ML100670462
| ML100670462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/2009 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| 50-250/09-302, 50-251/09-302 50-250/09-302, 50-251/09-302 | |
| Download: ML100670462 (253) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:FACILITY NAME: Turkey Point Section 4 REPORT NUMBER: 2009-302 DRAFT SIMULATOR SCENARIOS CONTENTS: D~aft c.rOraft Simulator Scenarios
~/ Each containing ES-O-1 "Scenario
"'~ " Scenario Outline" o" l:ach p*/ " Required Operator Actions" Each containing ES-O-2 "Required Location of Electronic Files:
Submitted By SubmitredBy ~~I Lb.11 ~1 Verified By 1rlJ ifJ1(6 1tlJ ikb
~.~
NRC 25 Scenario 1 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Inside SNPO: Admin Unit 3 Unit 4 Plant Status Unit 4
- 38 harging pump outut off service ervice due tto packi packing ng leakage. chedulcd leaknge. Sched ervicc ul ed return to serv ice in 14 ali nal Weather Se"vice ervice has issued i ued a severe ere thunder t nn warning for Miami-Dade County thunderstann ount none none
[ Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator C C' Mode: Mode: I1 Res RCS Leakrate leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power:
~ . 75 Gross::
Gross .02 A 6614 MWe: 1 543 54l Unidentified .01 B 6631 B Tavg: Tavg : 1 566 Charging Pps: Pps: .01 C 6621 RCS Pressure: 1 2250 RCS Boron, Cone Cone:: 755 Abnorma l Annunciators: Annunciator: Comp Actions : Camp Actions: Annunciator: Annunciator: Comp CompoActions: Annunciator: Comp Actions o : Annunciator: Cpmp. Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp_Aclion~: Comp . Annun iat r: Comp ActionActions; ': Annunciator: Comp omp Actions: clion : C ( ~ nnunciat~r: I omp Actions: Lomp ActIOns : Annunciator: Actions: Comp Actions: Annun
- iator::
Comp Ac tion : Actions: IC urren. Tech Soec Current Spce \ction Statements:: (Docs No. I, Not Include For Trackin2,Only
- ""For Onlv Items" T!".S.A.S
.. .S I Component:
Reason:: Reason I E",,,, Dale: Entry Dale:
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T.S.A Rea Reason: n: I Entry E",,,, DaISDa": 1'.S.A* ..SiiI Component: Reason Reason:: I E",,,, Entry Date:Dale; T.S.A T.S.A.S .S I Comp nent: Component: Reason:: Reason I Entry Date: En'", 1)".0 T.S.A.S
* . iI/ 'Component:
Reason :: I centry ol", Date: Dale; T.S.A * .;// 'Component:
.S
[i Re son : E",,,, Date:
£ntry Dale;
Unit 3 Status Changes to Risk Sianificant Significant EQuiDment: Equipment: c.:)B (..; B train protected both units uni ts Online ri sk is green risk Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities: Ul!:coming Upcoming Major POD Activities: Imm ediately after shift turno Immediately turnoverver swap lew pumps to 3A and 38 runni ng using 3-NOP-19 step 4.2. 3B running 1.5. 4.2.1.5. Operators to support the evo lution have been briefed and are on station. Maintain evolution Mai ntain 75% steady stale power. state power. (( for Release:
-- ) Upcoming EeOs ECOs to Hana Han-.a and lor Evolutions or Compensatory Actions In in Progress:
Information, Remarks and Operator Work Around Status: General Information Aux. Au . steam suppl uppl y aligned from unit 4. Condenser inleakage 0 serm. ondenser inleakag fin .
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description
- Facility:
Examiners: Turkey Point Scenario No,: No.: Candidates: 1 NEW Op Test No.: No. : 2009-301 US RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 75% MOL Turnover: Turnover: Equipment DOS OOS:: 38 3B Charging pump oul out of service seNice due to packing leakage. Scheduled return to seNice in 14 hours. service hours. The National Weather Service SeNice has issued a severe thunderstorm warning for Miami-Dade County Immediately after shift turnover swap ICW lew pumps 10 to 3A and 383B running using 3-NOP-19 slep step 4.2.1.5. 4 .2 .1.5. The shift manager has granted permission to perform the evolution. Operators to support the evolution have been briefed and are on stationstation.. Maintain 75% power. Online risk - green train protected both units B Irain Event Event Type Event Description No. 1 (N) SRO Swap running ICW pumps uSing using 3-NOP-19 step 4 4.2.1.5.
.2. 1.5.
(N) BOP TFlICB1 :T (C) RO Control bank 0D rod (M10) (M 10) drops ;nto into the core the crew responds using 3-2 TFlIC81=T (C)(TS) SRO ONOP-028.3 ONOP-028 .3 The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in 3 (R) ALL response to the dropped rod. 4 TCE6DS4C (C) RO 120 VAC power panel3P09 is deenergized deenergized.. The crew stabilizes the plant
- 0
=0 (e)
(C) SRO using 3-0NOP-003.9. The RO reduces charging flow to control Pressurizer (TS) SRO Pressure and Pressurizer Level. The SRO addresses TS LCD LCO 3.4.3 and 33.8.3.1
.8.3.1 4.
4a (C) BOP Steam Generator 3B level controls are in AUTO LOCKUP LOCKUP.. The BOP will adjust blow down flow as needed to control B SfG blowdown S/G level. 5 TVSBVL5 (M) ALL A Main Steam Une Line leak upstream of the MSIVs MSIV's begins and gradually 0.2 ramp 3-EOP-E-0. 3-MOV-843A fails to auto degrades. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. 10:00 open when SI actuates. The crew manually opens 3-MOV-843A3-MOV-843A.. TFSWX6C= Transition is made to 3-EOP-E-2, the 38 3B MSIV fails to auto dose close.. The crew 6 T (C) BOP manually doses the MSIV and isolates feed to the faulted SfG. S/G. Once the 38 3B S/G has been isolated isolated,, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and 7 subsequently to 3-EOP-ES 1.1 to terminate SI.
. (N)ormal .,
(N)onnal {Rjeactivity. (R)eac!ivity, {I)nstrument. (l)nstrument. (C)omponent, (C)omponent. (M)ajor
- 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description
- Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #1 Event 1 - The crew will swap running ICW pumps using 3-NOP-19 step 4.2.1 .5.
4.2.1.5. Event 2 - Control bank D 0 rod (M10) will drop fully into the core, the crew responds using 3-ONOP-028.3 by placing rod control to manual and reducing main turbine load to stabilize th thee plant. The SRO addresses LCO 3.1.1 3.1 .1.1
.1,, 3.1.3.1, 3.1 3.1.3.6
.3.6 and 3.2.4.
Event 3 - The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the dropped rod . Event 4 -120
- 120 VAC power panel3P09 panel 3P09 is deenergized. The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-ONOP-003.9. Since letdown is lost, the RO reduces charging flow to control Pressurizer Pressure and Pressurizer Level. The SRO addresses TS LCO 3.4.3 and 3.8.3.1 3.8.3.1 Event 4a - Steam Generator 3B 38 level controls are in AUTO LOCKUP. The BOP will adjust blowdown flow as needed to control B SIG S/G level.
Event 5 - A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the MSIV's begins and gradually degrades. degrades. The reactor trips and the crew responds using 3-EOP-E-O. 3-EOP-E-0. During the performance of 3-EOP-E-O, 3-EOP-E-0, cold leg injection valve 3-MOV-843A fails to auto open when SI actuates. The crew manuall 81 actuates. manuallyy opens 3-MOV-843A to initiate Train A injection flow. Event 6 - The crew completes the applicable steps of 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to 3-EOP-E-2. 3-EOP-E-2. The 38 3B MSIV fails to auto close during the steam line break,break, the crew manually closes the MSIV M81V and isolates feed to the faulted 8/G S/G . Critical Task Event 7 - Once the 383B SS/G
/G has been isolated, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and subsequently to 3-EOP-ES 1.1 1.1 to terminate SI. Critical Task 2
TP-2009-301 TP*2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description
- Scenario XXV NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-16 (7S%
(75% power MOL)
- Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXV_NRC_1.lsn SRO_XXV_NRC_1 .lsn
- Place simulator in run Trigger lesson step:
- SETUP - 38 Charging pump OOS. OOS. Removes 38 charging pump from service.service. (Actuates (Ad",..
=RACKOUT)
TAB1POSM '"
- SETUP - PV2605 PV260S FAILS OPEN (Actuates (Act""" TFSWX6C n TFSVVX6C T)
- Place clearance info tag on 38 Charging Pump start switch
- Start 3A ICWP and stop 38 ICWP.
- Provide an in progress procedure 3-NOP-019 step 4.2.1.5 4.2.1.S
- Provide shift turnover checklists
- Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RCO desk to the Utilities screens screens..
- Perform Simulator Operator Checklist
- 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description
- Event 1 - Swap running ICW If directed, lew pumps using 3-NOP-19 step 4.2.1.5.
Initiated immediately after shift turnover. directed, respond as ANPO ifif directed to perform pre-start checks for 38 3B lew ICW pump & post-shutdown checks for 3A ICWP. ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory. 7.1.3.1 - The BOP starts the 3B ICW pump and stops the 3C ICW pump Step 7.1.3.1 When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step "EVENT 2 - DROP ceo CaD ROO ROD M10" M10" (actuates TFUC81:T). TFLlC81 =T). Event 2 - Control bank D rod (M10) Drop Control bank 0 D rod (M10) will drop fully into the corecore,, the crew responds using 3-0NOP-02B 3-0NOP-02B.3 .3 by placing rod control to manual and reducing main turbine load to stabilize the plant. The SRO addresses LCO 3.1.1 .1, 3.1.3.1 3.1.1.1. 3.1 .3.1,. 3.1.3.6 3.1 .3.6 and 3.2.4. If directed, respond as Reactor Engineering when notified of rod drop. If directed as the STA, come to the control room and perform hourly QPTRs. directed, respond as WCC/ If directed, WCCII&C I&C when notified of the dropped rod & the need to reset PRNI hi flux trip setpoint. Respond that an I&C technician respond as requested. requested. Event 3 - Fast Load Reduction The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-1 3-0NOP-100 00 in response to the dropped rod . directed, respond as System when called about load reduction If directed, reduction.. directed,, respond as SM when told to review 0-EPIP-20101 & 0-ADM-115 If directed 0-ADM-11S for notification requirements. requirements. State that the NRC Resident will be notified of the fast laod reduction . If directed, respond as chemistry to take samples. No response back required. If directed, respond as FS/NSO to align aux steam using attachment 1. No response back required . directed, respond as SNPO if directed to increase CCW~ If directed, CCW~NRHX NRHX flow. flow. Click on SCHEMATICS~COMMON SERVICES-.COMPONENT SCHEMATICS-.COMMON SERVICES~COMPONENT COOLlNG-.reportCOOLlNG~report the CCW flow shown adjacent to the NRHX. This should let the crew know that ftow flow has already been increased (2 cha charging rging pumps & 2 orifices already in service). Event 4 - LOSS OF 3P09 120 VAC power panel 3P09 main feeder breaker fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds using 3-0NOP-003.9 to control Pressurizer and Steam Generator level. level. When directed by the lead examiner, examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - LOSS OF 3P09 (actuates TCE60S4C TCE6DS4C ::= 0) 0).. If directed, directed, respond as FSITO FSrrO to inspect 3P09 & 3D inverter. After 1-3 min, min, report 3P09 deenergized with the main feeder breaker tripped . 4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description
- If directed, respond as FS if directed to restore power using min then trigger the following lesson steps.
EVENT 4 - OPEN 3D INVERTER CB6 TCEDl4C = (actuates TCEDI4C usIng 3-0NOP-3.9 Attachment 1, wait 1-3
- F)
'-3 EVENT 4 - OPEN ALL 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6217S = '" T)
T) EVENT 4 - OPEN All ALL 3P24 BREAKERS TCC2DLM3 = F, (actuates TCC20lM3:: TCC2DLM = F, TCC2DlM :; F, TCM2DX3M TCM20X3M = '" F, F, TCC2DLE TCC2DlE ='" F, TCC2DPE = '" F, TCF1DA3M = F, TCK72407 '" F, TCF1DA3M" = F, TCCMP248 = F, F, TCCMP248" TCN1409M = F, lCN1409M '" F, TCN1410M = ::: F & TCN1411M:: TCN1411M = F) Call the control room as FSrrO FSfTO and inform them you are performing 3-0NOP-3.9 attachment 1 step 7 and the Main Feeder breaker for 3P09 will not close. If directed, directed, respond as WCC to contact Electrical Maintenance and plant management. If directed, directed, respond as WCC wec to prepare a PWO/Clearance. PWOIClearance. Event 5 - Main Steam Line Leak A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the MSIV's begins and gradually degrades. degrades. The crew 3-EOP-E-0. During the performance of 3-EOP-E-0, responds using 3-EOP-E-O. 3-EOP-E-O, cold leg injection valve 3-MOV-843A fails to auto open when SI actuates. The crew manually opens 3-MOV-843A to 8 1actuates. initiate Train A injection flow. flow. When directed by the lead examiner,examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - Main Steam line Line Leak leak TVSBVl5 0.2 ramp 10;00) (actuates TVSBVL5 10:00 ) When the reactor trips,trips, ensure lesson step EVENT 5 - MOV 3 843A Fails to Auto Open is inserted. (actuates TF13S120::T) inserted, TFL3S12D=T) If directed, respond as FSfTO FSrrO to investigate the source of the steam leak, leak, make a report of an extreme amount of steam and loud noise coming from the main steam platform but cannot determine the exact sourcesource.. Due to the loss of 3-P09, the indication for various valves are lost. lost . Acknowledge as FSfTO/SNPO to isolate valves as directed by the Control Room . (3-SV-2911 (3-SV-291 1 and 2912.) When directed respond as the FS/SNPO FS/SNPQ to place PAHMS in service, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - ALIGN PAHM FOR SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A::I.OIJO TAC2V02A=1.0/30 sec delay, TAC2V02B=1 .0f1 .0/1 min delay, TAAAV21"'1.0/2 TAAAV21 =1 .01 2 min delay, TAAAV22::1 TAAAV22=1.0/3.5 TACA005::0.0) . Report completion 10-15 min later.
.013.5 min delay & TACA005=O.0). later If directed, respond as Chemistry to sample S/G, S/G , monitor DAM-1 DAM-1 If directed, respond as HP to perform surveys. surveys .
Event 6 - PV2605 FAILS OPEN Transition is made to 3-EOP-E-2, 3-EOP-E-2, the 38 MSIV fails to auto close. close . The crew manually closes the MSIV MStV and isolates feed to the faulted S/G S/G. . When the crew manually closes 3-PV-2605, ensure lesson step SETUP SeTUP - PV2605 FAILS OPEN is removed (TFSWX6C;F) (TFSWX6C=F) 5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description
- When directed respond as the FSITO FSfTO wait 3 minutes and trigger lesson DE ENERGIZE & LOCALLY CLOSE MOV-3-1404 DEENERGIZE complete.
Event 7 - SI Termination Jesson step EVENT 6 -
- n. Report when MOV*3-1404 (actuates TCF5M527=F, TFFXC04 ='" T).
Once the 38 S/G has been isolated, isolated, the crew transitions to 3-EOP-ES 1.1 81. 1.1 to terminate SI.
- 6
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ES-O-2
- No.:: 2009-301 Op-Test No. 200S-301 Scenario No.No.:: 1 Event
Description:
The crew will swap running ICW Event No.: 1 lew pumps using 3-NOP-19 Page 1 of 1 3-NOP- 19 step 4.2.1.5. 4.2.1.5. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: When starting ICW lew Pumps, the maximum flow rates for the inservice HXs may be exceeded. exceeded . The high flow fl ow rate is acceptable provided the duration of high flflow ow is minimized. minimized . Procedure Note: Operation of an ICW lew Pump is permitted up to 19,000 gpm. If an ICW lew Pump is operated in excess of 19,000 gpm, then flow should be reduced to lesstess than 19,000 gpm as soon as possible. If an ICW lew pump has operated at flows greater than 19,000 gpm for more than twenty (20) minutes, then once pump flow has been reduced to 19,000 gpm or less, less, the 1ST Coordinator should be notified to perform vibration and pump DP OP testing per 3-0SP-019.1, 3-0SP-019.1, Intake Cooling Water Pump Inservice Test to ensure the integrity of the affected pump. pump. CAUTION Intake Cooling Water Pump Motor starting limits :;
- With motor at ambient temperature.
temperature , two successive starts are allowed with the motor coasting to rest between starts. starts.
- With Wah motor at operating temperature ., one start is allowed . Subsequent starts require that the motor is allowed to cool by standing idle for one hour or by running for one-half hour.
hour. SRO Directs evolution using 3-NOP-19 BOP START STA RT 3B ICW PUMP from VPA. VPA. CHECK 3B ICW PUMP Motor Amps at VPA stabilizes to less than 49 amps. amps . CHECK PI-3-1451, PI 14S1 , PRESS PRE SS INDINO FOR INTAKE COOLING WTR PUMP B indicates between 11 and 35 psig. psig . Stops 3C ICW pump Examiner note: note: When the 3C ICW pump is stopped, stopped , proceed to evert 2 1
Appendix D 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.
No.:: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Description : Control bank D Event Oescription: No.: 1 Event No.: 2 0 rod (M10) will drop fully into the core 3-0NOP-028.3 by placing rod control to manual and redu::ing using 3-0NOP-02B.3 Page 1 of 6 core,, the crew responds redu:::ing main turbine load to stabilize the plant. The SRO addresses LCO 3.1.1.1, 3.1.3. 3.1.3.1, 1, 3.1.3.6 and 3.2.4. 3.2.4. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator operato r to tt'igger igger lesson lesso n step "EVENT" EVENT 2 - DROP CSO CBD ROD M1 0" (actuates M10" TFUC81==T). TFLlC81=T). RO Recognizes and reports rod M 10 drop. BOP Addresses Alarm Response for 8-2 B-2/2, 2/3,4/4,6/4,
/2 , 213 7/1,9/3 and 8-5/2.
, 4/4 , 6/4 , 7/1,913 G-5/2.
SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-028.3 I
~---------~~s------
~---------~~s-----------, - - - --,
I I I
- 0 Foldout page is required 10 to be monitored tlJrougnout throughout this procedure.
I I
- Misaligned rods are addressed by 3-0NOP*02B, L
L _ 0 ______________________ JI 3-0NOP-028. 1. RCC 1, Re C Misalignment. Misalignment. CREW Reviews foldout page (See page 10) RO Checks M-10 the only dropped rod rod.. SRO Checks reactor in MODE 1 RO Places rod control to MANUAL CAUTIONS CA UT IONS 0 Do NOT dilute the RCS while performing this procedure until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN calculation has been performed using O O-OP-028.2,
*OP*028.2, SHUTDOWN CALCULATION.
MARGIN CALCULA TlON. 0 Do NOT increase reactor power while performing this procedure. 0 Do NOT use control rods for power or temperature adjustments until the cause of the dropped rod is identified and de(ennined determined not to affect any other rods. rods. RO Verifies PLCS and PPCS controlling in AUTO BOP Reduces main turbine load as needed to match Tavg & & Tref within 3 degrees. BOP Verifies FWCS controlling in A AUTO UTO
- BOP Compares AFD to RAOC Imit book) &
limit (PCB sect 5 fig 1 also found in ARP
& determines AFD within limit 2
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: No. : 2009-301 Scenario No. No.:: 1 Event No.No.:: 2 Page 2 of 6
Description:
Control bank 0 rod (M10) Event
Description:
(M 10) will drop fully into the core core,, the cre'vVl'esponds crewresponds using 3-0NOP-028.3 by placing rod control to manual and reducing main turbine load to stabilize stabitize the plant. The SRO addresses LCO 3.1.1.1, 3.1.3.1 3.1.3.1,, 3.1.3.6 and 3.2.43.2.4.. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs RE or the STA to iniiate hourly QPTR calculation using 3-0SP- 3-0SP* 059.10 until results sat or power < 50% EXAMINER NOTE: Satisfies compliance with LCO 3.2.4 SRO Declares M-10 rod inoperable per LeO LCO 3.1 .3.1 3.1.3.1 EXAMINER NOTE: 3.1.3.1 All full length (shutdown and control) rodsshallrods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within the Allowed Rod Misalignment between the Analog Rod Position Indication and the group step counter demand position within one hour after rod motionmotion.. The Allowed Rod
- Misalignment shall be defined as:
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 APPLICABILITY: ACTION ACTION:: as :
- b. for THERMAL POWER greater than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, POWER, the Allowed Rod Misalignment is +/- 12 steps.
l *' and 2*2' steps .
- d. With one full length rod inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a, above,, or misaligned from its group step a, above counter demand position by more than the Allowed Rod Misalignment of Specification 3.1 .3.1, POWER OPERATION may continue provided that 3.1.3.1, within one hour either:
- 1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the Allowed Rod Misalignment of Specification 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.1, or
- 2. The remainder of the rods in the bank with the inoperable rod are aligned to within the Allowed Rod Misalignment of Specification 3.1.3.1 of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation ,
or
- 3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1 3.1.1.1.1 is satisfied.
satisfied . POWER OPERATION may then continue prO/ided prOJided that: 3
Appendix 0 D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 No,:: 1 Scenario No. Event No.: No. : 2 Page 3 of 6 Event
Description:
Description:
Control bank D 0 rod (M (M110) will drop fully into the core, co re , the crew responds using 3-0NOP-028.3 by placing rod control to manual and reducing main turbine load to stabilize the plant. The SRO addresses LCO 3.1.1 3.1.1.1,
.1, 3.1.3.1 , 3.1.3.6 and 3.2.4.
3.2.4. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior a) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within one hour and within the next 4 hours the power range neutron flux high trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER. THERMAL POWER shall be maintained less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER until compliance with ACTIONS 3.1.3.1.d.3.c 3.1.3. 1.d .3.c and 3.1.3.1.d.3.d 3.1.3, 1.d.3.d below are demonstrated, demonstrated, and b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 3.1.1 .1 is determined at least once per 12 hours, hours, and c) A power distribution map is obtained from the movable incore detectors andFQ and FQ (Z)(2) and FN 6H FN.6H are verified to be within lheir t1eir limits within 72 hours SRO Makes decision to reduce Reactor Power To Less Than 50% Within 1 Hour SRO Transitions to 3-0NOP-100 3-0NOP-1 00 while continuing in 3-0NOP-28.3 Exa miner Note Examiner Note:: 3-0NOP-28.3 3-0NOP-2 8.3 details continued on page 8, 3-0NOP- 3-0 NOP-100 actions continued on the next page. 4
Appendix 0D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- No.:: 2009-301 Op-Test No.
Op-Tesl Scenario No.: 11 Event No. No.:: 3 Page 1 of 4 Event Description The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using J.ONOP-100 in response to the dropped rod rod.. 3-0NOP-100 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-100. 3-0NOP-1 00. SRO Performs 3-0NOP-3-0NOP-100 brief. (See nexl 100 brief next page) CREW Reviews 3-0NOP-100 foldout page actions (See page 11) 11 ) SRO Determines 18 gall% gal/% boric acid addtionadd lion is required . RO Initiates boration boration::
- 1. Sets SA BA totalizer as directed (18 9al/% gal/% for 20% load decrease =
360 gal BA)
- 2. Takes FC-3-113A pot --+ ~8 . 0 or as directed 8.0
- 3. RMSS~BORA
- 3. RMSS- >BORATE RMCS~START
- 4. RMCS-> START RO Adjusts FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to obtain the Attachment 3 desired flow rate BOP Reduces turbine load. load.
0 Maintains Tavg less than 5°F above Tref 0 Maintains rods greater than insertion limit.
~-----------------------,
~----------~~-----------, !iQIE II Axial (lux flux difference is is aI/owed allowed to exceed the Target Band during the load reduction without I
~
~ __
entenng entering _ _ _Operation O-OP-059.9. O-OP-059.9. ___ __ Within the _ _ Axial _Difference Flux _ _ _Operational _ _ _Space._ _ _ _ JI CREW Notifies plant management and System of the impending unit shutdown shutdown.. RO Check pressurizer level following program CREW Verifies load reduction rate and auto rod control is maintaining the expected Tavgrrref I::J. ~ T identified in Attachment 3 (see next page) page )
- 5
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2
- ATTACH~'lEl'IT ATTACH)IE"'T FAST LOAD REDFCTIOl'l (Page 1I of 1)I)
REDl'CTlO'" BRIEF 3 BIUEF J. Reason for load
- 1. IOild reduction reduct ion _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
~'(J Powel'
- 2. Target power level - - - % Power Time to Shutdown from fro m 100%100% ,- mID.
_~mm
. :'! 50 SO min 75 min 110 min LOfl d Reduction Load RedlL('11011 Rate Ril le IvlWimin MVli mill MWhnin 30 MW!min 15 MW/win 15 :-'1\V/min y[Wllllin 10 M\Vimin 7 MW/min MWimin Load Reduction Rate (I*iI/min o*o/min 4 °'%0 /' min 2.2 %
0 (I /I min ~' o !I min 1.3 3 °'0 1.33 1l %
% ;'/ mill min Expectl'ci T avg/T Expected ref ~ T nn!"iTref.:.\ 4
~ of c'F 3O ofF 2:2 OofF IO 1 'F
- 3. Load LllHc\ reduction rate nHe ___ :vIw ~1\\" ,I. minute miuute I
-----------. -. I II** available.
Suggested borationbofallon is 9 gallons per % with control rods completely withdrawn and I available, 18 gallons per % with witf) no control rod movement (use a value between 9 and 18 I if rods are not fully withdrawn when statting starting a load reduction from full power). power)_ I* 1 1
- 4. Bonuioll The Unit Supervisor may change the boration as desired during the load reduction.
I BOl'<1lioil Rille:
=-. Plant
- 5. Plmll Control Rate: ~~_
_ __ total P;l1"ll1llelt"r~ and Cm llroi Parameters
!OTfl i gallons gilliom, i _
<Illd Contingency
-_ -_ minutes COIlTiugency Actions minlllt'S =
_ _ _ gallons/minute. reduction , gIlIJOIlsillliuutf' . I
- T av-I?,l\'g i T I Tref expected ~ T ballcL ref eqJecled not to b<Hld. nOl 10 exceed +/- 1 J OF of of expected, slow ramp expecled, slO\\1 mmp to b<lud.
10 restore ballcL
- If tl' AllI HlIlcialor B 8/ 1.
AluHmcifltor 1. ROD BANK 8.-\.NK LO LIMIT LNTT aimllls. alarms. the load It"lac\ reduction shall be slowed. slowed .
- 6. EOP E-O transition tf:lIIsilion clit eri<l - Manual criteria Mmlll<ll reactor reRctor and Rud flubine nu-biue Iriptrip :
- Tave > 578 OF
- Tave 6 Tnve GO ofF >*, Iref Tref
- inst'11ioll Limits Rod Inseltion Linnls (RIL)(RIl) arefi re exceeded
- 7. Review required <lctiolls actions hom pro('edllfe~ cunendy li'olll other procedures curren tly in ill dred effect (example.
<<('.'{ample, stop Rep).
slap RCP). Q \l e ~ t i~ln .<,. o
- 8. Questions orr crew inpnt" iIlPll!?
- 9. End of Brief 9, Brie f
- 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ES-O-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:No.: 1 Event Description The crew will initiate a befatlen in response to the dropped rod .,
Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 4 boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Reduces turbine load load.. 0 Maintains Tavg less than 5°F above Tref 0 Maintains rods greater than insertion limit.
~ - - - ----- - ---
~-----------------------,
I t:!Q!S - ----- - ----, I I Axial flux nux difference is allowed to exceed the Target Band during the load reduction without IS
~ _______________________
~ _ _O-OP-059.9.
entering _ _ _Operation O-OP*OS9.9. ___ __ Within _ _ the Axial _Difference Flux _ _ _ _ _ _Space. Operational __ Space . _ I _ J CREW Notifies plant management and System of the impending unit shutdown. shutdown. RO Check pressurizer level following program
- CREW Verifies load reduction rate and auto rod control is maintaining the TavglTref ~ T identified in Attachment 3 expected TavglTref.6.T
- 7
Appendix D 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- No .: 2009-301 Op-Test No.: Scenaro Scenarb No.:
No .: 1 Description : Control bank 0 rod (M10) Event
Description:
No.:: 2 Event No. (M1 0) wil drop fully into the core, Page 4 of 6 core, the crew responds 3-0NOP-028.3 by placing rod control to manual and reducing main turbine load to using 3-0NOP-02B.3 stabilize the plant. The SRO addresses LCO 3.1.1.1, 3.1.3.1, 3.1 3.1.3.6
.3.6 and 3.2.4.
Time Position Applicant's A pplicant's Actions or Behavbr Behavor EXAMINER NOTE : 3.1 .3.6 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion LCO 3.1.3.6 specified in the Rod Bank Insertion Limits curve curve,, defined in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* 1* and 2* ** 2* ** ACTION : With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2 either:
- a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within two hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position specified in the Rod Bank Insertion Limits curve, in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, REPORT, or curve , defined Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. 8e EXAMINER NOTE :
Reducing power to within the limits of the COLR satisfies compliance with LCO 3.1.3.6 action b SRO Determines annunciator &9/3 B-9/3 is locked in and directs RP1fstep RPlistep counter comparison every 4 hours EXAMINER NOTE Compare RPts RPls to group step counters every 4 hours to comply with Technical Specification Surveillances 4 4.1 .3.1.1
.1.3.1 .1 and 4.1.3.6.
4.1.3.6 . SRO Directs notification of Reactor Engineering about dropped rod (if not already done) SRO Determines Shutdown Margin is adequate since RCS boron greater than or equal to pre-event value 8
Appendix 0 D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- 2009-301 Op-Test No.: 200S-301 Scenario No.:
Event
Description:
Control bank 0 No.: 1 D rod (M10) Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 6 (M 10) will drop fully into the core core,, the crew responds using 3-0NOP-028.3 by placing rod control to manual and reducing man turbine load to 3.1 .1.1, 3.1.3.1, stabilize the plant. The SRO addresses LCO 3.1.1.1, 3.1 .3.1, 3.1.3.6 and 3.2.4. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE : Satisfies compliance with LCO 3.1.1.1 3.1.1 .1 SRO Directs notification of I&C of potential need b reset PRNI hi flux trip setpoint using 3-0SP-059.4 SRO Directs RE or STA to perform a Shutdown Margin calculation using 0 () OP-028.2 EXAMINER NOTE: reduced,, proceed to EVENT 3 When power has been sufficiently reduced
- 9
Appendixx 0 Appendi D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 6 Event
Description:
Description:
Control bank D rod (M10) will drop fully into the core, core, the crew responds 3-0 NOP-028. 3 by placing rod control to manual and reducing main turbine load to using 3-0NOP-028.3 stabilize the plant. plant The SRO addresses LCO 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.1, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.6 and 3.2.4. 3-0NOP-28.3 Foldout Page Following Is Followmg is a list of applicable Technical SpecIfIcation Specification LCOs and procedure steps that verify comphance. compliance. These need to be reviewed by the Shift Manager to ensure compliance. compliance
- 1. T.S. 3.1.1.1 3.1 .1.1** SHUTDOWN MARGIN
- Covered in 11 and 13 In Steps 11
- 1 hour to verify AND repea repeatt every 12 hours.
hours. 2.
- 2. T.S.
T.S . 3.1 .3.1
.3.' .* GROUP GROUp ROD HEIGHT
- Covered In in Steps 1,7.
1,7, B. 8,9, 15, Attachment 1 Steps 3 and 13
- 9. and 15.
- 1 hour *- to restore OR declare inoperable AND be less than 75% power.
72 hours - to pertorm perform Flux Map. and 5 days - to perform re.analysis re-analysis of accidents .,
- Rods , 7 hours*
If 2 Control RodS, hours
- to be in Hot Standby
- If 2 or more Shutdown Rods are not fully withdraWn.
withdrawn . apply Tech Spec 3.0.3. 3.0.3.
- If Rod Deviation Monitor is inoperable.
inoperable. compare RPls to Step Counters every 4 hours .
- 3. T.S. 3.1.3.5 *- SHUTDOWN ROD INSERTION LIMIT
- Covered in Steps 7 and 9
- 1 hour -* to restore OR declare inoperable.
inoperable.
- If 2 or more Shutdown Rods are not fully withdrawn . apply Tech Spec 3.0.3. 3.0.3.
- If Rod Deviation Monitor is inoperable. compare RPls to Step Counters every 4 hours.
4.
- 4. T.S. 3.1.3.6
- CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMIT
- Covered in Steps 8 and 9.
- 2 Ilours hours*- to restore OR to reduce power to WIthin within guideli nes of COLR.
guidelines
- If Rod Deviation Monitor Is is inoperable.
inoperable, compare RPls to Step Counters every 4 hours.
- 5. 3.2.1 - AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE T.S. 3.2.1*
- Covered In in Steps 5 and B.8.
- 30 minutes to get power less than 50% AND the next 4 hours to set the NIS trip setpoint setpo[nt to 55%.
- 6. T 3.2.4 . QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO
.S. 3.2.4*
T_S.
- Covered In 6.
in Step 6.
- 1 hour to perform AND required every hour Ihereaner thereafter while QPTR exceeds 2%.
- If QPTR IS IS greater than 9%,
9%, reduce power 3% for every 1% QPTR exceeds 1 within 30 minutes. minutes.
- If QPTR is greater then 2%. 2%. reduce power 3% for every 1% QPTR exceeds 1 within 2 hours. hours.
- Reduce the NIS tnp trip setpoints the same amount within the next 4 hours.
10
Appendix Appe ndix D 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 2009-30 1 Scenario Scen ario No.:
No. : 1 No.:: 3 Event No. Page 4 of 4 Event Description The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the dropped rod. 3-0NOP-100 3-0NOP-l 00 Foldout Page
- 1. 3-EOP-E-O 3-EOP*E-O Transition Criteria if Turbine 8NQ. go to IF any of the following limits are reached , THEN trip the Reactor and Turbine.8HQ 3-EOP-E-0,, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 3-EOP-E-O IN JECTION::
- a. RCS Tavg - GREATER THAN 578 of
- a. OF
- b. RCS Tavg - GREATER THAN Tref by 6 'of F C. Rod Insertion Limits
- c. limits are exceeded as indicated by:
- Rod Position Bank D 0 Insertion Limit Recorder (VPA)
- Stepcounters StepcQunters on console
- Plant Curve Book Section 7, Figure 3
- 2. Notify Chemistry Department WHEN reactor powepowerr has changed by greater than or equal equa l to 15 percent, THEN notify the Chemistry Department that RCS ReS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.
- 3. Restore Blender to AUTO complete.. THEN restore the Blender to AUTO as follows.
WHEN boration is complete
- a. Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to AUTO a.
- b. Set FC-3-113A, FC-3-11 3A, Boric Acid Flow Controller pot setting as desired
- c. Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START c.
- 11
Appendix 0D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:4 Page 1 of 3 Description : 120 VAC power panel 3P09 is deenergized. The crew responcS Event
Description:
respond> using 3-ONOP-003 .9 to control Pressurizer Pressure ONOP-003.9 Pressure,, Pressurizer Level , and Steam Generator level. The SRO addresses LCO 3.8.3.1 3.8.3 .1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility faci lity operator to tigger t'igger lesson step EVENT 4 - LOSS OF 3P09 (actuates TCEDS4C ='" 0). 0). BOP Recognizes and reports loss of 3P09 3P09.. SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-003.9 BOP Reports 38 3B SG level changing uncontrollably. uncontrollably. CREW Directs FS restore power to 3P09 using 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 1 CAUTIONS CA UTI ONS
.* An AUlo SOJfety fnjeelion Auto S;Jfery wilf occur injection will occur fol/owing OJ
,J f'e ;f T<Jvg
- Jcror trip if re<Jctor r"vg Is cqu;:,' to or is equ<J1 Jeu rhim 543"F less th;,n 543 'F..
- sprays were open prior fO If the pressurizer spr.Jys loss of 3P09.
to the los$ 3P09, ReS pressure will dec,.,,,so ;tftor continue to decre;,se ;,fter the Ro",cror RC<Jctor Trip occurs.
~
I NOTES I I *
# Step I1 is IS an Immediate a/1 Im action step.
medl.::Jle aCMIl step. It I
- Ail J3P09 (YELLOW)
P09 (YELL channel mdicatlon/com OW) ch:mnel indication/controls affected tols are .::Jffe cled by failure of 3P09 .
- I Enclosure EnclosUi e I pl oVldes.:Ja li511119 provides iisting of lost {ullctions. mdications, and fUIlCIIOllS. Ilxilcaf;on5 controls.
,;)00 controls. It
~-----------------
~
__ __ __ __ __ _ II SRO Checks reactor trip has not occurred nor required SRO Checks Unit 3 in Mode 1 RO Verifies rod control is in MANUAL. BOP Places Steam Dump to Condenser Mode Selector to MANUAL MANUAL. RO Controls Pressurizer pressure by manually changing charging flow. flow.
- 12
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 NO.:4 Event No.:4 Page 2 of 3
Description:
120 VAC power panel3P09 Event
Description:
panel 3P09 is deenergized. deenergized. The crew responds using 3 ONOP-003.9 to control Pressu Pressurizer rizer Pressure, Pressure , Pressurizer Level Level,, and Steam Generator level The SRO addresses LCO 3.8.3. 3.8.3.11 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CA U T I ON CAUTION Sleam Steam Generator 38 level comrots controls are in In AUTO LOCKUP LOCKUP,. I
- - -- -- ---- ---- -- - - NOTES NOT ES --- ---- -- - - --- - - --- --.. I I -* 38 3B Steam Gansrator Generator Levels may be adjusteci adjusted by controlling Blal'lclown Blowdown Flow Flow.. I L _~n: 3 I
L :S!:a:e:er:'I:v:on~ro:: ~o~ :ma::..Jn_A:m:'c~ ___ IJ 3A and 3C Steam Generator level controllers should remain in Automatic. I BOP Controls B SG level by changing blowdown. blowdown. CREW Discusses reactivity effects of changing blowdown flow. flow .
- "ra If Tavg High Hlg vg decreilses decreases 10 coincident wit/')
/') Steam Flow caine/dent CAU TI ON CAUTION to less than 543°F, an automatIc automatic Safety Injection with Low Tavg.
wilt occur due to tnJ&etfon will CREW Maintain The Following Parameters -IN NORMAL CONTROL Fallowing Plant Parameters-IN CONTRO L BANDS
- Tavg
- Reactor power
- Pressurizer Pressure
- Pressurizer Water level
- Steam Generator Water level SRO Directs efforts to restore power to3P09, to 3P09, ultimately power restoration to 3-P09 3*P09 will not be successful.
SRO IF power can NOT be restored restora:l to 3P09 within 1 hour, THEN perform the actions of Technical Specifications as directed by the Shift Manager. Manager.
- 13
0 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: No. : 2009-301 Scenario No.No.:: 1 Event No.:4 Page 3 of 3 Description : 120 VAC power panel3P09is deenergized. Event
Description:
deenergjzed. The crew responds using 3-ONOP-003.9 to control co ntrol Pressurizer Pressure, Pressure , Pressurizer Level, Level, and Steam Generator Gene rator level. level. The SRO addresses LCO 3.8.3.1 3 .8 .3 .1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER EXAMIN ER NOTE 3.8.3.1 3.8 .3 .1 The following electrical busses* busses* shall shaU be energized in the specified manner with the tie breakers open between betwee n redundant busses within the unit** unit'" and between the busses of Units 3 and 4.
- j. 120 Volt AC Vital Panel 3P09 and 3P24 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 4A**** 4A.*"*"
(**** (".". A back-up inverter may be used to replace the normal inverter, inverter, provided the normal inverter on the same DC bus for the opposite unit is not replaced at the same time.) time .) APPLICABILITY:: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. APPLICABILITY 4. ACTION: ACTION : c.
- c. With one AC AC.. vital panel either not energized from its associated inverter, or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. D.C. bus:
(1) Reenergize the A AC.
.C. vital panel within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours;hours; and (2) reenergize the AC.A.C . vital panel from an inverter connected to its associated D.C. D.C . bus EXAMINER NOTE Proceed to event 5 14
Appendix Append ix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 E S-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301
Description:
- A Main Steam Une Event Description Scenario No.: 1 Line Leak Leakupstream degrades. The reactor trips and the crew responds using 3-EOP-E-O.
Event No.: 5 J.EOP-E-O. Page 1 of 4 upstream of the MSIV's begins and gradually Time Posi1ion Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to t"igger rigger lesson step EVENT 5 - Main Steam line Line Leak (actuates tactuatas TVSBVLS 0.2 ramp 10:00) TVSBVL6 10:00 ) CREW Recognizes the onset of the main steam line leak SRO Directs a manual trip of the reactor SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-O 3-EOP-E-O
,I~-----------------------,
~-----------------------f NOTE
~ I, RO I
Steps, rh/DUQh 4 are Steps 1 rhrough Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O: IMMEDIA TE ACTION steps IKe IMMED/A steps..
- --_._.. I
- Verifies reactor trip 0
0 0 Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing decreas ing May manually actuate Safety Injection, checks SI 51 if an auto actuation occurs. BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O: 3-EOP-E...Q: Verifies turbine tripped 0 Turbine stop valves closed 0 Manually closes MSR steam supply MOVs 0 May manually manua lly isolate the 3B MSIV 0 Mid & East GCBs open Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses 0 Determines Determ ines both 3A & 3B 38 4kV buses energized energ ized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 38 4kV bus
- 15
Appendix D A ppendi x 0 Operator Operat or Actions Form ES-D-2 ES-O-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No. : 1 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak Leakupstream Event No.: No.: 5 upstream of the MSIV's degrades. The reactor trips and the crew responds using 3-EOP-E-O. Page 2 of MSrV's begins and gradually 3-EOP-E-O. 4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
.-----------------------1
,----------NOTE-----------I I
NOTE I I
-- -- - - - - - - -- -- -- -- _.I shall be monitored for the remainder of this procedure.
FOLDOUT Page silall ________________________ 1 CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-O 3-EOP-E-O Foldout page (see page 18) BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification (See next page for detailed actions) RO Isolates AFW flow to the 38 3B S/G. S/G. SRO Directs RO in performance of 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-O subsequent actions. actions . RO Checks all AFW Pumps RUNNING
- RO RO RO Checks AFW valve alignment proper Verifies total AFW flow greater than 345 gpm.
Rep thermal barrier alarms off. Checks RCP RO Adjusts total AFW flow to 345 gpm to "A" & "C" S/G. S/G . RO Checks PRZ PORVs, PORVs , Spray Valves and Excess Letdown Isolated RO Checks if RCPs should be stopped (may already be tripped based on foldout page criteria). If subcooling is less than 25°, trips RCP's. CREW Diagnoses the main steam line break SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-E-2 BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification STA Provides the RO with stabilization S/G pressure information.information. RO Stabilizes RCS temperature using Steam Dump to Atmosphere Valves
- 16
Appendix D0 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Form ES-O-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:
No.: 1 Event
Description:
During the performance of 3-EOp*E-O, 843A fails to auto open when SI actuates. No.: 5 Event No.: Page 3 of 4
~EOP-E-O, cold leg injection valve 3-MOV-actuates. The crew manually opens 3MOV-843A to initiate Train A injection flow.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification
- Manually isolates the 383B MSIV
- Places Main Feed pump HS to STOP
- Reduces Feedwater control valve signal to 0
- Places FWIV MOV-3-1407, 1408 & 1409 HS to CLOSE
- Places SI Cold Leg Injection valve 3-MOV-843A HS to OPEN
- Places the Unit 4 HHSI pumps HS to STOP
- Depresses SI 8 1reset PB
- Resets Cont Isolation Phase A
- If RCP's running running,, places 3-MOV-1417 and 1418 to OPEN
- If RCP's Rep's running, running , places Normal Containment Coolers HS to START BOP Directs SNPO to align PAHMS per ~OP-094 3-0P-094 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No. No.:: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 4 of 4 Event
Description:
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leakupstream Leak upstream of the MSIV's MS1V' s begins and gradually degrades. degrades. The reactor trips and the crew responds using 3-EOP-E-O. 3-EOP-E-O. FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE E.{) E-O 1.
- 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IE IF either of the conditions listed below occur. occur, THEN use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature .t 180 ~ F 2: 180' QE OR Containment rad(;iion radiation levels .;: 1 . 3x10~ Rlhr
.:: 1.3x105 WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values values.. .I.!:1!t:!
THEN normal setpoints can again be used IE IF the Ihe TSC T5C determines that containment Integrated integrated dose rate has not exceeded 106 Rads . 2.
- 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- a. i.E.
IF both conditions listed below occur. occur. THEN trip all Reps. RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI 51 pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING RUNN1NG 8!:iQ 8!!ill SI FLOWPATH FlOWPATH VERIFIED.
- 2) RCS subcoohng subcooling - LESS l ESS THAN 25"F[65°F]
25' F[65°F] b. b, !E phase B actuated. I.!:!§:f I!::!.St! trip all RCPs RCPs.. 3.
