by the inspectors.
Specifically, the licensee failed to implement design control measures which assured that the design basis, as specified in the license application, was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions and failed to correctly update the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to reflect the safety analyses associated with License Amendment 240. As a result of these failures, the current fuel transfer tube blind flange seal configuration was contrary to the licensing basis. The successful as-left local leak rate tests performed during the prior refueling outage (Refueling Outage 15) provided reasonable assurance for continued operation. The finding and apparent violations were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors assessed the preliminary significance of the finding using the traditional enforcement policy. The inspectors determined that had the information been complete and accurate at the time of amendment approval, the NRC would have reconsidered the regulatory position or initiated substantial further inquiry. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance Resources, because the licensee did not have complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages. This cross-cutting aspect is considered reflective of current performance because the procedures in place at the time of this inspection, in addition to the procedures in place during the 1999-2000 timeframe, did not provide adequate guidance.
Response to Apparent Violation. 10 CFR 50.71(e)
Apparent Violation The following paragraph is from page 16 of the Inspection Report.
The licensee's November 15, 2000, Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) update did not include the effects of all safety analyses and evaluations performed by the licensee in support of an approved license amendment. The licensee failed to identify that the surveillance test history from September 1991 through May 1998 using a double O-ring configuration, showed no test failures, and that this information was used to support approval of a March 28,2000, license amendment. This appears to be inconsistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e) and is considered an Apparent Violation.
Attachment L-10-087 Page 2 of6 Reason for the Apparent Violation The cause of the DBNPS failure to include the Fuel Transfer Tubes Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.163 exception from as-found testing in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to reflect Technical Specification (TS) Amendment 240 could not be determined. The individuals involved with implementing the TS Amendment or the USAR change are no longer with the company or those that are cannot recall the details of the License Amendment Request (LAR), TS Amendment 240 or the USAR change after approximately nine years. The USAR change was incorporated into USAR Revision 22, dated November 15, 2000. The documentation in the LAR file was primarily related to the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Option B approach for Type Band C containment and the penetrations in general. Therefore, the RG 1.163 exception may have been overlooked. However, as noted in the Inspection Report, the procedures for updating the USAR were not complete in that they did not proVide adequate guidance for determining the appropriate content for updating the USAR to incorporate the effects of license amendments.
Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved A review of other DBNPS TS License Amendment Request safety evaluations that may have been requested with exceptions or exemptions was performed. No similar instances were found.
Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations Information regarding the Fuel Transfer Tubes Blind Flanges as-found testing exception basis, as described in the License Amendment Request and accepted by the NRC in TS Amendment 240, will be initiated in a USAR change notice and approved by FENOC as described in NOP-LP-4008, "Licensing Documents Change Process." Once approved, it will be made available for individuals to review during their 10 CFR 50.59 reviews for the various facility change processes. The change will then be incorporated into the next DBNPS USAR Revision due six months after the current refueling outage (16RFO).
Industry benchmarking for updating the USAR and coordinating TS changes will be conducted. Based on this benchmarking, the procedures will be revised appropriately.
Date When Full Compliance will be Achieved Full compliance with 10 CFR 50.71(e) will be achieved with incorporation of the change into the DBNPS USAR no later than June 30, 2010.
Attachment L-10-087 Page 30f6 Apparent Violation. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III Apparent Violation The following paragraph is from page 16 of the Inspection Report.
In Equivalent Replacement Review (ERR) 60-0003-070, the licensee allowed the fuel transfer tube blind flange seal configuration to change from a double O-ring configuration having a test history of no as-found local leak rate test failures to a flat gasket configuration without a comparable test history. This appears inconsistent with the licensing basis, which became effective March 28, 2000, through approval of a license amendment. This appears to be inconsistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III and is considered an Apparent Violation.
Reason for the Apparent Violation The ERR process failed to communicate the change to personnel familiar with statements made in the License Amendment Request (LAR) associated with TS Amendment 240. If this communication would have been made, either further investigation into the LAR may have occurred causing the ERR to be cancelled or additional information about the flat gasket design to be communicated to the NRC for their consideration during the processing of the LAR.
Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved During a mid-cycle outage in February of 2005 after approximately one year of service with the flat gaskets installed, as-found testing of Fuel Transfer Tube Blind Flanges was conducted and the joints were found to have zero leakage.
An as-found test of the Fuel Transfer Tube Blind Flanges prior to disassembly was performed in 16RFO on March 8, 2010. The configuration tested in 16RFO had O-rings as the inner seal and flat gaskets on the outer seal. The 16RFO as-found test data shows the inner and outer seal leakage did not increase from the 15RFO as-left local leak rate taken on January 24, 2008. The February 2005 mid-cycle, 15RFO and 16RFO test results met the local leak rate test acceptance criteria. Therefore, there was no operability concern during operation and there is no gasket material issue between the flat gasket used and the O-ring used.
Corrective Steps to Avoid Further Violations Procedure DB-MM-09186, "Fuel Transfer Tube Blind Flange Removal and Reinstallation," was revised to specify the use of one piece, seamless O-rings for both the inner and outer grooves of the Fuel Transfer Tube Blind Flange seal configuration.
Attachment L-10-087 Page 4 of 6 This procedure revision became effective March 5, 2010. This was also reflected in the Preventive Maintenance (PM) task used to generate instructions for future work orders.
