Text

Draft Operating Exam (Section a, Section B, and Section C) (Folder 2)
	ML101130402
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/29/2010
From:	; Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	David Silk; Operations Branch I
	Hansell S
Shared Package
ML092470038	List: IR 05000272/2010301; ML101130322; ML101130328; ML101130338; ML101130402; ML101520331; ML101520347; ML101520364; ML101520414; ML101880243; ML102520088; ML111730058;
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K~ ...._ ._ ,. _ _, ~,_ ..,:""" TQ-AA-106-0303 Hev. ;$ OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Perform a Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation TASK NUMBER: N0020200101 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC RO Admin Ai-i. ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 2.1.18

                                                                                 ------~--------~

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.6 I APPLICABILITY: RO SRo-EoD ROm STAD SROD EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom

REFERENCES:

S1.0P-ST.RC-0008, Rev. 23, S1.0P-ST.RC-0004, Rev. 14 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 25 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/1610 Instructor Validated By: S Harris Date: 03/18/10 SME rr\ Instruc~\ . ,\ Reviewed By: y~~\ U)f~~ Training Department Date: j-lG -<-0 \'I> Approved By: L~ Operations Representative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT o UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 8

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ____________________ DATE: SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Perform a Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation TASK NUMBER: N0020200101 INITIAL Salem Unit 1 is operating at 100 power, steady state. A daily RCS CONDITIONS: leakrate is in progress lAW S1.0P-ST.RC-0008, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance. The procedure has been completed through Step 5.1.14. The Initial and Final times for obtaining data are 0800 and 1000 respectively. The Total Corrected Volume Leak Rate obtained from the Plant Computer during performance of Step 5.1.14 is 3.0 gpm. Final PRT level is 12.5%. Final RCDT level is 58%. There is NO Identified RCS Leakage inside OR outside containment, nor is there any Identified RCS leakage to the ECCS Accumulators. INITIATING CUE: Beginning with Step 5.1.15, complete the RCS Leak Rate calculation. Return this JPM and-altprocedUi es to tnet=valuatof when you have completed Step 5. 1.21. Any steps in S 1.0P-ST.RC-0008 regarding control console operations or contacting chemistry may be initialed as completed when encountered. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

i 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the I I validated time if satisfactory progress is being made. I Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Complete steps 5.1.15-5.1.20, with Attachments 1 and 3 filled out lAW key.

Page 2 of 8

TQ-AA-10F "103 Rev. 3 OPERATL., TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ---------------- SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Perform a Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation

STEP STEP COMMENTS r

(*Denotes a Critical Step) (Required for NO. EVAL STANDARD UNSAT StU evaluation) Provide Candidate with a marked up copy of S1.0P-ST.RC-0008, Rev. 23, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance, and a calculator. Perform Steps 5.1.15 through 5.1.21 (initiating cue) 5.1.15 RECORD Leak Rate results on Candidate records 3.0 on Attachment 3, Attachment 3, Section 1.0 Section 1.0. c-5.1.6 IF the PRT AND RCDT are NOT returned I Candidate records Final Data on Attachment I to service, THEN RECORD Final Data on I 1, Sections 2.0 and 4.0. (as per key) Attachment 1, Sections 2.0 and 4.0. Data recorded is:

Section 2.0: PRT Leak Rate I Final Data (B) PRT Level 12.5 Time 1000 c-5.1.6 Section 4.0: RCDT Leak Rate
cant Final Data (B) Level 58 Time 1000

,1 _ ... -_.. _ Page 3 of 8

TQ-AA-10" "'03 Rev. 3 OPERATG., TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ________________ SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Perform a Manual ReS Leakrate Calculation COMMENTS I

STEP STEP (Required for

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL NO. STANDARD UNSAT S/U evaluation) 5.1.17 PLACE 1CV35, VCT 3 WAY INLET Candidate initials step as directed in Initiating VALVE, in AUTO. Cue. 5.1.18 OPERATE the Primary Water Pumps as Candidate initials step as directed in Initiating required to support current plant Cue. evolutions. 5.1.19 NOTIFY Chemistry that all sampling may Candidate initials step as directed in Initiating resume. Cue.

5.1.20 COMPLETE Attachment 1, PRT and Candidate completes Attachment 1 PRT RCDT Data data:

Difference (B-A) 267.3 gal 120 min Total Volume Change 267.3/120= 2.228 On Attachment 1, Section 1.0, there should be a 2% level change between 10-12% (211.4 gal) and 0.5% level change between 12-14% (55.9 gal). with a TOTAL of 267.3 gal. I - -... - Page 4 of 8

TQ-AA-10P ~~03 Rev. 3 OPERATL .* TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ________________ SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Perform a Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation COMMENTS STEP

STEP (Required for

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL NO. STANDARD UNSAT S/U evaluation) Candidate completes Attachment 1 RCDT

5.1.20 Data:

cont Difference (B-A) 17.5 gal 120 min Total Volume Change 17.51120= 0.15 On Attachment 1, Section 3.0, there should be a 3% level change between 54-57% (13.2 gal) and 1.0% level change between 57-60% (4.3 gal). with a TOTAL of 17.5 gal. _._ ..... __ ..... _._ ..... I Page 5 of 8

TQ-AA-106-n 103 Rev. 3 OPERATt.-.. rRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _______________ SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK: Perform a Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation

STEP STEP COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) (Required for STANDARD EVAL StU UNSAT evaluation)
5.1.21 COMPLETE Attachment 3, RCS Water Candidate completes Attachment 3, RCS Inventory Balance Calculation Sheet. Water Inventory Balance Calculation Sheet:

1.0 TOTAL CORRECTED VOLUME LEAK RATE 3.0 2.0 A. IDENTIFIED RCS LEAKAGE INSIDE CONTAINMENT 0 B. IDENTIFIED RCS LEAKAGE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT 0 C. IDENTIFIED RCS LEAKAGE TO ACCUMULATORS 0 D. PRT INLEAKAGE 2.228 E. PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE 0.001 3.0 TOTAL IDENTIFIED RCS LEAKRATE 2.229 4.0 UNIDENTIFIED LEAK RATE A. SUBTRACT Line 3.0 from Line 1.0 0.771 B. 1WR80 inleakage(*) 0.001 C. ADD 4A and 4B to obtain UNIDENTIFIED LEAK RATE 0.772 5.0 RCDT INLEAKAGE (from Attachment 1. Section 4.0) 0.15 6.0 is NA 7.0 Line 3 Leak Rate 2.229 SAT Line 4C Leak Rate 0.772 SAT Line 2E Leak Rate 2.0 SAT (Line 2E may be in gpm) 8.0 is filled out initially. candidate signs and dates bottom of~e 3 of Attachment 3. Page 6 of 8

TQ-AA-10F ~~03 Rev. 3 OPERATVr" TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: ________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System TASK' Perform a Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation COMMENTS

STEP STEP (Required for

("'Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL NO. STANDARD UNSAT S/U evaluation) JPM is terminated when candidate returns all JPM paperwork to evaluator. I Page 7 of 8

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3

 "' 'ITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 1 is operating at 100 power, steady state. A daily RCS leakrate is in progress lAW S1.0P-ST.RC-0008, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance. The procedure has been completed through Step 5.1.14. The Initial and Final times for obtaining data are 0800 and 1000 respectively. The Total Corrected Volume Leak Rate obtained from the Plant CompLter during performance of Step 5.1.14 is 3.0 gpm. Final PRT level is 12.5%. Final RCDT level is 58%. There is NO Identified RCS Leakage inside OR outside containment, nor is there any Identified RCS leakage to the ECCS Accumulators. INITIATING CUE: ~eginning with Step 5.1.15, complete the RCS Leak Rate calculation. Return this JPM and ali ocedures to the Evaluator when you have completed Step 5.1.21. Any steps in S1.0P-STRC-0008 regarding control console operations or contacting chemistry may be initialed as completed when encountered. Page 8 of 8

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ,...-----.-------~-~---~- -------------------------, STATION: SALEM SYSTEM,: Excore NIS TASK: Perform a QPTR TASK NUMBER: N0150020201

 .IPM NUMBER:           08-01 NRC RO Admin A1-2 ALTERNATE PATH:                                                KIA NUMBER:                    2.1.43 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: -----------------~

4.1

                                                                               ----:R::c-:::--

APPLICABILITY: O SRO EOD ROm STAD SROD EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom

REFERENCES:

S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002 Rev. 15 All rev checked 03103/10 S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011 Rev. 279 Tech Spec 3.2.4 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 27 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/03/10 Instructor Validated By: Date: 03/18/10 Date: 1-2fv-Z~'I\J Reviewed By: Approved By: Date: 3/1J/ta ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT o UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of7

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: _______________________ DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK: Perform a QPTR TASK NUMBER: 1200020301 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 204 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-38, UPPER S EeT OEV ABV 50% PWR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators completed reducing power to 74% 10 minutes ago to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P-AB.ROO-002 to restore Tavg to program. INITIATING CUE: The CRS has directed you to perform a QPTR using Manual Calculation lAW S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002. Initial NI currents are:

            !.Ilm..er Detectors ___~~Q.!¥er Del~9tors N41                  195                     200 N42                  185                     200 N43                  175                     170 N44                  195                     205 Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Perform the QPTR and calculate the highest QPTR as UNSAT (N41T) with a value of 1.023.

2. Identify TSAS 3.2.4 for QPTR is applicable.

Page 2 of7

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 OPERA. . TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS ------------------ TASK: Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS

   '"   STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) NO. STANDARD EVAL (Required for S/U UNSAT evaluation) Provide Candidate with a blank copy of S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002, Rev. 15, Power Distribution - Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, a copy of S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Rev. 279, [ Tables, and a copy of Tech Spec 3.2.4. 2.1 IDENTIFY sections of this procedure that are Candidate N/A's Section 5.2, Attachment 1 NOT to be performed with "N/A". Section 3.0, and Attachment 3. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS Reads and initials PRECAUTION AND LIMITATIONS 3.1-3.5 5.1.1 IF one PR channel is inoperable, AND RTP is Determines all PR channel are operable and step I >75%, THEN ... is NA .. I I 5.1.2 RECORD the following data on Attachment 2 I [

Date Records current date, current time, 74% reactor
Time power and checks OHA E-38 as reason for performance in Attachment 2
Reactor Power
Reason for performing QPTR Calculation

                                                                           ... ..... ~- .... -- ..... ~- ... ~-

Page 3 of 7

TQ*AA-106-1l303 Rev. 3 OPERA. _ ., TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS ----------------- TASK: Perform a QPTR

STEP STEP COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step)

STANDARD EVAL (Required for Stu UNSAT evaluation)

  . 5.1.3      RECORD the following data on Attachment 1 :

NI Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Records on Attachment 1: (From initial Upper Detector current readings conditions)
NI Channels N-41 , N-42, N43 and N-44 ., NI channels N41-44 Upper Detector Lower Detector current readings Current Readings
Respective 100% NI Current Values for
NI channels N41-44 Lower Detector Channels N-41, N-42, N43 and N-44 Current Readings Detectors from S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Table
100% NI Current Values from S1.RE 2 RA.ZZ-0011, TABLES NOTE: Attachment 1, Section 3 is NOT required to be performed to determine detector currents. It was added at Rev. 12 to use "when any NIS meter is suspect."

If asked, CUE that all Power Range Detectors are Ooerable .

  . 5.1.4      COMPLETE Attachment 1 calculations.           For Top and Bottom Detectors: (numbers as per                                       I I                                                                key for evaluator)

Calculates Detector Ratio for each top I and bottom detector.
Adds detector ratios to get Sum of detector ratios.
Divides Sum by number of operable detectors (4) to get Average Detector Ratios.
Places Average Detector Ratios in 4th column of Att. 1
Divides each detector ratio by the I average ratio to get the power tilt for each detector.

Cue: IV is complete when asked for IV of calculations Page 4 of7

TQ-AA-10f: 11303 Rev. 3 OPERA I . , TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS ----------------- TASK: Perform a QPTR

STEP STEP COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step)

STANDARD EVAL (Required for S/U UNSAT evaluation)

5.1.5 RECORD the following on Attachment 2 Records information on Attachment 2 (as per key I I

1. "Power Tilt" for each detector. for evaluator)

2. "Maximum Power Tilt" and applicable Maximum Power Tilt for N41 T will be marked detector identification information. UNSAT at 1.023

3. Test Results by initialing SAT or UNSAT column lAW stated Acceptance Criteria.

5.1.6 DIRECT a second Operator to perform Cue: IV is complete SAT. Independent Verification of calculations in Attachment 1, Sections 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 as applicable.

5.1.7 IF the Maximum Power Tilt for any detector Candidate refers to provided Tech Spec 3.2.4, exceeds 1.02, THEN REFER to TIS 3.2.4 for and determines:

corrective actions. TSAS 3.2.4 Action a is applicable because power is > 50% and QPTR exceeds 1.02. j 5.3.2 This surveillance is unsatisfactory. A. INITIATE NOTF(s) to correct the unsatisfactory condition( s). Candidate describes actions required on B. RECORD the NOTF number(s) AND Attachment 4 to initiate a notification, record the the reason for unsatisfactory notification # and reason, and notify Rx completion on Attachment 4 in the Engineering. Comments Section. C. NOTIFY Reactor Engineering. I I Page 50f7

TQ-AA-10r ~~03 Rev. 3 OPERAI_.{ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Excore NIS TASK: Perform a QPTR STEP COMMENTS

STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for NO. STANDARD StU UNSAT evaluation) 5.4.1 COMPLETE Attachment 4, Sections 1.0 and 2.0, AND FORWARD completed procedure to SM/CRS for review. JPM is terminated when candidate returns all JPM paperwork to evaluator. Page 6of7

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3

*f\JITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when rod 204 dropped fully into the core. OHA E-38, UPPER SECT DEV ABV 50% PVVR annunciated and remains locked in. Operators completed reducing power to 74% 10 minutes ago to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d lAW S1.0P AB.ROO-002 to restore Tavg to program. INITIATING CUE: The CRS has directed you to perform a QPTR using Manual Calculation lAW S1.0P-ST.NIS-0002. itial NI currents are:

            .!J.Qper Detector~~~_~owerJ)etector~

N41 195 200 N42 185 200 N43 175 170 N44 195 205 Page 7 of7

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE I STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data TASK NUMBER: 1200020301 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 (LOT NRC RO Admin 2 ALTERNATE PATH: ~ANUMBER: ________~2~.2~.1~______~ IMPORTANCE FACTOR: _---::::-4.:.;:-5_ _ APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD ROm STAD SROD EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom

REFERENCES:

SC.RE-RA.ZZ-0001, Rev. 10 All rev checked 03/01110 S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012, Rev. 143 S2.RE-RA.zZ-0016, Rev. 4 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED ,'PM COMPLETION TIME: 45min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/01/10 Instructor Validated By: S Harris Date: 03/18/10 SME\J.tstruc\tct.' ...\\ Reviewed By: ~WW'\ Training Department Date: <}ZJo-lv l C Approved By: ~~ Date: J/z/t~~ Operations Representative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIIVIE: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data TASK NUMBER: 1200020301 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 4. is in HSB at 547°F/2235 PSIG with a reactor startup planned for this shift. Previous Critical Conditions:

Reactor trip on 3/5/10 at 2200 after 55 days at 100% power
1150 ppm Boron
1828 EFPH
Bank D 226 lDtended CrItical Conditions:
2200 on 3/8/10
Bank C @ 189 steps
Bank D @ 61 steps Reactor Engineering is currently performing an ECC using BEACON, but the results are not available yet.

INITIATING CUE: Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data. This is NOr the required Calculation Verification. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfacto pr~.gres,=s=is=b=ei=n~g=m=a=d=e=.= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = l J

 ~Sk    Standard for Successful Completion:

v 1. Review the completed ECC calculation and identify the following errors: p) Step 2.7.2.B sign is wrong (should be positive number) because negative value from

 /     2.7.2.A was not used.                                                             ~~ 01 . I      "3"1e:T b) Step 2.7.3.A is wrong (should be 1397) becaus~19le !~'as lIotUseG-!:. /": s,*~:l::, !->n;,..-..s.
   ,c) Step 2.7.3.B is wrong because 2.7.2.A error used in determining differential bor6n worth

/' d) Step 2.7.3.C is wrong because of c above (should be 506) r e) Step 2.7.4 is wrong (should be 1656) because of d and c above.

f} Step 2.8.3 is wrong (should be 1656) because of d and c above.

Page 2 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 OPERA ( TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative ----------------- TASK: Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data STEP STEP COMMENTS ('Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)

Provide Candidate with a completed SC.RE-RA.ZZ 0001, Estimated Critical Conditions, and clean copy of S2.RE-RA.ZZ-D016, Curves, and S2.RE-RA.ZZ 0012, Figures. Reviews procedure. Reviews Prerequisites and Precautions and Limitations. Verify proper completion of Attachment 1 ECC Calculation Using Nuclear Design Data as described below: Review Section 2: Operator reviews Section 2.1, 2.2, & 2.3, for Proc completeness. Operator ensures data given in Steps 2.1 Previous Critical Conditions Initial Conditions matches data recorded in 1.1 2.2 Shutdown Conditions Sections 2.1-2.3. 1.4 2.3 Intended Critical Conditions AU. 1 Proc COMPLETE Sections 2.4 - 2.8 Step 1.5 AU. 1 Operator reviews Section 2.4 for completeness Review Section 2.4 Reactivity Worths at Previous as below: Critical Conditions. (100% power)

                        ...... ....... ..                                I                        _ ... -_.. _... __ -

Page 3 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 OPERA. .{ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK' Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data STEP STEP COMMENTS IL

NO. ('Denotes a Critical Step)

STANDARD EVAL (Required for UNSAT evaluation) StU 2.4.1 Integral Rod Worth at position in (2.1.4.)(Figure Operator verifies no reactivity is inserted from 2ITable 1-7) (If ARO. use zero) rods at ARO. (Table 1-7 ) 2.4.2 Power Defect at power in (2.1.2) and Boron Operator verifies Power Defect at power in Concentration in (2.1.3)(Figure 17A/Table 2-1) ;2.1.2 (100%) and boron concentration at 2.1.3 (1150) is 1635 pcm from Table 2-1 (page 113). 2.4.4 IF using design data, THEI'-J mark step 2.4.3."N/A" Operator verifies a Differential boron worth from and CALCULATE Corrected Xenon Reactivity . Table 2-4 on page 97 of -6.130 pem by: A. DIFFERENTIAL BORON WORTH AT CONCENTRATION IN ITEM 2.1.3 (Figure 10B/Tabie 1150 ppm at 100% power 900 ppm is -6.253, 2-4) 1200 ppm is -6.105, difference is 0.148, divide l by 300 ppm change to get 0.000493 pcm/ppm, then multiply by 50 to get change of 0.0247 from 1200 so -6.105-0.0247==-6.130 I B. INTEGRAL BORON WORTH x == Operator verifies (1150)(-6.130)==-7049.5 pem

./

Item 2.1.3 Item 2.4A.A 2.4.4 C. POISON CORRECTION FACTOR Operator verifies a Poison Correction Factor of I (Figure 8B) 0.906 using calculation at top of Figure 8B on

                                                                   /     page 62.

1.0 +(0.1327*7049.5*1 F4) Page 4 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-10F ~~03 Rev. 3 OPERAI vR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative ------------------ TASK' Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data r-STEP STEP COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAl (Required for UNSAT

STANDARD evaluation) stU 2.4.4 D. XENON REACTIVITY Operator verifies steady state Xenon of -2923 x = / pcm (100% power and ZERO time) from Table Fig. 8CfTabie 1-2 Item 2.4.4.C / 1-2 on page 75, and verifies corrected Xenon of (at time zero) -2648 pem.

2.4.6 IE using design data, Tljt:~ mark step 2.4.S."N/A" Operator verifies steady state Samarium of 943 and CALCULATE Corrected Samarium Reactivity. pcm (100% power and ZERO time) and verifies I I l,,/corrected Samarium of 854 pcm using Table A. SAMARIUM REACTIVITY 1-4 on page 7 I x = Table 1-4 Item 2.4.4.C I (at time zero) 2.5 REACTIVITY_WORTHS AT INTENDED CRITICAL Operator reviews Section 2.5 CONDITIONS 2.5.1 Integral Rod Worth at Position in (2.3.2) (Figure Operator verifies Rod Worth of 747.7 pcm 2A/Table 1-8).

                                                                          ;rable 1-8 page 46                                                                 I i

IF using design data, THEN mark step 2.5.2 "NIA" 2.5.3 and CALCULATE Corrected Xenon Reactivity at power in ITEM 2.2.2. A. Predicted Critical Boron Concentration supplied L/.--*-- by Reactor Engineering ( Value is 1275 l_ -'---- r"-- I Page 5 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-10P ~103 Rev. 3 OPERA I vR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: J08 PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative ---------------- TASK: Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data STEP STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) COMMENTS

NO.

STANDARD EVAL (Required for UNSAr SIU evaluation) B. ARI Integral Rod Worth (Table 1-5 using ITEM 2.5.3,A) Operator verifies 8763 pcm from table using 1/ 1275 ppm and 547 deg, Table 1-5 page 13 C. POISON CORRECTION FACTOR Operator verifies a Poison Correction Factor of (Figure 88) 0.884 from Figure 88 (page 62) 1.0+(0.1327*-8763*1 F4) Nole: This is NOT the same value as

correction factor used in step 2.4.4.C, since the boron worth is different. D. XENON REACTIVITY Operator verifies the change in Xenon Reactivity to be (100) = (0.884) 88.4 pcm x /

Fig, 8C/Table 1-2 (at time in 2.3.4) Item 2.5.3,C Table 1-2 page 75 I I 1 2.5.5 A SAMARIUM REACTIVITY Operator verifies Samarium Reactivity is I I I X 945.9 pcm (1070)(0.884) Table 1-4 Item 2.S.3,C Table 1-4 on page 7 (at time in 2,3.4) Page 6 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ"AA"106"0303 Rev. 3 OPERA ... ,~ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK' Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step)

STANDARD EVAL (Required for UNSAT L stu evaluation) 2.6 REACTIVITY CHANGES AND SUM Operator reviews Section 2.6 , I 2.6.1 Integral Rod Worth - Operator verifies 0-747.7= -747.7 pcrn I Item (2.4.1) Item (2.5.1) I L 2.6.2 Power Defect Item (2.4.2) Operator verifies 1635 pcrn I I I 2.6.3 Xenon Reactivity x Operator verifies 2559.6 from (-88.4)-(-2648)= Item (2.5.2)or(2.5.30) item (2.4.30r(2.4.40) 2559.6 pcrn 2.6.4 Samarium Reactivity Operator verifies -91.9 from (-945.9)-(-854)=

                                                                               -91.9 pcrn 2.6.5  SUM Item (2.6.1 )+Item (2.6.2)+ltem (2.6.3)+ltem (2.6.4)           Operator verifies Integral Rod Worth of
                                                                               -747.7 pem.

I Operator verifies Power Defect of 1635 pcrn. Operator verifies Xenon Reactivity of I 2559.6 pcrn Operator verifies Samarium Reactivity of

                                                                               -91.9 pcm I Operator verifies Sum of 3355 pern.
                                                                             \

Page 7 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-10F 1'1303 Rev. 3 OPERA. JR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD SIU evaluation) 2.7 INTEl'I.QED CRITICAL BORON C<LNc:::ENJ~110N Operator reviews Section 2.7 DETERMINATIQN 2.7.1 Correction TO Previous Boron due to Burnup Differences between Previous and Intended Critical Conditions A. HFP ARO Equilibrium Poioon Concentration at Operator verifies 1235 ppm Burnup in (2.1.5)

(Figure 30 of S 1(2).RE-RAZZ-0012(Q)) B. HFP ARO Equilibrium Poison Concentration at Operator verifies 1235 ppm Burnup in (2.3.3) (Figure 30 of S1(2).RE-RAZZ-0012(Q) C. Boron Concentration Difference (2.7.1.A)-(2.7.1.B) Operator verifies 0 ppm I D. Corrected Previous Boron Concentration Operator verifies 1150 ppm Note' If operator determines a different ppm for A and B values (from graph interpolation), it is / unimportant as long as there is no difference between the 2 values. I 2.7.2 First Estimate of Boron Concentration Change A. Differential Boron Worth at Concentration in Operator Verifies differential boron worth at 547 (2.7.10) and Burnup in (2.3.3) for Tavg=54rF, for 1150 ppm and 1828 EFPH is -6.785 NoXe pcm/ppm / (Figure 10AfTabie 2-4) Table 2-4 page 98 Page 8 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ~AA~106*0303 Rev. 3 OPERA. ,-{ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK' Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Design Data STEP STEP COMMENTS NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

STANDARD StU evaluation)
B. Boron Concentration Change to compensate for Operator identifies that the Differential Boron reactivity change Worth negative sign was not used, and the I /

                                                                       -494 ppm value should be +494 ppm.

(-) 2.6.5 (2.7.2A) 2.7.3 Second Estimate of Boron Concentration Change

A. L2l12I 1D)+j£L2J3)) Operator identifies that 2.7.3.A is incorrect 2 because of 2.7.2.B being incorrect, and

                                                                    / identifies correct value of 1397 ppm

B. Differential Boron Worth at Concentration in Operator identifies incorrect Differential Boron (2.7.3A) and Burnup in (2.3.3) for Tavg=547°F, Worth based on incorrect value carried forward, NoXe should be ~6.636 pcm/ppm (Figure 10AfTabie 2-4)
C. Boron Concentration Change to compensate for Operator identifies error carried forward, and reactivity change identifies correct should be 506 ppm.

I (-) 2.6.5 (2.7.3.B)

2.7.4 Intended Critical Boron Concentration Operator identifies error carried forward and

                              +                                        correct intended Critical Boron concentration (2.7.10)         (2.7.3.C)                          should be 1656 ppm Page 9 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 OPERA. ,-{ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative -------------- TASK' Perform a peer check on an ECC using Nuclear Desiyn Data STEP

            -                         STEP                                                                                                       COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step)

STANDARD EVAL StU (ReqIJir"d for UNSAT evaluation) I

2.8 ESTIMATJ;l) CRITJCAl.,QQtlQITION Operator identifies error carried forward and 2.8.3 Critical Boron Concentration should be 1656 ppm per above step.

State JPM is complete '-----L - Terminating Cue: Candidate states the ECC is correct, or states it is incorrect with justification, then state "This JPM is complete". Page 10 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 "IfTIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 is in HSB at 547°F/2235 PSIG with a reactor startup planned for this shift.

Reactor trip on 3/5/10 at 2200 after 55 days at 100% power
1150 ppm Boron
1828 EFPH
Bank 0 226
2200 on 3/8/10
Bank G @ 189 steps
Bank D @ 61 steps Reactor Engineering is currently performing an ECC using BEACON, but the results are not available yet.

,,~ITIATING CUE: Perform a peer check on an EGG using Nuclear Design Data. This is NOT the required Calculation Verification. Page 11 of 11 PSEG Confidential - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (ALARA) TASK: Perform Stay Time Calculation for Emergency Condition. TASK NUMBER: N1200100104 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 experienced Rx trip with a small ReS leak from 100% power.

2. Salem is currently in an Unusual Event.

3. Your TEDE dose for the year is 1925 mrem.

INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to perform a detailed inspection of 11 RHR pump room prior to starting the pump. (Note: This does NOT include the RHR HX Room.) Using the provided survey map, and conservatively using the HIGHEST dose rate in the room for your entire exposure, and calculate the number of HOURS you could theoretically remain in the area without exceeding any dose limit. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Standard for Successful Completion: calculates maximum stay time of 4.17 hours, which can be rounded DOWN, Page 2 of4

OPERATOR TRAINING PROC3kAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE r STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (ALARA) TASK: Periorm Stay Time Calculation for Emergency Condition. TASK NUMBER: N1200100104 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC RO ADMIN A3 ALTERNATE PATH: D KJA NUMBER: _ _ _ _2__.3_.4_ _ _-1 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.2 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD ROW STAD SRoD EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom

REFERENCES:

Radiological Survey Map 11 045Z1, RP-AA-203 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 15 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03*04*10 Instructor Date: 03*19/10 Validated: WWallace Srv}E, ~r Inst\~c.ttlO~

                                                                     ') ~ I)(p" 20\\7 Reviewed By:                .    '\WfJ\ ~r~                   Date: ,) '

Training Depa~ment Approved By: ~~ Operations Representative Date: y/zs1r CJ

.-------------------------~

ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON. IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 4

OPERATvr\ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE (AlARA) TASK: Determine Radiological Conditions For Personnel Exposure

#                                STEP                                                                                    COMMENTS STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD

(#Denotes a Sequential Step) S/U evaluation) 1 I Provide the attached survey map. START TIME: 2 Determine highest dose rate in room. Per the survey map, squares are dose

I rates in Imem/hr, and circles are smear locations. The highest square is located next to smear location" 11" or "12" and indicates 18 mrem/hr.

Note: The numbered circles reach 21. 3 Calculate Maximum Stay Time Candidate subtracts year to date TEDE

dose from Admin Dose limit of 2,000 mrem, i

and gets 75 mrem. Candidate divides 75 mrem by 18 mrem/hr, and gets 4.17 hours. , Candidate may round down to be

conservative, but if candidate rounds UP it

   )                                                         will result in exceedinq the Dose Limit.

Page 3 of 5

              "-, -_*_*v" ""  -- ............ ~ .......... _. ...., ........... _.   "I~~~~* ~
 # STEP                      STEP                                                                                                    COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD

(#Denotes a Sequential Step) S/U evaluation} Notes: The PSEG Admin Limit is 2,000 mrem/year TEDE. Upon the declaration of an ALERT or higher, a persons annual limit is I automatically raised to 4500. This declaration is only a UE, so no dose escallation is provided. Terminate JPM when candidate has I I returned paperwork. 5 STOP TIME:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 experienced Rx trip with a small ReS leak from 100% power.

2. Salem is currently in an Unusual Event.

3. Your TEDE dose for the year is 1925 mrem.

INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to perform a detailed inspection of 11 RHR pump room and HX room prior to starting the pump. Using the provided survey map, and conservatively using the HIGHEST dose rate in the room for your entire exposure, and calculate the number of HOURS you could theoretically remain in the area without exceeding any dose limit. Page 5 of 5

s 11(145 1

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                                                                                                               "                                       ')
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         --,amen; I                            Teclmiclicll R::;n:w IB/-.;:XJI.. II i~Q-=-3'+~

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

   ~TATION:                  SALEM
   ~rSTEM:                   Chilled Water TASK:                     Operate the Chilled Water System (Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads)

TASK NUMBER: 0980020101

  ..'PM NUMBER:             08-01 NRC SRO Admin A1-1 ALTERNATE PATH:         0                                     KIA NUMBER:                   2.1.25
                                                                                 ------~--~------~

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: _-==-_ 4.2 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD ROO STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD:

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-SO.CH-0001, Rev. 28, TECH Spec 3.7.10 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS:

..... "weloped By:                   G Gauding                              Date:    03/04/10 Instructor Validated By:                        J Franklin                             Date:    03/19/10 SME 0dnstruct,\,r-..

Reviewed By: \~~ Date: 3--ZC::.-ZO \0, Training ~ep~nt jZs(;o O£~R . Approved By: Date:3 peratlons epresentatlve ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT o UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: -vALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 8 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAJNING PROGRAl\1 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASIJRE SYSTEM: Chillec Water TASK: Operate the Chilled Water System (Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads TASK NUMBER: 980020101 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power.
23 Chiller has been removed from service and CIT due to an electrical control problem.
22 Chiller has tripped on freeze protection and cannot be reset.
Technical Specification LCO 3.7.10 Action b.1. is in effect and non-essential heat loads need to
be removed from the chilled water system.
Inlet Water Temperature Readings from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q), Circulating I Service Water Log:

2TL3756 = 70.0 a F 2TL3757 = 68.4°F

River temperatures are NOT expected to rise any further.

INITIATING CUE: You are directed to determine which non-essential chilled water supplied components to remove from service in order to meet the requirements of TS 3.7.10 Action b.1. lAW S2.0P-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation. Components Off Normal and Off Normal Tagged lists have been reviewed with no components identified that will affect this evolution. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Candidate determines Total Heat Load Isolation required is 1267.2 kBTUlhr.

2. Candidate selects Heat Loads for isolation, including CREACS INOP, which are ~ 1267.2 kBTU/hr.

Page 2 of 8 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TR. ~G PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _____________ SYSTEM: Chilled Water System TASK: Operate the Chilled Water System (Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD stU Evaluation)

Cue: Provide the applicant with copies of:

                                                                         - Tech Spec 3.7.10 I
                                                                         - S2.0P-SO.CH-0001(Q) Chilled Water System Operation 2.1             IDENTIFY Sections of this procedure that          Candidate determines that Section 5.6 are not to be performed with uN/A".               is the correct section to be performed, and N/A's all other sections.

