ML100950464
| ML100950464 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/2010 |
| From: | Saporito T - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Leeds E NRC/EDO, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2.206, EDATS: OEDO-2010-0258, G20100185, OEDO-2010-0258 | |
| Download: ML100950464 (6) | |
Text
EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM:
DUE: 05/03/10 EDO CONTROL: G20100185 DOC DT: 03/31/10 FINAL REPLY:
Thomas Saporito Jupiter, Florida TO:
R.
W. Borchardt, EDO FOR SIGNATURE OF
DESC:
ROUTING:
2.206 - Florida Power & Light (Turkey Point Nuclear Plant)
[EDATS: OEDO-2010-0258]
Borchardt Virgilio Mallett Ash Mamish Burns/Rothschild
- Burns, OGC
- Mensah, NRR
- Marco, OGC
- Baggett, OEDO DATE: 04/02/10 ASSIGNED TO:
NRR CONTACT:
Leeds SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
iQO~~c -&
F-Dtk oO-C E-- v-t C.) "'ý --L-.Z)D -C) \\
EDATS Number: OEDO-2010-0258 Source: OEDO Genra Ifomaio Assigned To: NRR Other Assignees:
Subject:
2.206 - Florida Power & Light (Turkey Point Nuclear Plant)
==
Description:==
OEDO Due Date: 5/3/2010 11:00 PM SECY Due Date: NONE CC Routing: Regionll; 01; OGC; OE ADAMS Accession Numbers -
Incoming: NONE Response/Package: NONE I
Ote Ifrmto I
Cross Reference Number: G20100185 Related Task:
File Routing: EDATS Staff Initiated: NO Recurring Item: NO Agency Lesson Learned: NO OEDO Monthly Report Item: NO I
Pocss Inomtn I9 Action Type: 2.206 Review Signature Level: NRR Approval Level: No Approval Required OEDO Concurrence: NO OCM Concurrence: NO OCA Concurrence: NO Special Instructions:
Priority: Medium Sensitivity: None Urgency: NO Ii Docmen Inomtn I
Originator Name: Thomas Saporito Originating Organization: Citizens Addressee: R. W. Borchardt, EDO Incoming Task Received: Letter Date of Incoming: 3/31/2010 Document Received by OEDO Date: 4/1/2010 Date Response Requested by Originator: NONE Page 1 of I
From the Desk of Thomas Saporito Post Office Box 8413, Jupiter, Florida 33468 Voice: 561-972-8363 Fax: 561-952-4810 Electronic Mail: saponto3@agmall.com 31 MAR 2010 Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 In re: Petition Under 10 C.FR. 2.206 Requesting Enforcement Action Against the Florida Power & Light Company, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant
Dear Executive Director:
In accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and authority under 10 C.F.R. 2.206, the undersigned hereby submits a petition to the NRC requesting that the agency take certain and specific enforcement action against the licensee, Florida Power &
Light Company (FPL), Turkey Point Nuclear Plant as delineated in the enclosed petition.
Respectfully. submitted, Thomas Saporito, Citizen United States of America EDO -- G20100185
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS In the matter of:
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, DATE: 31 MAR 2010 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (Units 3 & 4)
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 PETITION UNDER 10 C.F.R. §2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST THE FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT NOW COMES, Petitioner, Thomas Saporito, a citizen of the United States of America and resident of the State of Florida and submits a Petition Under 10 C.FR. §2.206 Requesting Enforcement Action Against the Florida Power & Light Company, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, and states as follows:
On March 25, 2010, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) notified the NRC of an accident mitigation event under 10 C. FR. Section 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) related to a voids detected in piping associated with the high head safety injection system for the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (TPN) Unit-4. At the time of occurrence, the Unit-4 nuclear reactor was operating at 100% power. The event lasted approximately 2-hours and 10-minutes. According to the licensee, "At 1540 on 3/25/2010, engineering identified a gas void in the Unit 4 B Cold Leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pipe which exceeded the station's allowable gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg injection flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 1540. The void was immediately vented and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 1750." See, NRC Event Number EN45791.
PETITIONER'S SPECIFIC REQUESTS To ensure for the protection of public health and safety with respect to the circumstances surrounding the event described immediately above as further documented in NRC EN45791, Petitioner requests that the NRC:
- 1. Issue a confirmatory order modifying the licensee's operating licenses for the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Units 3 and 4 as to require the licensee to bring both associated nuclear reactors to a "cold" shut down mode to allow the NRC and the licensee to conduct a timely and meaningful investigation of the void described in NRC EN45791; and
- 2. Require the licensee to determine the entire duration of the void described in NRC EN45791 encompassing the period of time prior to discovery by the licensee's engineering personnel at 1540 hours0.0178 days <br />0.428 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.8597e-4 months <br />; and Page 1 of 2
- 3. Require the licensee to state whether the TPN Unit-4 B Cold Leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) flow path was inoperable prior to discovery of the void identified at 1540 hours0.0178 days <br />0.428 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.8597e-4 months <br /> as described in NRC EN45791, and if so, state the estimated time period that the system was inoperable; and
- 4. Require the licensee to identify the "root-cause" of the void described in NRC EN45791 and state what, if any, corrective actions were taken to prevent recurrence; and
- 5. Require the licensee to determine whether or not alternative means were available (other than an observation made by licensee engineering personnel) for the licensee to become aware of the void described in NRC EN45791, and if so, describe in detail such alternative means; and
- 6. Require the licensee to determine whether or not any operator annunciation system failed to engage to alert the reactor operator on duty about the existence of the void described in NRC EN45791, and if so, require the licensee to determine the "root-cause" of the failed system and state why the failure was not timely reported to the NRC; and
- 7. Require the licensee to determine whether reactor operator error played any role in the existence of the void described in NRC EN45791, and if so, describe the context of the operator error and any licensee actions taken to prevent recurrence; and
- 8. Require the licensee to determine whether or not public health and safety was compromised as a direct or indirect result of the void described in NRC EN45791, and if so, provide a detailed context for NRC evaluation; and
- 9.
Require the licensee to make the same evaluations described in items 1-8 above with respect to the TPN Unit-3.
Respectfully submitted, Thomas Saporito, Citizen United States of America Page 2 of 2
Power PReactor.
Event Number 45791 Facility' TURKEY.:POINT Notification Dateý 03/25/2010 Region.l2 State: FL Nbtification Time:.20.18.[El]
tUnit: [I[4]
.E*ent DateE. 03/25/2o0 1PX T pe: f3]"W-3-PLPj4)
Event. Time1
.45:40 [EDT.
.NRC Notified By,..ROGER-.NONTGOMERY Last Update Dat:ý.03125!2040 IHQ OPS.Offiter., PETE.SNYDER I Emergency ýCtass: NON Ea1iERGENCY tPerson(Ol garlzatiol)'.
10 CFR Section:.
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IGfi HEAD SAFETY INJECON:-INOPERAfBLE DUE TO VOIDS -MENTIFIED IN.PIPING:
j ~At1540on 325/210 ngieering i entife -a gas:(
foid n h irirt 48 BCol6d Leg sag H
adSfeymIjectbion(N.I
.0Pipe whicd exceeded.the statin's allo.able gas.acumut0on-atceptante criteria.. Thise condton rendered-the cold feg rijecýton flow path in6perable and required entry into TerchnicalSpiEication.l30.3-at 1540..The vaoid was timmrddiatel..ýnfted:and Tichnical Spedification 3.0;3fwas ejt!ed at:*750" CPesden. ns ecor