ML101550539

Assignment Report (AR) 01000819 Report

ML101550539
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	01/28/2010
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	NRC Region 1
References
AR 01000819, FOIA/PA-2010-0118
Download: ML101550539 (15)

Text

A-K,- ASSignment Keport Page 1 of 3 Go Back Print I New Search I Home AR 01000819 Report Aft Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: APPROVED Island Aft Unit: NA Owed To: A5552CAP Due Date: 02/23/2010 Aft System: Event Date: 11/21/2009 CR 4/B Disc Date: 11/21/2009 Level/Class:

How H02 Ii, Orig Date: 12/03/2009 Discovered: V l'e WR/PIMS AR: Component #: 1rUri Aibtion Itequest'Details§ ,

Subject:

RB NOT NEGATIVE PRESSURE DURING HIGH CONTAMINATION WORK jip

Description:

Originator: CATHERINE G HARDEE Supv Contacted: Russ Green, C. Wend, R Barley Condition

Description:

Contrary to requirements of ECR TM 06-00816, Rev 1, Containment Structural Opening, RB purge was not maintained to induce air flow into containment after the RB liner plate was removed. The RB liner plate was removed to provide a construction opening to support OTSG replacement during T1R18. I Additionally, the alternative measures prescribed for cases when the RB purge was unavailable apparently were not applied.

Immediate actions taken:

Immediate Actions:

1.) RB Purge restored.

2.) Operations Standing Order issued to ensure appropriate control of RB purge and to ensure airflow into reactor building maintained or alternate control measures in place.

Recommended Actions:

Review issue with regard to failure to implement design requirements and lack of organizational sensitivity to potential release pathway. Identify.

and implement corrective actions Why did the condition happen?

A single point of contact for all ventilation related activities was recommended by Ops-during the ECR review but does not appear to have been impleme -

Referen ýIR 994989 alered station personnel to this problem on 11/18/09.

Operable Basis:

Reportable Basis:

Reviewed by: BRADLEY A PARFITT 12/03/2009 09:44:02 CST Reviewer Comments:

Reviewed by Operations for'operability and reportability. This issue has 1 /1") 01"Pin OI1t IA httr):H/eam~yenco.ceco com/c.,-n/.-,.rvlt-et/Rp~nrrtAR CPriil t1

AR - Assignment Report Page z or j, no impact on the ability to safely operate the plant, to achieve. or maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition, or to mitigate the effect of any accident condition. This is a process issue that does not identify an equipment deficiency that affects operability of any SSC. There are no operability or reportability concerns.

SOC Reviewed by: SUZANNE M SULLIVAN 12/09/2009 09:57:04 CST SOC Comments:

Followup to Ops to determine action. (SOC 12/04/09)

Design Engineering agreed to take the lead on the ACE. Close to ACE actions created. (REH 12/8/09) (SOC 12/09/09)

Reviewed by: RANDY E HESS 12/08/2009 10:00:25 CST Reviewer Comments:

Issue discussed with Operations, Engineering, SGRP, and the airborne RCE team lead. Design Engineering agreed' to lead the ACE with assistance from Operatiosn and SGRP. ACE actions created. (REH 12/08/09)

AssignmenIts -4, Assign #: 01 Assigned To: Status: COMPLETE Aft Fac: Three Mile Prim Grp: ACAPALL Due Date: 12/08/2009 Island Assign Type: TRKG Sec Grp: Orig Due Date: pp/pp/pppp Priority:

Schedule Ref:

Unit Condition:

Subject/Description: RB NOT NEGATIVE PRESSURE DURING HIGH CONTAMINATION WORK Assign #: 02 Assigned To: U00OM5H Status: ACC/ASG Aft Fac: Three Mile Prim Grp: A5552NESD Due Date: 02/03/2010 Island Assign Type: ACE Sec Grp: Orig Due Date: 12/28/2009 Priority:

Schedule Ref:

Unit Condition:

Subject/Description: Perform ACE on IR 1000819.