- 3. FAULTED SIG S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA
!E any SIG decreasing in an uncontrolled manner QE S/G pressure decreasmg .QB any S/G depressurized, I.!::!.S.ti SJG completely depressurized. THEN the following performed :
following may be performed: a.
- a. feedwater Maintain total feedwa ter flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow naHO'N range level in In at least one S/G 5/G is greater than 6%[32%).
6%[32%}. b.
- b. faulted SIG(s).
Isolate AFW flow to faulted S/G(s).
- c. Stabilize RCS ReS hot leg temperature using steam dumps when faulted SIG has blown down to less faulted S/G than 10% wide range.
- 4. RUPTURED S/G S /G ISOLATION CRITERIA if. any S/G level
!E increases in an uncontrolled manner QE QB. any S/G has abnormal radiation radiation., 8tiQ AND narrow range levelleve! in affected SlG(s)
S/G(s) is greater than 6%[32%]. 6%132%1. .I!::!5!i THEN feed flow fl ow may be stopped to affected SIG(s S/G(s). ). 5.
- 5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA a.
a !E two AFW pumps are operating on a single train
!E. train,, I!:!5.!:Lone
!!!5!i..0ne of the pumps shall Shall be shut down within initial start signa!
withm one hour of the Initial signal b.
- b. !E
.!£. two AFW trains are operating and one of the AFW pumps has been operating at low flow of 60 gpm or less ior for one hour, THEN that AFW pump shall be shut down dO\VTl 6.
- 6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, 10%, THEN add makeup to CST C5T using 3-0 3-0P-018.1.
P-018.1, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK. 18
Appendix 0D Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: No.: 1 Event No. No.:: 6 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Description:
The crew completes the applicable steps of 3-EOP-E-O 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-2. The 36 3-EOP-E-2. 3B MStV MSIV fails to auto close during the steam line break, the crew manually closes the MSIV and isolates feed to the faulted S/G S/G..
'T':.
Time - Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-E-2. SRO Di rects response using 3-EOP-E-2 Directs CAUTIONS
- At least one SlG S/G must be maintained available for ReS coo/down.
RCS cooldown
- faulted S/G or secondary breClk Any faulred subsequenr break is;5 required to subsequent recovery actions unless needed for ReS (0 be maintained isolared RCS cooldown.
coo/down. isolated during r----------~~-----------I I I I ReS_OOlle9 hot leg temperature should be slabiflled stabilized using steam dumps when the {auf/eel faulted SlG S/G has ______________________ I
~ _elown blown __
down __ to less
/0 than_ _SlG 10% _wiele wide _indication range ___
indication.. _________ J RO Manually closes 3-PV-2605 "B" S/G MSIV (if not already closed closed)) RO Verifies u8""B" S/G was faultedfaulted.. CAUTION If the AFW pumps are the only available source of '"d flow, a s feed flow, steam team supply to the AFW pumps must be maintained from at least one S/G. SlG. RO Isolates A AFWFW to the 38 3B S/G and maintains greater than 345 gpm total AFW flow to the 3A and 3C S/Gs. (May already be complete in 3-EOP-E-O) RO Directs SN SNPOfTO/FS POITOJFS to de-energize & close 38 3B SG AFW steam supply isolation MOV-3-1404. MOV 1404. Crew Critical Task Isolate feed and steam for the faulted SG prior to transitioning from E-2. &2. CREW Verifies 38 3B S/G is isolated BOP Directs chemistry to sample S/G S/G,, monitor DAM 1
- BOP Directs HP to survey Main Steam Lines 19 lines
Appendix Appe ndix D Operator Actions ES-D-2 Form ES*D*2
- Op-Test Op*Test No.:No. : 2009-30 2009-3011 Scenario No.: No.: 1 No. : 6 Event No.:
Event
Description:
The crew completes the applicable steps of 3-EOP-E-O and tran 3-EOP-E-2. The 38 MSIV fails to auto close during the steam line break, 3-EOP-E-2. Page 2 of 2 transitions sitions to break, the crew manually closes the MSIV and isolates feed to the faulted S/G S/G..
- 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS occurs, It!.5!:i IF either of the conditions listed below occurs. THEN use adverse containment selpolnts setpoints:.
Containment atmosphere temperature .: ::: 180"F 180°F OR 1.3x 1O~5 Rlhr Containment radiation levels 2;:: 1.3x10 Rihr
~ containment parameters drop below the above Values. values, I!:!5!:!
~ normal setpoints can again be used
!E containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded 10& 106 Rads.
Rads .
- 2. Rep RCP TRIP CRITERIA a.
a, !.E IF all conditions listed below occur. occur. THEN trip all RePs: RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI 51 pumps - AT LEAST ON ONE E RUNNING AND 8 SI1FLOWPATH VERIFIED
- 2) RCS SUbcooling subcooling - LESS THAN 25' > F[65°F]
25°F[65°F] ReS cooldown is NOT in progress
- 3) Controlled RCS
- b. actuated.. THEN trip all RCPs IF phase B actuated
- 3. 51 TERMINATION CRITERIA SI occur. THEN go to 3-EOP-ES-1.
IF all conditions listed below occur. 3-EOP-ES-1.11., SI TERMINATION, TERMINATION. Step 1:
- a. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN 30°F[See below Table]
51 TERMINATION ADVERSE SUBCOOLING VALUE RCS PRESSURE (PSIG) ADVERSE SUBCOOLING VALUE
< 2485 AND;:: 2000 ;:: 55 of
< 2000 AND;:: 1000 2: 85 of
< 1000 2: 210°F
- b. intact SGs - GREATER THAN 345 GPM QB.
Total feed flow to inlact QB narrow range level in alleasl at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 6%[32%] c
- c. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 psig] .8t!Q M!Q STABLE OR INCREASING
- d. level-- GREATER THAN 17%[50%]
PRZ level 17%(50%] 4,
- 4. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA
.!E.
IF any S/GSIG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner .Q!! QB has completely depressurized at!!2. that depressurized,. .e.t!Q SIG has NOT been isolated, THEN go to 3-EOP-E-2. SJG 3-EOP-E-2. FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION ISOLATION,. Step 1.
~~~ffi~~.an 5.
S. E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA IF any SIG level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR any SSIG /G has abnormal radiation, It!!ili. THEN manually start 51I pumps as necessary and go to 3-EOP-E-3. 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1. S.
- 6. COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER SWITCH OVER CRITERIA
!E IF RWST level decreases to less than 155,000 gallons.
155.000 gallons. THEN go to 3-EOP-ES-l 3-EOP-ES-1 .3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION , Step 1.
- 7. RECIRCULATION SUMP BLOCKAGE IF RHR pump flow ANO AND amps become erratic OR abnormally low after recirculation has been established, THEN transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1 ..1. LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, Step 1,
- 1. lOSS 1.
- 8. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA IE
!E CST level decreases to less than 10%, 10%. THEN add maKeupmakeup to CST using 3-0P-018.1. Condensate Storage TanK Tank..
9. 9 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR SI 51 ON OTHER UNIT IE IF SI has been reset, AND either offsite power is lost OR 5 SI1 actuates on the other unit. THEN restore safeguards equipment to required configuration . Refer to ATIACHMENT 3 for essential loads. 20
Appendix D 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- No.:: 2009-301 Op-Test No.
Event
Description:
Once the 3B Scenario No.: No.: 1 61ent No.: 7 6tent Page 1 of 5 38 S/G has been isolated, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and subsequently to 3-EOP-ES 1.1 to terminate SI. 8 1. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. 3-EOP-E-1 . SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-1. 3-EOP-E-1.
~----------~~-----------,
~----------~ ~-- - --------,I I
I Foldout page is required /0 to be monitored throughout this procedure. I CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-1 Foldout page (see page 23 for foldout) RO Monitors for continued RCP Rep operation (if Rep's RCP's are running). ft BOP Checks "8 "B" S/G isolated BOP Controls AFW flow to maintain "A" uN & "C"~ C M S/G NR levels 15%,....50% 15%-50% CREW Directs Chemistry to take activity samples on all S/Gs & DAM1 DAM 1 monitor readings. readings . CREW Directs HP to take main steam Hne line radiation readings. CAUTION CAUT I ON If any PRZ PORV opens because of high PRZ pressure, it is required to be verified closed or isolated after pressure decreases decre<lses to less than th<ln the PORV setpoint. RO Check PRZ PORVs and Block Valves CLOSED RO Verifies SI - RESET RO Verifies Containment Isolation Phase A - RESET BOP Verifies Instrument Air Containment Isolation, Isolation, C\L3-2B03 C'J.3-2803 - OPEN AND Verifies instrument air pressure, P1-3-1444 P~3-1444 - GREATER THAN 95 PSIG BOP Checks power supply to all Charging Pumps Pumps-- ALIGNED TO OFFSITE POWER 21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.:
No.: 2009-301 Event
Description:
Once the 3B Scenario No.: No.: 1 38 S/G has been isolated and subsequently to 3-EOP-ES 1,1 No.: 7 Event No.: Page 2 of 5 isolated,, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 1.1 to terminate S SI.I. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Performs Attachment 4 to establish charging. charging. 0 Checks RCPRep thermal barrier alarms off. 0 Starts One Charging Pump
*0 Places Pla ReS Makeup Control Switch in STOP ces RCS
*0 Starts additional charging pumps if needed and offsite power available
*0 Adjusts Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, Exchanger, HCV-3-121 ,
to maintain proper seal injection flow 0 Verifies charging pump suction auto transfers to RWST if required . SRO Checks if 8 SI1 Should be Terminated
*0 RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs -GREATER THAN 30°F ReS
*0 reed flow to intact S/Gs - GREATER THAN 345 GPM Total feed OR 0 Narrow range level in at least one intact S/G- GREATER THAN 6%
*0 Pressure - GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG AND 0* Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING 0 PRZ level-level - GREATER THAN 17%
SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-ES-1 .1
- 22
Appendix D 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ES-O-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Event
Description:
Scenario No.: 1
Description:
The crew completes the applicable steps of J.EOP*E-O 3-EOP-E-2. The 38 MSIV fails to auto close during tre steam line break Event No.:No. : 6 Page 3 of 5 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to break,, the crew manually closes the MSrV MSIV and isolates feed to the faulted S/G .
- 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS
!.E occurs. ~
IF either of the conditions listed below occurs, THEN use adverse containment setpoints: setpoints: Containment atmosphere temperature --= 180~ F
~ 180°F OR Containment radiation levels _ 1.3x 1055 Rlhr
", 1.3x10
~ containment parameters drop below the above values, It!5!i !!:!5!:!. normal setpoints can again be used
!E containment integrated dose rate has not nol exceeded 10 10~6 Rads.
Rads .
- 2. Rep TRIP CRITERIA RCP a..
a IF all conditions listed below occur, occur. :rt!.£t! THEN trip all Reps: RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 8!:!Q. AND SI $1 FLOWPATH VERIFIED
- 2) RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25' RCS siJbcooling F[65°F]
25°F[65°F]
- 3) Controlled RCS cooldown is NOT in progress
- b. IF phase B actuated. THEN trip all RCPs
- 3. SI TERMINATION CRITERIA IF all conditions listed below occur, occur. THEN go to 3-EOP-ES-1.1, TERMINATION , Step 1:
3-EOP-ES-l .1. SI TERMINATION.
- a. RCS subcooling based on core exit res TCs - GREATER THAN 30' F[See below Table]
30°F[See SI TERMINATION ADVERSE SUBCOOLING VALUE RCS ReS PRESSURE (PSIG} PSIG ADVERSE SUBCOOLING VALUE
<- 2485 AND
< AND;;:~ 2000 ;;: 55 O
~ ~F F
< 2000 AND;;:
<- AND '> 1000 '>;;: 85 of
< 1000
<- ;;:210"F
'> 21O" F b.
b Total feed flow to intact SGs - GREATER THAN 345 GPM .QB QB narrow range level in alleast at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 6%[32%) Intact 6%[32%] c. c RCS ReS pressure - GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 psig]8!:!Q psigl .!!:!Q STABLE OR INCREASING
- d. PRZ level level-- GREATER THAN 17%150%1 17%[50%]
- 4. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA LE any S/G pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner .QB
!E QB. has completely depressurized, 8.tiQ that depressurized . !iliQ S/G has NOT been isolated ., THEN go to 3-EOP-E-2 SIG 3-EOP-E-2.. FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, ISOLATION.
Step 1. 5.
- 5. E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA IF any S/GSIG level increases in an uncontrolled uncontroUed manner OR any SIG S/G has abnormal radiationradiation,, THEN manually start SI pumps as necessary and go to 3-EOP-E-3. 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE RUPTURE,, Step 1. 1,
- 6. COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCH SWITCHOVER OVER CRITERIA IF RWST level decreases to less than 155.000 155,000 gallons.
gallons , THEN go to 3-EOP-ES-1.3, 3-EOP- ES-l .3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, RECIRCULATION, Step 1. 1.
- 7. RECIRCULATION SUMP BLOCKAGE IE IF RHR pump flow ANO AND amps become erratic OR abnormally low arter after recirculation has been established, established ,
THEN transition to 3-EOP-ECA-U 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 ., LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, RECIRCULATION , Step 1. 8. S. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN add makeup 1 to 0 CST using 3-0P-018.1, 3-0P-01S .1. Condensate Storage Tank .
- g.
9 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR SI ON OTHER UNIT LE IF SISI /las reset , illiQ has been reset, AND either offsite power IS eqUipment to required configuration safeguards eqUIpment 23 is lost OR configuration., Refer to An SI actuates on the other unit. ACHMENT 3 for essential loads. ATIACHMENT unit, I!:!5!:i THEN restore
Appendix D 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 200g.301 2009-301 Scenario No.:
Description:
Once the 3B Event
Description:
No. : 1 Event No.: 7 38 S/G has been isolated,the isolated , the crew will and subsequently to 3-EOP-ES 1.1 to terminate SI. 81. Page 4 of 5 w~1 transition to 3-EOP-E-1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-ES-1.1. 3-EOP-ES-1 . 1. CREW Monitors 3-EOP-ES-1.1 3-EOP-ES-1 .1 Foldout page (see page 25 for foldout) RO Verifies SI - RESET RO Verifies Containment Isolation Phase A - RESET BOP Verifies Instrument Air Containment Isolation, C\L3-2803 C\L3-2B03 - OPEN AND pressure , P1-3-1444 - GREATER THAN 95 PSIG Verifies instrument air pressure, RO Checks Charging Flow Established RO Places both RHR pump HS to OFF Places both HHSI pump HS to OFF CREW CRITICAL TASK: Limit HHSI HHSt operating time at shutoff head on minimum flow recirculation to 55 minutes during a steamline break. RO Verifies SI 81 flow not required . RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN 30°F ReS AND PRZ level - GREATER THAN 17% EXAMINER NOTE The scenario is terminated when Safety Injection is terminated in 3-EOP-ES-1.1. 3-EOP-ES-1.1 .
- 24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2.
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Event
Description:
Scenario No.: Description : Once the 38 S/G has been isolated, and subsequently to 3-EOP-ES 1.1 to terminate SI. No.: 1 Event No.:No.: 7 Page 5 of 5 isolated, the crew will transition tran sition to 3-EOP-E-1 3-EOP-E-1 3-EOP-ES-1 3-EOP-E S-1.1 .1 Foldout Page
- 1. AOYERSE CONTAINMENT ADVERSE CONIAINMENT CONDITIONS
!E
!.E either of the conditions listed below occurs.occurs, !!::!EN I!::i§!:! use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature ...: :c: 180 Q 180°F F OR Containment radiation levels 2: :: 1.3x 105 Rlhr 1.3x 10 R1hr X!!::!§.!::! containment parameters drop below the above values, !!::!EN
~ I!::i§!:! normal setpoints can again be used IF containment Integrated integrated dose rate rale has not exceeded 106 Rads.
- 2. 51 SI RE-INITIATION CRITERIA I.E IF either condition listed bela' below.... occurs following Sllenninalion, SI termination , THEN manually start SI pumps as necessary to restore ReS RCS subcootlng subcooling and PRZ level ., AND go to 3-EOP-E-1, 3-EOP*E* 1. LOSS l OSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT. COOLANT, Step 1:
** ReS RCS subcooling based on cote core exit TCsTes - LESS THAN 30' 30 ' F[See below Table]
SI 51 RE-INITIATION RE-INITIATlON ADVERSE SUBCOOLING SUBCOOl!NG VALUE RCS PRESSURE (PSIG) PSIG ADVERSE SUBCOOLING 5UBCOOLING VALUE
< 2485 ANDAND?::> 2000 < 55 O ofF AND?!~ 1000
< 2000 AND < 85 OF
< 1000 <2 10°F 210°F OR
- PRZ level - CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 17%[50%]
- 3. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA
!E CST level decreases to less than 10%,
lE 10%. .!t!.5.t:!.
~ add makeup to CST using 3-0P-018.1. CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK TANK..
- 4. LOSS OF OFFSITE OFF SITE POWER OR SI 51 ON OTHER UNIT
!E lE SI has been reset AND either offsite power is lost QB SI actuates on the other unit, !!::!EN restore unit. !.tiS!:!
safeguards equipment to required configuration. AnACHMENT 3 for essential loads. configuration. Refer to ATIACHMENT loads .
- 25
( jNRC2S cenario,22 ?tJ OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT
~
ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shif! Mg" Fi, 'd S OPY.' i <po, Admin RCO, ANPO, Unit 3 Unit4 Unit 4 Uni' Sopv., Uni! s opv. , RCO , RC O , NI'O, NPO,
~
Unit 3 Unit 4 Mod" , I 100 100 MW" RCS 8 0ro" Con"
~
Lill MW"
; ro" ReS Do ron Con"
, 75 6 1ft-I
( 9"
, ODS: 313 pump out of service due to packing leakage. Sclu-duled
.. return to service The National WCilther Service has issued a severe thunderstOrm warning for Miami-Dade County er ice in 14 ounty U3 LeO I none none U4 LCO Actions:
none
; of . Focus I none
Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator (, C SMode: 1 Res l eakrate RCS leakrate Accumulator I r Ref l evels
~
~
Power: MWe: Tavg: RCS Pressure: RCS Boron, Cone: Con e: I~ 100 762 574 2250 680 Gross: Unidentified Charging Pps:
.02
.01
.01 A 6614 8 6631 C 6621 Abnormal Annunciators:
Annunciator:: Comp Actions: Annunciator: r" Comp Actions: Ann un ciator: r, Comp Actions: Annunciator: Annunc iator: Co mp Actions: I Cc Annunciator: r, Comp Actions:: Annunciator: r.omp Actions:: Annunciator:: _ Action : Comp AClions: C ~Annunciator: ( Comp Camp Actions:clions: A nnuntiator: Annunciator: I Comp Actions: Actions : Annunciator: ICompomp Actions: clions: C u rrent Tech TccbSncc (Does Nott Include,_"For Trackinf!, OnLy Sncc Action Statements::~No O nly Items" T.S.A.S T.S.A . I Component: omponent: Rea Re;lson:on: I Entry
£mry Uule Date::
. . iiI 'Component:
T.S.A.S Reason: I Entry En.,), Dale: Date: T.S.A.S . iiI 'Component: Rea on: Reason: I Entry F.n.", Dale: Date:
- r.
T.S.A.S S .A .S "I Component: Reason: I Entry Enn)' Datc: Da,,: T.S.A.S I/ Component: Componem: Rca on: Reason: I Entry En.ry Date: Dale:
~ ., ." .; I Component:
~
,T.S.A.S Re on:
*~ntry En.')' Date:
Dale:
Unit 3 Status C)B ~rain Changes to Risk Significant
, ' 0 .
I Equipment: C train protected bothI uni Dnlin risk Online risk isis green gr en unitsts Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities: nonc none Upcoming, MaioO Major POD Activities: . Immediatel Immediate ly afier aft r shin shift: turnover perform th the Quarterly
'<' ,, 1ST of of3-0SP-206.2 . s etion, 7.3 7.3.. TPCW 1pew HX JCWlew IIsoolati lati on Va lves on Val es POV-3-4882 & & 4883 stroke tim lime test.
lest. The shift hift manager has granted pennission permission to perform th pcrfonn the te l. Operators to supp lesl. Operators support the evolution rt the briefi d and arc olution have been briefed are on slation. station. Maintain Maintain 100% steady state power. (" JUpcomingI ECOs '0 to Han. Hang and lor Release: non nonc Evolutions* o orr Compensatory Actions* In in Progress : non none General Information. Remarks .and and Operator~ Work Around Status: IAuX:SJeam Condenser iinleakageI '" ~"O' ~ Aux. steam supply aligned from unit 4. 0 scfm.
\
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description
- Facility:
Examiners: Turkey Point Scenario No.: Candidates: 2 NEW Op Test No.: 2009-301 US RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1 100% MOL. Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3B charging pump out of service due to packing leakage. Scheduled return to service in 14 hours. The National Weather Service has issued a severe thunderstorm warning for Miami-Dade County Immediately after shift turnover perform the Quarterly 1ST of 3-0SP-206.2 section 7.3. TPCW HX ICW Isolation Valves POV-3-4882 & 4883 stroke time test. The shift manager has granted permission to perform the test. Operators to support the evolution have been briefed and are on station. Maintain 100%. Online risk - green B train protected both units Event Event Type Event Description No.
- 1 2
TFKC882A= T TVHNL1B = 8.7 e-04 3 min ramp (N) BOP (N) SRO (TS) SRO (R) ALL TPCW HX ICW Isolation Valves POV-3-4882 stroke time test using 3-0SP-206.2 section 7.3 During the test, the valve will fail to close and will be declared inoperable. 3B RCP #1 seal failure gradually develops, the crew enters 3-0NOP 41.1 and subsequently to 3-0NOP-100 which will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load. TFBVSHRA (C) RO When the power reduction has started, the 3A BATP shaft shears, the crew 3 =T (C) SRO will initiate boration by starting the 3B BATP using 3-0NOP-46.4 3A S/G pressure transmitter PT-3-475 fails low. The crew manually controls TFS1MBWL (I) BOP 4 =T 3A S/G level manually to maintain plant operation using the ARP and 3-(TS, I) SRO ONOP-49.1. TVHHPBFB 3B RCP shaft seizes due to the onset of the seal failure. The reactor fails to 5 = 13 min automatically trip due to an ATWS. Crew enters 3-FRP-S1 to initiate a local ramp reactor trip. TFHP1CLK= Crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-0 once the reactor is tripped. A SBLOCA 6 0.53 min (M)ALL develops through a gradually degrading code safety valve. The crew ramp. transitions to 3-EOP E-1 and trips RCP's.
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (Mlajor
- 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description
- Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #2 Event 1 - The crew will perform TPCW HX ICW Isolation Valves POV-3-4882 stroke time test using 3-0SP-206.2 section 7.3. During the test, the valve will fail to close and will be declared inoperable.
Event 2 - 38 RCP #1 seal failure gradually develops, the crew enters 3-0NOP 41.1 and subsequently to 3-0NOP-100 which will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load. Event 3 - When the power reduction has started, the 3A 8ATP shaft shears, the crew will initiate boration by starting the 38 8ATP using 3-0NOP-46.4 Event 4 - 3A S/G pressure transmitter PT-3-475 fails low. The crew manually controls 3A S/G level manually to maintain plant operation using the ARP and 3-0NOP-49.1. Event 5 -The 38 RCP shaft seizes due to the onset of the seal failure. The reactor fails to automatically trip due to an ATWS. Crew enters 3-FRP-S1 to initiate a manual boration and manual turbine trip. Critical Task Event 6 - The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripped. A S8LOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor is tripped, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and trip the reactor coolant pumps. Critical Task
- 2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description
- Scenario XXV NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-1 (100% power MOL)
- Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXV_NRC_2.lsn
- Place simulator in run Trigger lesson step:
- SETUP - 38 Charging pump OOS. Removes 38 charging pump from service.
(Actuates TAB1POSM = RACKOUT)
- S ETU P - A TWS (actuates TFL2XASE = T, TFL2XBSE = T TFL4AF=T)
- Place clearance info tag on 38 Charging Pump start switch
- Provide an in progress procedure 3-0SP-206.2 step 7.3.9
- Provide shift turnover checklists Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RCO desk to the Utilities screens.
Place a stopwatch on the Unit Supervisor desk. Perform Simulator Operator Checklist
- 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description
- Event 1 POV-3-4882 & 4883 Stroke Time Test Initiated immediately after shift turnover.
The crew will perform TPCW HX ICW Isolation Valves POV-3-4882 stroke time test using 3-OSP-206.2 section 7.3. During the test, the valve will fail to close and will be declared inoperable. When the BOP has placed the HS for POV-3-4882 to close, ensure lesson step EVENT 1 - POV-3-4882 FAIL TO CLOSE is inserted after 30 seconds. (actuates TFKC882A with a 30 second delay.) If directed, respond as SM, grant permission to perform this test. If directed, respond as FS and report local valve position indication section of the test is not required. If directed, respond as FSITO and report POV-3-4882 is in mid position and has stopped moving. There is no apparent cause for the failure of the valve. If directed, respond as SM and acknowledge the failure of POV-3-4882. If directed, respond as WCC if requested to prepare a PWO/Clearance and notify maintenance. Event 2 38 Rep #1 Seal Failure and Fast Load Reduction
- The 3B RCP #1 seal failure gradually develops, the crew enters 3-0NOP 41.1 When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - 38 RCP #1 seal failure.
(actuates TVHNL1B = 8.7 e-04 3 min ramp) If directed, wait 3 to 5 minutes and respond as SNPO, "Seal Injection flow to all RCP's is 8 gpm." The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the 3B RCP seal failure. If directed, respond as System when called about load reduction. If directed, respond as SM when told to review 0-EPIP-201 01 & 0-ADM-115 for notification requirements. State that the NRC Resident will be notified of the fast laod reduction. If directed, respond as chemistry to take samples. No response back required. If directed, respond as FSITO to align aux steam using attachment 1. No response back required. If directed, respond as SNPO. After 1-3 min Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - INCREASE NRHX FLOW TO 780 GPM (actuates TAKA834 = 0.6). Report when complete.
- 4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description
- Event 3 3A BATP Shaft Shear When the power reduction has started, the 3A BATP shaft shears, the crew will initiate boration by starting the 3B BATP using 3-0NOP-46.4 When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - 3A BATP Shaft Shear.
(actuates TFE3GA25=T) If directed, respond as WCC to prepare a PWO/Clearance. If directed, respond as SNPO if directed to inspect 3A BATP. After 2-4 min., report 3A BATP coupling has failed and the motor is still running. Event 4 PT 475 Fails Low The 3A S/G pressure transmitter PT-3-475 fails low. The crew will take manual control of 3A S/G by controlling FCV-3-478 to maintain plant operation using 3-0NOP-49.1. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 PT-3-475 Fails Low. (actuates TFS1MBWL =T) If directed, respond as WCC if requested to prepare a PWO/Clearance and notify I&C. If directed, respond as I&C and acknowledge request to troubleshoot and repair PT-3-475. If directed, respond as TO to inspect the main steam platform area around PT-3-475. Wait 5 minutes and report that you observe no apparent damage. If directed, respond as FSITO if directed to reset AMSAC. Wait 3 min, then trigger EVENT 4, Reset AMSAC (actuates TCL4RST = T). Report when complete. Event 5 3B Rep Shaft Seizes The 3B RCP shaft seizes due to the onset of the seal failure. The reactor fails to automatically trip due to an ATWS. Crew enters 3-FRP-S1 to initiate a manual boration and manual turbine trip. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3B RCP shaft seizes (actuates TVHHPBFB = 1 with a 3 min ramp.) If directed to locally trip the reactor, respond as TOIFS. When directed by the lead evaluator, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - LOCALLY OPEN RX TRIP BKRS (actuates TFL2XASE=F then TFL2XBSE=F 15 sec later). Report when complete. Event 6 Pressurizer Safety Valve failure The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripped. A SBLOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor is tripped, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-O and ultimately 3-EOP-E-1. The reactor coolant pumps will be tripped when subcooling is lost. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - Pressurizer Safety
- Valve failure. (actuates TFHP1CLK=O.5 3 min ramp.)
5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description
- When directed respond as the FS/SNPO to place PAHMS in service, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN PAHM FOR SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A=1.0130 sec delay, TAC2V02B=1.011 min delay, TAAAV21=1.0/2 min delay, TAAAV22=1.013.5 min delay & TACA005=O.O). Report completion 10-15 min later.
If directed, respond as Chemistry to sample S/G, monitor DAM-1 If directed, respond as HP to perform surveys .
- 6
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
The crew will perform TPCW HX ICW Isolation Valves POV-3-4882 stroke time test using 3-0SP-206.2 section 7.3. During the test, the valve wll fail to close and will be declared inoperable. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs 3-0SP-206.2 section 7.3 actions. BOP Places 3A TPCW Hx Isolation Valve POV-3-4882 handswitch to CLOSE. Notes After the BOP places POV-3-4882 HS to close, direct facility operator to trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - POV-3-4882 FAIL TO CLOSE is inserted after 30 seconds.(actuates TFKC882A with a 30 second delay.) r- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. I NOTE I I The tested Intake Cooling Water Valves are operable if aI/ test values are within the specified ranges. I I I
~----------------- ______ I
- Examiner Note:
TPCW Hx Isolation Valve POV-3-4882 and 4883 will have a significant delay from the time of switch actuation until the time the valve begins to stroke. BOP Notes POV-3-4882 does not fully close SRO Declares A ICW INOPERABLE and enters LCO 3.7.3.b action c Examiner Note: 3.7.3 The Intake Cooling Water System (ICW) shall be OPERABLE with:
- b. Two ICW headers.
- c. With only one ICW header OPERABLE, restore two headers to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
When the SRO has addressed Tech Specs for ICW, direct facility operator to tigger lesson step EVENT 2 - 3B RCP #1 seal failure. (actuates TVHNL1B =8.7 e-04 3 min ramp)
- 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
3B RCP #1 seal failure gradually develops, the crew enters 3-0NOP 41.1 and subsequently to 3-0NOP-1 00 which will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - -- -- -- NOTES _..
I I
- Foldout Page Is required to be monitored throughout this procedure. I I
- Off-normal RCP Conditions that require shutdown of a RCP shall be verified by I I cross-checking all RCP parameters. I I
- If either 38 or 3C Reps are stopped by the petiormance of this procedure. then the I I associated RCS loop pressurizer spray valve should be closed to prevent back-flow I through the valve.
I I
~----------------- _ _ _ _ _ _ I RO Notes increasing trend on FR-3-154A BOP Verifies alarm A 1/5 and 6/5 SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-041.1.
CREW Reviews 3-0NOP-041.1 foldout page actions (see page 3) RO Checks For Proper Seal Injection Flow, may dispatch SNPO to a local seal injection verification. RO Verifies seal leakoff is NOT within the limits of enclosure 1. SRO Goes to step 16
.!iQ!5
- - - - - - - - - - - - - I I I
- An seal Rep STANDPIPE HI LEVEL alarm is indication of 0.5 gpm flow past the number two I I
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - _.I SRO Determines 3B RCP Seal Leakoff flow is greater than 5.5 RO Checks RCP Seal Bypass Valve CV-3-307 - CLOSED SRO Determines 3B RCP Seal Leakoff flow is less than 6 gpm.
- 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 5 Event
Description:
3B Rep #1 seal failure gradually develops, the crew enters 3-0NOP 41.1 and subsequently to 3-0NOP-100 which will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load. Time TimE=! I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT PAGE FOR PROCEDURE 3*0NOP*041.1
- 1. RCP Vibration Assessment Criteria
!E motor frame vibration, R-369 (Points 2, 6. 10) is greater than or equal to 3 mils but less than 5 mils, I!:::!.5!:!
contact Engineering to evaluate the condition.
- 2. RCP STOPPING CRITERIA IF any of the following Rep limits are reached. THEN manually trip the reactor. verify reactor trip using the EOP netvvork AND stop the affected Rep.
- Rep number one seal ~P - LESS THAN 200 psid.
- RCP number one sealleakofftemperatures on ERDADS - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 235=F.
- Rep pump bearing temperature on ERDADS - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 225°F.
RCP motor bearing temperature on ERDADS - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 195°F. RCP stator winding temperature on ERDADS
- GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 248°F Note exception in Foldout Page Item 4.
Motor frame vibration. R*369 (Points 2. 6, 10) - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5 MILS Note exception in Foldout Page Item 4.
- RCP shaft vibration. R-369 (Points 3. 7,11) - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 20 MILS Note exception in Foldout Page Item 4.
- 3. RCP SEAL CRITERIA FOR STOPPING RCP WHEN the RCP number one seal leakoff flow exceeds 6 gpm. THEN perform the following:
- a. Trip the reactor AND verify the reactor tripped using the EOP network.
- b. Stop the affected RCP.
- c. Close the applicable RCP Seal Leakoff Isolation Valve 303A, 3038. or 303C.
- 4. EXCEEDING VIBRATION OR STATOR TEMPERATURE LIMITS For the basis of obtaining data for startup. for balancing an RCP, or for shutdown operations; the Electrical Maintenance Supervisor or Component Engineering Supervisor may authorize continued RCP operations vtith vibration level or stator winding temperature above stopping criteria noted in Foldout Page Item 2. This authorization Is required to be obtained prior to starting the RCP.
- 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 5 Event
Description:
3B RCP #1 seal failure gradually develops, the crew entErS 3-0NOP 41.1 and subsequently to 3-0NOP-100 which will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load. T; Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Transitions to 3-0NOP-100 SRO Conducts a crew brief to conduct a power reduction, to trip the reacbr and trip 3B RCP. SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-100. SRO Performs 3-0NOP-100 brief (see next page). CREW Reviews 3-0NOP-1 00 foldout page actions (see page 6) SRO Determines 9 gal/% boric acid addition is required. RO Initiates boration:
- 1. Sets BA totalizer as directed (9 gal/% for 100% load decrease 900 gal BA)
- 2. Takes FC-3-113A pot
- 3. RMSS~BORA TE
~8.0 or as directed
=
- 4. RMCS~START RO Adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to obtain the Attachment 3 desired flow rate BOP Reduces turbine load.
- Maintains Tavg less than 5°F above Tref
- Maintains rods greater than insertion limit.
EXAMINER NOTE When the initial boration has been established, proceed to EVENT 4.
- 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 5 Event
Description:
38 Rep #1 seal failure gradually develops, the crew enters ~ONOP 41.1 and subsequently to 3-0NOP-100 which will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load. ATTACIL'.fEl'IT 3 (Page 1 of 1) FAST LOAD REDlTCTIOl'l BRIEF
- 1. Re(lson for load reduction
- 2. Target power level - - - % Power Time to Shutdo'wn from 100% 25 min 50 min 75 min 110 min Load Reduction Rate M\Vimin 30 MWimin 15 Y1W!min 10 Y1W/min 7 Y1Wimin Load Reduction Rate o'o/min 4 0'0 .' min 2 0 0 ! min 133 0 0 ;' min 1 % / min Expected TavgTref ~ T 4 of 3 of 2 of 1 of
- 3. Load reduction rate ;"'lw i minute I
Suggested boration is 9 gallons per % with control rods completely withdrawn and available, 18 gallons per % with no control rod movement (use a value between 9 and 18 I if rods are not fully withdrawn when starting a load reduction from full power). I* The Unit Supervisor may change the boration as desired during the load reduction . I
- 4. Boration Rate: _ _ _ total g(lllons / _ _ _ minutes = ___ gallons/minute.
- 5. Plaut Control Parameters and Contingency Actions
- T(l\'g! Tref expected tlT bam1. not to exceed +/-l OF of expected, slO\v ramp to restore bam1.
- If AmlUnciator B 8/1. ROD BANK LO LIMIT alarms, the load reduction shall be slowed.
- 6. EOP E-O transition criteria - Manual reactor and turbine trip:
- Tave"' 578 of
- Tave 6 :)F > Tref
- Rod Insertion Limits (RIL) are exceeded
- 7. Re\"iew required action:; hom other procedures clUTeutly in effect (example. stop RCP).
- 8. Questions or crew input"
- 9. End of Brief 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 5 of 5 Event
Description:
3B RCP #1 seal failure gradually develops, the crew enters 3-0NOP 41.1 and subsequently to ~ONOP-1 00 which will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load. Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3-0,IJOP-100 Foldout page
- 1. 3-EOP-E-O Transition Criteria IF any of the following limits are reached, THEN trip the Reactor and Turbine AND go to 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION:
- a. RCS Tavg - GREATER THAN 578 OF
- b. RCS Tavg - GREATER THAN Tref by 6 of
- c. Rod Insertion Limits are exceeded as indicated by:
- Rod Position Bank D Insertion Limit Recorder (VPA)
- Stepcounters on console
- Plant Curve Book Section 7, Figure 3
- 2. Notify Chemistry Department WHEN reactor power has changed by greater than or equal to 15 percent, THEN notify the Chemistry Department that RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.
- 3. Restore Blender to AUTO WHEN boration is complete. THEN restore the Blender to AUTO as follows.
- a. Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to AUTO
- b. Set FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller pot setting as desired
- c. Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START
- 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
When the power reduction has started, the 3A BATP shaft shears, the crew will initiate boration by starting the 3B BATP using 3-0NOP-46.4 Page 1 of 2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A SA TP Shaft Shear. (actuates TFE3GA25=T) RO Observes alarm A 2/5 and no flow on FR-3-113 RO Places makeup control switch to STOP RO May start 3B Boric Acid Transfer Pump and stop the 3A Boric Acid Transfer Pump. SRO Transitions to 3-0NOP-46.4 SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-46.4 RO Check boric acid or primary water makeup flow rates- ABNORMAL
- RO Verify RCS makeup control switch is in MID position with makeup I
system stopped r -- -- -- -- -- NOTES - - - - - - - - - - .., Steps 4 through 26 will need to be repeated as necessary to maintain an adequate I I suction source for the charging pumps and proper boron concentration until repairs are I I completed. I I , One percent VCT level indication is approximately 14.1 gal/ons. I I I RO Check the reactor makeup selector switch in BORATE SRO Determines additional boric acid should be added SRO Determines Boric Acid flow rate was LESS THAN EXPECTED BEFORE THE MAKEUP SYSTEM WAS STOPPED RO Calculate the amount of boric acid needed RO Verifies FC-3-113A pot ~8.0 or as directed RO Sets BA totalizer as directed RO Place the reactor makeup selector switch to BORATE
- RO Turn the RCS makeup control switch to START 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
When the power reduction has started, the 3A BATP shaft shears, the crew will initiate boration by starting the 3B BATP ushg 3-0NOP-46.4 Page 2 of 2 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Starts 3B Boric Acid Transfer Pump, if not already complete. RO Stops 3A Boric Acid Transfer Pump, if not already complete. I NOTE I I Normal Differential Pressure across the Boric Acid Filters should be less than 10 PS/D I L when I _______________________ boric acid flow has been established. ~ I RO Check Flow Rate On FR-3-113 EXAMINER NOTE Boric Acid flow has been established, the crew proceeds with reducing power.
- RO BOP Adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to obtain the Attachment 3 desired flow rate Reduces turbine load.
- 1. Maintains Tavg less than 5°F above Tref
- 2. Maintains rods greater than insertion limit.
~-----------------------,
I tiQ.!.5 I I Axial_flux_difference is allowed to exceed the Target Band during the load reduction without
~ _____________________
entering O-OP-059.9. Operation Within the Axial Flux Difference Operational Space. I J CREW Notifies plant management and System of the impending unit shutdown. RO Check pressurizer level following program CREW Verify load reduction rate and alto rod control is maintaining the expected TavgfTref t:. T identified in Attachment 3 RO Monitor RCP seal leakoff during the down power. EXAMINER NOTE:
- When power has been sufficiently reduced, proceed to EVENT 4 8
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenarb No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
3A S/G pressure transmitter PT-3-475 fails low. The crew controls 3A S/G level manually to maintain plant operation using ~ONOP-49.1. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavbr Direct facility operator totrigger lesson step EVENT 4 - PT-3-475 Fails Low. (actuates TFS1 MBWL =T) BOP Observes alarms C-4/1, 5/1 & 6/1, C-9/3 & 0-7/6 SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-049.1, may direct suspension of the boration. SRO Observes indicators PT-3-475 I FT-3-474 failing low and compares to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions. SRO Verifies no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels. BOP Manually controls FCV-3-478 and returns S/G level to program using 3-ARP-097.CR
- BOP SRO When 3A S/G level on program, selects FT-3-475 (channel 4 steam flow) for FCV-3-478 control & returns FCV-3-478 to AUTO.
Refers to LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 12 action 6 & LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3-2 Functional Unit 1e/1f/4d action 15 (b/s trip in 6 hr) SRO Makes determination to trip the following bistables within 6 hours.
- BS-3-474 (rack 16) & BS-3-475 I 478B1 I 478B2 I 478C (rack 17)
CAUTION The failed channel bistab/e(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in the tripped or test position and would result in an undesired Engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuation. The overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and, therefore, a possible reduction in plant protection. EXAMINER NOTE When the SRO selects which bistables to trip, proceed to e\ent 5. EXAMINER NOTE See next two pages for applicable Tech Specs. 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
3A S/G pressure transmitter PT-3-475 fails low. The crew controls 3A S/G level manually to maintain plant operation using 3-0NOP-49.1. Page 2 of 3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE: 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-1. MINIMur,1 TOTAL NO CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS IQJB!E QEEB8BLE MOPES ACTIQtl
- 12. Steam Generator Water Level** 2 strn. gen. 1 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. 1,2 Low COincident With Steam! level and level coin- level and Feedwater Flow Mismatch 2 stm ,~eed* cident with 2 stm/feed-waterflow 1 stmjfeed* waterflow mtsmatch in waterflow mISmatch In each stm gen mismatch in same stm. gen, same stm. or 2 stm gen gen. level and 1 stm)feedv/ater flow m,smatch IDsameslm oen ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.
EXAMINER NOTE: 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-2 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-3. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-2. ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-2.
- 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
3A S/G pressure transmitter PT-3-475 fails low. The crew controls 3A S/G level manually to maintain plant operation using 3-0NOP-49.1. Page 3 of 3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE E'll'lQIIQtJ~L UtJlI QE CI:l~tJl'lELS IQ..IBI.E QEEMBLE MQQES AQIIQtl 1 Safety Injection (Feedwater Isolation)
- e. High Differentml 3,l steam hne 2isteam !Ine 2!steam 12.3' 15 Pressure Betv."Cen on any steam line the Steam Line hne Header and any Stearn Line f StealT' Line now*-High 2lste3m line 1(steam line 1':steam hne 1.2.3' 15 Coincident 'fVtth In any two in any tvJO steam hnes steam lines Steam (Jenerator Pressure--low I/stearn 1lsteam 1isteam 1,2 J' 15 generator generator generator rn any two in any two steam lines stearn hnes 0'
Ta-',';i--Lwi lfloop I!loop In any llJoop in any I. 23' 25
~wo lOOPS tWD loops
- 4. Steam Line Isolation 4 Ste~m Une Isolation lContlOued) d Ste<lffi L,ne Flow--High 2fsteam line 1/steam !lnt?' 1istearn Jifle 1,2,3 15 CoInCident w,th: In any two in any nvo Steam Generator steam lines steam Hnes Pressure--Low 1}s1eam 1/5tearn listeam I. 2, 3 t5 generator generator generator In an-y two 10 any two steam hnes steam lines 0<
T~--low 1!Loop lnoop In liloop In I. 2, 3 25 any t't'lO any two loops lOOps ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.
- 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
The 3B RCP shaft seizes due to the onset of the seal failure. The reactor fails to automatically trip due to an A TWS. Crew enters 3-FRP-S 1 to initiate a manual boration and manual turbine trip. Time I'"' Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 38 Rep shaft seizes (actuates TVHHPBFB = 1 with a 3 min ramp.) RO/BOP Observes alarms F 1/1, B 1/2 and C 2/5 (first out) RO Observes increasing amps for 3B RCP and Low Coolant Flow Loop B RPS bistables tripped US Directs manual reactor trip when the RCS Low Flow trip setpoint is exceeded. EXAMINER NOTE The 3B RCP amps peg high in approx. 1 min and the trip setpoint for
- RO SRO RCS Loop Low Flow is exceeded in approx. 1.5 min.
Attempts to manually trip the reactor when the RCS Low Flow trip setpoint is exceeded. Enters 3-EOP-E-O then directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-S.1. SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-FR-S.1 CAUTION RCPs should not be tripped with reactor power GREA TER THAN 5%. I r----------~~-----------l I I Steps 1 and 2 are IMMEDIA TE ACTION steps. I
-------------------------I RO Verifies the reactor not tripped.
RO Ensures control rods drive in. BOP Manually trips turbine & closes MSR steam supply MOVs BOP Ensures all AFW pump turbines start. 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
The 3B RCP shaft seizes due to the onset of the seal failure. The reactor fails to automatically trip due to an ATWS. Crew enters 3-FRP-S1 to initiate a manual boration and manual turbine trip .
- Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Initiates Emergency Boration Of RCS
- 1. Verify charging pumps- AT LEAST ONE RUNNING IN MANUAL
- 2. Stops makeup system
- 3. Manually starts Boric Acid Pump 3B
- 4. Opens Emergency Boration Valve, MOV-3-350 RO Verifies HCV-3-121 & CV-3-310A open RO Establish emergency boration flow by manually adjusting charging pump
- speed to:
FI-3-110 - GREATER THAN 60 GPM FI-3-122A - GREATER THAN 45 GPM CREW CRITICAL TASK: Insert negative reactivity into the core by manually inserting RCCAs or establishing emergency boration flow to the RCS prior to completing step 4 of J.EOP-FR-S.1. RO Checks PRZ Pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG RO Verify Containment Instrument Air Bleed Isolation valves- CLOSED
- CV-3-2819
- CV-3-2826 CAUTION If an SI signal exists or occurs and the reactor Is subcritical, proper safeguards equipment alignment Is required to be verified using Attachment 3 of 3.EOP.E.Q, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, while continuing with this procedure.
CREW Directs the FSITO locally trip the Reactor Trip Breakers & MG set input
& output breakers 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
The 3B RCP shaft seizes due to the onset of the seal failure. The reactor fails to automatically trip due to an ATWS. Crew enters 3-FRP-S 1 to initiate a manual boration and manual turbine trip. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Examiner note: When the crew directs AND when the emergency boration has been established, direct the facility operator totrigger lesson step EVENT 5
- LOCALLY OPEN RX TRIP BKRS (actuates TFL2XASE=F then TFL2XBSE=F 15 sec later).
RO May trip 3B RCP if Rx Power is less than 5% and the 3B RCP is still running. RO Monitor Reactor Subcritical
- Power range channels - LESS THAN 5%
- Intermediate range channels- NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE SRO Observes Caution prior to Step 17 and gees to Step 17 CAUTION 8oration should continue during subsequent actions until adequate shutdown margin Is obtained.
- 14
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 8 Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripj:Sd. A SBLOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor is tripped, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and trip the reactor coolant pumps.
-r:
I Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator totrigger lesson step EVENT 6 - Pressurizer Safety Valve failure. (actuates TFHP1CLK=O.5 3 min ramp.) SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-E-0 step 1 SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-O I~-----------------------I NOTE I I Steps 1 through 4 are IMMEDIA TE ACTION steps. I RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O: Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing May manually actuate Safety Injection, checks SI if an auto actuation occurs. BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O: Verifies turbine tripped
- Turbine stop valves closed
- Manually closes MSR steam supply MOVs
- Mid & East GCBs open Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses
- Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus
*----------NOre-----------,
I I I FOLDOUT Page shall be monitored for the remainder of this procedure . I
- CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-O Foldout page (see page 18) 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 8 Event
Description:
The crew transitions to ~EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripped. A SBLOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor istripped, the crew will transition to ~EOP-E-1 and trip the reactor coolant pumps. Timp Dnr-i+i"..,.
.~ ,~
'" pplicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification (See next page for detailed actions)
RO Trips the 3B RCP when the Reactor Trip is verified. RO Trips RCP's on loss of subcooling when the HHSI flowpath is established. CREW CRITICAL TASK: Trip RCPs due to a loss of subcooling during a SBLOCA prior to completing step 12 of J.EOP-E-O. SRO Directs RO in performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions. RO Checks all AFW Pumps RUNNING RO Checks AFW valve alignment proper RO Verifies total AFW flow greater than 345 gpm. RO Checks RCP thermal barrier alarms off. RO Limits total AFW flow to 345 gpm max S/G's. RO Checks PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves and Excess Letdown Isolated CREW Diagnoses the small break LOCA. SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification
- 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 4 of 8 Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripped. A SBLOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor is tripped, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and trip the reactor coolant pumps.
- Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification
- Places Main Feed pump HS to STOP
- Places FWIV MOV-3-1407, 1408 & 1409 HS to CLOSE
- Places SI Cold Leg Injection valve 3-MOV-843A HS to OPEN
- Places the Unit 4 HHSI pumps HS to STOP
- Depresses SI reset PB
- Resets Cont Isolation Phase A BOP Directs SNPO to align PAHMS per 3-0P-094
- 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 8 Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripped. A SBLOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor is tripped, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and trip the reactor coolant pumps. FOLDOUTFORPROCEDUREE~
- 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS
!E either of the conditions listed below occur, THEN use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature 2 180'F OR Containment radiation levels -.:: 1.3x1 06 Rfhr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values, THEN normal setpoints can again be used
!E the TSC determines that containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded 106 Rads.
- 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- a. !E both conditions listed below occur. THEN trip all RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 8!:!Q SI FLOWPATH VERIFIED.
- 2) RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25'F[65°F]
- b. IF phase B actuated, THEN trip all RCPs.
- 3. FAULTED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA
!E any S/G pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner OR any S/G completely depressurized. ~
the following may be performed: a. b. Maintain total feedwater flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level in at least one S/G is greater than 6%[32%]. Isolate AFW flow to faulted S/G(s).
- c. Stabilize RCS hot leg temperature using steam dumps when faulted SIG has blown down to less than 10% wide range.
- 4. RUPTURED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA
!E any SIG level increases in an uncontrolled manner .QB any SIG has abnormal radiation, AND narrow range level in affected S/G(s) is greater than 6%[32%]. THEN feed flow may be stopped to affected S/G(s).
- 5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA
- a. !E two AFW pumps are operating on a single train, J:.!:!§:Lone of the pumps shall be shut down within one hour of the initial start signal
- b. IF two AFW trains are operating and one of the AFW pumps has been operating at low flow of 60 gpm or less for one hour, THEN that AFW pump shall be shut down
- 6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA
!E CST level decreases to less than 10%. THEN add makeup to CST using 3-0P-018.1, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK.
- 18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 5 of 8 Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripped. A SBLOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor is tripped, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and trip the reactor coolant pumps. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-1.
~----------~~-----------II I
Foldout page is required to be monitored throughout this procedure. I I CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-1 Foldout page (see page 22 for foldout) RO Trips RCP's on loss of subcooling when the HHSI flowpath is established. (From foldout page, may already be complete in 3-EOP-E-0)
- BOP BOP CREW CRITICAL TASK: Trip RCPs dueto a loss of subcooling during a SBLOCA prior to completing step 12 of 3-EOP-E-O.
Checks no S/G are faulted Controls AFW flow to maintain S/G NR levels 15%-50% CREW Directs Chemistry to take activity samples on all S/Gs & DAM1 monitor readings. CREW Directs HP to take main steam line radiation readings. CAUTION If any PRZ PORV opens because of high PRZ pressure, it is required to be verified closed or isolated after pressure decreases to less than the PORV setpoint. RO Check PRZ PORVs and Block Valves CLOSED RO Verifies SI - RESET RO Verifies Containment Isolation Phase A ... RESET BOP Verifies Instrument Air Containment Isolation, CV-3-2803 - OPEN and instrument air pressure, P1-3-1444 ... GREATER THAN 95 PSIG 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 6 of 8 Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripped. A S3LOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor is tripped, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and trip the reactor coolant pumps. I,; Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Checks power supply to all Chargng Pumps - ALIGNED TO OFFSITE POWER RO Ensures charging pumps running Performs Attachment 4 to establish charging if no charging pumps running.
- Checks RCP thermal barrier alarms off.
- Starts One Charging Pump
- Places ReS Makeup Control Switch in STOP
- Starts additional charging pumps if needed and offsite power available
- Adjusts Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, to maintain proper seal injection flow
- Verifies charging pump suction auto transfers to RWST RO Verifies SI can not be terminated.
RO Verifies Containment Spray not running. CAUTION High-Head SI flow and ReS Subcooling are required to be monitored. If either High-Head SI flow increases or ReS Subcooling decreases in an uncontrolled manner, the RHR pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the ReS. RO Checks If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped
- Checks RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 250 PSIG
- Checks RHR flow - LESS THAN 1000 gpm
- Verifies SI - RESET
- Places both RHR pump HS in OFF and STBY 20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 7 of 8 Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripped. A SBLOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor is tipped, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and trip the reactor coolant pumps. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE The scenario is terminated when transition has been made to 3-EOP-E-1 and when the RHR pumps have been stopped
- 21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 8 of 8 Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-O once the reactor is tripped. A SBLOCA will develop through a gradually degrading code safety valve. Once the reactor is tripped, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 and trip the reactor coolant pumps.
- 1. A S IF either of the conditions listed below occurs, THEN use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature::: 180°F OR 5 Containment radiation levels..:: 1.3x10 Rlhr
~ containment parameters drop below the above values, THEN normal setpoints can again be used
!E containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded 106 Rads.
- 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- a. IF all conditions listed below occur. THEN trip all RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND SI FLOWPATH VERIFIED
- 2) RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25"F[65°F]
- 3) Controlled RCS cooldown is NOT in progress
- b. IF phase B actuated, THEN trip all RCPs
- 3. SI TERMINATION CRITERIA IF all conditions listed below occur. THEN go to 3-EOP-ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION. Step 1:
- a. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN 30'F[See below Table]
SI TERMINATION ADVERSE SUBCOOLING VALUE RCS PRESSURE {PSIGI ADVERSE SUBCOOLING VALUE
< 2485 AND ~ 2000 ~ 55 OF
< 2000 AND z 1000 ~ 85 OF
< 1000 ::210°F
- b. Total feed flow to intact SGs - GREATER THAN 345 GPM QB narrow range level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 6%[32%J
- c. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 psig].8!i!2 STABLE OR INCREASING
- d. PRZ level- GREATER THAN 17%[50%]
- 4. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA
!E any S/G pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner QB has completely depressurized, AND that S/G has NOT been isolated, THEN go to 3-EOP-E-2. FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.
- 5. E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA IF any SiG level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR any S/G has abnormal radiation, THEN manually start SI pumps as necessary and go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
- 6. COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCH OVER CRITERIA IF RWST level decreases to less than 155,000 gallons, THEN go to 3-EOP-ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Step 1.
- 7. RECIRCULATION SUMP BLOCKAGE IF RHR pump flow AND amps become erratic OR abnormally low after recirculation has been established, THEN transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, Step 1.
- 8. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA
!E CST level decreases to less than 10%. THEN add makeup to CST using 3-0P-018.1, Condensate Storage Tank.
- 9. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR SI ON OTHER UNIT IF SI has been reset, AND either offsite power is lost QB SI actuates on the other unit, THEN restore safeguards equipment to required configuration. Refer to ATIACHMENT 3 for essential loads.
22
( (
I NRC 25 Scenario nario 3 U OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT Shlr. MC" Field S up',:
~A~
ONCOMING ......... . ::: **
,SN PO:
Adm in RCO , Unit U. it 3 Unit 4 Unit Sup',: I Unit Sup', : RCO: ' ",co: NI' O: ~ NI' O:
~
Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: I Mode: I
~'k,"": ~
100 100 CS loron Cono:
.02 I 680 russ CS Boron Co no:
- w-286
( .1 r. I
~ y ipmcnt pmcnt OOS:
00 : 33 . pump out of service 38 charging crvice due to packing leakage. leakag . Schedul ed re chedu led turn to service return ervice in in 14 r r . The National ati naf Weat her Service Weather i ued a severe thundcrstonn ervice has issued warning thunder tonn warni ng for l'Or Miami-Dade Miami- Dade County ounty _l,!J') I Le O , I none none V4 , LCO I none Results Resu lts OJof Focus Area:
; focus J none
Unit 3 Status (;,
, Reactor Operator I
Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate ReS Accumulator Refl Ref Levels Power: I MWe: Tov. Tavg : 100 763 574 Gross: Gross: Unidentified Un identified Charging Pps: Charg ing Pps:
.02
.01
.01 IfF IC A 6614 B 6631 6621 C 6621 I RCS Pressure: 2250 I RCS Boron Cone: Cone: 1 680 A bnormal Annunciators:
Annunc iator: I Comp Actions: i Annunciator: Comp I Ca mp Actions: i Annunciator: I Comp Actions: Annunciator: i I Comp Actions: , Annunciator: I Camp Comp AClions: Actions: Annunciator: omp Actions: Camp Action : Annunciator: i l Comp Actions: Camp Actions: r.. ~ctions: nnunciator: ( , :-Comp omp Actions: Annunciat i r: Com p Actions: Comp A tion ': Annunciator: Annunc inlor:
- Camp ACltion Comp ions::
C urrent'Tech T ech Sncc ..l.222.. Spec A ction Sta tements: (Does N ot Includ e "For Trackine, O Nol nly Items" Only T.. .S I Component: T,S.A.S Rca n: Reason: Entry Enl Date:
')' Dme:
T T.S.A.S II (Com ponent: Rea on: Kcason: Entry Enl Date: ry Dale: T.S.A.S I Component:
~.
Rea on: Reason: Entry Dato: Enl')' Date: T T.S.A.S II (Component: Rca on : __~~~~~qa~e: Entry Date: T.S.A.S I Compon nt: Rea on: Reason: ,-,r Entry Dme E",ry Dale: T.S.A.S I Component: ea on: Dale: Entry Dalc: ..,. Ent')'
Unit 3 Status Changes; to Risk Significant cant Equipment: C ~i train tTain .protect d bothI units line ririsk nline sk is i green Upcoming Reactivity Management Activtties: i ImmCdiat~~a~~;cr Immediately after Shi~r gpm.uusiing
.~~u-ul,-qO Upcoming Major POD Activities:
shift tumo er add 500 gallons gallon of primary water to RWST at 100 gpm ofprimar O-OP-46 tarting "0 tep 7.5.2. at step 7.5.2.1. 1. Operators Operators toto support SlIpport the th' evolution tation. RW ev lution have been briefed and are on station. WST T boron concentration is 2143 2 143 ppm. Mainta in 100% Maintain 100% power. p wer. (( - ) UpcomingI ECOs to Hang and lor Release: I Evolutions, ort or Compensatory Actions, in Progress: General Information Remarks* and' and Operator~ Work Around Status: Condenser stearn suppl y aligned rTom Aux . steam inleakage 0osefm. onden erinleakag scfm. from unit 4. d \
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description
- Facility:
Examiners: Turkey Point Scenario No.: Candidates: 3 NEW Op Test No.: 2009-301 US RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1 100% power MOL. Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3B charging pump out of service due to packing leakage. Scheduled return to service in 14 hours. The National Weather Service has issued a severe thunderstorm warning for Miami-Dade County Immediately after shift turnover add 500 gallons of primary water to RWST at 100 gpm using 0-OP-46 starting at step 7.5.2.1. The shift manager has granted permission to perform the evolution. Operators to support the evolution have been briefed and are on station. RWST boron concentration is 2143 ppm. Maintain 100% power. Online risk - green B train protected both units Event Event Type Event Description No. 1 TAMHTMRT (N) RO Make up 500 gallons of water to RWST. (0-OP-046 section 7.5)
= 2650000.0 (N) SRO TABM365B=
1.0 2 TFH1TU59= (I) RO/SRO LT-3-459 fails high which lowers 3C charging pump to minimum speed. The T (TS) SRO crew responds using the ARP, 3-0NOP-041.6 and 3-0NOP-49.1 to remove LT-3-459 from service. 3 TVHHSGB= (C) RO/SRO A 3 gpm tube leak develops on the 3B S/G, the crew transitions to 3-0NOP-0.003 & (TS) SRO 071.2. The RO increases letdown and starts an additional charging pump in response to the SGTL. 3a TFSWV8BA (C) BOP Blowdown control valve FCV-3-6278B will fail to close automatically when R-
=T 19 alarms. The BOP will manually close FCV-3-6278B to isolate the 3B S/G from Blowdown.
4 N/A R (ALL) The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-71.2 in response to the SGTL. 5 TFS1MWEH (I) BOP Controlling steam flow channel for 3B S/G, FT-3-474, fails high. The crew
=T (TS,I) SRO manually controls 3B S/G level manually to maintain plant operation using the ARP and 3-0NOP-49.1.
6 TFFW98C=T 3C FRV fails closed, reactor trips on low S/G level, crew enters 3-EOP-E-0 7 When the reactor has tripped, the tube leak on 3B S/G will degrade into a TVHHSGB= tube rupture, the crew will stop feeding the 3B S/G and transition to 3-EOP-E-5 3. POV-4883, TPCW isolation, fails to close automatically, an operator will TFKC882A = (M) ALL T manually close POV-4883. Following the transition to 3-EOP-E-3, the crew isolates the 3B S/G and performs a cooldown of the RCS or transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1
* (N)ormal, IN)ormal, (R)eactivity, (Rteactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description
- Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #3 Event 1 - The crew will initiate an addition of 500 gallons of water to the RWST using 0-OP-046 section 7.5.
Event 2 - LT-3-459 fails high which lowers 3C charging pump to minimum speed. The crew responds using the ARP and 3-0NOP-041.6 to remove LT-3-459 from service. Event 3 - A 3 gpm tube leak develops on the 3B S/G, the crew transitions to 3-0NOP-071.2. The crew increases letdown and starts an additional charging pump in response to the SGTL. Event 3a - Blowdown control valve FCV-3-6278B will fail to close automatically when R-19 alarms. The BOP will manually close FCV-3-6278B to isolate the 3B S/G from Blowdown. Event 4 - The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-71.2 in response to the SGTL. Event 5 - 3B S/G steam flow transmitter PT-3-475 fails low. The crew manually controls 3B S/G level manually to maintain plant operation using the ARP and 3-0NOP-49.1. Event 6 - When control of the 3B S/G has been established the 3C feed regulating valve will close, the reactor will trip on low S/G level and the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-0.
- Event 7 - When the reactor has tripped, the tube leak on 3B S/G will degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will stop feeding the 3B S/G and transition to 3-EOP-E-3. Critical Task. POV-4883, TPCW isolation, fails to close automatically, an operator will manually close POV-4883.
Following the transition to 3-EOP-E-3, the crew isolates the 3B S/G (Critical Task) and performs a cooldown of the RCS or transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1.
- 2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description
- Scenario XXV NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-1 (100% power 1 MOL)
- Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXV_NRC_3.lsn
- Place simulator in run Trigger lesson step:
- SETUP - 38 Charging pump OOS. Removes 38 charging pump from service.
(Actuates TAB1POSM = RACKOUT)
- SETUP - Reduce RWST level. (actuates TAMHTMRT = 2650000)
- SETUP - ALIGN CVCS M/U TO RWST
- SETUP - FCV-3-62788 Auto Close Failure (actuates TFSWV8BC=T)
- SETUP - POV-3-4883 FAILS TO CLOSE(actuates TFKC882A = T)
- Place clearance info tag on 38 Charging Pump start switch
- Provide an in progress procedure 0-OP-046 step 7.5.2.1
- Complete O-OP-046 section 7.5.2 for a primary water addition up to step 7.5.2.1
- Provide shift turnover checklists
- Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RCO desk to the Utilities screens.
- Perform Simulator Operator Checklist
- 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description
- Event 1 - M/U TO RWST Initiated immediately after shift turnover.
The crew will initiate an addition of 500 gallons of water to the RWST using 0-OP-046 section 7.5. If directed, respond as SNPO to close 3-365A & 8. Wait 1-3 min then trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - SECURE CVCS M/U TO RWST (actuates TABM365B = 0.0). Report when complete. If directed, respond as Chemistry regarding RWST sampling by stating that last RWST boron concentration = 2143 ppm. If directed, respond as WCC to prepare a PWO/Clearance. Event 2 - LT-3-459 FAILS HIGH LT 459 fails high which lowers 3C charging pump to minimum speed. The crew responds using the ARP and 3-0NOP-041.6 to remove LT-3-459 from service. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 LT-3-459 FAILS HIGH (actuates TFH1TU59=T). If directed, respond as the SM andlor WCC, acknowledge the failure of the LT-3-459. Event 3 - 3B SG 3 GPM TUBE LEAK
- A 3 gpm tube leak develops on the 38 S/G, the crew transitions to 3-0NOP-071.2. The crew increases letdown and starts additional charging pumps in response to the SGTL. 810wdown control valve FCV-3-62788 will fail to close automatically when R-19 alarms. The crew will manually close FCV-3-62788 to isolate the 38 S/G from 810wdown.
When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - 3B SG 3 GPM TUBE LEAK (actuates TVHHSGB=0.003). If directed, respond as HP to perform surveys. If directed, respond as Chemistry to perform 0-NCAP-104, increase sampling frequency of S/G and to monitor DAM-1 and SPNG. After 10-15 min., confirm 38 S/G tube leak increase. Ensure lesson step EVENT 2 - FCV-3-6275 Manual Close executes when the SG8D flow controller output has been reduced to O. Event 4 - Fast Load Reduction The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-71.2 in response to the SGTL. If directed, respond as System when called about load reduction. If directed, respond as SM when told to review 0-EPIP-201 01 & 0-ADM-115 for notification requirements. State that the NRC Resident will be notified of the fast load reduction.
- If directed, respond as chemistry to take samples. No response back required.
4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description
- If directed, respond as SNPO. After 1-3 min Trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - INCREASE NRHX FLOW TO 780 GPM (actuates TAKA834 =0.6). Report when complete.
When directed as FSfTO to locally downpower and close MOV-3-1404 wait 3 minutes and trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - CLOSEIDEENERGIZE MOV-3-1404 (actuates TCF5M527=F & after 2 min delay TFFXC04=T). Report when complete. When directed, respond as FSfTO to align aux steam supply from U4. Wait 5 min and report when complete, no action required. Event 5 - FT-3-474 Fails High Controlling steam flow channel for 3A S/G, FT-3-474 fails high, the BOP will need to take manual control of 3A SG level control using FCV-3-478. FT-3-474 is removed from service per 3-0NOP-049.1. Once FT-3-475 is selected for steam flow input to 3A SG level control, FCV 478 can be returned to automatic. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 FT-3-474 Fails High. (actuates TFS1 MWEH =T) If directed, respond as WCC if requested to prepare a PWO/Clearance and notify I&C. If directed, respond as I&C and acknowledge request to troubleshoot and repair PT-3-475. Event 6 - FCV-498 Fails Closed
- When control of the 3B S/G has been established the 3C feed regulating valve will close, the reactor will trip on low S/G level and the crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-0.
When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - FCV-498 FAIL CLOSE (actuates TFFW98C) When directed, respond as the FS/SNPO to place PAHMS in service, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN PAHM FOR SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A=1.0/30 sec delay, TAC2V02B=1.0/1 min delay, TAAAV21=1.0/2 min delay, TAAAV22=1.0/3.5 min delay & TACA005=O.O). Report completion 10-15 min later. If directed, respond as Chemistry to sample S/G, monitor DAM-1 If directed, respond as HP perform surveys. Event 7 - Post trip 38 SGTR Event 7 - When the reactor has tripped, the tube leak on 3B S/G will degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will stop feeding the 3B S/G and transition to 3-EOP-E-3. Critical Task. POV-4883, TPCW isolation, fails to close, an operator will manually close POV-4883. Following the transition to 3-EOP-E-3, the crew isolates the 3B S/G (Critical Task) and performs a cooldown of the RCS or transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1. When the reactor is tripped, ensure trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - 38 SGTR (actuates TVHHSGB 5). If directed, respond as FSfTO to locally downpower and close MOV-3-1404 wait 3 minutes and trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - CLOSE/DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1404 (actuates TCF5M527=F & after 2 min delay TFFXC04=T). Report when complete. 5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description
- If directed, respond as FSITO. After 5 minutes report "Main Steam to Aux Steam Header Isolation Valve, 3-10-007 and Steam Traps 1 through 13 have been isolated." (No simulator action is required.)
- 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew will initiate an addition of500 gallons of water to the RWST using 0-OP-046 section 7.5. Page 1 of 3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs action using 0-OP-046 section 7.5. CAUTI°tf Instrument uncefialnties for the Boric Acid and Primary Water flow transmitters can result in the actual amount of Boric Acid or Primary Water added to be either more or less than the amount calculated. Thus. care is needed to ensure that excessive reduction in ReS boron concentration does not occur due to the uncertainties.
"------------------------ NOTES
- The RWST makeup shares the same Ime as Safety Injection Pump recirculatIOn.
Operation of safety injection pumps with recirGIrculatlol1 flow aligned to the affected RWST will affect RWST makeup .flow mtes.
- VCT level IS 14.15 gallons per % level in(i1catlOll.
- When tile RWST boron concentration 1$ greater t!lan 2050 ppm, makeup may bB accompilDheci by using primtl!Y water only When tillS metliod is IISed. caution shall be exercised to ensure tflat the RWST IS !lot cliluteci below a concentratIOn of 1950 ppm.
- If pianl/log to make up only primary vv'8ter to tile RWST, t!len steps deSignated with an astel1Sk (') can be marked NlA.
- If Amw{)c/{)tor G 8/2. RWST Tech Spec Min Level, is received prior to makeup, approxJ/iwtely 4000 gallons of makeup will be requlI-ed to clear tile alanR L* The RWST Hi Level alann setpoint IS 332,000 galfons wtih a margin of error of 1675 gallons If fillrng above 33? 000 gaf/ons, RWST Hi Level is an expected a/ann RO Record the unit number on the QA Record Page.
RO Determine the approximate boric acid and primary water flows AND volumes needed to obtain the desired blend concentration Examiner Note: From the initiating cue, "Immediately after shift turnover add 500 gallons of primary water to RWST at 100 gpm" CAUTION Tavg and reactor power are required to be monitored for changes during makeup to the RWST. {Commitment - Step 2.3,2]
- 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
The crew will initiate an addition of 500 gallons of water to the RWST using 0-OP-046 section 7.5. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Verifies the following valves closed:
- Blender to Charging Pump Suction, FCV-3-113B
- Blender to VCT, FCV-3-114B
- Manual Emerg Boration Isol, 3-356 RO Place the following control switches to CLOSE
- Blender to Charging Pump Suction, FCV-3-113B
- Blender to VCT, FCV-3-114B RO Verifies Emergency Boration Valve, MOV-3-350, is closed.
- RO RO RO Places RCS Makeup Control Switch to STOP.
Directs SNPO to Unlock and open Blender Disch to RWST Stop Vlv, 3-365A and open Blender Disch to RWST, 3-365B. Places Primary Water Flow Controller, FCV-3-114A, to MANUAL AND adjust the output on the demand meter to zero. RO Set the Primary Water Totalizer to 500 gallons by performing the following: RO a. Press LI.MIT 1.
- b. Press CLR.
- c. Enter desired amount using llumeric keypad.
- d. Press ENT.
- e. Press COUNT A.
- f. Press LI~nT 1 and yerify desired amount was properly entered.
- g. Press COUNT A.
- 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
The crew will initiate an addition of 500 gallons of water to the RVVST using 0-OP-046 section 7.5. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: From the initiating cue, '1mmediately after shift turnover add 500 gallons of primary water to RWST at 100 gpm" I NOTES I
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - __ I I I
- The Boric Acid addition will stop automatically when the Boric Acid Totalizer reaches I the pre-set value.
I I I
- The Primary Water flow will continue and the Primary Water Totalizer will count as I long as FCV-'-114A is open.
I
~-----------------------I RO Turn the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.
- RO RO RO Verify Red START light is energized.
Place the control switch for Primary Water to Blender, FCV-3-114A, to OPEN. Adjust Primary Water Flow Controller, FCV-3-114A, to 100 gpm. RO Verify proper flow to the RWST by observing an increase in RWST level AND a decrease in BAST and PWST levels as applicable. RO IF primary water addition is complete before boric acid addition is complete, THEN close Primary Water to Blender Valve, FCV-3-114A. CREW Directs SNPO to close and lock Blender Disch to RWST Stop Valve, 3-365A and Close Blender Disch to RWST Valve 3-365B. EXAMINER NOTE: When the direction to close and lock Blender Disch to RWST Stop Valve, 3-365A and Close Blender Disch to RWST Valve 3-365B has been given, proceed to EVENT 2
- 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:2 Event
Description:
LT-3-459 fails high which lowers 3C charging pump to minimum speed. The crew responds using the ARP, 3-0NOP-041.6 and 3-0NOP-49.1 to remove LT-3-459 Page 1 of 2 from service. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to tigger lesson step EVENT 2 LT-3-459 FAILS HIGH (actuates TFHHU59=T). RO Observes alarms A-8/3, 9/3 and G 1/1 SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction and 3-0NOP-49.1 to remove LT-3-459 from service. _----------~-----------~I NOTES I* , !f Pressuri::er Level Malfunction is 8 rssult of a fe/furf: of the 3-459GX or 3-46OCX rela)'s {os Indicated by D loss of letdown flew w!th a loss of Pressurizer Hemers with no II ccnculTenf feilure of Level TransmiNers 3-459A. 3-460, 3-461) use 3-DNOP-<J036 I Atrachrnel1! 4. for 3-460CX failure. OR :3-0NOP-oOJ.9 Affachment 4. for 3-459CX I
- failure as guidance for establishing Letdown flcw and Pressurizer Hearers . I I
# if the Durton Of) relays 3-459GX or 3-460CX are used ro restorf: Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters, comply With Tech Spec Action Statement :3 4 J Awol) b. I
* , .'f the manual control of Heaters from the Electrica,' penedration room is used. comply I
I I/dth Tech Spec Action State.f11ent 3.4 3 Action a. I
~----------------- ______ I RO Observes indicator LI-3-459 failing high and compares to LI-3-460 AND LI-3-461 RO Places CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL switch to position 3 RO May place MASTER CHARGING PUMP CONTROLLER, LC-3-459G in MANUAL RO Places CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZER LEVEL RECORDER to position 2 or 3.
RO Maintains pressurizer level to be consistent with programmed level as required. SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-049.1. SRO Refers to LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 9 action 13
- 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:2 Event
Description:
LT-3-459 fails high which lowers 3C charging pump to minimumspeed. The crew responds using the ARP, 3-0NOP-041.6 and 3-0NOP-49.1 to remove LT-3-459 Page 2 of 2 from service. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION The failed channel bistable(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in the tripped or test position and would result in an undesired Engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuation. The overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and, therefore, a possible reduction in plant protection. SRO Makes determination to trip the following bistables within 6 hours.
- BS-3-459A-1 & BS-459A-2 EXAMINER NOTE
- When the SRO selects which bistables to trip, proceed to event3.
EXAMINER NOTE ACTION 13 -With the nUf'lbH of OPERABLE charmers one less than the Total 'lumber of channe!s, STl,RTUP and/or PO'NER OPERATION rlay proceed provided the moperable channel is placed In :he tripped coMmon within {; hours. For sut*sequent requ,red DIGITAL I CHANN:::L OPERATIONAL TESTS the iI10perable channel may be place<! in bypass I status for uo to 4 hours
- 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event NO.:3 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
A 3 gpm tube leak develops on the 3B S/G, the crew transitions to 3-ONOP-071.2. The crew increases letdown and starts additional charging pumps in response to the SGTL. Blowdown control valve FCV-3-6278B will fail to close automatically when R-19 alarms. The crew will manually close FCV-3-6278B to isolate the 3B S/G from Blowdown. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step "EVENT2 3B SG 3 GPM TUBE LEAK" (actuates TVHHSGB=O.OO3). RO Observes increase in 3B SG tube leak rate BOP
- Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS HI radiation)
- R-3-15 SJAE effluent PRMS rising/alarming
- R-3-19 SGBD PRMS rising/alarming (eventually)
- SJAE SPING RAD-3-6417 rising/alarming (see ERDADS)
RO Observes increase in 3B SG tube leak rate BOP
- Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
- Slight increase in charging flow to maintain PZR level
- Charging/letdown flow mismatch increases to 3 gpm (see ERDADS)
SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-71.2. I~-----------------------I ~ I I Foldout Page shall be monitored throughout this procedure . I CREW Reviews 3-0NOP-71.2 foldout page actions (See page 11)
- 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event NO.:3 Event
Description:
A 3 gpm tube leak develops on the 3B S/G, the crew transitions to 3 Page 2 of 6 ONOP-071.2. The crew increases letdown and starts additional charging pumps in response to the SGTL. Blowdown control valve FCV-3-6278B will fail to close automatically when R-19 alarms. The crew will manually close FCV-3-6278B to isolate the 3B S/G from Blowdown. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Checks R-15 High Alarm and R-19 High Alarm light - ON
~-----------------------I I ~ I I A PRMS source check on a channel with a HIGH Alarm may be Inconclusive since the effect I I of the source may not cause a noticeable change In the readout. I BOP
- 1. Checks R-3-15 and R-19 alarms valid
- a. Checks readout on alarming R-3-15 and R19;?: ALARM SETPOINT
- b. Checks channel operability:
- 1) 2)
3) Depresses and holds FAILITEST pushbutton on alarming R-3-15 and R-3-19. Checks readout =288K OR 289K Releases FAILrrEST pushbutton
- c. Observes CAUTION prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6 BOP When R-3-19 is observed to be increasing or has a valid alarm, closes FCV-3-6278B based on foldout page direction.
EXAMINER NOTE: The trend on 3-R-19 begins increasing approximately 10 minutes after the SGTL commences. CAUTIONS
- Maximum allowed specific activity of secondary coolant is less than or equal to 0.10 j./Cilgm Dose Equivalent /-131. (Reference T.S. 3.7.1.4.)
- Use of the Steam Dump to Atmospheric valves should be limited to minimize uncontrolled release of radlonuclldes to the environment. If SlG Steam Dumps to Atmosphere must be used, use only the unaffected S/G dump valves If possible.
RO Observes PZR level- STABLE and can be maintained that way since charging can keep up with 2 gpm tube leak 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event NO.:3 Page 3 of 6 Event
Description:
A 3 gpm tube leak develops on the 3B S/G, the crew transitions to 3 ONOP-071.2. The crew increases letdown and starts additional charging pumps in response to the SGTL. Blowdown control valve FCV-3-6278B will fail to close automatically when R-19 alarms. The crew will manually close FCV-3-6278B to isolate the 3B S/G from Blowdown. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP When R-3-19 is observed to have a valid alarm, closes FCV-3-6278B. SRO Directs Shift Engineer Approximate Tube Leakage Using
- 3-0SP-041.1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION
- Unit 3 SJAE SPING Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Graph in the Plant Curve Book (Section 5, Figure 14) AND record on Attachment 5
- Unit 3 R-15 Primary to Secondary Leek Rate Graph in the Plant Curve Book (Section 5, Figure 15) AND record on Attachment 5 I~-----------~-----------.
NO S I I
- Additional Chemistry personnel may be needed for sampling and analysis.
I
- SJAE SPING and R-t5 are the quickest indications of increasing leak due to I I radioactive gases being carried over in the steam to the condenser. Air in-leakage I greater than 5.5 SCFM will dilute this indication.
I I I
- DAM- 1 and R-19 are slower and may take s&v&ral hours to stabilize for accurate I indication due to the process delay times.
I I CREW Identifies leaking S/G:
- a. Monitors the following for S/G tube leak indications:
- Unexplained increase in any S/G level
- High radiation detected on a S/G sampe, main steam line, AFW steam supply line (if running) or S/G Blowdown line
- Unexplained difference between steam and feed flow
- Increasing radiation levels indicated on R-15, R-19, SPING, AND DAM-1
- 8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
A 3 gpm tube leak develops on the 3B S/G, the crew transitions to 3 Page 4 of 6 ONOP-071.2. The crew increases letdown and starts additional charging pumps in response to the SGTL. Blowdown control valve FC'J.3-6278B will fail to close automatically when R-19 alarms. The crew will manually close FC'J.3-6278B to isolate the 3B S/G from Blowdown. Tim", I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:
- b. Directs Radiation Protection to perform the following:
- Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Lines, AFW steam supply line (if running) & S/G Blowdown lines
- Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors
- c. Directs Nuclear Chemistry to perform thefollowing:
- Perform O-NCAP-104, PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE CALCULATION
- Increase S/G sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry
- Monitor DAM-1 and SJAE SPING readings r----------~m-----------I I ' Sampling of Condenser water for activity is required prior to dumping/rejecting water. I I , The fol/owing step is to provide guidance for continued unit operation when I I Primary-to-Secondary leakage has been CONFIRMED. These actions are to ensure I that an Identified leak is Isolated prior to S/G tube faflure.
I
' Any tube leakage rate-of-change determination should be performed over at least a I I 30-minute period to eliminate the possibility of inappropriate actions being taken in the case of instrument spikes,
~----------------- _ _ _ _ _ _ I SRO Determines a shutdown is required due to the SGTL being greater than 150 gpd Leak Rate Increasina Action RE'qllil'E'd Leak Rate Tll Action lewl ;;>150 gpd 3B m
- Be in :\lode 3 within 3 hOU1,
(:.,625 gph
- Increa<,e monitoring of PR.\.lS chalmel to or eyelY 15 minute'>.
- .:0.1 gplll)
- Coordinate with RP to contain acriYity in
.,ecolldary systeJll5
- 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 6 Event
Description:
A 3 gpm tube leak develops on the 3B S/G, the crew transitions to 3 ONOP-071.2. The crew increases letdown and starts addtional charging pumps in response to the SGTL. Blowdown control valve FCV-3-6278B will fail to close automatically when R-19 alarms. The crew will manually close FCV-3-6278B to isolate the 3B S/G from Blowdown. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE: 3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System operational leakage shall be limited to:
- c. 150 gallons per day primary-to-secondary leakage through anyone steam generator (SG),
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3 and 4. ACTION:
- a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or with primary-to-secondary leakage not within limit, be in at least HOT STANDBY within
- SRO 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
Performs the following prior to commencing load reduction: Notifies System Dispatcher about load reduction Briefs Control Room personnel using Foldout Page
- Uses page boost to notify plant personnel of load reduction CREW Notify the Shift Manager to Review the Following Procedures AND Make Any Required Notifications
- 0-EPIP-201 01, Duties of Emergency Coordinator
- 0-ADM-115, Notification of Plant Events
- Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and S/G Tube Leakage
- 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event NO.:3 Event
Description:
A 3 gpm tube leak develops on the 38 S/G, the crew transitions to 3-ONOP-071.2. The crew increases letdown and starts additional charging pumps in response Page 6 of 6 to the SGTL. 81owdown control valve FCV-3-62788 will fail to close automatically when R-19 alarms. The crew will manually close FCV-3-62788 to isolate the 38 S/G from 8lowdown.
- 1. 3-EOP-E-O TRANSITION CRITERIA a) IF any of the folloW109 limits are reached, THEN tnp tile Reactor and Turbine AND go to 3-EOP-E-O.
REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION I) RCS Tavg GREATER THAN 578 Deg
- 2) RCS Tavg GREATER THAN Tref by 6 degrees F
- 3) The REOUIRED shutdo....m rate violates Rod Insertion Limits b) IF any of the folloi/,1ng limits are reached . .!!i5.t:! trip the Reactor and Turbine, initiate Safety Injection and Phase A, a!':!Q. go to 3-EOP-E-O. REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
1} RCS Leakage greater than Charging Pump capacity AND letdovvTI isolated
- 2) PZR Level can NOT be maintained within 10% of program
- 2. STANDARD BRIEFING
- 3) SpeCify Shutdown rate Time for SID 30 min 1 hr. 1.5 hrs. 2 hrs.
from 100% Approx. LoM 30 MWnnin 15 MWimin 10 MW/min 7 f...,W!min Ramp Rate b) Target Pmver Level-If the Unit is not to be taken off-line. C) Current SIG Tube Leakage and affected S/G d) Cover any actions requIred after the unit IS Off-line. (Example - Feed flow to the affected and unaffected SiGS) e) Method of Reactivity Control- Control Rods, Boratlon, or Botl1.
- 3. PLANT ANNOUNCEMENT Notify plant personnel via the plant page of any potential hazardous effluent release.8tiQ. to stand clear of the SJAE and Blowdo'y'/O piping. Notify non-essential personnel to stay clear of the Power Block.
- 4. BLOWDOWN RELEASE PATH ISOLATION 1E PRMS R-19 Count Rate !s increasing OR High Alarm is present, .!!::1.§t! verify the following:
a) Steam Generator Blo..vdmvn Flow Control Valves are Closed
- FCV-3-6278A
- FCV-3-62788
- FCV-3-6278C b) Bfowdovm Tank to Canal Level Control Valve, LCV-3-62658 is closed C} ~ R-19 High Alarm is present, THEN verify NO FLOW on S/G Sample Flow Indicators at the Cold Chern Lab (Ensures Sample Valves SV-3-2800. SV-3-2801, SV-3-28.o2 are closed.)
- 5. AFW STEAM SUPPLY RELEASE PATH ISOLATION
~ the affected Steam Generator is Identified. THEN perform the folfol,vlng:
a) Venfy Ste<:lm Supply aligned to both trains of AFIN from the Intact Steam Generators b) \jenfy closed atiQ de-energize the affected steam Generator AFW steam Supply MOV using Attachment 2. 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:4 Page Event
Description:
The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load usirg 3-0NOP-71.2 in response to the SGTL. 1 of 1-Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS
- For a shutdown at the maximum rate, boration should be initiated PROMPTL Y to avoid exceeding rod Insertion limits.
- ShuTdown rates greater than 5% fuff power per minute (-35 MwelMln) may place the unit In an uncontrolled condition and should be avoided.
- Control Rod motion may cause axial flux difference to deviate outside of the Target Band without necessitating corrective actions until the load reduction is terminated.
RO Initiates boration per ~ONOP-071.2:
- a. Establishes desired boration rate using normal boration flowpath
- 1) Places Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE
- 2) Places RCS Makeup Control Switch to START
- 3) Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to 8.0 or as directed
- b. Sets Boric Acid Totalizer to Sets Boric Acid Totalizer to 850 gal SRO Determines approximately 850 gal of boric acid required to shutdown for present conditions.
RO Starts an additional Charging Pump. Places an additional letdown orifice in service Directs SNPO to increase CCW flow to the NRHX Reduces plant load at a rate determined by SM as follows: BOP a. Reduce turbine load while verifying Auto Rod Insertion (Tavg should not exceed Tref by more than 5°F) RO b. Monitors Control Rod Position (RO) > RIL (Ann. B8/1 & 2) EXAMINER NOTE: When power has been reduced a sufficient amount, proceed to EVENT 4.
- 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page Event
Description:
Controlling steam flow channel for 3A S/G, FT-3-474 fails high, the BOP will need to take manual control of 3A SG level control using FC\J.3-478. FT-3-474 is 1 of 1-removed from service per ~ONOP-049.1. Once FT-3-475 is selected for steam flow input to 3A SG level control, FCV-3-478 can be returned to automatic. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step "EVENT4 FT-3-474 Fails High." (actuates TFS1 MWEH =T) BOP Observes alarms C-4/1, 5/1 & 6/1, & 0-7/1 SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-049.1. SRO Observes indicator FT-3-474 failing high and compares to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions. SRO Verifies no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels. BOP Manually controls FCV-3-478 and returns S/G level to program using 3-
- BOP SRO ARP-097.CR When 3A S/G level on program, selects FT-3-475 (channel 4 steam flow) for FCV-3-478 control & returns FCV-3-478 to AUTO.
Refers to LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 12 action 6 & LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3-2 Functional Unit 1f/4d action 15 (bls trip in 6 hr) SRO Makes determination to trip the following bistables within 6 hours.
- BS-3-474 (rack 16) & BS-478B1 I 478B2 I 478C (rack 17)
CAUTION The failed channel bistable(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in the tripped or test position and would result in an undesired engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuation. The overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and, therefore, a possible reduction in plant protection. EXAMINER NOTE When the SRO selects which bistables to trip, proceed to next event. EXAMINER NOTE See next two pages for applicable Tech Specs. 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:5 Event
Description:
Controlling steam flow channel for 3A S/G, FT-3-474 fails high, the BOP will need to take manual control of 3A SG level control using FCV3-478. FT-3-474 is removed from service per ~ONOP-049.1. Once FT-3-475 is selected for steam flow input to Page 1 of 1_ 3A SG level control, FCV-3-478 can be returned to automatic. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE: 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.~1. ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-1. MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNEL S IQJRlE' Qe£BAaLE. MODES 8ITlQtl
- 12. SleQI11 Generator Water Level** 2 stm ge-n 1 stm. gen. 1 stm. ge-n. 1.2 6 Low COlncrdem Wrth StMmf level and ",vel coin* level and Feedwater Flow MISmatch 2 slm 'feed* (l<ient wrth 2stmJYeed*
water flow 1 stm !feed- waterfiow mlsmatch In water flow mismatch In each stm gen mismatch in S-t,me stm. gen. same stm. Of stm ge-n 2 5tm gen. level and 1 stmJfeedwater flow mismatch If! same stm Qefl ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. EXAMINER NOTE: 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks sho'v\fl in Table 3.3-2 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.~3. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.~2. ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-2. 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Controlling steam flow channel for 3A S/G, FT-3-474 fails high, the BOP will need to take manual control of 3A SG level control using FCV3-478. FT-3-474 is Page 1 of 1-removed from service per 3-0NOP-049.1. Once FT-3-475 is selected for steam flow input to 3A SG level control, FCV-3-478 can be returned to automatic. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior MINIMUM TOTAL NO CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE EIJI'ICIIQML UI'/IT CIE Gl:lAI'II'IELS TIUBlE QEEMeLE M!2DES AcrlQtl 1 Safety Injection (Feedwater Isolation) e High Differential 3/steam line 2!steam ilne 2isteam 1 2.3" 15 Pressure Be1v...-een If) any steam hne the Steam Line hne Header and any StearrJ Line f Stear,.. une now*. High 2 /s1eam line 1fsteam line 1isteam line 1.2.3' 15 l"",ojndde-nt t,Vltn In any t'NO in any two steam IU1s '3team lines Steam Generator Pressure-Low l/steam 1lsteam 1!steam 1.23' 15 generator generator generator In any two in any two steam lines steam lines or T.J'.'ij-~Law 1,10op llloop In [Jny l/1oop in any 1.2.3' 25 1wo ~oops two loops 4, Steam Line Isolation 4 Stearn l lsoianoo (Continued) d Steam Lt~e Flow--HJgh 2/stetUll hne 1!steam ,me 1/steam line 1,2,3 15 COinCident '.vrth 10 any two in any t\1'o Steam Generator steam fines steam lines Pressure--low 1!steam Hsteam listeam 1. 2, 3 15 generator generator generator 111 any two In any two steam hnes steam lines Of TlYg--Low llLoop 1,100pln 1/(oop In 1. 2, 3 25
~ny WiO any two loops oops ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.