(The section for restoring these heat I loads may also be left blank, as the procedure may be left open if the duration will be short.) 2.2 REVIEW Components "Off Normal and From initiating cue, Candidate initials Off Normal Tagged" List(s) for the Components Off Normal and Off system( s) and support system( s) Normal Tagged lists have been associated with evolution to be performed reviewed with no components in this procedure. identified that will affect this evolution. 2.3 IF performing a system startup, THEN ... Candidate NA's this step and sub-steps since system startup is not being performed. Page 3 of 8 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRI .~G PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ------------------- DATE: ____________________ SYSTEM: Chilled Water System TASK: Operate the Chilled Water System (Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD StU Evaluation) 2.4 IF substitution of Measuring and Test Candidate NA's this step since it does Equipment (M&TE) is required, THEN ... not apply.

3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS Candidate reviews and initials Precautions and Limitations 3.1 through 3.15 5.6 Isolation of Non-Essential Heat loads 5.6.1 REFER to Technical Specification LCO Candidate refers to LCO 3.7.10, 3.7.10 for the Action requirements. (provided). (The action requirements have already been delineated to the candidate in the initial conditions; and are spelled out in the CH procedure) 5.6.2 IF two Chillers are inoperable, THEN: Candidate refers to and performs

SELECT components for isolation lAW Attachment

                                                                          ,          2 as identified in the Attachment 2.                                 individual attachment as follows.

ALIGN the Control Area Ventilation system for Operation with Unit 2 EACS Out-of SERVICE (MAINTENANCE Mode) lAW S1.0P-SO.CAV-0001(Q).

Att.2 RECORD the following data for use in 1.0 Table A: - . - ... -.- Page 4 of 8 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATORTR NG PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Chilled Water System TASK: Operate the Chilled Water System (Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)

Att.2 Inlet Water Temperature from SC.OP DL.ZZ-0008(Q) Circulating I Service 1.1 Water Log: 2TL3756=- OF 2TL3757- of Candidate enters 70.0 and 68.4 in the From the above indicated respective 2TL2756 and 2TL3747 2TL3756/2TL3757 temperatures, spaces. RECORD the highest temperature AND ADD 1.5°F to account for instrument uncertainty. Utilize this temperature / when referring to Table A. _OF{highest temp) +1.5°F =_0 Candidates enters 70.0 as the highest

temp, adds 1.5 deg to that and calculates 71.5 Att.2 Number of inoperable Chiller Units:_ Candidate enters 2. /

1.2

Att.2 RECORD the TOTAL HEAT LOAD Candidate enters 1267.2 from the 2.0 ISOLATION from Table A: column with temp> 70:::75, and 2 chillers inoperable.

Page 5 of 8 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATORTR "IG PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ---- DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Chilled Water System TASK: Operate the Chilled Water System (Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step)

EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD Stu Evaluation)

Att.2 IDENTIFY the components to be isolated 3.0 in TableB as follows:

3.1 RECORD the value from the HEAT LOAD column into the ISOLATION Candidate enters 406.5 in the column for the components selected for ISOLATION column for CREACS isolation. INOP (MAINTENANCE Mode), since step 5.6.2 directed aligning the control

! area ventilation in Maintenance mode. I

Candidate selects additional heat loads, which when combined with the 406.5 noted above, add up to at least 1267.2.

I (Note: The largest heat load, Unit 2 ECAC, would take the longest to isolate, so while it appears to be the most logical choice for isolation, it is not incorrect to isolate smaller loads as long as the total is > 1267.2). 3.2 RECORD liN/A" for the components Candidate marks all components selected to remain available. selected to remain available as N/A. Page 6 of 8 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRJ., AG PROGRAM NAME: ____________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ____________________ SYSTEM: Chilled Water System TASK: Operate the Chilled Water System (Identify and Isolate Non-Essential Heat Loads) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD stU Evaluation)
Att.2 ADD the values recorded in the Candidate adds all values in the 4.0 ISOLATION column AND RECORD the ISOLATION column and records TOTAL ISOLATION value in Table B. number in TOTAL ISOLATION.

Number MUST be ~ 1267.2. Att 2 VERIFY that the TOTAL ISOLATION Cue: IV completed SAT. JPM is 5.0 value recorded in Table B is ? the TOTAL complete HEAT LOAD ISOLATION recorded in step 2.0 of this attachment. -- TERMINATING CUE: None. Page 7 of 8 PSEG Restricted Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power.
23 Chiller has been removed from service and CIT due to an electrical control problem.
22 Chiller has tripped on freeze protection and cannot be reset.
Technical Specification LCO 3.7.10 Action b.1. is in effect and non-essential heat loads need to
be removed from the chilled water system.
Inlet Water Temperature Readings from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q), Circulating / Service Water Log:

2TL3756 = 70.0°F 2TL3757 = 68.4°F

River temperatures are NOT expected to rise any further.

INITIATING CUE: You are directed to determine which non-essential chilled water supplied components to remove from service in order to meet the requirements of TS 3.7.10 Action b.1. lAW S2.0P-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation. Components Off Normal and Off Normal Tagged lists have been reviewed with no components identified that will affect this evolution. Page 8 of 8 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From NuclearTraining

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE I ~TATION: SALEM

 ;:,(STEM:            Administrative TASK:                Evaluate a shift staffing situation and take corrective action lAW administrative procedures TASK NUMBER:          1210020302 JPM NUMBER:           08-01 NRC SRO Admin A.1-2 ALTERNATE PATH:                                            ~ANUMBER:        ______~2~1~.5~_____~

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.9 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD ROO STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom

REFERENCES:

Salem Tech Specs Section 6.0 (Both Units) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 9min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 3/15/10 Instructor Validated By: J Franklin Date: 3/19/10 SMfj~ Instr~c. \.oorr f\ Reviewed By: ~~\~ Operations Representative Date: 3"Uc-(1)\\:) Approved By: Tr~£ent Date: J}rfo ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT 0 UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY:

  'ALUATOR'S SIGNATURE:                                                       DATE:

Page 1 of 5

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ____________________________ DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Evaluate a shift staffing situation and take corrective action lAW administrative procedures TASK NUMBER: 1210020302 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 1 is in Mode 5. Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 1. A number of on shift Operators and Technicians have fallen ill after eating lunch in the Salem Cafe, to the point where some are becoming incapacitated and unable to remain at their duty stations. ONE unaffected SRO is also qualified as STA. INITIATING CUE:

1. lAW Salem Technical Specifications, determine the a~solute minim~_1l'! number (as a TOTAL number of each type) of individuals by position required to fill ALL required Shift positions on BOTH units.

Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task standard for Successful Completion: Identify minimum shift manning of 1 Shift Manager, 1 STA Qualified SRO, 3 NCO's, 4 NEO's, and 1 Radiation Protection Technician. Page 2 of 5

TQ-AA*1f\t~-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATG" I'RAINING PROGRAM NAME: _________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Evaluate a shift staffing situation and take corrective action lAW administrative procedures

#    STEP                         STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

(#Denotes a Sequential SteJ!) STANDARD StU evaluation) I Section 6.0 of Salem Technical Specifications contains Administrative Controls. Provide candidates with pages 6-1 through 6-6 of Unit 1 Tech Specs, and pages 6-1 through 6-7 of Unit 2 Tech Specs. Candidate refers to Unit 2 Tech Specs, page 6-5 for Minimum Shift Crew Composition. Determines 1 SM is required (can be the v same for Unit 1 position. Determines 1 SRO is required. Stem states the healthy SRO is STA qualified, so they

                                                            / fill both slots.

Determines 2 NCO's are required . Determines 3 NEO's are required. v Determines 1 Maintenance Electrician is I k required. I v Determines 1 Rad Pro Tech is required,

                                                         "    who can fill the same position on Unit 1.

Page 3 of 5

TQ-AA-11-t-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATO" I RAINING PROGRAM NAME: _________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Evaluate a shift staffing situation and take corrective action lAW administrative procedures

#    STEP                         STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

(#Denotes a Sequential Ste£l STANDARD StU evaluation) Candidate refers to Unit 1 Tech Specs, page 6-5 for Minimum Shift Crew Composition. Determines 1 SM is required (can be the same for Unit 1 position. Determines NO SRO is required. Determines no additional STA is required. Determines 1 NCO's are required. Determines 1 NEO is required. Determines NO Maintenance Electrician is required. Determines 1 Rad Pro Tech is required, who can fill the same position on Unit 1. Adds required operators together and gets total number of positions required:

1 Shift Manager
1 STA Qualified SRO 3 NCO's I
4 NEO's
1 Maintenance Electrician
1 Radiation Protection Technician.

Terminate JPM when candidate returns cue sheet. Page 4 of 5

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 1 is in Mode 5. Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 1. A number of on shift Operators and Technicians have fallen ill after eating lunch in the Salem Cate, to the point where some are becoming incapacitated and unable to remain at their duty stations. ONE unaffected SRO is also qualified as STA. INITIATING CUE: Determine the absolute minimum number (as a total number of each type) of individuals required to fill ALL required Shift positions on BOTH units. Page 5 of 5

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM

    ... TEM:               Administrative- Technical Specifications TASK:                     Identify the most restrictive Tech Spec Action Statement TASK NUMBER:              N1200010301 JPM NUMBER:               08-01 NRC SRO Admin A2 ALTERNATE PATH:         I       I                                  ~ANUMBER:      ________~2~.2~.4~2______~

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.6 APPLICABILITY: --~R~O~-- SRO EOCJ ROc=J STA CJ SRO IT] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator in Freeze

REFERENCES:

Salem Tech Specs TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: . Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/17/10 Instructor validated By: B Boos I) Date: 03/19110 SME or 'Etuctor D 3-20-{D Reviewed By: ~ It0~!~ \ Date: Approved By: T~n~27 Opera.rc;(s Representative

                                                        .                    Date:  ~j;~lo ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:

ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT o UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 9 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORl\iA.1\lCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative- Technical Specifications TASK: Identify the most restrictive TSAS Action Time TASK NUMBER: SIMULATOR SETUP:, Initialize Simulator to IC*258, Rx power 55%, Cb 42 ppm. 22,24 SW pumps control power off, 21 charging pump control power off, 24,25 CFCU control power off, PZR level channel III high level bistable energized. Take the simulator out of freeze and quickly print Alarm Summary for Aux Alarm Typrewriter, then return Simulator to freeze. See next page for Bezel Covers Required INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when 22 SGFP tripped 5 minutes ago. The unit automatically ran back as expected. Prior to the runback, Salem was experiencing heavy grassing in the Delaware River. 23A and 23B circulators were Emergency Tripped just prior to the 22 SGFP trip. During the runback, 26 SW pump tripped.

   'st prior to the 22 SGFP trip, the following conditions were present:

22 & 24 SW pps were CIT at 0800 today for strainer cleaning.
24 and 25 CFCUs were CIT at 1900 yesterday for investigation of out of spec low SW flow.
21 charging pump was declared inoperable at 0800 two days ago due to cooler biofouling, and remains CIT due to emergent issue discovered during cooler cleaning.
23 AFW pump outboard pump bearing bubbler was found empty, and the 2MS52 was shut at 0600 today.
15 AFD penalty minutes had been accumulated in the last 24 hours.
I&C is performing a Channel Calibration of PZR Level Channel III, and are midway through the calibration. (A'o~~n )", ,.@f'/:' 2"Itcr ;rd)%)/ ,'7.6/3((99 JIM!? 6/,1,'7';'; iN '/,v MI"-57f.;7
2PR2 was declared inoperable at 0930 today due to excessive seat leakage.

The Current Time is 1000. INITIATING CUE: You are the Unit 2 CRS. Walkdown the control console and determine AT Ttll§ TIME the most limiting Tech Spec Action Time. Tum in Cue Sheet to the Evaluator with the Tech Spec AND Action Time identified when complete. Page 2 of9 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SIMULATOR O~ERA TOR - Bezel Covers Required. Initial 21 CVCS CIT PZR level Channel III - Clear Bezel Cover 24 and 25 CFCUs CIT - Bezel Covers on Hi and La Speed Breakers. 23 AFW pump- Clear Bezel Cover. 22 and 24 SW pumps CIT. 2PR2 - Clear Bezel Cover Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Il Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Determine the most limiting Tech Spec is 3.1.1.1 for Shutdown Margin, since Control Rods are below the Rod Insertion Limit AND Emergency Boration has not been started.

2. Identify the action time is Immediately.

Page 3 of9 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  ~alem   Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when 22 SGFP tripped 5 minutes ago. The unit automaticaily ran back as expected. Prior to the runback, Salem was experiencing heavy grassing in the Delaware River.
   - 23A and 238 circulators were Emergency Tripped just prior to the 22 SGFP trip.
   - During the runback, 26 SW pump tripped.

Just prior to the 22 SGFP trip. the following conditions were present:

22 & 24 SW pps were CIT at 0800 today for strainer cleaning.
24 and 25 CFCUs were crr at 1900 yesterday for investigation of out of spec low SW flow.
21 charging pump was declared inoperable at 0800 two days ago due to cooler biofouling, and remains CIT due to emergent issue discovered during cooler cleaning.
23 AFW pump outboard pump bearing bubbler was found empty, and the 2MS52 was shut at 0600 today.
I&C is performing a Channel Calibration of PZR Level Channel III, and are midway through the calibration.
2PR2 was declared inoperable at 0930 today due to excessive seat leakage.

The Current Time is 1000. INITIATING CUE: You are the Unit 2 CRS. Walkdown the control console and determine AT-"[HIS TJM!; the most limiting Tech SJ?~e~A91iQn Tim~. Turn in Cue Sheet to the Evaluator with the Tech Spec AND Action Time identified when complete. Page 9 of9 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TR ,NG PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE --------------------- DATE: _____________________ SYSTEM: Administrative- Technical Specifications TASK: Identify the most restrictive TSAS Action Time STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD StU Evaluation)

Allow candidate sufficient time to Note: There are no "hidden" walkdown control consoles and refer to components that are OIS that the Tech Specs. candidates are expected to find. Cue candidates if asked about "other" Tech Specs and Action Times are listed conditions that only the conditions to the right. stated in the stem are present, i.e., actual plant status, alarms that indicate plant status in response to the SGFP runback, and components that have been identified as being I removed from service. PZR level Channel III -3.3.1.1 Action 6 actions are already taken since first part of procedure has bistables

                                                                     /   tripped, which puts plant in compliance to trip bistables within 6 hours. Stem states procedure is Y2 done.

Page 4 of9 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR T~ .NG PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE -------------------- DATE: ____________________ SYSTEM: Administrative- Technical Specifications TASK: Identify the most restrictive TSAS Action Time STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL

NO. (Required for UNSAT STANDARD S/U Evaluation)

SW pumps- 3.7.4. Using S2.0P SO.SW-0005, Attachment 2 SW Operability Guidelines, page 1 of 35, the minimum pump requirements are not met to have 2 operable SW loops, since there are not 2 operable pumps per bay (24 & 26 inoperable). This will result in a 72 hour action time, and t the clock started when 26 SW pump tripped during downpower. (Is NOT 3.0.3) I

Shutdown Margin 3.1.1.1 - this is
the most limiting Tech Spec Action Time since it requires immediate initiation of Emergency Boration,

                                                                  ~v and it has not been initiated. The
                                                               ;QIl \      s)".f$   surveillance requirement for Sf~7            lZ:~~X ~';)*I"             4.1.1.1.1.b states that the rods are 0, )                   within the limits of the COLR, which

5\(1\

                                                   .,055   ul                       IA     . ure 1, with auct hi OIT power a 9% , shows 98 steps on Control Sa     O. Actual rod position is 78 sp--l5    f;      tt. {tid.     \'1~    steps.

1 0v 0 ,,<fo tl p'; ? {li'i:I Page 5 of9 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TR. .ING PROGRAM NAME: _____________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _____________________ SYSTEM: Administrative- Technical Specifications TASK: Identify the most restrictive TSAS Action Time STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) , EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD Stu Evaluation)

Rod Insertion Limit Lo-Lo OHA E-16 in alarm. RIL is exceeded, and 3.1.3.5

                                                                    ~as a 2 hour action time. Alarm has been in for a maximum of 5 minutes since that it when the SGFP tripped.

Note: The Alarm Response for OHA E-16 directs operators to commence van Emergency Boration, but Tech

                                                                  /    Specs has the 2 hour Action Time.

21 charging pump C/T- 3.5.2 ECCS I subsystems, 72 hour action time if V only one train operable. 22 hours remain. DNB 3.2.5.b(RCS pressure <2200 \ I! psiA) is N/A since RCS pressure i ; ~,"7 " I _s::sSTET n" 2202 psiG. I I Page 6 of9 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permissicn From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR T" JNG PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ------------------- DATE: ____________________ SYSTEM: Administrative- Technical Specifications TASK: Identify the most restrictive TSAS Action Time STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 23 AFW pump 2MS52 shut- 3.7.1.2.

With one AFW pump inoperable, 72 V hour action time. 68 hours remain. Axial Flux Differenti~he 15 minute action time 0 on a.1 applies only >90% power. The 30 mi.nute action time of Action 2.a could only be applicable after the : 11>~r.; accumulation of 45 more penalty I minutes or outside the COLR, which is

                                                                    -28 at 55% power, and actual AFD is 20.

I I Page 7 of9 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific PermissiOl From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TR. .NG PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Administrative- Technical Specifications TASK: Identify the most restrictive TSAS Action Time STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD stu Evaluation) 2PR2 be' gino erable due to seat leakag -3.4.5 ction a, requires the

                                                                                                                  ~/;6 PORV loc        alve to be shut within one hour. Block valve is NOT shut.          ;; rV    D This leaves 30 minutes to close the 2PR6.

I I JPM is terminated when candidate has turned in Cue sheet with Tech Spec identified. I I Page 8of9 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPER.\TOR TMINL'l\fG PROGRAM JOB PERFORl\1.~~CE l\fEASURE I ~TATION: SALEM

 .;:)(STEM:              Waste liquid TASK:                   Select Release Path for Radioactive liquid Waste Release TASK NUMBER:            N0680070302 JPM NUMBER:             08-01 NRC SRO Admin A3 ALTERNATE PATH:                                             KIA NUMBER:                      2.3.6 IMPORTANCE FACTOR:
                                                                              --------------------4  3.8
                                                                              --R-O-APPLICABILITY:                                                                                      SRO EOD          ROD              STAD             SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD:               Classroom

REFERENCES:

S1.0P-SO.WL-0002, Rev.25, 205209 (CW), 205242 (SW) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 35 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: ueveloped By: G Gauding Date: 03/17/10 Instructor Validated By: J Franklin Date: 03/19/10 SME~truct~ 3--- Z-(;,~ Lo\D Reviewed By: V\ '\ fL-- Date: Training Departm nt Approved By: op~ons epresentative Date: J /Z-'Jjt 0 ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: -'/ALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: Page 1 of 5 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERt\.TOR TRlil'llING PROGR<\..,.1\l JOB PERFORl\lANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Waste Liquid TASK: Select Release Path for Radioactive Liquid Waste Release TASK NUMBER: N0680070302 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is on day 25 of a scheduled 45 day refueling outage. 21 CCHX is in service, 22 CCHX is removed from service and drained. All Unit 2 Circulators are O/S. Salem Unit 1 is operating at 75% power. 12A Circulator is O/S for waterbox cleaning. The Non-Rad Waste Treatment System is in service performing a release, and must remain in service. Unit 1 is NOT in any active Tech Specs. 12 CVCS Monitor Tank is in Recire, and Chemistry has granted permission to release the tank. INITIATING CUE: You are the Unit 1 CRS. Select the release path for ~S Monitor Tank lAW S1.0P-SO.WL-0002, Attachment 2, step 2.2 Release Verification AND provide marked up drawings of the flow path from 12 CVCS Monitor tank to its ultimate release point. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Candidate determines the release path as 21 CCHX to 12A ANDIOR 128 CW Pump lIS (Att. 2 Step 2.2.3) and provides release flow path drawing of 12 CVCS MT to 21 CCHX, (via Unit x-conn) to discharge of 12A112B Circulators.

Page 2 of 5 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TR, ,~G PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ------------------- TASK: STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD StU Evaluation)

Provide candidates with marked up copy of S1.0P-SO.WL-0002., and blank copies of drawings 205242 Sheets 3-6, / 205342 Sheets 4-6, 205239 Sheet 1, 205309 Sheets 2-3, and 205209 Sheets 2-3, and a colored marker. Candidate uses S2.0P-SO.WL-0002,

Attachment 2, Section 2.2, to select r the release flow path based on I CCHX's available and Circulators in service, as 12 CVCS Monitor Tank to 21 CCHX, to 12A andlor 12B CW pumps lIS.

I

Candidates mark the appropriate drawings, from the 12 CVCS MT on drawing 205239 Sheet 1, to 205339 Sheet 1 via x-connect line, to 205342 Sheet 4, to 205342 Sheet 3, through 21 SW22, to 205342 Sheet 6, to 205342 Sheet 3, to 205209 Sheet 2 Page 3 of 5 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TR. .NG PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ------------------- DATE: ____________________ SYSTEM: TASK: STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD stu Evaluation)

Terminate JPM when candidate has returned procedures and marked up I drawings. Page 4 of 5 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

  . 'ITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 2 is on day 25 of a scheduled 45 day refueling outage. 21 CCHX is in service, 22 CCHX is removed from service and drained. All Unit 2 Circula.tors are O/S. Salem Unit 1 is operating at 75% power. 12A Circulator is O/S for waterbox cleaning. The Non-Rad Waste Treatment System is in service performing a release, and must remain in service. Unit 1 is NOT in any active Tech Specs. 12 CVCS Monitor Tank is in Recirc, and Chemistry has granted permission to release the tank. INITIATING CUE: You are the Unit 1 CRS. Select the release path for 12 eves Monitor Tank lAW S1.0P-SO.WL-0002, , step 2.2 Release Verification ANQ provide marked up drawings of the flow path from 12 CVCS Monitor tank to its ultimate release point. Page 5 of 5 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1 ) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-1 (ESG-1) ALTERNATE PATH: I I KIA NUMBER: IMPORTANCE FACTOR: __~~__ 2.4.29

                                                                           ------------------~

4.4 APPLICABILITY

RO SRO EoD ROO STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulate (Simulator or Classroom)

REFERENCES:

Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Inform Simulator Operators - DO NOT ERASE ANY PROCEDURES UNTIL THE SRO EVALUATOR APPROVES VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/15/10 Instructor Validated By: B Boos Date: 03/18/10 SMn..r Inst~ft~h Reviewed By: ti17\ WIW~ Operations Representative Date: ",.zi:- j 10:1 ZOtO Approved By: Tra~£ ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1 ) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running."* If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.

INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

I 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory . progress is being made. Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of ALERT under EAL 3.2.2.b, and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.

OPERATO" I RAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1) STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)

Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet" Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as I I , necessary - 5 minute limit prior to starting)

                  *START TIME:
                  *Start time begins when candidate          Cue: The regulatory commitment time reports he/she is ready to assume SM       clock has started.

duties

         ------~-

1 Reviews ECG to classify event Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG i-- 2 Classifies the event Determines the classification of the event and refers to ECG Attachment 2 (ALERT) i f--- 3 Fills out Section A of Emergency

Unit: 2 Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2
EAL#(s): 3.2.2.b
Declared at: Current Time and Date
Initials as EC 4 CALL communicators to the Control Pages communicators and initials as SM Room Cue: I am the Primary Communicator

OPERATe .'RAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: _______________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 5 ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.

Callout Activation (EP96-003) 6 COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of

 '*                                                        Fills out Section II of ICMF:

this attachment).

TimelDate: Time/date filled in on Attachment 2
EAL#(s): 3.2.2.b
Description of Event: Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier Note: Description of Event is found in Section IV of the ECG.

1Fills

                                                            - - *out
                                                                   *

Section III:

I* Checks No Radiological Release is in progress Fills out Section IV: Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS Initials for aQQroval to transmit

   '*    7        PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary           Provides ICMF to Primary Communicator Communicator and DIRECT the               within 15 minutes of START TIME Communicator to implement EGG              COMPLETION TIME:

I Attachment 6. Terminating Cue: Repeat back message from the operator on direction to the Primary Communicator, and then state "This JPM is complete"

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties.

You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ISTATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-2 (ESG-2) ALTERNATE PATH: KiA NUMBER: 2.4.29

                                                                            ------~~~---~--~

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.4 APPLICABILITY:

                                                                            - -RO-            SRO EOD          ROO               STAD            SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD:               Simulate (Simulator or Classroom)

REFERENCES:

Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Inform Simulator Operators - DO NOT ERASE ANY PROCEDURES UNTIL THE SRO EVALUATOR APPROVES VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/15/10 Instructor Validated By: B Boos Date: 03/18/10 s~~' IJJ;)!,' 3 Zore opr~ns Representative Reviewed By: Date: Approved By: T~~ ACTUAL JPI\II COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: I PERFORMED BY: I GRADE: 0 SAT o UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: __________________________ DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.

INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Complete the ICMF V\-ith the classification of SAE under EAL 8.1.3.c, OR 3.1.1.b AND 3.2.1.b and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.

OPERATG., (RAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan ------------------ TASK: Classify an event and complete an leMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG~2) STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD S/U evaluation) .

Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet" Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as necessary 5 minute limit prior to starting)

                  "'START TIME:
                  "'Start time begins when candidate                     Cue: The regulatory commitment time reports he/she is ready to assume SM                   clock has started.

duties 1 Reviews ECG to classify event Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG 2 Classifies the event Determines the classification of the event and refers to ECG Attachment 3 (SAE) 1--- 3 Fills out Section A of Emergency

Unit: 2 Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2
EAL#(s): 8.1.3.c OR 3.1.1.b AND 3.2.1.b
Declared at: Current Time and Date
Initials as EC 4 CALL communicators to the Control Pages communicators and initials as SM Room Cue~ I am the Primary Communicator

                           ~--   ....... - - . - ...... ~-
                                                             - -.. ~- ~--   -----                                    I       I

OPERATul, fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an 'CMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 5 ACT IVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.

Callout Activation (EP96-003) 6 COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of

Fills out Section \I of ICMF:

this attachment).

TimelDate: Time/date filled in on Attachment 3
EAL#( s): 8.1.3.c OR 3.1.1.b AND 3.2.1.b
Description of Event: Complete Loss of Functions Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown OR Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier AND Potential Loss of the Reactor I Coolant system Barrier Note: Description of Event is found in Section IV of the ECG.

Fills out Section III:

Checks No Radiological Release is in progress Fills out Section IV:

Retrieves wind speed and direction data

from SPDS Initials for aggroval to transmit

OPERATO,. I RAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK" Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2) STEP COMMENTS STEP

NO.

(*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation) I I I I

7 PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Provides ICMF to Primary Communicator Communicator and DIRECT the within 15 minutes of START TIME Communicator to implement ECG COMPLETION TIME:

Attachment 6.

                                                                                                 -   ~--.- ... ~- ....

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties.

You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE r=::-::-::=-::-:-----~-:-:-:=-:-:------------------.----------. STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG~3) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 I\IRC SRO Admin A4-3 (ESG~3) ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 2.4.29 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: ---:::--:--

4.4 APPLICABILITY

RO SRO EOD ROO STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulate (Simulator or Classroom)

REFERENCES:

Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Inform Simulator Operators - DO NOT ERASE ANY PROCEDURES UNTIL THE SRO EVALUATOR APPROVES VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes

                                                              ---.-~-

Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/15/10 Instructor Validated By: . B Boos Date: 03/18/10 SM~,~.llnstfuftort1 Reviewed By: rtr~ (jOJiti!l Date: 3-Z{;-LOiO Operations Repres ntative Approved By: L"/- Training q partment Date: ....3'z/ s--/ 0 ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: ____________________________ DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-3) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.

INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the corn~ct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of SAE uuder EAL 5.1.3, and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.

OPERATL . fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-3) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD StU evaluation)

Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet" Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as II necessary - 5 minute limit prior to starting) I

                    *START TIME:
                    *Start time begins when candidate            Cue: The regulatory commitment time reports he/she is ready to assume SM         clock has started.

duties 1 Reviews ECG to classify event Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG r-- -- 2 Classifies the event Determines the classification of the event and refers to ECG Attachment 3 (SAE) I 3 Fills out Section A of Emergency

Unit: 2 Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2
EAL#(s): 5.1.3
Declared at: Current Time and Date
Initials as EC 4 CALL communicators to the Control Pages communicators and initials as SM Room Cue: I am the Primary Communicator

                                                                                                      - - ... - ..... - ~- ...-

OPERAT\.. . fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regUlatory committed time limit (ESG-3) STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 5 ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency I

posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM. Callout Activation (EP96-003) 6 COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of

this attachment).

Fills out Section II of ICMF:

Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 3
EAL#(s): 5.1.3
Description of Event: Reactor Trip Failure with power above 5%.

Note: Description of Event is found in Section IV of the ECG. Fills out Section III:

Checks No Radiological Release is in progress Fills Q!.It Section IV:

Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS Initials for approval to transmit

7 PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Provides ICMF to Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of START TIME I

I Communicator and DIRECT the Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6. COMPLETION TIME: Terminating Cue: Repeat back message from the operator on direction to the Primary Communicator, and then state "This JPM is complete"

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties.

You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE I STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-4 (ESG-4) ALTERNATE PATH: KiA NUMBER: 2.4.29

                                                                            ------------------~

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: __-=~__ 4.4 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD ROO STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulate (Simulator or Classroom)

REFERENCES:

Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Inform Simulator Operators - DO NOT ERASE ANY PROCEDURES UNTIL THE SRO EVALUATOR APPROVES VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/15/10 Instructor Validated By: B Boos Date: 03/18/10 SMrr~.'lnst~uftor Reviewed By: 1XliJ)tfr~ Operations Representative Date: 3 2.010 Approved By: L/://7 Trainin~ent

~.-----------------------------------------------------------------~

ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: _______________________________________________ GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: i EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: __________________________ DATE: __________________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.

INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Complete the ICMF "ith the classification of SAE under EALs 3.2.3.b AND 3.3.4.b and provide it to the Primary Communicator "ithin 15 minutes of Start Time.

OPERATl", TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK' Classify an event and complete an ,eMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG~4) STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)

I Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet" Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as i necessary - 5 minute limit prior to starting)

                  *START TIME:
                  *Start time begins when candidate             Cue: The regulatory commitment time                                         I reports he/she is ready to assume SM          clock has started.

duties 1 Reviews ECG to classify event Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG 2 Classifies the event Determines the classification of the event and refers to ECG Attachment 3 (SAE) 3 Fills out Section A of Emergency

Unit: 2 Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2
EAL#(s): 3.2.3.b AND 3.3.4.b
Declared at: Current Time and Date
Initials as EC I--

4 CALL communicators to the Control Pages communicators and initials as SM Room Cue: I am the Primary Communicator I

OPE RAT '- . TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG~4) STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSA T STANDARD S/U evaluation) 5 ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.

Callout Activation (EP96-003) 6 COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT

MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of this attachment). Fills out Section 1\ of ICMF:
Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 3
EAL#(s): 3.2.3.b AND 3.3.4.b
Description of Event: Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier AND Loss of the Containment Barrier.

Note: Description of Event is found in Section IV of the ECG. Fills out Section III:

There IS a Radiological Release is in progress Fills out Section IV:

Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS Initials for al2l2roval to transmit

7 PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Provides leMF to Primary Communicator Communicator and DIRECT the within 15 minutes of START TIME Communicator to implement ECG Attachment 6. COMPLETION TIME:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties.

You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM

 ~______.____________~J~O~B~P~E=R~F~ORMANCEMEASU_R_E________________________

STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Rod Control TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s) TASK NUMBER: 1140330401 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Sim a ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 003 AA2.03 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.6 3.8 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EO I I RO [KJ STA ,---_I SRO [KJ EVALUATION SETIING/METHOD: Simulator

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-AB.ROD-0002 Rev. 10 (checked 3/9/10) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 4 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/01/10 Instructor Validated By: B Shavor Date: 03/19/10 SME() :\nstr~uc or Approved By: ~ Training Depa

ment Date: 3-2."'- 2\i1C> Approved By: ope~~nt Date: 3~1a ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT i REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: ! EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 5

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Rod Control TASK: Take corrective actions for 2 dropped control rods TASK NUMBER: 1140330401 SIMULATOR SETUP IC-251 Insert RT-1, RD0267, ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, Final Severity 5 after candidate has assumed the watch. Modify RD0267 ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, to Final Severity 53 when candidate has completed step 3.10 of S2.0P-AB.ROD-0002 O~ if candidate attempts to change Main Turbine load due to Tavg being >1.5 degrees lower than Tref. INITIAL CONDITIONS: 40% power, BOL A power reduction to bring the Main Turbine off-line is on hold. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Page 2 of 5

TQ-AA ,)-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATur< TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ROD CONTROL ------------------- TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Oenotes a Critical Step) EVAl (Required for UNSAT STANDARD StU evaluation)

SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Insert RT-1 RD0267, ANY ROD DROPS Candidate announces cluster of rod related INTO RX, Final Severity 5, when "E" Window OHAs as unexpected alarms. candidate assumes the watch. Announces indications of rod 2SA 1 dropped into the core. Enters S2.0P-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod. I-----{- ------i 2.1 IF more than one rod is verified to be Verifies only 1 rod has dropped into core. tripped, THEN Manually TRIP Reactor AND GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip OR Safety Injection.

