ML102280174

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Part 21 Report 4160 Vac Control and Transfer Breaker Switch Defect
ML102280174
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/10/2010
From: Madsen D
Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
46165
Download: ML102280174 (2)


Text

081101201 0 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Paze I Power Reactor Event# 46165 Site: COOPER Notification Date / Time: 08/10/2010 13:43 (EDT)

Unit: 1 Region: 4 State: NE Event Date / Time: 08/09/2010 12:30 (CDT)

Reactor Type: [1] GE-4 Last Modification: 08/10/2010 Containment Type: MARK I NRC Notified by: DAVID NELSON MADSEN Notifications: NEIL OKEEFE R4DO HQ Ops Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ PART 21 GROUP Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:

21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH Unit Scram Code RX Crit Init Power Initial RX Mode Curr Power Current RX Mode 1 N Yes 100 Power Operation 1100 Power Operation.

4160 VAC CONTROL AND TRANSFER BREAKER SWITCH DEFECT "On August 9, 2010 at 12:30 CDT, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) completed a reportability determination which concluded that certain General Electric - Hitachi (GEH) Type SB-1 Control and Transfer Switches, contained a defect that would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of safety related 4160 VAC breakers at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS), had the switches been installed as received. NPPD has concluded this condition is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21.

"Specifically, GEH supplied 23 Type SB-1 Control and Transfer Switches under GEH part number Q16SB1EB4G75SSS1C142 to CNS. 14 of the 23 switches exhibited a failure to maintain the established contact logic when implementing the logic feature of these switches. This condition was discovered during pre-installation testing in support of a station modification of 4160 VAC breaker control. The defect would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of the essential affected 4160 VAC breakers. This would have prevented the transfer of the essential 4160 VAC switchgear from the normal station service transformer to either source of offsite power or the emergency diesel generators and the sequential loading of emergency core cooling system pumps in response to a design basis accident LOCA.

"All of the switches have been returned to GEH, and none were installed in the station. Therefore, the condition is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73. These switches were designed and supplied by GEH as a safety related part, specifically for CNS. NPPD is unaware as to if this specific switch design has been supplied to any other licensee. The condition is being reported under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). The Responsible [NPPD] Corporate Officer has been notified of this condition per 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(i) on August 9, 2010 at 15:45 CDT- Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) written notification is due to the NRC within 30 days of this notification."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

09/10/2010 12:41 FAX 402 825 5818 NPPO ONS 4 NRC OPS CENTER la001/001 NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY OPERATIONS CENTER COMMISSION (12-2000)

REACTOR PLANT EN #

EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 OR 800-532-3469", BACKUPS - (1") 301-951-0550 OR 800-449.3694' 12" 301415-0550AND3 5301-415-0553 *Liccnsm who mintain **c" own M are provided thee tecfpbrcn nurnbqi, NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT VIAME OF CALLER I, CALL BACK#

Cooper Nuclear Station I S( avid -teven NGogRk elson 402-5s-551 402475-5817 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER / MODE BEFORE POWER / MODE AFTER 12:30 CDT 05/09/2010 100% / Mode I 100% / Mode l EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emergeney 10 CFR 50.72(bfl) (vXA)Sne S/D Capaifflity AMA

- GENERAL EMEROSN5-CY GEN/AAEC 1 [ Deviaziin ADEY _ I

)(B} RHR Cacbilily AIN1 sITE AREA EMEROiENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Eme uener 10 CFR 50.72(b)2) (YXC)CoamlofitdReiaxe AINC ALERT ALE/tAAC (i) TS Rmfrd S/ID AHU [)(fJ AkC*lC*A1 M0l42glo A[

UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AASC (ivXA) ECCEDi,*shae to RICS ACCS N(W OffaktMdical AMED 50.72NON.EMERGENCY_- (menw coluhmn) (1v)(1) MSAtmixao (wram) ARPS (xiii) L.= Comm/AxmVl*Rp ACOM FHYSiCAL SECUIRITY (71.71) DDDD (xi) Ofttr Nmflcen AIPRE 60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(a(1)

MATERKIAL.*POFQUKE M 8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72b)31 Invalid So,ifi*dSyic*

,,* n mi A(/V FITNESS FOR DUTY ISFIT (1iXA) DqrmnlCondhian ADEG Other Unspecllied RequIrement (Identify)

OTHER UNSPECIFEDREE*MT (t 1. -I-t)a j ("iNB) ,*lyziConaiokt AUNA X "I.I) NONG.

INFORMATIOONNLr . NINP I Il vA) Spomfd Swnmm Amsan AMEP NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions aken or planned, etc (Continue on back)

On August 9, 2010 at 12:30 CDT, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) completed a reportability determination which concluded that certain General Electric - Hitachi (GEH) Type SB-i Control and Transfer Switches, contained a defect that would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of safety related 4160 VAC breakers at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS), had the switches been installed as received. NPPD has concluded this condition is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21.

Specifically, G3EH supplied 23 Type SB-i Control and Transfer Switches under GEE part number QI6SBlEB4G75SSSlCi42 to CNS 14 of the 23 switches exhibited a failure to maintain the established contact logic when implementing the logic feature of these switches, This condition was discovered during pre-installation testing in support of a station modification of 4160 VAC breaker control. The defect would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of the essential affected 4160 VAC breakers. This would have prevented the transfer of the essential 4160 VAC switchgear from the normal station service transformer to either source of offsite power or the emergency diesel generators and the sequential loading of emergency core cooling system pumps in response to a design basis accident LOCA.

All of the switches have been returned to GEH, and none were installed in the station. Therefore, the condition is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73. These switches were designed and supplied by GEH as a safety related part, specifically for CNS. NPPD is unaware as to if this specific switch design has been supplied to any other licensee.

The condition is being reported under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). The Responsible Corporate Officer has been notified of this condition per 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) on August 9, 2010 at 15:45 CDT- Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) written notification is due to the NRC within 30 days of this notification.

NOTI ICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NRC RESIDENT X NOT UNDERSTOOD? [] YES (explain abowv) 0 NO STATE(s) X DID ALL SYSTEMS LOCAL X FUNCTION AS REQUIRED? 0n YES - None Required H NO (explain above)

OTHER GOV AGENCIES X MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK?

MEDITPRESS RELEASE X UNTIL CORRECTED. I RESTART DATE: N/A [ YES Z NO NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)