Assign #: 03 Assigned To: U00OM5H Status: ACC/ASG Aft Fac: Three Mile Prim Grp: A5552NESD Due Date: 02/17/2010 Island Assign Type: MRC Sec Grp: Orig Due Date: 01/11/2010 Priority:

Schedule Ref:

Unit Condition:

Present ACE on IR 1000819 to MRC. Note: Schedule MRC presentation with the Subject/Description: Engineering CAPCO following EARB review of the ACE.

Assign #: 04 Assigned To: U999PLF Status: ACC/ASG httn-1I/enrn n-.nr~n encmrn.ervei nrAR rvt1//20 ]/28/2010

,. AR Assignment Report Page 3 of 3 Aft Fac: Three Mile Prim Grp: A5552NESD Due Date: 02/23/2010 Island Assign Type: ACIT Sec Grp: Orig Due Date: 01/25/2010 Priority:

Schedule Ref:

Unit Condition:

Subject/Description: Update trend codes following MRC approval of ACE on IR 10 00819.

Assign #: 05 Assigned To: U000BY0 Status: COMPLETE Aft Fac: Three Mile Prim Grp: A5552NESD Due Date: 12/24/2009 Island Assign Type: ACIT Sec Grp: Orig Due Date: 12/24/2009 Priority:

Schedule Ref:

Unit Condition:

EARB Review of ACE Ensure EARB review of ACE. Schedule EARB with Engineering Subject/Description: CAPCO.

Assign #: 06 Assigned To: U00OM5H Status: ACC/ASG Aft Fac: Three Mile Prim Grp: A5552NESD Due Date: 01/29/2010 Island Assign Type: ACIT Sec Grp: Orig Due Date: 01/21/2010 Priority:

Schedule Ref:

Unit Condition:

Subject/Description: Present ACE to EARB for Review Note" Schedule EARB review with Engineering CAPCO prior to the due date of this assignment.

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AX- Assignment Report Page 1 of 8 Go Back Print New Search I Home Assignment Report I sign .A-- .R.' 00008,19' Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: ACE Status: ACC/ASG Priority: Assigned To: U000M5H Due Date: 02/03/2010 Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: A5552NESD Original Date: 12/28/2009 Unit Condition: Sec Grp:

I kAssi-nment-Re guest >

Subject/Description: Perform ACE on IR 1000819.

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1. Osignmeneft Cope In Progress Notes: Extension 2: From 01/25/10 to 02/03/10 approved by the MRC on 01/20/10.

See Attributes for approval document. P. Fink 01/20/10.

Reopen and extension approved by Acting Plant Manager 01/11/10.

See Assignment Attributes for approval paperwork and IR submittal for late request (IR 1014623).

ACE reopened extended to 01/25/10 MRC due dated extended until 02/08/10.

P. Fink 01/11/10.

Apparent Cause Evaluation

Title:

Negative Pressure Not Maintained in the Reactor Building during High Contamination Work Condition Report #: 1000819-02 Event Date/Event Time: 11/7/09 -11/21/09 Station/Unit(s): TMI-1 Sponsoring Manager: Pat Bennett Investigator(s): Michael Harty Condition Statement: -

The reactor building purge exhaust system was not in service between 11/7/09 and 11/21/09 per the requirements of ECR TM 06-00816, "OTSG Replacement - Containment Structural Opening." The intent of running the purge system is to maintain slight negative pressure with-respect to the outside environment in the reactor building while high contamination Work cont:inued. Without negative pressure, airborne contamination could be free to escape the building through the construction opening or equipment hatch instead of being directed through the purge exhaust system where it would be.removed by the reactor building purge filtration system.

Additionally, alternative measures prescribed for cases when the reactor building purge was unavailable were not applied.

Event

Background:

The scope of ECR TM 06-00816, was to provide the engineering for creating and restoring a temporary opening in the side of the containment building, above the Equipment Hatch, to facilitate ingress/egress of the steam generators as well as equipment and personnel. The ECR TM 06-00816 details the requirements for the various activities pre-outage while at power, outage activities while in cold shutdown, during refueling shutdown and while defueled. Included in these activities is an extensive list of requirements for containment building liner removal.