- 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event NO.:6 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
When control of the 3B S/G has been established the 3C feed regulathg valve will close, the reactor will trip on low S/G level and the crew will transition to 3EOP-E-O. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson stepEVENT 6 - FCV-498 FAIL CLOSE (actuates TFFW98C) CREW Recognizes the loss of feed to the 3C S/G BOP Recognizes and reports dropping 3C SG levels and feedwater flows
- Annunciators C-S/3 (SG steam> feed flow)
- Annunciators 6/3 (SG level deviations)
- Decreasing level in 3C SG SRO Directs a manual trip of the resctor SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-O
- RO I~-----------------------I I
~
Steps 1 through 4 are IMMEDIA TE ACTION steps. Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O: I I Verifies reactor trip
- Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero
- Rx trip & bypass bkrs open
- Neutron flux decreasing Determines SI not actuated BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
Verifies turbine tripped
- Turbine stop valves closed
- Manually closes MSR steam supply MOVs
- Mid & East GCBs open Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses
- Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:? Page Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Actions, the tube 1 of 10 leak on 38 S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the crew vJ1 transition to ~EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 38 S/G. The 38 MSIV fails closed and 38 S/G Atmospheric Dump to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 38 S/G using 3-EOP-E-3 and performs a cooldown of the RCS. Time Position Applicant's Actions or 8ehavior Examiner note: When Immediate Operator Actions are complete, proceed to EVENT? Direct facility operator to trigger lesson stepEVENT 7 - 38 SGTR (actuates TVHHSGB 0.5 with a 3 min ramp). I NQIg I I FOLDOUT Page shall be monitored for the remainder of this procedure. I CREW Monitors ~EOP-E-O Foldout page (see page 25)
- 80P SRO RO Performs 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification (See next page for detailed actions)
Directs RO in performance of 3-EOP-E-O subsequent actions. Checks all AFW Pumps RUNNING RO Checks AFW valve alignment proper RO Verifies total AFW flow greater than 345 gpm. RO Checks RCP thermal barrier alarms off. RO Limit total AFW to 345 gpm, stop feeding the "8" S/G CREW CRITICAL TASK: Isolate feedwater flow into the 38 SIG prior to completing step 8 of 3-EOP-E-3 RO Checks PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves and Excess Letdown Isolated RO May trip Reps if subcooling is less than 25 deg with HHSI flow. CREW Diagnoses the SGTR on the 38 S/G
- 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:? Page 2 of 10 Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Actions, the tube leak on 3B S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will transition to 3EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 3B S/G. The 3B MSIV fails closed and 3B S/G Atmospheric Dump to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 3B S/G using 3-EOP-E-3 and performs a cooldown of the RCS. Tim!'! Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-E-3 BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification
- Manually isolates the 3B MSIV
- Places Main Feed pump HS to STOP Places FWIV MOV-3-140?, 1408 & 1409 HS to CLOSE
- Closes POV-3-4883
- Places the Unit 4 HHSI pumps HS to STOP
- Depresses SI reset PB
- Resets Cont Isolation Phase A
- Closes CV-3-62?SB BOP Directs SNPO to align PAHMS per ~OP-094
- 18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:?
Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Actions, the tube Page 3 of 10 leak on 3B S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will transition to 3EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 3B S/G. The 3B MSIV fails closed and 3B S/G Atmospheric Dump to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 3B S/G using 3-EOP-E-3 and performs a cooldown of the RCS. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-3. I~-----------------------I NOTES I I
- FOLDOUT Page shall be monitored for tile remainder of this procedure . I I I L _______________________
- Personnel will be necessary for sampling during this procedure.
J CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-3 Foldout page (see page 26) RO Trips RCP's on loss of subcooling when the HHSI f10wpath is established. (May already be complete in 3-EOP-E-O)
- CREW Directs Radiation Protection to perform radiation readings on main steam lines AND blowdown lines Direct Chemistry to sample the steamlines for activity SRO Determines the 3B S/G is ruptured due to an unexpected increase in narrow range level CAUTIONS
- If the AFW pumps are the only available source of feedwater flow, the steam supply to the AFW pumps must be maintained from at least one S/G.
- At least one S/G must be maintained available for ReS cooldown.
BOP Adjusts 3B SG steam dump to atmosphere setpoint to 1060 psig.
- 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event NO.:7 Page 4 of 10 Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Actions, the tube leak on 3B S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will transition to 3EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 3B S/G. The 3B MSIV fails closed and 3B S/G Atmospheric Dunp to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 3B S/G using :>EOP-E-3 and performs a RCS.. cooldown of the RCS
. T; T;,
- Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Verifies SI and AMSAC reset.
SRO Determines AFWSS train 1 from 3C SG & train 2 from 3A SG BOP Closes MOV-3-1404 and directs FSITO to open breaker 30833 RO Verifies CV-3-6275B closed CAUTION All steam generator blowdown sample lines must be isolated within the first 30 minutes of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture event to prevent release of contaminated fluid through unmonitored vent paths. SRO Verifies MOV-3-1427/1426/1425 already closed CREW CRITICAL TASK Isolate steam flow out of a ruptured the 38 SIG prior to completing step 7 of 3-EOP-E-3 CAUTION If any ruptured S/G is also faulted and is NOT needed for ReS cooldown, feed flow to that S/G is required to be maintained isolated during subsequent recovery actions.
- 20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:? Page 5 of 10 Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Actions, the tube leak on 3B S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the (Jew will transition to 3-EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 3B S/G. The 3B MSIV fails closed and 3B S/G Atmospheric Dump to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 3B S/G using 3-EOP-E-3. T; Time
" ,'-' Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Verifies 3B SG level> 6% and all feed to 3B SG isolated CREW CRITICAL TASK: Isolate feedwater flow into the 38 SIG prior to completing step 8 of 3-EOP-E-3 SRO Verifies the 3B S/G is ISOLATED FROM INTACT S/Gs SRO Verifies 3B SG pressure> 500 psig EXAMINER NOTE:
If the 3B S/G decreases to less than 500 psig go to page23 for 3-EOP-ECA-3.1 entry
~-----------------------1 I ~ I I If Reps are not running, the following steps may cause a false Integrity Status Tree I indication for the ruptured loop. Disregard the ruptured loop T-cold indication until after L
I _______________________ JI performing Step 34. SRO Determines required CET temperature for cooldown based on J3 SG pressure. LUWi:.~ I KUP LOWEST RU\-J rI yRi:.~)~/G yKt:~)~/G Ri:.QUIRi:.D KI::(JUIKt:U COKt:CORE (E)IT (~~II PRESSURE PSIG TEMPERA TURE OF C Greater than or equal to 1100 513°F [466 F] 1000 to 1099 501°F [44rF] 900 to 999 488°F [426°F] 800 to 899 474°F [400°F] 700 to 799 458°F [385°F] 600 to 699 44 f'F [369°F] 500 to 599 420°F [350°F] BOP Fully opens 3A & 3C steam dumps to atmosphere. 21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 6 of 10 Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Actions, the tube leak on 3B S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will transition to 3EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 3B S/G. The 3B MSIV fails closed and 3B S/G Atmospheric Dump to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 3B S/G using 3EOP-E-3 and performs a cooldown of the RCS. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain NR level 15-50% CAUTION If ;my PRZ PORV opens because of high PRZ pressure, it is required to be verified closed or isolated after pressure decreases to less than the PORV setpoint. RO Verifies PORV's closed. CAUTION If offsite power is lost after 51 is reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment using 3-EOP-E-0, Attachment 3.
- RO BOP Verifies SI & phase A reset Verifies CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig CAUTION Res pressure is required to be monitored. If ReS pressure decreases in an uncontrolled manner to less than 250 psig{650 psigj, the RHR pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the ReS.
RO Verifies RCS pressure> 250 psig & stops RHR pumps RO Starts a charging pump, stops RCS makeup, takes running charging pump speed to maximum & adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal inj. flow. RO Verifies charging pump suction auto transfers to RWST RO Informs US when CET temperature < value from step 11 a table SRO Verifies RCS CET subcooling > 50°F BOP Closes 3B & 3C SG steam dump to atmosphere when CET temperature
< value from previous page table 22
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:? Page 6 of 10 Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Actions, the tube leak on 3B S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will transition to 3EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 3B S/G. The 3B MSIV fails closed and 3B S/G Atmospheric Dump to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 3B S/G using ~EOP-E-3 and performs a cooldown of the ReS.
"T":,
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE The scenario is terminated when the crew completes the ReS cooldown of 3-EOP-E-3
- 23
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:? Page ? of 10 Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Actions, the tube leak on 3B S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will transition to 3EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 3B S/G. The 3B MSIV fails closed and 3B S/G Atmospheric Dump to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 3B S/G using 3-EOP-E-3 and performs a cooldown of the RCS. Time Tim!=! Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE: Entered if the 3B S/G decreases to less than 500 psig during event6 SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1. EXAMINER NOTE The scenario is terminated when the crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1
- 24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:? Page 8 of 9 Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Actions, the tube leak on 38 S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will transition to 3EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 38 S/G. The 38 MSIV fail; closed and 38 S/G Atmospheric Dump to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 38 S/G using 3-EOP-E-3 and performs a cooldown of the RCS. FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE E-O
- 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IF either of the conditions listed below occur, THEN use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature 2 180°F
.QB.
Containment radiation levels --.: 1.3x1 05 Rlhr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values. THEN normal setpoints can again be used IE the TSC determines that containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded 106 Rads.
- 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- a. IE both conditions listed below occur. THEN trip all RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 8!iQ SI FLOWPATH VERIFIED.
- 2) RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25~F[65CF]
- b. IE phase B actuated, !1:!5t! trip a/l RCPs.
- 3. FAULTED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA IE any S/G pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner QB any S/G completely depressurized. !1:!5t!
the following may be peliormed:
- a. Maintain total feedwater flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level in at least one S/G is greater than 6%[32%].
- b. Isolate AFW flow to faulted SfG(s).
- c. Stabilize RCS hot leg temperature using steam dumps when faulted S/G has blown down to less than 10% wide range.
- 4. RUPTURED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA IF any SfG level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR any S/G has abnormal radiation, 8tfQ narrow range level in affected S/G(s) is greater than 6%[32%], !1:!5t! feed flow may be stopped to affected SfG(s).
- 5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA
- a. IE two AFW pumps are operating on a single train, I!:iE.t:L0ne of the pumps shall be shut down within one hour of the initial start signal
- b. IF two AFW trains are operating and one of the AFW pumps has been operating at low flow of 60 gpm or less for one hour, THEN that AFW pump shall be shut down
- 6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN add makeup to CST using 3-0P-018.1, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK .
- 25
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Event
Description:
When the crew has addressed the Immediate Operator Action~ the tube Page 9 of 9 leak on 38 S/G will gradually degrade into a tube rupture, the crew will transition to 3EOP-E-3 and stop feeding the 38 S/G. The 38 MSIV fails closed and 38 S/G Atmospheric Dump to Atmosphere valve opens. Crew isolates the 38 S/G using 3-EOP-E-3 and performs a cooldown of the RCS .. 3-EOP-E-3 Foldout Page 13-EOP-E-3
- 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS lf either of the conditions fisted below occur, It::I.Eli use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature ~ 180°F OR Containment radiation levels 2: 1.3x105 Rlhr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values 8NQ the TSC has determined that containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded 106 Rads, I.!:llili normal setpoints can be used.
- 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- a. IF all conditions listed below occur. THEN trip al/ RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND Sf FLOWPATH VERIFIED D
- 2) RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25"F[65 F]
- 3) Controlled RCS cooldown not initiated
- b. IF phase B actuated, THEN trip al/ RCPs.
- 3. 51 REINITIATION CRITERIA IF SI has been terminated Atm either condition listed below occurs, THEN manually start Sf pumps as necessary to restore RCS subcooling and PRZ level 8tlQ go to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1. SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 1:
- RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN 30°F[210°F]
OR PRZ level- CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 17%[50%]
- 4. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA
!E any S/G pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner OR has completely depressurized, AND that S/G has NOT been isolated, THEN go to 3-EOP-E-2. FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.
Step 1.
- 5. MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA
!E any intact S/G level increases in an uncontrolled manner .QB any intact S/G has abnormal radiation.
I.!:llili stabilize the plant 8.!:fQ return to 3-EOP-E-3. STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
- 6. COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCH OVER CRITERIA IF RWST level decreases to less than 155,000 gal/ons, THEN go to 3-EOP-ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Step 1.
- 7. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA
!E CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN add makeup to CST using 3-0P-018.1, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK.
- 8. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR 51 ON OTHER UNIT
!E SI has been reset 8.!:fQ either offsite power is lost OR SI actuates on the other unit, I.!:llili restore safeguards equipment to required configuration. Refer to ATIACHMENT 3 for essential loads.
- 26
( ( (
I N RC 25 .uu4 cenario 4 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT Shirt Mgr:
~~ ING CREW ASSIGNMENTS FI"d Sap" ,: :
Ad min Re O: ANPO : Unit 3 Unit 4 1_IJu H s"",:: Unll Sap *. : I RCO: RCO: I NI'O : Nro:
~
Unit 3 Unit 4 I Mode: I Mode: 50 r ow,,, 100 344
~
IMW" lW"
,0" .
I :s no,on Con" ~ : S 1Io,0n Cone: 286 ( I. I ~~. ? ~g<~:~;"
- 3B charging pump OUI ul or of service due 10 to pac packing I akage. Schedul king leakage. cheduled ed return 0 service in 14 relum 1to The National ali nal ' .....eather ~,ervice has iissued UI ....... sued a severe thund rstorm warning for Miami-Dade County evere thundcrsloml U3 A. I Lg>
none U4 ILC O I none
, or( ,~~",",...,.n Focus Area:
Area: I none ()
Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator ~I Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate ReS ~R.' Accumulator Ref Levels
~
Power: 50 Gross: .02 A 6614
~ MWe: 344 Unidentified .01 B 6631 IB 6631
~
Ta. Tavgg : 558 Charging Pps: .01 C 1 6621 IC 6621 RCS Pressure: 2250 RCS BoronI Cone: I ~ 839 Abnormal Annunciators: Annunciator:
;\ ctio~s :
I Comp Actions: Annunciator: Annunciator: I ~mp~ Comp Actions: Annunciator: r, Comp Actions: nnunciator: Comp I Actions I : Annunciator:: r , Actions: Comp I Annunciator; Annunciator: I Comp Camp A Actions: lions: Annunciator: ___ r,omp Actions: ( lAnnunciator:
' Comp r, Actions:
Annunciaror:: Camp Actions: Comp Actions: Annunciator: I C mp Actions: Comp Acti n : IC e urrent* Tech Spec Action Statements::~No (Does Nottll Include, "For "Fo r Trackioe-,Onlv Onlv Items" T ...A.S T.S A . I Component: I ~~:~",e: Reason : Entry_Date: T .S.A.S
, ., ." .; / 1Component:
Reason : IE",,,, Entry Date: D"" T .S.A,.; .S / 'Component: Reason: I Ii",,,, Entry Dale:Dale: T.S.A .S I Compon T.S.J\ ComponcnI 111:: Reason: Entn< I En Dale: try Dare:
,..S.A.S T.S.A .S / Component:
1 Reason R a on::
. Entry Date:D""
~ T.$.A .S I Compon nl:
,T.S,A,S ReasonI :
- Entry Ent')' Date:
D""
Unit 3 Status Changes to Risk Significant EQuipment: ChanQes Equipment: V ~ train protected both units Online ri sk k is is green Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities: Activities : Upcoming Ma UpcomlnQ Major or POD Activities: Immediate ly after shift Immediately shjft turno turnover perfoml RHR pump 3A monthl y op er perform operabili ty Lest rability test, 3-0SP-050.2, 3-0SP-050.2 starting at slep tep
- 7. 1.23. Operators La support the evolution have been briefed and arc peralors to are on station. Maintain 50% steady slate teady state power.
pow r. (~tJpcoming C Upcomin!=l ECOs to HanQ Hang and lor Release Release:: Evolutions or Compensatory Actions In Pr99ress: Progress: Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status: Information, Remarks General information, A ux., steam Aux supply aligned team suppl ali!:,rned from unit 4. 4. ondenser Conden inlcakagc 0 serm. ser inleakage sefm. Cr\--------------------------------~
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description
- Facility:
Examiners: Turkey Point Scenario No.: Candidates: 4 MOD Op Test No.: 2009-301 US RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1 50% power MOL. Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3B charging pump out of service due to packing leakage. Scheduled return to service in 14 hours. The National Weather Service has issued a severe thunderstorm warning for Miami-Dade County Immediately after shift turnover perform RHR pump 3A monthly operability test, 3-0SP-050.2, starting at step 7.1.23. The shift manager has granted permission to perform the test. Operators to support the evolution have been briefed and are on station. Maintain 50% power. Online risk - green B train protected both units Event Event Type Event Description No. 1 TAM1D3AS (N) RO/SRO The crew will perform RHR pump 3A monthly operability test, 3-0SP-050.2.
=3 During the test, the pump will be declared inoperable and taken out of (TS)SRO service due to high pump vibrations induced by bearing failure.
2 TFKCSMB= (C) BOP 3B ICW Pump shaft shears, crew manually starts the 3A ICW pump using the T (C,TS) SRO ARP or 3-0NOP-19. 3 TVFCLK1= (R)ALL Degrading condenser vacuum due to a condenser shell leak. The crew 0.35 min responds using 3-0NOP-014 and reduces unit load to stabilize condenser ramp vacuum. 4 TFS1MAML (I)RO Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 slowly fails low resulting in
=T (TS,I)SRO continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond using 3-0NOP-028 and then 3-0NOP-049.1 to address the failed channel.
TFGFRPT=T (C) BOP Main Generator Regulator PT failure, crew verifies DC Regulator control and 5 (C)SRO places Main Generator Voltage Regulator to test using the ARP. 6 TFP8SWYD (M)ALL Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the
=T TFQ5GAFS switchyard. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0, the 3A EDG will fail to
=T start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A TFQ5B20A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions
= to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. The TTFG1B86S crew will isolate seal injection to the RCP's prior to starting a charging pump.
=T 7 The crew will transition following power restoration to 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 and will isolate seal injection to the RCP's prior to starting a charging pump or to ECA-0.2 and manually start one Unit 3 HHSI pump.
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (I)nstrument (C)omponent (M)ajor 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description
- Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #4 Event 1 - The crew will perform RHR pump 3A monthly operability test, 3-0SP-050.2. During the test, the pump will be declared inoperable and taken out of service due to high pump vibrations induced by bearing failure.
Event 2 - The 38 ICW Pump shaft shears, the crew manually starts the 3A ICW pump using the ARP or 3-0NOP-19. Event 3 - A condenser shell leak will cause degrading condenser vacuum, the crew directs response using 3-0NOP-014 to stabilize condenser vacuum. The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the degrading condenser vacuum. Event 4 - Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 slowly fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond using 3-0NOP-028 and place rod control to MANUAL to stop the control rod insertion and 3-0NOP-049.1 to address the failed instrument. Event 5 - The Main Generator voltage regulator will experience a PT failure, the crew verifies DC regulator control and places Main Generator voltage regulator to test using the ARP. Event 6 - A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 38 EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel 8. The crew transitions
- to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. Critical Task. The crew will isolate seal injection to the RCP's prior to starting a charging pump. Critical Task EVENT 7 - The crew will transition following power restoration to 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 and will isolate seal injection to the RCP's prior to starting a charging pump Critical Task or to 3-EOP ECA-0.2 and manually start one Unit 3 HHSI pump. Critical Task
- 2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description
- Scenario XXV NRC 4 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-2 (50% power MOL)
- Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXV_NRC_4.lsn
- Place simulator in run Trigger lesson step:
- SETUP - 38 Charging pump OOS. Removes 38 charging pump from service.
(Actuates TAB1POSM = RACKOUT)
- SETUP -3A EDG Fails To Start (actuates TAQ5GAFS=T)
- SETUP -38 EDG Output 8reaker Fails To Close (actuates TFQ5B20A=T)
- SETUP - OPEN 3-741A (actuates TAMR1V29 = 1.0)
- Place clearance info tag on 38 Charging Pump start switch
- Provide an in progress procedure 3-0SP-050.2. step 7.1.22
- Provide shift turnover checklists
- Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RCO desk to the Utilities screens.
- Perform Simulator Operator Checklist
- 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description
- Event 1 - 3A RHR Surveillance Initiated immediately after shift turnover.
The crew will perform RHR pump 3A monthly operability test, 3-0SP-050.2. During the test, the pump will be declared inoperable and taken out of service due to high pump vibrations induced by bearing failure. Following turnover call the CR as FS, request the crew perform step 7.1.23 of 3-0SP-050.2. 1 minute after start, call the CR as FS to report 3A RHR pump very noisy and vibrating badly. Steps 7.1.33 & 34 are not applicable. If directed, perform steps 7.1.35 through 7.1.37. Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - CLOSE 3-741 A (actuates TAMR1V29 =0.0 on 1 min ramp). Step 7.1.38 is not applicable. Steps 7.1.39 through 7.1.43 are performed in the field, but no simulator action is required. If directed, respond as FS to report to the crew that the 3A RHRP test is complete and unsatisfactory (steps 7.1.44 & 46). Steps 7.1.45 & 47 are not applicable.
- If directed, acknowledge as SM regarding 3A RHRP unsatisfactory surveillance results.
If directed as OCC to remove 3A RHRP from service, rack out breaker, trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - RACK OUT 3A RHRP BKR (actuates TAM1D3AS =3). If the breaker is not racked out, to prevent further 3A RHRP use, trigger lesson step EVENT 1
- 3A RHRP SHAFT SHEAR (actuates TFMUM01S = T).
If directed, respond as WCC regarding troubleshooting & repair of 3A RHRP. Event 2 - 38 lew Pump Shaft Shears The 38 ICW Pump shaft shears, the crew manually starts the 3A ICW pump using the ARP or 3-0NOP-19. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - 3B ICWP SHAFT SHEAR (actuates TFKCSMB = T). If directed, wait three minutes and respond as the FS/ANPO to:
- perform pre-start checks for 3A ICWP. Report back that pump is ready to start.
- locally inspect the 38 ICWP. Report back that coupling between motor & pump shaft has failed.
- perform post-start checks for 3A ICWP. Report back that pump is operating normally.
4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description
- locally investigate breaker 3AB17. Report back that the breaker is open, but otherwise normal.
- walk down the ICW system to look for leaks. After 4-6 min, report no ICW system leaks are visible.
If directed, wait three minutes and respond as the TO to report TPCW HXs ICW flow. Click on SCHEMA --* COMMON SERVICES --* INTAKE COOLING --* report TPCW HX ICW total flow as indicated on ICW system mimic (or use default value of 5800 gpm). If directed, respond as SNPO if directed to report CCW HXs ICW flow. From ICW system mimic, report indicated CCW HX ICW total flow (or use default value of 13600 gpm). If directed, respond as TO if directed to check TPCW supply temperature (TI-3-1432) < 105°F. From ICW system mimic, touch TPCW * & report system temp TE-1472fTl-1432 at top left of TPCW mimic (approx 99°F and stable). If directed, respond as WCC to prepare a PWO/Clearance. If directed, respond as FS/ANPO to rack out 3B ICWP breaker 3AB17. After 8-12 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - RACK OUT 3B ICWP BKR (actuates TAK2B17P = 3). Event 3 - Condenser Shell Leak A condenser shell leak will cause degrading condenser vacuum, the crew directs response using 3-0NOP-014 to stabilize condenser vacuum. The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the degrading condenser vacuum. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM (actuates TVFCLK1 = 0.3 5 min ramp) ATTENTION: monitor Main Condenser vacuum, adjust the severity of TVFCLK1 to maintain a vacuum> 24.5 in hg. If directed, respond as FSfTO, acknowledge direction to place the steam jet air ejector (SJAE) hogging jet in service. Wait one minute then Trigger lesson step, EVENT 3 - PLACE SJAE IN SERVICE. (actuates TAFB072 and TAFB010). Inform control room hogging jet in service after 3 minutes. If directed, respond as FSfTO, acknowledge direction to the close hogging jet drain, 3-30-045. No simulator action is required, report complete after 3 minutes. If directed, respond as FSfTO, acknowledge direction to verify CV-3-221 0 for proper operation. Standby air ejectors are in service If directed, respond as System when called about load reduction. If directed, respond as SM when told to review 0-EPIP-201 01 & 0-ADM-115 for notification
- requirements. State that the NRC Resident will be notified of the fast laod reduction.
If directed, respond as chemistry to take samples. No response back required. 5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description
- If directed, respond as FSITO to align aux steam using attachment 1. No response back required.
When directed by the lead evaluator following a 3 to 5% load reduction, trigger lesson step, EVENT 3 - RESTORE VACUUM. (deletes TVFCLK1) Event 4 - PT-3-447 Slowly Fails Low Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 slowly fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond using 3-0NOP-028 and place rod control to MANUAL to stop the control rod insertion and 3-0NOP-049.1 to address the failed instrument. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - PT-3-447 FAIL LOW (actuates TVS1SALO*1.0 1 min ramp) If directed, respond as FSITO. Bypass AMSAC power 2 input & reset trouble alarm after 2-4 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 1- AMSAC - BYPASS POWER 2 INPUT & RESET ALARM (actuates TCL4P2BA(B)=T, TCL4RST=T). Report completion when Annunciator D-7/6 clears. If directed, respond as WCC if requested to prepare a PWO/Clearance and notify I&C. If directed, respond as I&C and acknowledge request to troubleshoot and repair PT-3-447 Event 5 - Generator PT Failure The Main Generator voltage regulator will experience a PT failure, the crew verifies DC regulator control and places Main Generator voltage regulator to test using the ARP. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - Generator PT Failure (actuates TFGFRPT=T) Event 6 - LOOP Loss of All AC Event 6 - A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. Critical Task When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 LOSS OF ALL AC (actuates TFP8SWYD = T, TFQ5GAFS = T, TFQ5B20A = T, TFG1 B86S = T, TCE2E01T=-1, TCE2E07T=T, & TCE6DR5C=F) If directed, respond as FS/SNPO, acknowledge direction to locally open 3-MOV-843A&B. After 3 minutes TRIGGER lesson step EVENT 6 - LOCALLY OPEN 3-MOV-843 A and B (actuates TFMW010 & TFMW020=T) If directed, respond as FS/ANPO, acknowledge direction to locally reset 3A EDG lockout relay. After 2 minutes TRIGGER lesson step EVENT 6 - ATTEMPT LOCAL RESET OF 3A EDG (actuates TCQ586AR). Report back lockout will not reset. If directed, respond as FS/ANPO, acknowledge direction to locally synchronize 3B emergency diesel generator to 3B 4KV bus using 3-0NOP-023.2, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE. After 10 minutes, notify CR using step 14 and 15 of 3-0NOP-023.2 that the 3B EDG is running sat and you would like permission to locally energize 3B 4KV bus. TRIGGER lesson step EVENT 6 - 3B EDG LOCAL OPERATION (actuates TAQ5LRSB LOCAL, TCQ5XS3B=F & TCQ5XS1B=F) After 3 minutes inform CR 3A EDG output breaker will not close. 6
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description
- If directed, respond as FS/ANPO to take 3A EDG MCSS to OFF & rack out 3AA20, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - 3A EDG MCSS OFF & RO 3AA20 (actuates TAQ5LRSA=O & TAQ5A20P=3).
Report when complete. If directed, respond as FS/ANPO after 1 to 2 minutes report the 3"8" EDG is running but the output breaker 3A820 is open. There are no visible problems with the breaker and no visible problems with the 3"8" 4 kv bus. If directed, respond as WCC, after 10 minutes report Electrical Maintenance has performed a visual inspection of output breaker 3A820 and can find no visible problem If directed to rack out 3A820, respond as FS/ANPO after 1 to 2 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - RACK OUT 3 "B" EDG OUTPUT BREAKER 3AB20, (actuates TAQ5B20P RACKOUT) report when complete If directed, respond as FSITO, acknowledge direction to reduce DC bus loading as necessary using ATTACHMENT 3. 3-0NOP-04.2 If directed, respond as the unit 4 RO "Unit 4 has also lost offsite power." "80th Unit 4 EDG's are supplying power to their respective 4kv busses." "The 48 EDG is supplying power to the 4D 4kV bus." If directed, respond as the unit 4 RO, acknowledge request to place all non running safeguards equipment on 48 4KV bus in off or pull to lock, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - U4 SAFEGUARDS EQUIP TO STOP OR PTL, report all non running safeguards equipment is in stop or pull to lock when complete. If directed, respond as the unit 4 RO, acknowledge direction to close 4AD07 breaker. After 15 sec trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE 4AD07. Report 4AD07 breaker closed. If directed, respond as the FSITO, acknowledge direction to locally verify no breaker targets exist on 38 4KV bus breakers. After 4 minutes report no targets exist on 38 4KV bus breakers. Event 7 EOP-ECA-O.1 or ECA 0.2 Response The crew will transition is to 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 or ECA 0.2 following power restoration depending on the extent of the cooldown of the RCS. The crew will isolate seal injection to the RCP's prior to starting a charging pump. Critical Task If directed, respond as FS/SNPO to place PAHMS in service, trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - ALIGN PAHM FOR SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A=1.0/30 sec delay, TAC2V02B=1.0/1 min delay, TAAAV21=1.0/2 min delay, TAAAV22=1.0/3.5 min delay & TACAO05=O.O). Report completion 10-15 min later. If directed, respond SNPO, trigger lesson step EVENT 7 Locally Isolate RCP Seals (actuates TAHN97A, B & C=O) Report when complete. If directed, respond SNPO, trigger lesson step EVENT 7 Locally Isolate MOV-3-626 and 381 Seals (actuates TCK1938M=T & TFBVC60=T) .' If directed, respond as Chemistry to sample S/G, monitor DAM-1 If directed, respond as HP perform surveys. 7
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description
- Step 7 RNO a.2 - Respond as NSO, acknowledge direction to perform attachment 10f 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 to align unit 4 RWST to unit 3 SI pumps.
- 8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew will perform RHR pump 3A monthly operability test, 30SP-Page 050.2. During the test, the pump will be declared inoperable and taken oli of service due to 1 of 2 high pump vibrations induced by bearing failure. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
--- -- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - -- - - -- -.I I
NOTES I
- Steps marked with an
- are only required to be performed for the quarterly pump 1ST. I These steps should be marked NIA if performing only the monthly OP test.
I
- I Steps 7.1.1 through 7.1.6 may be performed in any order.
I I SRO Directs evolution using 3-0NOP-014. RO Starts 3A RHR pump and records start time. EXAMINER NOTE: One minute after the pump start, the CR receives a call informing 3A RHR pump is vibrating excessively. This requires skipping steps 7.1.24 thru 7.1.31.1 CAUTION RHR Pump 3A should be observed for any abnormal condition requiring shutdown. SRO Directs RO to stop the 3A RHR pump RO Stops the 3A RHR pump (May place the pump control switch in pUIl-to-lock position). RO Directs SNPO to close and lock the RHR Recirc Line Isolation, 3-741A. SRO Declares 3A RHRP inoperable and notifies SM. CREW Directs FSIWCC to take actions to rackout 3A RHR pump breaker. SRO Implements LCO 3.5.2.c Action g.
- 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
The crew will perform RHR pump 3A monthly operability test, 30SP-050.2. During the test, the pump will be declared inoperable and taken out of servicedue to failure.. high pump vibrations induced by bearing failure Time I " lit:: Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE: LCO 3.5.2 The following Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment and flow paths shall be OPERABLE:
- c. Two OPERABLE RHR pumps with discharge aligned to the RCS cold legs Action g With an ECCS subsystem inoperable due to an RHR pump being inoperable, restore the inoperable RHR pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in as least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours .
- EXAMINER NOTE:
Proceed to EVENT 2
- 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:2 Page Event
Description:
The 3B ICW Pump shaft shears, the crew manually starts the 3\ ICW pump using the ARP or ~ONOP-19. 1 of 3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step EVENT2 38 ICWP SHAFT SHEAR (actuates TFKCSMB = T). BOP Observes reduced 3B ICWP amps & annunciator 1-4/4 BOP Refers to ARP for annunciator 1-4/4 SRO Directs response using ~ONOP-019. May direct response from the ARP. Examiner Note: If 3-0NOP-19 is NOT entered, observe 3A ICW pump is started and go to page 4 for TS LCO enty.
- CREW Reviews 3-0NOP-19 foldout page actions (See page 5)
CAUTIONS If the cause of the Intake Cooling Water Malfunction is determined to be due to high differential pressure on the traveling screens, then 3-0NOP-011, SCREEN WASH SYSTEM/INTAKE MALFUNCTION, should be used.
- If an Intake Cooling Water Pump is stopped in this procedure and the reason for stopping the pump has not been corrected, that pump is not available for starting in subsequent procedure steps.
- Monitoring Main Generator RTDs is required if TPCW flow or temperature is changed due to the effect on Main Generator hydrogen leakage. An increase in hydrogen leakage is expected if the gas temperature to rotor temperature gradient increases. (Reference CR 2008-803)
RO Observes all ICWP alarms off (ann. 1-4/1, 4/2 & 4/3) RO Observes traveling screens clean (ann. ~3/3 OFF & ~p < 7.5"1-b0) BOP Verifies Intake Cooling Water Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP Manually starts 3A ICW Pump, stops the 3B ICW pump. I~-----------------------I Nore I
- I I An operable intake cooling water header consists of an intact header being supplied by at least one intake cooling water pump.
I _.I 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:2 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
The 3B ICW Pump shaft shears, the crew manually starts the 3\ ICW pump using the ARP or 3-0NOP-19.
, Time TilYlo Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Observes alarm I 4/4, ICW HEADER AlB LO PRESS - OFF BOP Observes ICW pressure >10 psig & < 35 psig on PI-3-1619 & PI-3-1620 CAUTIONS If POV-3-4882 or POV-3-4883 must be 10callK, opened using the handwheel, then the Technical Specification 72- our action statement for an inoperable ICW header is required to be entered.
RO Verifies SI terminated BOP Verifies POV-3-4882 & 4883 both open CAUTIONS If not corrected prompa,;;; reduced intake cooling water flow to the Turbine Plant Cooling ater Heat Exchangers may result in damage to vital plant equipment. BOP Observes 1-5/4 (TPCW hi temp/lo press) OFF BOP Directs TO to check TPCW supply temperature T1-3-1432 stable or decreasing CAUTIONS If not corrected promptly, reduced intake cooling water flow to the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers may result in damage to vital plant equipment. BOP Verifies CCW supply temp < 120"F and stable/decreasing with ann. H-8/5 OFF. BOP Repeats check for normal TPCW conditions BOP Repeats check for normal CCW conditions CREW Notifies WCC to initiate PWO & repair SRO Implements LCO 3.7.3.a actions a & b (72 hr until 3B ICW pump bkr racked out then 14 day with 3A & 3C ICWP on independent power supplies) 4
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:2 Event
Description:
The 3B ICW Pump shaft shears, the crew manually starts the 3\ ICW pump using the ARP or 3-0NOP-19. Page 3 of 3 EXAMINER NOTE: LCO 3.7.3 a The Intake Cooling Water System (ICW) shall be OPERABLE with Three ICW pumps Action b With only one ICW pump OPERABLE or with two ICW pumps OPERABLE but not from independent power supplies, restore two pumps from independent power supplies to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY \Mthin the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Then to: Action a With only two ICW pumps with independent power supplies OPERABLE, restore the inoperable ICW pump to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. (Once the 3B ICW pump breaker is racked out.) EXAMINER NOTE: Proceed to EVENT 3
- 1. TRIP CRITERIA
- Component Cooling Water temperature as read on TI-3-607 A and TI-3-607B cannot be maintained less than 120cF.
- Turbine or Generator bearing temperatures cannot be maintained less than 180 v F.
- 2. MINIMUM FLOW REQUIREMENTS FOR CCW HXs While Isolating a CCW/ICW strainer, ICW flow less than minimum required through the CCW HXs can be r!
tolerated without entry into Technical Specification Action 3.0.3, provided flow is restored to the minimum, allowable. as determined by 3-NOP-019, Intake Cooling Water System, in less than 5 minutes by reopening the strainer isolation valves. If flow is below the minimum allowable value for greater than 5 minutes, then entry into Technical Specification Action 3.0.3 is started at the point where flow first fell below the minimum value. [Reference 3.1 AJ 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
A condenser shell leak will cause degrading condenser vacuum, the crew directs response using ~ONOP-014 to stabilize condenser vacuum. The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using ~ONOP-100 in response to the degrading condenser vacuum.
"T':
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step EVENT3 LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM (actuates TVFCLK1 = 0.3 5 min ramp) I NOTE -,I I Diverse mdications of condenser vacuum should be used to validate the loss of vacuum including ERDADS back pressure. I I I
~-----------------------.
BOP Observes condenser vacuum lowering by diverse indications:
- Main condenser vacuum lowering
- Main Generator load decreasing
- Main condenser air in-leakage increasing SRO Directs response using ~ONOP-014.
CAUTION Hot water may be emitted from the silencer causing the potential for personnel injury. CREW Directs FSITO to place the SJAE hogging jet in service I NOTES - --, I I
- For the remainder of this procedure. the most conservative of the following three indications of Main Condenser vacuum should be used to determine the appropriate I
I I actions I PI-3-1612 and PI-3-1406 on VPA DDPSA 105-3 on ERDADs/R*Time I I I I
- DDPSA 105-3 on R*Time indicates Main Condenser backpressure .
vacuum from backpressure. To determine I I I L _~~o~n:r:u~m~o~n~-~D:'A~~ _________ J CREW Directs FSITO to Close Hogging Jet Drain, ~30-045.
- CREW Directs FSITO to place the standby set in service using Attachment 1 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
A condenser shell leak will cause degrading condenser vacuum, the crew directs response using 3-0NOP-014 to stabilize condenser vacuum. The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the degrading condenser Page 2 of 5 vacuum. I T: TimA,~ Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO IF vacuum can NOT be maintained by the SJAE hogging jet, THEN reduce turbine load as necessary using 3-GOP-103, Power Operation to Hot Standby, OR 3-0NOP-100, Fast Load Reduction, to maintain condenser vacuum greater than required by Enclosure 1. ENCLOSURE 1 (Page 1 of 1) CONDENSER VACUUM LIMITATIONS 21
- r:
z 22 H I 23
=== DO NOT OPERATE IN TIllS Rf:GJON 1===
~
- > 24
() :!4.5
~ 25 OPERATE IN TIllS REGION 0:: 26 W
(j) Z 27 W 0 Z 2< 0 () 29 10 0 1()() 200 30" 334 400 500 531 600 700 728 81)0 LOt\D*.\tW WC(~NIB'fl'f~'V~ SRO Transitions to 3-0NOP-100 SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-100. SRO Performs 3-0NOP-100 brief. (See page 9) CREW Reviews 3-0NOP-100 foldout page actions (See page 10) SRO Determines 9 gal/% boric acid addition is required.
- 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:3 Page 3 of 5 Event
Description:
A condenser shell leak will cause degrading condenser vacuum, the crew directs response using 3-0NOP-014 to stabilize condenser vacuum. The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the degrading condenser vacuum. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Initiates boration:
- 1. Sets BA totalizer as directed (9 gal/% for 50% load decrease =
450 gal BA)
- 2. Takes FC-3-113A pot ~8.0 or as directed
- 3. RMSS~BORA TE
- 4. RMCS~START RO Adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to obtain the Attachment 3 desired flow rate BOP Reduces turbine load.
- Maintains Tavg less than 5°F above Tref
- Maintains rods greater than insertion limit.
~-----------------------,
I tillI.5 I I~Axial_nux_difference is aI/owed to exceed the Target Band during the load reduction without entering O-OP-059.9. Operation Within the Axial Flux Difference Operational Space. I J CREW Notifies plant management and System of the impending unit shutdown. RO Check pressurizer level following progran CREW Verify load reduction rate and auto rod control is maintaining the expected Tavgrrref 8T identified in Attachment 3 EXAMINER NOTE: When power has been suffiCiently reduced, p-oceed to EVENT 4
- 8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:3 Page 4 of 5 Event
Description:
A condenser shell leak will cause degrading condenser vacuum, the crew directs response using 3-0NOP-014 to stabilize condenser vacuum. The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the degrading condenser vacuum. ATTACIDJEI\T 3 (Page 1 of I) FAST LOAD REDPCTIOK BRIEF
- 1. Renson for load reduction
- 2. Target power leyel °0 Power Time to Shutdo'wn from 100% 25 min 50 min 75 min 110 min Load Reduction Rate MWimin 30 MWhllin 15 MWimin 10 M\V imin 7 MWimin Load Reduction Rate 0 0 mill 4 °0 . ' min 2 0 0 / mill 1.33 °0 ,/ min 1 0/0 i min Expected T avg,T ref ~ T 4 of 3 of 2 OF 1 of
- 3. Load reduction rate I
- - - - Mw ( miuute Suggested boration is 9 gallons per % with control rods completely withdrawn and I available, 18 gallons per % with no control rod movement (use a value between 9 and 18 I I
if rods are not fully withdrawn when starting a load reduction from tuff power). I
- The Unit Supervisor may change the boration as desired during the load reduction. I I
- 4. Boratioll Rate: _ _ _ total gallom. ' ____
_ _ _ minutes = ___ gallons/minute.
- 5. Plant Control Parameters and Contingency Actions
- Tayg' Tref expected .:.'l T bauct not to exceed +/- 1 OF of expected, slow ramp to restore baneL
- If AruHlllciator B 8/ I. ROD BANK LO U)"HT alarms, the load reduction shall be slowed.
- 6. EOP E-O transition criteria - Manual reactor and tmbille trip:
- Tavel' 578 OF
- Tave 6 8F > TIef
- Rod Insel1ion Limits (RIL) aTe exceeded
- 7. Reyiew required actions from other procedures c1UTently in effect (example. stop Rep).
- 8. Questions or crew input')
- 9. Eud of Brief 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:3 Page 5 of 5 Event
Description:
A condenser shell leak will cause degrading condenser vacuum, the crew directs response using 3-0NOP-014 to stabilize condenser vacuum. The crew will initicte a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the degrading condenser vacuum. 3-0NOP-100 Foldout page
- 1. 3-EOP-E-O Transition Criteria IF any of the following limits are reached, !.!::!.§t:! trip the Reactor and Turbine 8lfQ go to 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION:
- a. RCS T avg - GREATER THAN 578 of
- b. RCS Tavg - GREATER THAN Tref by 6 of
- c. Rod Insertion Limits are exceeded as indicated by:
- Rod Position Bank D Insertion Limit Recorder (VPA)
- Stepcounters on console
- Plant Curve Book Section 7, Figure 3
- 2. Notify Chemistry Department WHEN reactor power has changed by greater than or equal to 15 percent, THEN notify the Chemistry Department that RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.
- 3. Restore Blender to AUTO WHEN boration is complete. THEN restore the Blender to AUTO as follows.
- a. Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to AUTO
- b. Set FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller pot setting as desired
- c. Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START
- 10
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:4 Event
Description:
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 slowly fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond using 3-0NOP-028 and place rod Page 1 of 4 control to MANUAL to stop the control rod insertion and 30NOP-049.1 to address the failed instrument. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step EVENT4 PT-3-447 FAIL LOW (actuates TVS1SALO-1.0 1 min ramp) BOP Observes alarms C-8/3 & 0-7/6 SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-28 and then 3-0NOP-049.1, may direct suspension of the boration. SRO Observes indicators PT-3-447 failing low and compares to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions. SRO Verifies no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels. RO Places rod control to MANUAL. RO Withdraws rods to restore Tavg to Tref BOP Selects PT-3-446 for control.
~-----------------------.
I ~ I I A few mliluleo neee/s to elapse between tile tllne First Stage Pressure IS trensfened and Rod Control is returned to Automatic ThiS WII! preclude the POSSibility of tile power I 11lISmatc/l CircUitry causlIIg uncleslrecl rod motion L _______________________ II I RO Places rod control to AUTO SRO Refers to LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 17B action 7 & LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3-2 Functional Unit 1f/4d action 15 (b/s trip in 6 hr) SRO Makes determination to trip the following bistables within 6 hours.
