ML100760476
| ML100760476 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/2009 |
| From: | Collins S NRC Region 1 |
| To: | David Lew NRC Region 1 |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2010-0118 | |
| Download: ML100760476 (1) | |
Text
Lew, David From:
Collins, Sam Sent:
Sunday, November 22, 2009 9:59 AM To:
Lew, David
Subject:
FW: Update on the TMI event Dave, please include Bruce Mallett and Bruce Boger on next update...thx. Sam Original Message -----
From:* Lew, David Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2009 9:47 AM To: Collins, Sam; Spindler, David; Hayden, Elizabeth; Powell, Amy; Grobe, Jack; Johnson, Michael; Roberts, Darrell Cc: Screnci, Diane; McNamara, Nancy; McKinley, Raymond; McDermott, Brian; White, John; Newport, Christopher; Bamford, Peter; Barber, Scott; HOO Hoc; Kern, David; Brand, Javier; Bellamy, Ronald
Subject:
Update on the TMI event The HOO has established a bridge for Region I to facilitate internal communications and coordination in response to the anticipated media issues. The staff should provide information via this bridge by calling the HOO and asking to be put on the TMI bridge. We will be looking to set up a general briefing for internal stakeholders later this morning (expected around 11 am).
Update on media interest:
- 1. Numerous calls last night from external stakeholders were address but the HOO and Region I PAO; however, few calls were received after 2 am this morning.
- 2. The Region I PAO (Diane Screnci), a DRS Branch Chief (John White) and a senior Health Physicists (Ron Nimitz) will be on site today. Tentatively, they will meet with the media at 2 pm at the training center to answer questions.
- 3. The staff continues to monitor media interest on the web.
- 4. Exelon public affairs will been meeting with the media this morning.
Update on the plant
- 1. The licensee has completed the whole body count of about 150 workers in containment. 20 of these workers had estimated between 10 mrem and 36 mrem. 5 of these workers initially show higher doses, but the results are suspect and are being evaluated.
- 2. The licensee continues to maintain a tarp on the containment hole for the SG replacement.
- 3. Two potential causes of the airborne contamination event are being reviewed. The first is associated with welding activities on a small plug inside the skirt on the bottom of the B SG, during which the associated HEPA filter which is powered via an extension cord was found tripped. The other is pipe decontamination and preparation activities associated with the A cold leg, which they identified high contamination on the outside of a wet vac located near the work.
- 4. Both these two activities are located in the D ring. The license has maintained a hold on work in these areas, as they continue to assess the cause and clean up areas of high containment.