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From the time that the liner was breached until the time it was restored, the plant was in Mode 6,-Defueled. In the de-fueled mode, there are no licensing requirements that require containment integrity or mandate the operation of the purge system. TMI Technical Specifications only require the RB purge to be running when containment integrity is not required during the movement of irradiated fuel. Impact reviews were conducted with extensive documentation and determined that no procedures required revision for this ECR. As determined by impact reviews, the ECR did not take actions to modify any procedures in order to explicitly prevent the planned shutdown of the purge system.

Appendix I of 10 CFR 50.34a sets the limits on the amount of radiological material that can be released to the environment, and mandates the monitoring, calculation, and reporting of results to the NRC. TMI complies with these requirements through the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). In accordance with the ECR, radiation monitors (AMS4) were placed at the construction opening to su port data collection for the ODCM.

,slight negative pressure existed within ithe reactor building with the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building Ventilation system on. This system draws air from the Reactor Building through the personnel hatch. So, even

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with the Reactor Building Purge system off, there was a slight negative pressure in the building with respect to the outside environment.

ri togar Z* -0"-hep ewa n -'-"o fr nefcn Prior to appro 1-ofECR-0"6--008 the package was sent out for Interfacing Department Impact Reviews in accordance with the requirements of CC-AA-103, Configuration Change Control and CC-AA-102, Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening. The Impact Review phase of a project is used to identify the drawings, design bases, licensing documents, programs, procedures and training that are impacted, evaluate the technical adequacy of the proposed change, and initiate the revisions to the affected documents and programs. This Impact review phase is also used to provide comments on the implementation of the proposed change to address constructability concerns.

A2187706, ECR 06-00816 Remove/Restore Containment Structural Opening Evaluation #04 contains the Interfacing Department Impact Review performed by Operations. Contained in this evaluation is the following question, "There is a significant amount of coordination required with regard to operation of the Reactor Building purge and verification of plant mode prior to initiating various phases of the project. Who is responsible for coordination and what work documents incorporate verification of the plant modes?" Furthermore, the Operations review stated "I have identified no program changes, no changes to plant procedure, and no training."

These comments were addressed in the ECR section 3.19 - System operating requirements changed or added:

"During further interim conditions of the liner plate, to include removal and reinstallation, the Reactor Building Purge and Vent System-may be adjusted, for practical reasons, so as to minimize differential pressure across the liner plate ..... as an aid to maintaining the optimal condition of a slight negative pressure on containment such that all effluent air is passing a monitored release site, a single point of contact with operations will be established to communicate with the Operations department regarding these developments:

? Liner plate is first breached via cutting

? Liner plate is removed

? Liner plate curtains are installed or removed

? Liner plate is placed back into the opening.

Any purge adjustments must be coordinated with the Operations through a single point of contact."

The ALARA Installation Review, page 6 of attachment 7 to the ECR shows the radiation protection department's comments. Control of airborne contamination was deemed necessary. For the mitigation of airborne httn'//-nrmnonrn r-r'n.rnm/r'cn/kervilt/Rf'.nnortA s'-i nmentServlet?ar=01000819&assien=02.:. 1/28/2010

,AR - Assignment Report ,Page 3 of 8 release it was recommended that "Negative ventilation should be maintained by RB purge per Exelon procedures" and that "A curtain shall be installed, able to be pulled over the opening to mitigate effects of inclement weather or loss of RB purge."

These comments were addressed in the ECR, section 1.2.1.2- Outage activities while in cold shutdown, refueling shutdown, or defueled:

h.) Control and Monitoring of Contamination "The Reactor Building purge will be maintained as required by Exelon procedures to induce airflow into containment" . . . "if there is a ventilation failure for any reason, RP may direct that any of the following measures be taken until the purge is restored:

a.) Discontinue work activities with potential airborne contamination levels; b.) Close all openings to the outside environment, including the containment access opening (two (2) curtains, an inner and an outer, shall be provided covering the containment opening once the concrete and liner has been removed); and, c.) Provide and operate auxiliary purge HEPA units (as needed) to permit appropriate airborne contamination controls for hot particle work.