- BS-3-475 (rack 24) & BS-3-447 1/2 BS-3-485/495 (rack 25)
CREW Directs FSITO bypass AMSAC PT-3-447 (power 2) input. BOP Places steam dump to condenser control to RESET & then to AUTO
- CREW Directs WCC to initiate PWOltroubleshooting/repair 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:4 Page 2 of 4 Event
Description:
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 slowly fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond using 3-0NOP-028 and place rod control to MANUAL to stop the control rod insertion and 3-0NOP-049.1 to address the failed instrument. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION The fai/ed channel bistable(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in the tripped or test position and would result in an undesired Engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuation. The overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and, therefore, a possible reduction in plant protection. EXAMINER NOTE When the SRO selects which bistables to trip, proceed to Event 5. EXAMINER NOTE See next two pages for applicable Tech Specs.
- 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:4 Event
Description:
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 slowly fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond using :>ONOP-028 and place rod Page 3 of 4 control to MANUAL to stop the control rod insertion and 3-0NOP-049.1 to address the failed instrument. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE: 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-1. MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE fUNCTIONAL UNIT Of CHANNELS IQ.IB1£ QEEBA6Lf MODES 6GlQtI
- 17 0
c Re>actor T np System InteriQcks a 1l1fermedlate Range Neutron Flux P-6 Low Power Reactor Tnps Block. P-7 PolO Input or Turbtne FJr5t Stage Pressure Power Range Neutron 2 4 2 1 2 I 2 3 2 2# 1 I 7 7 7 Flux. P-8 4 2 3 1 7 d Power Range Neutron Flux. P-lO 4 2 3 1.2 7 ACTION 7 With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3. EXAMINER NOTE: 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.:>2 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-3. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-2.
- ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-2.
13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:4 Event
Description:
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 slowly fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond using J.ONOP-028 and place rod control to MANUAL to stop the control rod insertion and J.ONOP-049.1 to address the failed Page 4 of 4 instrument. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior MINIMUM TOTAL NO CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE EtmCIIQU8L UtJlI OE CI:l8W:JELS NIRlE QI"ERABLE MOOES l\CIJQN 1 Safety Injection (Feedwater Isolation) f Steam Line fiow *. H'gh 2Jsleam line 1/steam line 1isteam line 1,2,3' 15 Coincident wrth !r! any roVo in any two steam lines steam lines Stearr" Generator Pressure--Low lr'stemn 1i~teafll 1fsteam 1,2.3' 15 generator generator generatOf In any two in any two steam lines steam lines or T.wij--LWJ 1/100p l!loop in any 1/1oop in any 1. 2. 3' 25
!woloops two loops
- 4. Steam Line Isolation 4 Steam Lrne Isolation (Contmued) d 51""m Lme Flow-HiJh Comcident 'Vlth Stearn Generator Pressure--Low 21steam line I tsteam 'me n any two steam fmes 1Isteam line in anytv"o steam lines 1,2,3 15 l/steam- 1!stearn listeam I. 2, 3 15 generator generator generator 111 any two Ifl any two steam hnes steam lines Of T...~--Low l!Loop i:100p In 1.I1oop In 1. 2, 3 25 any two any two loops loops ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.
EXAMINER NOTE: Proceed to EVENT 5
- 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 1-Event
Description:
The Main Generator voltage regulator will experience a PT failure, the crew verifies DC regulator control and places Main Generator voltage regulator to test using the ARP. Time II P T Position oSllon Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step EVENTS Generator PT Failure (actuates TFGFRPT=T) BOP Observes alarms E-7/6, 8/5 & 9/3 SRO Directs response using the ARP BOP Verify generator voltage regulator transfers to mamal. BOP Place the voltage regulator selector switch in the test position. BOP Adjust voltage manually using the DC regulator. (As required) CREW Notify Electrical Dept.
- CREW Notify the System Dispatcher within 30 minutes of changing generator MVAR loading or changing the status of generator voltage controls and the duration of the instability and then log the notification in the Unit Narrative Log.
EXAMINER NOTE: Proceed to EVENT 6
- 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 16 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step EVENTS LOSS OF ALL AC (actuates TFPBSWYD = T, TFQ5GAFS = T, TFQ5820A = T, TFG18B6S = T, TCE2E01T.:f, TCE2E07T=T) SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-O
~-----------------------I I ~ I I Steps 1 through 4 are IMMEDIA TE ACTION steps.
I
,..... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - __ I RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O:
Verifies reactor trip
- Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero
- Rx trip & bypass bkrs open
- Neutron flux decreasing BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O:
Verifies turbine tripped
- Turbine stop valves closed
- Manually closes MSIV's
- Mid & East GCBs open Verifies NO power to emergency 4kV buses SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0
- 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:6 Page 2 of 16 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-0, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts bLt its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to ~EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. I~-----------------------II t:!Q!5. I
- Steps 1 and 2 are IMMEDIA TE ACTION steps . I I
- CSF Status Trees are required to be monitored for information only. FRPs shall NOT I I be implemented. I
'-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - __ I RO Performs immediate actions of3-EOP-ECA-0.0:
Verifies reactor trip
- Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero
- Rx trip & bypass bkrs open
- Neutron flux decreasing BOP Performs immediate actions of3-EOP-ECA-0.0:
Verifies turbine tripped
- Turbine stop valves closed
- Manually closes MSIV's
- Mid & East GCBs open RO Checks PRZ PORVs - CLOSED RO Closes Letdown isolation valves RO Checks Excess letdown isolation valves - CLOSED BOP Checks all AFW Pumps RUNNING BOP Verifies total AFW flow greater than 345 gpm.
- 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:6 Page 3 of 16 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-0, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. T: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS
- If 51 has been reset or 51 actuation occurs on the other unit, safeguards equipment needs to be restored to the required configuration.
- If an 51 signal exists or is actuated during this procedure, it must be reset to ensure restoration of a power source and to ensure controlled loading of equipment on the 4KV Bus.
--- - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I I NOTES ~
I
- Attachment 5 provides a reference for Emergency Diesel Generator loads. I I
- If a Sequencer failure has occurred and SI has actuated, the associated EDG output I I breaker may not close unless SI is reset. I L _______________________ I BOP Verify 4KV bus stripping using ATIACHMENTS 1 and 2 RO Verify SI - RESET EXAMINER NOTE:
The SRO will probably choose to implement Attachment 2 for expediency since the 3D 4kv bus is aligned to the 38 4kv bus. Either attachment is acceptable. See the following two pages for ATIACHMENTS 1 and 2 SRO Checks the A and B 4KV buses de-energized and goes to step 6. RO Verifies The A And B 4KV Bus Lockout Relays- RESET RO Directs FS/ANPO to locally reset 3A emergency diesel start failure relay by depressing the alarm reset pushbutton. The relay WILL NOT reset. RO Verifies 3B Emergency Diesel Generator Lockout Relays- RESET EXAMINER NOTE: Go to page 21
- 18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker Page 4 of 16 fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. 3A 4KV BUS STRIPPING
- 1. IE 3A 4KV Bus is de-energized .8tl.Q 3D 4KV Bus is aligned to 3A 4KV Bus, It!5!::! verify the Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue light is ON .8tl.Q 4AD07 OPEN,
- 2. IE 3A 4KV Bus is de-energized Ar:!Q 3D 4KV Bus is NOT aligned to 3A 4KV Bus.QB Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue Light is OFF, ~ verify the following breakers open:
- 3AA22 , 3A 4KV Bus Emergency Tie To Unit 4 Startup Transformer
- 3AA09, 3A 4KV Bus Tie To 3B Or 3C 4KV Bus
- 3AA05, Startup Transformer 3A 4KV Bus Supply
- 3AA02, Auxiliary Transformer 3A Bus Supply
- 3AA03, Steam Generator Feed Pump 3A
- 3AA07, Heater Drain Pump 3A
- 3AA21, Condensate Pump 3A
- 3AA13, Safety Injection Pump 3A
- 3AA15, Residual Heat Removal Pump 3A
- 3AA12, Component Cooling Water Pump 3A
- 3AA01, Reactor Coolant Pump 3A
- 3AA19, Intake Cooling Water Pump 3A
- 3AA 11, Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 3A
- 3AA16, Circulating Water Pump 3A1
- 3AA 18, Circulating Water Pump 3A2
- 3AA08, 3A Load Center
- 3AA14, 3C Load Center 3 IE Supply From 4KV Bus 3A. 3AD01, is open, It!5!::! verify Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, 3AA 17, is open.
- 4. !E Supply From 4KV Bus 3A, 3AD01, is closed, It!5!::! perform the following:
- a. IE Station Blackout Breaker. 3AD07, is closed, II::!Iili perform the follOWing:
- 1) Open Station Blackout Breaker, 3AD07.
- 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to open Station Blackout Breaker, 4AD07.
- b. Verify breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD05, is open.
- c. Verify breaker for Component Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD04, is open
- d. !E breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD05, OR breaker for Component Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD04, can NOT be opened, THEN open Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, 3AA17. AND Supply From 4KV-Sus 3A, 3AD01
- 5. Notify Unit 3 Reactor Operator that 3A 4KV bus stripplng is complete.
- 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker Page 5 of 16 fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. 3B 4KV BUS STRIPPING 1 IE 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized 8lli2 3D 4KV Bus is alJgned to 3B 4KV Bus. I!iS.t:! verify the Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue light is ON 8lli2 4AD07 OPEN. 2 IE 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized AND 3D 4KV Bus is NOT aligned to 3B 4KV Bus OR Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue Ught IS OFF. THEN verify the following breakers open:
- 3AB22, 3B 4KV Bus Tie To 3A Or 3C 4KV Bus
- 3AB05. Startup Transformer 3B 4KV Bus Supply
- 3AB02, Auxiliary Transformer 3B Bus Supply
- 3AB10, Heater Drain Pump 3B
- 3AB21 , Condensate Pump 3B
- 3AB12, Safety Injection Pump 3B
- 3AB15, Residual Heat Removal Pump 3B
- 3AB13. Component Cooling Water Pump 3B
- 3ABO 1, Reactor Coolant Pump 3B
- 3AB06, Reactor Coolant Pump 3C
- 3AB17. Intake Cooling Water Pump 3B
- 3AB 11, Turbine Plant COOling Water Pump 3B
- 3AB16, Circulating Water Pump 3B1
- 3AB18, Circulating Water Pump 3B2
- 3AB09. 3B Load Center
- 3AB14, 3D Load Center
- 3. 1E Supply From 4KV Bus 3B, 3AD06, is open, I!iS.t:! verify Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D. 3AB19, is open.
- 4. IE Supply From 4KV Bus 3B, 3AD06, is closed, I!iS.t:! perform the folloWing:
- a. 1E Station Blackout Breaker. 3AD07, is closed, ~ perform the following:
- 1) Open Station Blackout Breaker. 3AD07.
- 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to open Station Blackout Breaker, 4AD07.
- b. Verify breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD05, is open
- c. Verify breaker for Component Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD04. is open.
d !E breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD05. OR breaker for Component Cooling Water Pumr 3C. 3AD05, can NOT be opened. THEN open Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, 3AB 19, AND Supply From 4KV-Bus 3B. 3AD06
- 5. Notify Unit 3 Reactor Operator that 3B 4KV bus stripping is complete.
- 20
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Page 6 of 16 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power tothe switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-0, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. tie .
,~
~ Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Verifies 3B 4KV bus stripping from ATTACHMENT 2 - COMPLETED RO Verifies SI - RESET RO Attempts to manually synchronize 3B emergency diesel generator to 3B 4KV bus. Directs FS/ANPO to locally synchronize the 3B EDG. The 3B bus WILL NOT be energized by the 3B EDG.
SRO Checks the 3A and 3B 4KV buses de-energized. SRO Directs BOP to restore AC power using 3-0NOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS.
- SRO WHEN power is restored to the 3A or 3B 4KV bus, THEN observe the CAUTIONS prior to Step 32 and go to Step 32 to perform recovery actions.
EXAMINER NOTE: SRO directs the BOP to recover power to the 3B 4kv bus from the Unit 4B EDG through the 40 4kv bus and the SBO tie. See page 26 for details. The SRO will continue to progress through 3-EOP-ECA 0.0 while the BOP is restoring power through the SBO tie. The SRO will go to step 32 when 4kv power is restored. The crew may take the following actions depending on the length of time required to restore power to the 4kv bus CAUTION When power is restored to 3A or 38 4KV bus, recovery actions should continue by observing CAUTIONS prior to Step 32 and then performing Step 32. RO Places non running Unit 3 ESF equipment in stop or PTL RO Emergency containment filter fans - STOP AND OPEN Breaker 30806, Emergency Containment Filter Fan 3B, on MCC 3D
- RO Places Unit 4 HHSI pumps in PTL 21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Page 7 of 16 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG aarts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. I Tit'Y'lo
~ Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO IF SI occurs, directs FS/SNPO to locally open MO\J.3-843 A and B RO Directs SNPO to locally close ~297 AlBIC MOV-3-626 and MOV-3-381 CREW CRITICAL TASK: Isolate RCP seal injection to the RCPs prior to starting a charging pump.
RO Checks the following CLOSED
- Main steamline isolation and bypass valves
- Main feedwater control and bypass valves
- S/G blowdown isolation valves CAUTIONS A faulted or ruptured S/G that is isolated shall remain isolated.
Steam supply to the AFW pumps must be maintained from at least one intact S/G. SRO Checks S/Gs are NOT Faulted. CAUTION If CST level decreases to less than 10%, makeup water sources for the CST will be necessary to maintain secondary heat sink. RO Controls AFW flow to maintain narrow range S/G level between 15% and 50% SRO Checks S/G Tubes are NOT Ruptured SRO Goes to Step 24 CAUTION Step 1 of ATTACHMENT 3 is required to be performed within the first 60 minutes of a loss of all AC power event if both the 3A 1 and 3A2 battery chargers are inoperable. 22
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew Page 8 of 16 responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Direct operator to reduce DC bus loading as necessary using ATTACHMENT 3 and to periodically monitor DC power supply voltage RO Checks CST Level - GREATER THAN 10% SRO CAUTIONS
- S/G pressures shall NOT be decreased to less than 80 psig to prevent injection of accumulator nitrogen into the ReS.
- 51G narrow range level is required to be maintained greater than 6%[32%J in at least one intact 51G. If level can NOT be maintained, S/G depressurization is required to be stopped until level is restored in at least one S/G.
I- - - - - - - - - - - NOTES
- - - - - - - - - - - __ I I
- I I
I I S/Gs are required to be depressurized at maximum rate to minimize ReS inventory loss. Although PZR level may be lost and reactor vessel upper head voiding may occur due to depressunzation of SGs, depressurization shall NOT be stopped to prevent this.
~-----------------------.
I I I I RO Depressurizes S/G to 180 psig, using S/G steam dump to atmosphere valves at maximum rate and maintaining:
- S/G narrow range levels - GREATER THAN 6% IN AT LEAST ONE S/G
- RCS cold leg temperatures - GREATER THAN 350°F
- Manually control S/G steam dump toatmosphere to maintain S/G pressures at180 psig CREW Checks Reactor Subcritical
- - - - - - - - __ - - - - - - - - - - - - __ I I NOTE I I Depressurization of S/Gs will result in SI actuation. SI is required to be reset to permit I I manual loading of equipment on 4KV buses. I L _______________________ J
- RO Checks 81 ACTUATED and reset 23
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Page 9 of 16 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to theswitchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Verifies Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB - ALL BRIGHT RO Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and supply fans- OFF RO Verifies Control Room ventilation status panel - PROPER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT CREW Checks Containment Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 20 PSIG CAUTIONS
- These cautions apply to AFW pump operation throughout all of the EOPs.
- If two AFW pumps are operating on a single train, one of the pumps needs to be shut down within one hour of the initial start signal using 3*0P*075, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Subsection 6.2.
- If two AFW trains are operating and one of the AFW pumps has been operating with an average flow of less than 60 gpm, the pump should be shut down within one hour of operating at less than 60 gpm using 3-0P-075, AUXILIARY FEEDWA TER SYSTEM, Subsection 6.2.
SRO Check Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN 1200°F SRO Notes QSPDS Channel A not functioning, monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. CREW Checks 3B 4KV buses ENERGIZED from the Unit 4 EDG's BOP Stabilizes S/G Pressures CAUTIONS
- Steady state loading on each Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator shall NOT exceed 2500 KW. Load transients up to 2750 KWare acceptable when starting additional equipment.
- Steady state loading on each Unit 4 Emergency Diesel Generator shall NOT exceed 2874 KW. Load transients up to 3162 KWare acceptable when starting additional equipment.
24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:6 Page 10 of 16 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of pOJVer to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW Verify Equipment Loaded On Energized 4KV Buses SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 if SI is not required SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 if SI actuates or Pressurizer level is less than 17% Examiner Note: For 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 details go to page 32. For 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 details go to page 33.
- 25
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Page Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker 11 of 16 fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. Time Dnsition Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION The CCW System load requirements of 3-0P-030, COMPONENT COOLING WA TER SYSTEM, shall not be exceeded.
- - - - - - - - - - - NOTES I
------------- I I . If O-ONOP-105. CONTROL ROOM EVACUA TlON, is in effect, this procedure shall I I NOT be used. I I. If emergency operating procedures are NOT in effect, the plant should be stabilized I I using 3-0NOP-004, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. wllile performing this procedure. I I . Wilen 3B 4KV Bus is supplying power to Unit 4 AND offsite power to 3B 4KV Bus is I I lost, 3B Emergency Diesel Generator output breaker will NOT close until tile Station I Blackout Breaker, 3AD07, has been manually opened.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _.I I
BOP Performs 3-0NOP-004.3 as directed to restore 3B 4kV bus, EXAMINER NOTE: Steps annotated by
- were p-eviously completed in 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 BOP *Verifies Bus Stripping On 3B 4KV Bus*
CAUTION Emergency Diesel Generators should NOT be run unloaded for more than 4.5 hours. BOP *Checks 3B 4KV Bus Lockout Relay - RESET* CAUTION If an SI signal exists or is actuated while performing this procedure, it is required to be reset to ensure restoration of a power source and to ensure controlled loading of equipment on the 4KV bus. BOP *Verifies SI Reset* 26
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew Page 12 of 16 responds per 3-EOP-E-0, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel 8 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie.
"T":
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION The affected EDG may Auto-Start when the Lockout Relay is reset in Step 4. BOP *Checks 3B Emergency Diesel Lockout Relay- RESET* CAUTION Steady state 10adinJ', on each Unit 3 EDG shall NOT exceed 2500 KW. Load transients up to 275 KWare acceptable when starting additional equipment.
, - - - - - - - - - - -NOTES ------------,
I I When Unit 3 startl(Jt transformer is available, offsite power to 38 4KV bus slwuld be I restored uSin~ 3- NOP-004.1, SYSTEM RESTORATION FOLLOWING LOSS OF OFFSITE PO ER. I I I If a 38 Sequencer failure has occurred and SI has actuated, the 38 EDG output I
- breaker may not close unless SI is reset. I I
- -- - - -- - - -- -- - - -- - -- - -- I BOP *Directs FS/ANPO to locally synchronize3B Emergency Diesel Generator to 3B 4KV bus using 3-0NOP-023.2, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE.*
BOP *Verifies 3B 4KV bus stripping from ATTACHMENT 1- COMPLETE* BOP *Directs FS/ANPO to Shut down 3B Emergency Diesel Generator using 3-0P-023, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.*
~-----------------------.
I NOTE I I Verifying that SI is reset prior to closing Stal1up Transformer bus supply breakers should help to ensure the breaker will close. I I I BOP Checks Unit 3 Startup Transformer Potential White Light on VPA- NOT ON EXAMINER NOTE:
- Start time for the CT begins at step 7 of ONOP 4.3 27
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew Page responds per 3-EOP-E-0, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The 13 of 16 crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. T; Time - Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION The Station Blackout Tie Line may be used only when both the 3A and 3B 4KV Buses are deenergized. _________________________ r I MQIS I I If the 3A and 3B 4KV Buses are both deenergized because offsite power and Unit 3 I I Emergency Diesel Generators are NOT available, power needs to be restored to at least I one of these 4KV buses within 10 minutes to satisfy station blackout requirements. I- - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - _.I BOP Prepares to energize 3B 4kv bus from SBO tie.
- 1. Checks 3A 4kv bus de-energized.
- 2. Checks 4A and 4B 4kv busses energized.
- 3. Checks 3D 4kv bus LO relays reset.
- 4. Checks 3D 4kv bus aligned to 3B 4kv bus.
- 5. Verifies SBO tie 3AD07 permissive light ON.
- 6. Checks 4D 4kv bus energized.
CAUTIONS
- When a station blackout condition exists, loading on each Unit 4 Emergency Diesel Generator shall be limited to 3095 KW.
- If the Unit 4 4KV bus supplying power to the 4D 4KV bus is energized by an EDG and Station Blackout Breaker 4AD07 is closed; non-running safeguards equipment on the bus supplying power should be placed in PULL-TO-LOCK or STOP to prevent autos tart and possible overload of the EDG.
BOP Directs the Unit 4 RO to place non-running safeguards equipment in PULL-TO-LOCK or STOP on the Unit 4B 4KV bus.
- 28
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Page Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker 14 of 16 fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION If offsite power to the Unit 4 4KV bus supplying power to the 4D 4KV Bus is lost after Station Blackout Breaker 4AD07 is closed; the associated EDG output breaker will NOT close until4AD07 has been opened. BOP Closes 3AD07 EXAMINER NOTE: Stop time for the CT ends when 3AD07 is closed. CREW CRITICAL TASK: Energize the required 4KV bus from station
- BOP blackout tie within 10 minutes after reading cauti01 before step 7 of 3/4-0NOP-004.2 or step 6 of 3/4-0NOP-004.3 during a loss of all AC.
Directs U4 RO close 4AD07 BOP Verifies 3B 4KV Bus - ENERGIZED Verifies SI - RESET CAUTION If this is the first bus restored following a loss of offsite power, Load Centers shall be reenergized as directed in the applicable Emergency Operating Procedures or in 3-0NOP-004, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. BOP Directs FSITO to verify no relay targets on the 3B 4 kv bus. Energizes the B, D & H load centers.
- 29
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Page 15 of 16 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power using the blackout tie. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION The CCW System loads requirements of 3-0P-030, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM, shall not be exceeded. I
- - - - - - - - - - - !iQI5. - - - - - - - - - -- --, I I If any component powered from a deenergized motor control center must be started. the I I affected motor control center needs to be reenergized using 3-0P-007. 480 VOL T MOTOR I CONTROL CENTER.
I-- - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - _.I BOP Starts the 3C ICW and 3B CCW pumps.
- 30
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:6 Event
Description:
A grid disturbance causes a loss of power to the switchyad. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-0, the 3A EDG will fail to start, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker Page 16 of 16 fails to close. QSPDS Channel A fails, the crew monitors CET using QSPDS Channel B. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O to recover electrical power usng the blackout tie. 3B 4KV BUS STRIPPING
- 1. IF 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized AND 3D 4KV Bus is aligned to 3B 4KV Bus. THEN verify the Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue light is ON 8tiQ. Station Blackout Breaker. 4AD07. is OPEN.
- 2. IF 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized 8!:.!Q 3D 4KV Bus is !:!Q! aligned to 3B 4KV Bus.QB. Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue light is OFF . .II::I.S.t:I. verify the following breakers are open:
- 3AB22. 3B 4KV Bus Tie To 3A Or 3C 4KV Bus
- 3AB05. Startup Transformer 3B 4KV Bus Supply
- 3AB02. Auxiliary Transformer 3B Bus Supply
- 3AB10. Heater Drain Pump 3B
- 3AB21. Condensate Pump 3B
- 3AB12. Safety Injection Pump 3B
- 3AB15. Residual Heat Removal Pump 3B
- 3AB13. Component Cooling Water Pump 3B
- 3AB01. Reactor Coolant Pump 3B
- 3AB06, Reactor Coolant Pump 3C
- 3AB17. Intake Cooling Water Pump 3B
- 3AB11. Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 3B
- 3AB16, Circulating Water Pump 3B1
- 3AB 18, Circulating Water Pump 3B2
- 3AB09, 3B Load Center
- 3AB14. 3D Load Center
- 3. IF Supply From 4KV Bus 3B, 3AD06, is open. THEN verify Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, 3AB19, is open.
- 4. !.E Supply From 4KV Bus 3B, 3AD06, is closed, !.!::!..5!! perform the following:
- a. IF Station Blackout Breaker. 3AD07, is closed, !!::!.E!iperform the following:
- 1) Open Station Blackout Breaker, 3AD07.
- 2) Direct Unit 4 RO to open Station Blackout Breaker, 4AD07.
- b. Verify breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD05, is open.
- c. Verify breaker for Component Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD04. is open.
- d. IF breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD05. OR breaker for Component Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD04. can!:!Q! be opened,!!:!!ili open Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D. 3AB19. 8!:!Q Supply From 4KV Bus 3B. 3AD06.
- 5. Notify Unit 3 RO that 3B 4KV bus stripping is complete.
31
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event NO.:7 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
The crew will transition is to 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 or ECA 0.2 following power restoration depending on the extent of the cooldown of the RCS. The crew will isolate seal injection to the RCP's prior to starting a charging pump. IT:
, T;
,~
Position r u::illlUII Applicant's Actions or Behavior
/"\fJplicant's SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 CAUTION If an SI signal is actuated prior to Step 11 of this procedure, it needs to be reset to permit manual loading of equipment on an ac bus.
_________________________ r I t:l.QI§. I I CSF status trees are required to be monitored for information only. FRPs shall NOT be I I implemented prior to completion of Step 11, I L _______________________ J RO Directs FS/SNPO to locally close the RCP seal njection isolation valves
- before starting charging pump:
3-297A 3-297B
- 3-297C CREW CRITICAL TASK: Isolate RCP seal injection to the RCPs prior to starting a charging pump.
EXAMINER NOTE: The scenario is terminated when RCP seal injection isolation valves are isolated in ECA-O.1 or earlier, at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
- 32
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:? Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
The crew will transition is to 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 or ECA 0.2 following power restoration depending on the extent of the cooldown of the RCS. The crew will isolate seal injection to the RCP's prior to starting a charging pump. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 CAUTION If SI is reset and either offsite power is lost or SI actuation occurs on the other unit, manual action may be required to restore safeguards equipment to the required configuration. I~---------~~-----------. - I I CSF status trees are required to be monitored for information only. FRPs shall NOT be I LP:m:e:p:t:c:,/:o::~e::: _ ____________ J RO Verifies SI - RESET
- RO RO RO Checks RWST Level- GREATER THAN 155,000 GALLONS Checks SI Valve Amber Lights On VPB- ALL BRIGHT Closes RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet, MOV-3-626 CAUTION Steady state loading on each Unit 3 emergency diesel generator shall NOT exceed 2500 KW. Load transients up to 2750 KWare acceptable when starting additional equipment.
BOP Starts 2 ICW pumps Verifies ICW To TPCW Heat Exchanger-ISOLATED
- POV-3-4882
- POV-3-4883 Checks intake cooling water headers - TIED TOGETHER CAUTION
- CCW System load requirements of 3-0NOP-030, COMPONENT COOLING WA TER MALFUNCTION, SHALL NOT be exceeded.
33
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:? Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
The crew will transition is to 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 or ECA 0.2 following power restoration depending on the extent of the cooldown of the RCS. The crew will isolate seal injection to the RCP's prior to starting a charging pump. T: Time
" ' Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Checks CCW Heat Exchangers - THREE IN SERVICE RO Starts 2 CCW pumps RO Checks CCW headers - TIED TOGETHER RO Starts 1 Unit 3 HHSI and ensures 1 Unit 4 HHSI pump are running.
CREW CRITICAL TASK: Manually establish flow from at least 2 HHSI pumps prior to completing step 7 of 3-EOp*ECA-O.2 with a valid SI signal present EXAMINER NOTE:
- The scenario is terminated when a HHSI Pump is started in ECA 0.2 or earlier, at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
- 34
( (
I NRC 25 Scenario cenario 5 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT l ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Unit 3 Unit 4 Plant Status I( I { i {OOS: 3D " rvice in 14 pump out of service due to packing leakage. Sc hedul ed return 10 service ""Rlour"'s,, The National Weather Service has issued a severe thunderstorm warning for Miami*Dadc Countyounty U3 A n Leo Act ions: I none I U4 LCO I none Results; of o f~ A rPa I none no ne s'-----_ _ _ _---'
Unit 3 Status
\ Reactor Operator I
Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate ReS ~torRef Accumulator Ref lLevels Power: 60 Gross: .02 A 6614
~ MWe: 421 Unidentified Un identified .01 B 6631 ravg :
Tavg: 1561" 561 Charging Pps: Pps: .01 [t}lli C 6621 RCS Pressure: 2250 12250 RI;S RCS BoronI Cone: Conc: 804 1800 Abnormal Annunciators: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: C:~m;;
~om 1> AClions:
Annuncialor: Com Compp oActions: Annunciator: Camp. Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions Acti ons:: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator:
. Comp clions:
Actions: l i" nnunciator:
~ Comp omp Actions:
ction : Annunciator: Comp Actions: AClions: Annunciator: Camp clions: Com p Actions: IC urrent Tc<h Current SDec . \ction Statements:~ Tech Snc< No l Include: ""For (Does Not On~Ite~" For Trackinf!:,Onlv T.S.A.S I Component: T,S.A.S Reason: I EnI'Y Entry Date: Date:
. ..S; / Component:
T.S.A Reason: Reason: I Dale: Entry Date:
. . ; I{ ,Component:
T.S.A.S Reason : Reason: I Date: Entry Date: Rca on: T.S.A.S / Component: RCt\son: I Enl'Y Date~ Entry Dale: T.S.A.S. ; II ,Component : Reason: I Entry Oat" Enlry Dale: ( ."
~T. S.A . S I ,Component:
ea on:
~n~1)' Oat(':
Dale:
Unit 3 Status _ Changes to Risk Significant Equipment: c.. C )B B train protected both units Onlin On line ri riskk is green Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities: Upcoming UpcominR Major POD ActivitiesActivities:: Immediate1 Immediate ly afteraft r shift turnover tumo er reduce letdown flow to 60 gpm and remo removee one from service De charging pump from using 3-0P-04 3- P-0477 starting slan ing at step 7.7.11.2.4. Op ralOrs to support 11 .2.4. Operators evol ut ion have been briefed and are upport the evolution arc on station tation.. Muinlai Maintainn power at 60% steady slate. tate. r-( Upcoming ECOs to HallR JUpcoming Hang and lor Release: Com~ensaton' Actions In Evolutions or Compensatorv in Progress: Proaress : Information Remarks and Operator General Information, OQerator Work Around Status: Au upplyy aligned
' . steam suppl A ux. ali gned from unit unil 4.
Condenser inl cilkagc onden er inleakagc 0 serm. cfm. e "I
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description
- Facility:
Examiners: Turkey Point Scenario No.: Candidates: 5 NEW Op Test No.: 2009-301 US RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1 60% MOL. Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3B charging pump out of service due to packing leakage. Scheduled return to service in 14 hours. The National Weather Service has issued a severe thunderstorm warning for Miami-Dade County Immediately after shift turnover reduce letdown flow to 60 gpm and remove one charging pump from service using 3-0P-047 starting at step 7.11.2.4. The shift manager has granted permission to perform the evolution. Operators to support the evolution have been briefed and are on station. Maintain 60% power. Online risk - green B train protected both units Event Event Type Event Description No. 1 TAKA834= (N)RO Reduce letdown flow to 60 gpm and secure one charging pump using 3-0P-0.5 (N)SRO 047. 2 TVFABP6A= (C) BOP 3A Condensate Pump bearing high temperature requiring manual start of 3C 0.352 min (C) SRO Condensate pump. ramp TFH1TU44= (I)RO/SRO Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-3-444 fails high, crew responds using 3-3 T ONOP-41.5 to establish RCS pressure control. (TS)SRO 4 TVHHCLB= (C) RO/SRO An RCS leak develops, the crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.3 to start a 8.0 E-06 (TS) SRO charging pump. TVHHCLB=. 4.0 E-05 5 TVHHCLB=. (R) ALL The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 4.0 E-04 in response to the RCS leak. The RCS leak will progressively degrade and the crew will isolate letdown. The leak will continue to degrade which will require a manual reactor trip when RCS inventory cannot be maintained within the capacity of the Charging Pumps. 6 TVHHCLB= (M) ALL When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew 2.0/3:00 transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. ramp 6a TFQ6A2BF= (C) BOP The 3A RHR shaft shears and the3B RHRP fails to automatically start, the T crew will initiate a manual start during 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3. 6b TFL3S1=T (C) BOP Containment Spray fails to actuate, the crew will manually initiate at least TFL3S2=T one train of Containment Spray during 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3
* (N)ormal, (N)ormal (R)eactivity, Jl)nstrument, (R)eactivity. (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (Cjom20nent, jMJajor 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description
- Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #5 Event 1 -The crew will reduce letdown flow to 60 gpm and secure one charging pump using 3-OP-047.
Event 2 - The 3A Condensate pump bearing will develop high a temperature condition but not trip. The crew will manually start of 3C Condensate pump and secure the 3A Condensate pump. Event 3 - Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-3-444 fails high, crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.5 to establish RCS pressure control. Event 4 - An RCS leak develops, the crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.3 to start a charging pump. Event 5 - The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the RCS leak. The RCS leak will progressively degrade and the crew will isolate letdown. The leak will continue to degrade which will require a manual reactor trip when RCS inventory cannot be maintained within the capacity of the Charging Pumps. Event 6 - When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. Once the crew addresses the diagnostic steps of 3-EOP-E-0 the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal, the 3A RHR pump shaft shears and the 3B RHR pump fails to automatically start. The crew will manually start the 3B RHR pump during 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3. Critical Task Both trains of Containment Spray fail to actuate. The crew will manually initiate at least one train of Containment Spray during 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3. Critical Task
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TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description
- Scenario XXV NRC 5 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-24 (60% power EOl)
- Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXV_NRC_5.lsn
- Place simulator in run Trigger lesson step:
- SETUP - 3B Charging pump OOS. Removes 3B charging pump from service. (Actuates TAB1POSM = RACKOUT)
- SETUP - 3A RHR Pump Motor Failure (Actuates TFE2GA15=T)
- SETUP - 3B RHRP Fails To Auto Start (Actuates TFQ6A2BF=T)
- SETUP - Containment Spray Fails to Actuate (Actuates TFL3S1& TFL3S2=T)
- Place clearance info tag on 3B Charging Pump start switch
- Bypass the lD Demineralizers by placing the letdown Divert Valve 3-TCV-143 handswitch to DIVERT.
- Provide an in progress procedure 0-OP-047 step 7.11.2.4
- Provide shift turnover checklists
- Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RCO desk to the Utilities screens.
- Perform Simulator Operator Checklist
- 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description
- Event 1 - Reduce Letdown Flow Initiated immediately after shift turnover.
The crew will reduce letdown flow to 60 gpm and secure one charging pump using 3-0P-047. If directed, respond as HP when notified of upcoming letdown flow change to support additional monitoring, as required. If directed, respond as SNPO. After 1-3 min trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - Adjust CCW Flow to NRHX (actuates TAKA834 = 0.5). Report when complete. Event 2 - 3A Condensate Pump Bearing Failure The 3A Condensate pump bearing will develop high a temperature condition but not trip. The crew will manually start of 3C Condensate pump and secure the 3A Condensate pump. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - 3A Conds Pump Bearing Failure (actuates TVFABP6A = 0.35 2 min ramp) If directed, respond as FS/SO to inspect 3A Condensate Pump, state that the lower motor bearing is smoking with paint scorching on the bearing housing. Recommend tripping the Condensate Pump before further damage occurs. When directed by the lead examiner, if the BOP fails to trip 3A Condensate Pump, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - 3A Conds Pump TRIP (actuates TVFABP6A = 0.40 on 10 sec ramp)
- Event 3 - PT 444 Fails High Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-3-444 fails high, crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.5 to establish RCS pressure control.
When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - PT-3-444 FAIL HIGH (actuates TFH1TU44=T) If directed, respond as WCC if requested to prepare a PWO/Clearance and notify I&C. If directed, respond as I&C and acknowledge request to troubleshoot and repair PT-3-444. Event 4 - RCS Leak An RCS leak develops, the crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.3 to start a charging pump. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3 gpm RCS Leak (actuates TVHHCLB= 8.0 E-06) Event 5 - Fast Load Reduction/RCS Leak Degrades The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the RCS leak. The RCS leak will progressively degrade and the crew will isolate letdown. The leak will continue to degrade which will require a manual reactor trip when RCS inventory cannot be maintained within the capacity of the Charging Pumps. Respond as System when called about load reduction.
- Respond as SM when told to review 0-EPIP-201 01 & 0-ADM-115 for notification requirements.
State that the NRC Resident will be notified of the fast laod reduction. 4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description
- Respond as chemistry to take samples. No response back required.
Respond as FS/NSO to align aux steam using attachment 1. No response back required. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 30 gpm RCS Leak (actuates TVHHCLB= 4.0 E-OS) When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 300 gpm RCS Leak (actuates TVHHCLB= 4.0 E-04) Event 6 - LBLOCA When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal, the 3A RHR pump shaft shears and the 38 RHR pump fails to automatically start. The crew will manually start the 38 RHR pump using 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3. 80th trains of Containment Spray fail to actuate. The crew will manually initiate at least one train of Containment Spray using 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3. When directed by the lead examiner, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - LBLOCA (actuates TVHHCLB= 2.0/3:00 ramp) If directed respond as the FS/SNPO to place PAHMS in service, trigger lesson step EVENT 6
- ALIGN PAHMS (actuates TAC2V02A=1.0/30 sec delay, TAC2V02B=1.011 min delay, TAAAV21=1.0/2 min delay,
- TAAAV22=1.0/3.S min delay & TACAOOS=O.o). Report completion 10-15 min later.
If directed respond as the FSITO to inspect 38 RHRP breaker 3A815. After 1-3 min., report no apparent problem. If directed respond as the FSITO to inspect 38 RHRP. After 1-3 min., report no apparent problem. If directed respond as Chemistry to sample S/G, monitor DAM-1 If directed respond as HP to perform surveys.
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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew will reduce letdown flow to 60 gpm and secure one charging pump using 3-0P-047. Page 1 of 2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs 3-0P-047 section 7.11.2.4 CAUTIONS
- Changing letdown flow without changing CCW flow to the Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger will result in a reactivity change.
- Example: Increasing letdown temperature will cause a release of boron from the demineralizers (negative reactivity). Decreasing letdown temperature will cause the demineralizers to remove boron from the RCS (positive reactivity).
- Filter DP changes should be anticipated prior to changing letdown f1owrates.
Filter DPs will change as a flowrate ratio square function (i.e., :-'P2=:,>P1x(f1owrat62lf1owrate1l). RCP seal water injection f10wrates are expected to more than double when letdown flowrates are increased greater than 100 gpm.
- I I
I I
------------------------ !:!QIS With two ciJarglOg pumps runnmg and If1 automatic contro/. {) prolonged pressuozer lugh lwei may cause the Pressurizer Master Controller to reduce speed on the wnnmg clwrgmQ pumps {)e/ow the pump 011 top speed I
I I I RO Takes manual control of running charging pumps and maintains greater than 20% demand on both running charging pumps while maintaining Pressurizer level. RO Places PCV-3-145, Low Pressure Letdown Controler, Manual-Auto Station is in MANUAL. RO While monitoring letdown pressure on PI-3-145, adjust Low Pressure Letdown Controller, PCV-3-145, to obtain a letdown pressure of 300 psig. I
-- ---------------------, NOTES I I
- Sub steps 7.112.4.d and 7.11.2.4.e should be performed concurrently using two operators, one to perform the valve maneuvers and the ot/Jer to perform any I
I I PCV-3-145 adjustments necessary to prevent going beyond the pressures specified. I
- The operator adjusting PCV-3-145 should take a bump closed as soon as a decrease I
I I L _______________________ , in flow rate or pressure is detected to prevent flashing.
- 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
The crew will reduce letdown flow to 60 gpm and secure one charging pump using 3-0P-047. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO WHEN letdown pressure is stable in manual, THEN closes the desired open orifice stop valve. BOP Adjusts Low Pressure Letdown Controller, PCV-3-145, in manual to maintain pressure above 150 psig as indicated on PI-3-145. RO Adjusts Low Pressure Letdown Controller, PCV-3-145, in manual to normal operating band. CAUTION Automatic charging pump control should not be restored until pressurizer level is at program level to prevent charging pump trip on low speed. RO Places Low Pressure Letdown Controller, PCV-3-145, in AUTO.
- CREW RO Directs SNPO to adjust Norrregen HX Temp Control Vlv TCV-3-144 Bypass, 3-834, as necessary to maintain stable letdown temperature on TI-3-143. (VPA)
Verifies all running charging pumps are in manual speed control. RO Slowly decreases the charging pump speed on the pump being removed from service. RO WHEN minimum demand on the Demand Meter (20 to 25 percent) for the pump to be shutdown has been established, THEN turns the pump control switch to OFF. EXAMINER NOTE: When the RO has established single charging pump operations proceed to event 2 RO WHEN Pressurizer level is at program level, THEN restore automatic charging pump control. RO Verifies Letdown Demineralizer Divert Vawe, TCV-3-143, is in the AUTO position and the green DEMINS light is lit.
- 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.:2 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
The 3A Condensate pump bearing will develop high a tempercture condition but not trip. The crew will manually start of 3C Condensate pump and secure the 3A Condensate pump. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to rigger lesson step "EVENT 2 3A Conds Pump Bearing Failure" (actuates TVFABP6A = 0.35 2 min ramp) BOP Observes annunciator D 9/1 "COND PUMP AlBIC MOTOR OVERLOAD" EXAMINER NOTE: The magnitude of the malfunction is large enough to initiate the MOTOR OVERLOAD alarm but does not result in a 3A Condensate pump breaker trip. SRO Directs response using the ARP
- BOP BOP Monitors SGFP suction pressure.
Starts 3C Condensate pump. EXAMINER NOTE: When the BOP has started the 3C Condensate pump proceed to event 3 BOP Stops 3A Condensate pump. BOP Checks associated feed train components for proper operation. CREW Directs TO to verify the condensate pump recirculation valves closed and motor amps locally. CREW Directs OCCIWCC rack out breaker 3AA21 & generate ECO
- 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-3-444 fails high, crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.5 to establish RCS pressure control. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step "EVENT 3 PT 444 FAIL HIGH (actuates TFH1TU44=T) RO Observes the following:
- RCS pressure decreasing.
- PZR pressure control channel PT-3-444 pegged high
- one PORV (PCV-3-455C) open with no actual high pressure condition RO Observes the following alarms:
- Annunciator A-4/1, PORV/SAFETY VALVE OPEN
- Annunciator A-9/2, PZR CONTROL HI/LO PRESS
- Annunciator A-9/5, PZR PRESSURE CONTROLLER HI OUTPUT SRO Directs response using the ARP and 3-0NOP-41.5 RO Alarm Response actions:
- Closes PORV PCV-3-455C
- Takes manual control of Pressurizer Master Controller 3-PC-444J to close PZR Spray valves(s).
I~-----------------------II Nore I Foldout page is required to be monitored throughout this procedure. I
~-----------------------!
I
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Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 4 Event
Description:
Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-3-444 fails high, crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.5 to establish RCS pressure control. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION The Master Controller should be operated carefully (Normal controller output for 2235 psig is 42.5 percent demand; 92 percent demand will open PCV-3-455C). If the following conditions are met, an excessive increase in controller output could cause Power Operated Relief Valve PCV-3-455C to open:
- 1. PCV-3-455C hand switch in AUTO.
- 2. Pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal to 2000 psig, or OMS switch in LO Press Ops.
CREW Reviews 3-0NOP-41.5 foldout page actions (See page 7) RO Checks PT-3-444 - FAILED by comparison with adjacent pressure channels and known plant parameters EXAMINER NOTE: Steps annotated with
- may have already been performed in the ARP.
RO *Closes PORV PCV-3-455C* RO *Takes manual control of Pressurizer Master Controller 3-PC-444J to close PZR Spray valves(s).* SRO Recognizes requirement for LCO 3.2.5 Action b entry. EXAMINER NOTE: 3.2.5 The following DNB-related parameters shall be maintained within the following limits:
- b. Pressurizer Pressure c: 2200 psig APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 ACTION:
With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less then 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours. 5
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event NO.:3 Page 3 of 4 Event
Description:
Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-3-444 fails high, crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.5 to establish RCS pressure control. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Checks PT-3-445 - NOT FAILED by comparison with adjacent pressure channels and known plant parameters RO Checks both PORVs closed CAUTION A fire in containment or the 38 4KV Switchgear Room may cause spurious actuation of and give false valve position indication for Auxiliary Spray Valve, CV-3-311. RO Checks PZR spray valves closed. Since PZR pressure is less than normal:
- Places PCV-3-455A in MANUAL and CLOSE.
- Places PCV-3-455B in MANUAL and CLOSE.
- Verifies CV-3-311 (Aux Spray) is CLOSED.