3.1 PLACE Rod Bank Selector Switch in Places Rod Bank Selector Switch in MAN.

MAN. I 3.2 IF a Turbine load change is in progress ... Verifies no turbine load change in progress. 3.3 ADJUST Taveto within 1.50 of program as Verifies Tave is within 1.50 of program. Note: It will take - 2 follows: minutes 15 seconds for

                          -IE Main Turbine is operating,                                                               T err to reach -1.5 Simulator Operator: IF operator                    degrees.

THEN adjust Turbine load. attempts to lower turbine load,

                          -   IF Main Turbine is NOT operating,             then change RT-1 as described THEN ADJUST Steam Dumps                       on next page now.

OR 21-24MS10 valves.

~--

Page 3 of 5

TQ-AA 1-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ROD CONTROL ------------------ TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD StU evaluation) !

3.4 Is Reactor subcritical as a result of the Answers NO, GOES TO step 3.9 dropped rod? 3.9 IF AT ANY TIMJ::: a power reduction Determines no power reduction is becomes necessary, THEN BORATE necessary. AND ADJUST Turbine load or Steam Dump System flowrate to maintain T ave within 1.50 F of program. 3.10 Is power above 50% of RATED Answers NO, and GOES TO Step 3.12 THERMAL POWER? SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Modify malfunction RD0267, ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, to Final Severity 53, when candidate has completed step 3.10 of S2.0P-AB.ROD-0002. f---

2.1 IF more than one rod is verified to be Candidate should observe a second rod tripped, THEN Manually TRIP Reactor bottom light by direct observation, or by AND GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip depressed power in the region of the 2 OR Safety Injection. dropped rods, Terr or Tavg lowering, or OHA D-32 TAVE LO, and MANUALLY TRIP the Reactor lAW Step 2.1.

Evaluator: See next step jf candidate does not recognize the second dropped rod and continues in the procedure. {This will allow the candidate to continue in the JPM until the 2 times validation time has been reached and the JPM is terminated. I Page 4 of 5

TQ-AA,' ,-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATlJr< TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: ROD CONTROL TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod STEP STEP COMMENTS ,

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD S/U evaluation) 3.12 REQUEST Maintenance to determine if Candidate contacts Maintenance or an Individual Rod Position Indicator requests CRS to contact Maintenance to (lRPI) malfunction has occurred. determine if an IRPI malfunction has occurred.

Cue: Maintenance has been contacted. 3.13 Has an IRPI malfunction occurred? Candidate answers NO based on rod bottom, OHAs, and primary plant parameter changes, and GOES TO Step 3.15. 3.15 INITIATE a power reduction to <75% Candidate recognizes power is 40%. Rated Thermal Power ... 3.16 REQUEST Reactor Engineering Candidate contacts Reactor Engineering or assistance to recover rod. requests CRS to contact Reactor Engineering for assistance in recovering dropped rod. Cue: Reactor Engineering has been contacted. 3.17 Is dropped rod to be recovered, per Cue: Reactor Engineering will be Reactor Engineering? performing a flux map to aid in determination of whether a recovery will be made of the dropped rod.

                                                                                                                                      ~ ~~-

Terminate the JPM once the candidate has inserted a manual Reactor Trip or reaches two times the validation time. Page 5 of 5

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 INITIAL CONDITIONS: 40% power, BOL. A power reduction to bring the Main Turbine off-line is on hold. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications. Page 6 of 5

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: o;;TATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Perform The Actions For Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Manually initiate SI based on demand with no auto SI) TASK NUMBER: N1150020501 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Sim b ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 013 A4.03

                                                                             ------~~~~---4 IMPORTANCE FACTOR:              4.5            4.7 APPLICABILITY:                                                                   RO            SRO EOL]          ROW              STAL]           SROW EVALUATION SETTI NGIM ETHOD:              Simulator I Perform 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Rev. 27        S2.0P-IO.zZ-0005, Rev. 20

REFERENCES:

OP-AA-101-111-1003, Rev. 1 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 2 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/08/10 Instructor Validated By: S Harris Date: 03/19/10 SMr\~r.llrnst~~cto~

                                    ~~r~

T:;pl Reviewed By: Date: 1-2(Y-Zotu Approved By: Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT D UNSAT , REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: I I EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: ___________________________ DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Perform The Actions For Reactor Trip or Safety Injection TASK NUMBER: N1150020501 SIMULATOR SETUP Reset Simulator to IC*252 MALFS: 1. VL0460 through VL0465, 21-23TB10 and 21-23TB20 fail 100% open

2. VL0454 through VL0459 21-23TB30 and 21*23 TS40 fail 100% open (all TS valve failures tied to ET-1 MONP0254<20 (Control Bank C Control Rods <20 steps) with 5 second time delay.

3. AN0588 SER 588 FAILS -:F21 STEAM FLOW HIGH (Final Value 1)

4. RP0108 FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC 51 (Final Value TRUE)

5. MS0092E,F,G,H 21-24MS167 FAILS OPEN.

6. CF06, CF07, CF08, and CF10 all overridden OFF to prevent turning steam dumps off.

IOP-5 out and marked up to Rx trip step. (5.1.7.B) INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 2 is performing a plant shutdown to enter a refueling outage. Rx power has been reduced to 19% in preparation for tripping the Rx. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0005, Minimum Load to Hot Standby has been performed up to Step 5.1.7.B
Group busses have been transferred to their Station Power Transformers.
21 and 22 AFW pumps are in service supplying 10E41bm/hr to each SG.
22 SGFP is at idle speed.
Rod Control is in Manual.

INiTIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Initiate a Rx trip lAW Step 5.1.7.B of S2.0P-IO.zZ-0005, and enter EOP TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All criticai steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Candidate initiates a Manual Safety Injection based on board indication of excessive steam flow OR PZR pressure dropping following Rx trip prior to an automatic Safety Injection.

PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATO... fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Perform the Actions for a Reactor TriD or Safety Iniection STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)

Candidate reviews S2.0P-IO.zZ 0005, Minimum Load to Hot Standby.

IOP-5 TRIP the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Candidate announces tripping the 5.1.7.8 Switches on 2CC2 AND GO TO 2-EOP* reactor and trips the reactor with TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. either of the Reactor Trip Switches on 2CC2.

Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-1 is TRUE upon the Rx trip. Candidate performs Immediate Actions of TRIP-1 from memory: EOP TRIP REACTOR TRIP-1 Candidate verifies reactor is tripped from operation of Reactor Trip Switch and indication of Reactor Trip Breakers open. EOP IS REACTOR TRIP CONFIRMED Candidate confirms the reactor trip TRIP-1 by:

1. Power range NI indication less than 5% AND

2. Intermediate range NI indication dropping AND

3. Intermediate range NI SUR negative.

PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERAT0... TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK . Perform the Actions for a Reactor _.- T . I * ...,.. Saf I . __ ._ . . . 11 _ _ ",'''., STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD S/U evaluation)

EOP- TRIP TURBINE Candidate checks all 4 Turbine Stop TRIP-1 Valves indicate shut on 2RP4. EOP- IS ANY 4KV VITAL BUS ENERGIZED Candidate checks 4KV vital bus TRIP-1 voltage indication on 2CC3 and responds YES. 1--. EOP- IS SI ACTUATED Candidate checks S\ has NOT TRIP-1 initiated. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATt... fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK - . T.... Perform the Actions for a Reactor ~. Safety

                                                       .. _. Iniect"-'-"

STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD StU evaluation)

EOP- IS SI REQUIRED BY 2RP4 OR FIRST OUT Candidate identifies that there is no I TRIP-1 OHA demand for a Safety Injection by I First Out Overhead Alarm. Candidate identifies that bistable

coincidence on 2RP4 for Lo Lo Tavg is present, and then Low Steam Pressure, and additionally notes that !

steam flow is> expected for a Rx trip. Candidate may also identify rapidly lowering PZR pressure. Candidate manually initiates Safety I Injection from either Safeguards Train A or Train B Keyswitch. 1 Note: There is no requirement to identify specific condition which is I causing the excessive steam flow. However, candidate MAY identify Main Steam Dump valves all 100% open and attempt to shut them or the_ MSIVs. (Will not work). PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERA TO~ fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Perform the Actions for a R ~~~.~ * * *

j..,!~. _~.~tY ... ~~ .. ~ **

STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAl (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD evaluation)

S/U Terminate JPM when candidate states: "Ready for you to read", which indicates their performance of the first pass through Immediate Actions is complete, or when they announce "Immediate actions are complete", or after an automatic Safety Injection has occurred. '--~~~ ~-~

~-~

PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Salem Unit 2 is performing a plant shutdown to enter a refueling outage. Rx power has been reduced to 19% in preparation for tripping the Rx. S2.0P-IO.zZ-0005, Minimum Load to Hot Standby has been performed up to Step 5.1. 7.B
Group busses have been transferred to their Station Power Transformers.
21 and 22 AFW pumps are in service supplying 10E41bm/hr to each SG.
22 SGFP is at idle speed.
Rod Control is in Manual.

INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Initiate a Rx trip lAW Step 5.1. 7.B of S2.0P-IO.zZ-0005, and enter EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control TASK: TCAF for Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction - Respond to Unwarranted PZR Pressure Overprotection System (POPS) actuation TASK NUMBER: N1140240401 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Sim c ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: _ _ _0,,-1,--0_A..;..4_._0,--3_ _ _ 1 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.0 3.8 I

                                                                         ----R-O--                   SRO APPLICABILITY:                                                                                            i EOD            ROm             STAD             SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD:             Simulator I Perform S2.0P-SO.RC-0002, Rev. 29, S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001, Rev. 18,

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0011, Rev. 56, S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0005, Rev. 18 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 13 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: - . - -N/A--- Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/09/10 Instructor Validated By: B Boos Date: 03/19/10 SMrfr Instri~.ttoorr . Reviewed By: \rmJ\ ~~ Training Departme Approved By: z:::-d Operations~~sentative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT o UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control TASK: TCAF for Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction - Respond to Unwarranted PZR Pressure Overprotection System (POPS) actuation TASK NUMBER: N1150020501 SIMULATOR SETUP IC-253 Open RCP screen on P-250 computer Mark up S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, to show 23 RCP has been started. (marked up through 5.3.6, with step completed for 23 RCP. MALF: 1. VL0297 2PR1 FAILS TO POSITION (0-100%) Final Value 100 Delay 10 seconds tied to ET-1.

2. RC0022A RCS PRESS (PT405) FAILS HIILO Final Value 390 Delay 9 seconds tied to ET-1.

ET*1 KAK06PBH 22 RCP Start pushbutton ET-3 QB201PRI 2PR1 open indication on 2CC2 Command DMF RC0022A (deletes the high pressure on PC405 that caused POPS Channel 1 initiation. INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in MODE 5. RHR HX inlet temperature is '180 degrees. RCS pressure is 290 psig. 21 RHR loop is supplying shutdown cooling. 22 RHR loop is being aligned for ECCS. 23 RCP is in service. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to start 22 RCP lAW S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, beginning at step 5.3.2. All pre-requisites have been performed SAT. Current open copy of procedure was used to start 23 RCP. Required RCP trends are displayed on P-250 computer, 2RP3, and 2RP4. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Candidate starts 22 RCP.

2. Candidate shuts 2PR6.

PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATt-. _ fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control TASK - TCAFf _. ,

____ .. __ l I '"",,,V,,",\.41'" fVIUIiUllvl.lVII-- 1'\.\J..;)I-VfIU lV UIIVVOIICUU.CU rL..l"'\. r-.c~~urt:: vvt:.::H[J~UltH.;liUii QV!)tt:ln trvr-*::'1 al';lUcHIUll STEP STEP COMMENTS

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)

Provide candidate with marked up copy of Candidate reviews procedure, S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump including Precautions and Limitations. Operation, marked up through Step 5.3.6, and with step 5.3.6 completed for 23 RCP. 5.3.2 ENSURE RCP Standpipe is filled ANQ Candidate checks 22 RCP standpipe STANDPIPE LEVEL LO alarm is clear for level low alarm on RCP bezel is clear. each RCP to be started. 5.3.3 NOTIFY the following of the impending RCP Candidate uses correct phones to start(s): notify the ESO, Unit 1 CRS. and the

Electric System Operator Hope Creek SM/CRS that 22 RCP is
Unit 1 SM/CRS about to be started.
Hope Creek SM/CRS 5.3.4 IF 21 RCP is to be started, THEN ... Candidate identifies that 21 RCP is not going to be started.

Note: Since this procedure can be used to start all RCPs, this step is not required to be N/A's prior to proceeding to the next step. Candidate notes step has already 5.3.5 IF 23 RCP is to be started, THEN ... been performed when placing 23 I RCP in service. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERAT0... TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control TASK .

TCAF for P .---~ .. -~ * * ,-',",'- IVIQIIUllvllVII ~ n.OSPUIIU lU ullwarramea t-'LK t-'ressure Uverprotection System (POPS) actuation STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL STANDARD (Required for UNSAT S/U evaluation) 5.3.6 PERFORM following for the selected RCP:

A. TREND parameters for selected RCP Candidate notes that trends are (listed in Attachment 5, RCP established per initial conditions. Parameters) J

B. START RCP Oil Lift Pump on Candidate depresses start push selected pump, AND OPERATE for a button for 22 RCP Oil Lift Pump, and I minimum of two minutes. verifies red light illuminates and green light extinguishes. Candidate notes I I I

I time of start for two minute time requirement. C. IF steam generator temperature is Candidate determines that 22 SG lower than RCS temperature, THEN temperature is equal to RCS I ENERGIZE Pressurizer Heaters as temperature by checking P~250 required to maintain pressure at 325 psig. computer for SG temperature or SG metal temps on 2RP5. I D. ANNOUNCE start of selected RCP Candidate announces starting 22 on Plant Page. RCP on plant page. I I

E. START selected RCP. Candidate depresses 22 RCP start push button, and verifies red light illuminates and green light extinguishes.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Verify ET-1 is TRUE when 22 RCP start PB is d~ressed. PSEG Restricted~Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATv" rRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ------------------ DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control TA t'" ..._ . "".

                      .~, .. IVI I IvvvU11L1:l1 '11:l~~UIt:: IVldllUIlClIon - KeSDona to unwarranted PZR Pressure Overorofection Svslem (POPS) actuation STEP                                   STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD S/U evaluation) 5.3.6 F. MONITOR following parameters until Candidate announces unexpected Con't stabilized: alarms:
Seal Water differential pressure
Console alarms POPS
Amps INITIATED PRESSURE HI on
Loop flow channel I, and CHANNEL 1
Plant Computer trends PRESSURE HIGH. i
Seal Leakoff flow
aHA E*26 2PR1 NOT FULL
Vibration Monitors CLSD.

Note: The 2 console alarms will clear I I i I after 2PR 1 is fully open, when the MALF RC0022A which caused the POPS initiation is automatically deleted. Note: The 2PR6 is not able to be I closed as long as POPS Channel 1 is ARMED. With the 2PR1 failed open, I the only way to isolate the loss of I RCS inventory is to disarm POPS Channel 1 and shut the 2PR6. Candidate may refer to any of the following response procedures. Note: If candidate's first action is to disarm POPS Channel 1 and attempt to shut 2PR1 and shut 2PR6 without referring to any procedure, then allow the candidate to continue to ensure that they check their actions are backed up by the proper procedure. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERAT0., rRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control TASK: TCAF for P

____ a
__ * *
_ _ _ _ .................. _ . ,_0.''" ."._- _.. - ...... -"~.-''''''''''''''''-'

                                                                                                                                        ........... _....,~, .....,.- ._" _.. - .. ....,....,"'._ .. -  ......... -.. ~ .      ....."'- ...... ~.- ..

STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD evaluation)

S/U ARP E-26 IF a Reactor Coolant System high pressure Candidate refers to ARP for E-26 3.1 condition exists ... 2PR1 NOT FULL CLSD and: 3.2 IF the reactor Coolant System pressure is a. Determines that RCS pressure normal and 2PR1 is leaking, THEN: indicated on 2PC-405 is less A. CLOSE 2PR6, PZR PWR OP RELIEF than 375 psig and lowering STOPV. b. May attempt to shut 2PR6 PZR B. REFER to Technical Specifications. PWR OP RELIEF STOP V, but it I will not shut. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATL .. fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control TASK'. TCAF for Pressurizer P . --- ...... - Malf r -- .. R......... --- ........ d

                                                   " ' - " - ' ..........    ~                         " ..... - ...

U ~- .............. -- ...... z..... * ....,. _ _ _

___ "'...., . . . . . . . . . _ . . , ... _ ** _ ........ "' . . . . . . . . . . _. -I ..... _ .. _ _ .... ......-.,

STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD StU evaluation)

ARP MONITOR actual RCS pressure on the Candidate refers to Console Alarm Console following indicators: Response for POPS INITIATED 3.1 - 2PA-9858 on POPS bezel (2CC1) PRESSURE HIGH and:

                    - 2PI-403 and 2PI-405 on RC Pressure                                                          a. Determines that RCS pressure Bezel (2CC2)                                                                                 is less than 375 psig and lowering.

NOTIFY SM/CRS to refer to Technical b. Notifies SM/CRS to refer to I Specifications and the ECG. Technical Specifications and the 3.2 ECG. IF the actual pressure is high, THEN: ... c. Candidates determines pressure is NOT high. 3.3 IF actual RCS pressure is <375 psig and 2PR1 is failed open, THEN: 3.4 A. PLACE POPS Ch I on OFF. 1. PLACES POPS Ch 1 on OFF. I: B. CLOSE 2PR6 PZR PWR OP RELIEF STOPV.

2. CLOSES 2PR6 PZR PWR OP RELIEF STOP V.

C. GO TO S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001 , 3. GOES TO S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001. Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATL .. rRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control -- ~ ~- .. __ *** ,_,. ______ 01<\-,_. l

__ ""'_._.\11\,..41'-.'...,\., ...... , .,""'-' V i i ..... \,V ' - " I I V i / U f J U I I " ...... "'" I '-'" I IVV.;;J\'.AJV ........ v ...... ; t\J1.'-t-\",-*U"j,1 "'-Ivv\.'l;;;i111 \1 '-11 '-' uv\.\"AUlIVII STEP COMMENTS STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD evaluation)

S/U AB.PZR Enters S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction directly based on entry conditions, I and performs the following: 3.1 INITIATE Attachment 1 Continuous Action Summary. Initiates Attachment 1 Continuous Action Summary. Cue: I will monitor the CAS. 3.2 Is POPS in service? Candidate answers YES, and GOES TO Attachment 3. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATG., TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control ..... _-,...

_ .... ~,. ''''''AIIL..<;;i' , ,,,,,,,,u,e; ,VIClIlUI l\.,lIUI I - r\t;:tiPVIIU lV UIIWdlldlW::lU .Lr;. .HjSSUre vveror01:eClIon ~VSlem (1-'\)1-';:') actuation STEP STEP COMMENTS
NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD S/U evaluation)

AB.PZR AU. 3 1.0 Is a PORV open? Candidate answers YES I 2.0 Is RCS pressure greater than 375 psig? Candidate answers NO based on console indication, and GOES TO Step 5.0

5.0 PLACE the affected channel in OFF AND Candidate depresses OFF CLOSE the PORV. pushbutton for POPS Ch. I, then attempts to shut 2PR 1 by depressing 2PR1 MANUAL and SHUT push buttons, and recognizes 2PR 1 does not shut.
6.0 CLOSE the affected PORV Stop Valve. Candidate closes 2PR6 PZR PWR OP RELIEF STOP V by depressing shut pushbutton, and verifying it shuts.

Terminate JPM after candidate has shut 2PR6. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in MODE 5. RHR HX inlet temperature is 180 degrees. RCS pressure is 290 psig. 21 RHR loop is supplying shutdown cooling. 22 RHR loop is being aligned for ECCS. 23 RCP is in service. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to start 22 RCP lAW S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, beginning at step 5.3.2. All pre-requisites have been performed SAT. Current open copy of procedure was used to start 23 RCP. Required RCP trends are displayed on P-250 computer, 2RP3, and 2RP4. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRk'W JOB PERFOR.l\i[ANCE MEASURE ISTATION: SALEM STEM: ECCS TASK: Respond to a Shutdown LOCA TASK NUMBER: 1140260401 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Sim d ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 2.4.9

                                                                    ------------------~

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 4.2 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD ROm STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator / Perform

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-AB.LOCA Rev. 8 (checked 03/09/10) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 13 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A LJeveloped By: G Gauding Instructor Validated By: S Harris Date: 03-19-10 Reviewed By: S~~t~ll Date: 1~ l.~- 2..D\\) Training Department Approved By: 6f.ra62ent Date:-¢~ ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT o UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:

OPER;\TOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORl\1A-,~CE :\1EASlJRE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SIMULATOR SETUP INSTRUCTIONS SYSTEM: EGGS TASK: Shutdown LOGA TASK NUMBER: 1140260401 SIMULATOR IC: IG- 257 on Blue Flash Drive (Shutdown IC with SI pumps, Accumulators, and one centrifugal charging pump removed from service) MALFUNCTIONS REQUIRED: RT-1 RC0002 RCS Leak Final Value 300 This equals - 138 gpm leak at this RGS pressure. MALF VL0083 2SJ1 fails to 0% (will be automatically deleted when the 2SJ1 MANUAL PB is depressed) MALF VL0084 2SJ2 fails to 0% (will be automatically deleted when the 2SJ2 MANUAL PB is depressed) These 2 malfunctions defeat the auto swap of charging pump suction on 10-10 VCT level, but are removed when the associated SJ1 or SJ2 MANUAL PB is depressed. This ensures operator action is required to shift charging pump suction from VCT to RWST. Events: ET-1 KB116DMK Command DMF VL0083 ET-3 KB117DMK Command DMF VL0084 OVERRIDES REQUIRED: None SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: None

OPERATOR TR.;\INING PROGR.;\M JOBPERFOR.l\1A.1\TCE MEASURE NAME: ___________________________ DATE: SYSTEM: ECCS TASK: Respond to a Shutdown LOCA TASK 1140260401 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Reactor is shutdown. 21 RHR loop is operating in Shutdown Cooling Mode RHR HX inlet temp at 27rF, RCS pressure is 325 psig. 22 and 23 Charging pumps and both SI pumps are CIT. The accumulators have been isolated. There are no personnel in containment. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all indications and alarms. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. .JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Raise charging flow to maintain PZR level stable

2. Transfer charging pump suction from VCT to RWST.

OPERAT,_ _fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERI"ORMANCE MEASURE DAT.K: SYSTEM: BCCS --------------------- TASK: Respond to a Shutdown LOCA STEP -

NO.

STEP (*Oenotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL S/U COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT I Evaluation) INSERT RT -1 after operator assumes the Operator responds to OHA C-2, watch. CNTMT SUMP PMP START, and identifies RCS leakrate is > 1 gpm. Operator uses diverse indications (PZR level lowering, riSing charging flow, lowering PZR pressure) to determine there is an RCS leak. Note: Candidate may enter AB.LOCA directly based on meeting entry criteria. Evaluator Note: If any AFW alarms occur during JPM, state that another operator will acknowledge alarms. Operator determines entry conditions are met for S2.0P-AB.LOCA-0001, SHUTDOWN LOCA. I NOTE: Operator may enter S2.0P I AB.RC-0001, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK, which will direct entry into AB.LOCA.

                                                                                    --.-... -~- .. - .......

OPl':RAl fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _____________________ JOB P.ERFORl\lANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ECCS -------------------- TASK: Respond to a Shutdown LOCA STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) 3.1 INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Action Indicates that Attachment 1 is to be Summary. monitored.

Cue: The CRS will monitor Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. 3.2 CLOSE the following valves to isolate letdown: Operator closes 2CV2, 2CV277,

2CV2 (LETDOWN CONTROL) 2CV7, and 2CV8, and verifies shut
2CV7 2CV278 and 2CV131
2CV277 (LETDOWN CONTROL)

Note: Depending on the amount of

2CV8 (LETDOWN ISO FOR RHR) time from leak initiation to entry into
2CV278 (EXCESS LETDOWN)

AB. LOCA-1, an automatic letdown

2CV131 (EXCESS LETDOWN) isolation may have occurred from PZR hot calibrated level channel low at 17%.

If so, then operator should verify correct letdown isolation at this step.

OPERAT\. fRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _____________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ECCS --------------------- TASK: Respond to a Shutdown LOCA STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS

NO. rDen~esaCriticaIS~~ STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) 3.3 Can Pressurizer Level be maintained stable Determines that pressurizer level is or rising? lowering. Operator may raise charging flow here to attempt to stabilize PZR level, and respond YES to stable PZR level. If so, go to Step 3.12.

If they do not adjust charging flow here, continue to step 3.4. They will be directed to adjust CV55 at step 3.9 I

Note: 1f the VCT 10-10 level alarm is received at any time during the JPM, the operator will recognize that the automatic actions to swap charging pump suction from the VCT to the RWST has tiQIoccurred, and manually swap from VCT to RWST.

This is a critical step if required to be performed. 3.4 Is a Centrifugal Charging Pump in service? Determines a Centrifugal Charging Pump is in service and goes to Step 3.9

OI'ERATth' ('RAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE --------------------- DATE: SYSTEM: ECCS --------------------- TASK: Respond to a Shutdown LUCA STEP

  .      NO.

STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL S/U COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT Evaluation)

  .. 3.9         ADJUST 2CV55 until Pressurizer level can       Depresses the 2CV55 OPEN (INCR be maintained stable or rising.                FLOW) PB until Pressurizer level is stable or rising.

3.10 MAINTAIN seal injection flow 6-12 gpm per Monitors seal injection flow and I pump not to exceed 40 gpm total using adjusts 2CV71 if required. I 2CV71 (CHG HDR PCV) -~ I 3.11 Is Pressurizer Level >11% (>19% for Determines PZR level is >11 % and adverse containment) AND stable or rising? stable or rising, and goes to Step 3.12 I below, OR Depending on the amount of time from leak initiation to this point, PZR level MAY be < 11 %. If so, then operator will perform step 3.15 by: A. Opens 2SJ 1 OR 2SJ2. B. Closes 2CV40 OR 2CV41 C. Verifies only one centrifugal charging pump running. D. Opens 2SJ4, 5, 12, and 13. E. Closes 2CV68 and 69. F. Fully opens 2CV55. G. Closes Charging mini flow valves 2CV139 and 140, and goes to step J 3.18 I

0I'ERA1\~ fRAINING PROGRAJ\I1 NAME: JOB l'ERFORMANCE MEASURE ---------------------- DATE: SYSTEM: ECCS ---------------------- TASK: Respond to a Shutdown LOCA STEP STEP EVAL COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U (Required for UNSAT Evaluation) 3.12 Is RCS Subcooling >0° F? Determines subcooling is 0° F.

3.13 Is Charging Flow < 100 gpm? Determines charging flow is > 100 gpm, and goes to step 3.17 3.17 ALIGN Charging Pump suction to the RWST:

A. OPEN 2SJ1 .oR 2SJ2, (RWST TO CHG Opens 2SJ1 OR 2SJ2, (RWST TO PUMP). CHG PUMP), and shuts 2CV40 Q8 B. CLOSE 2CV40 OR 2CV41 , (VCT DISCH 2CV41 , (VCT DISCH STOP VALVE).

STOP VALVE). 3.18 IF leak is in containment IHI=N EVACUATE Determines leak is in containment all non-essential personnel from from console indications and alarms, Containment: and identifies from initial conditions A. SOUND Containment Evacuation that no one is in containment. Alarm. Operator may still sound the B. ANNOUNCE on the Plant PA: There containment evacuation horn and is a Reactor Coolant Leak in make page announcement. Containment, ALL non-essential plant personnel evacuate Containment. TERMINATING CUE: After determining no one is in containment OR after-performing containment evacuation step, state JPM is complete.

JOB PERFORMA.,"lCE MEASU RE INITIAL CONDITIONS: React or's shutdown. 21 RHR loop is operating in Shutdown Cooling Mode RHR HX inlet temp at 277°F. RCS pressure is 325 psig. 22 and 23 Charging pumps and both SI pumps are CIT. The accumulators have been isolated. There are no personnel in containment. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all indications and alarms.

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: I STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Main Steam TASK: Demonstrate Operability of Main Steam Line Isolation Valves (Perform Stroke Time Testing of 21 MS167 (Main Steamline Isolation Valve) TASK NUMBER: N0390140201 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Sim e ALTERNATE PATH: IT] KIA NUMBER: 039 A4.01

                                                                         ------------------~

IMP ORTANCE FACTOR: 2.9 APPLICABILITY: --=-RO-=-- SRO EOD ROm STAD SRoD EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator / Perform

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-ST.MS-0003, Rev. 16 Steam Line Isolation and Response Time Testing TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: StopwatchlTimer VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 17 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/09/10 Instructor Validated By: WWaliace Date: 03/19/10 S~)or Instr~. tor Reviewed By: .\~\ , Training Depa ment Approved By: opt,;,<<.?ment ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT o UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: ____________________________ DATE: SYSTEM: TASK: Demonstrate Operability of Main Steam Line Isolation Valves (Perform Stroke Time Testing of21MS167 (Main Steamline Isolation Valve) TASK NUMBER: N0390140201 SIMULATOR SETUP IC-255 OVERRIDE 4803 OVLO STM LINE ISOL - 21MS167 Final Value OFF INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 3, NOP, NOT. Main steam Dumps are in MS PRESSURE CONTROL - AUTO @ 970 psig. 21 and 22 AFW pumps are in service. All Main Steam line Isolation Valves (21-24MS167) are shut, with their respective bypass valves (21 24MS18) open. All MSIV locking rings are removed. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to perform the Stroke Time Testing of 21MS16I lAW S2.0P-ST.MS-0003, Steamline Isolation and Response Time Testing, Section 5.2. A second control room operator will be performing the Remote Position Indication (RPI) of Step 5.2.1 using Attachment 6. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Candidate opens 21MS167 and calculates 90% opening time.

2. Candidate shuts 21MS167 from 2CC1.

3. Candidate terminates surveillance after determining 2RP4 status light for 21MS167 is NOT illuminated.

PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERAT~.~ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Main Steam TASK . - . .

_ ** _ .........u. _ _ tJ ...... 1'-A...,'II\.Y '-", I'lfJII,..AIII ~l,",UIII 1-11-' I...;JV H.,,".iV I I V~IYvv I '\,;iIJVIIII 'Vuvn,1;J IlIt.v 1 vvUII~ V1 L.. 'IVI\,.,) IVI P"lOll ( V\.vQ:!lltlf"-.'" , .. ;H..IIUUVI' V\,AIV""'J STEP COMMENTS STEP

*                                               (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                                                                                                           EVAL             (Required for UNSAT NO.                                                                                                                                                STANDARD stu                     evaluation)

Provide candidate with a marked up partial Candidate reviews Pre-requisites, copy of S2.0P-ST.MS-0003. Rev. 16, with and reviews and initials Precautions the Pre-requisites signed off, and non and Limitations. applicable portions of procedure removed, and copy of S2.RA.ST.MS-0003, Steam Line Isolation and Response Time Testing Modes 2-3 Acceptance Criteria. 5.2.1 PERFORM Attachment 6, Remote Position Candidate may verify Field operator Indication (RPI) Verification, for 21MS167 is at 21 MS167 by contacting them via concurrently with the performance of the plant page. stroke time testing. Cue: (If needed) A second operator will be performing the RPI verification.