Outage work was planned for the inspection of purge supply and exhaust valves AH-V-1A and AH V 1D as well as purge supply isolation valve AH-V-1C. Multi-step clearance #9500697 was written to support this work.

Clearance step #2 includes actions by the operations department to shut down the purge system and ensure the purge exhaust (AH-V-1A) and purge supply (AH-V-1D) valves are closed locally, resulting in the inability for air to enter or leave the reactor building through the purge system. The approver of the clearance consulted purge operating procedures and determined it was acceptable to remove the purge from service. He then checked with the Outage Control Center to see if it was an appropriate time to take the purge out so the clearance could go into effect and the scheduled work could be completed. Operations followed procedure OP-TM-823-408, "RB Purge - Doors and/or Equipment Hatch Open" to remove the purge from service on 11/7/2009 and step #2 of the clearance was executed on 11/8/09. It remained active, with the purge system off until it was suspended on 11/19/09 in order to lift all tags to allow the RB purge to be placed back in service.

A timeline of important events has been included as Attachment #1 Interviews were conducted with the following people to ascertain details of the situation:

? John Blair - Shift Operations Superintendent

? James Rosner - ECR Approver

? Nick Jarecha - ECR Writer

? Bill Price - Clearance Approver

? Don Allison - Operations Services Manager

? Laura Weber - ODCM Coordinator Causal Factors:

Apparent Cause #1 Compensatory measures included in ECR #06-00816 to prevent the release of radiological material in case of a ventilation failure were not installed until long after the liner had been removed. The hanging of the construction opening tarp was included as the second to last step of the SGT work package for the removal of the liner plate. While the final step, notifying TMI SGRP Ops that the containment purge system can be returned to normal service was completed on 11/11, the tarp was not.

installed until 11/19 (see items 1070 and 1080 in attachment #2).

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AR - Assignment Report Page 4 of.8 An error precursor not recognized was unclear goals, roles, and responsibilities. The goal of installing the curtain was to be able to close it while the liner was removed if purge system was lost. A clearer understanding of the curtain's purpose could have forced its installation immediately after the liner was removed, with the knowledge that the reactor building purge system was taken out of service A defense that failed to prevent this inappropriate action was planning and OOPS. The work package was written with the assumption that the purge, system would be available, temporarily adjusted for the liner removal, and then placed back in service. When step 1080 was performed to notify SGRP Ops that the Containment Purge System can now be returned to normal service, OOPS would apply in that the service could NOT be returned to normal service due to a clearance.

Apparent Cause #2 Throughout the development of the ECR, operations, radiation protection, and engineering failed to coordinate the execution of the compensatory measures for any failure of the ventilation system.

While the reactor building purge was addressed several times in the ECR, the directions were to maintain it in accordance with the existing Exelon processes and procedures. While radiation protection may have assumed that this direction would keep the purge running the entire time, Exelon procedures allow the purge to be turned off.

The purge operating procedures were not changed with the assumption that Radiation Protection would execute compensatory measures prior to the planned tag out of the purge system. Per SGT work order, Radiation Protection was informed on 11/6 that the liner would be cut in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

Per procedure OP TM-823-408, Radiation Protection was informed on 11/7 that the reactor building purge system was taken out of service for maintenance. There were no actions in place to drive radiation protection to take the compensatory measures outlined in the ECR for when the construction opening existed and the purge system was lost.

An error precursor not recognized is assumptions and interpretation requirements. The assumption that Exelon procedures would keep the purge on throughout the work process was incorrect. The statement in the ECR stating "The reactor building purge will be maintained as required by Exelon procedures to induce airflow into containment" was interpreted to mean different things by the Operations and Radiation Protection departments.

A defense that failed to prevent this inappropriate action is an Exelon fundamental, maintaining a questioning attitude. Further questioning the comments included in the impact reviews could have uncovered flaws in the design implementation.