Current design control-related processes and procedures will be reviewed to ensure they are adequate to prevent recurrence of events of the type described in this condition report.
Date when full compliance will be achieved Full compliance will be achieved when the DBNPS processes and procedures are changed. This will be completed by October 1, 2010.
Categorization of the Apparent Violations Significance Determination of Apparent Violations The NRC Enforcement Policy, last updated November 28, 2008, under "Supplement I -
Reactor Operations" provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of reactor operations. Severity Level III violation example C.1 0 states:
The failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71 (e) where the unupdated FSAR was used in performing a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for a change to the facility or procedures, implemented without prior Commission approval, that results in a condition evaluated as having low to moderate, or greater safety significance (Le., white, yellow, or red) by the SOP.
As described above, the as-found local leak rate testing of the Fuel Transfer Tube Blind Flanges was found to be acceptable in the mid-cycle outage in February 2005 and in 16RFO. This demonstrates there was no operability concern during operation and there is no material issue between the flat gasket and O-ring specified. It does not appear that this finding meets the criteria of the Severity Level III violation specified above in the Enforcement Policy, as a failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) where the unupdated FSAR was used in performing a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for a change to the facility, implemented without prior Commission approval, that results in a condition evaluated as having low to moderate, or greater safety significance. As shown by the two (2) acceptable as-found local leak rate test results, this failure to update the USAR did not result in an unacceptable change to the facility.
Therefore, in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy this finding is of very low safety significance (Le., green or Severity Level IV), and does not appear to be a Severity Level III violation.
The NRC Enforcement Policy under "Supplement VII - Miscellaneous Matters" provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the
Attachment L-10-087 Page 5 of 6 appropriate severity level for violations involving miscellaneous matters. Severity Level III violation example C.1 states:
Incomplete or inaccurate information that is provided to the NRC (a) because of inadequate actions on the part of licensee officials but not amounting to a Severity Levell or II violation, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate at the time provided, likely would have resulted in a reconsideration of a regulatory position or substantial further inquiry such as an additional inspection or a formal request for information.
It is important to review the timeline of the submittal of the License Amendment Request, approval of ERR 60-0003-070, approval of the License Amendment, and the implementation of the ERR in the plant, as follows:
July 26, 1999: Submittal of the License Amendment Request for NRC review.
March 6, 2000: ERR approved.
March 28, 2000: NRC approval of License Amendment 240.
April 1, 2000: Commencement of the Twelve Refueling Outage (12RFO) during which flat gaskets were installed in the Fuel Transfer Tube Blind Flanges per the ERR.
Accordingly, at the time the License Amendment Request was provided to the NRC the information was accurate and complete. Although the ERR was approved prior to the License Amendment being approved, it was not implemented in the plant until after the License Amendment was approved, and the plant personnel involved with the License Amendment Request were not aware of the ERR. The ERR could have been prepared and approved after the approval of the License Amendment in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process. It does not appear that this example includes the situation at the DBNPS whereby information was accurate and complete at the time of submittal, but for which changes were subsequently planned for future implementation.
The NRC Enforcement Policy under "Supplement I--Reactor Operations" provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of reactor operations. Severity Level IV violation example D.6 states:
A failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) in cases where the erroneous information is not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures.
This example appears to be applicable to the situation that occurred because ERR 60-0003-070 used to install flat gaskets instead of O-ring gaskets was processed in parallel with the NRC's review of FENOC's request for License Amendment No. 240, and
Attachment L-10-087 Page 6 of6 approved prior to the NRC's approval of the amendment. Since the amendment request had not yet been approved by the NRC when the ERR was approved, the DBNPS USAR could not have been updated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e) to reflect the effects of approved License Amendment No. 240 Safety Evaluation that provided the basis for no longer performing as-found testing on the Fuel Transfer Tube Blind Flanges. Rather, the failure to update the USAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) with the information from NRC-approved License Amendment 240 later resulted in the situation where the erroneous information (Le., the lack of updated information in the USAR regarding the crediting of O-ring use for removing the as-found testing requirements), was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. This is because the ERR had been approved prior to the USAR being reqUired to be revised. Therefore, in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy this finding appears to fit within this example and should be categorized as a Severity IV violation.
FENOC respectfully requests that the NRC consider this information in the final determination of the severity level of these two apparent violations.
NRC Cross-Cutting Aspect Assignment The Inspection Report states, "this finding (AV 050003461 2009007-01) has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance Resources because the licensee did not have complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages. Specifically, the licensee procedures for updating the USAR were not complete in that, they did not provide adequate guidance for determining the appropriate content for updating the USAR. This cross-cutting aspect is considered reflective of current performance because the procedures in place at the time of this inspection, in addition to the procedures in place during the 1999-2000 timeframe, did not provide adequate guidance. (H.2(c>>"
The FENOC does not believe this finding is indicative of current performance. This issue with the Fuel Transfer Tube Blind Flange gaskets did not occur within the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, described previous 3-years in order to be reflective of current performance. Technical Specification Amendment 240 was issued on March 28, 2000. During this ten-year span of time, no similar examples have been identified. Additionally, due to the age of the issue, as described in the Condition Report 09-68029 that evaluated this issue, a cause could not be determined. Since the "performance characteristic" that is the most significant contributor to the performance deficiency could not be determined, FENOC does not believe a cross-cutting aspect should be assigned.