- ~ ~-. - .... -~ ... ~ ** ~" ~'" '-' vi <-<'-'lilly V, lVIall' '-'Le:;all. I-1I.e:; I;;)UlallUII V ClIVt;;;;) \ . t;;IIUI" I Cll! UI\.I;:: 111111;:: I l;::::illllU VI L IIVlv i Q f

IVlcJin Steamline !solation Valve)

STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD stu evaluation) 5.2.2 RECORD Pretest Position of the Candidate records: !

components specified in Attachment 5, 21MS7 - 0 Section 1.0 21MS18-0 21 MS167 - X 21MS168 - 169&171 VLVS SELECTED Candidate contacts Field operator and requests position of 21 MS 169 , I and 21MS171. ,I Cue: 21MS169 and 21MS171 are shut. Candidate records 21MS169 - X 21MS171-X 5.2.3 ENSURE 21 Steam Generator pressure is Candidate observes 21 steam 900(800-1000)ps~. generator pressure on 2CC2 and identifies it is -970 psig. I I.E candidate attempts or signals that they want to adjust steam pressure, THJ;N Cue: The CRS directs you to ,,i perform the test with steam pressure II at its current value. J II PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training I

OPERAT....... TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Main Steam TASK: Demonstrate Operability of Mail'L~tegm Line Isolation Valves (Perform Stroke Time Testinq of 21 MS167 (Main Steamline Isolation Valve) STEP COMMENTS

STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD StU evaluation) 5.2.4 if the 21MS167 Mechanical Shaft Locking Candidate determines shaft locking Device is installed, THEN ... device is not installed per initial conditions.

5.2.5 IE 21MS18 is NOT OPEN, THEN ... Candidate determines 21 MS 18 is open from initial conditions or position indication on control console. 5.2.6 ENSURE 21 MS7 is OPEN. Candidate determines 21 MS7 is open from control console indication.

5.2.7 Simultaneously PERFORM the following: Candidate depresses the 21MS167
START the stopwatch. open push button on the control
OPEN 21MS167 console while starting the stopwatch.

Note: MS167's can only be opened hydraulically from the Steam Generator section of the control console, the open button on the MSIV portion of CC3 is indication only. Note: Stroke time for 21MS167 is -3 minutes and 50 seconds. The ST.MS-003 provided to candidate will have the last stroke time on it. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERAT\".~ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Main Steam TASK: Demonstrate Operabilitv of Main Steam Line Isolation Valves (Perform Stroke Time Testina of 21MS167 (Main Steallliine Isolation Valve) STEP NO. STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) I STANDARD EVAL StU COMMENTS (Required for UNSAT evaluation) 5.2.8 When 21MS167 indicates fully OPEN, STOP Candidate monitors 21 MS 167 the stopwatch. position and stops stopwatch when red open light illuminates. 5.2.9 PERFORM the following for 21MS167 on Attachment 4: A. RECORD the "MSIV Opening Time". Candidate transfers opening time from stopwatch to the 21MS167 MSIV Opening Time (A) on Attachment 4.

B. CALCULATE the "MSIV 90% Candidate multiplies that time by 0.9 Opening Time". and records that time in MSIV 90%

Opening Time on Attachment 4. 5.2.10 VERIFY OHA G2, 21 SG STM LN ISOL is Candidate determines OHA G2, 21 clear. SG STM LN ISOL is clear by looking up at alarm. 5.2.11 PERFORM the following: A. PLACE 21MS168 selector switch to Candidate rotates 21 MS168 selector 171 VLV SELECTED. switch to the 171 VLV SELECTED position and verifies indicating light B. VERIFY 171 VLV SELECTED illuminated indicating light illuminated. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATI....., TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Main Steam ------------------ TASK . ~ ..." . 'V""" <A'V ' J <;;1 aUlIllY VI lYlalll "'::>ll::dlll 1..1111:: I::'UlcHlUII v Clive::; \ .enorHl vlfOKe lime I eSW)Q or L -, IV!Q -, \J f llVlalfl ~leamllne ISOlutlon ValVe) STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD S/U evaluation) 5.2.12 RECORD 21 Steam Generator pressure Candidate records 21 Steam 1 during performance of 21MS167 stroke time Generator pressure and circles the testing. selected pressure indicator.

_ psig as indicated on PI514A IPI515A I PI516A (circle one) 5.2.13 Simultaneously perform the following:

PRESS the TRAIN A - LOOP 21 Main Candidate depresses the TRAIN A Steam Isolation pushbutton at 2CC 1. LOOP 21 Main Steam Isolation I I
START the stopwatch . pushbutton at 2CC 1 while simultaneously starting the stopwatch.

5.2.14 I. When 21MS167 indicates full closed on Candidate stops stopwatch when 2CC2 position indicator lights, STOP the 21MS167 indicates full closed on stopwatch 2CC2 position indicator lights. Note: Fast close time is 6 seconds. 5.2.15 RECORD the actual Stroke Time, Stopwatch Candidate records the actual Stroke Number, Date & Time, and Initials on Time, Stopwatch Number, Date & Attachment 3, Section 1.0 Time, and Initials on Attachment 3, I Section 1.0. I 1 i I PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training I

OPERATvr( TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Main Steam TASK: Demonstrate Operabilitv of Main Steam Line Isolation Valves (Perform Stroke Time Tesiillq of 21 MS 167 (MainSteamlioeJsolatLQo Valve) STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL (Required fo~ UNSAT S/U evaluatlor:!l 5.2.16 VERIFY the TRAIN A-LOOP 21 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION actuated the following valves to the closed position:
21MS7-CLOSED
21MS18-CLOSED
21 MS167-CLOSED
5.2.17 VERIFY the RP4 CLOSED Status Light for Candidate determines the RP4 21 MS167 illuminated. CLOSED Status light for 21MS167 is NOT illuminated.

Note: Candidate may perform a lamp check on 2RP4 to determine it does not have a burnt out light bulb, but it is not required per procedure.

5.2.18 IF the RP4 CLOSED Status light for 21 MS167 is extinguished, THJ:N:

A. TERMINATE performance of this Candidate terminates performance of surveillance. procedure. B. INITIATE NOTF(s) to correct the unsatisfactory conditions( s). Cue: Once candidate announces C. RECORD NOTF number(s) on procedure termination, state: "JPM is Attachment 7 in the Comments complete". Section. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 3, NOP, NOT. Main steam Dumps are in MS PRESSURE CONTROL - AUTO @ 970 psig. 21 and 22 AFW pumps are in service. All Main Steam line Isolation Valves (21-24MS167) are shut, with their respective bypass valves (21 24MS18) open. All MSIV locking rings are removed. INITIATING CUE You are directed to perform the Stroke Time Testing of 21~S1~I lAW S2.0P-ST.MS-0003, Steamline Isolation and Response Time Testing, Section 5.2. A second control room operator will be performing the Remote Position Indication (RPI) of Step 5.2.1 using Attachment 6. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: I STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification TASK NUMBER: 220130201 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Sim f ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 022 A4.01

                                                                       ------------------~

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.6 3.6 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD ROW STAD SROW EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003 Rev. 17 (Rev checked 3/21/10)

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-SO.CBV-0001 Rev. 32 (Rev checked 3/21/10) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: ljlA Developed By: G Gauding Date: 3/8/10 Instructor Validated By: S Harris Date: 3/19/10 SME~ru~ Date: 3- '2£:>- Z(HO Trainin~~Department Reviewed By: Approved By: ~i~nt ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: '- _G_RA_D_E_:~[]~S~A_T~~[] REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: __ U_NS_A_T______________________________ DATE:

                                                                                                  ~II 1 of 11

I \.J,(-r-\r"\- I "" v"""" __ . OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification TASK NUMBER: 220130201 SIMULATOR SETUP: Reset Simulator to IC-1, 100% power, BOL INITiAL CONDITIONS: Rx power is 100% steady state, BOL INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to perform S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Systems-Cooling Systems surveillance for 25 CFCU for monthly run. 25 CFCU is filled and vented. Component Off Normal Report has been reviewed with no abnormalities noted. Calibration data for required instruments has been obtained and recorded in appropriate Attachments. The differential pressure gauge for 22 SW header has been installed. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Perform S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003 for 25 CFCU and evaluate data as SAT.

2 of 11

TQ-AA-A'I6-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATv,'\ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK' Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification

  #  STEP                        STEP                                                                              COMMENTS

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD

(#Denotes a Sequential Step) S/U evaluation) START TIME: I I Provide candidate with marked up copy of Prerequisites have been completed, but S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003, Containment candidate should review them before Systems-Cooling Systems. proceeding. Candidate reviews and initials Precautions and Limitations. NOTE: There is no requirement to either start additional SW pumps OR stop any running CFCUs. There is a system requirement

                                                                ,         NOT to run 5 CFCUs in HIGH speed, but that is N/A here. However, candidate MAY start another SW pump OR stop a CFCU, which is acceptable.

3 of 11

TQ-AA-1l)6-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATl,... TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification.

                                                                    ~--~
#  STEP                           STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) COMMENTS

NO. EVAL (Required for UNSAT J#Denotes a Sequential StepJ STANDARD StU evaluation)
5.1.1 PERFORM test on each CFCU required to Candidate retrieves S2.0P-SO.CBV-0001, be tested lAW the following instruction: Containment Ventilation Operation, and A. ENSURE the CFCU to be tested is reviews P&Ls, and Prerequisites.

in LOW SPEED lAW S2.0P Candidate identifies the sections of the SO.CBV-0001, Containment procedure NOT to be performed (Sections Ventilation Operation. 5.2-5.6) with N/A. If needed, tell candidate Components Off Normal review is complete and SAT. Candidate starts 25 CFCU in LOW speed lAW Step 5.1.3 by: I SO.CBV A. ENSURE CFCU is filled and vented A. Ensuring 25 CFCU is filled and

      -1              lAW S2.0P-SO.CBV-0003(Q),                    vented (Initiating Cue) 5.1.3             Filling and Venting Containment Fan Coil Units.

B. ENSURE Service Water is B. Ensuring SW is available by available. checking SW pumps in service and

C. PRESS FAN LOW SPEED START adequate SW header pressure.

bezel. D. ENSURE following dampers are in C. PRESS FAN LOW SPEED START indicated positions: bezel for 25 CFCU.

ROUGH FL TR DAMPER D. ENSURES damper alignment is CLOSED correct for 25 CFCU:
HEPA INLET DAMPER OPEN ROUGH FLTR DAMPER CLOSED
HEPA OUTLET DAMPER OPEN HEPA INLET DAMPER OPEN HEPA OUTLET DAMPER OPEN 4 of 11

TQ-AA- A t')6-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATC,." TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification

#                                 STEP                                                                               COMMENTS STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD

(#Denotes a Sequential Step) StU evaluation) SO.CBV E. IF Service Water flow is <1465 Verifies SW flow >1465 gpm to 25

      -1              gpm, THEN:                                 CFCU.

5.1.3 1. STOP the CFCU. (cont) 2. REFER to S2.0P-SO.SW-0005, Service Water System Operation, Service Water System Operability Guidelines. F. ENSURE Service Water flow> 1465 gpm. ST.CBV B. RECORD Start Time in the Candidate records start time of 25 CFCU in 3 applicable Attachments(s), Section Attachment 5. 5.1.1 3.0, for the CFCU being tested. 5 of 11

TQ-AA-" f)6-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATl", TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS

#  STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD

(#Denotes a Sequential Step) StU evaluation) 5.1.1 C. When at least 15 minutes have Cue: 25 CFCU has been operating for 15 (cont) elapsed, RECORD the following in minutes. the applicable Attachment( s), , Section 3.0, for the CFCU being tested:

1. Stop Time Candidate records 25 CFCU stop time, SW flow rate, and 22 SW header L'lP.

2. Cooling Water Flow Rate (gpm)

3. IF testing 21 OR 22 CFCU, THEN 21 SW HDR L'lP is to be recorded.

4. IF testing 23 CFCU. THEN both 21 SW HDR L'lP AND 22 SW HDR L'lP Candidate marks steps for 21-23 CFCU are to be recorded (Refer to Step N/A.

3.5)

5. IF testing 24 OR 25 CFCU, THEN Cue: WHEN asked, report 22 SW header

22 SW HDR AP is to be recorded. L\P is 68 psid.
6. Test results by initialing the SAT or UNSAT column lAW the Acceptance Criteria stated in the Attachment i Accegtance Seenext rutg e for discussion of Criteria for ST.CBV-0003 6 of 11

TQ-AA-1t)6-0303 Rev. 3 . OPERAT\.. .* TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Ooerabilit I - ---- -.1 dS Water Flow Verificaf STEP COMMENTS

#  STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO.

(#Denotes a Sequential Step) STANDARD stU evaluation) 5.1.1 Exhibit 1 identifies the minimum flow rate I (cant) associated with different SW header ilP. P&L 3.4 states that when ilP falls between two points on Att., the value shall be rounded up. The 68 psid reported by the field operator shall be rounded up to 70 psid, which yields a required minimum flow of 1447 gpm for 25 CFCU. The recorded flow for 25 CFCU recorded was -1950 (depending on other CFCU status and number of SW pumps operating) gpm, so the minimum TS flow of 1465 is SAT, and the minimum flow for the ilP is also SAT.

                                                    -     ~.--

7 of 11

TQ-Aft . "6-0303 Rev. 3 OPERAT\.", TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS

#   STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

'"   NO.

(#Denotes a Sequential Step) STANDARD StU evaluation) 5.1.1 D. ALIGN the CFCUs as required to (cont) support current plant conditions lAW Candidate stops 25 CFCU lAW Step 5.1.4 S2.0P-SO.CBV-0001, Containment of S2.0P-SO.CBV-0001 by: Ventilation Operation. A. IF CFCU is running in High Speed ... N/A since fan is not in high speed.

 '"                B. IF CFCU is running in Low Speed, THEN PRESS FAN LOW SPEED                  Presses FAN LOW SPEED STOP bezel STOP bezel.                               for 25 CFCU.

C. ENSURE bezels illuminated: Checks proper bezels illuminated

1. FAN STOP.

1. FAN STOP

2. ROUGH FLTR DAMPER OPEN.

2. ROUGH FLTR DAMPER OPEN 3. HEPA INLET DAMPER

3. HEPA INLET DAMPER CLOSED.

CLOSED 4. HEPA OUTLET DAMPER CLOSED.

4. HEPA OUTLET DAMPER CLOSED 8 of 11

TQ-AA*A'I6-0303 Rev. 3 OPERATt,,\ TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS

#  STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD

(#Denotes a Sequential Step) S/U evaluation) IF candidate determines that current plant conditions require operation of 4 CFCU's in High Speed (original configuration) AND less than 4 CFCU's are running in High Speed, II:II;N candidate starts available CFCU lAW S2.0P-SO.CBV-0001, Step SO.CBV 5.1.1 by:

      -1          A. ENSURE CFCU is filled and vented lAW S2.0P-SO.CBV-0003{Q),                 Ensures CFCU is filled and vented by Step noting it was previously in service.

5.1.1 Filling and Venting Containment Fan Coil Units. Ensuring SW is available by checking B. ENSURE Service Water is SW pumps in service and adequate available. SW header pressure. C. PRESS FAN HIGH SPEED START Presses FAN HIGH SPEED START bezel. bezel. D. ENSURE bezels illuminate: ENSURES bezels illuminate:

ROUGH FLTR DAMPER OPEN Roughing Filter damper OPEN
HEPA INLET DAMPER HEPA inlet damper CLOSED CLOSED HEPA outlet damper CLOSED
HEPA OUTLET DAMPER CLOSED 9 of 11

TQ-AA .. '16-0303 Rev. 3 OPERAT\.. .* TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Containment Cooling TASK: Perform a CFCU Operability and Service Water Flow Verification STEP COMMENTS

#  STEP

(*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD

(#Denotes a Sequential Step) stu evaluation) E. IF Service Water flow is <1465 i gpm, THEN: j

1. STOP the CFCU.

2. REFER to S2.0P-SO.SW-0005.

Service Water System Operation, Service Water System Operability Guidelines. F. ENSURE Service Water flow 2: 1465 Verifies SW flow >1465 gpm for CFCU gpm. started. Terminate JPM when candidate has performed Step 5.1.1.0 regarding I alignment of CFCU's to support current plant status. I 10 of 11

TQ-AA-106-0303 Rev. 3 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Rx power is 100% steady state, BOL. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to perform S2.0P-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Systems-Cooling Systems surveillance for 25 CFCU for monthly run. 25 CFCU is filled and vented. Component Off Normal Report has been reviewed with no abnormalities noted. Calibration data for required instruments has been obtained and recorded in appropriate Attachments. The differential pressure gauge for 22 SW header has been installed. 11 of 11

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: I STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: 4KV Vital Bus Electrical Distribution TASK: Place a 4KV Vital Bus in Service (Start an EDG from the Control Room and energize an isolated vital bus). TASK NUMBER: N0620060101 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Sim g ALTERNATE PATH: 0 KIA NUMBER: 064 A4.01 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: ----~~--------~ 4.0 4.3 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD ROm STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator 1 Perform

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-SO.DG-0002, Rev. 34 (Checked 3/10/10) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 25 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/10/10 Instructor Date: 03119110 Validated By: W. Wallace

                                      'Ft SME or. struc}4.rr. (\..            Date:  3-2.(.;,- 20 (\~

Reviewed By: l]JC~ tlJ¥\ Date:J/z'~ Training Department O~~tative Approved By: ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT 0 UNSAT REASON. IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: 4KV Vital Bus Electrical Distribution TASK: Place a 4KV Vital Bus in Service (Start an EDG from the Control Room and eneraize an isolated vital bus). TASK NUMBER: SIMULATOR SETUP IC-256 Note: To simulate a defueled condition for realism, most components are O/S and numerous alarms are present. It is not intended that the candidate be required to respond to conditions outside of the system they are operating, and any associated alarms caused by operation of that system. INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is defueled during an extended shutdown. 2B 4KV Vital bus is being restored from a deenergized inspection due to multiple breaker failures over the last year. All 2B 4KV Vital bus breakers are open. Part of the vendor supplied, approved re-test is to energize 2B vital bus remotely from the Control Room with 2B EDG. INITIATING CUE: Using S2.0P-SO.DG-0002, 2B Diesel Generator Operation, start 2B EDG from the control room lAW Section 5.3, and energize 2B 4KV Vital Bus lAW, Section 5.6. DG Startup checks have been completed lAW Section 5.1. A Field Operator is standing by at 2B EDG, and has a Field Copy of procedure . Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4 JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if 1 . satisfactory erogress is being made. Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Start 28 EDG.

2. Adjust 28 EDG voltage to 4.023-4.306.

3. Energize 28 4KV Vital bus with 28 EDG.

PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

~ ... _-,..      *

_ - - "'" fl'Y YI\.4Al IoJUv III V\;il Vlv'CI '-'lOll CHIl-V""", I I V I I I lIlV" '-.,.tWIIlIVI I\VUIII CHIl,l C:;llvl~lL.v all t~Vla1.CU VJldl UU\j",

STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD StU evaluation)

Provide candidate a marked up copy of Candidale reviews and initial S2.0P-SO.DG-0002, with Prerequisites and Precautions and Limitations. Section 5.1 completed. I I 5.3.1 PRESS 2B DIESEL GEN START pushbutton Candidate depresses START I on Control console 2CC3. pushbutton on Control console 2CC3 for 2B DG. 5.3.2 RECORD the following: Candidate identifies 2VA5843 and ! II I I

                               - Generator Voltage on 2VA5843                                              20A5844 on 2CC3 and records
                               - Generator Frequency on 20A5844                                            readings in procedure step_

Note: 2VA5843 will read >4.306 I which is the maximum allowed per procedure for the EDG. Candidate may have NEO adjust voltage to correct it here, or procedure will ENSURE voltage is 4.023-4.306 at steps 5.3.4, and 5.6.1

Simulator Operator: IF directed by candidate to lower EDG voltage locally at the EDG, THEN modify REMOTE: CD03 OVDI to 4.28 then report that you have lowered voltage to 4260 volts.

I I PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERAT\...., TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: 4KV Vital Bus Oi~tribution TASK: PI - ...... - ....... " , . . wl"VlI ___ III '-'_IVJ_V .....,1.\.A11.\".411 L- ....... "-'" 11"""11 \,1 I v , " " V l t .. ,,,,,. VVIII QIIU '-'11\,.,01 -\..I UII I>JVIVI.VU VI"~I t**.n...1 Q . STEP COMMENTS STEP

  *                                             (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                                                                                                            EVAL           (Required for UNSAT NO.                                                                                                                                           STANDARD StU               evaluation)

Direct NEO to PERFORM the following: 5.3.3.A A. RECORD the following Diesel Generator Candidate contacts Field Operator Start readings: and directs them to record:

                              - 2PL 7272 Lube Oil Header Pressure                                                          - 2PL 7272 Lube Oil Header Pressure
                              - 2PL 7232 Jacket Water Header Pressure                                                      - 2PL 7232 Jacket Water Header
                               - 2PL 7330 Air Manifold Pressure                                                                 Pressure                                                                                                 I
                               - 2TA16525 Highest Gen Stator Temp                                                          - 2PL 7330 Air Manifold Pressure
                                                                                                                           - 2TA 16525 Highest Gen Stator Temp Note: It is permissible for the candidate to instruct the Field Operator to: "Perform Step 5.3.3".                                    !

Simulator Operator:Jf directed to I perform step 5.3.3, then report that I 5.3.3.A is compiete, 5.3.3.B is complete SAT, 5.3.3.C is NA, and 5.3.3.0 is complete SAT. Otherwise, report back as directed in following steps. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

 ~     _
   .... ....       * * ~vv ~ . , . " v V Ilal LJUi;> III vCI VI\JC \ vldll dll I::U\.::J II VIII lilt:: vVflllUI "UUIIl ana   enerGIze an ISOlatea Vllal DUS I.

STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD StU evaluation) 5.3.3.B B. IE 2BD1AX6D*, 2B Diesel Generator 125VDC breaker is closed, THEN.:

CHECK voltage permissive indicator light Candidate directs Field Operator to 2DAE23-LT2, EDG VOLTAGE, on Generator check voltage permissive indicator Control Panel is ON. light 2DAE23-L T2, EDG VOLTAGE. CHECK speed permissive indicator light, on Generator Control Panel is ON. 2DAE23-LT-3, EDG SPEED, on Generator Simulator Operator: Voltage Control Panel is ON. I permissive indicator light 2DAE23 LT2, EDG VOL TAGE. on Generator I Control Panel is on. Cue: Speed permissive indicator light 2DAE23-LT2, EDG SPEED is ON. i--- 5.3.3.C C. lE Field Ground Relay 64/G white Candidate directs Field Operator to indicating light is OFF AN.D. GENERATOR check Field Ground Relay 64/G white FIELD GROUND alarm is CLEAR. IHEf\.i: indicating light status.

1. RESET 64/G relay. Simulator Operator: Report that

2. ENSURE 64/G white indicating light is ON. Field Ground Relay 64/G white indicating light is ON.

5.3.3.D ENSURE K1 C Field Flashing Relay Simulator Operator: Report that Supervisory Light is OFF. K 1C Field Flashing Relay Supervisory Light is OFF. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATl", TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: 4KV Vital Bus Distribution TASK p

           ** _-- -   ** ,. v ",,,_1 _ _ 'oJ .. I ,,",vl Y...... ""',"UI ... t;A11 L-J"..#'-" II VI.I II Iv ......,VI 11.1 VI t ,\\JVt t J OIIU ~'Ivll". lL.U 01' .>:)UIOlV;u v ilOI iJUV".

STEP COMMENTS STEP

 *                                 (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                                                                                                            EVAL    (Required for UNSAT NO.                                                                                                                                     STANDARD S/U        evaluation) 5.3.4         ENSURE the following control console indication:

READY TO LOAD lamp is ON. Candidate verifies READY TO LOAD
Diesel Generator output voltage is lamp on control console is'ON.

4.023-4.306 KV. Candidate checks Generator Voltage

Diesel Generator frequency is 58.94 on 2VA5843 is between 4.023-4.306 60.36 Hz. KV. If not corrected previously, voltage will be reading >4.306.
Simulator Operator: IF directed by candidate to lower EDG voltage locally at the EDG, THEN, modify REMOTE: CDOl OVDI to 4.28 then I report that you have lowered voltage to 4260 volts.

Candidate checks Generator Frequency on 2QA5844 is 58.94 60.36 Hz. 5.3.5 IF 2B Diesel Generator is to operated Cue: 2B Diesel Generator will be unloaded for an extended period of time(>30 loaded in 15 minutes. minutes), THEN INITIATE Section 5.7, Diesel Generator Running Checks. Candidate NA's step based on cue.

OPERAT0" TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: 4KV Vital Bus Distribution ------------------ TASK: Place a 4KV Vital Bus in Service (Start an EDG from the Control Room and energi:z:e an isolated vital bus). STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD stu evaluatiof!l 5.6.1 ENSURE Diesel Generator voltage is within Candidate checks Generator Voltage 4.023-4.306 KV range AND frequency is on 2VA5843 is between 4.023-4.306 within 58.94-60.36 Hz as indicated on 2CC3 KV.

bezels. Candidate checks Generator Frequency on 2QA5844 is 58.94 60.36 Hz. 5.6.2 ENSURE the following breaker indication on 2CC3 bezels: Candidate checks 23BSD and 24BSD

23BSD OPEN breakers open on 2CC3 by verifying
24BSD OPEN green OPEN light is illuminated for each breaker.
5.6.3 PRESS Mimic Bus 2BDD pushbutton. Candidate depresses mimic bus 2BDD pushbutton on 2CC3 electrical distribution mimic.

5.6.4 ENSURE 2B MIMIC BUSINTLK CLOSE Candidate verifies 2B MIMIC BUS SELECTION bezel is ON. INTLK CLOSE SELECTION bezel is ON at 2B EDG bezel.

5.6.5 PRESS 2B BREAKER CLOSE pushbutton. Candidate depresses 2B BREAKER CLOSE pushbutton.

PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATL" TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ------------------ SYSTEM: 4KV Vital Bus Distribution - ~ - ~ _. *

_""- - ,. '110 V 11' HUll ,-"U\J II I \oJ\,..... Y J\,.I\J VlOI lOll L-LJ"-J II VIII 1I1e; VUlllI VI r\.UUIII ctilU tllt:1 ~ILt:: dll J~Uidlt::U Vltdl UU::::" J.

STEP STEP COMMENTS

NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT STANDARD S/U evaluation}

5.6.6 ENSURE the following:

2B BREAKER CLOSE pushbutton Candidate checks 2B BREAKER ON CLOSE pushbutton ON is illuminated.
2B 4KV Vital Bus voltage is 4.023 Candidate checks 2B 4KV Vital Bus 4.306 KV. Voltage on is between 4.023-4.306
OHA J-18, 2B 4KV VTL BUS KV.

UNDERVOLT, is CLEAR. Candidate acknowledges OHA J-18, 2B 4KV VTL BUS UNDERVOLT clearing. Cue: Once candidate has ensured Step 5.6.6 is complete, state "JPM is complete.

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is defueled during an extended shutdown. 2B 4KV Vital bus is being restored from a deenergized inspection due to multiple breaker failures over the last year. All 2B 4KV Vital bus breakers are open. Part of the vendor supplied, approved re-test is to energize 2B vital bus remotely from the Control Room with 2B EDG. INITIATING CUE Using S2.0P-SO.DG-0002, 2B Diesel Generator Operation, start 2B EDG from the control room lAW Section 5.3, and energize 2B 4KV Vital Bus lAW, Section 5.6. DG Startup checks have been completed lAW Section 5.1. A Field Operator is standing by at 2B EDG, and has a Field Copy of procedure. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticality, and TeAF Failure of Source Range Hi Flux Trip to BLOCK. TASK NUMBER: N1120170101 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC Sim h ALTERNATE PATH: W KiA NUMBER: 012 A4.03

                                                                      ----------~----~

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.6 3.6 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RO[ZJ STAD SRO[ZJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator 1 Perform

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Rev. 31 (Checked 3/10/10) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/10/10 Instructor Validated By: S Harris Date: 03/19/10 SMEO~ru~ Reviewed By: Date: 3~()o ~Zvi"D Training Department Approved By: o~~nl oale:3;£fo ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON. IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: NAME: OATE: __________________________ SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticality, and TCAF Failure of Source Range Hi Flux Trip to BLOCK. SIMULATOR SETUP IC-254 Override B410 OVOI (Block Source Range B PB will not block) Ensure AUDIO MULTIPLIER at NI racks is set at 1k Ensure both SR channels are displayed on NR-45 and NR-45 alarms cleared. INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 2 performing a Rx startup by control rods lAW S2.0P IO.ZZ-0003. The ICRR plot at the eight-fold position predicted criticality at 115 steps, which is the same as the Estimated Critical Rod Height. Rx Engineering predicts the Rx will go critical during the next rod pull of 25 steps. Control Bank D is at 100 steps. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Continue the startup at Step 5.3.16.F. by withdrawing Control Bank D 25 steps or until the Rx is critical, then continue with procedure to raise power and stabilize the Rx at 1x10-8A in the Intermediate Range. Successful Completion Criteria: i 1. All critical steps completed. I 2. All sequential steps completed in order. I 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time. I 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made. Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Candidate identifies criticality during rod pull prior to withdrawing control bank 025 additional steps.

2. Candidate establishes an approximately 0.25 dpm SUR.

3. Candidate inserts control rods to establish zero or negative SUR after determination that Source Range Channel B does not Block PRIOR to the Rx automatically tripping on High SR Flux.

PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATt... , TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticalit _.. d TCAF Fail _ * * .- fS

                                                                         .-.   -  - - .......... - , .. ....,... _  ** , . ,_"." fl' "...., L.#l-.......-;..,;t'\, "

STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)

When candidate states they are

                                                                                 'ready to accept the watch. take the                                                                              i SimUlator from FREEZE to RUN.

Provide candidate with marked up copy of S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum load. Candidate reviews procedure.

5.3.16.F WITHDRAW Control Bank D STOPPING at Candidate announces withdrawing the following hold points to obtain ICRR data: Control Bank D 25 steps or until

                        * ~ 50 step increments                                    criticality is achieved.

8-Fold Rod Position Candidate withdraws control rods while closely monitoring nuclear i

instrumentation, and stops I withdrawing Control Bank D when identification of Rx criticality is I observed. The Rx will be critical before Control Bank D have been withdrawn 25 steps. i-- 5.3.16.G IF P-6 (Source range Permissive) green light Note: P-6 will not energize at this energizes .... point. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATv,-. TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK-- Withdraw control rods to criticalit - .. d TCAF Fail _.- .......f S - * -_ R

                                                                                         ** _ .. _  ***** _n * "'" "J ~'~ __ 'JO' .

STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
5.3.17 When criticality is achieved: Candidate announces the Rx is A. MAKE the following announcement critical. I twice on the plant PA System: Candidate makes "Attention all plant "Attention all plant personnel, Unit 2 personnel, Unit 2 Reactor is critical."

Reactor is critical." announcement two times on the Plant PA system. B. RECORD Criticality Date/Time data in Cue: The Plant operator will annotate Attachment 2, Section 3.0, and in the the Control Room Log. Control Room Narrative Log. C. RECORD Attachment 2, Section 3.0, Candidate records date/time of Surveillance Results lAW the stated criticality in Attachment 2, Section 3.0 Acceptance Criteria. at bottom of page. Candidate initials SAT column of section 3.0 in Attachment 2. Cue: "The CRS directs you to continue the power ascension at Step 5.3.18 by withdrawing Control Bank 0 to establish and maintain a 0.25 decade per minute start up rate."

5.3.18 CONTINUE with Reactor Power ascension, Candidate withdraws Control Bank D with positive stable SUR f'.JOl to exceed 1.0 to establish and maintain a positive dpm, by adjusting Control Bank "0" as startup rate of approximately 0.25 needed . dpm SUR.

PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATlM TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Reactor Protection System TASK: Withdraw control rods to criticalit .. d TCAF Fail ........ - .- fS

                                                                                                  . _.. --- ... .. ..., ............ " .,. _____ I"'. ~

STEP STEP COMMENTS (*Denotes a Critical Step) !

NO. STANDARD EVAL (Required for UNSAT S/U evaluation) 5.3.19 OBSERVE source range and intermediate Candidate observes source range range levels on NIS for ~ one decade overlap and intermediate range and identifies during performance of next step. when at least 1 decade of overlap between them has occurred.

5.3.20 When P-6 (Source Range Permissive) green light is energized, as indicated on 2RP4 Y2 IR channels at 10-10 amps: A. SELECT one pen of NR-45 to an Candidate selects one Intermediate Intermediate Range channel and the Range channel and one Power other pen to a Power Range channel. Range channel on recorder NR-45.