Problem Statement Cause(s) Basis for Cause Determination Compensatory measures included to prevent the release of radiological material in case of a ventilation failure were not installed until 8 days after the liner had been removed. ApparentManagement SystemSPAC (Standards, Policies, Admin Controls) Not Strict Enough (5NS) The intent of the ECR was to have the curtain in place as a contingency. The order of the work completion could have been stricter to ensure the curtain was in place immediately following the breach of the liner plate to ensure the opening could be covered.

Adequate measures not taken during the development of the ECR to drive the execution of compensatory measures. ApparentInappropriate ActionCommunications - no communication or not timely (4NC) Comments provided during the impact review process by the Radiation Protection and Operations departments were not integrated. RP assumed that the operating procedures would keep the purge system on while Operations assumed that RP would take compensatory actions, preventing the need for interim procedural changes. The engineering outlined the compensatory measures to 1, ttn. ~Icnrr, ,yc~mnrt ,-v~nn nfl,-,-, lronIog~r, ,1 atfl.) onrrtA cc nmnnnt V ~r, ,latQ or~C~ 1 flCiA~ 1 Q ~', 0cc fl21')Olfl 1 I")f*l")Ol N

4,AR,- Assignment Report Page 5 of 8' be taken without creating actions to drive their execution..

Cause being addressed Extent of Condition Review Compensatory measures included to prevent the release of radiological material in case of a ventilation failure were not installed until 8 days after the liner had been removed. The extent of condition applies to the possibility of compensatory measures that are unable to be taken if the RB purge is lost for any reason.The liner plate has been restored and the compensatory measures included in the ECR are no longer applicable, No further actions are required.

Adequate measures not taken during the development of the ECR to drive the execution of compensatory measures. The extent of condition applies to the possibility of compensatory measures not being executed if the RB purge is lost for any reason.The liner plate has been restored and the compensatory measures included in the ECR are no longer applicable. No further actions are required.

Cause being addressed Extent of Cause Review Compensatory measures included to prevent the release of radiological material in case of a ventilation failure were not installed until 8 days after the liner had been removed. The extent of cause applies to ECR's that include compensatory measures in the event that a system that is assumed to be operating is lost or taken out of service. Any work required to enact the contingencies must be completed prior to the time they would be needed.Action # 100819-08 has been created to identify the

'ECR's that include compensatory measures and interim actions during the construction phase, and ensure that the written steps are explicitly transferred to the planning stage.

Adequate measures not taken during the development of the ECR to drive the execution of compensatory measures. The extent of cause applies to ECR's that include compensatory measures in the event that a system that is assumed to be operating is lost or taken out of service. The feedback provided by the impact reviews from each department must be integrated and fully understood by all affected parties. The engineering should communicate the exact actions to be taken by the appropriate personnel in the event that compensatory measures need to be taken.Action # 1000819-07 has been created to brief design engineering to raise awareness of error likely situations resulting from inadequate communication in incorporating and integrating impact review comments.

Latent Organizational Weaknesses - undetected deficiencies in the management control processes (e.g., strategy, policies, work control, training, and resource allocation), or associated values (shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, and assumptions), that create workplace conditions that provoke error (precursors) or degrade the integrity of defenses (flawed defenses).

Basic Work Practices Oversight/Monitoring Communication Organization Structure Computer Issues Program Controls Control of- Personal Resources Roles/Responsibilities Design/Modification Task Structure Documentation/Procedures/Policies Tools/Equipment Use Equipment/Facility Training/Qualifications Goals/Priorities Values/Norms Housekeeping Work Group Interfaces Industrial Safety Work Group Practices/Processes Management Effectiveness Work Planning/Execution Material Availability Work Scheduling Latent Organizational Weaknesses Questions:

A. Were there latent organizational weakness that were identified as contributing to this event? List and justify. (e.g., workarounds became htt,.I-~-.~ ~ AC'..1~)~~.A1 frAO l X---- S1ý ~r-t 1ý IN

AR - Assignment Report Page 6 of 8 accepted practices, habits allowed to develop over time, Pre-Job Briefs are felt to be unnecessary)

Latent Organizational Weakness that failed How did it contribute to the event?