SRO Determines Pressurizer pressure can be maintained greater then 2000 psig. Checks PZR Safety Valves closed by observing: PZR PORV/Safety acoustic monitor LEOs - NOT LIT BOP PZR safety line temperatures at or near normal RO
- PZR safety line temperature, T~3-465
- PZR safety line temperature, T~3-467
- PZR safety line temperature, T~3-469 RO Checks PZR Pressure Stable Or Increasing EXAMINER NOTE:
When the crew has stabilized Pressurizer pressure proceed to event 4
- 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- 1. FAILED INSTRUMENT ISOLATION
- a. !E. any FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE 3-0NOP-041.S Pressurizer Pressure control Instrument Loop fails, position that isolates the failed instrument.
I.!:!.IDf place applicable control switches to a
- 2. !E. PZR pressure cannot be maintained greater than 2000 psig, I.!:!.IDf perform the following:
- a. Continue efforts to restore PZR pressure and
- b. Trip the reactor and turbine and go to 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
- 3. PORV ISOLATION/LEAKING PORV IDENTIFICATION
- a. !E. any PORV is OPEN .QB Leaking 8!iQ pressure is less than 2235 psig. ~ CLOSE the applicable PORV and/or Block valve.
- b. The following are indications of leakage from a PZR PORV and should be used to identify and isolate a leaking PORV:
- 1) PZR relief line temperature, TI-3-463, INCREASING.
- 2) PZR relief tank level. LI-3-470, INCREASING.
- 3) PZR relief tank temperature, TI-3-471, INCREASING.
- 4) PZR relief tank pressure, PI-3-472, INCREASING.
- 5) PZR PORV/SAFETY ACOUSTIC MONITOR, LEDs LIT.
- 4. OPEN/LEAKING PZR SAFETY VALVE IDENTIFICATION
- a. The following are indications that a PZR safety is open or leaking:
- 1) PZR Safety line temperature, TI-3-465, INCREASING or at saturation temperature associated with the PZR relief tank pressure per Attachment 2.
- 2) PZR Safety line temperature. TI-3-467, INCREASING or at saturation temperature associated with tile PZR relief tank pressure per Attachment 2.
- 3) PZR Safety line temperature. TI-3-469. INCREASING or at saturation temperature associated with the PZR relief tank pressure per Attachment 2.
- 4) PZR relief tank level. LI-3-470, INCREASING.
- 5) PZR relief tank temperature, TI-3-471, INCREASING.
- 6) PZR relief tank pressure. PI-3-472, INCREASING.
- 7) PZR PORV/Safety Acoustic Monitor, LEDs LIT.
- 5. SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF CV-3-311 AUXILIARY SPRAY VALVE due to fire in Containment or 3B 4KV Switchgear Room
- a. IF pressurizer pressure is decreasing and Auxiliary Spray Valve. CV-3-311, is suspect, I1::i5!:! reduce charging to one charging pump on slow speed AND close charging to RCS Control Valve HCV-3-121.
7
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event NO.:4 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
An RCS leak develops, the crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.3 to start a charging pump. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step "EVENT4 - 9 gpm ReS Leak" (actuates TVHHCLB= 8.0 E-06) RO Observes a change in the RCS Inventory balance on ERDADS RO Observes alarm G 5/3 SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-41.3 CREW Reviews 3-0NOP-41.3 foldout page actions (See page 9) RO Checks RCS Inventory decreasing goes to step 10 SRO Directs STA to determine RCS leak rate using 3-0SP-041.1, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKRATE CALCULATION
- SRO EXAMINER NOTE RCS leakrate should be approximately 9 gpm Determines the RCS leak is unidentified and is not isolable goes to step 11.
BOP Verifies process radiation monitors stable. SRO Recognizes requirement for LCO 3.4.6.2 Action b entry. 3.4.6.2.b Reactor Coolant System operational leakage shall be limited to 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. Action b. With any Reactor Coolant System operational leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding primary-to-secondary leakage, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.:4 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
An RCS leak develops, the crew responds using 3-0NOP-41.3 to start a charging pump. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the examinee has recognized LCO 3.4.S.2.b ent~ direct facility operator to trigger lesson step "EVENT 5- 30 gpm RCS Leak" (actuates TVHHCLB= 4.00.05) RO Observes an increase in the RCS Inventory balance on ERDADS RO Starts 3C Charging pump. SRO Transitions to 3-0NOP-100 FO~DOl.JT FOR PROC;t:UUKt: FOLDOUT PROCEDURE 3-0NOP-041.3 J-ONUP-U41.J 3-EOP-E-O TRANSITION CRITERIA IF Unit 3 is in Modes 1 through 3 greater than 1000 pSig with the Safety Injection System aligned for injection AND either of the following occurs, THEN verify the Reactor tripped 8NQ go to 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION:
- a. RCS leakage greater than charging pump capacity and letdown isolated.
- b. PZR level- CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 12%[50%).
- 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event NO.:5 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the RCS leak. The RCS leak will progressively degrade and the crew will isolate letdown. The leak will continue to degrade which will require a manual reactor trip when RCS inventory cannot be maintained within the capacity of the Charging Pumps. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-100 SRO Performs 3-0NOP-100 brief (See next page). CREW Reviews 3-0NOP-100 foldout page actions. (See page 13) SRO Determines 9 gal/% boric acid addition is required. RO Initiates boration:
- 1. Sets BA totalizer as directed (9 gal/% for 60% load decrease =
540 gal BA)
- 2. Takes FC-3-113A pot 3.
4. RMSS~BORA TE RMCS~START
~8.0 or as directed RO Adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to obtain the Attachment 3 desired flow rate BOP Reduces turbine load.
- 1. Maintains Tavg less than 5°F above Tref
- 2. Maintains rods greater than insertion limit.
CREW Notifies plant management and System of the impending unit shutdown. RO Checks pressurizer level following program CREW Verify load reduction rate and auto rod control is maintaining the expected TavglTref t::. T identified in Attachment 3
- 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 4 Event
Description:
The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the RCS leak. The RCS leak will progressively degrade and the crew will isolate letdown. The leak will continue to degrade which will require a manual reactor trip when RCS inventory cannot be maintained within the capacity of the Charging Pumps. ATTACIDIEI\T 3 (Page 1 of I) FAST LOAD REDPCTIOl'i BRIEF
- 1. RenSOll for load reduction
- 2. Target power level - - - ~o PO\ver Time to ShUtdOVl'll from 100% ,,-
... ~mln
. 50 min 75 min 110 min Load Reduction Rate Iv1Wimin 30 M\:Vimin 15 MW!min 10 ~1Willlin 7 M\Vimin Load Reduction Rate o'oimill 4 % / min 2 °o! min 1.3 3 ~(O i min 1 %,1 min Expected T (lvgT ref ~ T 4 of 3 of 2 of 1 of
- 3. LO(ld reduction rate I
yIw .. miuute Suggested boration is 9 gallons per % with control rods completely withdrawn and available, 18 gallons per % with no control rod movement (use a value between 9 and 18 I I if rods are not fufly withdrawn when starting a load reduction from ful! power). I
- The Unit Supervisor may change the boration as desired during the load reduction. I I
- 4. Boration Rate: _ _ _ total gallons j ___ minutes = ___ gallons/minute.
- 5. Plant Control Parameters and Contingency Actions
- Tavg i Tref expected .0. T ballcL not to exceed +/-1 OF of expected, slO\v ramp to restore band.
- If A.ununciator B 8/ I. ROD BANK LO LLvlIT ala1111s. the load reduction shall be slowed.
- 6. EOP E-O transition criteria - Manual reactor and turbine trip:
- Tave> 578 OF
- Tave 6 of> Tref
- Rod Inseliioll Limits (RIL) are exceeded
- 7. Reyiew required actions from other procedures cunellt1y in effect (example, stop Rep).
- 8. Questions or cre\v input')
- 9. End of Brief 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event NO.:5 Page 3 of 4 Event
Description:
The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using 3-0NOP-100 in response to the RCS leak. The RCS leak will progressively degrade and the crew will isolate letdown. The leak will continue to degrade which will require a manual reactor trip when RCS inventory cannot be maintained within the capacity of theCharging Pumps. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the crew has sufficiently reduced power directfacility operator to trigger lesson step "EVENT 5 - 300 gpm ReS Leak" (actuates TVHHCLB= 4.0 E-04) RO Observes RCS Inventory cEcreasing RO Isolates letdown. RO Observes RCS Inventory continuing to cecrease with:
- Charging flow - MAXIMUM
- Letdown flow - ISOLATED SRO Directs a manual Reactor Trip and transitions to 3-EOP-E-O
- 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event NO.:5 Page 4 of 4 Event
Description:
The crew will initiate a boration and reduce turbine load using :>ONOP-100 in response to the RCS leak. The RCS leak will progressively degrade and the crew will isolate letdown. The leak will continue to degrade which will require a manual reactor trip when RCS inventory cannot be maintained within the capacity of the Charging Pumps. Time Jj Position Jj Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. 3-EOP-E-O Transition Criteria IF any of the following limits are reached, !!:!.Eti trip the Reactor and Turbine 81iQ go to 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION:
- a. RCS Tavg - GREATER THAN 578)F
- b. RCS Tavg - GREATER THAN Tref by 6!)F
- c. Rod Insertion Limits are exceeded as indicated by:
- Rod Position Bank D Insertion Limit Recorder (VPA)
- Stepcounters on console
- Plant Curve Book Section 7, Figure 3
- 2. Notify Chemistry Department WHEN reactor power has changed by greater than or equal to 15 percent, THEN notify the Chemistry Department that RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.
- 3. Restore Blender to AUTO WHEN boration is complete. THEN restore the Blender to AUTO as follows.
- a. Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to AUTO
- b. Set FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller pot setting as desired
- c. Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START
- 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event NO.:6 Page Event
Description:
When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew wi" transition to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. 1 of 8 Upon receipt of a Safety Injection sigral, the 3A RHR pump shaft shears and the 3B RHR pump fails to automatically start. The crew will manually start the 3B RHR pump using 3 EOP-E-O Attachment 3. Both trains of Containment Spray fail to actuate. The crew will manually initiate at least one train of Containment Spray using 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 3..
. T:
Time
" ,.... Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs a manual trip of the reactor Direct facility operator to trigger lesson step "EVENT6 LBLOCA" (actuates TVHHCLB= 2.0 I 3:00 ramp)
SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-O I~-----------------------I ~ I Steps 1 through 4 are IMMEDIA TE ACTION steps. RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O: Verifies reactor trip
- Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero
- Rx trip & bypass bkrs open
- Neutron flux decreasing Determines SI has actuated BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O:
Verifies turbine tripped
- Turbine stop valves closed
- Manually closes MSR steam supply MOVs
- Mid & East GCBs open Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses
- Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus
- 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event NO.:6 Page 2 of 8 Event
Description:
When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal, the 3A RHR pump shaft shears and the 3B RHR pump fails to automatically start. The crew will manually start the 3B RHR pump using 3 EOP-E-O Attachment 3. Both trains of Containment Spray fail to actuate. The crew will manually iritiate at least one train of Containment Spray using 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3. i Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
.-----------------------1 I
NOTE I
.... - - - - - - -- - - -- -- - - -- -- - -_.I I FOLDOUT Page shall be monitored for the remainder of this procedure, CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-O Foldout page (See page 20 for foldout)
RO Trips RCP's based on loss of subcooling with HHSI flow into the RCS. BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification (See page 3 for detailed actions) SRO Directs RO in performance of 3-EOP-E-O subsequent actions. RO Checks all AFW Pumps RUNNING RO Checks AFW valve alignment proper RO Verifies total AFW flow greater than 345 gpm. RO Checks RCP thermal barrier alarms off. RO Adjusts total AFW flow to 345 gpm max. RO Checks PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves and Excess Letdown Isolated CREW Diagnoses the LOCA BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification
- 15
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.:6 Page 3 of 8 Event
Description:
When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal, the 3A RHR pump shaft shears and the 3B RHR pump fails to automatically start. The crew will manually start the 3B RHR pump using 3 EOP-E-O Attachment 3. Both trains of Containment Spray fail to actuate. The crew will manually initiate at least one train of Containment Spray using 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior STA STA observes a RED PATH for Containment Integrity and recommenct entry to 3-FRP-P-1 SRO Transitions to 3-FRP-P-1 SRO Directs 3-FRP-P-1 response CAUTION If CST level decreases to less than 10%, makeup water sources for the CST will be necessary to maintain secondary heats Ink. RO Check RCS Pressure - LESS THAN 650 PSIG and RHR flow greater than 1000 gpm. SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-E-1.
- 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 4 of 8 Event
Description:
When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew will transition to ~EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal, the 3A RHR p.lmp shaft shears and the 3B RHR pump fails to automatically start. The crew will manually start the 3B RHR pump using 3 EOP-E-O Attachment 3. Both trains of Containment Spray fail to actuate. The crew will manually initiate at least one train of Containment Spray using ~EOP-E-O Attachment 3 3.. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification
- Places Main Feed pump HS to STOP
- Places FWIV MOV-3-1407, 1408 & 1409 HS to CLOSE
- Manually starts 3B RHR pump
- Manually stops 3A RHR pump Places the Unit 4 HHSI pumps HS to STOP Depresses SI reset PB Resets Cont Isolation Phase A
- Manually starts at least one train of Containment Spray.
BOP CREW CRITICAL TASK: Manually start at least one RHR pump following a large LOCA prior to completing E-O (Attachment 3 step 7). BOP CREW CRITICAL TASK: Manually start at least one RHR pump following a large LOCA prior to completing 6-0 (Attachment 3 step 7). BOP Directs SNPO to align PAHMS per ~OP-094
- 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event NO.:6 Page 5 of 8 Event
Description:
When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal, the 3A RHR pump shaft shears and the 3B RHR pump fails to automatically start. The crew will manually start the 3B RHR pump using 3 EOP-E-O Attachment 3. Both trains of Containment Spray fail to actuate. The crew will manually initilte at least one train of Containment Spray using 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3. T; Time
" 'v Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs 3-EOP-E-1 response BOP ~----------~~-----------II I
I Foldout page is required to be monitored throughout this procedure I CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-1 Foldout page (see page 21 for foldout) RO Verifies RCP's stopped. BOP Checks no S/G are faulted BOP Controls AFW flow to maintain S/G NR levels 15%-50% CREW Directs Chemistry to take activity samples on all S/Gs & DAM1 monitor readings. CREW Directs HP to take main steam line radiation readings. CAUTION If any PRZ PORV opens because of high PRZ pressure, it is required to be verified closed or isolated after pressure decreases to less than the PORV setpoint. RO Check PRZ PORVs and Block Valves CLOSED RO Verifies SI - RESET RO Verifies Containment Isolation Phase A and B - RESET BOP Verifies Instrument Air Containment Isolation, C\J.3-2803 - OPEN AND
- Verifies instrument air pressure, P1-3-1444 - GREATER THAN 95 PSIG 18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.:6 Page 6 of 8 Event
Description:
When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal, the 3A RHR pump shaft shears and the 3B RHR pump fails to automatically start. The crew will manually start the 3B RHR pump using 3 EOP-E-O Attachment 3. Both trains of Containment Spray fail to actuate. The crewwill manually initiate at least one train of Containment Spray using 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Checks power supply to all Charging Pumps- ALIGNED TO OFFSITE POWER RO Performs Attachment 4 to establish charging.
- Checks RCP thermal barrier alarms off.
- Starts One Charging Pump Places RCS Makeup Control Switch in STOP Starts additional charging pumps if needed and offsite power available Adjusts Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, to maintain proper seal injection flow
- Verifies charging pump suction auto transfers to RWST RO Verifies SI can not be terminated.
EXAMINER NOTE The scenario is terminated when the crew determines Safety Injection can not be terminated.
- 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event NO.:6 Page 7 of 8 Event
Description:
When the Reactor trips, the RCS leak will get progressively worse. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the large break LOCA. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal, the 3A RHR pump shaft shears and the 38 RHR pump fails to automatically start. The crew will manually start the 38 RHR pump using :3 EOP-E-O Attachment 3. 80th trains of Containment Spray fail to actuate. The crew will mmually initiate at least one train of Containment Spray using 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3. FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE E-O
- 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IE either of the conditions listed below occur, THEN use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature", 180°F QB Containment radiation levels....: 1.3x105 RJI1r WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values. THEN normal setpoints can again be used 6 IF the TSC determines that containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded 10 Rads.
- 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- a. IE both conditions listed below occur. THEN trip all RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 8!iQ SI FLOWPATH VERIFIED.
- 2) RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25"F[65°F]
- b. !E phase B actuated, !!:!§!:! trip all RCPs.
- 3. FAULTED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA
!E any S/G pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.QB any S/G completely depressurized. !!:!.5!::!
the following may be performed:
- a. Maintain total feedwater flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level in at least one S/G is greater than 6%[32%].
- b. Isolate AFW flow to faulted S/G(s).
- c. Stabilize RCS hot leg temperature using steam dumps when faulted S/G has blown down to less than 10% wide range.
- 4. RUPTURED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA
!E any S/G level increases in an uncontrolled manner QB any S/G has abnormal radiation, 8!iQ narrow range level in affected S/G(s) is greater than 6%[32%]. !.!:!5!:! feed flow may be stopped to affected S/G(s).
- 5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA
- a. !E two AFW pumps are operating on a single train, It!.El1.one of the pumps shall be shut down within one hour of the initial start signal
- b. IF two AFW trains are operating and one of the AFW pumps has been operating at low flow of 60 gpm or less for one hour, THEN that AFW pump shall be shut down
- 6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN add makeup to CST using 3-0P-018.1, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK.
20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONPITIONS FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE E-1 if either of the conditions listed below occurs, I!:!.5!::! use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature:.c 180°F OR Containment radiation levels::: 1.3x10 5 R/hr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values, THEN normal setpoints can again be used if containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded 10'R Rads.-
- 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- a. IF all conditions listed below occur, I!:l.E!! trip all RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND SI FLOWPATH VERIFIED
- 2) RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F[65°F]
- 3) Controlled RCS cooldown is NOT in progress
- b. IF phase B actuated, THEN trip all RCPs
- 3. SI TERMINATION CRITERIA IF all conditions listed below occur, THEN go to 3-EOP-ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION, Step 1:
- a. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN 30°F[See below Table]
SI TERMINATION ADVERSE SUBCOOLING VALUE RCS PRESSURE (PSIG) PRESSURE1PSIGJ ADVERSE SUBCOOLING VALUE
< 2485 AND 2: 2000 2: 55'F
< 2000 AND 2: 1000 2: 85 of
< 1000 2: 210°F
- b. Total feed flow to intact SGs - GREATER THAN 345 GPM QB. narrow range level in at least one
- 4.
c. d. intact SG - GREATER THAN 6%[32%] RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 psig]8t!Q STABLE OR INCREASING PRZ level- GREATER THAN 17%[50%] SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA if any S/G pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner QB. has completely depressurized, 8t!Q that S/G has NOT been isolated, THEN go to 3-EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION. Step 1.
- 5. E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA IF any S/G level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR any S/G has abnormal radiation, THEN manually start SI pumps as necessary and go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
- 6. COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF RWST level decreases to less than 155,000 gallons, THEN go to 3-EOP-ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Step 1.
- 7. RECIRCULATION SUMP BLOCKAGE IF RHR pump flow AND amps become erratic OR abnormally low after recirculation has been established, THEN transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION. Step 1.
- 8. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA IE CST level decreases to less Ulan 10%, THEN add makeup to CST using 3-0P-018.1, Condensate Storage Tank.
- 9. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR SI ON OTHER UNIT if SI has been reset, 8t!Q either offsite power is lost QB. SI actuates on the other unit, .I!:!§:! restore safeQuards equipment to required configuration. Refer to AITACHMENT 3 for essential loads.
- 21
I NRC 25 Scenario cenario 6 (. OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT I Sh;f, Mg" ~ [ Field S" pv. , ,SNPO, I Ad .. ln RCO, , Unit 3 Unit 4
~4 I Unl' s op", Un I, s op" .,
I RCO , RCO, I NPO, NPO, Plant Status
~
Unit 3 Unit 4 I Moll" Mod"
~ ~
I C , o" I RCS 80,on Con"
.02 50 I
;W" RCS 8o,on Con"
*:ill:
I~ 00 OOS:: 3B 3B charging pump ou ervice in 14 ( uipment "Y ours. The NaliNationa nall Weather Service outl of service due to packing leakage. Scheduled ervic has issued issued aa severe e ere thunderstonn thunder (orm warning for return to cheduled return 10 service ror Miami-Dade County I U3 LCO I none
. U4 A, LCO I none of >ocus Are.,
none 9
Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator CI \ Mode: 1 RCS Leak ReS Leakrate rate Accumulator A ccumulat or Ref Levels Power: 100 Gross: .02 6614 A 661 4 MWe: 761 Unidentified .01 B 6631 Tavg: 574 Charging Pps: .01 C 6621 ReS RCS Pressure: 2250 Res RCS Bo Boron ron Cone Co ne:: 50 Abnormal Annun Annunciators: ciators: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Camp Annunchllor: Annunciator: Comp AClions: Camp Actions: Annunciator: Com AClions: Compp Actions: Annunciator: Camp Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Camp Actions: II Annunciator: nn unciator: omp Actions: Camp Action : Annunciator: lc..- Camp AClions: omp Actions:
)l\
)A nnuncialor:
nnunciator: omp Ac Camp Actions: tions: Annunciator: A nnunciator: omp Acclion Comp tions:: A nnuncialor: Annunc iator: Camp Actions: Action : Current Tech Soec SDec Action Statements: (Does "Forr T (Docs Not Include "Fo Trackinf! Qnlv rackin2 On Iv Items" T .S.A.S I Component: T.S.A.S Rea on:: Reason Ernry Date Em", Date:: T .S.A.S I Component: T.S.A.S Component Reason: Entry Date: Dare: T .S.A.S I/ Component: Reason: Rea on: Date: Entry Date: T.S.A.S T .S.A.S I Component: Component: Reason : Entry Date: Dale : T .S.A.S I Component: T.S.A.S Component: Rea on: Reason: Entry tn l l)' Date: 1'.S.A.S Component:
"'.S.I\ .S I Componcnt:
~ Reason: Keason: Date: Entry Dalc;
Unit 3 Status Chanaea Changes to Risk Significant Sianificant Equipment: Eauipment: l)~ (. IB train protected both units nline risk Online ri sk iis green gre n Uocomlng Upcoming Reactivity Reactjvity Manaaement Management Activities: Activities : Activities : Upcoming Major POD Activities: Maintain 100% power. {- ; UDcoming Upcoming ECOs to Hana Hang and lor Release : Pr~ress: Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress: General Information Remarks , and Operator Work Around Status:Status: Aux. steam supply upply ali aligned gned from unit 4. ond ns r in Condenser leakage 0 selin. inleakage cflll. C \
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description
- Facility:
Examiners: Turkey Point Scenario No.: Candidates: 6 NEW Op Test No.: 2009-301 US RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1 100% power EOl. Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3B charging pump out of service due to packing leakage. Scheduled return to service in 14 hours. The National Weather Service has issued a severe thunderstorm warning for Miami-Dade County Maintain 100% power. Online risk - green B train protected both units Event Event Type Event Description No. TVBVLK40= (C) RO CVCS relief valve, RV-3-203, fails open, the crew isolates letdown using the 1 1.0 ARP. (C) SRO
- 2 3
4 TFS1ML3L= N (RO/SRO) TS (SRO) (R)BOP The crew establishes Excess letdown using 3-0P-041.2 The crew discovers the In Service Test of the C CCW pump failed. The crew declares the C CCW pump INOPERABLE. PT-3-1604 fails causing CV-3-2011 to open bypassing the lP feedwater T heaters, the crew responds to reduce power < 100% using the ARP. (R)SRO 5 TFN1P4AH= (I) RO PR Channel N44 Upper Detector fails high, the RO responds using 3-0NOP-T (TS,I) SRO 59.8 to stop control rod motion by placing rod control to manual. 5a (C) BOP The BOP removes the PR Channel N44 Upper Detector from service using 3-0NOP-59.8. TFF1MACH (I)BOP/SRO 3C S/G level transmitter l T-3-498 fails high. The crew controls 3C S/G level 6 =T manually to maintain plant operation using the ARP and 3-0NOP-49.1. TVFAHDR2 A common Main Feed Header break occurs, the crew will respond to the 7 1.000000 (M) All 5:00 ramp reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-0. When the reactor trips, the main turbine fails to trip automatically, the crew manually trips the main turbine. TFFXCGVA= During the reactor trip response, the "A" AFW turbine steam admission valve T, TVFXLGVB= fails to open, the "B" AFW governor develops an oil leak and the "C" AFW 8 1& turbine trips on overspeed. The crew transitions to 3-FR-H-1 to initiate Feed TFFXOGVC and Bleed.
=T
- * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, 1
(M)ajor
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description
- Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #6 Event 1 - CVCS relief valve, RV-3-203, fails open, the crew will isolate letdown using the ARP.
Event 2 - The crew will establish Excess Letdown using 3-0P-041.2 Event 3 -The crew discovers the In Service Test of the C CCW pump failed. The crew declares the C CCW pump INOPERABLE. Event 4 - PT-3-1604 fails causing CV-3-2011 to open bypassing the LP feedwater heaters, the crew responds to reduce power less than 100% by lowering main turbine load using the ARP. Event 5 - PR Channel N44 Upper Detector fails high, the RO responds using 3-0NOP-59.8 to stop control rod motion by placing rod control to manual. Event 5a - The BOP removes the PR Channel N44 Upper Detector from service using 3-ONOP-59.8. Event 6 - 3C SIG level transmitter LT-3-498 fails high. The crew controls 3C SIG level manually to maintain plant operation using the ARP and 3-0NOP-49.1. Event 7 - A common Main Feed Header break occurs, the crew will respond to the reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-0. When the reactor trips, the main turbine fails to trip automatically, the crew manually trips the main turbine. Critical Task
- Event 8 - During the reactor trip response, the "A" AFW turbine steam admission valve fails to open, the "B" AFW governor develops an oil leak and the "C" AFW turbine trips on overspeed.
The crew transitions to 3-FR-H-1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. Critical Task
- 2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description
- Scenario XXV NRC 6 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-6 (100% power EOl)
- Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXV_NRC_6.lsn
- Place simulator in run Trigger lesson step:
- SETUP - 38 Charging pump OOS. Removes 38 charging pump from service. (Actuates TAB1POSM =RACKOUT)
- SETUP - Main Turbine Fails To Trip (actuates TFU10005 T)
- Place clearance info tag on 38 Charging Pump start switch
- Provide shift turnover checklists
- INSERT OTSC for ARP alarm A 5/6. Change to Establish Excess letdown using 3-OP-041.2, PRESSURIZER OPERATION, Step 5.1.2.7 Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RCO desk to the Utilities screens.
Perform Simulator Operator Checklist
- 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description
- Event 1 - CVCS Relief Valve, RV-3-203, Fails Open Initiated immediately after shift turnover.
CVCS relief valve, RV-3-203, fails open, the crew will isolate letdown using the ARP. When directed by the lead examiner trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - RV-3-203, Fails Open (actuates TVBVLK40=1.0) Event 2 - Establish Excess Letdown The crew will establish Excess Letdown using 3-0P-041.2 If directed, respond as HP and Chemistry when notified that normal letdown is secured and excess letdown has been placed in service. If directed, respond as SNPO and report CCW Excess Letdown flow is 219 gpm. If directed, respond as SNPO to check for increasing RCDT level (indication of RV-3-304 lifting in excess letdown line). Report RCDT level stable as indicated on Waste Boron Panel. Event 3 -C CCW Pump Failed In Service test When directed call 4906, inform the control room that you are the Operations Manager. Engineering has informed Operations that a review of the data for the In Service Test of the C CCW pump reveals the pump has failed the test. Operations management has concurred with the decision from Engineering. Take appropriate administrative measures to remove the C CCW pump from service. If directed, respond as the FS/ANPO to rackout the 3C CCW pump breaker. Wait 10 minutes and trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - RACKOUT 3C CCW PUMP BREAKER (actuates TAK1G04P RACKOUT) If directed, respond as WCC to prepare a PWO/Clearance. Event 4 - PT-3-1604 Fails Low PT-3-1604 fails causing CV-3-2011 to open bypassing the LP feedwater heaters, the crew responds to reduce power less than 100% by lowering main turbine load using the ARP. When directed by the lead examiner trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - PS-3-1604 fails Low (actuates TFS1 ML3L=T) If directed, respond as TO to verify CV-3-1900 closed. Click on Schema--)- FEEDWATER HEATING--)-HIGH PRESS FW HEATERS & RHTR & HTR DRAIN TANKS--)-report CV-3-1900 position (see far right side of mimic). If directed, respond as WCC to prepare a PWO/Clearance and notify I&C. If directed, respond as I&C and acknowledge request to troubleshoot and repair PS-3-1604-1. Event 5 - PR Channel N44 Upper Detector Fails High PR Channel N44 Upper Detector fails high, the RO responds using 3-0NOP-59.8 to stop control rod motion by placing rod control to manual. The BOP removes the PR Channel N44 Upper Detector from service using 3-0NOP-59.8. When directed by the lead examiner trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - N44 Upper Detector Fails High (actuates TFN1P4AH=T) 4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description
- If directed, respond as WCC to prepare a PWO/Clearance and notify I&C.
If directed, respond as I&C and acknowledge request to troubleshoot and repair PR Channel N44. If directed, respond as Reactor Engineering to calculate QPTR. Reply that an engineer will be called in to perform this calculation. If directed, respond as SM direct crew to remove PR Channel N44 from service. Event 6 - LT 498 Fails High 3C S/G level transmitter LT-3-498 fails high. The crew controls 3C S/G level manually to maintain plant operation using 3-0NOP-49.1. When directed by the lead examiner trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - L T 498 Fails High (actuates TFF1MACH=T) If directed, respond as WCC to prepare a PWO/Clearance and notify I&C. If directed, respond as I&C and acknowledge request to troubleshoot and repair LT-3-498. If directed, respond as FSITO if directed to reset AMSAC. Wait 3 min, then trigger EVENT 6, Reset AMSAC (actuates TCL4RST = T). Report when complete. Event 7 - Main Feed Header Leak
- A common Main Feed Header break occurs, the crew will respond to the reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-O. When the reactor trips, the main turbine fails to trip automatically, the crew manually trips the main turbine.
When directed by the lead examiner trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - FEED HEADER BREAK (actuates TVFAHDR2 1.0 5 min ramp) When the crew manually trips the main turbine ensure lesson step EVENT 7 - Manually Trip Main Turbine (actuates TFU10005=0) is inserted. If directed, respond as TO/FS the U3 end of the turbine bldg. is inaccessible since a vapor cloud is rapidly filling up the area. The AFW cage is presently inaccessible due to steam in the area. I will enter the area when the steam dissipates. When directed respond as the FS/SNPO to place PAHMS in service, trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - ALIGN PAHM FOR SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A=1.0/30 sec delay, TAC2V02B=1.0/1 min delay, TAAAV21=1.0/2 min delay, TAAAV22=1.0/3.5 min delay & TACA005=0.0). Report completion 10-15 min later. If directed, respond as Chemistry to sample S/G, monitor DAM-1 If directed, respond as HP to perform surveys. Event 8 - Loss of AFW During the reactor trip response, the "A" AFW turbine steam admission valve fails to open, the "B" AFW governor develops an oil leak and the "c" AFW turbine trips on overspeed. The crew transitions to 3-FR-H-1 to initiate Feed and Bleed.
- When the Main Turbine has been manually tripped, ensure lesson step EVENT 8 - Loss of AFW (actuates TFFXCGVA=T. TVFXLGVB=1, & TFFXOGVC=T) 5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description
- If directed, respond as TO/FS "The AFW cage is presently inaccessible due to steam in the area. I will enter the area when the steam dissipates."
If directed as TO/FS wait 3 minutes and respond "The "A" AFW pump governor valve is shut and cannot be opened. The "8" AFW pump is running at minimum speed and the governor has an oil leak. The "G" AFW pump tripped on overspeed. "The overspeed trip mechanism will not reset due to mechanical binding of the trip linkage."" If directed as TOIFS wait 3 minutes and respond "The location of the feed line break is on the common feed line downstream of the Main Feed pumps." If directed as TO/FS wait 3 minutes and respond "The location of the feed line break is on the common feed line downstream of DWDS-3-012."
- 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
CVCS relief valve, RV-3-203, fails open, the crew will isolate letdown using the ARP.
-r: , Time I III It; Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to rigger lesson step "EVENT 1 - RV-3-203, Fails Open" (actuates TVBVLK40=1.0)
RO Observes A 5/6 CVCS LP LTDN LINE RELIEF HI TEMP SRO Directs response using the ARP r----------~Te-----------l I The decision to Isolate letdown should be based on unacceptable RV-3-203 leakage and
- L NPS discretion. J RO Verifies alarm by observing temperature is > 150'F on TI-3-141 &
decreased letdown flow RO Verifies CV-3-204 OPEN
- RO Attempts to reseat RV-3-203 as follows:
- 1. Closes all letdown orifices (may secure a Charging Pump)
- 2. Checks PCV-3-145 operates properly
- 3. Checks TI-3-141 NOT increasing
- 4. Opens the required number of crifices while controlling PCV-3-145 (Most likely will open the 45 GPM orifice)
RO Determines that RV-3-203 did NOT reseat by observing T1-3-141 temperature increasing and lower than expected letdown flow Performs the following to isolate the RV-3-203 relief valve:
- 1. Closes all letdown orifices
- 2. Closes LCV-3-460
- 3. Minimizes charging flow EXAMINER NOTE:
Excess letdown will be established in the next event CREW Notifies WCC of failed relief valve RV-3-203. 1
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301
~
Time I II lit::: rosition Position Scenario No.: 6 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
The crew will establish Excess Letdown using 3-0P-041.2. Page 1 of 1 SRO Directs placing excess letdown in service using 3-0P-041.2 step 5.1.2.7 RO Places excess letdown in service as follows: Verifies excess letdown HX CCW outlet valve, CV-3-739, is OPEN. Directs SNPO verify CCW flow to excess letdown HX 20()'238 gpm Determines Excess Ltdn Isolation Valve, CV-3-387 closed Determines excess letdown divert to WDS valve, CV-3-389, is aligned to the VCT. Slowly opens excess letdown flow controller, HCV-3-137, allowing the excess letdown lines to fill. After> 5 min., closes HCV-3-137
- Opens excess letdown isolation valve, CV-3-387 Directs SNPO observe RCDT level for indication of RV-3-304 lifting Slowly opens excess letdown flow controller, HCV-3-137, allowing the heat exchanger to warmup.
CAUTION If excess letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature exceeds 195"F, the VCT may have an excessive heatup rate. RO Monitors excess letdown HX outlet temp on n3-139. IF LCV-3-115A, reaches 100% divert position (RED light ON, GREEN light OFF), THEN aligns excess letdown divert to WDS, C\L3-389, to the RCDT (switch to DIVERT). CREW Notifies Chemistry & HP that normal letdown is secured and excess letdown now in service EXAMINER NOTE: When Excess letdown has been placed in service proceed to Event 3 2
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event NO.:3 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
The crew discovers the In Service Test of the C CCW pump failed. The crew declares the C CCW pump INOPERABLE. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator tomake the communication to the control room for Event 3. SRO Recognizes requirement for LCO 3.2.7.a Action a entry. EXAMINER NOTE: 3.2.7.a The Component Cooling Water System (CCW) shal be OPERABLE with Three CCW pumps
- a. With only two CCW pumps with independent power supplies OPERABLE, restore the inoperable CCW pump to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hoursand in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION: With only two CCW pumps with independent power supplies OPERABLE, restore the inoperable CCW pump to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. EXAMINER NOTE: When the SRO has addressed LCO 3.2.7.a Action a entry,proceed to Event 4.
- 3
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.:4 Page Event
Description:
PT-3-1604 fails causing CV-3-2011 to open bypassing the LP feedwater 1 of 1 heaters, the crew responds to reduce power less than 100% by lowering main turbine load using the ARP. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to tigger lesson step "EVENT 4 - PS-3-1604 fails Low" (actuates TFS1 ML3L=T) BOP Observes 0-7/4 LP HEATER BYPASS OPEN CAUTIONS
- Reactor power may Increase due to the positive reactivity addition of colder feedwater Into the Steam Generators.
- Reactor power indication may be lower than actual power due to lower Tavg .
RO Observes decrease in Tavg & increase in reactor power due to CV
- 2011 failure SRO Directs BOP to maintain power less than 100% by lowering main turbine load.
BOP Maintains power less than 100% by lowering main turbine load. SRO Directs response using the ARP BOP Recognizes/reports CV-3-2011 open and PT-3-1604 failed. Observes no other automatic actions have occurred. Observes SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig. Closes CV-3-2011. Directs TO to verify CV-3-1900 closed. May start the 3C Condensate pump Observes 2 HOPs running as required since turbine load> 450 MWe Notifies WCC of PT-3-1604 failure. EXAMINER NOTE: When the crew has sufficiently reduced power proceed to Event 4. 4
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event NO.:5 Event
Description:
PR Channel N44 Upper Detector fails high, the RO responds using 3-ONOP-59.B to stop control rod motion by placing rod control to manual. The BOP removes Page 1 of 4 the PR Channel N44 Upper Detector from service using 3-0NOP-59.B. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to tigger lesson step "EVENT 5 - N44 Upper Detector Fails High" (actuates TFN1P4AH=T) RO Observes the following:
- Annunciators B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 & 8-5/1, 5/2
- N-44 power range channel indication on console fails high
- N-44 axial flux indication on console fails high
- N-44 upper detector indication on NIS racks fails high SRO Transitions to 3-0NOP-59.B
- SRO RO BOP Directs response using 3-0NOP-59.B Places ROD MOTION CONTROL SELECTOR to MANUAL Places the DROPPED ROD MODE switch for N-44 in the BYPASS position.
BOP Places right rod stop bypass switch to bypass N-44. I----------~~-----------I I I I If an Upper Section Deviation or Lower Section Deviation alarm occurs. or if I ANNUNCIATORS 8-212 or 8-213 annunciate. the actions of 3-0SP-059. 10, Determination I of Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, need to be performed if power is greater than 50 percent. I L _______________________ J BOP Places the UPPER SECTION comparator defeat switch to N-44 BOP Places the LOWER SECTION comparator defeat switch to N-44 BOP Places right power mismatch bypass switch to bypass N-44. BOP Places the COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to N-44 SRO May direct manual rod withdrawal to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed using 3-0NOP-02B 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event NO.:5 Page 2 of 4 Event
Description:
PR Channel N44 Upper Detector fails high, the RO responds using 3-ONOP-59.8 to stop control rod motion by placing rod control to manual. The BOP removes the PR Channel N44 Upper Detector from service using 3-0NOP-59.8. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Manually withdraws control rods as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed using 3-0NOP-028. RO Places the ROD MOTION CONTROL SELECTOR to AUTO BOP May pull the instrument power fuses from N-44 drawer B SRO Refers to LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 2 Action 2 Functional Unit 17 c & 17 d Action 7 EXAMINER NOTE See next two pages for applicable Tech Specs. CREW Notifies I&C
- SRO Directs performance of monitoring the Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio using 3-0SP-059.10, DETERMINATION OF QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO. (Per Tech Spec 4.2.4.2)
EXAMINER NOTE: When the crew has restored Tave proceed to Event 6.
- 6
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.:5 Event
Description:
PR Channel N44 Upper Detector fails high, the RO responds using 3-Page 3 of 4 ONOP-59.8 to stop control rod motion by placing rod control to manual. The BOP removes the PR Channel N44 Upper Detector from service using 3-0NOP-59.8. Tim.:> Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-1. MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS IQ.lR1£ OPERABLE MODES AQIlQtl 2 Power Range, Neutron Flux a High Selpolnt 4 2 3 1.2 2
- b. Low Setpomt 4 2 3 111#.2 2 ACTION 2 -With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours,
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1, and
- c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75%
of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored per Specification 4.2.4.2.
- 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
PR Channel N44 Upper Detector fails high, the RO responds using 3-ONOP-59.8 to stop control rod motion by pladng rod control to manual. The BOP removes Page 4 of 4 the PR Channel N44 Upper Detector from service using 3-0NOP-59.8. T' T;
- Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior MINIMur" TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE E\.1t:lCIlQtlllL U!:llI QE CtJA!:l!:lELS TIUB!E' QtEB6at.E MQQES AcrlQtl 17 ReactOf Trip Syslem InterloO:s a IntermedIate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 2 1 2 211 7 b Low POYler Reactor Tnps BloCk, P-l P-ID '",>1..1 4 2 3 1 7 or T urbme First 2 1 2 1 7 Stage Pressure c Power Range Neutron Flux. P-B 4 2 3 1 7 d Power Range Neutron FlllX P-l0 4 2 3 1.2 7 ACTION 7 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour deternine by observation of the associated
- permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
- 8
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event NO.:6 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
3C S/G level transmitter LT-3-498 fails high. The crew controls 3C S/G level manually to maintain plant operation using 3-0NOP-49.1. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to tigger lesson step "EVENT 5 - LT-3-498 Fails High" (actuates TFF1MACH=T) BOP Observes alarms C-5/3 & 6/3, & 0-7/6 SRO Directs response using 3-0NOP-049.1. SRO Observes indicator LT-3-498 failing low and compares to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions. SRO Verifies no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels. BOP Manually controls FCV-3-498 and returns S/G level to program using 3-ARP-097.CR BOP When 3C S/G level on program, selects LT-3-498 for FCV-3-478 control
& returns FCV-3-478 to AUTO.
SRO Refers to LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1, and Table 3.3-2 and determines the minimum channels for S/G level are OPERABLE. EXAMINER NOTE When the SRO determines the minimum channels of S/G level are OPERABLE, proceed to Event 7.
- 9
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
A common Main Feed Header break occurs, the crew will respond to the reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-O. When the reactor trips, the main turbine fails to trip automatically, the crew manually trips the main turbine. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to tigger lesson step "EVENT 6 - FEED HEADER BREAK" (actuates TVFAHDR21.0 5 min ramp) BOP Recognizes and reports lowering SG levels and feedwater flows
- Annunciators C-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam> feed flow)
- Annunciators 0-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)
- Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs
- Slowly dropping level in all SGs SRO Directs a manual trip of the reactor
- SRO I
Directs response using 3-EOP-E-O I~-----------------------I NOTE Steps 1 through 4 are IMMEDIA TE ACTION steps. I I
~-----------------------.
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O: Verifies reactor trip
- Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero
- Rx trip & bypass bkrs open
- Neutron flux decreasing Determines SI not actuated
- 10
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 4 Event
Description:
A common Main Feed Header break occurs, the crew will respond to the reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-O. When the reactor trips, the main turbine fails to trip automatically, the crew manually trips the main turbine. Time 111110:;; Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O: Manually trips the main turbine.
- Turbine stop valves closed
- Manually closes MSR steam supply MOVs
- Mid & East GCBs open Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus
- Crew critical task: manually trip the turbine prior to completing immediate operator actions.
EXAMINER NOTE: When the BOP manually trips the main turbine the simulator malfunction that disables all AFW will automatically insert.
*----------Norc-----------
I I I I FOLDOUT Page s/7al/ be monitored for the remainder of this procedure. I CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-O Foldout page (see page 13 for foldout) BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification. BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification
- Places Main Feed pump HS to STOP
- Places FWIV MOV-3-1407, 1408 & 1409 HS to CLOSE BOP Directs SNPO to align PAHMS per 3-0P-094
- 11
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 4 Event
Description:
A common Main Feed Header break occurs, the crew will respond to the reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-O. When the reactor trips, the main turbine fails to trip automatically, the crew manually trips the main turooe. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs RO in performance of 3-EOP-E-O subsequent actions. RO Checks no AFW Pumps RUNNING May direct the FSITO investigate C AFWP and attempt to reset the overspeed trip (3-0NOP-075 Att. 4 may be used for guidance). RO Checks proper AFW valve alignment. RO Verifies total AFW flow less than 345 gpm. STA STA observes a RED PATH for Loss of Secondary Heat Sink and recommends entry to 3-FRP-H-1
- SRO Transitions to 3-FRP-H-1
- 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 7 Page 4 of 4 Event
Description:
A common Main Feed Header break occurs, the crew will respond to the reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-O. When the reactor trips, the main turbine fails to trip automatically, the crew manually trips the main turbine. FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE E-O
- 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IF either of the conditions listed below occur, THEN use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature "-: 1BO'F OR Containment radiation levels c.: 1.3x1 05 Rlhr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values, THEN normal setpoints can again be used IF the TSC determines that containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded 106 Rads.
- 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- a. IF both conditions listed below occur, THEN trip all RCPs:
- 1) High-head SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 8NQ SI FLOWPATH VERIFIED.
- 2) RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F[65°F]
- b. !E. phase B actuated, .!.!i5!:! trip all RCPs.
- 3. FAULTED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA
!E. any S/G pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner .Qft any S/G completely depressurized, .!.!i5!:!
the following may be performed: a. b. Maintain total feedwater flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level in at least one S/G is greater than 6%[32%]. Isolate AFW flow to faulted S/G(s).