B. BLOCK Source Range High Flux Trip Candidate depresses BLOCK by depressing both "BLOCK SOURCE RANGE An AND "BLOCK SOURCE RANGE An AND "BLOCK SOURCE RANGE B" pushbuttons on SOURCE RANGE B" pushbuttons on console, and observes BLOCK console. SOURCE RANGE B light does NOT
C. ENSURE Source Range Trains A&B illuminate.

TRIP BLOCKED blue light is illuminated on 2RP4 AND OHA E-5 Candidate inserts control bank D to SR DET VOLT TRBL alarms. stop the power ascension and establishes a zero or negative SUR Terminate the JPM when the candidate establishes a zero or negative SUR, or after the Rx trips on High Source Range Flux at 1E5 cpm in the Source Range . L.. L.. _ ..... __ ..... __ .... - . - -- ... - ...... - PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 2 performing a Rx startup by control rods lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003. The ICRR plot at the eight-fold position predicted criticality at 115 steps, which is the same as the Estimated Critical Rod Height. Rx Engineering predicts the Rx will go critical during the next rod pull of 25 steps. Control Bank D is at 100 steps. INITIATING CUE You are the Reactor Operator. Continue the startup at Step 5.3.16.F. by withdrawing Control Bank D 25 steps or until the Rx is critical, then continue with procedure to raise power and stabilize the Rx at 1x10-8A in the Intermediate Range. PSEG Restricted-Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ISTATION: SALEM c)YSTEM: Control Room Evacuation TASK: Reset Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Trip Valve MS52 TASK NUMBER: 1130040501 JPM NUMBER: 08-01 NRC IP-i ALTERNATE PATH: D KiA NUMBER: _ _A_P_E_0_6_8_AA_1_.0_2_-l IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.3 4.5 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD ROm STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In Plant

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Rev. 22 Att. 13 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 03/01/10 Instructor Date: 03/18/10 Validated By: WWaliace SME or Instructor 3/2j7l0 O ~~R Date: Approved By: pert~ons ~~.rr.ee~s~ntatlve Approved By: \~\ ~jJ, Training Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: -:VALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 6

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

      ,TEM:                  AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM TASK:                      Reset an Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Trip Valve (MS52)

TASK NUMBER: 1130040501 INITIAL CONDITIONS: The reactor has been tripped and the control room has been evacuated due to a bomb threat. 23 AFW Pump has tripped on over speed. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to reset 23 AFW Pp Turbine Trip Valve (2MS52) lAW S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 13, Turbine - Driven AFW Pump Restoration. Maintenance has corrected the cause of the overspeed trip. r CCESSFUL COMPLETION CRITERIA:

1. ALL critical steps completed

2. ALL sequential steps completed in order

3. ALL time-critical steps completed within the allotted time ..IPM completed within validated time. Completion may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Perform Attachment 13 in correct sequence.

Page 2 of 6

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB P£ DRMANCE MEASURE NAME:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater TASK: Reset MS52

 #  STEP                          STEP                                                   -

STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS

No. (*Oenotes Critical Step) Stu

       , c*

(#Oenotes Sequential Step)

1.2 ROTATE 2MS52 handwheel in the closed Simulates rotating 2MS52 23 AFW Pp direction (clockwise). This will cause the Turbine Trip Valve handwheel clockwise I Latch-Up Lever to move up toward the Trip and verifies Latch-Up Lever moving toward Hook. Trip Hook.

Cue: Lever is moving towards trip hook. 1.3 Verifies Trip Hook engages. CHECK that the Latch-Up Lever moves up into position, that it moves to and engages the Trip Hook. Cue: Trip Hook is engaged. 1.4 PULL UP on the Hand Trip Lever to ensure Trip Hook engaged in previous step. full engagement of the Trip Hook and Latch-up Lever. Cue: Trip Hook is fully engaged. I CAUTION: Leaving 2MS52 backseated may impose more reaction loading on the Trip hook than the Trip Linkage can overcome, thus rendering the 2MS52 trip function INOPERABLE. When resetting 2MS52, trapped steam pressure could spin turbine for short period of time (-2 seconds).

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB Pf ,)RMANCE MEASURE NAME:,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater TASK: Reset MS52

   # STEP

No.

STEP (*Denotes Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL S/U COMMENTS J

       "")  '.        .(#Denotes Sequential Step) f-;-                                                                      _.

1.5 Slowly ROTATE 2MS52 handwheel in the I Simulates rotating Handwheel counter-OPEN direction (counter-clockwise) until clockwise and verifies Split Coupling the Split Coupling raises and makes makes contact with Sliding Nut OR the contact with the bottom of the Sliding Nut valve comes to rest on the backseat. OR the valve comes to rest on the Cue: Split Coupling contacting Sliding Nut. backseat. I-

1.6 ROTATE 2MS52 handwheel clockwise Simulates rotating Handwheel clockwise approximately one turn until handwheel one turn and verifies Handwheel moves moves freely AND Latch-up lever is in full freely.

contact with Trip Hook. ! Cue: Handwheel moves freely and Latch-up lever is in full contact with Trip Hook. I 1.7 ENSURE turbine stops spinning (indicates I 2MS132 is seated) Cue: Turbine is not spinning. I

1.8 ENSURE proper engagement of tappet nut Ensures proper engagement lAW Att. 13, and head lever lAW AU. 13, page 2, 23 AF page 2.

Pump Trip/Throttle Valve & Overspeed Trip Mechanism, Overspeed Trip Mechanism Reset. _ . . __.__.. -..1..-.. _ TERMINATING CUE: Operator reports 2MS52 is reset. Page 5 of 6

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Ie reactor has been tripped and the control room has been evacuated due to a bomb threat. 23 AFW Pump has tripped on over speed. INITIATING CUE: Y 1ave been directed to reset 23 AFW Pp Turbine Trip Valve (.... ,..352) lAW S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 13, Turbine - Driven AFW Pump Restoration. Maintenance has corrected the cause of the overspeed trip. Page 6 of6

Operations Training Program Job Performance Measure f.. .-JON: SALEM fYSTEM: Control Air rrASK: Perform Actions for a loss of All AC Power (Start the SBO Compressor) rrASK NUMBER: N1150140501

      'PM NUMBER:         08-01 NRC IP-j ALTERNATE PATH:                                             KIA NUMBER:                    2.1.23 IMPORTANCE FACTOR:            4.3                 4.4
                                                                              --:R~O~-
    ~PPLICABI L1TY:                                                                                    SRO EoD        ROm            STAD                 SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD:            In Plant Sc.OP-SO.CA-0001, SBO Diesel Control Air Compressor, Rev. 13 2-EOP-LOPA-1, loss of All AC Power, Rev. 26

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-AB.lOOP-1, loss of Off-Site Power, Rev. 22 S2. OP-AB. CA-OOO 1, Loss of Control Air. Rev. 15 DWG 604495 (Rev. 2) and 205347-2 Rev. 40 (H-6)

   /rOOlS AND EQUIPMENT:         SBO Compressor Building is normally unlocked (l-3 key if locked)
   \. __IOATED JPM COMPLETION TIME:                       10 min

[rIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A

  !Developed By:                  G Gauding                             Date:   03/01/10 Instructor Ivalidated By:                   W Wallace                            Date:    03/18/10 SM E ~~~>s:ru,c\..oorr, "f\

Reviewed By: ~ \ ~J~ Date: 3'- '2.<0 - 'l Q t\) T~in~Dep~ I Approved By: 7 _~ OperatTonsDepartment Date: 3110

!ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:
~CTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME:

PERFORMED BY: GRADE: DAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: ,.... "ALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 10

Operations Training Program Job Performance Measure SYSTEM: Control Air TASK: Perform Actions for a Loss of All AC Power (Start the SBO Compressor) TASK N1150140501 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Both Salem Units have tripped due to a loss of off-site power. Equipment problems have resulted in NO Emergency Control Air Compressors (ECACs) running. INITIATING CUE: The Unit 2 CRS has directed you to start the Station Blackout Compressor (S80) lAW SC.OP-SO.CA-0001, SBO Diesel Control Air Compressor, starting with Step 5.1.3. The Component Off Normal and Off Normal Tagged review has been performed SAT. It is NOT the summer operating period. The inspection covers have already been removed, Step 5.1.1 was performed SAT, and the inspection covers replaced lAW Step 5.1.2 Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. ...IPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Operator performs SC.OP-SO.CA-0001, SBO Diesel Control Air Compressor, SECTION 5.1 in the correct sequence which would result in SBO Compressor running supplying air through 1CA1913 SBO COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE VALVE, and 1CA1886 BLACKOUT AIR COMPRESSOR ISOLATION, and 2CA584 YARD CONTROL AIR SUPPLY VALVE to Aux Building headers 1A and 2A Page 2 of 10

Operation~ aining Program Job Performance Measure SYSTEM: Control Air NAME: _________________________ TASK: Perform Actions for a Loss of All AC Power (Start the SSO Compressor) DATE: _________________________ STEP COMMENTS

    #  STEP               (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                                          EVAL   (Required for UNSA T

NO. (#Denotes a Sequential Step) STANDARD S/U Evaluation)

Provide marked up copy of the SC.OP- Operator has and uses standard I SO.CA-0001. SSO Diesel Control Air personnel safety equipment. Dons Compressor with Prerequisites signed off. hardhat, safety glasses. Uses hearing I Additionally. Step 5.1 1 for removing protection when entering high noise i Inspection Covers will be previously areas that are posted as hearing completed, as will Step 5.1.2 to re-install protection required. Uses gloves when inspection covers. operating equipment or climbing. Operator reviews and signs Precautions and Limitations, and performs P&L 3.10 I as described in next step. Operator must obtain hearing protection per P&L 3.1 All other P&Ls require no action other than reading and initialing with the exception of P&L 3.10 which will be performed at the SSO as identified below. Operator proceeds to SSO Compressor Building, and reviews 2 minute drill card at the job site. Page 3 of 10

Operations . (aining Program Job Performance Measure SYSTEM: Control Air NAME: __________________________ TASK: Perform Actions for a Loss of All AC Power (Start the SBO Compressor) DATE: _________________________

       -                                STEP                                                                             COMMENTS
   #     STEP                (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                                         EVAL  (Required for UNSAT

NO. (#Denotes a Sequential Step) STANDARD Stu Evaluation)

P&L Ensure the Battery Tender has power by Operator observes the battery Tender 3.10 observing the Red and Green lamps on the GREEN light is illuminated, and the front. The placard next to the Battery RED light is not illuminated in the SBO Tender explains the Red and Green lamps building. (Green is a float charge on and their significance. the battery, Red (full charging current) would only be present after a discharge) 5.1.3 OPEN both Engine intake louvers (located Cue: After operator locates and outside building on west wall.) describes how to open Engine intake louvers, state that the Engine intake louvers are open. 5.1.4 OPEN 1CA1920, BLACKOUT AIR Cue: After operator locates 1CA 1920, COMPRESSOR DRAIN VALVE, to drain BLACKOUT AIR COMPRESSOR any water accumulation, then CLOSE DRAIN VALVE, and describes how to 1CA1920. open, including that the drain cap must be removed, state 1CA1920, BLACKOUT AIR COMPRESSOR DRAIN VALVE, has been cycled and no water came out of pipe. Since the cue would be the same whether or not the drain cap was , removed (nothing came out the end of pipe) only comment here for review if pipe cap was not removed.

Operation~ . aining Program Job Performance Measure SYSTEM: Control Air NAME: __________________________ TASK: Perform Actions for a loss of All AC Power (Start the SSO Compressor) DATE:

              .                     STEP                                                                              COMMENTS
    #  STEP               (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                                        EVAL   (Required for UNSAT

NO. (#Denotes a Sequential Step) STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 5.1.5 OPEN 2FZSB010, BATTERY CHARGER, Operator iocates 2FZSB01 0, I breaker BATTERY CHARGER, breaker in Panel I 2FZSBO, SSO Compressor Bldg Distri?ution Panel, and simulates i opening. I Cue:2FZSB010, BATTERY I CHARGER, breaker, is open.

I 5.1.6 PLACE SBO Control Air Dryer switch in Operator locates SBO Control Air Dryer ON position. switch and simulates turning switch to ON position. Cue: SBO Control Air Dryer switch is ON, and Control Air On light is illuminated. 5.1.7 RECORD Engine Hourmeter reading on Operator locates Engine Hourmeter, Attachment 1, Section 1.0, and in log book 1XA16993, Tachometer/Hourmeter, at SBO compressor. inside engine control panel labeled Compressor Noise Emission Control Information, and records current reading in Section 1.0 of Att. 1. Operator locates logbook hanging from side of panel 2FZSBO, SSO I Compressor Bldg Distribution Panel, I =~~~~e~~f:~~;~ere Engine Hourmeter Page 5 of 10

SYS TAS STEP COMMENTS

   #   STEP            (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                          EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. (#Denotes a Sequential Step) STANDARD stu Evaluation)
5.1.8 PLACE UNLOADER VALVE selector switch in START position.

Operator locates UNLOADER VALVE selector switch, and ensures switch in I START position. Note: UNLOADER VALVE selector switch is normally in Start when engine I I is shutdown.

5.1.9 PRESS ,L\.I\,jQ HOLD BY-PASS VALVE Operators locates BY -PASS VALVE pushbutton. pushbutton in control panel, and simulates depressing AND holding depressed.

Page 6 of 10

OperationL aining Program Job Performance Measure SYSTEM: Control Air NAME: ________________________ TASK: Perform Actions for a Loss of All AC Power (Start the SBO Compressor) DATE: ________________________ II

I STEP COMMENTS

      #         STEP                (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                                       EVAL   (Required fOi UNSI\T

NO. (#Denotes a Sequential Step) STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
5.1.10 PLACE SBO-IGN-SWT, ENGINE While keeping the Bypass Valve IGNITION SWITCH in START position until pushbutton depressed, operator engine starts, then RELEASE to RUN simulates placing the SBO-IGN-SWT position. SBO Air Comp Inst Pnl Engine Ignition Switch in START.

Cue: Engine has started. After cue is given, operator releases SBO-IGN-SWT SBO Air Comp Inst Pnl Engine Ignition Switch to RUN. Note: If operator also releases tbe BYPASS VALVE pushbutton at this point, Wit/lOut checking oil pressure

                                                                           >15 psig, U,an CUE tllat the engine flas stopped.

5.1.11 When engine oil pressure is >15 psig, Operator identifies oil pressure reading RELEASE BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton. on gauge labeled oil pressure gauge inside control panel.

Cue: Oil pressure is 40 psig. Operator releases BY-PASS VALVE I I I pushbutton. I -- .. ~-~--.~ Page 7 of 10

SYS TAS STEP COMMENTS

   #   STEP           (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                               EVAL (Required for UNSAT

NO. (#Denotes a Sequential Step) STANDARD StU Evaluation) 5.1.12 ALLOW engine to run for 5 minutes to Cue: 5 minutes has elapsed. I warm up.
5.1.13 OPEN 1CA1913 SBO COMPRESSOR Operator locates and describes opening DISCHARGE VALVE, to pressurize Control Air header.

1CA1913 SBO COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE VALVE I I Cue: 1CA1913 SBO COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE VALVE, is open. I i

5.1.14 OPEN 1CA1886, BLACKOUT AIR Operator locates and describes opening COMPRESSOR ISOLATION. 1CA1886, BLACKOUT AIR COMPRESSOR ISOLATION.

Note: 1CA 1886 is iocated near the entrance to Service Building on right side past the U2 mixing bottle Cue: 1CA 1886, BLACKOUT AIR COMPRESSOR ISOLATION is open. Page 8 of 10 I I

SYS TAS STEP COMMENTS

   #   STEP            (*Denotes a Critical Step)                                               EVAL               {Required for UNSAT

NO. (#Denotes a Sequential Step) STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
5.1.15 OPEN 2CA584, YARD CONTROL AIR Operator locates and describes opening I I

SUPPL Y VALVE, to pressurize Aux. 2CA584, YARD CONTROL AIR Building 1A and 2A Control Air headers. SUPPLY VALVE. r II Note: 2CA584 is located near the entrance to Service Building on right side past the U2 mixing bottle. Cue: 2CA584, YARD CONTROL AIR I SUPPLY VALVE is open.

5.1.16 PLACE UN LOADER VALVE selector Operator returns to SBO Compressor switch in RUN position. Building and points out UNLOADER VALVE selector switch describes placing it in RUN position.

I Cue: JPM is complete. L ....... __...._ Page 9 of 10

JOB PERFOR.1\l<\.NCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: . .n Salem Units have tripped due to a loss of off-site power. Equipment problems have resulted in NO Emergency Control Air Compressors (ECACs) running. INITIATING CUE: The Unit 2 CRS has directed you to start the Station Blackout Compressor (SBO) lAW SC.OP SO.CA-0001, SBO Diesel Control Air Compressor, starting with Step 5.1.3. The Component Off Normal and Off Normal Tagged review has been performed SAT. It is NOr the summer operating period. The inspection covers have already been removed, Step 5.1.1 was performed SAT, and the inspection covers replaced lAW Step 5.1.2 Page 10 of 10

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

    .ATION:              SALEM SYSTEM:                 Radioactive Liquid Waste TASK:                   Respond to High Radiation Alarm during an Authorized Release of Rad. Liquid Waste to the CIRC Water System From 21 CVCS Monitor Tank TASK NUMBER:            N0685140104 JPM NUMBER:             08-01 NRC IP-k ALTERNATE PATH:       m                                          KIA NUMBER: _ _ _--=.2~.3. . .1. .......

IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 1_ _ __J 4.3 APPLICABI LlTY: RO SRO EoD ROm STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In Plant/SIMULATE

REFERENCES:

S2.0P-SO.WL-0001, Rev. 23, Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste from 21 eves Monitor Tank TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None

. "\LlDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME:                          15 min.

TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS:

                                                                         - - - N/A Developed By:                        G Gauding                                Date:      03/03/10 Instructor Validated By:                        WWallace                                  Date:     03/18/10 SME    yln.stru~cr
                                            ~\             n                  Date: 3-2..&-20\0 Reviewed By:
                                           ~\

Training Depa ment

~'"

Approved By: O~~tive Date~~} ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY:

  .'ALUA TOR'S SIGNATURE:                                                              DATE:

Page 1 of5 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Radioactive liquid Waste TASK: Respond to High Radiation Alarm during an Authorized Release of Rad. liquid Waste to the CIRC Water System From 21 CVCS Monitor Tank TASK N0685140104 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Both Units are at 100% _power. A discharge of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank to Unit 1 Circ Water via Unit 2 SW has been directed lAW S2.0P SO.WL-OOOi, Release of Radioactive liquid Waste from 21 CVCS Monitor Tank. Recirculation and preparation for release of the Monitoring Tank have been completed. Chemistry has authorized a maximum allowable release rate of 150 gpm. ALL Circulators are in service. 2R18 and the Overboard Flow monitor are OPERABLE. SW Room Cooler Headers are NOT cross-tied. S2.0P-SO.WL-0001, Sections 5.1,5.2, and 5.3 are complete. CVCS tank initial level is 19,600 gallons. INITIATING CUE: Perform Section 5.5, Release of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank via SW system to CW system, of S2.0P SO.WL-OOOi. Successful Completion Criteria:

1. All critical steps completed.

2. All sequential steps completed in order.

3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.

4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).

Task Standard for Successful Completion:

1. Perform normal Liquid Radwaste Release.

2. Terminate release upon receipt of high radiation alarm on release.

Page 2 of5 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM

.~

STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS ' ... 'ft ...* .* ;, No. S/U Provide candidate with marked up copy of I release procedure. Reviews marked up procedure I 5.5.1 IF 2FR1 064 is INOPERABLE .... NA's step since 2FR1064 is OPERABLE.

5.5.2 Direct unit 2 NCO to OPEN 2WL51, LIQUID Locates plant page or phone to call control RELEASE STOP VALVE. room.

Cue: Unit 2 NCO reports 2WL51 has been opened. 5.5.3 Direct a second operator to PERFORM an Independent Verification for 2WL51 position lAW Attachment 2, Step 4.1.2 OR 4.2.2 as applicable Cue: IV has been performed. (ODCM)

5.5.4 THROTTLE OPEN 2WR59, MT PMPS OB STOP Candidate locates 2WR59 and simulates VALVE, NOT to exceed the Maximum Release opening valve.

Rate recorded in attachment 2, Step 2.2.2 When candidate checks flow indication on 104

I panel,

                                                                               . is 10 gpm.

With the valve fuliy open, flow I 5.5.5 Direct a second operator to PERFORM an Independent Verification for 2WR59 position IA\I\ Attachment 2, Step 4.1.3 OR 4.2.3 as applicable Cue: IV has been performed. (ODCM) I

5.5.6 IE the Maximum Release Rate recorded in Candidate locates 21 WR53 and simulates Attachment 2, Step 2.2.2 can NOT be obtained, throttling valve closed.

THEN THROTTLE CLOSED 21WR53 MT RECIRC V, NOT to exceed the Maximum When candidate checks flow on 104 panel, Release Rate. CU~Flow is 55 gpm. 5.5.7 IF 2FR1064 flow monitor is OPERABLE, THEN Candidate simulates annotating recorder with RECORD time, date, and tank identification on time, date and tank. recorder. I Page 3 of 5

                                                    ".,ref' TJ  . e P    . I ~. S :c:. n. . .
                                                    * ,,~~ ". ""wtcOSSCSSlOfl{C lItrcs ~t- -'U' "r.    . 7'  .*
                                                                                                                    -rItUHIU5

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM STEP STEP

 ,,: ..                                                                                       STANDARD                     EVAL   COMMENTS
          .No*..

S/U 5.5.8 COMPLETE Attachment 2, Section 5.1 Candidate records data. I I Cue: When candidate reads 21 CVCS Monitor Tank Level, state, "2-LlS-180 indicates 90%". I

                                                                     , Operator records 19,600 from either Att. 1 Section 2.0 or AtL 2 Section 1.0. If operator requests I S2.0P-TM.ZZ-0002, Tank Capacity Data, tell them the procedure is not needed to determine the tank volume.

I200 Operator records Dilution Water Flowrate of 1 ,000 gpm. ) Inilial conditions stated all circulators were in service. 5.5.9 JI

Operator records 55 gpm for Discharge Flow Rate.

LEany of the following occur during the releas (Previous cue from Step 5.5.6"can be re-stated here i I I THE:N direct the NCO to CLOSE 2WL51, , if asked.) LIQUID RELEASE STOP VALVE. Loss of dilution water flow C_u~: When candidate reads 2R18 indication on 104 panei, state, "2R 18 reads 10 5 counts, the RED I j 2FR 1064 becomes inoperable HI RAO light is lit." 2R18 Monitor ALARMS MT pump pressure falls below the MOP Candidate calls control room to inform them of HI I allowed lAW Attachment 4, as applicable RADIATION condition and directs NCO to shut 2WL51. : Cue: Once operator has called control room to have the 2WL51 shut, state: "JPM is complete." Pagc 4 of5 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Both Units are at 100% power. A discharge of 21 eves Monitor Tank to Unit 1 Circ Water via Unit 2 SW has been directed lAW S2.0P SO.WL-0001, Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste from 21 CVCS Monitor Tank. Recirculation and preparation for release of the Monitoring Tank have been completed. Chemistry has authorized a maximum allowable release rate of 150 gpm. ALL Circulators are in service. 2R18 and the Overboard Flow monitor are OPERABLE. SW Room Cooler Headers are NOT cross-tied. S2.0P-SO.WL-00J1, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 are complete. 21 evcs tank initial level is 19,600 gallons. It ATING CUE: Perform Section 5.5, Release of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank via SW system to ew system, of S2.0P SO.WL-0001. Page 5 of5 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: RCP #1 seal failure. SBLOCA SCENARIO NUMBER: 08-01 NRC ESG-1 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates EXPECTED DURATION: 90 min REVISION NUMBER: o PROGRAM: D L.O. REQUAL [K] INITIAL LICENSE D OTHER STA REVISION

SUMMARY

New Issue for NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 03-06-10 Lead Date APPROVED BY: Salem Operations Training Date APPROVED BY: Page 1 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 I. OBJECTIVE(S): Enabling Objectives: A. Given the unit at 90% reactor power with the generator synchronized to the grid, the crew will perform a power increase at 2%/hr, lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004(Q). B. Given the unit at power with a failure of a Tavg channel which causes continuous rod motion, take corrective action lAW AB.ROD-0003. C. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the safety related plant cooling water system in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. E. Given the unit at power with a SW Bay Leak, take actions needed to isolate the bay, lAW approved station procedures. F. Given a RCP with various seal failures, take corrective action for RCP seal failures lAW AB.RCP-0001 and the appropriate alarrr, response procedures G. Given a failure of an RCP, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction lAW approved station procedures. H. Given the failure of a RCP, DIRECT the response to the malfunction lAW approved station procedures. I. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. Page 2 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 II. MAJOR EVENTS:

                                                                 "--~----~-~--~~--

A. Raise Rx power. B. Tavg Channel fails high. C. 4 SW bay leak. D. 24 RCP #1 seal failure E. SBLOCA F. Loss of Off Site power Page 3 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 III. SCENARIO

SUMMARY

A The crew will take the watch at -90% power with all systems in automatic at MOL. 23 SW pump is CIT for strainer repair. B. Shortly after assuming the watch, Tavg channel 22 will fail high. The crew will respond to place the control rods in manual after verifying no load rejection, and respond to the malfunction lAW S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. C. After the CRS has evaluated Tech Specs, #4 Service Water Bay will develop a SW leak. The crew will respond to perform leak identification and :solation actions in S2.0P-AB.SW-0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure and S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay Leak. The CRS will identify a Tech Spec 3.0.3 entry due to SW pump operability. D. After the SW leak is isolated and TS 3.0.3 is identified, 24 RCP #1 seal will experience degradation, and ultimately fail completely. The crew will respond lAW S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality, and determine an orderly unit shutdown is required. E. Once the determination of the required shutdown is made, the 24 RCP #1 seal will completely fail. The crew will take the action required in the AB anci trip the Rx. F. When the Rx trips, a SBLOCA will occur. The crew will initiate a Safety Injection based on deteriorating primary conditions. 2A 4KV Vital Bus will de-energize upon the Rx trip, and the 2A EDG output breaker will not shut, resulting in no SW pumps running. additionally, 21 SI pump will not be running from "A" bus, and 22 SI pump fails to start. The crew will perform actions to establish the minimum required SW pump and SI pump operation. G. After performing SI reset action in LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant, a loss of Off-Site power will occur. The Safeguards Equipment Controllers will load in MODE II (Blackout) The crew

c. will take actions to re-start the required ECCS components, and the scenario will be terminated.

Page 4 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 IV. INITIAL CONDITIONS:

                                                       .--~----.-- ~--.,.-

_ _ Initialize the simulator to IC-241, Blue Exam drive, 90% Power, MOL, equilibrium Xe, RCS Boron 916 ppm. PREP FOR TRAINING (i.e. computer setpoints, procedures, bezel covers) 1 RH1 and RH2 CIT 2 RH18s CIT 3 VC1 and VC4 cn 4 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 5 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 6 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 7 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ _ 8 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 9 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 10 23 Service Water Pump CIT 11 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." Page 5 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 EVENT TRIGGERS: ET-1 MONP0254<10, Control Bank C < 10 steps

  ~=~~="         '~~,

MALFUNCTION

SUMMARY

RC0015B, LOOP 22 COLD LEG RTD 1.- NA NA RT-1 NA 630 FAILS H/L SW0216B, 22 SW HDR LEAK IN SW

2. - NA 3 MIN RT-3 0 10,000 STRUCTURE RC007D, 24 RC PUMP-#1 SEAL FAILS 120

3. RT-5 0.72 0.95

   -     W/DEGRADATION                           NA MIN RC0002, RCS LEAK INTO 4.-                                            3 MIN    5 MIN     ET-1         0     2000 CONTAINMENT EL0273A, 2A DG BKR FAILS TO 5.
   -    AUTO-CLOSE                               NA      NA        NA       TRUE    TRUE SJ0184B, 22 SI PMP FAILS TO START

6. TRUE

   -    ON SEC                                   NA      NA        NA               TRUE EL0134, LOSS OF ALL 500KV OFF SITE POWER                               NA      NA       RT-7     FALSE    TRUE RP318A2, 221~HR PUMP FAILS TO
   -    START ON SEC                             NA      NA        NA       TRUE    TRUE REMOTE/FIELD FUNCTION

SUMMARY

23 SW PUMP BKR NA NA NA OFF OFF CONTROL POWER 3.- SW35D, 24 SW PUMP BKR NA NA RT-10 ON OFF Control Power

4. SW39D, 25 SW PUMP BKR

  -     CONTROL POWER 10 SEC       NA        RT-10       ON      OFF

5. - SW43D, 26 SW PUMP BKR 20 SEC NA RT-10 ON OFF CONTROL POWER

6. DG01 D, DEEI\JERGIZE "A" SEC

  -                                         NA         NA        RT-9        NO      YES CABINET Page 6 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 110 OVERRIDE

SUMMARY

2A VITAL BUS

1. NA NA ET-1 OFF ON FEEDER-OPEN C804 E OVDI, 24ASD 2A VITAL BUS NA NA ET-1 OFF OFF FEEDER-CLOSE C801 F OVDI, 23ASD 2A VITAL BUS

3. - NA NA ET-1 OFF ON FEEDER-OPEN C801 E OVDI, 23ASD 2A VITAL BUS

4. NA NA ET-1 OFF OFF

  -    FEEDER-CLOSE None Page 7 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS A. State shift job assignments: B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet) C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the SM that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. E. Do not review objectives with crew. F. If required to terminate the scenario early, the instructor should evaluate if sufficient information has been gathered to evaluate the crew's performance. Typically this would be accomplished by completion of the scenario through the third event, however, this is not a requirement. The final decision remains with the instructor and evaluators. Page 8 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected PlanUStudent Response Comments

1. Power Increase to 100%

j Reactivity plan per the turnover sheet

-~--~-.

J* CRS briefs crew on evolution Note: Rod Control may remain in

CRS implements S2.0P-IO.zZ-0004.

Auto or placed in manual with CRS approval lAW IOP-4, P&L 3.6

CRS directs PO to commence Turbine load increase at 2%/hour.

Note: The Main Turbine is initially set

PO sets up Digital EHC (DEHC) up for 15 % per minute, the PO must console for 2%/hr load increase, and change the ramp rate to 2% per hour. initiates load increase.

Note: The RO should maintain a log

RO initiates a dilution per the reactivity of dilutions to ensure reactivity plan provided.

additions are tracked.

PO monitors DEHC for proper response of load increase.
RO monitors Tavg and Delta T and MWe for expected indications of load increase.

Proceed to next event at direction of lead evaluator.

2. RCS loop 22 Tc RTD fails high r-=-:----------.~---~.~-----

Simulator Operator: Enter RT-1 on direction from Lead Evaluator. MALF: RC0015B, LOOP 22 COLD LEG RTD FAILS HIL Final Value: 630 Note: If rod control was placed in

RO reports TavglTref deviation and manual for power increase, the steps Rods stepping in as NOT expected for auto rod insertion and placing rods in manual will be NA.

Page 9 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

RO reports no turbine runback in progress, and placing rod control in manual.
CRS concurs with rod control being placed in manual.
RO places rod control in manual and reports rod motion stopped.
CRS enters S2.0P-AB.ROO-0003, Continuous Roc! Motion.
CRS directs PO to place turbine load increase on hold.
RO reports PZR level 10 console alarm due to auct hi Tave raising prog Ivl.

Note: 90% Rx power - 573 degrees

CRS directs RO to adjust rods in program Tavg. manual to maintain Tavg within 1.5 deg of T program. Any rod manipulation is pre-announced, and the RO monitors control board indications for plant response to rod motion.
RO reports rod motion was in the inward direction and a NIS channel has NOT failed.
CRS directs RO to stop any dilution in progress, and HO secures dilution if in progress.
RO reports 22 loop Tavg channel has failed Hi.
CRS directs RO to return PZR level to program.
RO places Charging System Master Flow controller in manual.

Page 10 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluator/lnstructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Response Comments Note: Tavg on program at 573

RO adjusts charging flow to restore degrees -55% programmed PZR PZR level to program.

level.

RO adjusts 2CV71 , CHG HDR PCV as required to maintain RCP seal injection flow between 6-12 gpm per pump, not to exceed 40 gpm total.
RO defeats 22 loop Reactor Coolant Differential Temperature and 22 loop Reactor Coolant Average Temperatures en 2CC2.
RO selects channel other than 22 loop for Reactor Coolant Differential Temperature and Reactor Coolant Average Temperature.
When PZR leved has been restored to program, RO places Charging System Master Flow controller in auto.
RO reports control rods are above the rod insertion limit.