Roles / Responsibilities When considering the impact of the construction opening, Operations considered it the responsibility of RP to monitor potential release path and take the appropriate compensatory actions while RP considered it the responsibility of Operations to maintain the purge system on.

Previous Events: Describe the review of any relevant previous site and industry events for which there is an indication that the corrective actions to prevent recurrence or industry experience recommendations were ineffective. Identify whether the event is a "Repeat Event."

Previous Events Previous Event Review Braidwood Station OE30264 Containment Penetration flow path not isolated as required by the Technical Specification Action Statement at Braidwood Station.No useful learning opportunities or insight for corrective actions. The creation of an undesired release path stemmed from a misunderstanding of the failure position of an isolation valve.

Hope Creek LER 05000354 Potential unmonitored release path has existed since plant startup due to failure of one of the vacuum breakers to close after a loss of power.No useful learning opportunities or insight for corrective actions. A design change removed the potentialrelease path.

McGuire Unit 1 - Failure Number : 217 Work inadvertently opened several Containment Purge Ventilation System (VP) containment isolation valves.

The cause was the lack of loop specific information in the generic procedure used for calibrating and testing the VP loop. Categorized as a maintenance preventable functional failure.Corrective Actions:

Preventative maintenance procedures and tasks revised.

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1LER 9709080230 Unmonitored Airborne Radioactivity Release Paths. Several conditions existed on site which could create potential unmonitored airborne radioactivity release paths.The cause of this event was inadequate program management.The work control administrative procedure has been revised with appropriate process controls in place to provide a method of monitoring of pathways for potential releases.

There is no operating experience addressing the inability to maintain negative containment pressure or the operation of a purge system during situations where containment integrity is not required.

Corrective Action: For all causes identified, list the Corrective Actions (CAs) or Action Items (ACITs) implemented or planned to be implemented. Identify the Action, the Owner, and the Due Date.

Cause Being Addressed Corrective Action (CA)'or Action Item (ACIT)

Owner Due Date Compensatory measures included to prevent the release of radiological material in case of a ventilation failure were not installed until 8 days after the liner had been removed. (CA) - Revise RCA related ventilation operating procedures to require a review of RCS work in progress and notify RP prior to operating or manipulating ventilation equipment.Action

1. 996823-34 Susan SalladeOperations 03/26/2010 Adequate measures not taken during the development of the ECR to drive the execution of compensatory measures Brief Design engineering on the recent revisions to CC-TM-103-1004 that came out of CCA 693870 under the common cause "Inadequate Design Preparation / Reviews SPAC NI / confusing bt,.II,~,, ~ ~ c,, Ic I.~,-Id tJP 9 nr~t A cc; ffnmpnt IQ rirl,-Ot r-f~flCflO)1 OR~ n orn-fC)? 1/~~l i1/9 R/gN n

, - Assignment Keport Page 7 of 8 or incomplete.Action #1000819-06 Mike HartyEngineering 3/17/2010 Adequate measures not taken during the development of the ECR to drive the execution of compensatory measures Brief design engineering to raise awareness of error likely situations resulting from inadequate communication in incorporating and integrating impact review comments.Action #1000819-07 Mike HartyEngineering 3/17/2010 Adequate measures not taken during the development of the ECR to drive the execution of compensatory measures. Identify the ECR's that include compensatory measures and interim actions during the construction phase, and ensure that the written steps are explicitly transferred to the planning stage. Mike HartyEngineering 1/13/2014 Apparent Cause Evaluation Quality Checklist Critical Content Attributes (criteria for acceptable product)