- c. Stabilize RCS hot leg temperature using steam dumps when faulted S/G has blown down to less than 10% wide range.
- 4. RUPTURED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA
!E any S/G level increases in an uncontrolled manner .Qft any S/G has abnormal radiation, 8!:iQ narrow range level in affected S/G(s) is greater than 6%[32%]. .!.!i5!:! feed flow may be stopped to affected S/G(s).
- 5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA
- a. !E two AFW pumps are operating on a single train, Il:i5t:Lone of the pumps shall be shut down within one hour of the initial start signal
- b. IF two AFW trains are operating and one of the AFW pumps has been operating at low flow of 60 gpm or less for one hour, THEN that AFW pump shall be shut down 6, CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA
!E. CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN add makeup to CST using 3-0P-01B.1, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK.
- 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event NO.:8 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
During the reactor trip response, the "A" AFW turbine steam admission valve fails to open, the "B" AFW governor develops an oil leak and the "C" AFW turbine trips on overspeed. The crew transitions to 3-FR-H-1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. T; Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs 3-FRP-H-1 response CAUTIONS
- If total feed flow has been reduced to less than 345 gpm due to procedural requirements and 345 gpm total feed flow is available, then this procedure shall NOT be performed.
- Feed flow should NOT be reestablished to any faulted S/G if a non-faulted S/G is available.
RO Determines RCS pressure> intact SG pressure Determines RCS Tavg >350°F CAUTIONS If wide range level in any S/G is less than 22% [narrow range level in all S/Gs less than 32%J and required feedwater flow can NOT be immediately restored or PRZ pressure is greater than or equal to 2335 psig due to loss of secondary heat sink, RCPs should be stopped and Steps 11 through 19 should be initiated immediately for bleed and feed.
- If eST level decreases to less than 10%, makeup water sources for eST will be necessary to maintain secondary heat sink.
RO Observes SG wide range levels less than 22% SRO Directs immediate transition to steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1. CAUTION Steps 11 through 19 must be performed quickly in order to establish ReS heat removal by ReS bleed and feed. RO Stops a" RCP's RO Manua"y initiates SI & Containment Isolation phase A RO Verifies 2 Unit 3 HHSI pumps running
- Verifies SI valve amber lights on VPB- ALL BRIGHT 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.:8 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
During the reactor trip response, the "A" APN turbine steam admission valve fails to open, the "B" AFW governor develops an oil leak and the "C" AFW turbine trips on overspeed. The crew transitions to ~FR-H-1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. Time TilYl"" Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Verifies PORV block MOVs open and energized RO Opens both PORVs for adequate RCS bleed path. BOP Verifies Instrument Air Containment Isolation, CV3-2803 - OPEN AND Verifies instrument air pressure, P1-3-1444 - GREATER THAN 95 PSIG RO Verifies RCS heat removal adequate by observing both PORV's and both PORV block valves OPEN. Crew critical task: Initiate feed and bleed cooling so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for HHSI injection flow to occurprior to
- completing step 16 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
EXAMINER NOTE The scenario is terminated when the crew verifies RCS Feed & Bleed using of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 step 16.
- 15
( ( (
l l'nl.("; 25 cenario, 7
=
( ( OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT f) Shirt Mg" ~~ Field Supv.: Admi. Reo: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit 4 U. it s upv" I Unit Supv.: RCO: I RCO :
.1'11'0' I NI' O:
~Plant Status
. U,lit 3 ~ ,it 4 Mode: I I Mod" I IW" I MW" CS 80'0. Co.e: ~ li ffio,o. co.e:
. ,e
(;'~f ' RO R assigned Ie els while in manual level control. The National assil!ncd to control steam generator levels ational Weather Service ervic issued a sesevere er thundcrstonn lhunderstorm warning for Miami-Dade County County
.!lJ ' LCO . I none U4
- LCO I none
; of : Focus Area: I Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generator to grid. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic automat ic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. 3-GOP-301 3-GOP-30 1 in progress at step 5.52.2.3 t
Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator (, ( Mode: 1 ReS Leakrate RCS l eakrate Accumulator. Ref Rei Levels
~
~
Power: MWe: Tavg : Res Pressure : RCS Boron, Cone: Gone ~ 6 0 549.5
>49.5 2250 1140 Gross:
Unidentified Charging Pps Pps::
.02
.01
.01 m!
A 6614 B 6631 C 6621 Abnormal Annunciators: Annunciator: " I Comp~ Comp Actions: Annunciator: I Com" Comp Actions: Annunciator: I Comp, Comp Actions: Annunciator: i\clio~s: I Comp Actions: Annunciator: I Comp , Com£ Actions: Annun ialor: Com Compp AClions: Actions: Annunciator:: Compp Actions: Com C \.. rI': nnuncial~r: omp Actions: Comp Actions: Annunciator:: r. Comp Actions: Annunciator: r.omp Actions: I Current C urrent Tech Soec Spec Action~Statements: (Does; Not Include, "For !l!!1vItems"
" For Trackine:t Only T.S.A.S I Com poncnI:
Component: Rea on : Reason: I Entry Date: EoI",
.. . ; I 'Component:
T.S .A.S Reason:: Reason I Entry Date: T.S .A.S I Component: T.S.A.S Component: Reason:: Reason I Entry Em", D""Dale:
. .; I 'Component:
T.S.A.S Rea on : Reason: I En,,,, Dale: Entry Dat" T.SAS I 'Component: T.S.A.S Reason:: Reason I Entry E:nlry Date: Dalt.":
. . I Component:
.T.S.A.S C. r ea on:
En"y Dale: Entry Date:
Unit 3 Status Changes Chanaes to Risk Significant Sianificant Equipment: lC ~
' B ,train train protected both units Online risk is green Upcoming UpcominQ Reactivity Management Activities Activities::
Upcoming Major POD Activities: ( .IU~coming Upcomina Hang and IDr ECOs to Hana lor Release: Evolutions or Compensatory Actions In in Progress: General Information Information, Remarks , and Operator Work Around Status: Aux. steam supply aligned from unit 4. Condenser inleakage 0 scfrn. Oscfm. C \
TP-2009-301 Scenario #7 Event Description
- Facility:
Examiners: Turkey Point Scenario No.: Candidates: MOD 7 Op Test No.: 2009-301 US RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 2,6% power, MOL. Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generator to grid. Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3B charging pump. Scheduled return to service in 14 hours. The National Weather Service has issued a severe thunderstorm warning for Miami-Dade County Immediately after shift turnover place unit on line and increase power using 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2.3. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. The shift manager has granted permission to perform the evolution. Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) ALL Place unit on line using 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2.3 Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. 2 TVKDOO1X~ iNKDOO1 x ~ 1 0/ (C) SRO/BOP The 3A TPCW pump bearing fails and the 3B TPCW pump fails to 2 min ramp automatically start. The crew responds using 3-0NOP-008 or the ARP and TFK3811S = T manually starts the 3B TPCW pump. 3 (I) BOP 3B S/G controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causing 3B FRV TFF1M86H = T (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). The crew responds using 3-0NOP-049.1 to (I,TS) SRO manually control 3B S/G level and avoid a reactor trip. 4 (I) ROjSRO VCT level transmitter LT-3-115 fails high. The crew responds using the ARP TFB1LTHV=T and 3-0NOP-46.4 and places LCV-3-115A, control switch to the VCT Position. 5 TFS1MREH = T (R) SRO/BOP PT-3-1608 fails high. CV-3-1608 fails open and increases steam flow 3-4%. TFSW13A=T The crew will eventually direct local isolation of CV-3-1608. 6 Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked resulting in TVUJINF ~ 0 95 a high air temperature condition. The crew responds using 3-ARP-097.CR for TVUJINFB=0.95 TVUJINFB=O.95 annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor when exciter hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of 3-EOP-E-0. Once the TVUJINFC=0.95 TVUJINFC=O.95 reactor is tripped, the switch yard relays out. 3B EDG starts but fails to TVUJINFD=O.95 automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus stripping failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be manually started. 7 TFP8SWYD = T (M) ALL The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. Power TF05GAFS = T will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output TF06XABF = T breaker. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam TFFXM05 = T leak. K30P118G = F K30P118R = F (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
- 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #7 Event Description
- Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #7 Event 1 - Place unit on line using 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2.3 Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map.
Event 2 - The 3A TPCW pump bearing fails and the 38 TPCW pump fails to automatically start. The crew responds using 3-0NOP-008 or the ARP and manually starts the 38 TPCW pump. Event 3 - 38 S/G controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causing 38 FRV (FCV 488 to fail closed). The crew responds using 3-0NOP-049.1 to manually control 38 S/G level and avoid a reactor trip. Event 4 - VCT level transmitter LT-3-115 fails high. The crew responds using the ARP and 3-ONOP-46.4 and places LCV-3-115A, control switch to the VCT Position. Event 5 - PT-3-1608 fails high. CV-3-1608 fails open and increases steam flow 3-4%. The crew will eventually direct local isolation of CV-3-1608. Event 6 - Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked resulting in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds using 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor when exciter hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of 3-EOP-E-0. Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. 38 EDG starts but fails to automatically load 38 4kv bus due to a breaker failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can
- not be manually started.
Event 7 - The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 38 4kV bus by locally closing the 38 EDG output breaker. Critical Task. Seal injection will be isolated to all RCP's Critical Task. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
- 2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #7 Event Description
- Scenario XXV NRC 7 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup
- Restore to IC 195 (Mode 2 MOL 6% power)
- Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXV_NRC_7.lsn
- Place simulator in run Trigger lesson step:
- SETUP - 38 Charging pump OOS. Removes 38 charging pump from service.
(Actuates TAB1POSM =RACKOUT)
- SETUP - 38 TPCWP AUTO START FAIL
- SETUP - 3A EDG START FAIL
- SETUP - 38 EDG 8KR 3A820 Fails to Close
- SETUP - MOV-3-1405 FAILS TO OPEN
- Place simulator in freeze.
- Place clearance info tag on 38 Charging Pump start switch
- Provide shift turnover checklists
- Provide power ascension guidelines
- Provide an in progress copy of 3-GOP-301 complete to step 5.52.3
- Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RCO desk to the Utilities screens.
- Perform Simulator Operator Checklist This scenario requires the use of a surrogate operator for SGWLC. He will turn over and leave when FRVs are in automatic.
- 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #7 Event Description
- Event 1 - Place unit on line Initiated by crew based on shift turnover.
The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.2.3 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap S/G level control to main feed reg valves controlling in automatic. Note that a surrogate operator will be required to maintain SG level. If directed, respond as SM that auto synchronization is to be used for placing the main generator on line. (Step 5.54 is n/a) If directed, respond as System and acknowledge Unit 3 to be synchronized and increasing power to 30% (135 MWe). If asked about VARS, request 100 MVAR out at 100% power. If directed, respond as Chemistry when notified to sample for 15% power change. If directed, respond as FSITO to commence purging MSRs using 3-0P-072.1 If directed, respond as FSITO to complete 3-0P-072 section 5.0, place steam traps in service. After 7-10 min. report complete. If directed, respond as FSITO to complete local actions to initiate MSR tube bundle purge using 3-0P-072.1.
- If directed, respond as FSITO to verify GCM filter free of oil & set H2 gas flow at 16. After 2-4 min., report complete.
If directed, respond as FSITO to check Bently-Nevada for turbine vibration alarm. Reset expected turbine eccentricity alarm. Click on Schema-.. TURBINES-.. TURBOVISORY
-..LOA-.. TCUFRST - TURBINE BENTLY-NEVADA ALARM RESET-.. TRUE then INSERT.
If directed, respond as SM if asked about transferring main turbine load from the governor to the load limit. Direct crew to wait until after power reaches 30% power before doing this. If directed, respond as FSITO to check PSS voltmeter inside the voltage regulator cabinet. Report back that meter reads zero volts. If directed, respond as Chemistry to verify SGs are within 0-NCOP-002 limits. As chemistry request power be held at or below 30% until SG chemistry verified within limits. If directed, respond as Reactor Engineering, request power be held at 30% until flux map complete. If directed, respond as FSITO to verify 3-0SP-089 step 7.1.2 completed during turbine startup. Report that this surveillance requirement met satisfactorily. If directed, respond as FSITO about status of hydrogen gas dryer. Report that it is in service.
- If directed, respond as FSITO to begin placing MSRs in service using 3-0P-072.1.
4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #7 Event Description
- Power should be stabilized at 30%, Tavg =554.5°F & turbine load =225 MWe.
Event 2 - 3A TPCWP bearing failure When directed, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - 3A TPCWP BEARING FAILURE (actuates TVKD001X = 1.0 on 2 min ramp). The 3A TPCW pump bearing fails and the 3B TPCW pump fails to automatically start. The crew responds using 3-0NOP-008 or the ARP and manually starts the 3B TPCW pump. Annunciators 1-5/1, 5/2 & 5/4 all alarm when 3A TPCWP trips. The crew responds using 3-ONOP-008 or the ARP. The BOP will need to start 3B TPCWP manually since the auto start function was failed at startup. If directed, respond as FSITO to locally check 3A TPCWP. Report back that the inboard motor bearing is smoking and very hot. If directed to do post-start checks on 3B TPCWP, report back that the pump is running normally. If directed, respond as FSITO to locally check TPCW supply temp (TI-3-1432) <110°F and stable/decreasing. Click on Schema---+COMMON SERVICES---+ TURBINE PLANT COOLlNG---+ TPCW HEAT EXCHANGERS+---+report TPCW supply header temperature at top of page.
- If directed, respond as FSITO to locally verify TPCW basket strainer f1p. From TPCW HEAT EXCHANGERS system mimic page, click on FROM ICW PUMPS+---+report f1p's on basket strainers downstream of POV-4882 & 4883.
If directed, respond as FSITO to check temperature of components cooled by TPCW. After 8-10 min., report all temperatures stable. If directed, respond as WCC, after 8-10 min rack out breaker 3M 11 by triggering lesson step EVENT 2 - RACK OUT BKR 3AA11 (actuates TAK3A11P = RACKOUT(3). Event 3 - FT 487 fails high When directed, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - FT-3-487 FAILS HIGH (actuates TF1M87H = T). 3B S/G controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causing 3B FRV (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). The crew responds using 3-0NOP-049.1 to manually control3B S/G level and avoid a reactor trip. If directed, respond as WCC to initiate a PWO and contact I&C. Also respond as WCC if directed to generate an ECO for the bistables tripped using 3-0NOP-049.1. If directed, respond as FSITO to reset the AMSAC TROUBLE alarm (0-7/6) at the AMSAC panel in the Cable Spreading Room. After 2-4 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - RESET AMSAC TROUBLE (actuates TCL4RST =T). Report when complete. 5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #7 Event Description
- Event 4 VCT level transmitter LT-3-115 fails high.
When directed, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 LT-3-115 fails high (actuatesTFB1LTHV=T) VCT level transmitter LT-3-115 fails high. The crew responds using the ARP and 3-0NOP-46.4 and places LCV-3-115A, control switch to the VCT Position. If directed, respond as WCC to generate a work order and contact maintenance. Event 5 - PT-3-1608 fails high I CV-3-1608 fails open When directed, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - PT-3-1608 FAILS HIGH I CV-3-1608 FAILS OPEN (actuates TFS1MREH = T & TFSW49D=O.1 then TFSW13A = T 5 sec later). PT-3-160B fails high. CV-3-160B fails open and increases steam flow 3-4%. The crew will eventually direct local isolation of CV-3-160B. If directed, respond as FSITO to close the air isolation valve and bleed air off the CV-3-160B operator. This will have no effect. Report steam continues to come out of the silencer with the greatest noise/vibration on CV-3-160B. Once power is stabilized at 30%, CV-3-160B can be locally isolated
- If directed, respond as FSITO, wait 2-4 min then trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - LOCALLY ISOLATE CV-3-1608 (actuates TASBV003 =0.0 on 1 min ramp). When complete, report that with the valve closed, although much less than before, some steam flow is still visible out the silencer.
If directed, respond as WCC to get Mechanical assistance in isolating 3C SG ADV. Event 6 - Exciter air cooler TPCW blockage I Reactor trip When directed, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - EXCITER AIR COOLER TPCW BLOCKAGE (actuates TVUJINF = 0.98, TVUJINFB = 0.98, TVUJINFC = 0.98 & TVUJINFD = 0.98 all on 1 min ramp). This will cause exciter air temperature to increase. The crew responds using 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator E-9/4. When exciter hot gas temperature reaches 90°C, the crew manually trips the reactor and 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions are performed. Events 7 - Loss of all AC power After the immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are completed, trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - LOSS OF SWITCHYARD (actuates TFP8SWYD = T, K30P11BG = F, K30P11BR = F, TCE2E01T = T & TCE2E07T = T). The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 38 4kV bus by locally closing the 38 EDG output breaker. Seal injection will be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. 6
TP-2009-301 Scenario #7 Event Description
- If directed, respond as FSITO to locally trip 3B1 & 3B2 CWP breakers 3AB16 & 3AB18. Trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - TRIP 3A816 AND 3A818 (actuates TCK4CC = F then TCK 4DC = F 1 min later).
Report when complete. If directed, respond as FS/ANPO to locally reset 3A EDG start failure relay by pressing alarm reset pushbutton. Report back that the 3A EDG turbocharger suffered catastrophic failure with considerable damage to EDG exhaust piping. When directed by the lead examiner, respond as FS/ANPO to remove the 3B EDG output breaker failure, trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - REMOVE 3A820 FAILURE. When directed by the lead examiner, respond as FS/ANPO to locally close the 3B EDG output breaker, trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - Locally close 3A820 (actuates TCQ5B20C=T). Report when complete. If directed, respond as FS/SNPO to check which unit CCW is supplying cooling to the U4 HHSIPs. Report that U4 CCW is supplying U4 HHSI pumps. If directed, respond as FS/SNPO locally open MOV-3-843A or B. After 2-4 min., trigger either lesson step EVENT 7 - LOCALLY OPEN MOV-843A (actuates TFMW010 = T) or EVENT 7 - LOCALLY OPEN MOV-8438 (actuates TFMW020 = T). Report when complete. If directed, respond as FS/SNPO to locally isolate RCP seals by closing 3-297AlBIC, MOV
- 381 & MOV-3-626. Trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - LOCALLY ISOLATE RCP SEALS (actuates TAHN97A = 0.0, TAHN97B = 0.0 after 1 min delay, TAHN97C = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TFBVC60 = T after 3 min delay &
TFKV626C = T after 4 min delay). Report when complete. If directed, respond as FSITO open AFSS-3-007 to restore train 2 steam flow to C AFWP. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - OPEN AFSS-3-007 (actuates TAFF07 = 1.0 on 30 sec ramp). Report when complete. If directed, respond as FSITO to deenergize and close MOV-3-140S. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 7 - DEENERGIZE MOV-1405 (actuates TCF5MA27 = F). Report when complete. If directed, respond as FSITO to report the status of steam from the 3C SG ADV CV-3-1608. Report that steam is still coming out of the silencer on the unit 3 main steam platform. If directed, respond as U4 RO of status of U4 4kV buses is requested. Report that 4A & 4B 4kV buses are both on their respective EDGs and 40 4kV bus is aligned to 4B 4kV bus. If directed, respond as FSITO to start a SFP cooling water pump. Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - START SFP Cooling Pump (actuates TCC4CL15 = T) and report when complete If directed, respond as FS/SNPO to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B
= 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
- 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.3 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap S/G level control to main eed reg valves controlling in automatic. Page 1 of 8 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs the evolution BOP 3. Ahgn the SDTA controllers as. follows:
- a. Ensure t\yO SDTA controllers are in automatic.
- b. Ensure one SDT A controller is in manual and maintaining Tayg two to four degrees hlgher than Tref I
I " The intent is to have all three SDTA valves throttled open to maintain Tavg greater t.7an Tref and reactor power below P7 (Target IS 5 to 7 percent). I I " The SDrA controiler:; should be adiusted SO that the valves do not c!ose at the same time, but operate on a staggered baSIl; and throttle closed as the main generator is I ioaded I A difference of approximately 20 psi shoufd be used as the initial staggered setting. I " I " The SDrA controller settmgs may be adjusted In small increments as necessary /0 mamtain steam flow frorn all three steam generators. I I The stearn generator with the lower setpoinl will require additional feed flow. BOP c. Adjust the setpoillts for SDT:\ controllers in automatic for staggered oper(ltioll.
- d. Adjust the setpoillt for SDTA controller in manual to 1005 psig. I
- e. II se the SDT A controller in manual to make minor adjustments to Tavg, as necessary .
.... ----- - - - - -NOTE- ----------.
I The followmg step may be performed as SOrA controllers £Iff! adjusted and steam I I generator le'leis are stabiliZed I
~-~.--.. f---"~-'~'-- f---*~*-~----------------~-----------~*----__ll BOP BOP 5.5~.3 Perform the follo\\'Ulg in preparation for &ynchrollizmg the main generator:
L Ventv that the :\1ai.n Exciter DC Regulator Control is ill the full lower positi'on (approximately 10 percent on DC Regulator Control Indicator).
- 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.3 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap S/G level control to main feed reg valves Page 2 of 8 controlling in automatic. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior r----------NoTe-----------1 I I The generator leads backup distance relay is susceptible to vibration wtfh the generator I II field CI(Cwt breaker open and may cause a generator lockout and subsequent turbine trip. To prev'ent tlus occurre."ce, the paddle IS removed from thiS relay during the Main Turbine I LSt:rt::~ ,::st~ie~r.: t~o:n~e ~e:at: ~ :c~:a: _____ I BOP Dm:"ct DU"I:"ct SOA to iUf>tall tlle relay paddle to restore the generator lead,> bad"up ..'"up dl~tat1c(' (LTD) SM1 tim('r r('lay 111 Cabinet 3('106 111 the Cable Spreading Room. r - - - NOTES - - - - - - - - - - - I I I I
- Annunciator E 8/2.
812_ GEII; FiELD FORC/fl/GNOL T REG UMITlNG, may come in I and clear. I I
- H'hen the exciter field breaker IS closed. the exciler amps and generator voltage may H'ben I vary based on generator conditions, i..e. cold from a refueling outage or relatively hot I from a srvo_
srvo. if eXCiter amps or generator voltage are not within the specified band. I I System Engineering shall be contacted for further gwdance_ gUidance. I f--------- f -----.--. BOP 3_
- 3. Clos.e CloSee the exciter field breaker and ,-erify respOllse on Control Room Of local bem-een greater than 0 and 90 amps_
exciter field ammeter bem'een amps. BOP 4. yoltmeter feading~ aIe Verify three generator voltmeter are indicating between great<'1* great<'1- than o and 17 KV. 5 Slowly increase generator voltage yoltage by raismg the DC regulator control tn BOP small step changes. 3. 3_ Verify exciter field ammeter r(ponds with each adjmtlllent.
- b. Verify all three generator voltmeters are indicating equal YaIue'>.
-~--r-------~r----~--
f-----~-- ~.---~ -~.-~-. CAUTION Generator operatio/l greater than 23,100 volts may damage the generator windings. Exciter field currelH is limited to 135 amps at flo-load to ensure acceptable generator voltage.
----~ ------.~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I BOP 6.
6_ Rluse generator yoltage until voltage is between 21.5 K\- and 22.5 KV on all bet',veen 100 amps alld 130 amps on the three phase,> ,nth exciter field amps bet',\"een ammeteI_ (The Control Room Of local generator voltmeter;; and exciter field ammeter. exciter field anuneter may be used) 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.3 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap S/G level control to main feed reg valves controlling in automaticautomatic.. Page 3 of 8 T:: Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 7. Place the Voltage Regulator Control Switch in the TEST position. r ----------------- !:!Qli I The regulator mismatclJ meter may oscillate about the zero point due to minor II I speed changes. S. Slowly adjust the AC regulator control to 11ull the AC-DC regulator
- - I BOP mismatch meter.
BOP 9. Place the \' oltage Regulator C outrol Switch ill the O~ position. BOP 10. Place the Generator Synchronizmg East Bus Control 10 the :\1A:.'\,"UAL po~ition. BOP 11. Adjust the turbine speed usmg the Generator Gowmor Speed Changer Control until the >ynchroscope IndicaTOr is rotating slowly in the FAST rureetion. BOP 12. Adjust the AC' f<:'guiatof control to set the tncom1ng Yoltag<:' equal to the
!'mUling -,oitage.
t----..- . - - t - -.. - ..~..~ - - * - * * - -..~-..--------*~-------------------__JI I---.. --------*~-------------------__jl 5.52.4 ~ reactor power is between 5 ilud 7 percent. ~ wrify the following RO palllmeters ilre stilble or indicMe il very slow mte of change: t('ollunitment Step 2.3.11 - ('APR]
- TIP;g: (:'49' to 551 'F)
- PRZ level (on program for Tavg:)
- Steam Generator levels (46 to 54 percent)
..... - - -- - - - - - NOTES - - - - - - - - - -- - -.
I " If auto synchronizmg is Inoperable or undeSirable. the Shift Manager may authorize the I use of Manual SynchrOlllzmg Mode. I I " In Auto Mode. the tueOlne speed and generator voltage are automatically adjusted. I wh,c.') may reqtllre several mmutes to salisfy the system logic. I I " If the auto synchroniZing p(Jshbutto.'l is held foe greater than 10 seconds,. the I auto-sync'jrOfllz!ng iogic '.'Iii! be disabled before a second auto-synchrofilzing attempt I at breaker closure is mit,oated. I
- - - - - - ______ 1 L.. - ---- ------
- 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew performs ~GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.3 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap S/G level control to main feed reg valves controlling in automatic. Page 4 of 8 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 5 53 Perform auro 5ynchronization as tollows: (XA if llli1nual mode 15 used.) 553.! Place the Gen Svncbronizmg East Bll~ ('anITa! to tbe AUTO position. 5.53.2 \'('rify Ea,t Bm Breakt'r wlute light abow synchroscope tlashe, at 12 o'clock position. mdlCanng sYllchromzed conditions. 5.53.3 Venr; the- Iuacl"ertent Proteclloll $chem(' Armed amber I1ght above the S}"t1chroscope i, LIT.
---- NOTES If East Bus Breaker fails to ciose. the Power Coordinator In Systems Operations needs I to be noti.Fied prior to attempting to synchronize with the Mid Bus Breaker, since I real'flnment of the switchyard may be required. (The Systems Operator/Power Coordmator evaluates system conditions to detemllne If the high Ime should be I Isolated before ciosing the Mid Bus Breaker and w;fi \'Iork with the plant to expedite I any necessa,nl sWitching) [Commitment - Step 2.3.1]
- If the generator is motored al 2 ,\4W or more Incoming for 30 seconds, the reverse I power relay w;!1 initiate generator lockout.
~----------------- _ _ _ _ _ _ I BOP 5.53.4 Beton' the s)TIchroscope feache<, the 11 o'clock PO<,IUOll. depre('(' and hold the ALTO Svnchroruzing Button.
5.53.5 WHE~ the GCB closes. ~perfolm the folIowmg: BOP
- 1. ObSelye the East Bm Breaker iudicatlllg hgbt" to verrfy breaker closure (red OIL green oft)
.:; IF mam generator load IS le~':i t11<'11 10 MWe, THE;\" l1lcrease load to iij)proximately 10 :\1\Ye U';11lg the Generator Govemor Speed Chang('r ControL
- 3. Place ~ynchroscope Ul the OFF position.
- 4. )"fatch the flag 011 the East Bus Generator GCB Control Switch by takmg the sWltch to CLOSE.
5 Venfy the Inad,'ertellt Protection Scheme Armed amber light aboH' the wllchroscope is OFF
- 6. \'enfy Generator Amps are Wltlllll 2 perc<'1lt Oll all three pha!>es.
r - - - - - - - - - NOTEs - - - - - - - - - --I I To pre'lent exceSSllie changes in S/G pressure and le.>el, the SDTA valves should be I checked to wmfy thai the)' are responding pnor to each additional load step. I
' Increasing mam generator load shaN be coordinated with the operator controfflng II I steam generator fe'ie/s.
- ~----------------- _ _ _ _ _ _ I 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.3 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap S/G level control to main feed reg valves controlling in automatic. Page 5 of 8 Timp Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior f55 Perf01111 the tollowing to increase turbine load: [Colllmitment Step 2.3.11 - CAPR] ROI 5.55.1 ~lonitor automatic control program \'alues USlllg: the Plant Curve Book BOP Section I\', Figure 5. A:'IID notify the Shift ~anag:er of any unexpected deVlatIon~.
--- -NOTE ------ -- - - -.
I The follow:l1g step .is performed by the operator controlling steam generator levels I I and pressures. BOP 5.55.2 IE the Stei1ll1 DUllIp to AtIl1o'>phere (SDTA) valves me being used. THE:'II' perform the following steps until all SDTA valws are closed and the Inyg - Tref delta I is within the band pro\'ided by the US. (Reference Attachment 5 for operation of the SDTA controllers.)
- 1. Yelit): the SDTA controllers in automatic are dosing the SDTA v[llws as steillll is drawn off to the tnrbine.
- 2. Slowly close the SDIA valw in manual to balance steam flow with the SDIA v[llws ill automatic and make uUllor adjustments to Tavg.
as necessary. r------ 'NOTEs -----------1
* }'\l/Jen the SOTA valves are operatmg properiy. there should be a balance between the I I SOrA vallies dosing and main turbine steam usage. with Jittle perturbation in main I steam header pressure as load IS Increased. I I , The SOTA 'v'alves can be verified to be clOSing by obseNing mail! steam header I I pressure recover as the main generator is loaded. I I , The SOrASOTA controller settmgs may be adjusted In smali smaH increments as necessary to I I mamtain stearn generator levels I I
- It should not be necessary to close the SOrA SOTA valve in manual as a pre-empilve action I wher. the ma*n generator outout breaker is closed I
--- .~
I
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ______ 1 BOP 3 Obsen;e maUl steam header pressure while loading the main generator to maintain a balance between the SDTA Yah"e!; do!;ing and the steam beil1g used to lncrea 5e load.
-f. \YHE~ steam generator lewIs and pres!;ure<; st.'lbilize follo\ving a load BOP ll1crease. ~ notify the operator controllUlg the maUl generator to lllcrease load by 5 to 10 M\Ve.
BOP 5 Continue monitoring and controlling in the steps above lUltil Step 6 below 1S completed.
- 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.3 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap S/G level control to main feed reg valves controlling in automatic. Page 6 of 8 I -r:. T; Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I r -- - - - - - - -NO-re- - - - - - - - - -
-----------~~-----------I --I I
I The SDrA valves should be closed by approximately 40 MWe. BOP
- 6. \YHE~
WHE~ TH£~ emure the SDTA the SDTA ',-alve'> l1l automatic are dosed. THE:"
\"<lIve III manual is clo,><,d and TaygiTrefare within the baud proYided by CS BOP 7. Align the SDTA controllers for autolUatic operation as foIlo\\"s:
- a. \-erify Steam DlUllP to Atmosphere Valve, CV-3-1606. is CLOSED.
(1) Adjust the controller setpoint to 1005 p~ig:. (2) Ensme the controller is ill AUTO.
- b. Verify Steam Dump to Atmosphere Valve, C\'-3-1607. is CLOSED.
(1) Adjust the controller setpoint to 1005 psig. (2) Ensure the controller is ill AUTO.
- c. \-erify Steam Dump to Atmosphere ValY<'. C\'-3-1608, is CLOSED.
(1) Adjust the controller setpoiut to 1005 psig:. (2) Ensure the controller is ill AUTO.
- 8. Perform the following to align the steam dump to condenser for AUTO:
BOP
- a. Place the Stemn Dump to Condenser ('ontrol s\vitch in the ON position.
- b. .l'vlomentarily place the :Mode Selector switch to RESET.
- c. Place the Mode Selector Switch to AUTO.
- Communication between rhe Reactor Operators on the control board is critical during plant startup. ROs must Inform each other of importalll parameter changes such as reactor and turbine power, SIG levels, and changes in blowdowfl flow.
- Intermediate Range to Power Rallge overlap is required prior to blocking the Intermediate Range Trip and the Power Range LO Range Trip.
.. Block of the Imermediate Iff/ermediate Range Trip and the Power Range LO Range Trip is required prior to iI/creasing power greater than 20 percetJt.
- 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event
Description:
The crew performs ~GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.3 to synchronize generator to grid, ncrease power and swap S/G level control to main feed reg valves controlling in automatic.automatic . Event No.: 1 Page 7 of 8
. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 5.57 Perform the following to .,lowly merea,e reactor power:
5.57.1 "tIE.'; WHE.'; S S*GG lewis are stable. THE:\, contmue continue to increase reactor power by (blunon u~mg O-OP-046, (yeS - Boron Concentration Control. QB by withdrawmg c-ontrol control rode, 5.57.2 Monitor and adjust $:G level~ in response to rising reactor power and mrbint' load. R0 5. 58 ~ ReaCTOr Power k,el is greatt'f than 10 pt>rcent., ~ perform the followUlg: 5.58.1 Verify POiVER ABOVE P-I 0 ~tatus light on VPA i~ OX 5.58.2 Venfy AT PO\VER TRIPS BLOCKED sU!tu.\ light all YPA goes OFF. 5.583 Pf<'C,S A_,D hold for.:' to 4 seconds Train A and Train B lurennediate Range Tnp Pl~sh to Block pllshbuttons on tht' Reactor Console. 5.58A Venf\' .:'5°~ INTER R..'G TRIP BLOCKED stams light on VPA i. ON. 5.58.5 Pres> A.SU. hold for 2 to 4 '>ecoud. Tram A lind Train B Power La Range Tnp Pmh tOBIOck pushbuHom on the Reactor Console. 5.58.6 Verin' 25°'Q PWR RNG TRIP BLOCKED status light on VPA IS OX
- U8.7 i'efit\. the follo\\'ing fol!o\\'ing on ERDADS I Intermediate Range ?>.l:S Trip blocked 2 :\'IS LO Power Range Trip blocked BOP 5.59 Konfy Chemistry Lab that RCS sampling IS reqmred by Technical SpeClficahon 3.4.8.
5.60 Perform the following as load 1S increar,ed: BOP 5.60.1 COlnplete Section 5.0 of 3-0p-On. Main Steam Syst~m. 5.60.2 Verify !h~ Feedwater Pump Turbllle Turbme Runback sWitch on 3eOl is in DEFEAT. 5.60.3 Commence purging the MSR tube blmdle3 using 3-0p-On. L MOisture Separato Reheaters. Examiner Note: BOP may direct field actions of 3-0P-072 and 3-OP-072.1 to be completed.
~'--'--
~'--'--~-------~------- '-----
~-
CAUTION Prior to opening the feedwater isolation MOVs, evaluate for leak-by.
~. ---~.~---~""""''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''1111111111'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''~1
- 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.3 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap S/G level contrd to main feed reg valves controlling in automatic. Page 8 of 8
. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 61 WHE.
- \ power l~ between 10 and 20°0. THE':\ stop the power mcrea&e and perform the BOP following to place dle fRV~ I1l ~lllo1Uat1c:
5.61.1 Ensure open the Feedwater holatioll nuves:
- f\V hoI SUll Geu 3A ;"10V-3-1407
- fIV Isol Stm Gen 3B, MO\'-3-1408
- f\\' hol Stm Gen 3C ~lOV-3-1409
'I - - - - - - - - - NOTes - - - - - - - - - - - i I . FRVs in the fonowmg steps can be placed in sell/Ice in an}' order I I
I
- The controlling channels of feed flow and steam flow can be changed al the discretion I of the US I I SUR Transfers the steam generator level controls to automatic Examiner Note: Surrogate transfers all FRVs to automatic control.
f -.---
~.--- ~~-~-r__.~-.~.
~~-~-r--*~-*~*---------------------------------jl SUR 5.61.5 Verify that each SiG leyel is being automatically controlled.
5.61.6 Verify the main feedwater control valves are ill AUTO:
- FCV-3-478
- FCV-3-488
- FCV-3-498 5.61.7 Verify the FW Bypass ValYes are CLOSED:
- FCV-3-479
- FCV-3-4S9
_~ _~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _L _ _ _ _ _
* ~
*~ _
FCV-3-499 _ -jl
~I Once feed regulating valves are placed in automatic,direct the facility operator to trigger event 2 - 3A TPCWP BEARING FAILURE.
- 8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
The 3A TPCW pump bearing fails and the 3B TPCW pump fails to automatically start. The crew responds using 3-0NOP-008 or the ARP and manually starts Page 1 of 4 the 3B TPCW pump. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Observes 1-5/1, 5/2 & 5/4 alarms SRO Directs response per 3-0NOP-008 or the ARP BOP May start the 3B and stop the 3A TPCW pump using the ARP c.;~UII~tj~
- If a turbine plant cooling water pump ;~ ~topped in this procedure and the rea~on for stopping the pump has not been corrected, that pump is not available for st<lfting in subsequent procedure 6teps.
- Monitoring Main Generator RIDs is required if fPCW flow or temperature is changed due to the effect on Main Generator hydrogen leakage. An increase in hydrogen leakage is expected if the gas temperature to rotor temperature gradi,mt increases. (Reference CR 2008*803)
I I I L.
------ -- ---- .w;m, -------_ .. -
If turbIne lube ail r::Oo.1ef olJtiei temperature iflcreaS>!!z to grealf!t than 125 'F. emergency c'Oollng may be esraoJiched ucing A ITACHMENT 1. I I I BOP 1 Check All Turbine Ptant Cooling Water Pump P",;form me fcl:o'lrng: Alarms -OFF
- a. Deter""ine aff~teo lurbine plant
- I";'
-, -PC'v'lP AlB MOTOR OVERLOAD COOling wale<' pvmp.
- I e,,'2, -PC'WP A(B TRI'" b. Check if standby tJroine pia")! cooling watl?r pump au:o-staried. !E standby
- I e. 3 -PCWF AlB MOTOR SRG Hi -E'.lP turbine plan: cOQhng 'Hater pump did
('\ot .. '..lto-star. 8!:!Q ofu'te power is ava.lat.le.l!;IW ~a1 sta")dby tu,bme pant cooiirg w:ater PUMP c, 3:00 affectE'd lu"b,ne olant COOI1g wa~er pump. I---~- I---'~' BOP 2 Verify Turbine Plant Cooflng Watorr Pumps* Perform *e lollo'li,ng: AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- a. IE. offsit.. pO'Her is avai;able . .Il;IJ;l:j start one turoire pia'1t ooolinij water pur'\'o,
- b. If neimer turtine plant ooolirg water p~ mp can, be started. I!:!S!'f manually tr,p reactor AWl main turbinE'.
----~
r'--~' f-----~-
- BOP 3 Check Turbine Plant Cooling Waber Header IE TPC'II' header pressure is Il?SS than Pressure 75 psg. ~ stan a .l?cond TPCV ptlmp
- I 514, ,pew HI TE\{PILO "RESS t!QI LIT 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
The 3A TPCW pump bearing fails and the 3B TPCW pump fails to automatically start. The crew responds using 3-0NOP-008 or the ARP and manually starts Page 2 of 4 the 3B TPCW pump. pump .
. Time Tim.:> Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 4 Check Proper Intake Cooling Waler Lineup BOP To Turbine Plant Cooling Waler Heat E.>cchangers
- a. Safa~y l'1j-ctloo 0'1 Urt Check Safe:)' Unt 3- c. 130 to Step 5~
-ERMINATEc) o Check Doth iON To TPC'-N ooth iC'N TPC'oN Hea: Exc'1a'lger valves. - OPEN 1} propar instx"nent
\/enfy proper ins.tx"nent air
- P(l\/-3-4382 a'ignmert to ~ valves usirg 2-0P-D13. iNS7RU~.fPf7 AIR
- POV-3-4S83 POV-3-4SE3 SYSTEM
- 2) !.E.
IF fow was not nat "edv~d for ION Pur,p ras1r cliOns . .IJ;;U;l::L oper Pur,:;; new res1r at least O'1e one IC'W To TOC'lv 'ieat '-leat Exchange' valve. Exohange' PCV-3-4882 PCV-3-48-S3 2)
- 3) .IE neither ICW To TPCW Hea:
Exchanger varve vaty!? oaf', be opened . manuail)' trip reactor Al:i.l2
.Il;tl;tj maruaily main lurbir~.
5 Check For Abnormal Surge Tank Level RO a Cheok alalr: I cPS. TPC'oN SURGE TANK Check a. Go to Step 12. hlf'_C LEVEL - Oh o Dispa:cr ap-rator:o operator:o "ocail,' mamlor momtor lU"bl'1e Iu"bme plart Cool1g Cool19 wa:er surge Unk le ... e: 12 Check Cooling To Turbine Plant Cooling Cheek Dire-:t operator to lccalfy perforM the WaWr Heat Exchange!'s Exchange!'$. following: a Ghe::k Che::k alarm I 5,'4.5.'4. TPCW HI TEMP'LO C1)eO -PCW kx Ccrrbned lew Outlet
- 1. Copen oRESS
- OFF Vav." 3-'.:£-401 as "ecessary to maimain rnairtain Turbine Plant Cooling VI'ate!'
b ...o:al!y d,ect Turbll'E Plant Cooling '....i1t.er
..o:al!y i1f'Er S'J~flly >f.ea<:er -ell'CeCa:ure
-ell"CeCa:ure ~s :han
~an
$'41'1'1 ~'Jer
~:ler -emt'3:ure
-emt'Ya:ure TI-3-1432- 'tC"'F .
... E~S -:-.':'."
-:-.':"" 11 C<F llC<F 2 V,=, 'y propY hea! exd!.Jllger V'='
- c. _C-:3i!Y chec( Turb", Plar,1 Ccoling Wnr W;r;er a gntne!':.
gnmt<":. S_~PI'l-N,Jer emt-e"a:ure, Ti-:- 1432- _~ply -N.Jer - emt"",a:ure;,
~T".ELE OR DEC"lEASING D::C"lEASING 3 S:art ail ava ade lew ;;'Jmps using 3..0'-019, I"lTAA::
3-0'-019. I"lTAAE COOLING ,'lATER SYSTEM
- 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
The 3A TPCW pump bearing fails and the 3B TPCW pump fails to automatically start. The crew responds using 3-0NOP-008 or the ARP and manually starts Page 3 of 4 the 3B TPCW pump. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 13 Loc<JIly V~ify Turbine Plant Cooling Water lE. <L"Y lUrbirn< plant ::cclinjl water ba>l:et BOP Basket Strainer t.P *LESS THAN 1.5 PSID strainer j,P is ",,,,aw i!"a:1 t5 !'Sid. .Itl5!! locally backwash turbine plant ro::> '1-;;
- DPI*3*14CO water bas~et st"a"~5) uSing 3-0"-019.
NTAi<E COOll'JG WATER SYS-EM.
- OPI*3* t40 1 BOP 14 Check Alarm F GiS. GEN RTD Hl-HI TEMP - Mal'rJ<1 Ytrip reaC'lor and main turb,.,~.
OFF BOP 15 Check The Following /3;;nerator Ai3l1llS - ?erl':>n11 :he 'cH:wil1<l: OFF a 'lerrCVl! reaC':fye 030 from rr,;; ;'1
- E 9:4. SEN EXCITE'l.t..R Hi TEMP ~~tar.
- b. Monitor ~Ef'ator Excite
- F :"5. ISOL "'-lASE C*JCT SANi( HI TE,.," terrperaru.res closely.
- F e.4. GEN 'l-O,.I
'l-O,.i TEMP c. .lE GenE!"a~or Ex::ita' temperalure r~hes e-c deg (R*347 pI 5 or c.;..
~reduoe load to 80% powe.
.lE Generr.or ExCll6" tenperalure d
-e3Cl'.es e*5 deg (R.147 pI 5 or ~ \.
.ll:lE!i ~~ ~E reacts..y and turtY~~ AttIl worm 2-EO?*E*O. REAC-OR """
- R SAFETy *~L'ECTION. wh e
*:ontJnUlF1g with th!s prooeOure.
.lE necessary.l.t;l,I;tL sn~~do....n :he Un!:
e as directed t', c*f:he /0 <filing: Shir. 1,1,mager us. r'{j _me
- J...C-o"*103. POWER OPERATION TO i-iO~ STANDBY.
QB. 3-Cf'iOP-*OC" FAST L8AD
'lEOt,.,'CTION QB.
1,1anuaHy trip reac\cr il"'a Main
~urbH'*,e.
f IF any seal" I 51'S!",'" COt>Ier is C;;;erhealing, ~ pe.-fOfM the follo ..i1ng: 1 i ~ rna n turbine 1',35
/',35 been lrippe-d. THEN purge ~'ler3tor
'Hi~ carbon .::c):,O! w. ng 2-:::P'()90. GAS EVOLUTIONS IN THE MAI"i GENERATOR L.i WHEN hyorogen has t'en P~
¥rom tJe1"~fa1Of. THEN shutdowrl seal oil sJ'SMm u~3-0P.!'.:a.7.1.
TURBIN: GENE°,ATOR SEA.:. OIL SySTEM.