Note: The Terr recorder on 2RP4 has

RO places rod control in auto after 22 loop Tave connected to it. This ensuring Tavg is within 1.5 degrees of means that the Terr will indicate off Tref.

scale high. The crew should understand that the Deviation Defeat

CRS directs PO to initiate S2.0P of loop 22 removes its input to the rod SO.RPS-0002 for removing aRCS control system. Temperature c1i-Jannel from service.
CRS enters TSAS(s) 3.3.1.1 Action 6 and 3.3.2.1 Action 19*.

Proceed to next event after CRS has determined Tech Specs at Lead Evaluators direction. Page 11 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific: Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlanUStudent Response Comments

3. #4 SW Bay Flooding Simulator Operator: Insert RT:_~ on direction from Lead Evaluator.

MALF: SW0216B, SW LEAK IN SW STRUCTURE Ramp 00:03:00

Final Value 10,000 Note: The first OHA's will annunciate

CREW announ:;es unexpected OHA

 -45 seconds after the leak is inserted.       alarms B-13 and B-14, followed shortly by B-30.

OHA B-30, 24-26 SW PMP SUMP AREA LVL HI, directs entry into AB.SW-0003 if alarm is concurrent with OHA B-14, 22 SW HDR PRESS LO.
RO announces the auto start of the standby SW pump when it occurs, and the clearirg of the low SW header pressures alarms.
CRS enters AB.SW-0003 SW Bay Leak per ARP direction or enters AB.SW-0001, Loss of SW Header Pressure then transitions to AB.SW 0003, and initiates CAS.
RO/PO pages NEO and directs investigation of 4 Bay problems.
PO monitors Main Turbine temps on SPDS and Plant Computer Role Play: 3 minutes after being
CREW splits SW Bays by opening contacted, report as NEO that there is nuclear header cross over MOVs 21 a large leak in 4 bay, you can't and 22SW23, and shutting SW bay identify where it is coming from due to cross connect valves 21 and 22SW17, the spray, and approx. 4 ft of water is and identifies the leak is in 4 Bay.

in the bay now, and rising slowly. Page 12 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Simulator Operator:

RO/PO ensures 22 SW pump is 2 minutes after being directed to de running. and stops 24 and 26 SW energize control power to 24-26 SW pumps.

pumps, call as NEO and state: 'This is (NEOs name) calling for a First

CREW sends NEO to open control Check. I am in Unit 2 64' switchgear power bkrs for 24-26 SW pumps.

room, and the walls are yellow." After acknowledgment from control room, then INSERT RT-10 REMOTE: SW35D, 24 SW Pump BKR Control Power Delay: None REMOTE: SW39D, 25 SW Pump BKR Control Power Delay: 00:00: 10 REMOTE: SW43D, 26 SW Pump BKR Control Power Delay= 00:00:20 Call control room after last remote is active and report control power breakers have been opened for 24, ~~§I"l<!~2~S~W pumJ;...ps.;,..:-._

CREW isolates 4 SW Bay by closing 22SW22 and 23SW20.

Role Play: Once 4 bay is isolated.

PO reports the leak is isolated.

NEO (If contacted) will report that the leak appears to have stopped.

PO reports SW remains available to the EDGs,
PO reports SW is being supplied to the Turbine Building through 21 SW20.
PO monitors Main turbine parameters on SPDS and the Plant Computer.
PO initiates action to remove one CCHX from service lAW CAS.

Page 13 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Note: GRS should contact work

CRS enters TSAS 3.0.3 due to having control to find status 23 SW pump, NO operable SW loops.

and when pump could be restored to service to avoid a unit shutdown due to Tech Spe::; 3.0.3 Note: ECG classification at this point

CRS directs SM to refer to the EGG.

would be UE lAW ECG section 9.7.1. Proceed to next event after CRS has

CRS contacts maintenance to determined Tech Specs at Lead investigate.

Evaluators direction. Page 14 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

4. 24 RCP #1 Seal Degradation and subsequent failure Simulator Operator: Insert RT-S at

RO announces as unexpected 24 Lead Evaluator direction RCP Seal Leakoff Flow Hi-Lo.

MALF: RC007D24 RC Pump #1

RO reports 24 HCP sealleakoff 5 gpm Seal Fails - w/degradation and rising very slowly.

Initial Value 0.72

CRS enters S2.0P-AB.RCP-001, Final Value *0.95 Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality.

Ramp 120 minutes

CRS verifies entry condition of seal The initial value equates to 5 gpm leakoff flow >5 gpm is met.

sealleakoff flow,* and leakoff flow will continue to rise very slowly.

CRS directs PO to initiate CAS.
RO uses P-250 computer to check 24 RCP conditions.
CRS determines CCW water supply is not causing abnormal condition.
RO reports all RCP temperatures are normal and stable.
RO reports Seal Injection Flow is >

6 gpm and seal leakoff flow is 5 gpm and rising very slowly.

CRS detE!rmines sealleakoff flow is slowly approaching 6 gpm, and pump bearing I seal inlet temperatures are stable or lowering.
RO ensures Seal injection flow is >9 gpm, not to exceed 40 gpm total.
CRS determines an orderly unit shutdown is and stop of 24 RCP must is required within 8 hours.

Page 15 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantJStudent Response Comments Simulator Operator: When directed by Lead Evaluator, MODIFY MALF RC007D to 100% with no ramp or delay. This raises seal leakoff flow on 24 RCP to > 6 gpm, which meets the Attachment 2 criteria for stopping I RCP's.

RO announces 24 RCP #1 seal DIP low alarm, 24 Rep #1 seal DIP lowering towards zero, and 24 RCP seal leakoff flow is off scale high reading 6.0 gpm.
Crew identifies that the CAS condition for seal leakoff flow.:::: 6 gpm is met, and goes to Att. 2 Stopping RCPs
CRS briefs Rx trip actions to be performed.
CRS identifies the requirement to shut 24CV104 3**5 minutes after pump shutdown.

 -~"--~""~-:::--

Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-1 is

RO trips the Rx and stops 24 RCP.

TRUE after the Rx trip. This deenergizes 2A 4KV vital bus. It will also insert the SBLOCA after a 3 minute time delay. TIME RX TRIPPED: MALF: RC0002, RCS LEAK INTO TIME RCP STOPPED: CONTAINMENT Initial Value: 500 Final Value: 2,000 Delay: 3 minutes Ramp 5 minutes OVDl801 and 804 opens both infeed breakers to 2A 4KVvitai bus- - - - - - ' Page 16 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected PlanUStudent Response Comments

5. SBLOCA

RO performs immediate actions of TRIP-1

                                              -Confirms the Rx trip
                                              -Trips the Main Turbine
                                              - Determines Sf is not actuated or required
                                              - Reports 2A 4kv vital bus is deenergized, 2B and 2C 4KV vital busses are powered from off-site power.

CRS reads immediate action steps to RO and verifies performance.

Note: If ReS leak inserts prior to

CRS transitions to TRIP-2 transition step, crew may SI and remain in TRIP-1.

CT!~ 24CV1043-5-~nutes ~ after

3-5 minutes after the 24 RCP was tripping the RCP due to Seal stopped, PO shuts 24CV104.

Leakoff> 6 gpm. Time 24CV104 Shut: SAT_ UNSAT_ _

RO makes page announcement.
CREW monitors TRIP-2 CAS.
CRS directs SM to implement the ECG.
PO reports 21 AFW pump is not in service, reports 22 and 23 AFW pumps are running and AFW flow

                                            >22E4 Ibm/hr, and stops 21 and 22 SGFPs.

RO announces lowering PZR pressure and initiates SI.
CRS concurs with PO lowering AFW flow to no less than 22E4 Ibm/hr when asked.

Page 17 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Crew should recognize that EDGs

RO reports SEC loading is NOT are running with NO SW cooling flow, complete for vital busses, and also and action is required to either identifies that 2A. 4KV vital bus is restore SW flow or stop the EDGs. deenergized and 2A EDG output breaker remains open, as well as 22 SI pump and 22 RHR pump have not started .

CT#2 (E.OM.J) Establish flow from

RO blocks and resets 28 and 2C at least one intermediate head SECs.

EeCS pump prior to transition out of EOP*TRIP-1.

RO starts 22 Safety Injection pump and 22 RHR pump.

SAT_ _ UNSAT_ _ cannot be reset due to the standing UV signal on its bus. With the SEC unable to be reset, the EDG output breaker cannot be shut. Note: The CRS may attempt to

CRS sends an operator to deenergize restore 2A 4KV vital bus with the 2A SEC.

following steps. However, the presence of OHA J-9, 2A DG Urgent Trouble, may lead the crew to believe there is a problem with 2A EDG, and not attempt to place it in service on the bus. If no attempt is made to restore 2A bus, then these next steps will not be performed, and no loads will be restored from A bus. CT#3 will be evaluated after 23 SW pump is restored after 2B SEC is reset. Role Play: If dispatched to investigate 2A EDG, report after 3 minutes that there are 6 alarms up at the local panel, and all indicate that there is no electrical power to the 2B local MCC. There are no generator alarms present. Simulator Operator: If dire~cted,2~~-1 minutes after being dispatched, enter RT*9 to deenergize 2A SEC, and report back toContTol Room~ REMOTE: OG010f DEENERGIZ "A" .SECCABINET ;',>' Final Value:> OFF ., ..... _._.. __ ._---'---'-' Page 18 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires SpecifiG Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

PO depresses mimic bus interlock then shuts 2A EDG output breaker.

CT #3 (E-O--L) Manually start at

RO starts 21 81 pump, 21 RHR pump, least the minimum required 21 and 22 SW pumps, 21 CFCU in number of SW pumps (one) in an low speed, 21 AFW pump, 21 Aux operating safeguards train to Bldg exh fan, and 21 chiller powered restore minimum FSAR analyses from 2A bus (if power restored). 22 conditions prior to 2A EDG RHR pump from 2B bus, and 22 SI tripping. pump powered from 2C bus. (21 AFW pp will start when the bus is re SAT_ _ UNSAT_ _ energized if standing 10-10 SG NR Ivl signal is present)

Role Play: After 2B SEC has been

CRS directs the PO to start 23 SW reset, call the control room as Hank pump when control power has been Kawecki, and report that you have restored.

racked up 23 8W pump breaker, you are going to energize the control power breaker, and the only remaining item on the Untagging list is the bezel cover. Then modify REMOTE SW32D from OFF to O~J, and report to control room that 23 SW pump control power is on.

PO reports all Safeguards Valves except 21 SW20 are in their correct positions, and CRS dispatches operator to locally close 21 SW20.
RO reports 21 and 22 CA 330's are shut.
RO shuts charging pump mini flow valves 2CV139 and 2CV140 when RCS pressure lowers <1500 psig lAW CAS.

CT #4 (E-1-C) Trip all RCPs so that

RO stops all Reps when RCS CET temperatures do not become pressure is <1350 psig and ECCS flow superheated when forced is established.

circulation in the ReS stops. (RCS pressure < 1350 with ECCS flow) Page 19 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires SpecifiG Permission "from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected PlanUStudent Response Comments

RO reports containment pressure, and that it is currently < 15 psig.
RO reports no MSLI is required.
CRS direct SM to implement ECG.
PO reports 4KV vital bus status.

Note: If operators did NOT energize 2A 4KV vital bus previously, then they should initiate actions lAW S2.0P AB.4KV-0001, Loss of 2A 4KV Vital Bus.

RO reports control room ventilation is in Accident Pressurized Mode, and runs the proper complement of switchgear ventilation.
RO reports 2 CCW pumps are running.
RO reports ECCS is not aligned for cold leg recirc, reports charging SI flow> 100 gpm, and SI flow> 100 gpm.
RO reports RCS pressure is > 300 psig.
RO shuts charging pump mini flow valves 2CV139 and 2CV140 when RCS pressure is < 1500 psig lAW TRIP-1 CAS.
RO/PO verifies AFW flow >22E041b/hr or SG level> 9%, and NR levels will be maintained 9(or 15% adverse)-33%
RO reports Tavg lowering due to ECCS injection.
RO reports Tavg <547, and not dumping stearn.
RO initiates MSLI.
RO/PO verifies RTBs open.
RO/PO verifies PZR PORVs closed and Stop Valvles open, and PZR Spray status based on RCP operation.

Page 20 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlanUStudent Response Comments

PO verifies no faulted SGs.
PO reports no indications of a SGTR.
RO reports only 'I rad monitor in Table F is in warning or alarm due to loss of A bus.
RO reports containment pressure is > 4 psig.
CRS transitions to EOP-LOCA-1.
STA reports a RED path exists for Thermal Shock.
CRS enters FRTS-1.
RO reports RCS pressure is > 300 psig. (420 adverse)
RO reports T-colds dropping.
PO ensures MS'10s and steam dumps are shut
RO reports RHR: not in service in shutdown cooling mode.
RO/PO verifies AFW flow >22E04 Ib/hr or SG level> 9%. and NR levels will be maintained 9( or 15% adverse )-33%
PO reports no uncontrolled depressurization of SGs.
RO reports PZR PORVs operating correctly for ReS pressure.
RO reports SI pumps in operation and RCS subcoolin!~ < 50 degrees.
RO reports all RCPs are stopped, and subcooling < 0 degrees.
RO reports cooldown has exceeded 100 degrees in one hour.

Page 21 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evalu3tor/lnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

CRS identifies one hour soak is required, and returns to LOCA-1.
CREW identifies containment ADVERSE c;ondi~ions exist when containment pressure reaches 4 psig.
PO identifies no faulted SGs .
PO adjust AFW flow to maintain SG NR levels 9%(15'%adverse)-33%.
PO identifies no ruptured SGs .
CRS reads CAS for Blackout Loading after SI reset actions.
CREW resets Safeguards Actuations:
Reset SI.
Reset Phase A Isolation.
Reset Phase B Isolation.
Open 21 & 22 CA330.
Resets B & C SECs.
Reset 230V Control Centers.

6. Loss of Off-Site Power

 ~-:---::-.--::---~.~.--~.--~-----

Simulator Operator: Insert RT:I after 230V Control Centers are reset, or at Lead Evaluator's discretion. MALF.: EL0134 Loss of All 500Kv OffsitePower i */il{;"'*k't;**~tt '>')'~fj.& Final Value~.True:i;)*

Crew recognizes the loss of off-site power.

Page 22 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected PlanUStudent Response Comments

CRS refers to Step 5 Continuous Action "IF Blackout occurs ... "
CREW performs actions of Table B of LOCA-1.

Note: IF 2A SEC was previously

RO verifies loading complete for deenergized, 2A EDG will continue Band C SECs and resets Band C supplying power to 2A vital bus SECs.

uninterrupted.

CRS directs restart of available Note: Loads should be started Safeguards loads:

sequentially and EDG loading checked. CRS may choose to not

22 SI Pumo; restart the RHR Pumps.
21/22 RHR Pump (if required)
21/22 CS Pump (if required)
22-25 CFCU slow speed
ECAC
Swgr room supply and exhaust fans.

Lead Evaluator terminate scenario when ECCS loads have been restarted. Page 23 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 V/' SCENARIO REFERENCES A. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards B. NUREG-1122, KIA Catalog for NPP Operators: PWR C. TQ-AA-1 04-3001, NRC ILT Examination Development and Administration D. Alarm Response Procedures (various) E. Technical Specifications F. Emergency Plan (ECG) G. JTA Listing H. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation I. S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion J. S2.0P-AB.SW-0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure K. S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay Leak L. S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality M. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection N. 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant O. 2-FRTS-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions Page 24 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 1 PLANT STATUS UNIT TWO TODAY* MODE 1 POWER 90% Res BORON 9'16 ppm MWE 1100 SHUTDOW1\ SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): NJA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS: Core Burnup is 6500 EFPH Control Bank 0 @199 steps Xenon burning (Jut at 3 pcm/hr. The Reactor fuel is conditioned to 100%. Reactivity plan for power increase at 2% / hr is to dilute 40 gal every 15 minutes for a total of 800 gal over 5 hours, while withdrawing rods as needed to maintain Tave on program. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATEITIME OF EXPIRATION: EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: Raise power to 100% lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Power reduced to 90% as a conservative action due to previous 21 SGFP speed control oscillation. Troubleshooting complete. Hope Creek and Salem 1 are at 100% power. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: Heating Steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress. CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: 23 SW pump is CIT for strainer work. All work on the strainer is complete, and the Maintenance Supervisor has just signed off the Tagging Request. Page 25 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Perrnission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY-FaR-TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load

2. Simulator is in RUN

3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON

4. All required computer terminals in operation

5. Simulator clocks synchronized

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented

7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date

8. Shift manning sheet available

9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced

11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

13. Required procedures clean

14. Multiple color procedure pens available

15. Required keys available

16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel

17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.

18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary

19. Exam security set for simulator

20. Ensure a current ReS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

21. Shift logs available if required

22. Recording Media available (if applicable)

23. Ensure ECG classification is correct

24. Reference verification performed with required documents available

25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.

Page 26 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...

degradation of any barrier to fission product release
degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
a violation of a safety limit
a violation of the facility license condition
incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuatior of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

Page 27 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 4 SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios. SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 08*01 NRC ESG-1 Rev. 0 REVIEWER: P Harsh Initials Qualitative Attributes PH 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PH 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PH 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PH 4. Each event description consists of:

the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
the expected operator actions (by shift position)
the event termination point PH 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

?H 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PH 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PH 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PH 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PH 10. The scenario has been validated. PH 11. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. Page 28 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 4 (Cent) SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios. Therefore, to complete this part of the review, the set of scenarios must be available. This page should be completed once per scenario set. The ranges listed for each scenario set represents a target and are not absolute limitations. Scenario sets that do not fit into the ranges listed should be further evaluated to ensure they are appropriate. Initial Qualitative Attributes GSG 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GSG 2 Malfunctions that occur after Eap entry: 1-2 GSG 3 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GSG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GSG 2 Eaps entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GSG 0 Eap Contingency Procedures requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GSG 4 Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: Page 29 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 ATTACHMENT 50 ESG CRITICAL TASKS 08-01 NRC ESG-1 Rev. 0 CT #1: (AB.RCP) Close 24CV104 3-5 minutes after tripping the RCP due to Seal Leakoff > 6 gpm. BASIS: Closing the Seal Leakoff Isolation Valve 24GV1 04 prevents unfiltered, high temperature RGS into the #2 RCP seal, which raises the probability of #2 seal failure. The 3 minute time frame is based on expected coastdown time of the RCP since a static condition is more favorable for the #2 seal to perform its backup function to the #1 seal. The 5 minute limitation minimizes RGS leakage from the damaged seal to maintain RGS inventory. Failure to isolate within 5 minutes raises the possibility of a #2 seal failure and subsequent LOGA. CT #2: (E-O.-J) Establish flow from at least one intermediate head EGGS pump prior to transition out of EOP-TRIP-1. BASIS: Failure to manually start at least one intermediate head ECGS pump under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECGS capacity." CT #3: (E*O**L) Manually start at least the minimum required number of SW pumps (one) in an ope:rating safeguards train to restore minimum FSAR analyses conditions prior to end of scenario. BASIS: Failure to manually start at least the minimum required of ESW pumps in an operating safeguards train represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to: Recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component Effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls. Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start at least the minimum required ESW pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a "violation of the facility license condition". CT#4 (E.1 ** C) Trip all RGPs so that GET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RGS stops. (RGS pressure < 1350 with EGCS flow) BASIS: Failure to trip the RGPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200'. Thus, failure to perform the task represents "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to the degradation of a barrier to fission product release. Page 30 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-1 ATIACHMENT6 ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION 08-01 NRC ESG-1 Rev. 0 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/I'! EYJ;NI Yir'! J;Y_ENI N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable Y Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss of CCW Y Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out

                                                                   --.~-

Y LOCA COMPONENTITRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y11':J QOIVIF:9NENTJ-~YSTEM, OR TRAIN YIN QQMEQNEN~"LsysIEMJ.. ORIBAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area Y Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OP~F~l~IQK.l\_GTION N Restore AC powE1r during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and Reps after loss of component cooling system N Re~align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG. Page 31 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: Charging Pump Cavitation, FRHS SCENARIO NUMBER: 08-01 NRC ESG-2 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates EXPECTED DURATION: 75 min REVISION NUMBER: o PROGRAM: L.O. REQUAL [ ] ] INITIAL LICENSE. DOTHER DSTA REVISION

SUMMARY

New Issue for NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 03-08-10 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: Q&~ ~f~ Salem Operations Tra.ining

                                                                         ~~
                                                                        ""> "G L, -- "'O\Q Date e.

APPROVED BY:

Facility R . presentative

                                                                            ~~O Date Page 1 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 OBJECTIVE(S): Objectives: A. Given the reactor operating at 100%, DIRECT actions to conduct a reactor shutdown to minimum load, in accordance with the approved station procedures. B. Given the unit in mode 1, the crew will perform a reactor shutdown from 100% power to 79% power lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004(q) C. Given a condition causing a console alarm, investigate the cause and take corrective action(s), lAW approved station procedufi9s. D. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of the Charging system. DIRECT corrective action for a Charging System malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. E. Given the order or indications of a charging system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the charging system in accordance with the approved station procedures. F. Given indication of a feedwater or condensate system malfunction, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. G. Given the order or indications of a feedwater or condensate system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given indication of a loss of secondary heat sink, DIRECT the response to the heat sink loss in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the order or indications of a loss of secondary heat sink, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss of heat sink in accordance with the approved station procedures. Page 2 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 II. MAJOR EVENTS: A. Lower Rx power. B. 21 CFCU Trips C. VCT Level Channel 2LT112 fails high D. 22 Charging Pump Cavitation E. 22 Condensate Pump Trips, Loss of SGFP suction pressure F. Main Turbine Fails to Trip, MSLI G. Loss of Heat Sink FRHS Page 3 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 III. SCENARIO

SUMMARY

A. The Crew will receive the watch at 100% power BOl. Pressurizer level Channel III is selected for control due to CH I indication problems. Rod control is in manual due to PT505 channel calibration in progress. 21 heater drain pump is O/S due to an oil leak. 22 CN pump has elevated vibrations. (1. B. The crew is directed to reduce power at 30% I hour to 79% in preparation for removing 22 eN pump from service. The crew will commence a down power lAW IOP-4. C. After the downpower is in progress 21 CFCU will trip. The crew will evaluate Tech Specs

 .c.            and start an additional CFCU.

D. After the Tech Specs are evaluated for the CFCU, 2LT-112 VCT level channell will fail L- high causing the 2CV35 to divert to the holdup tank and actual VCT level to lower. The crew will implement S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 and restore the 2CV35 flow to the VCT. E. After VCT level is stabilized, 22 Charging pump will begin to cavitate. The crew will re

     ~         enter S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, stop 22 Charging pump, send an NEO to vent 21 Charging pump, and start 21 Charging pump.

F. When 21 Charging pump is in service and PZR level is stabilized, 22 Condensate pump will trip. This will cause a low suction pressure condition on both operating SGFPs. The D crew Will bypass the polisher, and open 2CN47 to restore SGFP suction pressure. If action is not taken quickly to re-establish adequate suction pressure to the SGFPs, they will trip. If the SGFPs remain in service, 23 Condensate pump will trip - 3minutes after 22 CN pump tripped, and the SGFPs will trip on low slJction pressure. The CRS will order a manual RX trip lAW the CAS of AS.CN. G. When the RX trips the main turbine will fail to trip and the RO will initiate a Main Steam Line Isolation (MSLI) lAW the immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1. An automatic Safety Injection occurs on Hi Steam Flow. H. During the transient, 21 AFW pump will fail to start, 22 AFW pump discharge valves will fail to open and the 23 AFW pump will trip. The crew will perform the actions of EOP-TRIP-1, and transition to FRHS-1 based on no AFW flow and insufficient SG level. I. In FRHS the crew will establish Feed and Bleed of the RCS as required and establish a secondary heat sink by depressurizing a steam generator and feeding with a condensate pump. Page 4 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 "I INITIAL CONDITIONS:

                                                                             ~--~~~~~---

_ _ Initialize the simulator to IC-242, Blue Exam drive, 100% Power, BOl, equilibrium Xe, RCS Boron 1046 ppm. PREP FOR TRAINING (Le.computer setpoints, procedures, bezel covers) 1 RH1 and RH2 CIT 2 RH18s CIT 3 VC1 and VC4 CIT 4 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 5 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 6 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 7 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 8 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 9 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 10 23 Charging Pump CIT 11 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready.for.Training/Examination Checklist." Give copy of S2.IC-CC.RCP-0024, Exhibit 1 with turnover sheet (Last 2 pages of this _12 ESG) Page 5 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 EVENT TRIGGERS: Initial ET # ET-5 KB511AZP 22 AFW Pressure Override Defeat PB MALFUNCTION

SUMMARY

H/L AN0304 SER 304 FAILS - :A4 REACTOR 2.- NA NA NONE 2 2 PROTECT AN0027 SER 027 FAILS :A36 AMSAC

3. - NA NA NONE 2 2 BYPASSED AN0035 SER 035 FAILS - :A44 AMSAC 4.

    -       TESTORT                                    NA  NA       NONE          2      2 AN0154 SER 154 FAILS -:E5 SOURCE

5. - NA NA NONE 2 2 RANGE DE AN0170 SER 170 FAILS -:E21 SOURCE 6.- NA NA NONE 2 2 RANGE HI 7.- - RD0061 ROD SPEED PROGRAM FAILS NA NA NONE 8 8 VC0173A 21 CNTMT FAN COIL UNIT TRIP NA NA RT-1 FALSE TRUE 9.-- CN0117B 22 CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP NA NA RT-4 FALSE TRUE J. RP0069 MN TURBINE TRIP (INT VLV) FAIL NA NA NONE TRUE TRUE RP0073 MN TURB. TRIP FAILURES 11.- - NA NA NONE 4 4 (VARIOUS)

AF0183 23 AUX FW PUMP OVERSPEED 12.-- NA NA NONE TRUE TRUE TRIP AF0182B 22 AFP PRESSOVRD PROT FAILS NA NA NONE TRUE TRUE AN3520 AAS 520 FAILS-:21 AF PUMP 14.- NA NA NONE 1 1 LOSS 125 VL0469, 24BF40 FAILS TO POSITION (0 12

15. NA RT-10 0 100 100%) SEC CV0037 VCT LEVEL XMTR LT112 FAILS 16.- NA NA RT-2 36.7 100 H/L AF0181B 22 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 28 17.-- NA ET-5 FALSE TRUE TRIP SEC 3MIN 18.- . CN0117C 23 CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP 15 NA RT-4 FALSE TRUE SEC RP0279A AUTO MSLlS FAILS TO ACT 19.

    -     TRAIN A                                      NA NA        NONE       TRUE    TRUE RP0279B AUTO MSLlS FAILS TO ACT 20.
    -     TRAIN B                                      NA NA        NONE       TRUE    TRUE Page 6 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 REMOTE/FIELD FUNCTION

SUMMARY

0.81 0.81 CH I T~ANS PT-5 2.- CV62B 22 CHG PUMP SUCTION NA NA RT-3 0 .000045 VALVE 2CV49 3.- AF20D 21 AFW PUMP BKR CONTROL NA NA NONE OFF OFF POWER 4.- CT191-1O 21 CFCU BKR #1 HIGH NA NA RT-9 ON OFF SPEED 125VDC 5.- CT19' -2D 21 CFCU BKR #2 HIGH 14 SEC NA RT-9 ON OFF SPEED 125VDC

6. CT191-3D 21 CFCU BKR #1 LOW

  -                                       22 SEC     NA         RT-9         ON      OFF SPEED 125VDC 7.-     PHi5:) PZR HI LVL RX TRIP CH 1 NA      NA         NONE        TRIP     TRIP l.C459A BS 110 OVERRIDE

SUMMARY

OTHER CONDITIONS: None Page 7 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS A. State shift job assignments; B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet) C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift", O. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. E. Do not review objectives with crew. F. If required to terminate the scenario early, the instructor should evaluate if sufficient in':ormation has been gathered to evaluate the crew's performance. Typically this would be accomplished by completion of the scenario through the third event, however, this is not a requirement. The final decision remains with the instructor and evaluators. Page 8 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

1. Power Decrease to i'9%

CRS briefs crew on down power to 79% in preparation for stopping 22 CN pump, including reactivity plan, lAW S2.0P-10.zZ-0004.
RO commences a boration at rate directed by CRS reflecting reactivity plan.
PO initiates turbine load reduction to 79% at direction of the CRS at 30%

per hour at DEHC HMI Note: With Steamline Pressure

RO monitors primary plant parameters transmitter PT-505 O/S, the Terr and adjusts control rods in manual to recorder on 2RP4 will indicate off maintain Tavg on program.

scale high. RO must determine programmed Tavg via other procedures. (AS.CN, AS.ROD-3)

PO monitors Man Turbine and ensures proper response.

When the load reduction has progressed to the satisfaction of the lead evaluator then proceed to next event. Page 9 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

   ~. 21 CFCU Trip Jimulator Operator: Insert RT-1 an

RO reports flashing Stop bezel and direction from Lead Evaluator. trip of 21 CFCU.

MALF: VC0173A 21 CNTMT FAN i COIL UNIT TRIP _______---' Nate: CRS may direct load reduction

RO verifies normal containment placed an hold until CFCU issue is parameters complete.

Note: CRS may conservatively enter

CRS refers to S2.0P-SO.SW-0005 for TSAS 3.6.1.1 until the nature of the operability guidelines.

failure is known. If entered this TSAS can be exited when the 125VDC Control power is secured for 21 CFCU. Role Play: 3 minutes after being contacted, call control room as NEO and report that the overcurrent tab is extended for 21 CFCU high speed breaker #1. Simulator Operator: Insert RT-9 sequentially open 21 CFCU 125VDC toO

CRS dispatches an NEO to de energize 125V DC control power for I Control Power breakers if requested. all 21 CFCU breakers.
CRS enters TSAS 3.6.2.3 for 21 CFCU.

Note: CRS may determine that 3

CRS directs RO to start an alternate remaining CFCUs are adequate and CFCU to maintain containment direct RO to monitor containment parameters lAW S2.0P-SO.CBV parameters. 0001.
CRS directs load reduction re commenced (if placed on hold)

After the CRS has identified the TSAS, at the direction of the Lead evaluator proceed to the next event. Page 10 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

3. VCT Level Failure Simulator Operator: Insert RT-2 on

RO announces as unexpected VCT direction from Lead Evaluator Level Hi-Lo console alarm.

MALF CV0037 VCT LEVEL XMTR . L T112 FAILS H/L I Final Value: 100

               -----------------~

Note: CRS may direct the load

RO reports that LT-112 is failed high reduction be placed on hold. and 2CV35 has automatically diverted to HUT.
RO may place 2CV35 in the MAN FLOW TO VCT position with CRS concurrence prior to direction in S2.0P-AB.CVC-001.
PO refers to ARP and recommends entry into S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging.
RO monitors LT~114 indication on plant computer.
CRS enters AB.CVC-0001.
CRS directs PO to initiate CAS.
RO verifies a charging pump is in service and not cavitating.
RO reports no PZR level channel has failed.
RO reports 2LT-112 has failed high.
RO places 2CV35 in the MAN FLOW TO VCT position if not previously performec.
RO reports Letdown remains in service.
RO reports VeT level does not indicate a need to makeup, additionally, boron is being added during downpower.

Page 11 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

..Jroceed to next event on direction of

RO reports chargin;} pump flow is Lead Evaluator. normal.

4. 22 Charging Pump Cavitation Simulator Operator: Insert RT-3 on direction from Lead Evaluator REMOTE: CV62B 22 CHG PUMP SUCTION VALVE 2CV49 Value 0.000045

RO reports all Rep Seal Injection Lo Flow alarms are in.
RO reports charging flow is at zero, and 22 charging pump amps are oscillating.

Note: Flashing in the Letdown Line

CRS directs RO to stop 22 charging will occur if the charging pump is not pump.

stopped promptly. Letdown will automatically isolate when the charging pump is stopped. CRS may direct letdown isolation.

RO reports indications of flashing in the letdown line based on intermittent high pressure alarms and varying letdown flow if 22 charging pump is not stopped quickly enough.
CRS re-enters S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001.
CRS either proceeds through the steps to arrive at Step 3.18 or goes directly there based on Continuous Action Summary 2.0, if it is recognized quicker, and stops 22 charging pump.

Page 12 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluat::>rflnstructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Response Comments

RO reports letdown is isolated.
RO reports VCT level is adequate for charging pump operation.
RO reports 23 charging pump is CIT, and 21 charging pump is available.
CRS may direct the load reduction be placed on hold since no charging pumps are running to add boron to RCS.
CRS enters S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, based on no seal injection flow.