YES NO

.Is the condition that requires resolution adequately and accurately defined? X 2.Are the Causal Factors (problems) that resulted in the condition (i.e.,

equipment failure or inappropriate actions) clearly defined? ?For issues that involve inappropriate actions are Human Performance issues (i.e.,

error defenses and error precursors) clearly defined? ?For issues that involve equipment failures are the Equipment Performance issues (i.e.,

parts, components, systems, programmatic problem areas) clearly defined?*

X Have the causes been accurately identified and appropriately classified as an Apparent Cause or Contributing Cause? If the cause was indeterminate, has a risk assessment been performed? X 4.Are the CAs and ACITs adequate to address the causes identified? ?Do the corCAs / ACITrective actions describe the desired end-state and do they clearly identify the action(s) to be taken? oCorrective Actions / ACITs that are COMPLETE - State: Complete oCorrective Actions/ ACITs that are OPEN - State: Owner, Due Date, and Specific Actions Required ?Have recommended corrective actionsCAs / ACITs been concurred with by the assigned organization? X 5.Are the extent of condition evaluation results described and appropriate? 3 X 6.Are all CR Originator, Supervisor, Screener, Manager and MRC questions, comments, or concerns properly addressed? X 7.Have previous similar site and industry events been evaluated? X Attachment #1 - Timeline of Events TMI SGRP RP given notification that containment opening Iiner plate Would be cut in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Outside containment opening curtain tarp hung on track /roller assembly Purge Valves Tagged Out for Maintenance.

Activities Dave Ethridge writes IR#994989 addressing purge not available R2113461 (AH-V-1C Inspection) completed Clearance suspendedi all tags lifted to allow purge to be put back in service Purge System Shut Down Liner Plate Removed Purge Returned To Service 11/6 11/7 11/8 11/11 11/18 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/21 9 1 I')Rn)A1

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IL (~l*. 01 (1 Attachment #2 SGT Work Package Completion Dates Completion Notes:

http://eamgenco.ceco.com/cap/servlet/ReportAssignmentServlet?ar=01000819&assign=02...- 1/28/2010

AR.- Assignment Report Page 1 of 1

( Go Back Print New Search I Home Assignment Report Aft Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: MRC Status: ACC/ASG Priority: Assigned To: U00OM5H Due Date: 02/17/2010 Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: A5552NESD Original Date: 01/11/2010 Unit Condition: Sec Grp:

Subject/Description: Present ACE on IR 1000819 to MRC. Note: Schedule MRC presentation with the Engineering CAPCO following EARB review of the ACE.

ksplignment0ornplki&h' InCProgress Notes: Extension 02 from 02/08/10 to 02/17/10 (ACE extension approved by MRC on 01/20/10. (See ACE Attributes for extension paperwork).

P. Fink 01/20/10.

Extension 01 from 01/11/10 to 02/08/10 approved by Acting Plant Manager on 01/11/10.

(See ACE Attributes for extension paperwork).

P. Fink 01/11/10.

Completion Notes:

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Assignment Request,.

Subject/Description: Update trend codes following MRC approval of ACE on IR 10 00819.

In Progress Notes: Extension 02 to correspond with new due date of ACE and MRC presentation extensions.

Approved by the MRC 01/20/19.

P. Fink Extension 01 to correspond with new due date of ACE and MRC presentation extensions. Approved by Acting Plant Manager 01/11/10.

P. Fink Completion Notes:

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AK.- Assignment Report Page I of 1 0 Go Back Print I New Search I Home Assignment Report As~sign 4-0:'ji`,A #:01008 S' Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: ACIT Status: COMPLETE Priority: Assigned To: UOOOBYO Due Date: 12/24/2009 Schedule Ref: , Prim Grp: A5552NESD Original Date: .12/24/2009 Unit Condition: Sec Grp:

,'Assignment; Request ,<;KI{ .

Subject/Description: EARB Review of ACE Ensure EARB review of ACE. Schedule EARB with Engineering CAPCO.

"Assignment C61o et In Progress Notes: EARB completed 11/24/09.

Assignment owner changed from M Harty to B Young for assignment close-out.

Completion Notes:

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Aft Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: ACIT Status: ACC/ASG Priority: Assigned To: U000M5H Due Date: 01/29/2010 Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: A5552NESD Original Date: 01/21/2010 Unit Condition: Sec Grp:

Subject/Description: Present ACE to EARB for Review Note: Schedule EARB review with Engineering CAPCO prior to the due date of this assignment.

Aspignmeiit Coip etion~. .

In Progress Notes: Extension 01: Extended to correspond with ACE extension approved by the MRC on 01/20/10. P. Fink 01/20/10 Completion Notes:

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