- 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
The 3A TPCW pump bearing fails and the 3B TPCW pump fails to automatically start. The crew responds using 3-0NOP-008 or the ARP and manually starts the 3B TPCW pump. Page 4 of 4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 16 Check Th~ Following Pump Aldrms - OFF a q~U:E lZ<Wef 3S dire~ b~' S"ift
!'lan~ t~ alloif, stocpng of affected c,"mp! s: "sing one of :hE> '::. oHing:
- 2:3.
D 2:3, HC~ A MOTOR BRG -i: -EMP 3-30P*l03, POW"R OPERATION TO --,0- STANDBY,
- J ;'5.
;'5, HC~ 8 MOTOR ERG ",I -EMP
",; -EM?
- D ?:3,
?:3. CON:, ".iMP;' MOTCR ,,:;:G aRG ~i TEM" 2'-C:Nop-~ri:: J=A2 T _SAD qED~CTION
- COND" ~MP 904, CONJ"
- ' 904. a MeT;)R MGT;):;: eRG g:;:G -',
TEt.!=' Q!i
- F el*l.
el'l. CON:I ;:1.,A.tP :: M;)-OR BRG '"'11 'Aal'lu;;;lty :rip reactcr, TEt.!=' BOP 17 Cht'Ck Pfo~r Turmne Plant Cooling COOling Wat~r S~stem Operation 1: Rerro*..e reaw.e = txm rna" a Che:l<. alam' I 5'~, FC;'I'/ H T;:',fP'LO ~-:~3tOf.
"'RESS - OF" "RESS 2: qedv~e Ui" t <:ad il5 ,11'cted by SMI b Che<:l< alarrr, 15,:;, F'CW Che<:l<alarrr,15'c, P'CW SUR3E"'Al'Ii( Manager to pre\l~ 00111pooerrt <n"llage
",1;lO LEVEL - 0;1' using:
3-C*OP*l03, POW"R OPERATION TO MO-STANDBY. 2,..(;NOP- rX~, FAST _:JAO REDuCTiON,
'Aa!dJiiHy ~ip reaC'tCf ana Main
~urbfr.e.
3: Contnue e'ff'Y15 Ie -e~~ nOM'lal s~..ten1llneup, BOP 18 Tem~iltUfe Of Cornponents Check Temperature Components Supplied By Turbine Plant Cooling Water* STABLE OR DECREASING a V""'Y pr~ supply and re:"" a ";r'mer1 00 011 "ffected re,,,,, valve affected o::mpoolmt!S) v31ve using 3-0"-008. -;"RBI'IE -;"RB!'1E "LANT COOLING WATER SVSTEM b "f'e~ec ccmpon""'t IF af'ectec ccmpon"",~ "'as automate terrpe"3wre 00":\<01* !!:!5!i ma"llJa,'y terrpe".lwre- ffia."Il.!a,'y
~a;e
~3;e !eMperabJre
- enperabJre cont-d v'al"" v'alve .&iLl tw~!"re terr~:"re cor~1 c'f,ila'Ss cy;:>a'Ss v,,'ve va've as necessary to "1laintam r-crnal
- nsuu~ent air conpressors temp"'alures.
~rr;;<nent temp"'abJres.
- TUlt\lne lube cd cooers COO!!!,> c.
C, V!I::t'. V!I::t: a'fected c~&nt:s:' uSfl9 a'feoled c~&rWs:1 uSfl9 3-0°-008 TJRS NE ?LA,'< PLA,'< COOli~.G vVA T=-~ SYST=~;t d Jf lure.ne tum1ne \.It.. oli oil COC>'!I' COi>'!I' ou:let terr~tlJr~ lI1cr-~s 'to g"E-a~,ef fh..a.,1
~ eSlablish E"11erge"cy 1:5'F,~eslablish 125'F. E'11er"""cy tooling to ti>t> ne lube oil roolers coolers '4'Sing
,A.TTA,CHMENT 1.
.A.TTA,CHMENT 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
3B S/G controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causing 3B FRV (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). The crew responds using 3-0NOP-049.1 to manually control 3B S/G level and avoid a reactor trip. Page 1 of 3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the crew has started the 38 TPCW pump, direct the facility operator to trigger event 3 - EVENT 3 - FT-3-487 FAILS HIGH. BOP Observes failure of FT-3-487 high and loss of FW to 3B S/G as indicated by:
- FI-3-487 indication on VPA
- FCV-3-488 closed in automatic
- 3B feed I steam flow deviation alarms
- 3B S/G level indications lowering BOP Takes manual control of FCV-3-488 and restores 3B S/G level to program SRO Directs the performance of 3-0NOP-049.1 I~-----------------------I NOTES I I
. Momentary spiking of a channel that quickly returns to normal may be a precursor of I imminent channel failure. The bistables for that channel should be placed in the I tripped position as soon as possible. with a maximum delay time of 6 hours. to allow for further investigation by I&C.
I I I I
- Instrumentation failure may occur in such a manner as to cause a particular instrumentation loop to deviate from the actual monitored parameter by either a finite I
I I or extreme amount. Such a deviation may be in a direction such that a reactor I protection or safety related trip function may not occur on that instrument loop, even though the setpoint for the trip function has been reached by the actual parameter. I I I
---- -~-~~----
, -~-----------------------.
r--' --' BOP Verify instrument loop failure by comparison to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions. BOP Verify no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to remain in service .
- 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event
Description:
3B S/G controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causing 3B FRV (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). The crew responds using 3-0NOP-049.1 to manually control Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 3 3B S/G level and avoid a reactor trip. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Verify applicable control transfer switches are in the position which eliminates the failed loop. Examiner Note: transfers controlling FW flow channel for 38 SG to channel IV. Steam flow may also be tralsferred. BOP IF a control function was placed in manual control due to the failure, THEN verify the control function is returned to automatic.
~-
~.,
SRO Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation, AND verify the minimum channels operable.
-~~-
Examiner Note: determines T.S. 3.3.1 function 12 applies.
----~ r--"~--
--"~-- r-----'
f---------' TABLE 3 3~ 1 <Ccntlf",je:dr REAC-OR -RIP SY3TEM INS-:-RUMENTAPON MINIMUM TOTAL '10 C-IAN'IEc.S C--!AN'IEc.S C ... ,o,"INELS A?"t,!CABLE FU;C-1C)'IAL Jhl- OF ::HAht~EL3 -O-:-RI? OPERABLE MODES AC-rON I' Ste3n1 r3e""e-~.!-:o' 'tV a:-e:r 3I:s'.:rn. Q-er. 2;51M -;111'1 Ztstt, ~<&n <, ~ 0
.. evel-Low-<..c-w
- 12. Sa~n G.i~~;'iII;cr *.f;'a~ L6\lIi-I-~ ::san.~. ~ i-h. ge.., 1.t--n \IiIn 1,2: e
...C'ri\' CO"!i""cic~ Witr St'3:.aIn' Ia'/el.od fi'lV~' coin- :.e'.o&! ano
;:-I!e-dw~r >=;0'","' \i "m~c.'l 2s!mjf~ ode-u with .2 sVn /fHd-watfirflow *'lM.~ wa16-(f,-ow m,s"!'lJltc/"'! ,n waterflow mismatch in
&aCt: 'Str'n. g:~. misoMt-J'l ir S-2Iin"il!:st"n. gl!l'l.
s~n~ stm. or 2" stm. ~er,.
~. ;9~f and ~
.tM.1f HOWJlte-r flow m -s-match
- n."a-'""l&sm.
~o 1.3 J1"lrj-er¥-~ha-~ 10 K"I 8J'!iSE-s 2:bu'5 ~ /~l;.~ or 2ibvs 1 1; A and a :ft::xl'o/e P*7,: bo-:t Ol"oss-es 14 ,j,)!arrre'4uoS'n':Y-Tno ;)( R&~'K;o'" 2.'OU5 ' 10 lrip :::ib>..l5 1 11 C.oc.:v-4: PtJ<"'!"f Br~,lt;~r(s) OPEn Reps'"
- .AboV'i! P~7) 1~, - .Jr~r@ Trp {Ab:l'IE P.1J
~. A-..fosbr;:;)' ?t'iiS'ili!e
- o. ' .lroire Etop Vahle C~o$ve 2 3
~
~
~
2 1 1 12 12 f---------'--~ r-----'--~ ACTION e - 'lV-It1 t'le rd.. ",~r of O::>ERA8LE ohan1es one less tna") Me TO':3i t.,uMber of Ghal"inels. STARTUP ard:or PO'NER OOERATION may proceeo until performance of the nex: reoiJin=d ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TES-T pro'.~ded thElI'1op<&rabie oha1'ln&i is p;ac>?o in the t6pped ccmHon withh hows e t--------' 1---------'
- 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
3B S/G controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causing 3B FRV (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). The crew responds using 3-0NOP-049.1 to manually control Page 3 of 3 3B S/G level and avoid a reactor trip. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 5.11 ~ any other channel has fililed. ~ perform tlle following to trip bhtable~ for the failed channel. 5.11.1 !I plant conditions are ~Hch thilt all required bistables ils~ociilted with the failed chilunel 1l1l1Y be hipped without an undesired RPS or ESF actuation, THE); perfonn the follo\\ing:
- 1. Place all bistable s\\itche~ for the ilffected loop in test p05ition using Attachment 4.
-, Verify bistables nipped by obser\"lng corresponding stants light (VPB) lit.
AITACIDIE:>-'4 IPil~e J-' of<3) FAILED ( lLo\.."'-:-'1:L BISTABLE UH F*3487 $learn Generator B Main Feedwater Flow R.fOwg$ ei610*T*L1. Sh 19; 6610*T*0*17 Max Deviation As Compared 0%, s Pow.r < 10%. MAX DEV 1.0 x 10 b Ib/HR to other Channels 10~/. <: Pow.r 5. MI*I.. MAX OEV 6,0 x 1 O~ IbIHR
~*I. ~ Power S 70.,.., MAX DEV 4.0 l( 10~ IblHR 70% < Pow.r ~ 100-/.,. MAX OEV 3.0 x 10~ IbfHR RACK BISTABLE BISTABLE STATUS FUNC-ANNUNCIATOR LOGIC AFFECTED No. No. fUNCTION LIGHT TION
't-'1-1 fW e",:
1,2 ch,vnel<; (In "1/,) 5'G low "t-vel
., 9~*:'*4'?rlB*
9~*:'-4'?rlB-FWrG:::.F- ';\t5t1'Mcr, S'GS Sn.~~FW FLO P .. th 1 '2 'DW ft'Mwaler frow lO<JK: DE': FC42BBt \'lew on s..l1'lE' S/G 1)1)~.O(iC :b!hr <"team flew SF ~ F'rV ,Al,y'T'l Al,y'T) (:0:,,2 ~EEG C
" BS-1--4aRB-i SG B S TEAfA B BS-3*4SeC nAJ' SF Ala*n C 4,2 SO B FEED -' STEM.i
$TEM.i C Note: Determines 88-3-48881, 8S-3-48882, and 8S-3-488C need to be tripped.
When the SRO has determined which bistables to triR direct the facility operator to trigger event 4 - EVENT 4 - LT-3-11S FAIL HIGH.
- 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
VCT level transmitter LT-3-115 fails high. The crew responds using the ARP and 3-0NOP-46.4 and places LCV-3-115A, control switch to the VCT Position. T;"",,", Time ,~ Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Observes alarm A 4/6 and LCV-3-115A in the DIVERT position. SRO Directs response using ARP or 3-0NOP-46.4 I
-- -- -- - - -- -- - - -- -- -- - - -. NOTE I I L T-3-112 and L T-3-115 share common dry reference leg and a common wet variable leg.
A false high level will be produced If the common dry reference leg fails. I I I RO Verify alarm by comparing VCT level on U-3-115 (VP-A) with LT112 on ERDADS Chemical & Volume Control System displayor by local indication. RO Places LCV-3-115A control switch to VCT position.
- SRO SRO SRO Transitions to 3-0NOP-46.4 Directs response using 3-0NOP-46.4 Check boric acid or primary water makeup flow rates- NORMAL and goes to step 28 I NOT~S I I . L T-3-112 and L T-3-115 share a common wet variable leg and a common dry reference I I leg. A false high level will be produced if the common dry reference leg falls. I I I L *_______________________
Steps 28 through 38 assume stable charging and letdown flow; therefore. a transient I could mask the symptoms being used to determine which level transmitter has failed. ~I RO Checks VCT Level Transmitter, LT-3-115, Failed High
-~-----. f-~--~~-
~~---~~- ~-
CAUTIOtj With no operator action, L T-3-115 failed high will result in loss of suction to the charging pumps.
- 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
VCT level transmitter LT-3-115 fails high. The crew responds using the ARP and 3-0NOP-46.4 and places LCV-3-115A, control switch to the VCT Position. Page 2 of 2
~ Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I~------------------------ NQ.I.5. I I Failure of L T-3-1 f S high wil! result In the following: I I I I
- Annunciator Alarm A 416 VCT HIlL 0 LEVEL.
eves holdup tank. I I - Full divert of valve LCV-3-11SA to the I I I
- No su(o makeup. I I
I
- No auto swap over to the RWST.
I
~-----------------------~
RO Places LCV-3-115A control switch to VCT position. SRO Goes to step 41 r------ f------ -' Notifies failure of LT-3-115 to WCC Direct the facility operator to triggerEVENT 5 - PT-3-1608 FAILS HIGH I CV-3-1608 FAILS OPEN.
- 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event Description PT-3-160B fails high. CV-3-160B fails open and increases steam flow 3-4%. The crew will eventually direct local isolation of CV3-160B.
. T:
Time Dosition Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Observes lowering generator MW and PT-3-160B failed high & CV 160B failed open as evident by:
- PT-3-160B indication
- CV-3-160B position indication on ERDADS
- Steam noise present
- 3C SG steam flow indication
- Primary plant responses, Tavg indication, reactor power increase RO Observes 4-5% reactor power increase Observes Tavg < Tref SRO Determines CV-3-160B failure open caused Tavg-Tref deviation Directs taking manual control of CV-3-160B.
1-------. 1-------" BOP Takes manual control of CV-3-160B and determines valve will not close in manual.
- . _..- ~--~-~--- .------~--
SRO When informed of CV-3-160B failure, directs local isolation of CV 160B
-----~----~ .~.-~.-.~
- -.. -- ---------.----.---~~--.
- 18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event Description PT-3-160B fails high. eV-3-160B fails open and increases steam flow 3-4%. The crew will eventually direct local isolation of e\L3-160B.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Reduces turbine load to match Tavg = Tref Attempts manual closure of eV-3-160B & determines eV-3-160B failed open Directs NSO locally investigate eV-3-160B Relays report from NSO of steam coming from unit 3 silencer Directs NSO locally close eV-3-160B isolation valve Relays report from NSO that steam fbw not completely stopped with isolation valve closed. Adjusts turbine load as necessary to match Tavg = Tref SRO Determines eV-3-160B isolation valve leaking by Directs wee have Mechanical maintenance investigate eV-3-160B Directs caution tag generated for eV-3-160B in manual When the crew has stabilized power, direct the facility operator to triggerEVENT 6 - EXCITER AIR COOLER TPCW BLOCKAGE
- 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked resulting in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds using 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator Page 1 of 1 E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor when exciter hot gas temperature exceeds90°C and performs the actions of 3-EOP-E-O. Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. 3B EDG starts but fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a breaker failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be manually started. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Observes alarm E-9/4 SRO Directs response using ARP CAUTION Switchyard voltage should be maintained at or above 233 Kv. Actions may be necessary to maintain Swltchyard voltage greater than or equal to 233 Kv. r-----------------------~ NOTES I . An /ncreasmg Iremi If) poinl 5 or 6 Wit/lOllt a corresponding IIlcrease IfI point 7 or 8 (respectively) I is }/Jdfcative of 8 possible instrument problem I
- Hal EJlr temperatures /leerJ 10 be maml[)inea less tlwn 90 degrees C [)nd cold [JIr tempemture I Imlltatlons [)re required 10 be followed in order to preclude eqUipment damage.
I
- All \loltage clwnges sl)Quld be coor(imated Iliroug/1 System Operations I
~----------------- ______ I BOP Verifies alarm using recorder R-3-347 (VPA)
Monitors exciter air temperature closely SRO Determines hot air temp> 90°C & no expectation of fast reccvery Directs reactor trip Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O.
~--------~------*------~---------------------~-------------------------------------~I L---------r------*------~---------------------~-------------------------------------~I RO Manually trips the reactor
- 20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 18 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time - Tin">'" Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct facility operator to trigger lesson stepEVENT 7 - LOSS OF SWITCHYARD SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-O I~-----------------------I NOTE I I Steps 1 through 4 are IMMEDIA TE ACTION steps. I RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O: Verifies reactor trip
- Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero
- BOP Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O:
Verifies turbine tripped
- Turbine stop valves closed
- Manually closes MSIV's
- Mid & East GCBs open Verifies NO power to emergency 4kV buses SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0
- 21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be Page 2 of 18 restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDGoutput breaker. Seal injection will be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. I~----------------------- tfQ.I5. I
- Steps 1 and 2 are IMMEDIA TE A CTiON steps .
I
- CSF Status Trees are required to be monitored for information only FRPs shall NOT I be implemented.
~-----------------------
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-ECA-0.0: Verifies reactor trip
- Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero
- Rx trip & bypass bkrs open
- Neutron flux decreasing BOP Performs immediate actions of3-EOP-ECA-0.0:
Verifies turbine tripped
- Turbine stop valves closed
- Manually closes MSIV's
- Mid & East GCBs open RO Checks PRZ PORVs - CLOSED RO Closes Letdown isolation valves RO Checks Excess letdown isolation valves - CLOSED BOP Checks all two AFW Pumps RUNNING BOP Establishes total AFW flow of 270 gpm.
- 22
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 3 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS
,. If 51 has been reset or 51 actt/atien oc(;urs on the other unit, safl!guards equipment n~s to be restored to the required configuration.
,. If an SI signal exis,ts or is actuated during this procedure, it must be reset to ensure restoration of a power source and to ensure controlled loading of equipment on the 4KV B115.
I
-- - - - - -- NOTES - - - - -- -- -- ----
I
* ,. Alrachment 5 p.covider:: a reference for Emergency O~!)I:I Generator /oado. I I
- If a Sequencer fa1iure has occurred and Sf has actuated, the a3l3c'CUJted EDG output I
- breaker may net cIooe un!eas SI iff reset I
~----------------- ______ I
- BOP RO Verify 4KV bus stripping using ATT. 1 and 2 (see pages 24 & 25)
Verify SI - RESET EXAMINER NOTE: The SRO will probably choose to implement Attachment 2 for expediency since the 3D 4kv bus is aligned to the 3B 4kv bus. Either attachment is acceptable. See the following two pages for ATTACHMENTS 1 and 2 SRO Checks the A and B 4KV buses de-energized and goes to step 6. RO Verifies The A And B 4KV Bus Lockout Relays- RESET RO Directs FS/ANPO to locally reset 3A emergency diesel start failure relay by depressing the alarm reset pushbutton. The relay WILL NOT reset. Examiner Note: FS/ANPO reports failure of the 3A EDG turbocharger RO Verifies 3B Emergency Diesel Generator Lockout Relays- RESET
- EXAMINER NOTE:
Go to page 26 23
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 4 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 3A 4KV BUS STRIPPING
- 1. IE 3A 4KV Bus is de-energized 8!iQ. 3D 4KV Bus is aligned to 3A 4KV Bus, .I!::!5!:::l verify the Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue light is ON 8!iQ. 4AD07 OPEN.
- 2. If 3A 4KV Bus is de-energized awl 3D 4KV Bus is NOT aligned to 3A 4KV Bus QB. Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue Light is OFF, ~ verify the following breakers open:
- 3AA22, 3A 4KV Bus Emergency Tie To Unit 4 Startup Transformer
- 3AA09, 3A 4KV Bus Tie To 3B Or 3C 4KV Bus
- 3AA05. Startup Transformer 3A 4KV Bus Supply
- 3AA02, Auxiliary Transformer 3A Bus Supply
- 3AA03, Steam Generator Feed Pump 3A
- 3AA07, Heater Drain Pump 3A
- 3AA21. Condensate Pump 3A
- 3AA13. Safety Injection Pump 3A
- 3AA15, Residual Heat Removal Pump 3A
- 3AA 12. Component Cooling Water Pump 3A
- 3AA01, Reactor Coolant Pump 3A
- 3AA19. Intake Cooling Water Pump 3A
- 3AA 11, Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 3A
- 3AA 16, Circulating Water Pump 3A 1
- 3AA 18, Circulating Water Pump 3A2
- 3AA08, 3A Load Center
- 3AA14, 3C Load Center
- 3. If Supply From 4KV Bus 3A. 3AD01, is open, !!:!!ili verify Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, 3AA 17. is open, 4, IE Supply From 4KV Bus 3A. 3AD01, is closed, .I!::!5!:::l perform the following:
- a. If Station Blackout Breaker. 3AD07. is closed, ~ perform the following:
- 1) Open Station Blackout Breaker, 3AD07
- 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to open Station Blackout Breaker, 4AD07.
- b. Venfy breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD05, is open.
- c. Verrfy breaker for Component Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD04, is open
- d. IE breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD05, OR breaker for Component Cooling Water Pum 3C. 3AD04. can NOT be opened, I!::!!lli open Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D. 3AA17, AND Supply From 4KV-Bus 3A, 3AD01
- 5. Notify Unit 3 Reactor Operator that 3A 4KV bus stripping is complete,
- 24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 5 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 3B 4KV BUS STRIPPING
- 1. !E 3B 4KV Bus Is de-energized.8t!Q 3D 4KV Bus is aligned to 3B 4KV Bus, l!::!.!ili verify the Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue light is ON.8t!Q 4AD07 OPEN.
- 2. !E 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized AND 3D 4KV Bus is NOT aligned to 3B 4KV Bus OR Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue Ught is OFF. THEN verify the following breakers open:
- 3AB22. 3B 4KV Bus Tie To 3A Or 3C 4KV Bus
- 3AB05. Startup Transformer 3B 4KV Bus Supply
- 3AB02, Auxiliary Transformer 3B Bus Supply
- 3AB10. Heater Drain Pump 3B
- 3AB21, Condensate Pump 3B
- 3AB12. Safety Injection Pump 3B
- 3AB15. Residual Heat Removal Pump 3B
- 3AB13. Component Cooling Water Pump 3B
- 3AB01, Reactor Coolant Pump 3B
- 3AB06, Reactor Coolant Pump 3C
- 3AB17.lntake Cooling Water Pump 3B
- 3AB 11, Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 3B
- 3AB16. Circulating Water Pump 3B1
- 3AB18, Circulating Water Pump 3B2
- 3AB09. 3B Load Center
- 3AB14, 3D Load Center
- 3. IE Supply From 4KV Bus 3B. 3AD06. is open, l!::!.!ili verify Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D. 3AB19, is open
- 4. !E Supply From 4KV Bus 3B, 3AD06. is closed, l!::!.!ili perform the following:
- a. If Station Blackout Breaker. 3AD07, is closed. mI:i perform the following:
- 1) Open Station Blackout Breaker. 3AD07.
- 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to open Station Blackout Breaker. 4AD07.
- b. Verify breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD05, is open C. Verify breaker for Component Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD04, is open.
- d. !E breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD05, OR breaker for Component Cooling Water Purr Purr 3C, 3AD05. can!:!.QI be opened. I!::!5N open Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, 3AB19, AND Supply From 4KV-Bus 3B. 3AD06
- 5. Notify Unit 3 Reactor Operator that 3B 4KV bus stripping is complete.
- 25
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Sealinjection will Page 6 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
I Tirrto Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 9 Try To Reene(gize The B 4KV Bus From 38 Emergency Diesel Gen~ator a t.!ar.,aHy ~art 2>6 emer~cy c ~el genera1cr frorr, Con::--:> Ro<cm Err~9Ef1oy stir, No.".,a; start b Verif;' 38 4";',1 bvs st'wrg from b. IF any loa<; can NOT be disconneo:ed ATT AC~MENT 2.
- C8MPLE-:C trOM 38 4KV bu~go 10 Srep 10.
- c. Verif',. S
- RESE-c M3_aily stnCf"cn<~ 36 e~cy d. :'ccJllly 5'1"chronize 33 eMergency d,e*
dieS!; iW\Fa:or:o 38 4"V bus ~~:r to 38 4KV I?..s usii"Q usil"Q 3-CNOP,022<l. EMERGEN::;V DIESEL GE."IERATOR;: AILUqE .....nile continuing with Step 1 C. Examiner Note: The crew will direct the FS/ANPO to locally close the 38 EDG output breaker 3A820. Do not direct the facility operator to perform this action until the completion of step 13 on page 29.
- 26
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 7 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 10 Check If AC Power Has Been ReslOfed a Check ~'? 3A and !,B 41':V blJSi!s - A- "" Perform !;tie follcw rq
,-EAST ON£ EN::~GIZm
- 1) Resiore ,4,(: J)C\'I'" using lhe folk>Mng procedures:
- 3-0NOP-DJ4.2. LOSS 0= 3A 4KV8US
- 3-0NOP-004.3, LOSS 0= 38 4KV8US 2i WHEN;xtNer IS reS:Dred to tTl .. 3A er
'3B4RV I>.;s, I:tffti 00seM! :he CA\r C'NS prier ~o S.,ep 32 .me go to Step 32 to perfurn', re:::cvef), aclicns,
- 3) Observe CMJ"" ON p<"cflo Slep 11 am. :ont "lJE wilt! Step 11.
0, Man'JaJly slart eQ\t e<nent as "E<;lJired. c, ChKt if 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICA.:" SAFETY <:, ImpleMent FRPs 3S ~equired, unless '-"5 FUNCTION S-AT JS TREES bi!ing procdure was d-edly emew from monitored FOR INFORMA*0"1 ~L Y outSide the EOP network prcrlo e~lering 3-EOP-ECA-O.C. LOSS OF ALL A.C ";';:YNER d Retum te \:"'C~:iure ~ step in e:ffect Examiner Note: The RO and SRO continue in 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. Steps completed depend on timing of restoration of power to l3 4KV bus. Once power is restored, the SROwili go to step 32. Scenario details for the step commence on page 35
~.-~--
~.-~-- -'~--'~"-f-~'-"-
-'~--~'--~'-"-
CAUTION When power is (W;tored It) JA or 3B 4KV oo.s_ ~o't'ery actions should continue by observing CA uoons prior to Srep 32 and then performing 5rep 32,
- 27
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be Page 8 of 18 restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closng the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
leak .
. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 11 Place Non.Running Equipment Switches In PULL*TO*LOCK Or STOP As Follows
- Unit 3 high-head SI pumps - PTL
- Containment spray pumps - PTL
- Emergency containment coolers - STOP
- Emergency containment filter fans - STOP AND OPEN Breaker 30806. Emergency Containment Filter Fan 3B, on MCC 3D
- RHR pumps - PTL
- CCW pumps - PTL RO 12 Check Status Of Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps
- a. Check CCW supply for Unit 4 High Head a. Go to Step 12d.
SI Pumps - ALIGNED TO UNIT 3
- b.
c. Place Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK
!E. Unit 4 CCW System is in service, THEN have Unit 4 operator align CCW to Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps using 4-NOP-030, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM
- d. Check if SI required d. !Y!:!Stf ccw is aligned to Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps, I!:!.!ili place the Unit 4
- Any SI actuation setpeint exceeded High Head SI Pumps in Standby. Go to Step 13.
- RCS Subcooling based on CETs less than 30"F [210"F]
QR
- PRZ Level - can tlQI be maintained greater than 17% [50%]
- e. ~ CCW IS aligned to Unit 4 High Head SI pumps, THEN verify MOV-3-843A OR MOV-3-843B open AND start the Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps as required Examiner Note: Determines Pzr level can rot be maintained
>17%, starts U4 HHSIP when MOV-3-843A/B opened.
- 28
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EOG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 9 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
leak .
. T; Time,~ Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 13 Locally Close Valves To Isolate Rep Seals
- 2~297A RCPA ~ il"lecuon ',lanual Isolation Vill'll!
* :-2978 Rep 8 SeJ! !"Jection !Janwa!
lso.a:ion ~i.]i-V
- 3-297C. ,(C;: C Sea Ieovon Manual I-soa:lon Vaiv@
- MOV->-~;+, RC:J S~a Wa:~ Re-:urn E<'O'?S5 Leld"w" Is:;.i;rion Valve And
* \.10V*:"":2';,.
C'J;iet Valve RC"'~~a Cooling V,tater CREW CRITICAL TASK: Isolate RCP seal injection to the RCPs prior to the completion of step 13 of 3-EOP-ECA 0.0.
- Examiner Note: When the crew directs RCP seal isolation, direct the facility operator totrigger EVENT 7 - REMOVE 3A820 FAILURE.
Examiner Note: After the facility operator has removed the 3A820 failure, direct the facility operator totrigger EVENT 7 - LOCALL Y CLOSE 3A820 CREW CRITICAL TASK: Restore power to the 38 4kv bus prior to the completion of step 10 of 3-EOP-ECA 0.0. Examiner Note: Power should be restored to the 38 4kv bus, the SRO will go to step 32. Scenario details for the step commence on page 35 RO 14 Check SIG Status Manually close valves. IE '/<Jives \:aI1,Wll be Manually :;Jo~J . .Ilimlocajy ck>se vallles.
- a. ';lain stearr. I"e IsolatC!" ar,d bYT,;\'>5
\lalves
- CLOSED b Main 'eedwater :;entro and byWss ".'lIves
- CLOSED
- c. 31G bl()WJO'/In isola:ion ',alves - CLOSE;)
--~-~ --~-- -,.~,------
r CAUTIONS A Faulted or rJPrured S/G mar is isolated shalf l'e'7lain isoJared. SreaID supply ro me AFW pumps mu-sr be ID.linrained from ar (east one incaa 5/G. 5...G. 29
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be Page 10 of 18 restored to the 38 4kV bus by locally closing the 38 EDG output breaker. Seal injection will be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time 1 II lit::: Position Applicant's Actions or 8ehavior RO 15 Check If SIGs AfI~ !iQ! Faulted a Checil pres*sures In all S:Gs - a. 'soialE faulte(j 5IGI5):
* '.JO SiG PRESS~PE ClECo..;:;'SiNG n "I&rift 31 - RES8.
iN AN UNCONTROLLED t.lAN"IER 21 isolate ,A,FVV flew,
* "10 SiG CC"'PLETEL Y
- lEPP;:SSU'<IZED 3:, !f. steam S'JPIlly from intact S/G(s:' :0 any.t.HV pUMP .!:ll2I a.at/able, !!:!S£!
repositcn AFW slearr SUPP~f cross-OO'lr,ect '~alves. AFSS-3-0D6 and AFSS-3-007 to v,=",ide sleal'!". from intar.t S'u(s) to ail AF\N p"mps II'"inta1' steaM 110.... !); APN puMps while r~cning cfDSs-connect valves. a) Open AFW pump steaM supply MOV b:'ea\er en faulted S,'13(5). bi Close AFW :romp steaM suppl)' MelV or> f;;:.;, led 3,'(>(5).
- 5) '.Ie-rift S,3 blowoow'l isci-ltcn '/3ives
'/3ive-s -
CLOSED. III Vf!ff,. SiG sampie lines - SC:.J\TED
- 7) Ve-rtf f;;:\;le-d 3,'8;5) steam durrp te atmosphere valve dosed IF v3.W~
WI cosed, Jl!ai m"nUiI ;bse y Examiner Note: Determines CV-3-1608 failed open and local isolation valve closed but leaks by_ CAUTION
" cs r level decreases ro less Than 10%, makeup W<lrE*r SO'.Irces for !he CST will be nE'Cessary 10 maintain secondary hear sink.
- 30
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 11 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
or: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 16 Maintain Intact S/G Levels a Narrw( '31\ge level - GRE.~ TE=1 THAN a. Maiman rr~iMUm APi',' fky", Ili'lfil narrow e:~!.r:;Z'l.1 rangE' le'le j;lrea1er than 6%[12:%) in at leas: one 5,'G. b Contrel .f;,FW ftc\\' ~ rr*a.ntair. narrow ra. "'!g: I~"el cet.teen 1~<~r32%] -J;}"'t<j 5[1%
- o. Narrow 'a.~';;:e level. LESS. THAN 50~'. , Stop feed flow 10 ary S<G wlh "3tTOW range IeV'? greater :han 50";,. IF narrow rar!Qe lefre Ir, any S:3 ccn':FnJ~ ~o in~reas.e in an w,;onvoi!ed 'nanner.
ll1IJigo to Slep ~..,. RO 17 Check If SIG Tube-s Are &URuptu~ Go tv Step 1'0.
- Con::lenser aT e)ectY radiation. R-' 5 -
NOR!IIAL
- f------~
--~ -~-'-
-~-'-
RO 18 ZjG blcw::cwn radioltor. Q.19 - NORMA:" E;:;>.DADS or
- NO.QMAL
~al DA' m:::<n :or readings
;.o:al Slearr"'-!! radialion readings -
NORMt..:.. Go To step 24
----~ ~
~ -.
CAUTION Srep 1 of A ITACIiWENT ,1 is required to be performed wirhin me first 6Q mim/1e's of a loss of aU AC power event if troth the 3A 1 and JA2 batnY}' chargp.rs are inoperable. RO 24 Check DC 8us Loads a Dire:: cperaror Ie !1W'",~e DCv.s <:admg as neeE"Ssa"~ us,,,;; ATTACH.MENT 3 b Jispatch t~!'50nnel t:' penD:kally ncn,:):r Jispatzh ,.,cn,~ JC .,:>wer slIpply volta~
- 31
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be Page 12 of 18 restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 25 Cht'ek CST Leo,e!* GREATER THAN tO% A:.>> rnakeup to the CST M::>rn any ava'able source using 3-::>0-018. I. CONDENSA-e STOR:'.GE TAN,( OR oc,",sutltlil.'! tne -SC fe<" lIvailable me1hods fOrl;iling CS~ CAUTIONS
. S/G pressures shall NOT be decrea.sed to tess man 8() psig to prevent injection of accumulator niuogen into the ReS.
. SlU narrow range level is required to be maintained grearer chan
.least one ;ntact SIG. If level can NOT be maintained. SfG depressurization is 6%{32~'J mat required to IJ<e stopped uncillevel is reo:tored in at leas: one S*G.
- I_ _
I I I S/Gs
,O~.s, iN;;:
- - - - - - - NOTES reqwl'l?o XI be de,Dl'I?ssunzed ,,! max.mum rare- to mhmiZ'e ReS im-enterj Atrl;.;t.tgh FZR le"ei may b' kist and re;;ctOl' vessel upper J1.ead voiding may IXcur ove to depl'I?S.3-lKization of SGs d'¥'fe.s:wriz;;'on .shaff NOT be stopped to pre~enr rhis
- - - I I
I I I I
~~----------------------.
- 32
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EOG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 13 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 26 Oepressurize Alllnlact S!Gs To t30 Psig a Sheck SiG naITDlo" rar~ levels - a. Perfcnn t'le fc!lc ....rg 3RE,l..-ER i-lAN 6%:32%.J IN AT LEAST ONE S:G 1) Maim.. ,., IT<lXIMUn' AFW ~II 'Jr~1i narr::>>"," rarge \evel wea~er t'latl 6*!t'f32~!~: in a: leas~ one S/G.
- 2) ~ "arctN range le'lel great{"
than 5"*~:32%J in at lea!>! cne THEN c<> Steps 26b. 26c 26d and
""G.
~ont'1Ue ...M Srep 27.
b Manual!y '~'Jrnp stearr at MaX'llurr rate
>.ising SiG s:eaM :iu1'11P 10 a:nos,.~
valves
- 1) Centro SiS steam c'.;mp to atmosphere '.alves to:> stDp SiS depressu:"'za1)cn.
- 2) Go to Step 27.
d She:k SIG pressures -LESS THAN d. rlWJi SiG pressures Oet1easec to less t5()PSIG than BO psg. .Il;U;ti f1'anually coo:rol SiG s*<am dump to iiVnOSphere \:) majntan SiS presS\.ires a: 180 psig. Con:ll1;e with St~ 27. e I,l<lrrualty centre! S:G steam dumP tc 3:rt'CSPh.!-,.,. te, Mamta ~ SiG pressvf'eS at
~ 2C ps?g
- 33
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EOG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 14 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 27 Check Reactor Subcritical Subcriticaf Contre< SfG swain dUfll) to atmosphere vaves tc stop SiG ~sunzation and JiOfl qCS to
- intem1E'tlla;e C3f1ge manneis - ZERO OR hNt liP
'IEGA- VE 8-A"-UP RATE
- Sc'..roe range charmes - ZER~ OR NEG/C1E S"'"AR""1JP RATE
~ - - - - - - - - - - - __ - - - __ - __ - - - __ I I ~ I I OepressLJnzation cf S"/~ ",'iii' re:;u.Y in SI ac:tuark'll. 51 is requirea to be reset ro pelTIllt I I manuai .bading o.f equf(X'Of!n! on 4KV bu:ses, I
~----------------- ______ I RO 28 Check SI Signal Status a ~A,S ~Sl ac:uated. JJiei:1o Steps 2ab, 8;* BEEN t..CT JA TED a.
2';;;, 3D aro 31. C-..r,inue with Slep 32 b Verify S - qESE-RO 29 Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve Perform the folloWing: White Lights On VPB - ALL BRIGHT
- a. Manually actuate containment isolation phase A.
b, lE any containment isolation phase A valve is .tiQ! closed, !!:!Sr:f manually close valve. !E. valve(s) can.tiQ! be manually closed, !!:!Sr:f manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration, RO 30 Verify Containment And Control Room Ventilation Is.olation a Unit 3 c::.""~ainr"1en: purge e:d'.l'Jst and supp:y fans - O=F b Vo/l'y Cent',:, Room 'le~~i!atcn sta:u. D, Man'Jal~l align equiprren~ 'tr" Cc~:r,,1 c',v'e' - "'Re*"::R EI,IERGENC" Room em~rgncy ~:lwJlatO'" . REC RC ..'LA TON Ai-lGN'-I,E"IT
-.~.~.--- -------~----~ ~---~*~----------------------------------------_11
~---~*~-----------------------------------------u
- 34
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 15 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 31 Check Containment Pressure - HAS Perform the following REMAINED LESS THAN 20 PSIG
.. ~R~:'-62C~A,
?R-3-e~3C~B
- a. Verify ~tainMent is¢atlOl'! phase S-ACTUATED.
- b. Verify ocn~a'nMent isoiatlor, phase B v,r~e "tll:e lights on \lPB
- All3RI{3H-0, Jf any 00<'11ainMf!l1t isclalicn phase 6
'ialve is NOT closed. 'THEN manually dose '1a ve. IE vave{S:"Nn!!Q! be m.ln!Jall)' ccs..d.I11ftt Manually Of Icc..dy isolale the affeztl!!Q ccmaiMlent penetrat.::.....
- d. Reset conbinm&>1 spray signal.
CAUTIONS
- The6E' caution6 apply to AFW pump operation mroughol.lt a(J afme EOPs.
- If 1l'1O AFW p!Jmps are operating on a single uain. one of me pumps needs to be shut down wirhjn one hour of the initia( Sliif! signaf using 3-OP-075. AUXlLIARY FEEDWA TER SYSffiW. Sub.secrion 6.2.
- If!W(l AFW rrains are operating and one of me AFW pumps ha6 been operating wir.h an a~ flow of less than 60 gpm, the pump .should be shut down withm one hour of operating at less man 60 gpm using 3-0P-{)75. AUXILIARY FEEDWA TER SYSTEM. Subsection 6.2.
RO 32 Cheek Core Exit res - LESS THAN 1200°F .!f. co-e exil temperiIttJres greatenhan 1200'F AND f'~easjng. Il:1fli g;, to SACRG-1. SEVERE ACSIDENT CONTROL ROOM G'UiDEUNEiN1TIAl RESPONSE, Step t
- 35
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be Event No.: 7 restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EDG output breaker. Seal injection will Page 16 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
T: liTII'1' n
........l~.....
3 P'osition It"' Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 33 Ch~ck If 4l<V Bus POWfl'f Is Resto~
.:l :::heck 3A 3."d3,'1d 3& ,W:V 41<V :;uses - a. .If (he energized Jnit 3 4KV t>JS is being l*T LEAST ONE E\lER3 ZED f>:d frctr* 17'", StatO'l BlackolJ! Tie AWl.
frctr, 17'"
;:ROM T-lE 2A eA. ;,B EDG OM..Y :::NE ":nrt 4 4KV bus is el"lE1',pz:ed ONLY AND frorr. an EC*S. THEN. petfutm rh;:
EC*8. THEN iOITCW"9 - 1i Stat"li;:e S.'8S:S preSS'J1'e5 by seft "9 S'"G S!:eaM eump :0 at'nos:;here 'valve oon:(o £1> 10 rna tl'\ain S:G pressures stable m by Manually centro 'I"g s.,'G
'I"Q SiG steam O'Jmp to at'l1os;eoere valves to rr.alnta., stable SIS preSSlJ"l:.
rrillnta'1 b Che~l\ 3A 3:"<i 4K'oJ bJ50iiS 36 4K',J bJ5iis ..- b. CCf1~;rfJ~ to C-CfltrC" RCS corc~ion5 arc
..!I.T LEAST ONE ENERS ENER8 ZED m<lnltu plant 5ta'!US:
1i Check s!:3tus of o<~al
.::.~al ac1Jcns:
- 4KV bus power restora,ion
- Rep SE-a iscla:O'l
- DC PC\\'e< supply
- 1:, If. tx:ric aoo acd stu",?-
S;U",?- tank room temperature less lhan 55°F THEN oonsul: TSC s!ilf' for possibla bone add ccncentra:ticn re-:ructicn C<" drain. of the tor c acid s~rage tanks
- 3) If. spert low level aaml spoiiI"t fuel pit 10<< a a,.", is ON.
- wJ;.l:l n ~iate Makeu;*
- wJ;.l:l11 Make-...j:' tc thii thoii spen!
fue! pi:.ising 3-DNC 1>*033 1. $PEI\;- FvEL PIT {SFP, C:::ct NG SYTEM MALF,)NCTON 4 \ Locally perfcnn O*ONOi:l*O:!5.3, O-ONOi:l*O:!5.3. DC D::: EQU PMENT AND INVERTE"l ROOM SU??L::.ME\lTAL COOLING. 5\ Observe CAlF ON vcr tc Step 1e
&W. re:um :0 St ..;> 15.
St,,;> BOP 34 Stabilize SJG Pressures a S.;;:~ SiG stean' dU r 1P to a:r,c$p"'~ a:r,c5p"'~ "aive
".liVe a. Manually C>:f1~fol S:3 stea,.., CJmp c.;mp to contrcliers.
contrcliers tc' t:' r,ain~ r,ain~" ". SiG press,.~'ES pres5c~'es .- atmosphere ... at~e(s:' to ,..,aintar 5tab~ STABLE S;Gpl'le'Ss'J!'I: SGPfle'Ss\J!'I:
- 36
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 18 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 3B 4kV bus by locally closing the 3B EOG output breaker. Seal injection will be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
"T"'
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS
- Sready srare loading on each Unk 3 Emergency t:>i<ser Generator shall NOr exceed 2500 KW. Load mmsients up to 2751) KW <f!E' acceptable when starting
<fckRtiomtf equipment.
- Sready srare loading on each Unir 4. Emergency Diesef Generator shatl NOr e~ceed 2874 KW. f..wd rransiems up to 3162 KW a!E' acceptable when starting ackJ;uonaf equipmem BOP 35 Verity The Folfuwing Equipment Loaded On Energized 4KV Buses
- a. ManuaHy close klad control cerlto?f c~kws 10 energize 4BD \'0: C>3(l centers.
b Batery ciurgers
- Co'"nputer RoolY' Chiller
- Battery ReolY' Air Cone 1ioners -
E16E (3Qe09) E16F 140525) One Auxiliii')' Building Exhaust ::"3,'1 9 Spo?nt Fuel Po: ::'xhaust FNI h Spent Fuo?l p~ Cooling 'Na1er ?UIY'.p
- SJ,A£ SPlr\G
- 37
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2
- Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 7 Event No.: 7 The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 will fail to open. The power will be restored to the 38 4kV bus by locally closing the 38 EOG output breaker. Seal injection wi Page 18 of 18 be isolated to all RCP's. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or 8ehavior SRO 36 Se!e-ct Recovery Procedu~ a VeriMt SI!:!Q! requ'eC a. Go to 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 LOSS CF ALL;';:' POWER RECOIlE,,'¥' '.... mi SI
- ReS suboc<. ng based on cere exrt Tes - GREA-Eq THAN 30'=[210'F:
REC/0IRED. Step I.
- Check "'R.l .....ei - 3'lEA-ER 'THAN
~7%I;D'%J b
* :::hed( 3 ~ '-{AS NOT ,:',S~'JA-EC 8.:- to ~EG"'-EC4*:; 1. LO:E,s OF ALL AC P:::Jlj~iER qECO\lERY vV .... -.;Q.)T 51 REQU RED. Step 1 Examiner Note: SRO determines Pzr level, 17%, directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-O.2
- Examiner Note: The scenario is terminated when transition has been made to 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 or earlier, at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
- 38}}