Role Play: 3 minutes after being

CRS dispatches an operator to vent 21 dispatched, call control room as NEO charging pump.

and state: "This is (operator name) I have a venting bottle and HP support, and will be venting 21 charging pump suction via 2CV356. Wait one minute. Call control room as NEO and state: This is (operator name). 21 charging pump venting is complete SAT. IF asked, state there was very little air before a solid stream issued from vent valve.

RO verifies all RCP seal inlet temperatures <225 degrees on 2CC1 or Plant Computer.
RO shuts 2CV55
RO starts 21 charging pump, and verifies proper amperage and flow indications.
RO opens 2CV55 to establish sufficient trend of flow to restore PZR level to program.

Page 13 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected PlantJStiJdent Response Comments

RO adjusts 2CV71 to establish 6-10 gpm seal injection to each RCP not to exceed 40 gpm total.
RO reports no control room indication Role Play: When contacted as NEO, of cavitation, and contacts local report that all indications for 21 operator to check for indication of charging pump are normal. cavitation.
PO restores letdown by:

                                            - Verifying 2CVi' is open.
                                            - Closing 2CV18 manually
                                            - Opening 2CV18 until closed indicating light extinguishes.
                                            - Opens 2CV2 and 2CV277.
                                            - Ensures charging flow is 85-90 gpm.
                                            - Simultaneously opens 75 gpm orifice valve while maintain letdown pressure -300 psig.

RO reports PZR level can be maintained stable or rising.
CRS enters TSft,S 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4, and 3.5.2 for boration flowpaths, charging pumps, and ECCS trains.
CRS dispatches an operator to open Note: If operators don't open control the control power breakers for 22 power to 22 charging pump, it will re charging pump 4KV breaker.

start later in scenario on SEC initiation. Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator. Page 14 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluatorll nstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

5. 22 and 23 Condensate Pump trips.

Simulator Operator: Insert RT:~ on

PO announces 22 condensate direction from Lead Evaluator. pump trip MALFS: CN0117B 22 CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP Final Value: TRUE CN0117C 23 CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP Delay: 3 min 15 seconds Final Value: TRUE

~~~--------~-.------

PO reports SGFP suction pressure Note: SGFP suction pressure may lowering, and each SGFP Cond not lower enough for 2CN47 to open, Suct Press Lo alarm if they or low suct press alarms to come in, annunciate.

based on how far the load reduction is performed.

CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CN-0001.
Crew monitors CAS
PO reports 22 condensate pump tripped.
PO opens 21-2.3CN108s based on SGFP suction pressure remaining

                                            <320 psig.

PO opens 2CN47 based on SGFP suction pressure remaining <320 psig.
PO shuts 21-24GB4 and 21 24G8184 based on 2CN47 being closed.
CRS identifies maximum power allowed for this pump configuration is 30%.

Note: 23 condensate pump trips 3

PO reports 23 condensate pump minutes and 15 seconds after 22 has tripped, and both SGFPs have condensate pump tripped. tripped on low suction pressure.
RO/PO trips tine reactor based on no operating SGFPs > 10% power.

Page 15 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 E valucitorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

6. Rx Trip, Main Turbine fails to trip Note: The Main Turbine fails to trip upon the Rx trip, and an automatic Safety Injection will occur -17 seconds after the Rx trip. An automatic rvSLI will be demanded in

-22 seconds following the Rx trip, but no auto MSLI will occur.
  ~~~~~~~~~---~:--------~~~~-~~~---

CT #1 (E-O-Q)

RO performs TRIP-1 Immediate Manually trip the main turbine actions from memory.

before a severe challenge -Confirms the Rx trip develops to either the -Trips the Main Turbine subcriticality or the integrity Identifies turbine did not trip from CSF or before transition to trip switches, and depresses LOSC-2. whichever comes Turbine Trip bezel pushbutton. first. Identifies turbine has not tripped, and initiates MSLI on Safeguards Train A or B. SAT_ _ UNSAT_ _ - Reports SI has automatically initiated

                                              - Reports all 4KV vital busses are energized.

CRS reads immediate action steps to RO and verifies performance.

Note: lE control power was not

RO makes pag,e announcement.

removed from 22 charging pump, ItlI;f';4 it will auto start on the SEC

CREW monitors TRIP-1 CAS signal. The 2C SEC will need to be blocked and reset, and 22 charging pump stopped.
PO reports SEC loading is not complete for energized vital busses.
PO reports 21 AFW pump is not running.
RO blocks 2A SEC.

Page 16 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 E lIalu2,torllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

PO resets 2A SEC.
PO depresses start pushbutton for 21 AFW pump and it does not start.

Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-5 is

PO reports no AFW flow is indicated, TRUE when 22 AFW pump Pressure 21 AFW pump is not running, 22 AFW Override PB is depressed. This will pump is running with no flow, and 23 trip 22AFW pump after a 28 second AFW pump is tripped.

delay.

CRS directs PO to defeat Pressure Override protection for 22 AFW pump
PO depresses Pressure Override Defeat, and reports AFW flow is indicated to 21 and 22 SGs.
PO reports 22 AFW pump has tripped.

Role Play: 3 minutes after being

CRS dispatches an operator to dispatched, report as NEO that the 21 investigate 21 AFW pump failure to AFW pump 4KV breaker looks cocked start.

in its cubicle.

CRS dispatch maintenance to assist in breaker malfunction investigation.

Simulator Operator: 3 minutes afterJ.

PO opens Main Generator output

~. being requested, insert REMOTE AF25D to OFF to remove control LE<:>~~r toJ1 AFW pump 4KV breake..!:. breakers. Page 17 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluatorll nstructor Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

PO reports Safeguards Valves are in their correct positions.
RO reports 21 and 22 CA330's are shut.
RO reports containment pressure, and that it is currently < 15 psig.
RO reports MSLI has been performed and a High steam Flow SI occurred.
CRS direct SM to implement ECG.
PO reports all 4KV vital busses are energized.
RO reports control room ventilation is in Accident Pressurized Mode, and runs the proper complement of switchgear ventilation.
RO reports :2 CCW pumps are running.
RO reports ECCS is not aligned for cold leg recirc, reports charging SI flow> 100 gpm, and RCS pressure>

1540 psig.

PO announces when 21-24MS10 begin opening to maintain SG pressure.
PO reports no AFW is indicated and SG NR levels are a/l <9%.
CRS transitions to FRHS-1.
PO reports no AFW flow is not due to operator action.
RO reports ReS pressure is > than all SG pressures, and RCS Thots are>

350 deg. F.

RO reports 21 charging pump is available.

Page 18 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Bleed and Feed steps begin on

CRS reads CAS for Bleed and Fed page 21. initiation. PO monitors SG WR levels and ~eports when 3/4 WR levels are Note: Depending on how quickly a <32%. CRS goes to Step 23 when MSLI was performed, the crew may conditions are met.

go to Bleed and Feed as soon as they encounter this CAS.

PO shuts 21-24GB4 and 21-24SS94 valves.

Role Play: 3 minutes after being

PO reports no AFW pumps are contacted as Maintenance, report running or can bf3 started, and CRS back to CRS that the 21 AFW pump dispatches operators/maintenance to 4kv breaker was racked in incorrectly, investigate.

and is jammed in its current position. Additional troubleshooting is continuing. Also report that there is a smell of burnt insulation in the area of 22 AFW pump 4kv breaker.

RO stops 211/ RCPs.

Role Play: 3 minutes after being

PO reports condensate system is in contacted, report that 23 AFW pump operation.

trip linkage is bent and it doesn't appear that the trip can be reset.

PO reports no SGFPs are available.
RO reports SI elctuated.
PO verifies SI valve alignment lAW APPX-3.
CREW resets Safeguards Actuations:

                                                 - Reset SI.

Reset Phase A Isolation. Reset Phase B Isolation. Open 21 & 22 CA330. Resets each SEC. Reset 230V Control Centers.

CRS picks SG with the lowest level for depressurization (24) that is not 21 or 23.
PO reports steam dumps are not available.
PO reports MSLI previously actuated.

Page 19 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

PO fully opens 24MS10.

I*

~
    .~-~~~~~---------~-                                    ~.-~

SimUla.to.r Operator: 3 minutes aft.er CRS dispatches an operator to open being dispatched, insert RT-10 to 24BF40. i open 24BF40, and repoli its status.

PO opens 24BF1:3
PO reports 24BF22 is released.
PO opens 21 and 22CN48 and shuts 21 and 22CN32.
CRS waits at step 20.5 until condensate flow is established to 24 SG.

CT#2A: (F'-H~1A) -----.~

PO reports indication of feedwater n Establish f.,eedwater flow into at least one SG before ReS bleed and feed is, required.

flow to 24 SG. SAT_ _ UNSAT_ _

  ***SeeCT Basis and explanation for

when this task is deemed c.;. . r. .;. iti,. .:.c-'-a_1_--'

Once feed flow is established, PO maintains 24 SG pressure <575 psig.

Terminate the scenario once CRS

IF Bleed and Feed have NOT been returns to procedure in effect IF Bleed initiated, THEN CRS returns to TRIP-1 and Feed has not been initiated OR Terminate scenario when crew identifies feed flow to 24 SG has turned 24 SG WR level IF Bleed and Feed has already been performed.

Page 20 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

RO stops or verifies all RCPs are BLEED AND FEED STEPS stopped.
RO initiates Safety Injection.
PO reports SI valves in safeguards positions.

      ~--~'-~~=-:----~---

CT#2B (FR-H.1 B)

RO reports 21 charging pump is Establish RCS Bleed and Feed running.

before PORVsopen automatically due to SG dryout and RCS

RO reports BIT flow is established.

pressure increase.

RO reports both PZR PORV stop SAT_._ UNSAT_ _ valves are open.
RO opens both PZR PORVs.
RO reports both PZR PORVs and Block Valves are open.

      ---------------------~

PO verifies SI valve alignment lAW APPX-3.
RO resets safe9uards if required

                                                - Reset SI.
                                                - Reset Phase A Isolation.
                                                - Reset Phase B Isolation.
                                                - Open 21 & 22 CA330.
                                                - Resets each SEC.
                                                - Reset 230V Control Centers.

Crew maintains ECCS flow and PORVs open.
RO reports containment pressure remains <15 psig, and no Containment Spray pumps are running.
Crew returns to or begins performing steps to establish feedwater flow with condensate system at step 20, or step they were performing when Bleed and Feed was established.

Terminate scenario when condensate flow has been established and WR level is rising in any SG IF Bleed and Feed section was performed and then condensate flow established. Page 21 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 VI. SCENARIO REFERENCES A. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards B. NUREG-1122, KIA Catalog for NPP Operators: PVVR C. TQ-AA.-104-300'I, NRC ILT Examination Development and Administration D. Alarm Response Procedures (various) E. Technical Specifications F. Emergency Plan (ECG) G. S2.0P-IO.zZ-0004, Power Operation H. S2.0P-AB.CVC.-0001, Loss of Charging I. S2.0P-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality J. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection K. 2-EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Page 22 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 1 PLANT STATUS UNIT TWO TODAY MODE: 1 POWER: 100% RCS BORON 1045 ppm MWE 1190 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSlEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): N/A REACTIVITY PARAMETERS: Core Burnup is 3200 EFPH Controi Bank D @227steps Reactivity plan for power decrease to 79% at 30% I hr is to borate at 10 gpm and maintain Tavg on program using manual rod control. The total amount of boron addition will be 320 gallons. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: 3.3.1.1.b Action 6 for PZR Level Channel I EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: Lower power to 79% lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation. S2.IC-CC.RCP-0024, 2PT*505 Turbine Steam Line Inlet Pressure Protection Channel 1, is in progress ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Power reduction to 79% is required to remove 22 CN pump from service to investigate high vibrations. PZR level CH "' selected for control due to CH I indication problems. Channel is removed from service. Rod control in manual due to a channel calibration on 2PT505. Hope Creek and Salem 1 are at 100% power. PRIMARY: 23 Charging pump is CIT for packing replacement. SECONDARY: Elevated vibrations on 22 CN pump. 12 hr shift tech monitoring 1xl4hrs. Maintenance recommends stopping pump for further investigation. 21 Heater Drain pump is OIS for an oil leak. Heating Steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress. CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: Page 23 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load

2. Simulator is in RUN

3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON

4. All required computer terminals in operation

5. Simulator clocks synchronized

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented

7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date

8. Shift manning sheet available

9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced

11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

13. Required procedures clean

14. Multiple color procedure pens available

15. Required keys available

16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel

17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart mcorders are on.

18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary

19. Exam security set for simulator

20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

21. Shift logs available if required

22. Recording Media available (if applicable)

23. Ensure ECG classification is correct

24. Reference verification performed with required documents available

25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.

Page 24 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of eTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...

degradation of any barrier to fission product release
degraded emergency core cooling system (ECeS) or emergency power capacity
a violation of a safety limit
a violation of the facility license condition
incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irrE~parably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of eTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

Page 25 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 4 SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios. SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 08-01 NRC ESG*2 Rev. 0 REVIEWER: P Harsh Initials Qualitative Attributes PH 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PH 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PH 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PH 4. Each event description consists of:

the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
the expected operator actions (by shift position)
the event termination point PH 5. No more tnan one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

PH 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PH 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PH 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PH 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PH 10. The scenario has been validated. PH 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. Page 26 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 4 (Cont) SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios. Therefore, to complete this part of the review, the set of scenarios must be available. This page should be completed once per scenario set. The ranges listed for each scenario set represents a target and are not absolute limitations. Scenario sets that do not fit into the ranges listed should be further evaluated to ensure they are appropriate. Initial Qualitative Attributes GG 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GG 2 Malfunctions that occur after Eap entry: 1-2 GG 3 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 GG 1 Eaps entered/requiring substantive actions: '1-2 GG 1 Eap Contingency Procedures requiring substantive actions: 0-2 -~-~--- GG 2 Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: -~---~----------~------~--~-~-------------------~~-------- Page 27 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS 08*01 NRC ESG*2 Rev. 0 CT #1 (E-O.Q) Manually trip the main turbine before a severe challenge develops to either the subcriticality or the integrity CSF or before transition to LOSC*2, whichever comes first. BASIS: Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally such an omission constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to "take an action ... that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. CT#2A: (FR-H.1A) Establish feedwater flow into at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required. BASIS: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the crew's having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishi::lg RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release. (Note: This critical task must be evaluated such that if the crew has the abiillY: to establish feed flow to any SG but does not do so it is Unsat. For example, if the crew fails to establish feed flow due to incorrect procedure usage, improper transition, or overly long delay in implementing the correct FRP, this would constitute Unsat performance. ) OR CT#2B (FR.H.1 B) Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before PORVs open automatically due to SG dryout and RCS pressure increase. BASIS: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Page 28 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 ESG- PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION 08-01 NRC ESG-2 Rev. 0 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YiN E\LENI )1t-.{ EVENT N TR.J~NSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water

                                                                 --~-

N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss ofCCW

                                                                 --~-.

N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENTITRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/f\J .c.QMPONEI\lIl..SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/t-.{ COMPQNr;J~J~J§TEM! Q8..IBt-IN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SSO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/r:! QEE86IQB_6C_TLQt-.{ N Restore AC power during SSO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and Reps after loss of component coo!i!1g system N Re-allgn RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cool down the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS Y Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG. Page 29 of 31 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 S2.IC-CC.RCP-0024(Q) EXHIBIT 1 OPERATIONS INFORMATION SHEET Procedure

Title:

2PT-SOS Turbine Steam Line Inlet Pressure Protection Channell Performer Name: Date: A Reactor Trip signal will be initiated when the bistable test switches in Step 5.12 are placed in the test (up) position, if any of the following Status Panel lights are on:

         +     REACTOR TRIPS,       FLOW LOOP,                              2/3 in 2/4 loops
         +     REACTOR TRIPS,       UNDER FREQ Rep BUSES,                   1/2 taken twice
         +     REACTOR TRIPS,       PZR. HIGH WTR. LEVEL,                   2/3
         +     REACTOR TRIPS,       PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE,               2/3
         +     REACTOR TRIPS,       UNDERVOLTAGE RCP BUSES,                 1/2 taken twice
         +     REACTOR TRIPS,       RCP BREAKER OPEN,                              2/4 A Main Steam Isolation signal will be initiated when the bistable test switches in Step 5.1S are placed in the test (up) position, if any of the following Status Panel lights are on:
         +    SAFETY INJECTION, LOW LOW T AVG '                                    2/4
         +    SAFETY INJECTION, LOW STEAM LINE PRESSURE,                           2/4 Remarks

The Advanced Digital Feedwater Control System (ADFCS) utilizes median signat select. During performance of this procedure, this channel is left in scan on ADFCS. If deviation in channels of this loop exceed 4%, then actions should be considered to avoid steam generator level perturbations or ADFCS automatic swap to manual.

Required Lineups

MAIN STEAM SYSTEM, STEAM DUMP CONTROLS. CONTROL MODE, MS PRESS CONTROL selected
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM, ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH, NOT in AUTO Salem 2 Page 42 of 43 Rev. 32 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific; Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-2 S2.lC-CC.RCP-0024{Q) EXHIBIT 1 (Continued) Procedure

Title:

2PT-505 Turbine Steam Line Inlet Pressure Protection Channell Annunciators

RX PROT CH I ON TEST (A-4)
SR DET VOLT TRBL (E-5)
SR HI FLUX AT SID BLOCKED (E-21)
AMSAC BYPASSED (A-36)

       +   AMSAC TEST OR TRBL (A-44)

ADFCS TROUBLE (G-15)

Control Console Alarms

REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURES. AVERAGE TEMPERATURES, ALARMS, RC TAVG-TREF DEVIATION
21 STEAM GENERATOR, ALARMS, LEVEL 8, STEAM. FLOW HI
22 STEAM GENERATOR, ALARMS, LEVEL 8, STEAM. FLOW HI
23 STEAM GENERATOR. ALARMS. LEVEL 8. STEAM. FLOW HI
24 STEAM GENERATOR. ALARMS. LEVEL ~~ STEAM. FLOW HI Status Panel Lights

     +    REACTOR TRIPS. TURBINE POWER. STEAM LINE INLET Press, ABOVE P-7, CHI

REACTOR TRIPS. TURBINE POWER. STEAM LINE INLET Press. BELOW P-2
SAFETY INJECTION. HIGH STEAM LINE FLOW. LOOP 1, CH I
SAFETY INJECTION. HIGH STEAM LINE FLOW. LOOP 2. CH I
SAFETY INJECTION. HIGH STEAM LINE FLOW. LOOP 3. CH I
SAFETY INJECTION. HIGH STEAM LINE FLOW, lOOP 4, CH I Salem 2 Page 43 of 43 Rev. 32 l-"age;;l or ;;1 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific: Permission from Nuclear Training

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE

.:iCENARIO TITLE:                    Raise Power, AB.PZR**0001 and FRSM-1 SCENARIO NUMBER:                     08-01 NRC ESG-3 EFFECTIVE DATE:                      See Approval Dates EXPECTED DURATION:                   75 min REVISION NUMBER:                     o PROGRAM:                            o       L.O. REQUAL

[KJ INITIAL LICENSE o OTHER DSTA REVISION

SUMMARY

New Issue for NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 3-15-10 Lead egulatory Exam Author Date i~ APPROVED BY: 5a:0:42 , \ ' eJ~, f\ 9 3... z<V-'20\O Date APPROVED BY: Facility I¥presentative

d~GDate Page 1 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 I. OBJECTIVE(S): Enabling Objectives: A. Given the unit at 5% power, raise reactor power, in accordance with the approved station procedures. B. Given indication of a pressurizer control system malfunction, DIRECT the response to the malfunction, in accordance with the approved station procedures. C. Given the order or indications of a pressurizer control system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction, in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given a condition causing a console alarm, investi!~ate the cause and take CJrrective action(s), lAW approved station procedures. E. Given the order or indications of a loss of vacuum, DIRECT the response to the malfunction, lAW approved station procedures. F. Given the order or indications of a loss of vacuum, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction, lAW approved station procedures. G. Given indication of an anticipated transient without trip (ATWT), DIRECT the immediate response to the A TWT, in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given the order or indications of an anticipated transient without trip (ATWT), complete actions as the nuclear control operator to PERFORM the immediate response to the A TWT, in accordance with the approved station procedures.

    /. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip iI1 accordance with the approved station procedures.

J. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. Page 2 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 II. MAJOR EVENTS: A. Raise Rx power. B. Pressurizer Pressure Channel I Fails High C. 23 Accumulator Low Pressure D. Loss of Condenser Vacuum E. ATWT I FRSM F. Reactor Trip Response with a Failed Open PORV III. SCENARIO

SUMMARY

A. The crew will receive the unit at -5% power with the direction to raise power to 18% to place fL. the turbine on-line. No major equipment will be CITed. B. Once the crew has taken the watch they will raise power lAW S2.0P-IO.zZ-0003. C. During the power ascension, Channel I Pressurizer Pressure will fail high. The crew will enter .,. AB.PZR-0001, swap controlling channels, remove the channel from service, and enter the G-appropriate Tech Spec. D. Once the channels are swapped, 23 ECCS Accumulator relief will lift briefly and slightly 1" depressurize the Accumulator. The crew will enter the appropriate Tech Spec. The crew will c. re-pressurize the Accumulator lAW S2.0P-SO.SJ-0002 to restore it above technical specifications, and exit the Tech Spec. E. Once the accumulator is re-pressurized, a rapid less of condenser vacuum will occur, and both SGFPs will trip. The crew will manually initiate a reactor trip. Yv/ F. Once the reactor operator initiates the manual reactor trip, they will determine the reactor has failed to trip and \nitiate actions to trip the reactor with all available methods from the control room. Additionally, all rods will fail to insert, both manually and automatically. G. The crew will transition to FRSM-1. During the response in FRSM-1, the reactor operator will c... report that the rapid borate stop valve 2CV175 will not open, the crew will use the alternate flowpath to initiate the rapid boration. H. Once the crew has completed EOP-FRSM-1, they will transition to EOP-TRIP-1 to validate no need for an SI and then transition to EOP-TRIP-2. I. During the actions of EOP-TRIP-2, PZR PORV 2PR2 will fail open. The reactor operator will manually close 2PR7 to isolate the failed PORV. J. The scenario will terminate once EOP-TRIP-2 is complete. Page 3 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 INITIAL CONDITIONS: _ _ Initialize the simulator to IC-243, Blue Exam drive, 4.5% Power, BOL, equilibrium Xe, RCS Boron 1652 ppm. PREP FOR TRAINING (Le. computer setpoints, procedures, bezel covers) IniUal 1 RH 1 and RH2 Cn 2 RH18s CIT 3 VC1and VC4 CIT 4 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 5 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 6 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 7 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 8 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 9 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 10 INFO Bezel on 2PR1 11 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." 12 IOP-3 out and marked up through 5.4.15. Page 4 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 EVENT TRIGGERS: fial Handle, inserts RD005? 6 GA205BPL<0.848 Command DMF SJ0180C Accumulator Low level Alarm

==~

MALFUNCTION

SUMMARY

FAILS H/L RT-1 2235 2500 S"0180C 23 SI ACCUMULATOR GAS 2.

    -         LEAK                                        NA      NA    RT-2           0                5 CN0086 LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER

3. - NA 1:00 RT-3 0 50 VACUUM V~0298 2PR2 Fails to Position

4. NA :30 RT-4 0 100

    -          ( 0-100% )

RP0058 FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC RX 5.- NA NA NA NA NA TRIP RPOOS9A FAILURE OF MANUAL RX

6. - TRIP NA NA NA NA NA RPOOS9B FAILURE OF MANUAL SI/RX 7.

    -        TRIP                                         NA      NA     NA           NA               NA VL0095 2CV175 Fails to Position ( 0 8.
    -        100%                                         NA      NA     NA            0                0 RD0057 ALL RODS FAIL TO MOVE 9.
   -         (AUTO/MAN)                                   NA      NA    ET-5          NA               NA VL0115 21AR65 FAILS TO POSITION 0
     -       (0-100%)                                    2:00    2:00   RT-3           0               100 BF0105A 21 STM GEN FEED PUMP 11           TRIP                                        2:15     NA    RT-3           0                3 BF0105B 22 STM GEN FEED PUMP 12
    -        TRIP                                        2:18     NA    RT-3           0                3 REMOTE/FIELD FUNCTION

SUMMARY

NONE I/O OVERRIDE

SUMMARY

I De~criptjon

                                                              ,                         Initial Val !  Final Val Jnitiaf                                                I Dela~   ~~      Remote/Event B441 OVDI REACTOR TRIP BREAKER

1. NA NA NA OFF OFF

    -       'B'-TRIP B440 OVDI REACTOR TRIP BREAKER

2. NA NA NA OFF OFF

            'A'-TRIP C510 OVDI 2G6D PRESSURE

3. NA NA NA OFF OFF

    -       HEATER BUS 480V C310 OVDI 2E6D PRESSURE

4. NA NA NA OFF OFF

    -       HEATER BUS 480V 2PR6 shut with power applied Page 5 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS A. State shift job assignments: B. Hold a shift briefing. detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet) C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready te assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. E. Do not review objectives with crew. F. If required to terminate the scenario early, the instructor should evaluate if sufficient information has been gathered to evaluate the crew's performance. Typically this would be accomplished by completion of the scenario through the third event, however, this is not a requirement. The final decision remains with the instructor and evaluators. Page 6 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

1. Power Increase to 18%

CRS briefs crew on continuing power ascension IP.W S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, including expectations for rod withdrawal, and monitoring expected plant response.
CRS directs RO and PO to coordinate power ascension by withdrawing control rods and adjusting Main Steam Dumps to raise power to 18% over 30 minutes.
RO withdrawals rods in a slow deliberate manner, while closely monitoring plant parameters.
RO monitors reactor power, rod position and Tavg.
RO announces when MODE 1 is entered at 5% power.

Note: PO may place Main steam

PO verifies Main Steam Dumps are in Dumps in Manual to make setpoint MS Pressure Control- Auto.

adjustments, then return dumps to auto.

PO reports all :21-24 MS10s are in auto at 1010-1020 psig.
RO announces Tave-Tref deviation.

Crew determines the alarm is valid based on Tref input being Main Steamline Turbine Inlet Pressure PT 505, which is at no load with the Turbine off-line:.

PO verifies steam dumps are responding to the increase in Tavg, and adjusts dumps to maintain Tavg on program.
PO verifies MFW is responding to increase in steam flow.
RO/PO continue to slowly raise power to 18%.

Page 7 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Pla.nt/Student Response Comments

RO announces when power is above P-10 by 2RP4 indication.
RO blocks low power trips on IR and PR using block pLlshbuttons on the control console and verifying block indications.

Proceed to next event after power is well above P-10 (10%) at direction of lead evaluator. Power shouid be as high as possible prior to initiating the loss of vacuum to prevent crew from lowering power < 10% prior to the SGFP trip. Page 8 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nucfear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

2. Pressurizer Pressure Channell Controlling Channel Fails High Simulator Operator: Insert RT-10n

RO announces OHA E-42 2PR 1 1/2 direction from Lead Evaluator TRIP, and recognizes RCS pressure lowering.

MALF: PR0016A PZR PRESS CH I (PT455) FAILS H/L I Final Value: 2.:::..50:;..:0"---'--_______--'

CREW determines that Channel I Pressurizer Pressure is failed high and RO takes manual control of the Master Pressure Controller.
CRS enters S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001.
CRS direct PO to initiate CAS.
RO reports POPS not in service and PZR Pressure Channel I Controlling Channel is failed high.
CRS directs RO to control RCS pressure with manual control of Master Pressure Controller
RO swaps controlling channel to Channel III, and returns Master Pressure Controller to auto.
CRS directs PO to review S2.0P SO.RPS-0003 to remove failed channel from service.
CREW identifies the following Tech Specs: 3.2.5 (DNB), 3.3.1.1 Action 6, 3.3.2.1 Action b 19, and 3.4.5.b.

Power must be removed from PR6 within 1 hour.

CRS holds crew brief to discuss priorities and actions going forward.

Page 9 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 !\IRC ESG-3 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Note: This is a one hour requirement.

CRS directs an operator to remove Do not wait for this action to be control power from 2PR6 performed.

Simulator Operator: lE requested to remove power from 2PR6, THEN after 3 minutes insert REMOTE: PR34D Final Condition TAGGED. Proceed to next event once crew has determined Technical Specification requirements or at lead evaluators discretion. Page 10 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

1. 23 ECCS Accumulator Low Pressure

                      .---~-----.

Simulator Operator: Insert RT*2 on

PO reports 2~1 Accumulator Hi-Lo direction from Lead Evaluator Pressure Alarm, and identifies pressure is low.

MALF: SJ0180C 23 51 ACCUMULATOR GAS LEAK Final Value: 5 Verify ET*6 :s TRUE when Accumulator Low Pressure alarm annunciates, which deletes SJ0180C.

PO refers to Alarm Response Procedure S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0011.
CRS enters TSAS 3.5.1 Action a.

The crew may discuss why pressure

CRS directs PO to re-pressurize 23 dropped and if re-pressurizing Accumulator lAW S2.0P-SO.SJ-0002.

accumulator is the prudent course of action since there is no apparent reason why it lowered so quickly. If crew does not take action to re pressurize 23 accumulator, proceed to next event once crew has entered the Technical Specification for 23 Accumulator.

PO re-pressurizes 23 Accumulator as directed by:

1. Opening 2NT32

2. Opening 23SJ93

3. Closing 23SJ93 once pressure rises to desired pressure

4. Closes 2NT32

CRS exits TSAS 3.5.1 Action a when pressure is restored.

Proceed to next event once crew has determined a course of action for 23 Accumulator at Lead Evaluators direction. Page 11 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

4. Rapid Loss of Condenser Vacuum Simulator Operator: Enter RT*3 on direction from Lead Evaluator.

MALFS: CN0086 LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM Final Value: 100 Ramp: 1 minute VL0115 21AR25 Fails to position (o 100%) 2 minute delay 2 minute ramp BF0105A 21 Stm Gen Feed Pump Trip Final Value: 3 2 minute 15 second delay BF0105B 22 Stm Gen Feed Pump Trip Final Value: 3 2 minute 18 second delay I

RO reports Condensate DO alarm as unexpected.
PO informs CRS that condenser backpressure is rising.
CRS enters S2.0P-AB.COND-0001.
PO initiates CAS of AB.COND-0001
PO starts all available vacuum pumps.

After the 2 minute delay, the loss of

CRS may direct a power reduction to vacuum occurs quickly, and the CRS lower steam demand anticipating a may not have time to order a power loss of the Main Steam Dumps.

reduction.

PO reports that both SGFPs have tripped.
CRS directs PO to trip the reactor.

Page 12 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Stlldent Response Comments Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-5

RO attempts to trip the Rx with either is TRUE when the LEFT Rx Trip Rx Trip Handle and reports that the handle is taken to trip. This inserts Rx did not trip. and Crew identifies the rod control malfunction which ATWT.

prevents rod movement.

RO attempts to trip the Rx with the other Rx Trip Handle and reports that the Rx did not trip.
RO attempts to open Rx Trip Breakers and announces they did not open.
RO attempts to open PZR Heater Bus infeed breakers to deenergize RDMG sets, and reports they do not open.
RO reports the turbine is tripped and manually attemp',s to insert control rods.
RO reports rod control urgent failure with no way to manually or automatically insert rods.
CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1 and transitions to FF!SM-1 .
CREW dispatches an NEO to locally open RTBs.
PO starts or verifies running 21 and 22 AFW pumps, and reports AFW flow is >44E4 Ibm/hr.
RO starts 21 and 22 Charging Pumps, and repor.:s SI is NOT initiated.
PO throtti<3s AFW as needed to maintain SG levels 9-33% while maintaining >44E4 Ibm/hr.
RO verifies SI not actuated Page 13 of 25 PSEG Restrlcted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

RO starts both BAT pumps in fast speed.
RO attempts to open 2CV175.
RO reports 2CV1 i'5 will not open.
CRS directs alignment via alternate path.
RO closed letdown valves2CV2, 2CV277, 2CV3, 2CV4, 2CV5 and 2CV7.
RO opens 2SJ1, 2SJ2, 2SJ 4, 2SJ5, 2SJ 12, and 2SJ 13 to align RWST to charging flowpath.
RO closes 2CV40, 2CV41 , 2CV68 and 2CV69.
RO reports rapiC! boration aligned.

r=::--~--~-----. -----, CT #1 (FR-S.1-C) Insert negative I reactivity into to the core using the following method prior to completing step 4 of FRSM-1:

       *. Initiate Emergency Boration SAT              UNSAT

RO reports that 2PR6 is closed to isolate a leaking 2PR 1.
CRS direct valve to remain closed.

Simulator Operator: Open the

RO verifies 2VC5 and 6 are closed reactor trip breakers 3 minutes after the order is given but no sooner than completion of the Rapid Boration initiation in FRSM-1.

DeleteMALFs: RP0058, RP0059A, and RP0059B. ModifyJ/().()ve(ridesB440 .*and. ~44-t

to.ON** o*pens.RTBs}; t:'c,*. . '**. . **l(.fJ;:\~r:

Page 14 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

RO verifies Reactor Trip Breakers are open.
PO verifies turbine; tripped.
PO reports status of AFW and SG levels.
PO verifies RCS temperature is not lowering in an uncontrolled manner.
PO determines no SG is faulted.
RO verifies no CETs are greater than 1200°F.
RO verifies power range less than 5%

and IR SUR is negative.

CRS directs chemistry to perform an RCS boron sample.
CRS returns to EOP-TRIP-1.
CREW re-verifi~s immediate actions of TRIP-1.
CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-2.
RO announces reactor trip twice on station PA.
Upon transition to EOP-TRIP-2 CRS reminds crew that CFSTs are in effect and for crew to monitor CASso
CRS conducts a brief with the crew and discusses plant status.
PO stops 21 and 22 SGFP's and lowers 23 AFW pump speed to minimum.
CREW verifies ReS temperature is being controlled at 547°F Page 15 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 EvaluatClrllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStlJdent Response Comments

PO verifies 21-24BF19s and 40s are closed and closed 21-24FB22.
RO verifies all rods are inserted.
RO determines pressurizer level is controlling at 17%;. and charging flow in service.

Note: When asked, report there is no

CRS verifies no fire on Unit 1.

fire on Unit 1.

CREW verifIes Pressurizer pressure is responding normally.
PO determines all group busses are energized.

Simulator Operator: Once crew has

RO reports loss of closed limit on transitioned to step 15 then insert 2PR2 and valve is apparently open BT-4.

since RCS pressure is lowering. MALF: VL0298 2PR2 FAILS TO POSITION (0-100%) I Final Value: 100 LBamp: 30 seconds

RO attempts to shut 2PR2 in Manual, and reports it will not shut.
CRS directs 2PR7 closed to isolate 2PR2.

I CT #2 (E-O-M) Close the block MOV

RO closes 2PR7 and informs CRS upstream of the stuck-open PZR that valve is closed and no PORVs PORV prior to initiation of automatic are available to control RCS pressure.

Safety Injection. SAT UNSAT_ _

PO reports thelt 2E6D is closed and power is available to the pressurizer heaters.
PO verifies all secondary equipment is shutdown.

Page 16 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlanUStudent Response Comm ents

PO trips 23AFW Pump since it is not required to maintain SG levels.
RO verifies RCPs are in service providing forced flow.
RO verifies SR Elnergized.
RO verifies RCS parameters stable.

Terminate scenario when transition

CRS transitions to S2.0P -IO.zZ -0006 to lOP is made or 8.

Page 17 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Traini ng

08-01 NRC ESG-3 VI. SCENARIO REFERENCES A. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards B. NUREG-1122, KIA Catalog for NPP Operators: PWR C. TQ**M-1 04-3001, NRC ILT Examination Development and Administration D. Alarm Response Procedures (various) E. Technical Specifications F. Emergency Plan (ECG) G. S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load H. S2.0P-IO.zZ-0004, Power Operation I. S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction J. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection K. 2-EOP-FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation L. 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response Page 18 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 ATTACHMENT 11 PLANT STATUS UNIT TWO TODAY MODE: 2 POWER: 4.5% RCS BORON 1652 MWE 0 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): N/A REACTIVITY PARAMETERS: Control Bank D is at 153 steps Reac;:ivity plan for power increase to 18% in 30 minutes using rods only, in conjunction with Main Steam Dumps. Core is Xenon Free. Rx Engineering provides the following reactivity parameters:

       - Power Defect - 18 pcml % power
       - Differential Rod Worth - 5.3 pcm I step
       - Core Burnup - 1,000 EFPH MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.4.5.a 2PR1 isolated with 2PR6 shut with power available, 2PR1 leaks by EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, HSB to Minimum Load is complete up to Step 5.4.15 Continue Power Ascension by raising power to 18% lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003. An extra NCO has been assigned to perform Turbine Startup activities lAW S2.0P-SO.TRB 0001, Turbine Generator Startup Operations. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Main steam Dumps are in MS Pressure Control -Auto Unit is returning to service after a short outage. Hope Creek and Salem 1 are at 100% power. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: Heating Steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress. CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: Page 19 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. Verify simulator is in 'TRAIN" Load

2. Simulator is in RUN

3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON

4. All required computer terminals in operation

5. Simulator clocks synchronized

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented

7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date

8. Shift manning sheet available

9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced

11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

13. Required procedures clean

14. Multiple Golor procedure pens available

15. Required keys available

16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel

17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.

18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary

19. Exam security set for simulator

20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

21. Shift logs available if required

22. Recording Media available (if applicable)

23. Ensure ECG classification is correct

24. Reference verification performed with required documents available

25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.

Page 20 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY

,n reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...

degradation of any barrier to fission product release
degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
a violation of a safety limit
a violation of the facility license condition
incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby liquid Control, or manua!ly insert control rods)
a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actua1ion.

Page 21 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 ATTACHMENT 4 SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios. SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 08-01 NRC ESG-3 Rev. 0 REVIEWER: P Harsh Initials Qualitative Attributes PH 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PH 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PH 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. PH 4. Each event description consists of:

the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
the expected operator actions (by shift position)
the event termination point PH 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

?H 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PH 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commer,surate with the scenario objectives. PH 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PH 9. Ali crew competencies can be evaluated. PH 10. The scenario has been validated. PH 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. Page 22 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 ATTACHMENT 4 (Cont) SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios. Therefore, to complete this part of the review, the set of scenarios must be available. This page should be completed once per scenario set. The ranges listed for each scenario set represents a target and are not absolute limitations. Scenario sets that do not fit into the ranges listed should be further evaluated to ensure they are appropriate. Initial Qualitative Attributes GSG 6 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GSG 2 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 GSG 2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GSG 1 Major Transients: 1-2 -~-- GSG 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GSG 1 EOP Contingency Procedures requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GSG 2 Critical Tasks: 2-3 ~-~ COMMENTS: Page 23 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS 08-01 NRC ESG-1 Rev. 0 CT #1: (FR-S.1-C) Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods prior to completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (FRSM) BASIS: Failure to insert negative reactivity under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of this critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Since Salem employs flow charts vice the standard Westinghouse two-column format, there are no immediate actions associated with FRSM. The immediate actions of FRSM are contained in step:2 of EOP-TRIP-1 and steps 1-4 of FRSM. Thus the time limit of this critical task is extended to step 4 of FRSM to maintain alignment. CT #2: (E-O--M) Close the block MOV upstream of the stuck-open PZR PORV prior to actuation of automatic Safety injection BASIS: The ReS fission-product barrier can be restored to full integrity simply by closing the block valve. Therefore, failure to close the MOV represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety." Page 24 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-3 ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION 08-01 NRC ESG-3 Rev. 0 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE

tit::! EVf.NT Yib! ~\lf.lli N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss ofCCW

                                                                   ---~

N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out y LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Yib! .cQME.O~ENI~"ySTEM, OR TRAIN :tiN .QQ_MPONENT~YST~M, ORTRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump

                                                                   ---o-N       CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves               N  SSO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DA.MAGE YLf'J. OPERATOR ACTION N       Restore AC power during SSO N       Connect to gas turbine N       Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N       Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N       Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N       Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N      Cool down the ReS and depressurize the system N      Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s)

N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG. Page 25 of 25 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE: Steam Leak, Faulted/Ruptured SG SCENARIO NUMBER: 08-01 NRC ESG-4 (Spa.re) EFFECTIVE DATE: Effective on final aDproval date below EXPECTED DURATION: 60 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 03 PROGRAM: '-----' LO. REQUAL X I INITIAL LICENSE

                                     '---_---1 OTHER REVISION

SUMMARY

Rev. 03- 03/17110 Updated format and expanded expected actions.(last used 2002) Modified initial conditions from 100% to 67% with one GV already failed shut because SO.TRB-1 now only requires power reduction to ..::75% for one GV being shut. Modified initial conditions to include 2PS1 leaking and isolated, and 2PR1 leaking and isolated. Modified Rx trip failure to include only Automatic Rx trip. This will keep CT#1 valid. Swapped N I channel failure with PZR level channel failure. PREPARED BY: G Gauding 03-17-10 Lead R~ry ~mtAuthor (DATE) APPROVED BY: '\ s a l e m o p vg r'~*\ (DATE) 1'\

                                                                                       'j, 2.\0- I:':GD\
                                                                                             *        '" )-,
                                                                                                          \i APPROVED BY:
                                 ~.

Faci Ity Representative (DATE) J/zJ~O PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-(n NRC ESG-4 I. OBJECTIVES ENABLING OBJECTIVES A. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, lAW approved station procedures. B. Given a failure of a power range detector, take corrective action for a power range instrument failure lAW AB.NIS-0001. C. Given an NIS malfunction or loss, the crew will remove the failed channel from service lAW ap;:>roved station procedures. D. Given the order to rapidly reduce load, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction, lAW the approved station procedures. E. Given indication or order to rapidly reduce loael, DIRECT the response to the malfunction, lAW the approved station procedures. F. Given indications of a main turbine or generator malfunction, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. G. Given the order or indications of a main turbine or £jenerator malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given the indication of excessive steam flow, DIRECT the response to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given the indication of excessive steam flow, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given the order or indications of a loss of secondalY coolant, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the coolant loss, !AW the approved station procedures. K. Given indication of a loss of secondary coolant, DIRECT the response to the loss of secondary c:)olant, lAW the approved station proc,:;dures. L. Given the order or indications of a loss of sec:::mdary coolant, perform actions as the shift technical advisor to RESPOND to the loss of secondary coolant lAW the approved station procedures. M. Given indication of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), DIRECT the response to the SGTR in accordance with approved station procedures. N. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube rupture in accordance with approved station procedures. O. Given the reactor coolant system (RCS) subcooled with the immediate response to a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) with loss of coolant accident (LOCA) completed, DIRECT a subcooled recovery in accordance with approved station procedures. P. Given the order with the reactor coolant system (HCS) subcooled and the immediate response tc a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) with loss of coolant accident (LOCA) completed, carry out actions as the nuclear control operator to PERFORM a subcooled recovery in accordance with approved station procedures. Page 2 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 II. MAJOR EVENTS A. Controlling PZR Level Channel fails high B. (2 fd )Turbine Governor Valve Fails Closed C. Unisolable Main Steam Line Leak Outside Containment D. Faulted/Ruptured SG III. SCENARIO

SUMMARY

A. The crew will take the turnover at approximately 67% power, BOL. 21 MS29 Main Turbine Governor Valve is shut, it failed shut one hour ago. Load was reduced to meet the P&L requirement of SO.TRB-1 which requires power~. 75%. 2PS1 is leaking and its manual isolation valve is shut. 2PR1 is leaking and its block valve is shut with power applied. The crew will be directed to maintain current unit conditions.

    ,{     B. Shortly after the crew takes the watch PZR Level Channel I fails high. The crew will place Master G

Flow Controller in manual. and swap control to Channell" lAW S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001. C. After the crew completes removing the failed channel from service and the Tech Spec call is made, a (2 nd ) turbine governor valve (23MS29) fails closed due to workers bumping a panel in the (L HP turbine housing. The limitations of S2.0P-SO.TRB-0001 will be implemented to reduce load to v 2:30% at 5%/minute. The crew will reduce load lAW S2.AB.LOAD-0001 at 5% / minute while controlling reactivity and primary plant parameters in ,m effective manner. C. A main steam leak downstream of the MSIVs develops while the power reduction is in progress. The crew should enter AB.STM-1. The steam leak prcgresses, eventually requiring the CRS to order a MANUAL reactor trip and MSLI. 22MS167 will not close and remains open throughout the rest of the scenario. 2H Group Bus de-energizes when the main generator output breakers open. D. The steam leak continues through 22MS167 resulting in an AUTO SI on steamline delta P. The crew will implement TRIP-1 and transition to LOSC-1. At the completion of LOSC-1 the crew will transition to LOCA-1. When 22SG has depressLirizec. and LOCA-1 is in progress, a SGTR will be introduced. The CRS should transition to SGTR-1 whi3n continuous action step criteria are met. The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario after the crew enters SGTR-1. The scenario should not be continued beyond the transition to SGTR-3. Page 3 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 [IV. INITIAL CONDITION-S--~-~-------- ~ _ Initialize simulator to IC-244, Blue Exam Drive, 67% Power, BOL, downpower recently completed, Xe building in at 80 pcm/hr, RCS Boron 1095 ppm. FOR TRAINING (i.e. computer setpoints, procedures; bezel covers): 1675 (SELF CHECK) KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) Trip (SELF CHECK) in Manual and shut shut with power applied. in Manual and shut. Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Trainin;J/Examination Checklist."

- - - - w******************************************************1~***************

NOTE TO EVALUATORS: 500 gallon dilution finished -5 minutes ago. Tave is rising, TavelTref deviation will start at -029 degrees high and would peak at - 0.9 high after 15 minutes in RUN, so there is ample time for board walk downs without needing reactivity adjustment. PERFORM SETUP ACTIVITIES QUICKLY AND MINIMIZE TIME SIMULATOR IS IN RUN PRIOR TO CREW COMMENCING BOARD WALKDOWNS.

- - - - ~*********************

Page 4 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires SpeciJic Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 EVENT TRIGGERS C Bank Control rods < 10 which is - 48% 1_ 1. I RP0058 Failure of,;utomatic Rx trip NA I\I~.I NONE .--,-1_-_T_R_U_E_t--_ _--j 1_2. ! MS0092F 22MS167 Fails Open NA _I~~ ~ONE__ ~,_~RUE .. TRUE I i _3. I EL0140 Loss of 2H 4160 V Group Bus 30 sec I ~~~ _ ET-1 FAL~+_TRUE T I. .1

!_    4. i., 6~~~~1E 21MS29 Turb Cntrl Valve Fails           NA       'iA         RT-2         I  TRU--=--f- TRUE I    5 I MS0091 r Main Steam Header L e a k !                   NA   -r~    in I     ET-3         :-.~        I   35   i Ii -      . I Outside Containment                            I                                           ---i-C-

I

6. I AN0242 SE.R 242 Fail::!'22 N.Pen

     ..,. I SG00788 22 Steam Generator Tube
                                                    ~rT1P.t-5 min I   N/A 1-   _m - ;

NA I 5 min t' ET-3 TR-7

-0 0

l 21 600

                                                                                                                     -1 I

~ 8.; ~~6~~~G 23MS29 Turb Cntrl Valve Fails' -i--N-~-TNA--I RT-3 FAL.~*.-=rRUE I

  -        I Closed                                     ---l-                  ~                          ~

r9. I ~~~O~;t PZR level Channell (LT-459) : ~T NA- I RT-8 NA 100 i 10 !RP318E 22 Aux Feed Pump Fails to Start II N';-TNA NONE TRUE I- I on S E C . ... ' _---'-_ _ __ Page 5 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific PClmission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 Triggers 1 and 2 are already RED. Used during scenario construction. Page 6 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 [ V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS A. State shift job assignments: B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet) C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. E. Do not review objectives with crew. F. If required to terminate the scenario early, the instructor should evaluate if sufficient information has been gathered to evaluate the crew's performance. Typically this would be accomplished by completion of the scenario throu9h the third event, however, this is not a requirement. The final decision remains with the instructor and evaluators. Page 7 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 Eval uatorfl nstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments 1 _R Level CH I Fails High Simulator Operator: Insert RT-8 on direction from Lead Evaluator MALF: PR0017A PZR level Channell (LT-459) FailsH/L Final Value: 100

RO PZR HI LVL alarm and Channel I reading 100%.

Note: If OHA E-20 ARP is used, it only

CRS enters AB.CVC-001 OR uses has RO select an Operable channel OHA E-20 ARP.

and initiate S2.0P-SO.RPS-003 to remove channel from service.

RO may request permission to place the Master Flow Controller in Manual to establish control over charging flow.
CRS progresses through AB if used until reaching Step 3.54, and the RO reiterates PZR level channel I has failed high.
If not previously performed, RO places Master Flow Controller in Manual and adjusts charging flow to maintain PZR level on program lAW AU. 2.
RO selects Channel III for control, and Channel II or III for the recorder.

Note: All actions performed in the

CRS directs PO to initiate SO.RPS-003 Control Room have already been to remove failed channel from service.

performed in the AB.

CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Action 6 Proceed to next event after Tech Spec call is made at direction of Lead Evaluator.

Page 8 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-011~RC ESG-4 Evaluatorl!nstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudEmt Response Comments

2. ./lure Closed of 23MS29 Governor Valve Simulator Operator: Insert RT*3 on direction from Lead Evaluator.

MALF: TU0081G 23MS29 Turb Ctrl Valve Fails Closed Final Value: True Note: The 23MS29 closing will cause

CREW recognizes loss of turbine load Tave to initially rise -4.5 degrees. The by control rods inserting (lower MWe, unaffected governor valve opening will rising Tave/PZR pressure, Tave-Tref lower Tave - 2 de~Jrees. The entire console alarm, OHA's G-15 and G-3.

transient will take less than 3 minutes, and with no operator action steady state conditions would be established with Tave - 3 degrees higher than before the governor valve shut. Note: With rod control in auto, rods will

RO monitors ReS temperature and rod step in - 20 steps while the unaffected control.

governor valves open. Rods wi" then withdrall'i in auto due to the power n 3tch signal with Tave/Tref devldtion well above minus1.5 degrees. Note: With only a Terror signal present, automatic rod control is not expected to withdraw rods until Terror is minus 1.5 degrees. Note: CRS may direct rod control be placed in manual due to unusual outward rod motion if the cause is not readily identified as the Power Mismatch signal affecting rod control. Note: Rx trip steps start on page 11.

RO/PO investigates turbine indications and determines 23MS29 closed. 22 and 24MS29 will open to restore turbine inlet pressure at setpoint.
CRS reviews SO.TRS-0001 and determines main turbine load limitation of ~ 30% with failed valve.

Page 9 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments R Play: 5 minutes after being

CREW dispatches NEO to investigate Cl .cted reports as NEO or or contacts maintenance crew.

Maintenance Supervisor that a worker in the HP turbine housing banged into a panel, and the crew heard the 23MS29 go closed. If asked, state the panel has no 10 tag on it.

CRS enters AB.LOAO-0001 to initiate load reduction at 5%lminute to ~30%

load. Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-~ is

RO/PO coordinate actions to reduce TRUE when N42 power Jowers to load to .'5.30%.

-47%.

MALF MS0091r Main Steam Hdr

PO initiate a turbine load reduction to <

30% @ 5%/min. Leak outside Containment Final Value: 35% Ramp: 8 minutes MALF AN0242, SER 242 fails A22 Final Value: 2 Dela : 5 minutes

RO calculates boration required and initiates boration.
RO ensures auto rod control is inserting rods at the expected rate or inserts control rods jf in manual to maintain Tave on program.
RO energizes PZR heaters if not energized.
RO announces AFD outside target band when it alarms.

Note: The AFO Tech Spec is not

CRS enters TSAS 3.2.1 for AFO. and applicable <50% power, but the CRS recognizes that penalty minutes must realize that the excess penalty exceed 60 when it occurs.

minutes will prevent raising power above 50%.

RO/PO announces when Below P-9 light illuminates on RP4.

Page 10 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pe::mission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

3. Steam Leak Outside Containment Note: Due to the rate of power

CRS directs RO to stop all Heater reduction, the steam leak may not be Drain Pumps at - 40% Rx power.

diagnosed until after the load reduction is complete. The penetration area hi

RO stops 21-23 Heater Drain Pumps.

temp alarm OHA A-22 will annunciate 2 minutes after the load reduction is complete.

CREW observes the following as steam leak develops:

                                               - Rx power/MWe mismatch
                                               - PZR pressure dropping
                                               - Hotwell levels lowering
                                               - Tave lowering faster than expected.

RO/PO announces when Below P-8 light illuminates on RP4.

Role Play: If the crew dispatches an

RO/PO reports abnormal plant NEO to investigate, call back after 5 response to CRS.

minutes and report steam blowing out ( } outer penetration area. The blvwout panels may be open.

CRS enters AB.STM-1.
CRS directs NEOs to investigate for signs of steam leakage if not previously dispatched.
CREW determines reactor conditions unstable and personnel safety issues dictate a MANUAL Rx trip and steam line isolation lAW CAS of AB.STM.

r-::=-::-:-:--;~--::-:,..--~-- ~'---.--'. CT#1 (E-O-A)

RO initiates a MANUAL Rx trip.

Manually trip the Rx from the control room priortotransition to FRSM-1. (Auto !ripwill not occur) ..

RO confirms the Rx trip.

Page 11 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 Evaluatorflnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments iJ - AUL TED/RUPTURED SG Simulator Operator: Ensure !=T-1_ inserts on Rx Trip MALF EL0140 Loss of 2H 4160 V Bus Final Value: True Delay: 30 seconds

RO initiates MSLI.

Note: An automatic SI will occur on LOOP 22 STM DP LO (OHA F**22)

RO reports 22MS161 did not shut, and attempts to shut it wrth redundant controls on other Safeguards bezel and fast close on 2CC3, and reports 22MS 167 remains open with steam flow still indicated on 22 SG.
RO reports an automatic SI has occurred.
CREW implements TRIP-1.
RO performs immediate actions.

Verifies the Rx is tripped. Confirms the Rx trip. Trips the Main Turbine Verifies at least one 4KV vital bus energized. Reports SI is initiated from Steamline DIP on 22 loop.

CRS/RO verify immediate actions of TRIP-1 are complete by performing verification of immediate action steps.

CT#2 (E-2--A)

PO isolates AFW to 22 SG by closing Isolate all feedwater to the 22 SG, 22AF11 and 22AF,21.

and isolate 22 SG from the intact SGs before transition out of LOSC-1. SAT UNSAT

CRS contacts WCe/Maintenance for assistance closing 22MS 167.

Page 12 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specitic Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected PlantJStudent Response Comments

RO reports SEC loading is not complete for B vital bus, and 22 AFW pump did not start.
CRS directs 28 SEC blocked and reset.
PO starts 22 AFW pump.
PO reports 21 and 2:2 AFW pumps are running and reduces AFW flow to no less than 22E4 Ib/hr to intact SGs.
RO/PO verifies safeguards valve alignment is correct.
RO reports 21/22CA330s are shut.
RO reports containment pressure is -0 psig.
RO reports an auto 51 occurred on 22 steamline DIP, a MSLI has been performed, and 22MS167 remains open.

J\ .i: Crew should recognize loss of 2H Group Bus when checking RCPs.

PO reports all 4KV vital busses are energized.
RO reports control room ventilation is in Accident Pressunzed mode.
RO reports switchgear room ventilation status.
RO reports 2 CCW pumps are running.
RO reports RHR is not aligned for cold leg recire.
RO reports charginl;J flow is > 100 gpm on SI systems charging flow meter.
RO reports Res pressure and SI pump flow status.

Page 13 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments

 '"   ': RCS pressure may not lower to

RO shuts charging pump miniflow

 <.   ~O psig depending on how quickly          valves CV139 and CV140 lAW TRIP-1 feed flow is isolated to 22 SG.                CAS if RCS pressure is <1,500 psig and BIT flow established.

RO reports RCS pressure is >300 psig.
PO reports AFW flow and SG NR level status, and maintains >22E4 Ibm/hr until at least 1 SG NR level is > 9%.
RO reports a MSLI has already been performed and no operator controlled cooldown is in progress.
RO reports Rx trip breakers are open.
RO reports both PZR PORVs are closed, and CRS din:;cts RO to maintain 2PR6 shut to isolate leaking 2PR1.
RO reports spray valves are closed as expected for current conditions.
RO reports RCS pressure is >1350 psig.

PO reports 22 SG is faulted. CRS transitions to L.OSC-1. Simulator Operator: If called by CRS

PO reports all valves in Table A are to check on status of22MS167, reply shut EXCEPT 22MS167 which remains that the Maint crew is still being open.

assembled and briefed.

CRS verifies only a single SG is affected.
PO verifies faulted SG is isolated except for the 22MS 167 which will not shut.
PO reports faulted SG is NOT 21 or 23 SG.
PO lowers 23 AFW pump speed to minimum, trips, then stops 23 AFW pump.

Page 14 of 24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 Evaluatorll nstructor Activity Expected PlanUStudf~nt Response Comments

CRS determines no MS45 is affected.
RO resets Phase A isolation, resets SGBO Sample Isolation Bypass, and opens 21-24SS94's.
CRS directs chemistry to sample 21-24 SGs for boron and activity.
PO stabilizes RCS temperature by adjusting intact SG MS 1D's.

CREW determines no SGTR is present.

CRS transitions to LOCA-1.

Simulator Operator: Insert RT-7 when

RO/PO resets 51, Phase A, Phase B, 22 SG has blown down MJLLOCA-1 opens 21 and 22CA:330, resets each Step 4 (SGTR evaluation)has been SEC and 230V Control Center.

completed. NI" , F: SG0078B 22 SG Tube fi ure Final Value: 600 Ram: 5 min

RO/PO stops EDGs Note: The R15 reading will be
RO/PO notes abnormal faulted SG unaffected due to the contaminated response on 22SG:

steam from 22 SG going out the break steam flow is pn:~sent on the SG in the pipe, and no TB10s open. after it has completely blown down SG pressure fluctuations lowering RCS pressure R19 readings rising

CREW diagnoses SGTR
CRS refers to CAS and transitions to SGTR-1.

Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario anytime after the transition to SGTR-1 but s,hould,notcontinue beyond the t~ansitionJo §GTR*3, IF f:lnadditionalSriticalfTask .is.. . ", . . .' regtJir~e;;.I1i~Rqnti~H~'sc~l1~tit:!;Mi' ,*.*. !hpr:rE'}W lifis, . .()fTrl~~~th.~.9()R!do ~ Jle Olar tern erature'an Page 15 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission fyom Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 Evaluatorflnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments r Jnstrates the ability to maintain k ~ below the target temperature and take credit for: CT # 3 (E.3.B) Establish/Maintain RCS temperature so a transition from SGTR*1 does not occur because Tave is too highto maintain minimum subcooling, OR below the ReS temperature that causes an extreme challenge (Red) or severe (Purple) challenge to the sub* criticality and/or the integrity CSF. SAT UNSAT Page 16 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific P<::nnission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 VI. SCENARIO

REFERENCES:

A. NUREG-1021, Examiner Standards B. NUREG-1122, KIA Catalog for NPP Operators: PWR C. TQ-AA-1 04-3001, NRC ILT Examination Development and Administration D. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) E. Technical Specifications F. S2.0P-SO.TRB-0001, Turbine Generator Startup Operations G. S2.0P-SO.RPS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Trip/Restoration H. S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction I. S2.0P-AB-LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction J. S2.0P-AB.STM, Excessive Steam Flow K. 2-EOP-TR/P-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L. 2-EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant M. 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Coolant Accident N. 2-EOP-SGTR*1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Page 17 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 ATTACHMENT 1 PLANT STATUS UNIT TWO L~~~_~ __.. _~._.~_.~ _____ J~O_DA_Y_~_~._.___.___.~__._._.._.' .~_. ___ MODE: 1 POWER: 67 RCS BORON: 1095 MWe: 790 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): N/A REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 1100 MWD/MTU. Xe building in at 80 pcm/hr. Control Bank D is at 172 steps. The off going shift completed a 500 gallon dilution 5 minutes ago. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION: 3.4.5.a None EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: 21 MS29 Main Turbine Governor valve failed close -1 hour ago due to a hydraulic fluid leak which has been isolated. Power was reduced to ~75 (currently 67%) lAW SO.TRB-1 and AB.LOAD-1. A Maintenance crew is in the HP turbine housing working on the 211\11S29. AB.LOAD is complete and exited. Maintain current power level while troubleshooting is in pro9ress. CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. 58 AFD penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs, all accumulated in the last hour. PRIMARY: 2PR1 is in Manual and shut due to leakage past seat. 2PR6 is shut with power applied lAW TSAS 3.4.5. 2PS1 is leaking, it is in manual and shut. 2PS24 manual isolation valve is shut. Primary to Secondary leakage is zero. SECONDARY: 23 Condensate Pump was secured during performance of AB.LOAD and remains O/S. Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1. RADWASTE: None CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: None Page 18 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR READY-FOR*TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load

2. Simulator is in RUN

3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON

4. All required computer terminals in operation

5. Simulator clocks synchronized

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented

7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date

8. Shift manning sheet available

9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced

11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

13. Required procedures clean

14. Multiple color procedure pens available

15. Required keys available

16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel

17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.

18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary

19. Exam security set for simulator

20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

21. Shift logs available if required

22. Recording Media available (if applicable)

23. Ensure ECG classification is correct

24. Reference verification performed with required documents available

25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after clrill.

Page 19 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 ATTACHMENT :~ CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewir.g each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...

degradation of any barrier to fission product release
degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
a violation of a safety limit
a violation of the facility license condition
incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Soration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the prev;ous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

Page 20 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 ATTACHMENT 4 SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios. SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 08-01 NRC ESG-4 REVIEWER:P Harsh (Spare) Initials Qualitative Attributes PH 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. PH 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. PH 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events.. PH 4. Each event description consists of:

the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
the malfunction( s) that are entered to initiate the event
the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
the expected operator actions (by shift position)
the event termination point PH 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible precedin!;1 incident such as a seismic event.

PH 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. PH 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. PH 8. The simulator modeling is not altered. PH 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated. PH 10. The sCE~nario has been validated. PH 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need t::> modify or replace the scenario. Page 21 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 ATTACHMENT 4 (Cont) SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios. Therefore, to complete this part of the review, the set of scenarios must be available. This page should be completed once per scenario set. The ranges listed for each scenario set represents a target and are not absolute limitations. Scenario sets that do not fit into the ranges listed should be further evaluated to ensure they are a;::>propriate. ~.---~. Initial Qualitative Attributes GSG 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 GSG 2 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1*2 GSG 3 Abnormal Events: 2-4 GSG 2 Major Transients: 1-2 GSG 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 GSG 1 EOP Contingency Procedures requiring substantive actions: 0-2 GSG 3 Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS:

                                                    .~~~.-----.-     ..--.--.----.---

Page 22 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific: Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 ATTACHMENT 5 ESG CRITICAL TASKS ESG-08-01 NRC ESG-4 (Spare) CT#1 (E-O--A) Initiate manual Reactor Trip from the control room prior to a transition to FRSM-1 being required. BASIS: FSAR Section 15.4 Accident Analyses, Limiting Faults, section 15.4.2 Major Secondary System Pipe Rupture assumes the Rx is trioped (page 15.4-32). Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the sub criticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. CT#2: (E-2--A) Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of LOSC-1, by isolating all feedwater to the faulted SG (closing 22AF11 and 22AF21 valves,) and isolating the faulted SG from the intact SGs by closing unaffected MS167, MS7, and MS18s. BASIS: Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending on the p\ant condition, it could constitute a demonstrated inability of the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of ar, ESF system or component. Failure to isolate the faulted SG such that multiple SGs are allowed to blow down for an extended time can significantly worsen the power excursion. Similarly, failure to isolate all feedwater flow, including AFW, to the faJlted SG such that it continues to blow down for an extended time can significantly worsen the power excursion. CT#3(lf required) (E-3--B) Establish/Maintain RCS temperature so a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur because Tave is too high to maintain minimum subcooling, OR below the RCS temperature that causes an extreme challenge (Red) or severe (Purple) challenge to the sub criticality and/or the integrity CSF. BASIS: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that" ... necessitates the crew taking compensating actions which complicates the event mitigation strategy ... " Page 23 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training

08-01 NRC ESG-4 ATTACHMENT 6** ESG - PSA RELATIONSHlplEVALUATION SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN .E;'y'ENT Y/~ EVJ;lJI N --~--~-- TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable -~-- N Loss of Service Water Y Steam Generator Tube Rupture N

                                                            .----~---

Loss ofCCW N -"~~"- Loss of Offsite Power N

                                                            .---~--~~-~

Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area N Station Black Out

~-

VHntilation N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILln' THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YiN gOMPQNENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/lJ. CQMEQf'.:JE;lJT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIl'" N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation N SBO Air Compressor Valves OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATORAQILQ-"". __~ Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Y Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurize RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG. Page 24 of24 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Pennission from Nuclear Training}}

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